08. Polar Caps at GlanceDefining the PolesPopulation of the Polar RegionsEnvironmental hazard and the impact of Global Warming

12. Legal RegimesThe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)Maritime ZonesCommission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)The Antarctic TreatyAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM)The Antarctic Treaty System

18. Circumpolar States – The Arctic fiveThe Russian FederationThe United StatesThe U.S. Standing on the UNCLOSPosition of the Non-party claimantCanadaDenmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands)Towards the Danish CommonwealthNorwayThe smallest by size – the biggest by expertiseSvalbard

CONTENTS

Northwest PassageNorthern Sea RouteArctic BridgeChallenges of Shipping in the ArcticNatural Resources

54. Security challengeConclusionPost ScriptumList of ReferencesExtract from UNCLOS

30. Areas of ClaimsLomonosov RidgeMendeleev RidgeHans IslandBarents Sea – Loop HoleBeaufort SeaAntarctic Country Claims

40. Other Parties at StakeIceland, Finland and SwedenArctic CouncilOSCE, NATO, EU and the Nordic Council

46. Economic DevelopmentShipping Routes

The Russian Federation

By its size the largest country of theworld (17,075,200 km², or 1/8 of theworld’s land surface, with roughly142 million inhabitants), Russia hasnearly one-third of its territory lo-cated on the Arctic and sub-Arctic.Just a quick look at the map will in-dicate that roughly half of the entirecircumpolar territory is of Russia.The Russophones has penetratedthe Arctic as early as in the 11thcentury but the systematic explo-ration starts only in the 16th cen-tury.

Late Tsarist and early Soviet Russiahave settled nearly 2 million peopleto the polar circle marking the largescale systematic research, economicand military activity which withsome oscillation lasts uninterrupteduntil the very day. Thus, in thecourse of subsequent centuries,Russia (besides Denmark and Nor-way) has acquired enormousknowledge and uncontested ex-pertise in polar exploration. React-ing to the current climate changeeffects, which are simultaneouslyrevealing economic (and geopoliti-cal) opportunities, the Putin cabinetwas the first government of the fiveArctic states to lodge the official re-quests for the northwards territorialextensions. Continued with theMedvedev cabinet, Russia clearlyconducts a very assertive and boldArctic policy.

Consequently, the Russian territorial claim is ratherambitious: extending to an area of about 1.2 millionsquare kilometres of the Arctic seabed with the (ge-ographic) North Pole as the outermost point. In2001, Russia submitted as the first nation of the Arc-tic Five its prolongation of the continental shelfclaim to the CLCS, which includes parts of the Bar-ents Sea as well as the Lomonosov and MendeleevRidge. The claimed area shows a triangular shapedform (with the arches closing the eastern and west-ern flank of Russia’s northern border), topping at theNorth Pole. (Górski, 2009)

However, only one year later the Commission in-formed Russia that it should further engage in re-search activities as the information provided wasinsufficient (lacking important concussive data) formaking the Commission’s final recommendations.The revised version has been submitted in 2009, andthe Commission is examining it.

Russia’s economy heavily depends on the cash-flowsmaintained by the gas and oil exports to Europe andother parts of the world. Its Arctic region plays al-ready a significant role in the national economy as itaccounts for 11% of the country’s GDP and for 22%of all export earnings.

With the northwards territorial extension thesefigures are nearly sure to surge, as additionalhydrocarbon, ore and other mineral fieldslocked in the Arctic seabed are very probable.

Despite promising offshore and costal mineraldeposits, Russia will depend on foreign coop-eration regarding the high-tech know-how inexploitation under harsh Arctic conditions.(E.g. Russian state-holdings of Gazprom andRosneft are already planning joint explorationsites, like Shtokman field, with the NorwegianStatoilHydro and French Total.) Visibly demonstrating the capability to patrol,secure and defend its territory has also highpriority for the Kremlin’s policy–makers. There-fore, the Federation (like some other Arcticstates) has been lately allocating considerablefunds into the development and constructionof new (generation of ) ice breakers, sub-marines and polar patrol ships. To better mon-itor the vast area, the government has recentlyordered three additional nuclear ice breakersto the already large and well-equipped fleet.Clearly, Russia has increased its military budgetand has retaken its assertive patrolling activi-ties by water and air – the largest ever since thecollapse of the Soviet Union.

One of the geographichandicaps that Russia hassuffered throughout its his-tory was impossibility toconnect its 5 fleets: theBaltic, Northern, Pacific,Black Sea and Caspian. Asits military establishmentwell knew that who rules theoceans rules the world, eversince the Peter the Great,Russia has pressed west-wards and southwards in adesperate attempt to con-nect its fleets: the warm-seas quest. It was the samereason which drove the So-viet Russia into the develop-ment of impressivesubmarine fleets. Suddenlyand rather unexpectedly,the opportunity to connectmay arise in the rapidlymelting north.

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AREAS OF CLAIMS

ar too often in history the territorial disputestriggered the open and tragic conflicts or keptthe rhetoric on confrontational course, or atleast hindered any closer cooperation amongstates and their societies at large. Still, some-times the territorial disputes bring or even

hold states together. Both scenarios are highly probable be-tween the two disputed states. But, what happens when theinteraction is between five parties?

The first thing that the five unconstrained subjects would doin any (human) interaction (especially, if they have somethinglucrative to share or/and divide) is to agree to deny access tothe 6th, or 7th party. This would remain an underlying com-mon denominator, which invisibly holds them together. Oncethese 5 are secured from an external intrusion, the secondthing to do would be an attempt of 4 joining together as toeliminate the 5th one, aimed at reducing the number of par-ticipants and optimizing the shares of forthcoming spoils. 4are selecting 1 on either a basis of opportunity (weakest) oron a basis of fear (strongest). At this stage, the action of thesecond weakest (or second most likely to be the attackednext) is critical: Either he is (for right or wrong) assured byother 3 that he is not the next to be eliminated, or the 5thconvinces the 4th that he will be the second for elimination.The very outcome heavily depends on two things: (i) thesense of judgment of the 4th (access to information andanalysis of it), and (ii) the ability of both the first 3 and of the5th to convince the 4th.

F

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