Space Strategy in the 21st Century

This book offers an overview of space strategy in the 21st century.

The purpose of space strategy is to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize

space activities across security, commercial, and civil sectors. Without strat-

egy, space activities continue to provide value, but it becomes difficult to

identify and execute long-term programs and projects and to optimize the

use of space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. Strat-

egy is essential for all these ends since dependence on, and use of, space is

accelerating globally and space is integrated in the fabric of activities

across all sectors and uses.

This volume identifies a number of areas of concern pertinent to the

development of national space strategy, including: intellectual founda-

tions; political challenges; international cooperation and space govern-

ance; space assurance and political, organizational, and management

aspects specific to security space strategy. The contributing authors

expand their focus beyond that of the United States, and explore and

analyze the international developments and implications of national space

strategies of Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil.

This book will be of much interest to students of space power and poli-

tics, strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in

general.

Eligar Sadeh is President of Astroconsulting International and a Research

Professor with the Center for Space Studies at the University of Colorado,

Colorado Springs.

Series: Space Power and Politics

Series Editors: Everett C. Dolman and John Sheldon

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Air, Maxwell, USA

Space Warfare

Strategy, principles and policy

John J. Klein

US Hypersonic Research and Development

The rise and fall of ‘Dyna-Soar’, 1944–1963

Roy F. Houchin II

Chinese Space Policy

A study in domestic and international politics

Roger Handberg and Zhen Li

The International Politics of Space

Michael Sheehan

Space and Defense Policy

Edited by Damon Coletta and Frances T. Pilch

Space Policy in Developing Countries

The search for security and development on the final frontier

Robert C. Harding

Space Strategy in the 21st Century

Theory and policy

Edited by Eligar Sadeh

Space Strategy in the 21st Century Theory and policy

Edited by Eligar Sadeh

First published 2013

by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2013 selection and editorial matter, Eligar Sadeh; individual

chapters, the contributors

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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Space strategy in the 21st century : theory and policy / edited by Eligar Sadeh.

p. cm. – (Space power and politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Astronautics and state. 2. Astronautics and state–United States. 3. Space security. I. Sadeh, Eligar. TL790.S75 2013 629.401–dc23 2012027348

ISBN: 978-0-415-62211-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-09828-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Baskerville

by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

List of illustrations vii

List of contributors viii

Acknowledgments x

Introduction: towards space strategy 1

E L I g A R S A D E h

1 Space and strategy: from theory to policy 15

J A M E S C L A Y M O L T z

2 Political challenges of space strategy 39

R O B I E I . S A M A N T A R O Y

3 International cooperation and space governance strategy 52

N A N C Y g A L L A g h E R

4 Strategy for space assurance 77

J A M E S D . R E N D L E M A N

5 Strategy and the security space enterprise 120

D A v I D C h R I S T O P h E R A R N O L D A N D P E T E R L . h A Y S

6 Space strategy and strategic management 159

K U R T A . h E P P A R D A N D S T E v E g . g R E E N

7 Space economics and commerce in a strategic context 179

A N D R E W J . A L D R I N

8 Space launch capabilities and strategic considerations 201

J E F F F O U S T

vi Contents

9 Earth observations and space strategy 221

M O L L Y K . M A C A U L E Y

10 Policy and strategic considerations of the Russian space

program 237

v I C T O R z A B O R S K I Y

11 China’s space strategy and policy evolution 249

R O g E R h A N D B E R g

12 European experiences with space policies and strategies 263

C h R I S T O P h E v E N E T A N D K A I - U W E S C h R O g L

13 Japan’s space strategy: diplomatic and security challenges 278

h I R O T A K A W A T A N A B E

14 Space policy and strategy of India 303

g . S . S A C h D E v A

15 Israel’s space strategy 322

D E g A N I T P A I K O W S K Y , R A M L E v I , A N D I S A A C B E N I S R A E L

16 Planning and strategic orientations of the Brazilian space

program 335

O T A v I O D U R ã O

Index 347

Illustrations

Figures

7.1 Aerospace industry return on sales in the United States 184

7.2 Sales of space propulsion in the United States 185

7.3 Sales of space vehicle systems in the United States 189

7.4 National positioning for defense industrial policy 193

Tables

7.1 Industrial policy models 182

7.2 Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis of

the U.S. aerospace industry 191

Contributors

Eligar Sadeh, Ph.D., is Principal Investigator of the Space Strategy Project

that led to this volume, where he serves as the Editor. Sadeh is Presi-

dent of Astroconsulting International; Research Professor with the Uni-

versity of Colorado, and Adjunct Professor with the International Space

University, as well as Editor for the academic journal Astropolitics.

Andrew J. Aldrin, Ph.D., is the Director of Business Development and

Advanced Programs for United Launch Alliance.

David Christopher Arnold is a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. he serves as

Chief of the Program Assessment Division for the U.S. Department of

Defense Executive Agent for Space, and Editor of the journal Quest: The

History of Spaceflight Quarterly.

Isaac Ben Israel (ret. Major-general, Israeli Air Force), Ph.D., is the chair-

man of the Israeli Space Agency and a Professor at Tel-Aviv University.

he served as an Israeli Parliament Member.

Otavio Durão, Ph.D., serves as Deputy Planning Coordinator and Local

Coordinator for Nanosat/Cubesat Projects at the headquarters of the

National Institute for Space Research (INPE) of Brazil.

Jeff Foust, Ph.D., is a senior analyst and project manager with the Futron

Corporation.

Nancy Gallagher, Ph.D., is the Associate Director for Research at the

Center for International and Security Studies and a Senior Research

Scholar at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.

Steve G. Green, D.B.A., is a Professor of Management at United States Air

Force Academy.

Roger Handberg, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Science at the University

of Central Florida.

Peter L. Hays, Ph.D., supports the U.S. Department of Defense Execu-

tive Agent for Space and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense

Contributors ix

Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and teaches at george Washing-

ton University.

Kurt A. Heppard, Ph.D., is a Professor of Management at United States Air

Force Academy.

Ram Levi (ret. Israeli Air Force) is a Research Fellow at the Yuval Ne’eman

Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security, Tel-Aviv University,

and cybersecurity adviser for the Israeli National Council for Research

and Development.

Molly K. Macauley, Ph.D., is vice President for Research and Senior Fellow

at Resources for the Future.

James Clay Moltz, Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of National

Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he also holds a

joint appointment in the Space Systems Academic group.

Deganit Paikowsky, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Yuval Ne’eman Work-

shop for Science Technology and Security at Tel-Aviv University, and a

space consultant and committee coordinator at Israel’s National Coun-

cil for Research and Development.

James D. Rendleman, (ret. Colonel, U.S. Air Force), JD and LLM, prac-

tices space law as Chief, Operations Law for the Joint Functional Com-

ponent Command for Space, United States Strategic Command.

G.S. Sachdeva, (ret. Wing Commander, Indian Air Force) Ph.D., is

Adjunct Professor in Air and Space Law at the Center for International

Legal Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and Center

of Air and Space Law, NALSAR University of Law, hyderabad.

Robie I. Samanta Roy, Ph.D., is a professional staff member on the U.S.

Senate Armed Services Committee and served as the Assistant Direc-

tor for Space and Aeronautics at the Office of Science and Technology

Policy.

Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Ph.D., is the Director of the European Space Policy Insti-

tute.

Christophe Venet, Ph.D. candidate, is a Research Associate with the Insti-

tut français des relations internationales.

Hirotaka Watanabe is a Specially Appointed Researcher at the graduate

School of Law and Politics, and a visiting Scholar at the Osaka School

of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan.

Victor Zaborskiy, Ph.D., is an independent export control consultant

doing business as Special Trade Operations Consulting.

Acknowledgments

The genesis of this book began in 2009 with a Space Strategy Project. The

challenge of the project was to identify and assess the intellectual founda-

tions for developing national space strategy. With this challenge in mind,

Astroconsulting International with support of the Secure World Founda-

tion, and in collaboration with the Space Policy Institute at george Wash-

ington University and the National Space Studies Center of the Air

University implemented the project. Implementation included bringing

the right mix and quality of expertise to bear on the issues of space stra-

tegy, and applying research to the requirements of identifying and assess-

ing the intellectual foundations related to space strategy development.

The first part of the project entailed a workshop among the experts that

led to a special issue publication on national space strategy in the scholarly

journal Astropolitics 8:2/3 (2010). The publication of this volume repre-

sents the final intellectual effort of the project.

Foremost, I would like to thank the Secure World Foundation for their

support of this project and volume through a research grant. I would like

to thank as well the contributing researchers and authors. The expertise

and insights regarding space strategy provided by the contributing experts

are reflected here in the pages of this volume. Contributors include: James

Clay Moltz, Robie I. Samanta Roy, Nancy gallagher, James D. Rendleman,

David Christopher Arnold, Peter L. hays, Kurt A. heppard, Steve g.

green, Andrew J. Aldrin, Jeff Foust, Molly K. Macauley, victor zaborskiy,

Roger handberg, Christophe venet, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, hirotaka Watanabe,

g.S. Sachdeva, Deganit Paikowsky, Ram Levi, Isaac Ben Israel, and Otavio

Durão. The intellectual support of the following is also appreciated: Brian

Weeden, victoria Samson, Ray Williamson, and Michael Simpson of the

Secure World Foundation; Scott Pace of the Space Policy Institute at

george Washington University; and John Sheldon of the National Space

Studies Center of Air University.

Eligar Sadeh

Principal Investigator and Editor

Introduction

Towards space strategy

Eligar Sadeh

Strategy links power to purpose, serves and fulfills policy, and provides a

means for maintaining advantages for states.1 Fundamentally, strategy

results from identifying goals and objectives in policy, developing ways and

means to achieve these ends, and allocating resources to implement plans

to achieve them.2 In this context, intellectual foundations, concepts, and

topics for national space strategy to be developed, with a particular focus

on the United States but including other important spacefaring states, are

discussed in this volume.

The purpose of space strategy is to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize

space activities across security, commercial, and civil sectors. Without stra-

tegy, space activities continue to provide value, but it becomes difficult to

identify and execute long-term programs and projects and to optimize the

use of space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. Stra-

tegy is essential for all these ends, and all the more so, since dependence

on, and use of, space is accelerating globally and space is integrated in the

fabric of activities across all sectors and uses.

A number of areas of concern pertinent to the development of national

space strategy are identified in this volume: intellectual foundations; politi-

cal challenges; international cooperation and space governance; space

assurance and political, organizational, and management aspects specific

to security space strategy; strategic management; strategic context of space

economics and commerce including industrial base issues; strategic con-

siderations regarding space launch; the role of Earth observations in stra-

tegic formulations; and international developments and implications of

national space strategies and policies among spacefaring states other than

the United States and encompassing Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India,

Israel, and Brazil.3

The intellectual basis of the analysis in this volume is based on a

number of assumptions.

• Space strategy can either be formulated as a comprehensive, “grand

strategy” or as a more limited strategy covering specific areas of

concern and common problems that crosscut the different space

2 E. Sadeh

sectors. Both of these approaches have their advantages and disadvan-

tages, and in either case, strategy provides guidance, and national gov-

ernments can use strategy to evaluate and hold accountable the

various departments, agencies, and organizations that implement

space programs and projects.

• Spacefaring states do not suffer from a lack of space policy. Yet, they

do suffer from a lack of explicit space strategies, which can provide a

roadmap for connecting ways and means to achieve ends established

by space policy.

• The development of space strategy must advance on the basis that

resource constraints – given that program and project demands are

greater than the available resources – are more the norm than the

exception. Within this context, space strategy needs to account for

how best to deal with gaps between policies, programs, projects, and

budgets. For space strategy to be formulated and effective, it must

serve as a guide to allow for decisions on requirements, budgets, and

operations, and for trade-offs in the planning of space activities that

are necessary given resource constraints.

• Strategy must address the fact that the traditional boundaries between

the different space sectors – security, commercial, and civil – are no

longer applicable for many space activities that crosscut these sectors.

Thus, strategy must consider the common issues and concerns that

can provide for unity of effort among the space sectors. At issue for

greater cooperation and unity of effort among the space sectors, is to

identify and emphasize the mutual and common benefits that each

sector can derive from space and to work to lessen the barriers

between the sectors that disrupt such cooperation.

• A “whole-o f-government” approach is critical for space strategy. In

addition to a focus on development of projects, and the requisite tech-

nology, capabilities, and operations, the whole-of-government

approach addresses the broader context of security, commercial, and

civil space sectors, and considers political and diplomatic, bureau-

cratic and regulatory, managerial, and legislative factors.

• Space developers and users worldwide share a set of basic strategic

goals that serve as a common and shared basis for space strategy.

These goals include: to secure the space domain for everyone’s peace-

ful use; to protect legitimate space assets from the various types of

threats; and to derive value from space assets for security, economic,

civil, and environmental ends.

It is also important to avoid common pitfalls in the process of developing

strategy. Pitfalls identified herein include the following:

• over-r eaching with strategy formulation and underperforming with

implementation;

Introduction 3

• failing to assume a whole-o f-government approach, and instead, fixate

on governance, implementation, and optimization issues;

• mistaking goals, policies, and program and project planning for

strategy;

• failing to recognize and take seriously scarcity of resources;

• choosing poor or unattainable strategic goals and objectives;

• failing to recognize strategic problems and to define the strategic

environment competitively;

• making false presumptions about one’s own competence, or the likely

causal linkages between one’s strategy and one’s goals and objectives;

• trying to satisfy too many different stakeholders and demands, as well

as bureaucratic and programmatic processes, rather than focusing on

strategy;

• failing to understand and deter threats and adversaries;

• determining one’s areas of comparative advantage relative to the com-

petition inaccurately;

• failing to realize that few individuals possess the cognitive skills and

mindset to be competent strategists that are essential for strategy for-

mulation and implementation.

Intellectual foundations

The first chapter, “Space and strategy: from theory to policy,” authored by

James Clay Moltz, discusses definitions of strategy and how strategy applies

to space activities. The question of what is strategy is difficult to answer.

National Space Policy, for example, is something that every American

administration since Eisenhower has formulated, but the notion that

policy serves as strategy is incorrect. Further, a strategy is not an easy task

as it must focus on the entire range of space activities, and as such, serve

broader and more diverse interests than policy. And, strategy does not

necessarily solve problems related to the uses of space, especially strategy

that cannot be accomplished politically within a reasonable timeframe.

The issue of how to create effective strategy is addressed by Moltz.

There are a number of factors: develop consensus around a common

theme; account for the reactions of spacefaring actors and states; mitigate

resource constraints by prioritizing space at the national level and by stim-

ulating private sector development; and provide for sustainable uses of

space and effective space governance of common problems, such as orbital

debris, and spectrum and orbital slot allocations.

To further complicate matters, consensus that strategy is necessary is

not sufficient for formulation and implementation, as there is also the

need for political will and a process for strategic thinking. Political will is

essential to define strategy, which is ultimately about what you want to do

and how you want to do it – the policy and political interests that you want

to serve and fulfill. A process for strategic thinking can break down “stove

4 E. Sadeh

pipes” and make interests more transparent among constituents and

organizations. Strategy is a way of thinking, representing a common lan-

guage and framework for space activities. This requires as well the need to

develop competent strategists.

Moltz concludes that one viable way forward is to formulate strategy

based on cooperative approaches among spacefaring states to address

problems concerning the sustainable uses of space: “understanding and

acting upon our common interests as human beings in space may be the

most difficult, and most important, element of any future attempt at space

strategy.” Chapters 3 and 4 that follow later in this volume, which discuss

international cooperation, space governance, and space assurance,

provide further elaboration on common and cooperative strategies that

can develop among spacefaring states in the civil and security realms of

space. First, though, is an assessment of political challenges.

Political challenges

Robie Samanta Roy’s chapter on “Political challenges of space strategy”

makes the case that political challenges in developing strategy make a more

focused, limited approach to that end more plausible. Such an approach

can focus on common problems facing security, commercial, and civil

space. Other chapters in this book examine many of these common prob-

lems, including governance (Chapter 3), commerce (Chapter 7), space

launch (Chapter 8), and Earth observations (Chapter 9). At the same time,

a more narrowly focused strategy on specific issues, while more achievable

in the political environment that exists, posits the danger, nonetheless, of

continuing to “stove pipe” programs and projects that is recognized as a

serious problem in the space arena.

Further, the nature of politics tends to drive strategies to be reactive

and not proactive; strategies are adopted for the short term, rather than

for the long term that is required to fulfill strategic interests. Given the

reactive nature of the political system, sector-specific and issue-specific

issues, such as access to space, remote sensing, and space infrastructure

development, better suit the foci of strategy.

It is also vital to focus on processes of formulating and implementing strat-

egy, and the attendant policy-making, planning, and budgeting factors.

Prioritization and trade-offs, given resource constraints, are essential to suc-

cessful formulation and implementation, especially in light of entrenched

interests among agencies and bureaucracies that are tasked with realizing

programs and projects. Additionally, without top-level commitment and

direction, and common interests that crosscut the implementing agencies

and the space sectors, annual budget battles will tend to dominate imple-

mentation of any strategy. A strategic framework is essential to guide top-level

decision-makers, and to maximize mutual benefit to agencies and stake-

holders in the space arena so that their interests are to work together.

International cooperation and space governance

Introduction 5

In Chapter 3, “International cooperation and space governance strategy,”

Nancy Gallagher argues that the use of space is marked by “interdepend-

ence” with strong incentives for both cooperation and competition, and

thus, the development of space strategy is not an independent choice, but

an “interdependent” one. As such, key issues concern the best ways to con-

ceptualize when, why, and how space strategy should include international

cooperation. The concepts of “space as a global commons” and “shared

strategic objectives” are put forward and discussed in this regard.

Management of space as a global commons is rooted on the minimal

forms of cooperation that exist today. However, this alone does not

provide adequate incentives to forgo short-term national gains in return

for long-term collective benefits.4 The norm today of “voluntary actions”

and “mutual self-r estraint” to protect the space environment is hard to

sustain in the context of competitive security relationships among major

spacefaring states, and the increasing number and variety of space actors

worldwide. The most plausible approach for management is one based on

“governance without government” – different kinds of arrangements for

organizing states and other international actors so that they can solve

shared problems and achieve collective goals in the absence of political

authority.

Cooperation on the basis of shared strategic objectives is one way to

maximize security, commercial, civil, and environmental benefits that can

be gained from space. Incentives for this kind of space cooperation are

stronger if it includes approaches to space cooperation that serve funda-

mental strategic ends for spacefaring states. A national space strategy

should explain, Gallagher argues, that the central problem for the United

States, to illustrate, lies in providing and receiving credible strategic assur-

ance. Chapter 4, which follows next, addresses the issue of space assurance

in the context of security space. With an assurance-based strategy, a strong

basis for cooperation can be realized as both legal approaches to coopera-

tion based on the Outer Space Treaty Regime, which has broad and uni-

versal adherence, and voluntary actions and mutual self-restraint

approaches to cooperation focused on responsible space behavior and sus-

tainable uses of space can be accommodated.5

Space assurance

As noted earlier, spacefaring states are increasingly dependent on the use

of space assets. Concomitantly, space assets are vulnerable to interference

and disruption, either due to natural hazards of the space environment or

due to deliberate efforts, like electronic interference and anti-satellite

weapons. Given these vulnerabilities, strategy helps to address protection

of space assets and to deter others from interfering with space assets. This

6 E. Sadeh

is the focus of the analysis in Chapter 4, “Strategy for space assurance,”

authored by James D. Rendleman.

The specter of interference and disruption of space assets serve as cata-

lysts for reappraising political, diplomatic, economic, and technical means

to protect against and deter threats to these assets. Specific to the case of

the United States, Rendleman argues that protection and deterrence strat-

egy is incomplete for a number of reasons. One, going first with attack,

implying deterrence failure, is always plausible in times of conflict. Two,

by calling space systems vital as a matter of space policy, the United States

issues a deterrent threat, but highlights the value of space assets as a target.

Three, there are some actors that cannot be deterred. Four, actors can be

poor stewards of space and engage in irresponsible actions on orbit. Last,

there are space environmental threats, like space debris and space

weather, which clearly cannot be deterred (only mitigated and protected

from). Given these reasons, space assurance, not protection and deter-

rence, is the strategic goal. A space assurance strategy is a strategy to assure

access to space capabilities on a sustainable basis; assurance incorporates

deterrence, protection, and space governance to enable sustainable uses

of space.

Security space

Chapter 5, “Strategy and the security space enterprise,” authored by David

Christopher Arnold and Peter L. Hays, addresses the challenge of advan-

cing a unified strategy in the case of the security space sector of the United

States. To this end, there is no single organization with security space as its

job; the Department of Defense (DOD), for example, does not have a uni-

fying vision or mission statement for space activities. As a consequence,

Arnold and Hays make the case that the essential ingredients for unifying

security space lie with better organization and management based on ded-

icated and integrated offices within the Office of the President, DOD, and

the intelligence community. The focus of the next chapter – strategic

management of space programs that is capabilities enabled – advances the

end of a more unified vision and strategy for security space as well.

Strategic management

Kurt A. Heppard and Steve G. Green, in Chapter 6 on “Space strategy and

strategic management,” adopt a strategic management approach to the

development of space strategy. Within the context of program and project

management, Heppard and Green make the case that strategic manage-

ment approaches should inform space strategy. One key function is to

optimize the use of resources to achieve organizational goals and out-

comes; the call to optimize space assets for national interests is a call for

the strategic management of space-related resources and capabilities.

Introduction 7

Specifically, if a national space strategy is capabilities based, it will remain

focused on building and executing space capabilities that support national

priorities.

An additional strategic issue for program and project management, and

for space capabilities, concerns the role of government in stimulating,

developing, and using space capabilities in pursuit of national interests,

and in fostering international and commercial space efforts to achieve the

broader potentials of space. Strategy needs to address ways to use space

agencies and institutions, programs, investments, coordinating actions,

regulatory, and other tools to perform these roles. Deciding on what space

capabilities to develop and use involves complex decision-making pro-

cesses. Once the government decides what it wants to pursue, the actual

development, production, and delivery of new capabilities is fraught with

technical, industrial base, management, funding, oversight, bureaucratic,

and political challenges. The specific challenges concerning economics of

space, commercial space activities, and industrial base issues are discussed

in the next chapter on space economics and commerce.

Space economics and commerce

Economics and commerce influence the development of space strategy.

This is examined in Chapter 7, “Space economics and commerce in a stra-

tegic context,” authored by Andrew J. Aldrin. Both opportunity cost and

comparative advantage drive political and strategic decisions in space.

Other related issues of importance include: the role of government in

advancing space commerce; the role of economics as a driver for innova-

tion and development in the space sectors; the role space plays in national

and global economies; and the nature of global space business and com-

merce, and how this relates to strategic space advantages and wealth crea-

tion for spacefaring states.6

An important strategic question to address for space economics and

commerce is to what degree national governments enable or constrain the

development of the space industrial base that provides the means for con-

ducting space activities. Aldrin identifies four basic government market

models for industrial policy in this regard: “invisible hand” where market

forces predominate and there are many providers and buyers; “national

competition” where the government dominates and essentially serves as

“the space industrial base” through competitive government contracting;

“national champion” where there is a single dedicated supplier and pro-

vider, an attractive option for emergent space powers; and “arsenal” with

the government as the “only” customer and public–private models of

direct government ownership of commercial space enterprises.

Aldrin assesses strengths and weaknesses of the space industrial base in

the United States. Current strengths include skilled engineers, healthy

prime contractors, innovative experimentation in various aspects of the

8 E. Sadeh

market, and benefits from being the ostensible leader in space. How all

these strengths can be nurtured and exploited abroad, in service of

national interest, are important strategic concerns. On the other hand,

the industrial base is challenged by weak human capital, weak supplier

base, and declines in national budgets for space programs. Without a

coherent national strategy to which the industrial base can devote itself,

justifying fiscal outlays on its behalf becomes less plausible.7 Strategic

thinking and development can help to identify commercial opportunities,

or even civil opportunities supported by industry, that further both

national security and commercial goals. Space launch capabilities, the

topic of the next chapter, are situated within this context – global space

commerce, government support and subsides of commercial launch, and

strategic intent to ensure that space launch capabilities meet security space

and commercial space goals.

Space launch capabilities

Space launch capabilities are foundational for achieving strategic ends;

launching spacecraft into orbit is a key element of any national space strat-

egy. The analysis offered in Chapter 8, “Space launch capabilities and stra-

tegic considerations,” by Jeff Foust, examines cost, reliability, and

performance factors in relation to space strategy concerning space launch.

A review of security, commercial, and civil space launch customers

shows that for the majority of them cost is a lower priority than optimizing

for launch reliability and launch performance, which includes safety and

schedule assurance. Only for two emerging customer segments, operation-

ally responsive space and entrepreneurial space ventures, is cost a key

factor. Hence, existing launch systems actually meet most customers’

needs, creating equilibrium in the marketplace of space launch. Several

scenarios, though, can disrupt the existing equilibrium and prioritize cost

issues: the development of reusable suborbital and orbital vehicles; a shift

to commercial providers for cargo and crew transportation to low Earth

orbit (LEO); a growing use of small satellites in lieu of large-scale systems;

and space program developments, including space launch and small satel-

lites, in moderate space powers, such as in the examples of Israel and

Brazil discussed in this volume.

Earth observations

Earth observations are primarily driven by scientific interests, and by the

systems and technologies that are developed. Thinking of Earth observa-

tions more strategically requires a long-term view to set the agenda and

priorities, and to make sure bureaucracies and agencies implement from

that agenda.8 This will require changes in approaches to Earth observa-

tions as to funding, organization, implementation, and data use. Chapter

Introduction 9

9, “Earth observations and space strategy,” by Molly K. Macauley, probes

the management of Earth observations data as strategic information – how

to collect, analyze, and disseminate data, and whether and how much to

cooperate internationally. There are a number of questions that strategy

needs to address here: the question of who is authoritative; the question of

value; and the question of international cooperation.

On the question of who is authoritative, it is important to note possible

areas of discrepancies. There are discrepancies in data collection and dis-

tribution, interpretation of data, and in ground-truthing data, where states

tend to self-report. With the question of value, it is important to assess the

social and economic benefits of Earth observations, like in areas of natural

disaster mitigation and climate change. Additionally, Earth observation

systems are expensive, and there is the issue of charging for information

about natural resources when data policies treat information as a public

good.

In relation to the question of international cooperation, there are a

number of issues that can work against the end of data as a public good.

As a scientific discipline, there is pressure to publish first, and to allow for

the information that is gathered to be reserved for a period of time for the

use and assessment by the principal scientists and investigators. Also, there

are key differences between science collaboration, which is more common,

and sharing of information about valued natural resources that are under

sovereign control of states. Data access can also be limited as a result of

fees for data. Nevertheless, there is great deal of cooperation worldwide

with Earth observations. There is the Group on Earth Observation as an

outcome of the G8. Related to this cooperation is the concept of a Global

Earth Observation System-of-Systems. And, Earth observations are essential

to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change within the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Space strategies in spacefaring states

Chapters 10 to 16 address national space programs in Russia, China,

Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. In these chapters, strategic intent

and orientation from how these states plan and conduct space activities is

assessed.9 Russia and China both view space in similar strategic ways to the

United States – as a matter of international prestige and power where the

key strategic intent is to develop across-the-board space capabilities and to

maintain or achieve a leadership role in the space arena, including human

spaceflight programs.10 Russia is concentrated on developing a revamped

space program since the end of the Soviet Union, and has not put forward

an explicit space strategy. The lack of strategic guidance in Russia is

evident with inadequate program prioritization and funding. These two

factors have led to schedule delays, indefinite postponement, and outright

cancellation of a number of national space programs and projects.11 For

10 E. Sadeh

China, the primary areas of focus have been to achieve indigenous and

independent capabilities in civil, commercial, and military space pursuits,

and, more recently, international space cooperation. Strategies for specific

areas are evident in China, but institutional factors, such as the close and

overlapping military–civil space relations and institutions within the

Chinese government, restrict both the prospects of a more grand strategy

and of broadening international space cooperation.12

In the case of Europe, there is a great deal of development at the level

of space policy, but not strategy. Space policies are present at the Euro-

pean level with both the European Union and the European Space

Agency. Japan, more than other developed national space programs, has

advanced an explicit space strategy. A Basic Law for Space Activities and a

Basic Plan for Space Activities were established since 2008. The plan is sup-

ported by a minister and strategic headquarters for space activities, and

the Japanese government approved a law in 2012 to establish a space strat-

egy office at the cabinet level. The Japanese case illustrates a common and

crucial theme throughout this volume that the bureaucratic discipline to

implement strategy and policy must come from top-level decision-makers.

India, alternatively, developed its national space program more on an

ad-hoc basis. Even though India established a national space program and

the Indian Space Research Organization in 1969, there is no space policy,

doctrine, strategy, or white papers on the subject. This leads India to put

forward programs with specific short-term goals and motivations.13 None-

theless, India established a government-level Department of Space to

execute space policy, and it has successfully developed and utilized space

technology in the service of social development of the country.

Strategies in the case of Israel and Brazil are a reflection of specific pro-

grams and projects in those medium power spacefaring states. Israel’s

national space program is largely influenced by a pragmatic approach

directed at developing indigenous space capabilities for national security

purposes. This encompasses reconnaissance, remote sensing, and telecom-

munications to support early warning, intelligence, and deterrence. It is

only very recently that Israel added to this by developing shared strategic

interests with other spacefaring states in space cooperation.

Brazil’s strategic orientations to space, which have changed over time,

are evident through three distinct periods in the development of its

national space program. The first period was distinguished by the military

regime that developed the beginnings of the space program through a

Brazilian Complete Space Mission plan. Following this, Brazil shifted to a

strategy of cooperation that is represented by the China–Brazil Earth

Resources Satellite program. Since 1994, Brazil sought a greater degree of

space-related independence with the creation of the Brazilian Space

Agency to better coordinate and manage the development of space activi-

ties. Despite this effort, the agency has failed to successfully coordinate

and manage as programs and projects are weakly interconnected and

Introduction 11

underfunded. This situation posits the need for more explicit strategic

planning since new players are interested in and participate and benefit

from the growing use of space applications in Brazil, and due to the devel-

opment of Brazil, more generally, as a key power in the world.

Space strategy: addressing challenges and fulfilling policy

Ultimately, strategy needs to address challenges and fulfill policy in a

number of ways. These “ways” are analyzed in this volume.

• First, is to instill the intellectual foundations for strategy in relation to

the conduct of space activities, entailing the development of strategists

that can think and act strategically.

• Second, is to not only focus on the formulation of strategy on the basis

of policy, but also to pay attention to the factors, and political chal-

lenges, that influence implementation to allow for successful execu-

tion of strategy.

• Third, is to assure access to space capabilities, and, more generally,

the global commons of space, including the development of “circles-

of-trust” in values and behavioral norms among space actors to con-

tinue to allow for sustainable uses of space.

• Fourth, is to realize better unity of effort within and across the differ-

ent space sectors from security space to commercial and civil space.

This entails optimizing the management and organization of space

programs and projects, and bridging commercial and government

networks to enable more cooperative and fruitful relations that meet

their goals and interests. Most critical, is strategy that helps to sustain

an industrial base that is robust, vibrant, resilient, and capable to

address strategic challenges; strategy that ensures a role for global

space markets and commerce; and strategy that fosters and leverages

capabilities and technological innovation.

• Fifth, is the need to continue to develop cooperation in relation to secu-

rity space, like space situational awareness, and in civil space, such as

with global space exploration strategies and global climate monitoring

capabilities that address the strategic concerns of global climate change.

• Sixth, space strategy should proceed on the basis of the interdepend-

ent nature of the space arena, and in concert with, and recognition of,

policy developments and strategic orientations among spacefaring

states worldwide.

Notes

1 Power in this context can be thought of as “spacepower,” which is the ability to

exert influence in or from space in all conditions ranging from peace to war.

See Charles D. Lutes, Peter L. Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and

12 E. Sadeh

M. Elaine Bunn, eds., Toward a Theory of Spacepower (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2011), www.ndu. edu/press/spacepower.html (accessed May 2012).

2 Ideally, there should first be policy formulation, then strategy directed at how to fulfill policy, followed by plans, and, finally, budgetary allocations to imple- ment plans. In practice, all this is reversed in the case of the United States: the budget is first, then strategy is developed usually at the agency level, and, last, a policy is put forward. This leads to strategies that are less than optimal, and that fall short in providing top-level guidance and commitments that are essen- tial for success.

3 See “Special Issue: Towards a National Space Strategy,” Astropolitics 8:2–3 (2010).

4 Although the global commons logic may obscure matters more than help them, as much of that approach is based on voluntary measures and mutual self-restraint, which lacks credible assurance, the mindset of a global commons is essential for effective management and governance of the space domain.

5 As part of the United Nations system of treaties, the legally binding part of the Outer Space Treaty Regime includes the “Outer Space Treaty,” the “Rescue Agreement,” the “Liability Convention,” and the “Registration Convention.” The “Moon Agreement” was negotiated as well, but no space powers have rati- fied that agreement. In addition, there are five sets of non-binding legal princi- ples adopted by the United Nations General Assembly that provide for the application of international space law: see United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, www.oosa. unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (accessed May 2012).

Other aspects of the formal regime of space law also include The Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, and The Administra-

tive Regulations (Radio Regulations and International Telecommunication Regula- tions) that complement the Constitution. These agreements govern space-based telecommunications satellites as to spectrum and orbital slot allocations.

Voluntary actions and mutual self-restraint approaches include the legal principles mentioned above, which are non-binding agreements. In addition, in 2007, the General Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of

the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and agreed that the voluntary guidelines for the mitigation of space debris reflected the existing practices as developed by a number of national and international organizations, and invited Member States of the United Nations to implement those guidelines through relevant national mechanisms, www.unoosa.org/pdf/bst/COPUOS_SPACE_ DEBRIS_MITIGATION_GUIDELINES.pdf (accessed May 2012).

One additional voluntary agreement of note is the proposed European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. See Chapter 12 in this volume on “European experiences with space policies and strategies.” This code has engendered international dialogue on responsible space behavior for the sustainable uses of space.

6 Wealth creation, or wealth building, refers to the combined use of engineer- ing, technology, and human skills to maximize the creation, production, and delivery of goods and services that is needed to raise the standard of living, increase employment, spur education, and grow the economy.

7 In the area of regulations concerning export controls, for example, the United States government hinders commercial space and aerospace industries, eroding the space industrial base. To address this concern, the Obama Administration established the foundations for a “New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the Competiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technological Sectors,” www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/

Introduction 13

president-obama-lays-foundation-a-new-export-control-system-strengthen-n (accessed May 2012). Also, see Report to Congress, Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), Risk Assess-

ment of the United States Space Export Control Policy, Departments of Defense and State (released to public April 2012), www.defense.gov/home/fea- tures/2011/0111_nsss/docs/1248%20Report%20Space%20Export%20Control. pdf (accessed May 2012).

8 For a relevant long-term strategic view on Earth observations, see Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007). 9 Strategic orientations indicate space goals and objectives of states. This is useful

because there are some ambiguous areas in the formal documents published by national space agencies. One common orientation worldwide is to have an important role in international political leadership even considering the spe- cific objectives related to the economic and social contexts of individual space- faring states. Paraphrased from Giorgio Petroni, Karen Venturini, Chiara Verbano, and Silvia Cantarello, “Discovering the Basic Strategic Orientation of Big Space Agencies,” Space Policy 25:1 (February 2009): 45–62.

10 For example, in the case of the United States, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials at the creation of the agency decided to focus their efforts on human spaceflight, Moon and Mars missions, and human set- tlement of the Solar System. Its leaders made a conscious decision to downplay space applications projects, exclusive of technological research and develop- ment, and eschew operational activities. They did so in favor of concentrating on the human exploration and development of space. In so doing, NASA fell into the “prestige trap” that dominated this mission. In essence, NASA sought for ever greater space spectaculars featuring human involvement. Power and prestige, therefore, has cast a long shadow on the space agency, forcing it into a series of programs that have been oversold and undervalued. Paraphrased from Roger Launius, “Imprisoned in a Tesseract: NASA’s Human Spaceflight Effort and the Prestige Trap,” Astropolitics 10:2 (2012): 152–175.

11 See Russian Space Programs in 2011: Plans and Reality, www.russianspaceweb. com/2011.html (accessed May 2012).

12 For a listing of space-related agencies and institutions in China, see Eligar Sadeh, ed., The Politics of Space: A Survey (Routledge, 2011), A-Z Glossary of Space Organ- izations. Space organizations of note in China, in addition to the role of the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) include: China National Space Administration; Center for Space Science and Applied Research; China Aerospace Corporation; China Great Wall Industry Corporation; China Aerospace Machinery and Elec- tronics Corporation; China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; State Aerospace Bureau; China Satellite Launch and Control General; Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Center for Space Science and Applied Research; Chinese Society of Astronautics.

A primary impediment to international cooperation with China’s space program concerns organizational structure. This is due to the joint civil, com- mercial, and military implementation approach. From China’s perspective, this is a sensible and economic method of conserving limited resources to enable growth for all the sectors. Because of the dual-use nature of space technology, it is likely that this will continue to constrain cooperative efforts. At the same time, China has increasingly opened the space program to the world. This has been enabled by the commercial and civil benefits gained from cooperative space projects with other countries. These projects have, in turn, promoted further openness and economic interconnection with the rest of the world.

14 E. Sadeh

China balances cooperation with the goal of maintaining and growing an indigenous, self-sufficient space capability to ensure the rationale factors sup- porting the expense are achieved. Assuming that the political perceptions of China as a threatening and rival power to the United States, and the structural issues of unified implementation of the Chinese space program are sur- mounted, active engagement and cooperation with the Chinese space program is likely to further advance Chinese openness and integration into the interna- tional space community.

13 Some Indian space projects are now shifting to the long term in planning and development. Examples include: cryogenic engines and solid propellant rocket motor, both of which have long-term applications in deep space exploration; regional navigation system, mainly for use within India; remote sensing of the Moon; and plans for human spaceflight, reusable launch vehicles, and space tourism.