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Soviet Science and

W e ~ p o n s Acquisition

Arthur J. Alexander

Ra n d



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The research described in this report was sponsored by theNational Academyof Sciences under Contract No. 88-82-52.

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Alexander, Arthur J .

Soviet science and weapons acquisition.

"R-2942-NAS.""November 1982. 11

"Prepared for the National Academy of Sciences."1. Military research--Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union

Armed Forces--Weapons systems. 3. Soviet Union--ArmedForces--Procurement. I . National Academy of Science

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Published by The Rand Corporation



R-2942-NAS

Soviet Science and

Weapons Acquisition

Arthur J. Alexander

August 1982

Prepared for

The National Academy of Sciences

R a n dSANTA MONICA, CA. qo40b



- i i i -

PREFACE

This report was sponsored by th e National Academy of Sciences to

aid i t s Panel on Scientif ic Communication and National Securi ty. The

in tent of the report is to inform the Panel 's deliberations by an

independent assessment of one facet of a complex policy issue: the

relationship between Soviet weapons development and the sc ien t i f ic

community. Rand does not purport to develop here a complete policy

framework for dealing with the issue of sc ien t i f ic information t ransfer .

Because of the time constraints imposed by the Panel 's schedule,we

have

not ha d the opportunity to perform new research, but rather have

refocused and synthesized past research to f i t the Panel 's in terests .



- v -

SUHMARY

The pr incipal actors in Soviet science and weapons acquisi t ion

include the nine mili tary-product ion minist r ies; the Ministry of

Defense; the mil i tary and civ i l i an science sectors; and two coordinating

agencies--the powerful Hil i tary-Industr ia l Commission (VPK), and the

State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT). The "mili tary

science" sector is defined as comprising the research inst i tutes of the

mil i tary-product ion minis tr ies , and ins t i tu tes direct ly subordinated to

the Defense Ministry and the mil i tary services . The "civi l ian science"

sector consists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, i ts Siberian D ivision,

and the regional academies of sciences; the research component of the

higher educational ins t i tu t ions ; and the research establishments of the

civi l ian production minis tr ies . Soviet science organizations are marked

by the i r separat ion--by administrat ion, s tage of R&D, and sc ien t i f ic

f ield.

Soviet weapons acquisi t ion is shaped by formal procedures, the

planned economy, a powerful and demanding customer, and bureacratic

conservatism. Designers therefore face strong disincent ives to use

advanced technology or to look toward science for solut ions to design

problems. Incentives promote the a rt of design, whereby weapons

developers make as much use as possible of available components and

materials. The VPK and the Party overcome some of the impediments to

R&D ar is ing from the unresponsive economy and other sources through

the i r intervent ion and coordination.



- v i -

The general tendency in Soviet weapons i s for relat ively simple

designs; designs that make much use of common subsystems, components,

par t s , and materials; that are evolutionary in the i r improvements; and

tha t are comparatively l imited in performance. Important exceptions to

the tendency exist , however, and weapons are becoming more complex,

cal l ing on more diverse technologies than in the past .

Where once a Soviet production ministry could be close to se l f -

suff icient with i ts own s table of ins t i tu tes and design bureaus, today

an array of ta lents is necessary tha t crosses organizat ional and

sectora l boundaries. This is true for production and test ing, as well

as for component development. Therefore, despite the conservatism of

the process, the changing character of the systems is placing greater

demands on science.

Increasingly, the pol i t ica l leadership ha s emphasized the

importance of science, and ha s promoted the use of contract research in

science establishments. Civil ian science ha s ha d increased incentives

to perform mil i tary research. Individual scient is ts also par t icipate in

mili tary affai rs as consul tants and as members of panels and

commissions. Key individuals (usual ly ins t i tu te directors) act as

science entrepreneurs and promote the ideas of scient is ts before

decisionmakers.

There has been a severalfold increase in civi l ian science support

for the mil i tary since the 1960s. I ts contribut ions mainly precede the

formal weapons acquisi t ion process. I t appears to be directed toward

developing the science and technology base and maturing the technologies

tha t will l a t e r flow into the risk-avoiding weapons R&D process.



- v i i -

Civilian science ha s also made major contribut ions to mil i tary "big

science" programs such as high-energy lasers and, most l ike ly , high

energy-beam weapons research.

The l ines are blurring in the Soviet Union between pure and applied

research, mili tary and civi l ian science, Academy and industry. For many

years in the 1960s, and his tor ica l ly , the Academy system was t ruly

"academic," but polic ies intended to promote greater science involvement

in the affairs of the nat ion have had some effect . Scient is ts and

inst i tut ions, especial ly those at the forefront of the i r f ields, are

more l ike ly to be involved in mili tary science--through a varie ty of

mechanisms--than twenty years ago. Consequently, the l ikel ihood that

Soviet science contacts with the West will prove useful to the Soviet

mili tary ha s also increased.

I t may be advisable to impose rest r ict ions on t ransfers of

sc ien t i f ic information to a potent ia l enemy i f the information is

controllable; i f i t generates signif icant positive resource-enhancing

effects or is l ike ly to lead to par t icular ly undesirable capabi l i t ies

(from the U.S. viewpoint); i f these capabi l i t ies have important effects

on U.S. mili tary effor ts ; and i f the gains from avoiding these effects

through controls are not outweighed by th e direct and indirec t costs

tha t the controls impose on domestic science and research.

Four categories of sc ien t i f ic information i l lus t ra te key issues for

analysis: (1 ) sc ien t i f ic theory; (2 ) knowledge of ac t iv i t ies in

specif ic areas; (3 ) know-how; and (4 ) instrumentation and equipment.

The Soviet Union does much bet t e r with theory than with laboratory

hardware. The t ransfer of know-how and equipment is more amenable to

control than theory and knowledge of a f ield.



- v i i i -

Most arguments for the control of scient i f ic information t ransfer

break down into three elements: (1) resource-enhancement effects; (2 )

effects on par t icular capabi l i t ies; and (3 ) influence on the recipient 's

world view. The primary task of the analysis of science t ransfer should

be to elucidate the degree to which and the way in which a t ransfer

could aid the military effor t of a potential enemy.



- ix -

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The main lines of this report grew out of discussions with Robert

Perry and Thane Gustafson of Rand. An ear l ier draft benefi ted from the

detai led comments of Rand colleagues Emmett Keeler and Nancy Nimitz, and

those of David Holloway of the University of Edinburgh. The sections on

science t ies to the mili tary (Sections V-VII) were derived from Rand

research conducted with Abraham Becker.



- xi -

CONTENTS

PREFACE ......................................................... iii

SUMMARY ........................................................ v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . ix

Section

I . INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1

I I . ORGANIZATIONS IN SOVIET WEAPONS R&D AND SCIENCE • • . . • . • . . 3Defense Industry • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Minis try of Defense • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 5

Civil ian Science • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Coordinating Agencies • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Separation of Science Performers ...................... 9

I I I . SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS 11

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPON DESIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Constrained Use of T e c h n o l o g y . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . 14Growing Complexity • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

V. SCIENCE TIES TO THE SOVIET MILITARY ;.................... 17

VI. TYPES OF LINKAGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY . . . . . . 20

Contracts . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Science Consultants • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Science Boards, Panels, and Commissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Science Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

VII. NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC SU PP O R T . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . 28Rapid Growth . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Main Contributions Occur Before Formal Weapons

Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30"Big Science" and the M i l i t a ry . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . 31

VIII. THE LOGIC OF CONTROLLinG SCIENTIFIC INFORHATION

TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 34

The Logic of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 34Categories of Scientific In fo rma t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41



- 1 -

I . INTRODUCTION

The re la t ionship between science and the Soviet mili tary has been

intensifying over the past two decades. The forging of t igh ter and more

numerous l inks is the net resul t of opposing se ts of forces: those that

act to preserve the technological and organizat ional status quo; an d

those that encourage the adoption of new technologies and mature the

sc ien t i f ic base. An enduring se t of forces acts to l imi t change and the

use of new technology and science in the Soviet Union, including the

manner in which Soviet weapons acquisi t ion i s organized and managed; the

procedures--both formal regulat ions and customary modes of behavior-

tha t govern the process; and the motivations and constraints that shape

actions. But, act ing in the other direct ion , the evolving nature of

perceived mili tary needs, the movement of science and technology i t se l f ,

and polic ies intended to a l te r connections between science producers and

science users have generated forces fo i change. The resulting

al terat ion in the re la t ionship between science and the mili tary affec ts

the process of science information t ransfer both within the Soviet Union

and between the Soviet Union and other countries.

This report describes Soviet weapons acquisi t ion and i t s t ies to

Soviet science; i t then discusses the logic of restr ic t ing the t ransfer

of sc ien t i f ic information, which is categorized into several classes .

Our knowledge of Soviet weapons acquisi t ion and i t s t ies to the science

community is based on a great deal of past research. Although most of

tha t research has been directed toward purposes other



- 2 -

than the question of scient i f ic communications and national security, I

have attempted to refocus the l i terature to i l luminate th is quest ion.[!]

Before proceeding, however, we must rea l ize that not much is known

about the way in which science is transformed into useful products in

any country, and that even less is known about what affects the

transformation. When we turn to Soviet af fa i r s , especial ly those

dealing with the mili ta ry, our information is even more incomplete.

With these warnings, we ca n proceed.

[1 ] Previous studies by the author form the basis for the present

report : ~ & ~ in Soviet Aviation, The Rand Corporation, R-589-PR, 1970;

Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United Sta tes , The RandCorporation, R-1860-NA, 1976; The Process of Soviet Weapons Design, TheRand Corporation, P-6137, 1978; Modeling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking,

The Rand Corporation, P-6560, 1980; ' ~ e a p o n s Acquisition in the Soviet

Union, United States, and France," in Frank B. Horton I I I , et a l . ·

(eds. ) , Comparative Defense Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore,

1974; Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers

147-148, International Inst i tute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter

1978-79. Other relevant studies are cited in the text .



- 3 -

I I . ORGANIZATIONS IN SOVIET WEAPONS R&D AND SCIENCE

The pr incipal actors in Soviet science and weapons acquisi t ion

include: the producers--the nine mili tary-product ion minis tr ies ; the

buyers and users of the products--the Ministry of Defense; the mili tary

and civi l ian science sectors; and two coordinating agencies--the

powerful Mili tary-Industr ia l Commission (VPK: Voenno-promyshlennaia

kommissiia), and the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT:

Gosudarstvennyi komitet nauke i tekhnike). In th i s report, the

"mil i tary science" sector is defined as comprising the research

ins t i tu tes of the mil i tary-product ion minis tr ies , as well as ins t i tu tes

direct ly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and the mili tary

services. "Civil ian science" consists of the USSR Academy of Sciences,

i t s Siberian D ivision, and the regional academies of sciences; the

research component of the higher educational ins t i tu tes ; and the

research establishments of the civi l ian production minis tr ies .

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Each of the nine mili tary-product ion minist r ies is responsible for

the research, design, development, and production of weapons or the i r

components. (See Table 1 .) Some civi l ian production minist r ies also

contr ibute to mil i tary R&D in a minor way; and several of the mili tary

production ministries make substant ia l contr ibutions to non-defense

products, especial ly the Aviation, Shipbuilding, Radio, Electronics, and

Communications Ministr ies.



- 4 -

Table 1

MILITARY-PRODUCTION MINISTRIES AND REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS

Ministry of Aviation Industry: Aircraf t , aerodynamic missi les

Ministry of General Machine Building: Ball is t ic missiles, space-launch

vehicles, spacecraf t

Ministry of Defense Industry: Conventional ground forces weapons,

small arms, anti tank guided missi les

Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry: Naval vessels , submarines,

merchant vessels

Ministry of Medium Machine Building: Nuclear weapons

~ l i n i s t r y of Radio Industry: Computers, avionics, guidance equipment

Ministry of Electronics Industry: Integrated ci rcui t s ,

electronics components

~ l i n i s t r y of Machine Industry: Ammunition, ordnance

Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry: Radio, telephone,

te levis ion, other communications equipment

The bulk of applied mili ta ry research and development is performed

in the research inst i tutes and design bureaus of the military-production

sector. More than 90 percent of applied R&D in the Soviet Union is

performed in the industr ia l sector, including the military-production

minis t r ies . But the industr ia l sector also performs a s ignif icant share

of basic research, varying over the years roughly from 8 to 23 percent

of the national t o t a l . [ l ] However, because of the far-ranging scope of

sc ien t i f ic and industr ia l act ivi ty engaged in by defense industry, i t is

often necessary for them to go beyond the i r organizational boundaries

for sc ien t i f ic support, par t icular ly in basic research. They require

[1] Louvan E. Nolting, The Financing of Research, Development, and

Innovation in the ~ · ~ · ~ · ~ · • ~ ~ o f Performer, U.S. Department ofCommerce, Foreign Economic Reports FER-No. 9, April 1976, p. 45.



- 5 -

some aid in weapons development i t se l f , but general ly the i r own research

ins t i tu tes adequately support the design bureaus tha t develop the

systems and the plants that produce them. The highly directed nature of

the indust r ial minis t r ies ' tasks renders them less able to conduct the

required research on new technologies or on systems based on new or

unfamil iar princip les . I t is in these areas that civi l ian science makes

i t s greates t contribut ion to the mili tary and provides f lex ib i l i ty to

the t ight ly organized system.

An important feature of Soviet industr ia l s tructure is the

organizat ional separat ion of functions and of products. Research i s

performed in research ins t i tu tes to support the i r minis t r ies ' product

l ines ; design and development takes place in design bureaus; and

production in fac tor ies . Ordinari ly, each type of organization is

administrat ively separate from the others and operates under different

procedures and incent ives. The minis tr ies , too, are highly independent

of one another; Russians often say that dealings between minist r ies are

more d i f f i cu l t than negotiat ions between host i le countries. Since the

mili tary production ministr ies operate , to a large extent , under the

same system of incentives and const raints as the centra l ly planned

civi l ian sector , several mechanisms have been adopted to ameliorate i t s

more deleter ious effects on mili tary-re la ted ef for t s . The

~ l i l i t a r y - I n d u s t r i a l Commission (discussed below) performs some of these

buffering functions.

mNISTRY OF DEFENSE

Each of the mili tary services has one or more directorates charged

with managing i t s weapon developments. To support this function, these

armament directora tes maintain research ins t i tu tes to provide technical



- 6 -

expert ise to the buyer and to manage contracts. Central agencies of the

Defense Ministry also have the i r own ins t i tu tes . Staffed with capable

civi l ian and mil i tary personnel, these ins t i tu tes often ac t as the link

between the mil i tary requirement and the weapon developer. They

maintain close contacts with the indust r ial ins t i tu tes and design

bureaus, keeping aware of technical advances and poss ib i l i t i es as they

develop. These mil i tary inst i tutes may perform preliminary design

studies and engage in research on special mili tary needs, such as

re l iab i l i ty or maintainabil i ty problems, but they do not appear to do

deta i l design work or basic research.

CIVILIAN SCIENCE

The premier establishments for fundamental research are the 200

research ins t i tu tes associated with the USSR Academy of Sciences. The

Siberian Division (a mini-academy of 50 inst i tutes that i s largely

independent of the Soviet Academy) is strongly oriented toward

cooperation with industry in the t ransfer of science and technology from

laboratory to applicat ion. The regional academies, especial ly the

Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (with i t s pi lo t production fac i l i t ies and

jo in t industr ia l laborator ies) , also tend to be bet ter organized for

industr ia l support and to pa y greater at tent ion to the applicat ion of

research than the main division of the USSR Academy.

The univers i t ies and other ins t i tu tes of higher education (VUZy)

comprise the second par t of what is defined here as civi l ian science.

Research performed in this sector appears to be less coordinated and

more fragmented than that performed in the academy system. One reason

is that the great bulk of VUZy research is financed by contracts rather

than by the State budget, leading to a diverse se t of relat ionships and



- 7 -

patterns of sc ien t i f ic involvement with an array of cl i en t s . Many of

the researchers in the higher education sector par t icipate on a par t -

time basis . Much of this research i s concentrated in a few eminent

univers i t ies and polytechnical ins t i tu tes , with the r es t scattered in

small projects across the universe of educational ins t i tu tes . Since the

la te 1950s, the Soviet leadership has taken several s teps to bring the

VUZy closer to both t h ~ A c a d e m y ins t i tu tes and to industr ia l R&D,

par t icular ly through the incentives of contract research.

The research establishments of the civi l ian production ministr ies

comprise the thi rd component of civi l ian science. Organized in similar

fashion to the mili ta ry production sec tor , these inst i tutes par t icipate

in mili ta ry R&D to the extent that the i r ministr ies contr ibute to

military systems.

COORDINATING AGENCIES

The Council of Ministers has created several specia l i s t commissions

concerned with important sectors of the economy. The most powerful of

these i s the VPK, with representat ion from the military-production

minis t r ies , the Ministry of Defense, the State Planning Commission

(Gosplan), and probably the Central Committee Secre tar ia t .

As monitor and coordinator of mili ta ry R&D and production

throughout the economy, the VPK reviews proposals for new weapons with

respect to the i r technical feas ib i l i ty and production requirements.

Draft decrees submitted by lead design organizations specify

par t ic ipants , tasks, f inancing, and t imetables for a projec t . When

approved, the draf t becomes a "VPK decision," which is legally binding

on a l l par t ies concerned.



- 8 -

The VPK is instrumental in planning and supervising major

technological programs with mili tary uses, such as the development of

integrated electronic c i rcu i t design and production. I t also appears to

be involved in the planning and coordination of mili tary-re la ted

ac t iv i t ies in the Academy of Sciences.

Despite the overal l involvement of the VPK in most aspects of

weapons acquisi t ion, i t is primari ly an implementing organization ra ther

than on e tha t or iginates policy. I t is the job of the VPK to police

mili tary pr ior i t ies throughout the economy and to see tha t decisions are

actual ly car r ied out . Nevertheless, because the VPK originates

information, sponsors technical analyses, screens recommendations,

approves them, and monitors r esu l t s , i t has a more than marginal

influence on science, technology, and weapons.

The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), another

agency of the Council of Ministers , was establ ished in 1965 (a s a

successor to a ser ies of ear l ie r agencies) to plan, oversee, and

regulate sc ien t i f ic research and development, and to recommend the

introduct ion of technological innovations throughout the economy.

Evidence on the importance of the GKNT in mil i tary affai rs is mixed; i t

has formal authori ty over a l l sc ien t i f ic organizations "regardless of

ju r i sd ic t ion ," but (according to one expert) probably not over the

defense sector . [2]

The Committee ha s no direc t authori ty over the ministr ies or the

Academy of Sciences system; i t attempts to shape events largely through

[2] Louvan E. Nolting, The Structure and Functions of the USSR

State Committee for Science and Technology, Foreign Economic Report, No.16 , U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976, p. 2.



- 9 -

moral suasion (working through a network of subcommittees and sc ien t i f ic

councils) or through leverage applied through i t s influence over foreign

contracts , technology, and cooperation. Indeed, the GKNT departments

dealing with foreign ac t iv i t ies , such as those just mentioned, were said

to be larger and more inf luent ial than i t s other departments.[3]

The GKNT may have some effect on mili tary science through i t s

formulation of the "basic sc ien t i f ic and technical problems" of the

country and i t s working out of some 200 programs to deal with these

problems; th i s is the section of the science and technology plan on

which the GKNT concentrates. In par t icular , for the so-called "inter -

branch problems," the GKNT controls an important share of the f inancing

and t r ies to se t t le disputes among part ic ipat ing organizat ions. [4]

Although we have no evidence on this point , i t seems l ike ly that the

mili tary would want to par t icipate in the ident i f icat ion and inclusion

of such problems in the science plan so as to bet ter influence the

course of the nat ion ' s sc ien t i f ic effor t .

SEPARATION OF SCIENCE PERFORHERS

The inst i tut ional and individual performers of science in the

Soviet Union are marked by the i r separat ion--by administrat ive

subordination, stage of R&D, and sc ien t i f ic f ield. As a project

progresses along the successive phases of R&D, i t is relayed from on e

inst i tut ion under one system of authori ty to another inst i tut ion in

another organizat ional s tructure . Thus, a new technology may begin in a

[ 3] ~ t o r r is Bornstein e t a l . , The Planning and Management of

Industr ia l Research and Development in th e ~ - ~ - ~ . g . , Science Policy

Working Group, Joint US-USSR Science and Technology Exchange Program,

SRI International, June 1980, p. 47 .

[4] Paul M. Cocks, Science Policy: USA/USSR: Vol. I I , Science

Policy in the USSR, National Science Foundation, 1980, p. 40 .



- 10 -

research ins t i tu te of the Academy of Sciences, t ransfer to a research

ins t i tu te of an industr ia l ministry, enter in to detai led design and

development in a design bureau of the ministry, and f ina l ly be produced

in one or more ministry fac tor ies .

In a complex project , since each of these organizations tends to

special ize according to sc ien t i f ic f ield or class of products, several

ins t i tu tes , minis tr ies , and VUZy could become involved; management and

oversight would be the responsibi l i ty of a research ins t i tu te or other

agency in an armaments directora te of the mil i tary service customer.

The VPK, through i t s project decrees and supra-minister ial s ta tus ,

exercises a necessary coordination over this organization-hopping

act iv i ty .

Despite organizat ional separat ion and f ie ld specia l iza t ion , ~ h e r e is considerable functional overlap among the various R&D performers;

that i s , some Academy ins t i tu tes may develop and produce products,

whereas a number of ministry inst i tutes are leaders in basic research.

Moreover, this overlap is growing as several pol ic ies (discussed below)

act to break down the barr iers or iginat ing in organizat ional separat ion

and make the inst i tut ions on each side of the boundaries more alike.



- 11 -

I I I . SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS

Soviet weapons acquisi t ion is highly constrained in a number of

ways. One of i t s sa l i en t character is t ics is the control and

minimization of r i sk. An important technique used to control r isk is

the formal process out l in ing the steps to be taken in any development

project . [ 1]

These procedures establ ish standardized project steps from the

statement of requirements to del ivery of the product. (This sequence

wil l be referred to here as the "formal" acquisi t ion process.) Each

project , therefore , progresses according to a s t ipula ted sequence tha t

specifies the tasks to be carr ied out in each phase, the review

procedures by the user , and acceptance rout ines. With each succeeding

s tep , the technical poss ib i l i t i es become less uncertain, less research-

oriented, and more narrow and applied. Science input, therefore, i f i t

is to occur a t a l l in the formal process, is most l ike ly to enter at the

very early stages.

The general in f lex ib i l i ty of the centrally planned economy is an

addit ional const raint on weapons R&D. Because of unrel iabi l i ty of

supply and inabi l i ty to rely on contracts or plans to guarantee

del iver ies , designers are reluctant to ask for new products from

suppliers they have not dealt with in the past . They face strong

incentives to use off - the-shel f components tha t can be counted on to

perform to acceptable (though perhaps not optimal) standards.

[1] These steps have been standardized throughout civi l ian and

military industry and are known as the "Unified System of Design

Documentation" (YeSKD).



- 12 -

Over the past f if ty years, s ince the present economic system was

put into place by Stal in , mil i tary R&D managers have taken many steps to

cope with the system. Design handbooks closely control the choice of

technologies, components, and manufacturing techniques. Standards

organizations at the national level , in the mil i tary-product ion

minis tr ies , and in plants and design bureaus ensure tha t standardized

par ts and techniques a r ~ used to the greatest possible extent . But

perhaps most important in the Soviet environment, the buyer ( i . e . , the

Ministry of Defense) ha s rea l authori ty over the product. The mil i tary

can demand tha t an agreed-upon product be delivered as promised.

Although vigorous negotiat ions may precede a design bureau's acceptance

of a project , the responsible organization i s expected to del iver , once

the project is defined and accepted.

For a l l of these reasons, especial ly the l as t , designers are

re luctant to venture into new realms. They face powerful disincent ives

to use advanced technology or to look toward science for solut ions to

the i r problems. Given these const raints , the a rt of design i s promoted

where the designer works with avai lable materials--often creat ively ,

sometimes with genius.

The number of conservative forces acting on the system, together

with the necessi ty of coordinating complex development projects across

many organizat ional boundaries--mil i tary, c iv i l , minis ter ia l , Academy-

would normally hinder mili tary R&D, as i t hinders the civi l ian sector .

However, the Communist Party and the government have given mili tary R&D

the highest prior i ty over materials, manpower, and production capacity.

These pr ior i t ies are enforced by the VPK, which also coordinates



- 13 -

ac t iv i t i es that cross organizat ional l ines . The VPK and Party can

intervene to ease bott lenecks or loosen bureaucrat ic snags. But they

are s t i l l acting within the Russian system. With the increasing

complexity of modern weapon systems tha t incorporate a broader range of

technologies and inputs than in the past , the military i s l ike ly to

become increasingly dependent on the res t of the economy and could find

i t more di f f i cu l t in the future to avoid the consequences of the

civi l ian sector 's patterns of behavior.



- 14 -

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPON DESIGN

CONSTRAINED USE OF TECHNOLOGY

Given the bounds on technical exuberance imposed by the process

described above, i t should not be surprising tha t the general tendency

in Soviet weapons is for relat ively simple designs that make much use of

common subsystems, components, par ts , and materials; that are

evolutionary in their improvements; and that are comparatively l imited

in performance. Of course, exceptions to this pat te rn exist . The

evidence is best viewed as a s t a t i s t i ca l dist r ibut ion, especial ly

revealing when compared with another country 's experience. The bulk of

the evidence suggests that the central tendencies in the dist r ibut ion of

character i s t ics of Soviet and U.S. weapons are dist inct ly separate,

although there is considerable overlap between them.

One concrete example i l lus t ra tes the general tendencies described

above. The Soviet SA-6 surface-to-ai r missi le was analyzed by U.S.

defense industry specia l i s t s , who took note of i ts sol id- fuel , integra l

rocket/ramjet engine. The design, considered "unbelievably simple but

effect ive," permitted such simplif icat ions as the elimination of a fuel

control system, sensors , and pumps to control fuel flow.[l] However,

because the system cannot be modulated for maximum performance as a

function of speed and al t i tude, i t suffers performance degradation off

i t s design point when i t loses oxidative eff iciency. The analysts also

found that the SA-6 employed ident ica l components to those found in

several other Soviet surface-to-ai r and a ir - to -a i r missi les whose

deployment dates spanned more than a 10-year period.

[1 ] "U.S. finds SA-6 to be Simple, Effective," Aviation Week and

Space Technology, December 5, 1973, p. 22 .



- 15 -

An exception to this pattern--an outl ier in the dist r ibut ion--

is the T-64 tank. For 35 years, Soviet tank deployment was the epitome

of the standard design pat tern . But in the la te 1960s, the T-64

appeared with almost a l l subsystems of new design, and some with

advanced performance and technology. The tank carried a new engine and

transmission, new suspension, a completely new and modern f i re-contro l

system, advanced armor, and a larger gun scaled up from i t s predecessor,

the T-62; for the f i r s t time, a deployed tank ha d an automatic loader,

which reduced crew s ize from 4 to 3, and permitted the T-64 to be even

smaller than the compact T-62.

GROWING COHPLEXITY

The T-64 example i l lus t ra tes an important point . Although strong

conservative forces act on the design process, there is some movement.

Science and technology advance, as do military requirements. Weapons

performance is constant ly enhanced; missions grow more complex,

dif f icu l t , and numerous. Some T-64 tanks carry a laser range f inder ,

dig i ta l f i re-contro l computer, electro-opt ica l tracking system with

image processors, and armor arrays of several materials.

Not only do weapon systems perform more things, but each thing also

cal ls on more technology and science than in the past. A gun barre l

f ir ing a project i le at 6,000 f t /sec instead of 3000 f t / sec requires more

advanced metallurgical understanding, materials, and production,

measurement, and t e s t techniques than the older guns. Today's tanks

cal l for a greater diversi ty and a broader source of scient i f ic and

technical expert ise in the i r subsystem technologies, materials, and

components. And tanks are among th e more mature and technically stable

systems in modern armories.



- 16 -

Where once a Soviet production ministry could be close to se l f -

suff icient with i ts own s table of inst i tutes and design bureaus, today

an array of ta lents is necessary that crosses organizat ional and

sectoral boundaries. This is true for production and tes t ing, as well

as for component development. Therefore, despite the conservatism of

the process, the changing character of the systems is placing greater

demands on science.



- 17 -

V. SCIENCE TIES TO THE SOVIET MILITARY

Increasingly complex systems are only one of the forces bringing

science and the Soviet mili tary closer together . The mili tary

leadership now is more experienced in technical and scient i f ic af fa i r s

than in the past , when operational experience rather than technical

expertise was the key to the top posts . The careers of the present

Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff , and several deputy

defense ministers have included s t in t s as weapon developers and

scient i f ic managers of advanced technology programs. Brezhnev himself

spent several years as a Party Secretary with responsibi l i ty for

coordination of mili tary industry and especially ICBM development.

Former Defense Minister Marshal Grechko wrote expl ic i t ly of the need for

a "unified mili tary-technical policy"; one of the object ives of such a

policy, he said, was to direct R&D, including fundamental research, to

problems of mili tary interes t . [ ! ]

The pol i t ical leadership has sta ted a bel ief in the importance of

science to national economic growth and productivity. In recent

Five-Year Plans, Brezhnev has proclaimed a sh i f t in emphasis from the

Stal inis t focus on quanti tat ive goals to quality and efficiency--a sh i f t

that he figures could take a t leas t a generation to accomplish. Though

such proclamations are often only rhetoric , several concrete policies

have been adopted that are intended to bring science closer to

application.

[1] Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva, 2d ed., 1975, pp .

193-195.



- 18 -

One of the more important of these pol ic ies has been the emphasis,

since the late 1960s, on contract research on a cost-accounting

(khozraschet) basis between science performers and cl i en t s . This has

been par t of a broader development in which new t ies are being formed

between civi l ian science and industry; the Academies of Sciences see

themselves now as having an important role to play in innovation.

Because of off icial ly promoted contracting policy, combined with stable

or reduced financing of science enterprises from the State budget,

research ins t i tu tes have actively sought potent ia l customers. The

mili ta ry, with i t s seemingly l imit less budgets, has become a choice

ta rget .

Civil ian science contract work for the defense sector could be a

s ignif icant proportion of a l l (defense and civi l ian) contract research.

In 1975, about 12 percent of the to ta l work of the USSR Academy of

Sciences was financed by contracts; for the Siberian Division and the

Ukrainian Academy, contract research was a considerably larger

proportion of the to ta l a t roughly 20 percent and 38 percent,

respectively. [2 ] Individual academic ins t i tu tes report up to 80 percent

contract financing. From 1962 to 1975, contract funding in the

Ukrainian Academy increased a t a ra te of 18.5 percent per year, whereas

non-contract funding from a l l other sources grew a t less than half tha t

ra te . [3] In higher education ins t i tu tes , contract research accounts for

more than 80 percent of a l l R&D, although these inst i tut ions are

[2] Cocks, op, c i t . , pp . 99-100.

[3] Thane Gustafson, Sell ing the Russians the Rope? Soviet

Technology Policy a n d ~ · ~ · Export Controls, The Rand Corporation,

R-2649-ARPA, 1981, pp. 61, 65 .



- 19 -

responsible for only a small share (about 5 to 6 percent) of the

national R&D effort . Although information is scarce on mili tary R&D in

the VUZy, i t should be noted that an increasingly important role is

being played by production ministry laboratories created within the

educational inst i tutes , at the expense of the cl ient ministry.[4]

The Inst i tute of Nuclear Physics a t Moscow State University is an

interest ing example of the growth of contract research. According to a

former staff member, the Inst i tute is formally attached to and managed

by the Physics Department, which supports some 500 faculty from the

State budget. The self-supporting inst i tute , however, employs more than

3000 people, who are engaged in a wide variety of defense, industrial ,

and sc ient i f ic tasks. [5]

[4] Julian Cooper, Innovation for Innovation in Soviet Industry,

Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham,England, 1979, p. 36 .

[5] Lawrence 1. Whetten, Management of Soviet Scient i f ic Research

and Technological Development--Some Military Aspects, School of

International Relat ions, Graduate Program in Germany, University ofSouthern California, 1979, p. 46 .



- 20 -

VI. TYPES OF LINKAGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY

CONTRACTS

Scient is ts par t ic ipate in mili tary a f fa i r s through a var ie ty of

mechanisms. Contracting is one of the most important. Not only did the

direct ives encouraging contract research legi t imize the ac t iv i t ies of

those research managers and ins t i tu te directors with a desire to do more

applied work, but i t also provided the incent ives to do so for the

scient i f ic entrepreneur as well as for the ordinary sc ien t i s t who was

simply responding to opportuni t ies.

The chief incent ive ha s been the provision of laboratory

fac i l i t i es , instrumentation, expensive equipment, experimental designs

and models, and capi ta l construct ion tha t flows from contract research

general ly, and from mili tary research in par t icular . With the

pr ior i t ies of mili tary sponsorship, a laboratory ca n obtain scarce

materials and supplies, and develop new areas of research.

Because of these benef i ts , grantsmanship ha s become a rewarded

ta lent ; one technique involves the writ ing of proposals and ins t i tu te

plans to f i t key phrases in Party programs; another, described to the

author, requires frequent vis i t s of researchers to government agencies

in Moscow to keep abreast of plans and new developments. Some of this

research, then, is not very different from what i t would have been under

other funding arrangements, whereas in other cases, responsiveness to

potent ia l contractors ha s helped to redirec t ins t i tu te interes ts to f i t

the needs of c l i ent s . I t is not possible, though, to estimate the

re la t ive proportions in the two different categories.



- 21 -

Not a l l of the incentives to do mili tary contract research are

posi t ive . On a personal level, several disadvantages accrue to mil i tary

research, especial ly i f i t is class i f i ed , and most especial ly i f i t

takes place in closed, secret laboratories. Apart from the r igidi ty of

security controls, the most frequent ly mentioned disadvantages are the

const raints on foreign t ravel and on open publication of research

findings. Foreign t ravel , always problematic for Soviet sc ien t i s t s , i s

made almost impossible by close t ies to mili tary research. This policy

was underlined by a designer from the Yakovlev a i rc raf t design bureau

who remarked to the author at the Paris Air Show that only people

working on civi l ian projects could t ravel to Paris; the mili tary side of

the design bureau was t rea ted almost l ike a separate organizat ion, and

no on e from i t was allowed to t ravel .

Control over publication is not quite so s t r i c t as control over

t ravel , but i t is s t i l l dif f icu l t to c lear for publication a paper that

originated in military-sponsored research. Sometimes a sc ien t i s t ca n

disguise the source of the research funding, or perhaps submit his

papers to a journal unfamiliar with the technical publishing rules in

his special ized f ie ld ; but in general , mili tary secrecy imposes a major

bar r i e r to publication, and hence affects the reputat ion and career of a

sc ien t i s t . Some Soviet scient is ts suggest , in fac t , tha t i t is easier

to hide infer ior work and less capable people under a military umbrella

because the research is less l ike ly to come under c r i t i c a l scrutiny.

The bet t e r scient is ts therefore find a lower qual i ty of work among their

colleagues in military research, and are consequently deterred from

par t icipat ing in such work. I f f i r s t - ra te scient is ts are put off by the



- 22 -

quality and environment of mili ta ry research, second-raters perhaps find

this a useful channel for career advancement. Although the lower

quality of mili tary sc ient i s t s has not been universal ly accepted or

described by a l l sources, the evidence contains enough instances to

indicate tha t i t is a serious issue tha t cannot be disregarded.

Another disincentive to working on military research i s tha t cost

and schedule overruns, which are tolera ted on civi l ian projec ts , are

considered serious infract ions in some high-pr ior i ty mil i ta ry contracts.

Although the mili ta ry cl i en t might accept fuzzy excuses for fai lure to

reach objectives in basic research, his insistence on contract

provisions increases as the work moves closer to production.[!]

The posit ive incentives to perform military research act primarily

on the ins t i tu t ion , whereas the negative incentives are fe l t mainly by

the individual; for tha t reason, tension between the two often occurs.

Civil ian laboratories and individual sc ient i s t s may be expected to do

military work occasionally in order to build up the i r equipment and

f ac i l i t i e s , which they ca n then use to advantage in the i r main l ine of

civi l ian research. Refusal to do military research could possibly

hinder one's career poss ib i l i t i es .

In summary, the pol i t ica l leadership 's goal of bringing science

closer to applicat ion, and subsequent pol ic ies emphasizing contract

research, have s ignif icant ly strengthened the civi l ian science sector ' s

t i es to applicat ion in both the mili ta ry and c iv i l spheres. Indeed,

several prominent proponents of the policy are now viewing the resul ts

with alarm, fearing tha t the moves may have gone too far . Concern about

such tendencies has been expressed by many science leaders . The la te

[1 ] Whetten, op. c i t . , p. 53.



- 23 -

M. Keldysh, then President of the Academy of Sciences and a famous

leader of applied mili ta ry research in the aviat ion industry, declared

in 1976 that an excessive orienta t ion to production and involvement in

the innovation process could impair the country 's fundamental research

potent ia l . He observed tha t "an obvious tendency has emerged by Academy

ins t i tu tes not to cooperate with industry, but themselves to take the

matter to i t s conclusion. In my view, this tendency is very

dangerous".[2] Even B. Ye. Paton, President of the Ukrainian Academy and

a vigorous proponent of science-industry cooperation, thought tha t an

"inordinate enthusiasm" for short- term problems would act to the

detriment of fundamental research.[3)

Although individual scient is ts often see disadvantages in mil i ta ry-

sponsored research, strong enough posi t ive incentives today make i t

dif f icu l t to escape from performing such work. S t i l l , some tension wil l

continue to exist an d could be a problem in specific cases, although i t

does not seem to be a major hindrance to government policy.

SCIENCE CONSULTANTS

Consulting by civi l ian scient is ts is a frequent, but small-scale,

phenomenon. I t seems to be largely a personal matter involving the

nonins t i tut ional ef for t of a sc ien t i f ic expert . The act ivi ty does not

seem much different from U.S. prac t ices .

Academy personnel are sometimes included on technical committees

convened by a mili ta ry- industry ministry to consider the preliminary

[2] Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, 1976, No. 9, p. 41 ; J . Cooper, op.

c i t . , p. 37.

[3) Nauka i zhizn, 1977, No. 4, p. 19 ; quoted in Cooper, op . c i t . ,

p. 35 .



- 24 -

requirement for a new system. Such committees review the feasibi l i ty of

the requirement and may suggest research prior to fur ther decisions in

order to address technical problems and uncer ta int ies .

I t is not always necessary for a civi l ian sc ien t i s t to have

security clearances to consult on mili ta ry projec ts . The problem can

often be described in a compartmentalized manner without a contextual

framework. In some cases, resul ts are simply delivered to a postbox

number so that even the ins t i tu t ional af f i l ia t ion of the sponsor is

hidden. In fac t , i t i s through such signs tha t sc ient i s t s often

recognize a military connection to sponsored work.

Because of the absence of specif ic projec t , fac i l i ty , or cl i en t

ident i f icat ion in some of this work, i t i s often d i f f i cu l t for both

par t ic ipants and outside analysts to be clear about ult imate uses and

users. I t is perhaps for this reason that many Soviet sc ient i s t s refer

in a vague fashion to mil i ta ry research carr ied on in the civi l ian

sec tor , without being able to del ineate more clearly jus t what the work

is about or who the ult imate cl i en t might be.

SCIENCE BOARDS, PANELS, AND cmmiSSIONS

Commissions, panels , and other formally established boards are

another means for bringing science information to bear on important

questions. The issue of planning and directing science centra l ly has

been approached through the formation of scores of problem councils and

consultat ive bodies. The problems inherent in direc t ing science were

acknowledged by General Secretary Brezhnev in his address to the Academy

of Sciences on i t s 250th birthday. "We have no intention of dic ta t ing

to you the detai l s of research topics- - that is a matter for the



- 25 -

scient is ts themselves. But the basic directions of the development of

science, the main tasks that l i f e poses, wil l be determined joint ly."[4]

Some of the tasks of the various consultat ive groups include the

se lec t ion of basic science direc t ions . Such councils exist in the

academy system, in the indust r ial minist r ies , an d in joint groups tha t

bring together individuals from different organizations. Assessing the

importance of these groups, though, is dif f icu l t . The sc ien t i f ic

problem councils of the Academy are consultat ive and have no formal

administrative authority, yet they are said to "exert considerable

influence over the course of research."[5] They suggest topics for

inclusion among the "basic directions" and recommend assignments among

ins t i tu tes . Furthermore, inclusion of a subject on the l i s t s of basic

problems or basic directions provides a se t of highly visible pri_orities

tha t can influence the choice among al te rna t ives when research managers

must make decisions between programs. Other views, however, give the

Academy of Sciences councils less weight. Their powers are undefined

and the i r administrat ive support is often inadequate. Horeover, some of

the par t ic ipants in the council ac t iv i t ies dismiss them as of no

observable value. Even the chief academic secretary of the USSR Academy

complained of the bureaucrat ic nature of the councils and of their

inabi l i ty to influence the choice of research projects . [6]

[4 ] Pravda, October 8, 1975.[5 ] Cocks, op . c i t . , p. 131.

[6 ] V. H. Sisakyan, quoted by Helgard Weinert, "The Organization

and Planning of Research in the Academy System," in E. Zaleski e t a l . ,

Science Policy in the USSR, OECD, Paris , 1969, p. 230.



- 26 -

Coordinating groups in industry seem to fare l i t t l e bet ter . When,

for example, a leading Soviet computer sc ien t i s t was questioned by the

author about the resul ts to be expected from a newly appointed top

level , high-status committee, formed to iron out problems in the

computer industry, he dismissed the committee with a shrug and a laugh,

indicat ing tha t i t met once a year , ha d no formal authori ty, and was too

large and unwieldy to came up with a coherent se t of recommendations.

On the basis of this evidence, i t i s not possible to ignore such

committees, commissions, and counci ls , nor i s i t appropriate to regard

them in the same l ight as they may be described in the i r char ters . At

the leas t , these bodies serve as indicators of the direct ion of

government policy, of the research trends that are favored, and of the

ins t i tut ions tha t have been given the leading roles. They also draw

scient is ts into contact with decisionmakers as well as allow them to

communicate among themselves; [7] Moreover, members of the Academy from

mili tary inst i tutes may find that the i r involvement in Academy

proceedings provides them with a good view of what is going on in the

broader sc ien t i f ic world. Beyond th i s , especial ly in mil i tary af fa i r s ,

the various committees and commissions may at times actually recommend,

coordinate, and direc t the course of sc ien t i f ic research in an effect ive

way.

SCIENCE ENTREPRENEURS

Key actors in the l inks between science and the mil i tary (and in

the larger science t ransfer process) are the science-promoters. This

handful of individuals par t ic ipates in numerous committees and are

[7] These points are made by Weinert, op . c i t . , p. 231.



- 27 -

always in demand as consultants. They help break the bonds of r igidi ty ,

allowing the system to act more effectively. They usually head the i r

own ins t i tutes , possess solid reputations as producers or managers of

science, and s i t on academic and government boards. Their inst i tutes

work on both mili tary and civi l ian research; they chair problem councils

and coordinating committees. Although the i r committees may not achieve

a l l that is expected of them, these entrepreneurs of science have the

opportunit ies to promote the i r own ideas and those of their colleagues

before decisionmaking bodies and pol i t ica l leaders. Therefore, even i f

no formal t ies exis t , leading scient is ts may be connected to the

mili tary in a variety of ways.



- 28 -

VII. NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT

RAPID GROWTH

Many Russian emigre sc ient i s t s have described periods of rapid

growth of civi l ian sc ien t i f ic support of the mili tary , especial ly since

the la te 1960s. Some estimates have suggested tha t the aggregate effor t

ha s grown by many times in the past 20 years. According to counts based

on the f irst-hand evidence of former Soviet sc ien t i s t s , almost half of

the research inst i tutes in the Academy seem to have part ic ipated in

mili tary research.

The resurgence of Academy support of the mili tary in the past 20

years is not a to ta l ly new phenomenon in Soviet mili tary-science

rela t ionships. Before war broke out in 1941, Academy inst i tutes were

working on about 200 research topics ordered by the Defense and Navy

commisariats (the predecessors to today's minis t r ies) . Some leading

ins t i tu tes - - for example, the Ioffe Physico-Technical Inst i tute in

Leningrad--were heavily engaged in mil i tary research.[l] This work may

have been prompted by new statutes introduced in 1935 that st ressed the

promotion of timely and ef f i c i en t applicat ion of sc ien t i f ic

achievements; for several years before th i s , the Party ha d pushed the

admission of engineers into the administrat ion of the Academy.

Within days of the German attack on the USSR, inst i tutes of the

Academy of Sciences were ordered to review the i r research programs and

to redirec t the i r ef for ts to defense-related work. Coordinated by a

[1] G. D. Komkov, B. V. Levshin, and L. K. Semenov, Akademiia nauk

SSSR: kratki i i s tor icheski i ocherk (The USSR Academy of Sciences: Short

Histor ical Essay), Vol. I I , 1917-1976, 2d ed. , Moscow, 1977, p. 166.



- 29 -

science plenipotentiary of the State Defense Committee, sc ient i s t s

performed a great deal of valuable applied research during the war.

Following the war, civi l ian science made important contribut ions to

nuclear weapons developments, ba l l i s t i c missi les , radar , and j e t

propulsion. Many of the fields stimulated by wartime science

contribut ions matured and stabi l ized suff icient ly to form industr ia l

minist r ies around the new technologies and products; elect ronics ,

missi les , and nuclear weapons gained minis ter ia l s ta tus in the 1960s.

Several administrat ive reforms in the early 1960s removed from the

Academy applied research inst i tutes and those that were more oriented

toward engineering. The remaining organizations were directed to

concentrate on basic research. The more recent t rend appears to be an

attempt to find a balance between basic and applied research in the

leading ins t i tu tes of Soviet science.

Despite this vigorous growth, R&D contribut ions by the mil i tary

production ministr ies and the Defense Ministry dominate civi l ian ef for ts

by an order of magnitude. Civil ian science is not a central actor in

the formal weapons acquisi t ion process. Such effor ts as occur seem to

be ad hoc, short-term, and associated with specif ic problems ar is ing

during development. The further a weapon proceeds in the development

process, the more l ike ly that civi l ian science support will be l imited

to solving unexpected and narrowly del ineated problems tha t ar ise in

design, t e s t , production, or use. At the Inst i tute of Nuclear Physics

associated with Moscow State Universi ty, with 3000 employees, the ad hoc

nature of much of the type of work is demonstrated by the fact tha t few

mil i tary contracts are for more than 12 months, and most are for around

6 months. [2] In such cases, the problems are usual ly given to the

[2] Whetten, op . c i t . , p. 46.



- 30 -

civi l ian inst i tutes in abstract form and not presented as connected to a

specif ic weapon development. Often, i t is only through indirect means

that a researcher might fathom the ul t imate purpose of his effor ts .

MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OCCUR BEFORE FORMAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION

The military seems to sponsor research in the civi l ian science

community for several reasons: to ascertain the feasibi l i ty of a

requirement; to investigate potent ia l ly useful concepts and

technologies; or to reduce the r i sks inherent in new things by research

and experimentation. This kind of research appears to precede the

actual incorporation of a new concept, technology, or device in a weapon

design, althougr some of this work could be associated with a

development program, par t icular ly a t an early stage.

In general , i t appears tha t the military science sector has been

unable to meet a l l of i t s R&D requirements to support the pre-weapons

acquisi t ion phases, part icular ly in highly advanced technologies. Much

of the civi l ian science effor t appears to be directed toward developing

and maturing the science base and the technologies tha t wil l l a te r flow

into the risk-avoiding weapons R&D process. The broader range of

weapons technologies must be brought to maturity before their

incorporation in weapons designs. The technology requirements of new

systems are l ikely to go beyond the capabi l i t ies of the mili tary-science

sector , especial ly in the short ru n when they have not yet adapted to

the new demands. A lagged response of the military sc ien t i f ic base,

therefore, requires more extensive support from civi l ian science.

Civil ian science's main contr ibution to the military is to what can

be described as an enlarged "front end" of the standard acquisi t ion



- 31 -

process. Despite this greater attention to science and technology in

the early phases, we have no evidence tha t the style of design has

changed. Designers and mili tary customers alike s t i l l seem to shun

r isky solutions, untr ied technologies, and immature components. I t is

the new task of the science community to reduce the r isk through

research and experiment, to prove the technologies, and to demonstrate

the technical feasibi l i ty of new kinds of components--before they enter

into weapons development.

"BIG SCIENCE" AND THE MILITARY

In recent years, many Soviet science leaders have advocated program

planning for large science projects . The program approach emphasizes

the achievement of specif ic goals and the drawing up of a comprehensive

se t of measures for that purpose. In the postwar period, this approach

ha s been customary for prior i ty projects in the economic, socia l , and

mili tary spheres. In the development or both nuclear weapons and

bal l i s t ic missi les , special systems of management were headed by

councils subordinated to the highest levels of government and Party to

assure the adequacy of prior i ty and resources, backed by pol i t ica l

authori ty. Nuclear weapons and ba l l i s t i c missi les were l a te r

inst i tut ional ized within the standard minis ter ia l s t ructure , but the

management pattern of those successful programs ha s now become the norm.

"For the most important problems, a lead ministry or lead organization

wil l be designated and granted cer ta in r ights in re la t ion to other

part ic ipants and the allocation of resources," with a government

decision fully specifying schedules, resources, and executors.[3] I t is

[3] Cooper, op. c i t . , p. 42 .



- 32 -

not accidental that this descript ion applies to weapon system

development generally, and to the management of large, mili tary-re la ted ,

"big science" programs specif ica l ly . (4] I t has been the chief means by

which the Soviet leadership has attempted to achieve major advances in

science and technology. In some instances, as in the development of

nuclear weaponry, i t has been highly successful. In other areas--the

supersonic t ransport Tu-144 being a conspicuous example--special

management techniques, abundant resources, pr ior i ty , and pol i t ica l

backing have not overcome recalci t rant technologies and an economy tha t

is generally inhospitable to innovation.

Current examples of the project-planning technique may include the

work on high-energy devices, including so-cal led "par t icle beam weapons"

and high-energy lasers . Of the 20 to 30 research organizations

par t ic ipat ing in these effor ts in a major way, approximately half are

members of the Academy of Sciences (national an d regional) , one-quarter

are higher education ins t i tu t ions , and the remaining quar ter are

af f i l i a ted with the mili tary-production minis t r ies . (5]

The enlargement of those military research act iv i t i es we have

called "big science" i s a new "front end" to systems tha t have never

been bui l t before. The differences between these act ivi t ies and the

science contributions during the pre-weapons-acquisition phase l ie in

the scale of the undertakings and in the breadth of the technological

[4] By "big science," is meant coordinated research act ivi ty

involving many par t ic ipants , large volumes of resources, and expensive

fac i l i t ies invest igat ing and applying science a t the f ront ie rs of

knowledge.

[5] Examples of ins t i tu te par t ic ipa t ion are presented in SimonKassel and Charles D. Hendricks, High Current Par t icle Beams, I: TheWestern USSR Research Groups, The Rand Corporation, R-1552-ARPA, 1975.



- 33 -

development tha t a system--new in al l i t s par ts - -wi l l require i f i t is

to prove feasible. I t i s one thing to work, for example, on holographic

signal processing for a conventional radar system. I t is substant ia l ly

more complex to devise a high-energy laser defense for bal l i s t i c

missi les . All of the subsystems and components in the l a t t e r case must

be researched, demonstrated, and integrated into a system. No exist ing

organizat ion ha s the capabi l i t ies to carry out the whole task for such

systems. Special ly designated lead inst i tutes and loose, informal

coordination seem to define the chosen approach. Once again, though,

these ac t iv i t ies appear not to have affected the standard approach to

weapons acquisi t ion. The big-science effor ts are clearly dis t inc t from

weapons development, although many of the same defense industry

organizations may par t ic ipa te in big-science projects as in conventional

developments.



- 34 -

VIII. THE LOGIC OF CONTROLLING SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION TRANSFER

THE LOGIC OF CONTROL

Consideration of the control of sc ien t i f ic information requires

set t ing out a simple logic or framework in order to es tabl ish a context

for specif ic points. The f i r s t prerequis i te in this logic is

f eas ib i l i ty . Control is more feasible when there are few sources of the

information and when they are in the control ler ' s own country. Magnetic

fusion research, for example, from i t s beginnings in wartime, was highly

classi f ied in the United States and was confined to research sponsored

by the Atomic Energy Commission. This control lasted unt i l 1958, when

sc ient i s t s from India, Great Bri ta in, and the USSR revealed the i r own

research competence and resul ts in the f ie ld . At that point , the

feasibi l i ty of control dwindled and the benefi ts of collaborat ion grew

apace, whereupon the U.S. declassif ied i t s fusion research.

To just i fy control , the information should be valuable to potent ia l

enemies. Scient i f ic information can be valuable i f i t enhances overal l

eff iciency, or i f i t permits and encourages undesirable enemy mili ta ry

capabi l i t ies . (These points wil l be discussed in greater deta i l below.)

I t is thus necessary to estimate the s ize of the resource-enhancement

effects , the probable military uses of the science, and the potent ia l

damage to the U.S. of permitting a t ransfer . That damage should then be

weighed against the costs generated by control processes or by the

forgone prof i t s or other benefi ts from sale and exchange. A case can be

made for control , therefore, i f the information is contro l lable , i f i t

generates s ignif icant posi t ive resource effec ts or is l ike ly to lead to



- 35 -

par t icular ly undesirable capabi l i t ies , i f these capabi l i t ies have

important effects on U.S. mili tary ef for t s , and i f the benefi ts of

avoiding these effects through controls are not outweighed by the direc t

and indirec t costs tha t the controls impose on domestic science and

research.

Ultimately, most arguments for controll ing (or encouraging)

t ransfers to a potential.enemy can be decomposed into three elements:

(1 ) general resource-enhancement effects , (2 ) effec ts on par t icu lar

capabi l i t ies , and (3 ) inf luence on the other s ide ' s world view.[l ] Any

t ransact ion will general ly have a ll three effects . Most important for

the analysis of science t ransfer is the second effec t : the way and

degree tha t a par t icular science t ransfer could aid the mil i tary effor t

of a potent ia l enemy.

Resource-enhancement effec ts act to increase the resource base or

national income of a country by direct ly adding to resource

avai labi l i ty: by direc t credi t and resource t ransfers; by supplying a

product more cheaply than i t can be produced domestically; or by

increasing eff iciency and product ivi ty . This, in effect , i s equivalent

to an overall sh i f t in the income or budget of the recipient ; the

increase can be allocated in a general way throughout the economy. But,

in addi t ion, the accompanying effects of a t ransaction wil l usual ly make

some par t icu lar se t of goals relat ively cheaper to obtain than other

goals , and thus encourage expenditures in specific direct ions. [2]

[1 ] The f i r s t two effects are what economists cal l the income and

pr ice effects .

[2] In standard economic analysis , these income and price effectsare not independent. They joint ly depend on supply and demand

e la s t i c i t i e s , and prices .



- 36 -

The changing-world-view argument is based on the notion tha t a

potent ia l enemy wil l become more (or less) benign as t ransfers to i t are

encouraged (or denied). A control pol icy could be undone, therefore, i f

the potent ia l enemy's react ion were to view the world as more dangerous,

and therefore increase i ts mil i tary expenditures. The other argument is

also heard: Reducing science- t ransfer controls will ease tensions and

lead to a less dangerous world. The val idi ty of the arguments, however,

has not been demonstrated in ei ther the benign or malevolent guises. [3]

By decomposing the effects of a t ransaction into i t s general and

par t icu lar components, the considerations for control can be made more

expl ici t . Income enhancement effects from the t ransfer of gra in,

electronics technology, or bombs can be analyzed by the same metric.

However, the par t icu lar effects of such very different transfers are

l ikely to lead to quite different behavior. The primary task for

analysts of science t ransfer should be to elucidate the par t icu lar

effec ts : tha t i s , how and to what degree a par t icu lar t ransfer could aid

the mili tary effor t .

CATEGORIES OF SCIENTIFIC INFORNATION

The t ransfer of scient i f ic information can occur in many ways.

Four information categories i l lus t ra te ke y issues for the analysis of

the effec ts of t ransfer on Soviet weapons development: (1) sc ien t i f ic

theory; (2 ) knowledge of act ivi t ies and progress in speci f ic areas; (3 )

experimentation and procedural know-how; and (4 ) instrumentation and

equipment.

[3] For a skept ical view on the posi t ive effects of t rade on Soviet

sens ib i l i t i es , see Nathan Leites, The New Economic Togetherness:

American and Soviet Reactions, The Rand Corporation, R-1369-ARPA, 1973.



- 37 -

Soviet science is strong in theory, but weakens as one moves down

through the categories to hardware, where i t suffers in comparison with

the West. Soviet theory often equals tha t of the West, especial ly when

i t does not depend on empirical foundations that require a great deal of

modern equipment.[4] The USSR ha s ha d notable di f f i cu l ty in producing

laboratory equipment. Inst i tutes are often forced to spend considerable

time and resources building the i r own one-of-a-kind devices. I t is

noteworthy tha t Russian emigre scient is ts mention tha t a laboratory

out f i t t ed with Western equipment i s a mark of high-pr ior i ty , mil i tary

research. Indeed, obtaining access to such equipment is one of the

incentives for engaging in mili tary work.

Knowledge of what is going on in a f ield, of who is doing what, of

the main directions and the false steps, is of grea t benefi t in planning

one 's own research ef for t s . I t is especial ly useful to followers ra ther

than leaders. I t is a category of science-information t ransfer whose

value r ises when the user is in second place or cannot afford r isky

ventures.

Know-how is often the most important, and most often the missing

element in the t ransfer process. I ts absence ca n prohibi t or delay

transforming an idea or device into something useful . Examples abound

of Soviet attempts to duplicate American devices and processes--from

Tupolev's copy of the B-29 bomber to recent effor ts to reverse-engineer

integrated ci rcui t s . In many cases, inst i tutes or design bureaus are

presented with a device and ordered to imitate and produce i t - -by a

[4] Thane Gustafson, "Why Doesn't Soviet Science Do Better Than I t

Does?" in Linda Lubrano and Susan G. Solomon (eds . ) , The Social Context

of Soviet Science, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 32.



- 38 -

minister or pol i t ica l leader. In most instances, this takes years , i t

is very dif f icu l t , an d according to those involved, se ts back indigenous

Soviet science by almost as many years as i t takes to master the foreign

example.[5] The asser t ion of being retarded is widespread over time and

technologies; i t was made by Tupolev, who was forced by Sta l in to

produce the Tu-4, and more recently by those involved in similar

ac t iv i t ies in electronics. The important point here is tha t know-how is

what does not get into the journals. I t requires personal contact and,

frequently, dedicated effor t by both par t ies . This applies to the

t ransfer not only of know-how concerning a device or process, but also

to purely theore t ica l information. Soviet analysts of science often

point with envy to the " invis ible colleges" of the i r colleagues in the

West, where sc ient i s t s working in the same f ield ca n make easy contact

by telephone, le t te r s , or v is i t s . The Soviet penchant for secrecy and

compartmentalization, together with the high ins t i tu t ional barr ie rs

between organizations and sectors , strongly impedes the interna l flow of

information as well as interna t ional flows.

One influence of interna t ional sc ien t i f ic information t ransfer tha t

is associated with knowledge of the f ield l ies more in the psychological

and cul tura l realm than in the world of imitat ion and reverse

engineering. In reviewing statements by Soviet sc ient i s t s about the

conduct of research, on e is struck by the number of times tha t American

or other Western experience i s cited to jus t i fy , ra t ional ize , or

legi t imize the i r own in i t ia t ives . An example of th i s , as related to the

author by an American physic is t , concerned the Soviet physic is t Leonid

[5) I t should be mentioned tha t this claim could be a self-servingcomplaint by people who see themselves invidiously compared with the i r

American counterparts .



- 39 -

I . Rudakov of the Kurchatov Inst i tute . He ha d been mentioned by name in

the f i r s t major ar t ic le in the U.S. on beam weapons.[6] This came to the

at tent ion of high Soviet government of f ic ia ls , an event which, Rudakov

claimed, assured him ful l funding for his beam fusion program, despite a

good deal of ear l ie r doubt and hesi ta t ion by the author i t ies . He noted

tha t , "I no longer have to make neutrons to survive." This looking to

the West is not new. I t goes back to Peter the Great and the founding

of the St . Petersburg Academy of Science in 1724, when Western science

was the norm as well as the goal. Apparently, i t s t i l l is .

Considerations of the control of science information t ransfer must

account for the dif ferent character is t ics of the various categories

mentioned above. Theory is t ransmitted through journals, ar t ic les ,

papers, prepr in ts , presentat ions a t meetings, seminars, and other

processes. Control is dif f icu l t unless the research is performed

predominantly under closed, secret conditions. Even when the bulk of

the research in a f ield is performed in secure f ac i l i t i e s , para l l e l

ac t iv i t ies in open inst i tut ions can lead to some loss of control , as

recent ac t iv i t ies in cryptology demonstrate. Furthermore, i t is not

suff icient to control only the formal publication process.

Communications take place prior to publication through the " invis ib le

col leges" mentioned above.

Knowledge of what is going on in a f ield is just as dif f icu l t to

control as theoret ical information. Published resul ts of research are

important, of course; but so is information on the kind of work that is

being pursued, which is usually available from a wider variety of

sources than are the actual research resul ts .

[6] Clarence A. Robinson, J r . , "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon,"

Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 2, 1977, p. 16.



- 40 -

Because t ransfer of know-how often involves the energet ic

par t ic ipat ion of the possessor of the information, i t s t ransference i s

more readily ident i f iab le and controllable than theory or general

knowledge. I t general ly goes beyond the mere description of research

resul ts or of product at t r ibutes; i t involves the myriad detai l s of

technique. Attempts to acquire know-how are more obvious than the

acquisi t ion of more general knowledge, precisely because of the

extensive effor ts tha t may be required. Because know-how i s often

associated with applications, the us e to be made of the information may

also be discerned, thus informing the applicat ion of controls.

When one considers laboratory instrumentation, equipment, and

supplies, however, the si tuat ion is different . When used direct ly ( that

i s , when i ts acquisi t ion is not for imitat ion but for actual use), the

scient i f ic information is embodied in the hardware. Since such

equipment is designed to be used and documentation i s usual ly available

to fac i l i ta te i t s use, control of t ransfer requires controll ing the

physical shipment of the equipment. In some cases, the equipment is so

highly special ized tha t i t s end use i s fai r ly obvious. This i s not

always the case, though; much of the Soviet deficiency in this area is

in general purpose laboratory hardware as well as in special purpose,

low-production-quantity devices. However, since mili tary uses have

highest pr ior i t ies on foreign purchases, acquisi t ion (legal and i l legal)

of foreign equipment is more l ikely to be for mili tary-re la ted research

than for other uses.



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IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The l ines are blurr ing in the Soviet Union between pure and applied

research, mili tary and civi l ian science, Academy and industry. For many

years in the 1960s, and his tor i ca l ly , the Academy system was t ruly

"academic," but polic ies intended to promote greater science involvement

in the affai rs of the nation have had some effec t . Scient is ts and

ins t i tu t ions , especial ly those at the forefront of the i r f ields, are

more l ike ly to be involved in mili tary science-- through a var ie ty of

mechanisms--than twenty years ago. Consequently, the l ikel ihood tha t

Soviet science contacts with the West wil l prove useful to the Soviet

mili tary ha s also increased.

I t has not been the aim of this report to delve deeply into the

logic of control , but rather to describe the t ies of Soviet weapons

acquisi t ion to science and the t ransfer implications ar is ing from those

t i e s . Three main points flow from that analysis: (1 ) The Soviet

weapons design process faces many incent ives tha t or ient i t away from

the use of advanced science and technology. (2 ) However, the increased

complexity of modern weapons makes greater demands on science and

technology. (3 ) As a net resul t of these two forces, co ntribut ions of

Soviet civi l ian science to the mili tary have been on the increase since

the la te 1960s; these effor ts tend to precede the rout ine

weapons-acquisition process; and civi l ian science contribut ions are

v i ta l to nonroutine "big science" mil i tary effor ts .

Of course, many general questions on the t ransfer of sc ien t i f ic

information remain, answers to which would bet ter inform future pol icy:



- 42 -

(1 ) How should the value of the flow of scient i f ic information and

technology be measured?[!] (2 ) How-can "defense-relevant" scient i f ic

information and technology be identif ied? (3 ) How can the contribut ion

of science to the mili tary be quantified? (4 ) What are the direct and

indirect costs of control to the controller? Progress in answering

these questions would permit a more ra t ional and appropriate application

of the logic of control than i s possible today.

[1] For example, should information be valued at the orig inal costto the sender, the savings to the receiver , the to ta l value to the

receiver (consumer's surplus) , or at a market price established by

actual or proxy t ransact ions?



RAND/R-2942-NAS

soviet science and weapons acquisition

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