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Sept/Oct 2017 Debate Aid Free Resource Brief

South Korea Topic

Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest. Table of ContentsSouth Korea Topic.......................................................................................................................................1

Shortcuts for Flowing/Cardcutting...........................................................................................................3

Definitions...............................................................................................................................................5

Deployment.........................................................................................................................................6

Anti-Missile Systems............................................................................................................................8

Best interest........................................................................................................................................9

Topic Background..................................................................................................................................11

Korean War........................................................................................................................................12

North Korea Today............................................................................................................................13

South Korea Today.............................................................................................................................14

**THAAD**.......................................................................................................................................16

Pro Arguments and Cards......................................................................................................................23

1. Military Defense............................................................................................................................24

2. US Alliance.....................................................................................................................................26

3. Deterrence.....................................................................................................................................28

Con Arguments and Cards.....................................................................................................................34

1. Conflict Provocation with NK.........................................................................................................35

2. China..............................................................................................................................................40

2a. Weakens US-China Relations.......................................................................................................41

2b. China Proliferation.......................................................................................................................42

3. Arms Race......................................................................................................................................48

4. Harm Regional Security..................................................................................................................49

5. South Korea grows dependent on the United States.....................................................................50

Blocks Vs Pro:............................................................................................................................................55

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AT: Doomsday Attack.............................................................................................................................56

AT: Doesn’t Solve for Border Artillery....................................................................................................58

Blocks Vs Con:............................................................................................................................................59

AT: Environment....................................................................................................................................60

AT: Surveillance (maybe).......................................................................................................................62

AT: Nuclear Weapons............................................................................................................................63

AT: China...............................................................................................................................................64

AT: Deterrence......................................................................................................................................65

AT: Diplomacy........................................................................................................................................66

Readable............................................................................................................................................67

Cards..................................................................................................................................................68

AT: Economic Benefit.............................................................................................................................69

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Shortcuts for Flowing/Cardcutting “SoKo”=South Korea

“NK”=North Korea

“AMS”=Anti-missile systems

“Def”=Defense

“Det”=Deterrence

“CN”=China

“US”=United States of America

“Dplt”=Deployment

“BI”=Best Interest

“SKi”=South Korea’s Best Interest

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Definitions

Color Guide for Definitions

Green Color: Most Relevant to Topic.

Red: Less Relevant to Topic.

Blue: Up for your Interpretation, can be Effective

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Deployment

Cambridge Dictionary, 2017 [Cambridge University Press, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deployment]

1. The use of something or someone in an effective way:

the deployment of technologies to address this challenge

2. The movement of soldiers or equipment to a place where they can be used when they

are needed:

The Chief of Police ordered the deployment of 300 troops to try to stop the rioting.

Oxford Dictionary, 2017 [Oxford University Press,

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deployment]

1. The movement of troops or equipment to a place or position for military action.

‘the authorities announced deployment of extra security forces in towns and cities to prevent

violence’

‘they agreed to round up their troops for immediate deployment’

2. The action of bringing resources into effective action.

‘the rapid deployment of high-speed cable Internet services to consumers’

‘a world leader in the development and deployment of wave and tidal power’

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Anti-Missile Systems

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Best interest

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Topic Background

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Korean War Korea was divided into two states with independent political identities in 1948 as an unintended consequence of the Cold War. Prior to the Korean War, North Korea was recognized as being the part of Korea above the 38th parallel north (latitude), with South Korea being to the south of that line. The Korean War created distinctive borders and revealed the intensity that can be created between these two states during wartime. The Korean War is estimated to have claimed more than 5,000,000 lives

Te South Korea is officially known as the Republic of Korea (ROK). South Korea is

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North Korea Today

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South Korea Today

Roehrig, 20

“The difficulty for ROK officials is that U.S. deployment of THAAD to the peninsula, though not a ROK system, could be perceived as an incremental step to South Korea joining the U.S. regional BMD architecture. Seoul has indicated it would allow “further interoperability” but is determined to maintain a separate BMD system under KAMD. Indeed, former USFK commander B.B. Bell has argued that while he favors sending a THAAD battery to South Korea, he strongly opposes U.S. pressure on South Korea and “while I believe that most senior Korean security professionals understand the need for and desire deployment of THAAD, we must recognize that this is a complex issue for the South Korean public. We need to give them some breathing room.”40 In November 2014, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that the State Department approved the sale of 136 PAC-3 missile interceptors valued at $1.405 billion. The sale to an important ally “will increase interoperability between the ROK’s ground and sea-based (Aegis) BMD forces and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), which not only affects ROK national security but also the security of the U.S. personnel assigned in the ROK.”41 Currently, South Korea uses 300 PAC-2 missiles, weapons that use fragmentation warheads and are designed largely to counter aircraft as well as being somewhat capable against short-range ballistic missiles.42 PAC-3s are more capable, designed for all weather operations with on-board radar and guidance systems, along with “hit-to-kill” technology that can target ballistic and cruise missiles along with aircraft.”

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**THAAD**

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD)

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1. InfoDepartment of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2006 [Acquisition Systems Engineering Planning for the Ballistic Missile Defense System.. Inspector General Department of Defense. March 2, 2006 http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy06/06-060.pdf]

The THAAD system development started in 1992 with the award of the contract for the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of the acquisition process, which includes activities now performed in the early part of the technology development phase as defined in DoD Instruction 5000.2. These activities include early operational assessments as necessary to reduce technology, manufacturing, and support risks before the next decision point. The THAAD Element is a ground-based missile defense system that is being developed to protect forward-deployed military forces, population centers, and civilian assets from short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD consists of six principal components: missile round, launcher, command and control/battle management and communications, radar, peculiar support equipment, and non-embedded training devices. The THAAD missile provides a non-nuclear, hit-to-kill, missile intercept capability for engaging and destroying theater ballistic missiles in and above the earth's atmosphere. The THAAD development is divided into blocks (Block 2004, Block 2006, and Block 2008). The development of each block incrementally increases the element's capability. The THAAD Block 04 provides a THAAD Element capable of defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and provides homeland defense against different threats. Block 06 builds on THAAD Block 04, expanding the capabilities of the THAAD Element against increasingly complex targets with a tactical missile configuration. Block 08 includes two development aspects. dgvelopment_aspects,_ First,_ï¬‚ight-testing wilLdetermine. Ihe._capability_ aiths: THAAD_EiemenLagainsLthe.fulLspeclr1un ofishort-_ and.medium-range adversaria|.capabi|ities._ Second,.THAAD.capabi liLy.growth. wilbcnhanc survivability. amuicploymcnt oÂ£ lhe.wcap0n.systcm. -

2. Works best with othersUS Department of Defense, 2000 [BMDO Fact Sheet 204-00-11 “Fact Sheet” http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents/BMDO-THAAD.pdf, DoD, November 2000, pg 1]

“Furthermore, this ability will give U.S. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) forces the time to judge the success of an intercept attempt and, if necessary, launch more interceptors from THAAD or other missile defense systems. As the upper tier of a twotiered TMD architecture, THAAD provides near leak proof protection when employed with PAC-3 or Navy Area Defense.”

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3. 5 Minutes to work

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC 20548, April 2016 [GAO, “Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of Capabilities.” http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676855.pdf, pg. 19]

4. 210 THAAD systems in USVice Admiral J.D. Syring, USN Director, Missile Defense Agency, 2017 [“Before the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, June 7, 2017 pg 4, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY18_WrittenStatement_HASC_SFS.PDF]

Our priority is to continue to deliver greater missile defense capability and capacity to the Warfighter in support of Combatant Command priorities and defense strategy. This budget maintains the commitment to emplace 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by the end of this year for homeland defense and enhance the overall reliability and performance of the GBI fleet. To strengthen regional defenses, we plan to deliver a total of 36 Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IBs to the Navy in FY 2018 for use on Aegis BMD ships and at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, for a

total of 182 delivered since December 2013. MDA also plans to deliver in FY 2018 an additional 52 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors to the Army, for a total of 210 delivered since May 2011.

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We will also press forward with plans to identify, develop, and field cost-effective solutions to enhance BMDS sensors and discrimination for homeland and regional defenses.

5. Operational “The antimissile system recently deployed to South Korea to help protect that nation from a possible missile attack from North Korea is now operational, a U.S. official confirms to ABC News.

Though the system has been long-planned, the United States began moving parts of an antimissile system into its deployment site ahead of schedule last week, surprising some South Koreans and sparking protests by hundreds of residents.

Killalea, 2017 [Debra, “North Korea nuclear weapons: Is THAAD enough to protect the world” April 28 http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-is-thaad-enough-to-protect-the-world/news-story/fc35f24ecda160c465a60014393b1436]

Brendan Thomas-Noone, a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney,

The full THAAD includes three to six truck-mounted launchers which can carry about 50 interceptor missiles. This is backed up by a long-range radar, hailed as the world’s most advanced mobile radar.

But Mr Noone said it was more than that.

He said THAAD is designed to intercept a missile in its ‘terminal’ phase or the final stage as a missile is coming down to hit its target.

6. Cost Manyin et al, 2017 [Mark, “U.S.-South Korea Relations, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, May 23, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf, pg 8]

After North Korea launched a series of missiles in March 2017 into the Sea of Japan, the United States announced that it was deploying the first elements of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea.18 The launches, along with South Korea’s early presidential election, apparently accelerated the timetable of installing the THAAD battery, which had been scheduled for later in 2017. In early May, one week before South Korea’s presidential election, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) announced the system was operational. The land was provided by South Korea, but the United States will pay for the system and its operation. According to press reports, estimated costs for the system range from $800 million to $1.6 billion.19 South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo has stated that South Korea will not bear any of the costs associated with THAAD. Although officials in the Trump Administration have voiced strong support for the deployment, including Secretary of

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Defense Mattis, some analysts speculate that this development could prompt new questions about costsharing in providing for South Korea’s defense.”

7. Makes China wary Kim, 2017 [Yu Bim, March 22, “Hey, China: Deploying THAAD is South Korea’s Sovereign Right” http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/]

How exactly does the THAAD system undermine Chinese security? Unfortunately, China has never provided a clear answer to this question, but many experts agree that Beijing fears THAAD’s X-band radar the most, along with the possibility of an increased missile defense cooperation among the U.S. and its allies. In Beijing’s eyes, the X-band radar could jeopardize the credibility of its second-strike capability by reaching deep

into Chinese territory. (China has a no-first-use nuclear policy.) Concomitantly, China remains quite wary of the development of a U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral military alliance that could emerge from Seoul’s eventual integration into the U.S.-led missile defense system. The formation of such an alliance would be a nightmare for China as it would beef up Washington’s encirclement strategy.

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Signs of North Korean Aggression

A) Missiles

B) Words

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Moon’s Hesitation in Deploying THAAD 4. But US pressure and conflict escalation lessens tentativeness

Lee & Griffiths, 2017 [Tahoon & James, CNN “South Korea expects North to launch ICBM on Saturday, prime minister says.” http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/07/asia/south-korea-thaad-north-korea/index.html, September 7 th 2017]

Speaking to CNN this week, Moon Chung-in, a special adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, said the government had dropped its previous skepticism over THAAD "partly because of American pressure and partly because of the heightened threat of North Korea." It has also caused diplomatic rifts between South Korea and its neighbor China, which Seoul says imposed unofficial sanctions on it after deployment began, with Chinese tourist groups encouraged to boycott South Korea and Chinese consumers attacking Korean companies online. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang warned this week that further THAAD deployment "can only severely damage the strategic security balance in the region," harm the strategic interests of other countries such as China and cause further antagonism on the Korean Peninsula. Russia has also criticized the move.

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Pro Arguments and Cards

PRO

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1. Military Defense 1. THAAD Protection

Elleman & Zagurek, 2016 [Michael & Michael, “THAAD: What it Can and Can’t Do.” 38 North, US-Korea Institute at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.” https://www.uskoreainstitute.org/?utm_medium=38N%20Top%20Banner]

“The deployment of one or two THAAD batteries in South Korea would substantially enhance its capacity to defend against a North Korean missile attack. To be sure, there is no perfect defense against ballistic missile attacks, but

the probability of greatly reducing the damage resulting from missiles with conventional warheads increases when THAAD is incorporated into the defense architecture. When viewed through the lens of providing maximum protection from a North Korean missile threat, accepting the American offer to provide

THAAD to the Republic of Korea is a prudent and defensible policy decision for Seoul.”

Cordesman, 2017 [Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Forces that Shape the Military Options in Korea.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/forces-shape-military-options-korea]

“North Korea can, however, almost certainly develop and deploy at least some form of nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States over the next half decade that will be that are accurate enough to strike at U.S. cities. It can almost certainly develop and deploy nuclear-armed systems capable of striking South Korea and Japan with the next two to three years.”

[North Korea] has created a major missile production base as well as steadily growing inventories of deployed and deployable systems. It can also now move beyond an easily targetable nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, and deploying what seem to be two centrifuge halls at the Yongbyon facility, to dispersing covert centrifuge facilities in new locations.

Survivable missile forces, nuclear weapons, and the ability to launch precision-guided conventional missiles, or ones with biological and chemical warheads are all ways that give North Korea’s leader the ability to maintain its threat to its far more successful neighbor. The deployment of such forces, and the increases in North Korean nuclear technology, steadily limit U.S. capability to carry out preventive strikes. They also enable North Korea to increasingly threaten the United States and Japan. They give North Korea more leverage over China by giving it the ability to escalate to levels that could force China to either intervene on its behalf or deal with its collapse. At the same time, North Korea's growing reliance on nuclear and missile

weapons has other effects. It makes it steadily making it harder for South Korea to deter and contain North Korean threats at lower levels of force, and for the United States to respond with limited strikes or mil

itary options.

Fitzpatrick, 2016 [Mark, Executive Director of IISS-Americas, International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Getting Serious About North Korea,” 15 April 2016, https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2016-d1f9/april-6904/getting-serious-about-north-korea-ccb3.]

But just because Pyongyang wants us to pay attention, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t. While an ICBM threat to the US homeland is still years

away, North Korea today presents a clear and present danger to its immediate neighbours. Its Nodong missiles are a proven system which can hit all of South Korea and much of Japan. Armed with a crude 1,000kg warhead, the Nodong can fly 900km – not quite to Tokyo, but the range covers Japan’s capital if the warhead mass can be reduced to 750kg, a task Pyongyang has probably mastered. The Nodong variant displayed in October 2010 could probably fly 1600km, meaning it could also hit US bases on Okinawa, which is likely to be North Korea’s strategic objective.

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2017, U.S. Missile Defense Agency [“The Threat” https://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html, last updated 03/31/17, https://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html]

North Korea has expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces — from close-range ballistic missiles to ICBMs — and has conducted an unprecedented level of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches since 2016, including its fourth and fifth nuclear tests, as well as its short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, long-range, and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. In February 2016, Pyongyang launched a TD-2 SLV from a west coast testing facility. The technology involved in a satellite launch would be applicable to North Korea's other long-range missile programs. In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 SLV/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the two road-mobile ICBMs which, if successfully developed, would likely be capable of reaching much of the continental United States.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies observes in in 2017 that

[North Korea] has created a major missile production base as well as steadily growing inventories of deployed and deployable systems. It can also now move beyond an easily targetable nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, and deploying what seem to be two centrifuge halls at the Yongbyon facility, to dispersing covert centrifuge facilities in new locations.

Survivable missile forces, nuclear weapons, and the ability to launch precision-guided conventional missiles, or ones with biological and chemical warheads are all ways that give North Korea’s leader the ability to maintain its threat to its far more successful neighbor. The deployment of such forces, and the increases in North Korean nuclear technology, steadily limit U.S. capability to carry out preventive strikes. They also enable North Korea to increasingly threaten the United States and Japan. They give North Korea more leverage over China by giving it the ability to escalate to levels that could force China to either intervene on its behalf or deal with its collapse. At the same time, North Korea's growing reliance on nuclear and missile

weapons has other effects. It makes it steadily making it harder for South Korea to deter and contain North Korean threats at lower levels of force, and for the United States to respond with limited strikes or military options.

A world without anti-missile systems could result in catastrophe as Mark Fitzpatrick, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies explains that

But just because Pyongyang wants us to pay attention, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t. While an ICBM threat to the US homeland is still years

away, North Korea today presents a clear and present danger to its immediate neighbours. Its Nodong missiles are a proven system which can hit all of South Korea and much of Japan. Armed with a crude 1,000kg warhead, the Nodong can fly 900km – not quite to Tokyo, but the range covers Japan’s capital if the warhead mass can be reduced to 750kg, a task Pyongyang has probably mastered. The Nodong variant displayed in October 2010 could probably fly 1600km, meaning it could also hit US bases on Okinawa, which is likely to be North Korea’s strategic objective.

Fortunately, Michael Elleman and Michael Zagurek, researchers at the US-Korea Institute at John Hopkins School of Advanced Studies find in 2017,

“The deployment of one or two THAAD batteries in South Korea would substantially enhance its capacity to defend against a North Korean missile attack. To be sure, there is no perfect defense against ballistic missile attacks, but

the probability of greatly reducing the damage resulting from missiles with conventional warheads increases when THAAD is incorporated into the defense architecture. When viewed through the lens of providing maximum protection from a North Korean missile threat, accepting the American offer to provide

THAAD to the Republic of Korea is a prudent and defensible policy decision for Seoul.”

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2. US Alliance Cornerstone of security and diplomacy=Bilateral AlliancesMcKeon, 2016 [Brian, “Statement of Brian P. Meckeon Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20160414/104621/HHRG-114-AS29-Bio-MckeonB-20160414.pdf, 14 April 2016]

“The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan, and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.

South Korea has an immediate, proximate stake in preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked closely with South Korea to

ensure that our alliance maintains the capacity to do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In addition, South Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2 batteries. DoD has been consulting with South Korea about how it can upgrade its missile defense capabilities as part of an Alliance response to the growing North Korean missile threat. On February 7, 2016, in response to the evolving threat posed by North Korea, the United States and South Korea made an Alliance decision to begin formal consultations regarding improvements to the alliance missile defense posture, specifically exploring the viability of deploying to South Korea a THAAD system to be operated by U.S. Forces Korea.

Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries, early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems”

Protect US SourcesVice Admiral J.D. Syring, USN Director, Missile Defense Agency, 2017 [“Before the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, June 7, 2017 pg 3, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY18_WrittenStatement_HASC_SFS.PDF]

Space-launch activities involve multistage systems that further the development of technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 3 Approved for Public Release 17-MDA-9172 (4 May 17) space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and a new road-mobile ICBM. Over the past year North Korea conducted an aggressive testing campaign, launching at least seven Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which have a range greater than 3,000 kilometers. It also conducted multiple test launches of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. In February 2017 North Korea publicized the launch of a new solid-propellant missile that appeared to be a land-based variant of its submarine-launched ballistic missile. Most recently North Korea conducted a nearsimultaneous ballistic missile salvo launch of four missiles into the Sea of Japan and announced the units firing the missiles

had the mission of targeting U.S. bases in Japan. Today North Korea fields hundreds of Musudan, No Dong, and Scud missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

Alliance can be improved by dialogue and planningRoehrig, 2016 [Terence, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies.” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf pg 222]

South Korea and the United States have maintained the alliance through a variety of regular, bilateral dialogue mechanisms and military exercises. These aspects have taken on increased urgency in the wake of North Korean nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests along with other provocative actions and rhetoric. The

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dialogue and planning that has resulted provide an important tool for improving cooperation and collaboration between Washington and Seoul, while allowing the alliance to adapt and prioritize in an evolving security environment. In addition, these measures furnish opportunities for strategic messaging to North Korea that demonstrate the strength and resolve of the alliance.

Defense through a robust combined defense posture Roehrig, 2016 [Terence, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies.” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf pg 223]

The two most important forums for alliance dialogue are the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the Military Committee Meeting (MCM). Both have been held annually in the fall since the late 1960s, alternating between Washington and Seoul. The SCM includes the U.S. secretary of defense and the ROK minister of defense, and produces a joint communique that is an important indicator of the military

direction of the alliance. The document provides a threat assessment, a review of defense cooperation and joint capabilities, and a confirmation of the continued importance of the alliance. In the 2014 SCM, Minister Han Min-koo and Secretary Chuck Hagel “reaffirmed the two nations’ mutual commitment to the fundamental mission of the alliance to defend the Republic of Korea through a robust combined defense posture.”4 In addition, the communique highlighted the need for combined exercises and alliance readiness given the security environment since 2010, and “that any North Korean aggression or military provocation is not to be tolerated and that the United States and Republic of Korea would work shoulder to shoulder to demonstrate our combined resolve.”5

North Korea views end of hostile policy would

Revere, 2017 [Evans, “Senior fellow Center for East Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, “2017: Year of decision on Korean peninsula.” Feb 8, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_20170208_evans_revere_krins.pdf, pg 6]

North Korea argues that formally ending the Korean War will require the United States to end its “hostile policy,” which Pyongyang says is manifested by the U.S. military alliance with South Korea. In Pyongyang’s view, to end “hostility” the United States would have to terminate that alliance, withdraw its forces from the peninsula, and end its nuclear deterrence commitment to South Korea. Convincing the United States to do this would then open the way for Pyongyang to achieve its ultimate goal: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.

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3. Deterrence

Deterrence the likely strategy Roehrig, 2016 [Terence, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies.” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf pg 222]

When speaking to a Korean audience, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) invariably inserts the Korean phrase katchi kapshida (같이 갑시다), “we go together,” at some point in his remarks. U.S. responses to North Korean provocations have been grounded in its alliance with the Republic of Korea, a commitment of extended deterrence that has been in place since the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1953. The USFK commander also often speaks of being able to “fight tonight,” whereby the alliance seeks to deter an attack on the South but should this fail, the alliance is ready to defend the ROK on short notice. Since the end of the Korean War, deterrence at the strategic level has held firm. Pyongyang has never tried to repeat the large-scale invasion it launched in 1950 to reunify the peninsula. However, it has never stopped conducting numerous smaller-scale operations to disrupt regional stability or destabilize the South, including the Blue House Raid (1968), the seizure of the USS Pueblo (1968), the Rangoon Bombing (1983), the downing of Korean Air 858 (1987), and submarine infiltrations along the East Coast (1996, 1998), among many others. Despite these numerous provocative and antagonizing actions, ROK and U.S. leaders were restrained in their responses, in large part, for fear that retaliation would start a dangerous escalation spiral, a prospect that put Seoul, only 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ), in harm’s way.1 During the past few years, North Korean actions have become even more problematic with three nuclear weapons tests, numerous missile and rocket tests, and in 2010, the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do. Thus, while strategic deterrence has been stable, deterring lower level actions has been a problem, resulting in what scholars call the “stability-instability paradox.” B.H. Liddell Hart, one of the first to note the phenomenon, argued that “to the extent that the H-bomb

reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibilities of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.”2 As it becomes increasingly likely that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear ambitions, a stability/instability paradox playing out in Korea becomes a serious possibility. In addition, neither South Korea nor the United States is likely to take military action to remove North Korea’s nuclear program or the Kim regime, leaving the strengthening of deterrence as the most likely course of action.3 Thus, as strategic deterrence remains stable, deterring lower level provocations remains one of the most difficult challenges for the U.S. military and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Consequently, measures to improve deterrence at these lower levels while also reinforcing strategic deterrence have been at the heart of U.S. military actions taken in Korea over the past two years and will likely remain the focus in the years ahead.’’

Joint response sends a strong deterrence messageRoehrig, 2016 [Terence, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies.” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf pg 226]

According to some reports, the United States and South Korea were ready to conclude a CCP in January 2013 but delayed the final signing. One press report noted, “U.S. officials appeared uncomfortable with South Koreans taking too aggressive a stance that could risk provocations escalating into full scale war as well as possible conflicts on armistice rules of engagement under the U.S.-led U.N. Command.”24 Thus, for U.S. planners, rather than have the ROK military act alone, it would be better to have the United States be part of a response both in planning and

carrying out any military action. Moreover, announcing the intention to have a joint response sends a strong deterrence message to North Korea that there are serious risks should Pyongyang attempt other kinetic provocations.

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4. US-SK Relations

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2.

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Con Arguments and Cards

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1. Conflict Provocation with NK

Missile defense makes NK conflict inevitable—it fails as a deterrent and accelerates proliferationWooksik Cheong a co-founder and director of the Peace Network 2014

“Absolute Anxiety: Steer Clear of US-Led Missile Defense”, https://www.globalasia.org/article/absolute-anxiety-steer-clear-of-us-led-missile-defense/

Next, let me explain why I oppose South Korea’s participation in the US-led missile defense program. This is evident when we examine the reasons for the United States’ Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty with the former Soviet Union in 1972. Although the treaty was repealed when the George W. Bush administration unilaterally withdrew from it, while it lasted the treaty was lauded as a cornerstone of international peace and stability. Strategic stability, its core principle, consists of two pillars: the first is to suppress an arms race, the second is crisis management. Missile defense, meanwhile, exacerbates competition in the development of offensive and defensive weapons, and precipitates mutual distrust, all the while making crisis management difficult in times of escalation. Then whither South Korea’s participation in missile defense? Will missile defense teach Pyongyang the futility of nuclear missiles, prompting it to give up on them? Has there been such a case in human history? The past is said to be a mirror of the future. When the Reagan administration proposed its strategic defense initiative, satirized as “Star Wars” � by critics, the Soviet Union responded by upping its nuclear stockpile and developing even more bizarre missile technologies. China is also considering a variety of responses to the US missile defense project, albeit to a lesser degree than the former Soviet Union. Just what is the rationale behind the belief that North Korea will be an exception? Is it not more likely that Pyongyang would build more and bigger nuclear weapons and missiles while employing its tactics of concealment and deception in response to the trilateral missile defense? China regards South Korea’s participation in the missile defense program as the final straw for Sino-South Korea relations. Why? The worry that missile defense will make it hard to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea and will aggravate the situation on the Korean Peninsula is just one explanation. The Chinese believe the US-led program is really aimed at China. This can be understood in light of the European situation: on the flipside of the Ukraine crisis is Russia’s resentment of NATO’s easterly advance alongside US missile defense. Likewise, China sees the US rebalancing in Asia as a strategy of containment and the US-led missile defense in East Asia as a concrete manifestation of the strategy. South Korea is a US ally located close to the Chinese heartland. Further, the US is in the process of relocating its Yongsan headquarters and 2nd Infantry Division to the Pyeongtaek-Osan area for the sake of strategic flexibility. All of this is being done with the intention of intervening in case of Northeast Asian military conflicts. Simultaneously, to defend these installations, missile defense systems are being deployed and South Korea is being drawn into the program. China sees US intervention as a question of life or death in the case of conflict with Taiwan or Japan. China’s counter-US strategy will differ profoundly depending on the presence of a US-led missile defense program. That is why China is not indifferent to South Korea’s participation in missile defense. In addition, should South Korea join the program, resulting economic burdens vastly outweigh any improvement in its defense. Due to the geographical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula, mountainous and lacking spatial depth, the game of “shooting down bullets with bullets” will only have �a low probability of success. Thoroughly considering all the factors — the deterioration of the North Korean nuclear situation, the risk to Sino-ROK relations and the profit-loss imbalance — missile defense

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is an unworthy endeavor, whether chosen voluntarily or under duress. One can point to the benefit of a strengthened South Korea-US alliance, but the alliance is only a means to pursue security and national interest, not an end in itself. Then what is the alternative? The answer can be borrowed from the wisdom of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in their peaceful cessation of the Cold War. The idea that one can become more secure by making others insecure is based on a one-sided “Cold War mentality.” That mentality � led to tens of thousands more nuclear warheads and fiddling with missile defense without providing any added sense of security. The lesson was clear and costly: the quest for absolute security gives rise to absolute anxiety. To the contrary, the post-Cold War paradigm of common security is rooted in the concept that one can only be secure when the other party also feels secure. THE WAY FORWARD The problems of the Korean Peninsula, including the threat of North Korea, must also be approached with such a mentality. The narrow notion of trying to solve the nuclear problem by rendering North Korea less secure can only repeat the failures of the past. In this regard, missile defense will only make matters worse for South Korea without bringing any benefits. Of course, deterrents are needed against North Korea, but missile defense exceeds the boundaries of deterrence, and as the saying goes, too much is no better than too little. We need a flexible posture in maintaining a firm yet disciplined deterrent, actively engaging in dialogue and negotiation, taking mutual threat reduction measures and ultimately transitioning from a Korean Peninsula armistice regime into a peace regime. In truth, missile defense and Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons are two monsters that grew up side by side over 20 years. The 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the US was unexpectedly confronted by the Republican Party’s platform of offering missile defense as its foremost diplomatic and security policy. The ill-starred relationship between missile defense and Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons deepened in 1998 with the Rumsfeld Commission Report and Pyongyang’s long-range missile launch and reached its peak in 2001 with George W. Bush’s election win. His administration needed a pretext to justify missile defense, and North Korea’s timely brandishing of nuclear weapons played right into US hands. Unfortunately, that cycle has continued into the Obama administration. South Korea needs to break the vicious cycle of South Korea getting trapped more deeply into US-led missile defense in reaction to the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability and vice versa. The answer is closer than one might imagine: to co-operate with China to open the way again to Six-Party Talks. Arguing that these are of no use is a sign of ignorance not only to history but also to diplomacy, which is of course “the art of the possible.” Opening the door to the Six-Party Talks again will allow us to �suppress the mutually reinforcing proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile defense systems. Once we temporarily freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear program, we can also eventually terminate the program. Moreover, the eventual objective of the Six-Party talks is to forge a peace regime not just on the Korean Peninsula but in Northeast Asia. In other words, the alternative to missile defense is Six-Party Talks, an approach that still retains sufficient value. Why reject something that has yet to be fully and properly tried?

Additionally, THAAD deployment would break the strategic balance in the region, triggering a new Cold War and escalating tensions on the peninsulaJeremy Bender China warns South Korea that deploying THAAD missile system would trigger a Cold War-like arms race Business Insider February 29, 2016 6:11 PM http://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-warns-south-korea-deploying-231100663.html

"Much effort has been made to develop bilateral ties to today's level, but these efforts could be destroyed in an instant with a single problem," Qiu warned Kim on Tuesday.¶ ¶ Qiu also warned Kim, during their 45 minute meeting, that the deployment of the US missile system would lead to an arms

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race in East Asia that would ultimately be to the detriment of all nations involved. ¶ ¶ The THAAD deployment, Qiu said, "would break the strategic balance in the region and create a vicious cycle of Cold War-style confrontations and an arms race, which could escalate tensions."

Continued missile provocations cause miscalculation and additional nuclear prolif – that risks extinctionJoel Wit and Jenny Town 2013—Joel S. Wit is a visiting fellow with the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and founder of its North Korea website, 38North.org. Jenny Town is a research associate at the Institute ("7 Reasons to Worry About North Korea's Weapons." The Atlantic. 4/16/13. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/7-reasons-to-worry-about-north-koreas-weapons/275020/)

It is getting so you need a scorecard to keep track of the North Korea crisis. Every day there are reports of new moves on both sides -- U.S. bombers flying to the Korean peninsula, interceptors shifting into position to shoot down missiles, North Korea restarting a nuclear reactor to produce bomb-making material and preparing for missile tests, and of course louder threats. Even harder to figure out are the real dangers; one day the White House says that there are no signs of disturbing military moves by the North, the next day Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel trumpets that Pyongyang represents a "clear and present danger to the United States," and the next North Korea is warning foreigners to leave the peninsula.¶ The situation is confusing, but one

thing is sure. These weapons are not going away and neither are the North Korean s. Pyongyang's arsenal could grow from a

few bombs to, according to some estimates, as many as 50 by 2016, quite a lot for a small country, or any country for that matter.

Also, odds are North Korea will adopt a dangerous strategy for using these weapons , similar to what NATO did during the Cold War. Faced with superior conventional military forces, just as NATO was with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Pyongyang might threaten to "go nuclear" very early in a conflict to forestall defeat.¶ A North Korean nuclear bomb dropped on Seoul or Tokyo would inflict enormous devastation, killing or injuring an estimated two million people in each city.¶ Of course, all may not go well for the North; Pyongyang's close friend China may head it off at the nuclear pass; the North might experience problems building more nuclear weapons; or the U.S. could strike a deal with the North that stops its growing arsenal. In short, we can hope for the best but should be prepared for the worst.¶ Why then should we be concerned about North Korea's WMD arsenal now and in the future? It boils down to seven reasons.¶ 1) The threat of a nuclear attack : Right now, a North Korean attack on the continental United States is not likely because its missiles cannot fly far enough carrying a heavy nuclear warhead. However, they may make progress in the future, and Secretary Hagel's announcement that the U.S. plans to position interceptors in Alaska and

possibly on the east coast to shoot down North Korean missiles is important.¶ The more immediate danger, however, is that the North could use nuclear weapons against its neighbors , South Korea and Japan . If there is a war on the

peninsula, experts believe Pyongyang could probably put nuclear warheads on shorter-range missiles and attack major population centers. A North Korean nuclear bomb dropped on Seoul or Tokyo would inflict enormous devastation, killing or injuring an estimated two million people in each city, not to mention radioactivity that would last for

decades. Pyongyang's ability to inflict horrendous damage is only going to grow if it builds new and more powerful bombs.panThe North has already tried to help Syria build a nuclear reactor that could produce materials for nuclear weapons. Luckily, that reactor was destroyed by Israeli warplanes in 2006. But if Pyongyang's inventory of nuclear bombs grows, its technological base expands, and its need for hard currency to help cope with international sanctions increases, the North will have a larger inventory of merchandise, plus the incentive to look for overseas buyers. It's worth noting that some exports can be done just with the push of a button -- that's all it takes to transfer a bomb design in today's connected world.¶ ¶ Even if we detect transfers, because Pyongyang's own nuclear security blanket may grow, the international community will be less able to stop exports. While some Americans argue that the U.S. should simply attack North Korea if it is caught sending nuclear bombs or technology to our enemies, launching military strikes against a North Korea that has a bristling arsenal of weapons and is not afraid

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/7-reasons-to-worry-about-north-koreas-weapons/275020/

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/7-reasons-to-worry-about-north-koreas-weapons/275020/

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to threaten or even use them would be extremely risky.¶ 3) Growing strains on the U.S. nuclear umbrella provided to our allies. America's alliances with South Korea and Japan are designed to protect them from attack. That includes not just stationing U.S. troops in those countries, but also a willingness to threaten and even use nuclear weapons in their defense against other nuclear-armed countries. While some experts question how effective our "nuclear umbrella" has been, South Korea and Japan see it as vital. It stands to reason that if the threat from North Korea's nuclear arsenal grows, the stress on the U.S. umbrella will also grow, requiring constant reassurance for our allies. The U.S. sent B-2 and B-52 bombers able to carry nuclear weapons to South Korea during the current crisis to calm our ally's growing security concerns while telegraphing a warning to the North. Whether such an approach will remain effective in the future is unclear.¶ Washington's moment of truth may come if North Korea develops nuclear-armed missiles able to reach the United States and South Koreans ask themselves whether the U.S. will risk sacrificing Los Angeles to protect Seoul. Many South Koreans doubt American reliability even today, despite 50 years of alliance. And some cite the distressing example of Washington pulling out of Vietnam during the 1970s. With confidence in U.S. security guarantees already in question, an emboldened Pyongyang could erode that confidence even further.¶ ¶ 4) Increased risk of war by miscalculation . Pyongyang may believe that its nuclear arsenal gives it more freedom to conduct limited military provocations --such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean ship and artillery attack on the South's Yeonpyeong Island -- without reprisal. That was true then, although Washington seems to have restrained the South from launching a serious military response to those actions for fear of triggering a second Korean war. However, now Seoul is working with the U.S. on a new proactive strategy. This means launching "preventive attacks" if intelligence indicates that the North is preparing for a limited strike. It also means responding militarily to provocations like those in 2010. In either case, the dynamic set in motion could trigger an all-out war. What if a mistake is made in identifying North Korean preparations for a strike? And why does anyone think the North is going to roll over and play dead? While some argue that Pyongyang would not respond because war with a stronger U.S. and South Korea would mean suicide, the North may be willing to take the risk. Not responding after all would show a fatal weakness. It's a tough spot for the United States and South Korea to be in, but the cure may be worse than the disease.¶ 5) The aggravation of fault lines in U.S.-Chinese relations. Every time North Korea does something wrong, there is an inevitable outcry that China should solve this problem for us. The logic is, as the North's closest political and economic ally, Beijing has more influence with Pyongyang than anyone else. China, however, is right in claiming that its influence is limited, not only because the North Koreans are adept at resisting pressure from all comers, but also because Beijing has its own national interests. China's top priority has been to avoid instability on its borders--not the U.S. prime objective of denuclearization of the North--and that means making sure North Korea stays solvent in order to avoid collapse and the emergence of a unified Korea aligned with the U.S. on its doorstep.¶ A nuclear-armed South Korea would not only suffer from the economic blowback from its trading partners but its building of nuclear weapons might convince Japan, which has not always been on the best of terms with the South, to follow suit.¶ If Pyongyang's arsenal continues to grow and China does not join in efforts to stop it, chances are this problem will aggravate fault lines already appearing between Beijing and Washington on a whole raft of issues in Asia and elsewhere. The split between the two will deepen, as will the divide between China and South Korea and Japan, who remain the target of threats by Pyongyang. That will create more tensions in a vital region already beset by a host of other problems.¶ 6) A breakdown of the international regime intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear program, while a setback for efforts to stop the spread of these weapons, may trigger far worse developments. In South Korea, where discussion of building nuclear weapons was almost unheard, public opinion polls show two-thirds of Korean citizens now support the idea. As one Seoul dweller told the New York Times, "Having a nuclear North Korea is like facing a person holding a gun with your bare hands." Of course, the downsides would be serious. A nuclear-armed South Korea would not only suffer from the economic blowback from its trading partners but its building of nuclear weapons might convince Japan, which has not always been on the best of terms with the South, to follow suit. That in turn, would create further tensions with Japan's rival, China.¶ At the end of the day, faced with a bullying, nuclear-armed Pyongyang, whose ultimate objective is reunification of the Korean peninsula on its terms, Seoul may have no choice but to rely on its own nuclear umbrella. Where the nuclear dominos fall will depend on Washington's ability to cope with the dangers posed by a nuclear North and to shield its ally.¶ 7) Instability leading to a nuclear coup, nuclear civil war or bombs leaking beyond the North's borders. Pundits have been predicting for decades that North Korea would collapse just like the Soviet Union. They have been

proven wrong, although instability remains possible. North Korea could experience convulsions, perhaps because the military is

fed up with the young leader pursuing policies contrary to its interests; new food shortages could lead to unrest and the unravel ing of the government; or factional fighting between those supporting reform and others who want to maintain the status quo could break out. ¶ The more weapons Pyongyang has, the more dangerous instability becomes. Nuclear bombs could be pawns in a power struggle, even used by different factions against rivals, or they might simply disappear, smuggled abroad and sold to the highest bidder. Moreover, there is nothing that could be done to stop it from happening; restoring order in a collapsing North would require hundreds of thousands of outside troops, and finding the bombs before they are used or exported would require almost 100,000 more. And what would the Chinese do if these troops approach the Yalu River like American soldiers did during the Korean War? Talk about mission impossible.¶ The bottom line is that, even if this current crisis recedes, North Korea's WMD programs pose serious security risks in the region and to the U.S. that will continue to grow if not addressed in a direct and compelling way . Warning Pyongyang against aggression and reacting to nuclear and missile tests with sanctions, while tactically necessary, is strategically inadequate. The challenge for statesmen is to find a strategy that does not just wait for the North's next bellicose outburst, but seeks to moderate its behavior and goes beyond military countermeasures and economic sanctions. It may be distasteful given the nature of the North Korean regime, but there is no

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substitute for diplomacy and direct contact with Pyongyang. Only through such contacts can the United States and the international community figure out whether there is a peaceful way forward.

Even a limited Korean nuclear war causes extinctionHAYES AND HAMEL-GREEN 2009 Peter; Professor of International Relations – RMIT University AND Michael; Dean and Professor of Arts, Education and Human Development – Victoria University, “The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/projects/A-J-disarm/research-workshop/drafts/hayes-hamel-green.pdfThe consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but also for the whole international community. At worst,

there is the possibility of nuclear next-use1 or even an actual nuclear exchange, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are relatively close, well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Japan over 130 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented

proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research is indicating that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming . Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear

darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Whoever uses nuclear weapons in Korea, and especially the first-user, is doomed to possibly win a battle but will certainly lose the political and psychological war, especially among Koreans. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by

nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis , and

in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence , including possible loss-

of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

http://www.nautilus.org/projects/A-J-disarm/research-workshop/drafts/hayes-hamel-green.pdf

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2. China

Congress, 2017 [H. Res. 223, U.S. Government Information, GPO, Authenticated U.S. Government Information, https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hres223/BILLS-115hres223ih.pdf]

Whereas a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, denounced the alliance’s decision to deploy the THAAD system and vowed that Beijing would ‘‘take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests’’ further warning that the two countries should not ‘‘go further and further down the wrong road’’; Whereas, on March 6, 2017, the first components of the THAAD anti-missile system, including two launchers, arrived at Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea; Whereas the Republic of Korea and the United States reiterated on numerous occasions that the THAAD system would be deployed solely for the purpose of defending against North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third-party nations; Whereas U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) stated that ‘‘North Korea’s accelerating program of nuclear weapons VerDate Sep 11 2014 02:22 Mar 24, 2017 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR223.IH HR223 lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS 3 •HRES 223 IH tests and ballistic missile launches constitute a threat to international peace and security,’’ and that the THAAD battery is a ‘‘strictly defensive capability’’ and ‘‘poses no threat to other countries in the region’’; Whereas Hwang Kyo-Ahn, the Acting President of the Republic of Korea reiterated the need for early deployment of THAAD and further stated that the Government of the Republic of Korea would look aggressively for ‘‘ways to effectively strengthen the United States extended deterrence’’ in South Korea; 232

Lee, 2017 [Brianni, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, “THAAD Deployment in South Korea, Militarism Leading to Political Regression” http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503”, feb 17]

China’s fierce condemnation of THAAD deployment is the expression of its discomfort with the nearby presence of the US military. While the United States argues that the deployment of THAAD has a purely defensive purpose, China assumes that THAAD deployment creates a potential threat of US intervention against Chinese military action. China also accuses the South Korean government of supporting US military interests and willingly taking the role of the United States’ “puppet state.” China has two main arguments against THAAD deployment. First, China argues that THAAD is unnecessary for protecting South Korea. THAAD is designed to detect and shoot down ballistic missiles in their reentry phase, thereby preventing longer-distance missiles from exploding on land. Because the distance between Pyongyang and Seoul is merely 194 kilometers, China has claimed that THAAD is not suited for protecting South Korea. Second, THAAD’s radar can detect China’s military actions and interfere with Chinese interests. Because THAAD has to detect missile action as soon as possible, it must constantly collect data from areas within a 1,000 kilometer range, which includes Chinese and Russian territory. THAAD deployment in South Korea seems unlikely to improve relations with North Korea since compromised relations with China, one of few countries with significant influence over North Korea, will likely further damage relations on the peninsula.

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2a. Weakens US-China Relations

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2b. China Proliferation

BMD in Asia triggers destabilizing arms races that crack the foundation of deterrence between the US and China risking war.Navarro, 2015 [Peter, Professor at the University of California-Urvine, Crouching tiger: What China's militarism means for the world. NY: Prometheus Books. Pg. 60]

Of course, the importation of these AMD¶ systems into the theater is, in and of itself, likewise escalatory because China’s likely response will be to simply build more missiles in an attempt to ‘swarm’¶ and thereby overwhelm any such systems – a classic case of a ‘security dilemma’¶ arms race playing out before our eyes¶ Note, however, that

the introduction of American advanced missile defense systems in response to china’s growing missile threat is not just escalatory. It is also highly destabilizing. This is because a US missile shield may not just neutralize China’s conventional missile arsenal, it also, inevitably, and perhaps quite unintentionally, will threaten China’s nuclear “second strike” capability. This is highly destabilizing because it is just such a second strike capability that is the foundation of nuclear “mutually assured destruction” deterrence , that is, “if I can second strike you back with deadly nuclear missiles you won’t strike me first”.

BMD development is the primary driver of Chinese hypersonic weapons developmentErika Solem and Karen Montague 2016 Erika Solem is a Ph. D. Fellow at the Potomac Foundation where she supports the research efforts on the "China’s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. Karen Montague is a Research Fellow at the Potomac Foundation Updated - Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Development Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 7April 21, 2016 05:30 PM

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45313&no_cache=1#.V2sSXPkrKM8

China on the other hand has conducted seven DF-ZF tests in the past year and a half. And although frequency does not determine test quality, it does show that China is dedicated to the successful development of this technology. Its 10th Research Institute (also known as the “Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute”), which is under the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is the sole entity responsible for the development of HGVs. [2] This unique concentration of the entirety of the program into the 10th Research Institute seems to have facilitated a remarkably quick development of China’s DF-ZF. Unlike the United States, China is assumed to be using a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) as the delivery method for all of its HGV tests. This design launches the boost-glide vehicle into the atmosphere along a trajectory similar to a traditional ballistic missile. After the vehicle reenters the earth’s atmosphere, it boosts itself back into the upper atmosphere. It then performs a pull up maneuver to control speed and altitude before gliding into its target (Next Big Future, August 1, 2015). The low trajectory of the HGV and its intended mid-flight maneuverability is believed to prevent ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems from locking onto its target. Countries in the region with BMD available to intercept a Chinese HGV are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, each with U.S. supplied PATRIOT-3 (PAC-3) batteries, along with India, Pakistan and Russia, each of whom has its own indigenous BMD, as well as BMD purchased from other countries. The DF-ZF’s unpredictable flight path and ability to be launched from a variety of missiles, each with different range capabilities, shows that China’s goals for its HGV is to evade ballistic missile defense systems that

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threaten its ability to launch a successful offensive or defensive strike.¶ A major concern about China’s HGV program is that the weapons they are developing could have both conventional and nuclear capability. [3] The wreckage of China’s second (and failed) HGV test indicates that it was conducted using a liquid-fueled launch platform. This test contradicts the many reports that China is using the DF-21 solid-fueled rocket as a launch platform, however, it warrants special attention because it is the only one that has public images of its components (Arms Control Wonk, September 3, 2014). This is important because liquid-fueled launchers are associated with China’s nuclear program. The use of a liquid-fueled launch platform such as the Long March-4C (speculated to have been used in the second test) indicates that China may be developing the DF-ZF for both conventional and nuclear use. An alternative explanation for the use of liquid fuel could be to compensate for the weight of the glider during acceleration to hypersonic speed. However, this explanation likely complements—rather than displaces—the theory behind intended nuclear use (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2014). [4]¶ China’s design of the DF-ZF indicates that its primary goal is to have it travel fast and low enough to evade BMD systems. China has expressed its frustration with deployed U.S. BMD in the Western Pacific for over a decade due to the perception that such a system would degrade China’s limited nuclear deterrent (MOD, May 26, 2015; MOD, December 9, 2011). Further adding to China’s unease, other regional powers such as Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in ballistic missile defense, making any sort of larger-scale engagement in the region quite challenging for China’s missile forces (CRS, April 3, 2015). Most of China’s HGV launches have attempted to travel distances up to 1,750 km (1,087 miles) and have been launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi province (China Military Online, December 12, 2014). The intended distance of these tests is a strong indicator that China is either less advanced in its HGV development than the United States or is priming its weapons to address regional threats. If China successfully designs an operational medium-range HGV, it will have a better chance of delivering successful missile strikes against its regional adversaries. Given China’s regional focus—particularly on developing the ability to defeat the Taiwan militarily—a shorter-range HGV addresses China’s more immediate needs.

Hypersonic weapons are a unique escalation riskEleni G. Ekmektsioglou Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou is pursuing her PhD at American University’s School of International Service. Her research focuses on the impact of military innovation on crisis management. She is a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.¶ June 28, 2015

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-hypersonic-missiles-push-america-china-towards-war-13205

The main drivers behind escalation are two: firstly, hypersonic weapons are escalation prone due to their low levels of responsiveness once they are initiated, and limited capabilities for signaling given their high speed. All these make a surprise attack an eventuality the other side needs to account for pushing both parties to seizing the initiative early which leaves no room for signaling and diplomacy. Secondly, within the context of China’s “double deterrence,” according to Thomas Christensen, both nuclear and conventional ballistic forces are put under the same command. This strategic move, in essence, “manufactures” an inadvertent escalation scenario where an eventual American surgical strike against conventional systems inadvertently engages with nuclear targets. Put simply, the objective is to deter the adversary from implementing surgical strikes under the “manufactured” threat of inadvertent escalation.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1258.html

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1258.html

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-hypersonic-missiles-push-america-china-towards-war-13205

http://nationalinterest.org/profile/eleni-g-ekmektsioglou

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US-China war goes nuclear5Goldstein, 2013 – Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013)

Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post-Cold War era. The first is the potentially deadly mix of nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and international terrorists, a worry that became dominant after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.1 The second concern, one whose prominence has waxed and waned since the mid-1990s, is the potentially disruptive impact that China will have if it emerges as a peer competitor of the United States, challenging an international order established during the era of U.S. preponderance.2 Reflecting this second concern, some analysts have expressed reservations about the dominant post-September 11 security agenda, arguing that China could challenge U.S. global interests in ways that

terrorists and rogue states cannot. In this article, I raise a more pressing issue, one to which not enough attention has been paid. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak, the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict . In contrast to the long-term prospect of a new great power rivalry between the United States and China, which ultimately rests on debatable claims about the intentions of the two countries

and uncertain forecasts about big shifts in their national capabilities, the danger of instability in a crisis involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible, near-term concern . 3 Even if the probability of such a war-threatening crisis and its escalation to

the use of significant military force is low, the p otentially catastrophic consequences of this scenario provide good reason for analysts to better understand its dynamics and for policymakers to fully consider its implications . Moreover, events since 2010—especially those relevant to disputes in the East and South China Seas—suggest that the danger of a military confrontation in the Western Pacific that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise. In what follows, I identify not just pressures to use force preemptively that pose the most serious risk should a Sino-American confrontation unfold, but also related, if slightly less dramatic, incentives to initiate the limited use of force to gain bargaining leverage—a second trigger for potentially devastating instability during a crisis.4 My discussion proceeds in three sections. The first section

explains why, during the next decade or two, a serious U.S.-China crisis may be more likely than is currently recognized. The second section examines the features of plausible Sino-American crises that may make them so dangerous. The third section considers general features of crisis stability in asymmetric dyads such as the one in which a U.S. superpower would confront an increasingly capable but still thoroughly overmatched China—the asymmetry that will prevail for at least the next decade. This more stylized discussion clarifies the inadequacy of focusing one-sidedly on conventional forces, as has much of the current commentary about the modernization of China's military and the implications this has for potential conflicts with the United States in the

Western Pacific,5 or of focusing one-sidedly on China's nuclear forces, as a smaller slice of the commentary has.6 An assessment considering the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility . Before proceeding, however, I would like to clarify my use of the terms "crisis" and "instability." For the purposes of this article, I define a crisis as a confrontation between states involving a serious threat to vital national interests for both sides, in which there is the expectation of a short time for resolution, and in which there is understood to be a sharply increased risk of war.7 This definition distinguishes crises from many situations to which the label is sometimes applied, such as more protracted confrontations; sharp disagreements over important matters that are not vital interests and in which military force seems irrelevant; and political disputes involving vital interests, even those with military components, that present little immediate risk of war.8 I define instability as the temptation to resort to force in a crisis.9 Crisis stability is greatest when both sides strongly prefer to continue bargaining; instability is greatest when they are strongly tempted to resort to the use of military force. Stability, then, describes a spectrum—from one extreme in which neither side sees much advantage to using force, through a range of situations in which the balance of costs and benefits of using force varies for each side, to the other extreme in which the benefits of using force so greatly exceed the costs that striking first looks nearly irresistible to both sides. Although the incentives to initiate

the use of force may not reach this extreme level in a U.S. China crisis, the capabilities that the two countries possess raise concerns that escalation pressures will exist and that they may be highest early in a crisis , compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict.

US deployment of BMD systems risks collapse of Chinese NFU doctrine; and other increased suspicions creating further instability in relations.Virginia Marantidou and Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou is pursuing her PhD at American University’s School of International Service. Her research focuses on the impact of military innovation on nuclear posturing and crisis management.

Virginia Marantidou is Program Coordinator, Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a non-resident WSD-Handa fellow with Pacific Forum, CSIS.

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¶ February 17, 2016 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227?page=3

American officials’ numerous assurances notwithstanding, China remains suspicious of the U.S. BMD program. As much as the U.S. has named the DPRK (and previously, Iran) as the main targets of its limited BMD capabilities, China insists that ballistic missile defenses decrease the security of its own nuclear arsenal. Specifically, Chinese experts are concerned about their country being subject to American coercion, mainly due to Washington’s nuclear superiority, which married to BMD and hypersonic weapons—Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)—puts China’s retaliatory capability at stake. Wu Chunsi, director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at SIIS, argues that missile defense makes China’s No-First-Use doctrine increasingly difficult to maintain because it gives the United States a double advantage in both offensive first-strike capability and credible defensive capability. The main concern is that hypersonic weapons could facilitate a preemptive strike against the Chinese arsenal, which, after an attack, would be seriously weakened and less capable of successfully penetrating U.S. BMD systems.

This causes further arms racing and accidental nuke warAlexander Kolbin 12, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Coordinator at the PIR Center, “China and Nuclear Disarmament,” in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical Necessities, google books [pages not numbered]

In any event, if China were to build up its nuclear arsenal, that would have negative effects for the entire system of regional security in Asia Pacific. Faced with such a scenario, Japan and South Korea might try to acquire their own nuclear capability. Such a move by China could also trigger a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan69 and have a very adverse impact on Russian- Chinese strategic dialogue.

Besides, a rapid increase in the numbers Of Chinese nuclear weapons would disturb the strategic balance in Asia Pacific, prompting the United States and its allies to speed up their missile defence deployment in the region. ¶ Finally, a sharp increase in the size Of the Chinese nuclear arsenal would probably mean that Beijing has abandoned its current defensive posture, including its no-first-use commitment . At the very least. that commitment would become more of a propaganda tool than a practical strategy. Such an increase could signal a transition to the "launch under attack" strategy, whereby Beijing would try to reduce to a minimum, the time between the enemy'S strike and the launch Of its own nuclear missiles . That would require advanced and highly reliable early warning systems which , according to various sources, China either does not have at all or is only just beginning to deploy. According to some sources, at present China stores nuclear warheads separately from the missiles. A number of

researchers believe this is because China "lacks reliable technical means for preventing unauthorised use Of nuclear weapons".

BMD induced vulnerability results in Chinese MIRV development—outweighs any other factorsBaohui Zhang 2015 “China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order” New York: Routledge.

The rise of US missile defense has altered the incentive structure for the force development of Chinese nuclear deterrence . Until the 1990s, China subscribed to the doctrine of minimal deterrence. Now, US missile defense has provided a powerful reference point for the development of Chinese nuclear forces. China must make sure that its

http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/chinas-no-first-use-policy-promotes-nuclear-disarmament/

http://book.douban.com/subject/1443738/

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offensive capability can keep pace with any advancement in US defensive capabilities. Thus, contrary to the view that the Chinese nuclear posture has not undergone major changes, China’s response to missile defense has in fact critically affected warhead deployment patterns, basing modes, and the size of its strategic nuclear force. First, in recent years China has successfully developed and deployed a new generation of strategic weapons systems. For example, in addition to the DF-31 strategic missile, which has a range of 8,000 kilometers and is road mobile, the longer-range DF-31A was officially debuted at a military parade on October 1, 2009. The missile has a range of at least 11,000 kilometers and is thus capable of striking the entire USA. This capability was confirmed by Zhang Guangzhong, commander of the DF-31A squadron that participated in the military parade. During an interview with Xinhua

News Agency, Zhang claimed that the missile “is capable of hitting all important strategic targets.” 32 More importantly, China has clearly abandoned its previous single-warhead deployment pattern in order to counter US missile defense . After its debut in October 2009, an important Chinese military magazine published an article on some of the details of the DF-

31A. It claimed that the missile is capable of carrying either a single warhead of one-megaton yield or three to five warheads of 90 kiloton

yield. 33 This magazine, published by the Chinese defense industry, has good credibility due to its special access to China’s strategic weapons research establishment. As the following paragraphs show, it has published a series of lengthy interviews with Wang Wenchao, a chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, on ballistic missile and nuclear warhead designs. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 , Chinese reports in October 2012 claimed that China’s DF-25

medium-range missile is the world’s first missile of its class to carry three independently guided nuclear warheads. If China can put three warheads on the DF-25, the much larger intercontinental DF-31A should certainly be able to carry multiple warheads. Indeed, in the age of US missile defense, equipping its strategic missiles with multiple warheads has become a necessity for China to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence. In fact, Chinese assessments suggest that deploying multiple and independently guided warheads is vital for the penetration of defensive systems. As revealed by two Chinese missile experts, “According to studies, when warheads number between 5 and 10, a missile’s penetration probability approaches 1. This is reportedly capable of carrying 10 MIRV warheads, a Chinese missile expert offered an analysis to highlight the vital importance of MIRV technologies. As he pointed out: The main purpose of MIRV technologies is to improve penetration probabilities and to ensure the credibility of nuclear deterrence . Assuming that the enemy’s defensive system can achieve a success rate of 80% against a single warhead, then the penetration rate of the single warhead should be 20%. However, three warheads will improve the

penetration rate to 48.8%. The penetration rate of ten warheads will be 89.26%. 35 In an interview on ballistic missile design, Wang Wenchao argued that “facing a complex missile defense environment, without the aid of penetration technologies and stealth measures, missiles will not be able to survive, let alone hit their targets. Penetration technologies primarily refer to multiple and independently targeted warheads.” 36 In another interview focusing specifically on nuclear warhead design, Wang discounted the effectiveness of using decoys to elude missile defense, citing the rapidly improving technologies that can differentiate real warheads from decoys. Instead, Wang argued that deploying multiple warheads was the only guarantee of successful penetration of missile defense. 37 Indeed, according to Wang’s research, 100 single-warhead-equipped missiles cannot penetrate a multilayered missile defense , even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack. In this

interview, Wang actually provided the blueprint of a design that contained five warheads. 38 Although there is no evidence that this particular design is used by the newest Chinese strategic missiles, it certainly matches the claimed number of warheads deployed on the DF-31A. The possibility that China’s new generation of strategic missiles are armed with multiple warheads has been further established by recently released photos of the JL-2 SLBM. In October 2010, the Channel 7 of China’s CCT V showed documentary footages of a JL-2 being lunched from under the sea. 39 This was the first time that pictures of this new sea-based strategic missile were released to the public. According to a sequence of images, the missile has a blunt nose design that suggests it is armed with multiple warheads. It is completely different from the cone-shaped nose design of China’s first-generation SLBM, the single-warhead equipped JL-1. According to Tang Zhicheng, a nuclear expert of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the nose shape of strategic missiles “is primarily determined by the number of warheads carried and the ways they are arranged inside the missile.” 40 According to Tang, while a cone-shaped nose is used for

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single warhead missiles, French M51 SLBM as examples of this latter design. Both of them can carry 8–10 warheads. The JL-2 shown in the CCTV documentary has exactly the same blunt nose design as Trident II D-5 and M51. This is the most convincing evidence so far that China’s new generation of SLBM could be armed with multiple warheads. In contrast, the single-warhead equipped JL-1 has the classic cone-shaped nose. China’s newest strategic missile, the DF-41, represents the most important efforts by the Chinese military to employ MIRV technologies to ensure penetration of US missile defense. The missile first made its debut in a widely circulated photo on the Internet. On July 24, 2012 China performed the first test of the missile. The missile saw its second test on December 13, 2013. According to

analyses, this road-mobile missile, by being able to carry up to ten warheads and being able to reach the entire USA, is tailor-made for US missile defense. One Chinese analysis argues that the missile’s ten MIRV warheads “will make them extremely difficult to be intercepted.” In fact, the analysis claims that the DF-41 will “render US missile defense useless.” 41 Another analysis argues that DF-41 could resolve the challenges of coordinating a counter attack by single warhead missiles during times of war. As it states, “In theory, one hundred single warhead missiles could be launched simultaneously to increase penetration probabilities. However, in front of a potent missile defense system, if effective simultaneous launches are not possible, then each warhead will face the possibility of being defeated individually. This scenario will destroy China’s nuclear

counter-attack.” 42 Instead, the DF-41 will be far more likely to penetrate missile defense by carrying multiple warheads and decoys. Therefore, Chinese analyses argue this missile is capable of re-shaping the strategic balance between China and the USA . As an

editorial of the Global Times claims, the DF-41 “is an offensive oriented strategic missile and possesses extremely potent deterrence and balancing capabilities” and will “fundamentally change the US perception of Chinese power.” 43 Given their ability to vastly improve China’s offensive nuclear capabilities, US security experts are taking notice of the DF-41 strategic missiles. According to Larry Wortzel, an expert on the Chinese military, “The bigger implication of this is that as they began to field a force of missiles with multiple warheads, it means everything we assume about the size of their nuclear arsenal becomes wrong.” 44

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3. Arms Race

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4. Harm Regional Security

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5. South Korea grows dependent on the United States Lee, 2017 [Brianni, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, “THAAD Deployment in South Korea, Militarism Leading to Political Regression” http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503”, feb 17]

THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China’s strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea’s conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD’s risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be

independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive MD system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia, which have openly expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule.

Lee, 2017 [Brianni, staff writer for the Harvard International Review, “THAAD Deployment in South Korea, Militarism Leading to Political Regression” http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503”, feb 17]

“Another unsettling fact for South Korean citizens who oppose THAAD deployment is that the South Korean government has no control over either the information gathered by THAAD or the actual use of the technology during an attack, because THAAD is a US weapon solely controlled by the US military. South Korea is only providing the deployment location, but controls neither the technology nor operations. Many on the left in South Korea see deployment of THAAD as increasing dependence on the US military for South Korean self-defense.”

US presence tanks South Korean influence in multiple waysBandow 15 (Doug Bandow, JD from Stanford University and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Kick South Korea Off of America's Defense Dole: Seoul Should Be Too Proud to Be an International "Welfare Queen"”, The World Post, 7-29, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/kick-south-korea-off-of-a_b_7899940.html)

However, the delay won't make a future Park trip any more useful. There is much on which the two nations should cooperate, since the

Republic of Korea has graduated from Third to First World status and sports one of the world's largest and most advanced economies. But the military alliance is outdated . Despite having surged past the North, enjoying a 40-to-1 economic advantage and 2-to-1 population edge, Seoul continues to play the helpless dependent, unable even to command its own forces in a war. The military relationship was forged in a different time. The U.S. and Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula after Japan's surrender in 1945. There weren't many alternatives. Continued Japanese rule would have enraged all Koreans and united Soviet rule would have enslaved all Koreans. But the division resulted in two hostile Korean states, leading to a three-year quasi-civil war, in which the U.S. and West fought against China and the Soviet Union through their respective Koreas. After mass destruction, highlighted by millions of casualties and refugees, the conflict ended roughly where it started. With the ROK a wreck and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea backed by neighboring China and Soviet Union, only Washington's security guarantee kept the South independent, if not exactly free. That eventually changed. In the 1960s President Park Chung-hee, the present president's father, suppressed all political opposition but reformed the economy, leading to the ROK's dramatic growth. Democracy

waited another quarter century, until the growing middle class tired of military rule. Yet through it all South Korea's defense dependency on America persisted. Seoul surpassed the DPRK in economic strength and achieved political stability. The Soviet

Union disappeared and China joined the international community, with both Beijing and Moscow recognizing the South. South Korean

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/kick-south-korea-off-of-a_b_7899940.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/kick-south-korea-off-of-a_b_7899940.html

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businesses spanned the globe and Seoul began having military ambitions beyond the peninsula. No matter. The ROK insisted that abundant American forces must remain, backed by additional units aground in Okinawa and afloat and aflight in the Pacific. The South Korean government hasn't even been willing to take over operational control, or OPCON, of its own forces in wartime. It isn't ready, it insists. Why not, one wonders? North Korea commands its forces. One can't imagine Kim Il-sung leaving the keys to his tanks

with Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong after the Korean War concluded. What other nation with serious international ambitions subcontracts not only its defense, but control of its own forces, to another government? For decades. Of course, some South Koreans admit that they most fear shifting command would encourage Washington to withdraw its troops. Thus, their objective is to appear as helpless as possible as long as possible to retain the U.S. troop tripwire. Please, we just can't do it without you, Seoul tells Washington. It's an embarrassing ploy by a country whose people want to be taken seriously abroad. The present arrangement obviously is bad for America, other than for U.S. officials who enjoy running the world, or at least who think that they run it. The "mutual defense treaty" requires Americans to defend the ROK. In return, the South agrees to be defended. That's the way it always has been, and nothing much has changed recently despite all of the talk of refashioning the alliance. Protecting South Korea isn't cheap. Promising to go to war means America might have to go to war. That's a risk which should not be taken lightly. Being ready to go to war requires force structure. The more potential wars, the bigger the military needed. That the ROK helps pay for occupation costs ignores the more basic expense, the cost of raising, equipping, and maintaining the units themselves. Nevertheless, Washington considered the ROK's survival as compensation enough, at least in the early years, when the U.S. was prepared to defend South Korea as part of the larger Cold War struggle. But today the peninsula is militarily inconsequential. A North Korean victory would be just that, a North Korean victory, not the first leg of an exorable march toward global Communist domination. There would be no threat to America. No question, of course, it would be an awful outcome. But that doesn't mean it warrants a permanent "alliance" entangling the U.S. in one of the most heavily militarized and unstable regions on earth. Anyway, the North would win a conventional contest only if Seoul allowed the former to do so, by failing to build the defense which it is well-capable of deploying. The South is only acting helpless. Leon Whyte of the Fletcher Security Review calls for expanding the alliance "beyond old parameters," but there are no alternative purposes for the military alliance (in contrast to reasons for friends to cooperate). Some American policymakers imagine the ROK as part of an iron ring containing the People's Republic of China, but few South Koreans want to make a permanent enemy of their big neighbor with a very long memory. It's one thing to be defended by America in the extremely unlikely event that the PRC attacked the South. But to join the U.S. in a war against China over, say, Taiwan's quest for independence or Tokyo's control of the Senkaku Islands? Washington can dream on. The South Koreans ain't that crazy! The Pentagon imagines other military scenarios in East Asia -- say a squabble in Southeast Asia -- but they almost certainly wouldn't justify American intervention. And even if they did, Seoul wouldn't likely join in unless it was in the ROK's interest to do so, in which case a formal treaty would be unnecessary. (The first President Park sent soldiers to Vietnam in order to convince Washington to keep U.S. personnel in the South.) A temporary coalition of the willing makes more sense than permanently defending another country in the hope that it might help out somewhere sometime. Seoul did kick in some support for America's misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, but again, if the price was a permanent garrison on the peninsula, the cost was far too high. Nor does Washington get much else out of the relationship. South Koreans have never purchased U.S. products as a reward for America's defense guarantee. Nor has the Blue House ever pliantly taken orders from Washington. Seoul rolls out the red carpet when an American president visits, but acts in its own interest nonetheless. Army Lt. Col. James Minnich proposed that a "comprehensive, strategic alliance" cover climate change, human trafficking and peacekeeping, but none of these have anything to do with a bilateral military pact. The most important downside for the U.S. today is that defending the South puts America in the middle of a contest between North and South Koreas, Japan, China and Russia. All have more at stake than the U.S. Washington is constantly badgering the PRC to do America's bidding against Pyongyang. And North Korea is constantly threatening the U.S. only because the latter's forces "are there," in the South, threatening the DPRK. Pyongyang might not like Washington, but it wouldn't care about America if U.S. troops weren't on its border. The North likely would spend its time issuing threats against its neighbors instead. As it is, the Korean peninsula is one of the most important flashpoints which could drag America into a real war with potentially horrific casualties, even if the outcome was certain "victory." While it might have been likely that North Korea would have sought nuclear weapons anyway, America's involvement likely made it inevitable. As Henry Kissinger once said, even paranoids have enemies, and only nukes offer a certain deterrent to the North, which today alone faces the U.S. in a region filled with U.S. allies. Worse, Washington has proved its willingness to dismember (Serbia), undermine (Syria) and impose regime change (Afghanistan, Grenada, Haiti, Iraq, Panama), even after making a deal with a government (Libya). The fact that the Kim dynasty is evil does not mean that it has no legitimate security fears which might be assuaged by possession of a nuclear arsenal. Only by markedly reducing the threat perceived by the DPRK is Washington likely to have meaningful negotiations over nuclear weapons, like those going on with Iran, once viewed as a fellow pariah state.

Although the benefits of being defended are obvious, the ROK loses in several ways. The first is diminished self-respect. Real

countries should defend themselves, not be dependent on other states. Persistent squabbles over the status of forces agreement highlight the tension of being a sovereign state and hosting foreign troops. South Koreans rankle over showing American personnel special consideration, but the U.S. can't station forces in another nation without ensuring minimal

legal protections. Second, the South's defense is in part out of its own hands . After the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the U.S. urged restraint at almost any price. And Washington had the right to do, since it could be drawn into a

war if Seoul retaliated and conflict erupted. Contracting out one's defense to others necessarily yields control over major defense decisions. Third, the ROK's diplomatic strategy toward the North suffers . If Washington chooses the opposite approach, the result will be conflict and confusion. Moreover, the U.S. can use its dominant position to pressure South Korea to adopt America's stance. Differences between George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung were sharp, for instance. To the

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extent that Pyongyang views the South as merely a puppet regime the former will pay more attention to America's tactics. Fourth , secure in the U.S. defense guarantee Seoul has felt little pressure to seek a modus vivendi with Japan. The two prosperous democratic states should cooperate in defending themselves and promoting regional security , but have refused to leave history behind them. Both nations' leaders made conciliatory remarks on the 50th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, but nothing substantive changed. Both countries share the blame but face the same

perverse incentives. Fifth , relying on the U.S. encourages South Korea to accept permanent dependency. No special geographical feature of the peninsula keeps the country to the south militarily inferior. But Seoul has less incentive to invest in the military. If the South won't defend against the North, which really does pose a threat,

Washington can't seriously expect the ROK to join America in containing China.

South Korea is seeking independence but it’s ineffective—now is key for the plan to solveWork 15 (Clint Work, Ph.D. Candidate at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington and M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations, "South Korea: Dependence in the Age of OPCON", The Diplomat, 7-9, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/?allpages=yes_) swap

South Korean leaders have consistently sought to dilute their dependence on the U.S . As part of this

effort, the ROK has worked to develop its own armaments industry and upgrade its technological capabilities. Park’s HCI drive in the early 1970s was a key part of the process. ROK capabilities have since evolved from the early production of firearms and ammunition to the more recent manufacture and export of light fighter jets, and the development of advanced SAR-equipped remote sensing satellites and dual-use commercial and military communications satellites. Following the Pentagon’s lead, South Korea has begun its own Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), driven by the economic logic and efficiency gains of commercial and military spin-on/spin-off, as well as the overriding goal of enhancing command and control capabilities. In line with this trend, the ROK Ministry of Defense has been outspoken in its need to pursue netcentric reforms aimed at increasing the overall interoperability of South Korean armed

forces. Despite this notable progress , though, Seoul, by its own admission, cannot independently check the threat from Pyongyang. South Korea is neither fully dependent nor fully independent. It is neither a pawn of empire nor a fully equal ally. The ROK’s postwar history is a unique example of rapid economic development, modernization, and eventual democratization. As a consequence of this remarkable historical evolution, it has become a much more

independent actor in the U.S.-ROK alliance and in the larger international system. Nevertheless, it remains the smaller of the two partners, with its security ultimately dependent upon the U.S. In other words, while South Korea has unquestionably enhanced its profile, it remains semi-sovereign. Control over a nation- state’s armed forces is a significant, if not the most fundamental , element of state sovereignty . Thus, calling South Korea a semi-sovereign state within the U.S.-ROK alliance is not so much a radical leftist critique as a statement of fact. The history of OPCON reveals Seoul’s fundamentally truncated sovereignty within the U.S.-ROK alliance. In July 1950, following the disastrous early phase of the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee handed over control of ROK armed forces to the United Nations Command (UNC), then under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. In 1978, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established, thus forming a U.S.-ROK integrated command structure, thenceforth always under the four-star U.S. Army General commanding United States Forces Korea (USFK). While peacetime OPCON was transferred back to the ROK in 1994, wartime OPCON remains under CFC auspices. In the mid 2000s, ROK

President Roh Moo-Hyun initiated talks on full OPCON transfer back to the ROK, with negotiators settling on April 2012 as the transfer date, at which point two separate but coordinating U.S. and ROK commands would

have replaced the U.S.-ROK CFC. However, this plan was delayed in June 2010 following a bilateral meeting between then

ROK President Lee Myung-Bak and President Barack Obama, setting December 2015 as the new deadline. In early 2014, OPCON transfer was put under review once again, as ROK officials stressed the continuing asymmetrical

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/?allpages=yes_

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/?allpages=yes_

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threat from the DPRK as a reason to delay the transfer. During their January summit meeting in Seoul, Obama and President Park Geun-hye announced that both countries would be reconsidering the timeline for the transfer. Senior South Korean officials as well as former USFK commanders have cited the need to enhance ROK command and control capabilities

before taking over wartime OPCON. Reports now indicate the transfer date could be pushed back another five to seven years, with an official announcement expected during the annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings this coming October.

Thus, as has historically been the case, a crucial element of South Korean sovereignty remains under U.S. auspices, with the abiding risk of abandonment or entrapment ever in mind.

US support limits Korean middle power effectiveness – new alliance structure is keySohn 12/18 (Yul Sohn is a professor and Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. He also serves as Director of the Japan Center at the East Asia Institute, “Searching For A New Identity: South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy – Analysis” DECEMBER 18, 2015 http://www.eurasiareview.com/18122015-searching-for-a-new-identity-south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-analysis/) swap

COMES NEXT? Over the past decade, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy has evolved as its focus shifted from regional to global issues. The Roh Government used it as a guiding concept for overall foreign policy. Particularly, it focused on regional strategy, acting as a facilitator of community building and also as a balancer between China and Japan. By contrast, the Lee and Park

Governments applied middle power diplomacy solely in the global arena. Concepts drawn from a network approach to foreign policy such as ‘bridge’ and ‘convener’ have been applied to the country’s global diplomacy.

However, if middle power diplomacy only applies to global issues, it will represent, at best, a partial contribution to South Korea’s foreign policy. For the country is faced with grave geopolitical challenges, constantly exposed to an existential threat from North Korea, and to the heated US-China competition over regional leadership. Worse, complicated history problems have blocked the

development of regional institutions that can resolve pressing security and economic problems. There is an immediate need for South Korea to apply its middle power role to help shape a regional architecture. As the United States and China compete over regional leadership, tensions have developed over the years. In this context, South Korea, is potentially well placed to play a mediating role. Seoul has friendly relations with the two great powers. It maintains a long-standing alliance with the United States while

recently crafting an amicable relationship with China. But, South Korea stops short of playing such a role because both

China and the United States support the initiatives of middle powers only to the extent that they serve their respective interests. Similarly, the troubled Korea-Japan relationship hampers South Korea’s middle power role because it discourages the US from seeking to strengthen South Korea-US-Japan relations in the face of a strong China, and also because the rocky relationship makes it difficult for South Korea to help bridge the divide between China and Japan. South Korea is well positioned within regional economic networks. It does not face a dilemma between the US-centred Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-centred Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) because it already has concluded free trade agreements with most of the members of these plurilateral agreements, including the United States and China. This unusual position gives South Korea a clear advantage to play a proactive

role. The Park government wants South Korea to act as a ‘linchpin in regional economic integration,’ linking TPP and RCEP. The next step for South Korea is therefore to activate its middle power role in the region while expanding its engagement on global issues to include cyber security, climate change and human rights, and

deepening the partnership with the European Union. In doing so, the country needs to reconfigure and redefine its alliance with the United States. While the security interests of South Korea are closely tied to this alliance, Seoul needs to alleviate Chinese concerns over a tightened alliance by presenting its strategic purpose in terms that do not challenge China, and making explicit its vision for a peaceful and unified Korea. Ultimately, the objective of Korea’s middle power diplomacy is to deepen the South Korea-US-Japan cooperation network, while on the other hand expanding South Korea-China cooperation. South Korea must work with Japan to ensure that these two goals can coexist.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/18122015-searching-for-a-new-identity-south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-analysis/

http://www.eurasiareview.com/18122015-searching-for-a-new-identity-south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-analysis/

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6. Diplomacy Efforts will Work

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Blocks Vs Pro:

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AT: Doomsday Attack

Cordesman, 2017 [Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Forces that Shape the Military Options in Korea.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/forces-shape-military-options-korea]

Seoul may be in range of the North's artillery, but North Korea's fragile economy could be destroyed in days from the air by attacks on its power grid, communications, critical bridges and routes, and key industrial facilities. For all its forces and posturing, North Korea is, to some extent, the strategic equivalent of a Potemkin village. Hyper-militarization creates its own vulnerabilities if a conflict escalates too far, and like Iran, North Korea needs a threat to counter that risk.

Potemkin Village:

Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, 2017 [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Potemkin%20village]

“An impressive facade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition”

It is essentially a figurative and in this case literal construction that is created to deceive others into thinking the situation and construction is better than it is.

2.

The THAAD System is simply the first level of defense when it comes to South Korea’s missile defense system. Richard Sisk report for Military.com and Defense Technology reminds us that THAAD is simply the first line of defense, and in the unlikely event that missiles bypass THAAD they would be targeted by the Navy Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, and if that failed, the PAC-3 Batteries that South Korea possesses would be able to target the missiles.

First, you can’t just assume that North Korea has the capability to launch more than a dozen missiles at one time and somehow bypass THAAAD, one of the most advanced anti-missile systems. In all reality, we can see this not being very probably as Mark Fitzpatrick, executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Americas and a former member of the U.S. Department of State explains that THAAD creates a level of confidence that is high enough as long as North Korea is not able to launch a couple dozen missiles or more, which he estimates that they do not have”

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Sisk, 2017 [Richard, Defense Tech, “Amid Tough Talk on North Korea, US Wants More THAAD Interceptors.”

“The THAAD system in South Korea was intended to be the first layer in a triple-layered defense against North Korea’s short- and medium-range missiles.

The powerful AN/TPY-2 radars, the world’s largest mobile X-band radars, would track the missile launch and attempt to bring it down with a THAAD hit-to kill interceptor.

If that failed, the THAAD tracking data, instantly passed to Navy Arleigh Burke class destroyers offshore, would enable the destroyers to attempt to shoot down with missile with the Aegis Combat System, developed by RCA and now produced by Lockheed.

If that failed, the PAC-3 Patriot batteries, which would have the tracking data from THAAD relayed by the Aegis destroyers, would be the last line of defense.”

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AT: Doesn’t Solve for Border Artillery Roehrig, 2016 [Terence, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies.” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf pg 231]

In addition to efforts to enhance deterrence, the United States has undertaken measures to improve its combat capabilities should deterrence fail. One of the most challenging threats is North Korea’s ability to launch a barrage of artillery shells and rockets on Seoul. The counter-battery mission designed to neutralize these systems is central to any defense of the capital. As part of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the United States is in the process of returning close to 60 U.S. bases back to South Korea. The vast majority of U.S. forces are set to be based south of Seoul in two hubs—Camp Humphreys/Osan Air Base around Pyeongtaek in the northwest and the Daegu/Chinhae hub to the southeast. Due to the concern for North Korea’s long-range artillery and rockets, U.S. and ROK officials agreed to keep the 210th Fires Brigade of the U.S. Army in its current position in Dongducheon, north of Seoul. USFK had made this request several times in 2014 during Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) meetings, arguing that moving the brigade south would hurt combat readiness.57 Camp Humphreys is simply too far away to counter North Korean artillery, and it would take too long to move these assets north should they be needed on short notice. During the 2014 SCM, U.S. and ROK officials announced that they had agreed to keep the U.S. unit in place until South Korea’s counter-battery units completed their improvements at which time the 210th would move to Camp Humphreys. Local residents who were expecting to receive the vacated land in Dongducheon were not happy with the decision and demanded compensation for the change in the Land Partnership Plan (LPP).58 In a related agreement, U.S. and ROK officials decided to leave CFC headquarters in its present location in Yongsan, a large military base in central Seoul. As part of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), USFK was expected to return the base to Korean authorities. The Yongsan base occupies valuable real estate in Seoul that ROK authorities were very anxious to see returned.

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Blocks Vs Con:

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AT: Environment

http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/effects/environment.htm accessed 2017

When evaluating the impact of nuclear weapons on the environment, scientists and academics have taken two major approaches – analyzing the potential impact of an increasingly likely nuclear war, and studying how nuclear weapon production has affected, and continues to affect, the environment. We need to take into account everything from contaminated water sources to nuclear winter in order to fully appreciate the environmental consequences of this technology. No nuclear weapons state, however, has officially evaluated the impact a nuclear war would have on Earth’s climate and ecosystems.

Extensive research has been conducted on the potential repercussions of a nuclear conflict. Aside from the initial human death toll, it is clear that the use of nuclear weapons can have devastating and long-lasting effects on the Earth’s environment. For example, a regional nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan could create a smoke layer around the planet that would block out 10% of the incoming sunlight; we could see the coldest temperatures in over 1000 years. This would wreak havoc on worldwide temperatures and, most importantly, on agriculture – growing seasons could be eliminated for over a decade

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AT: Surveillance (maybe)

Panda, 2017 [Ankit, foreign affair analyst and the Council of Foreign Relations and The Diplomat. “THAAD ad China’s Nuclear Second-Strike Capability.” http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/thaad-and-chinas-nuclear-second-strike-capability/]

There are two possible serious explanations for how THAAD infringes on Chinese national interests. One is less convincing than the other. I’ll address both in order, beginning with the less convincing explanation.

The first hypothesis is that China may fear that the AN/TPY-2 radar at the former Lotte Group golf course in Gyeongsangbuk-do will give the United States unprecedented surveillance insight into sensitive Chinese missile testing and development work deep within the mainland.

This may sound convincing at first glance, but there’s a few reasons why it doesn’t hold water. First, the South Korean THAAD deployment is not the first AN/TPY-2 deployment from the United States; nor is it even the first deployment of an advanced radar by the United States to the region. The U.S. already has two AN/TPY-2 installations in Japan, at the Kyogamisaki Communications Site in Kyoto prefecture and Shariki in Aomori prefecture.

Second, while we have no watertight estimates on just how capable the AN/TPY-2 radar is and in what configurations, even the most generous estimates don’t leave the Gyeongsangbuk-do unit capable of any useful surveillance deep into the Gobi desert, where China has its most active and sensitive missile testing ranges. (AN/TPY-2 range estimates go from “several hundred miles” to 3,000 km.) I’ve mapped out the ranges below with the most generous range estimate of 3,000 km, using a Chinese ballistic missile impact range that Thomas Shugart at War on the Rocks recently revealed as a test-bed for potential People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force preempetive warfare tactics (i.e., a site of surveillance interest for the United States).

Adding the westernmost AN/TPY-2 in Japan — the Kyogamisaki Communications Site unit — the map doesn’t change drastically, either. (Incidentally, North Korea’s latest missile test resulted in three missiles splashing down in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, between the two AN/TPY-2s in the country — a less-than-subtle show of confidence.)

Basically, the surveillance explanation doesn’t appear to be terribly convincing here. The United States additionally has an older PAVE PAWS installation in Taiwan that adds to its long-range radar capabilities in the region. Given these existing capabilities, the Gyeongsangbuk-do THAAD battery and its accompanying radar won’t give the United States a new and potent looking glass into China that it doesn’t already possess.

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AT: Nuclear Weapons Fitzpatrick, 2016 [Mark, “THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia” “An Interview with Mark Fitzpatrick, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, fall 2016 pg 130. Executive Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies- Americas, https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_fitzpatrick_0.pdf, ]

“I think that THAAD deployment does increase the U.S. and ROK joint leverage vis-à-vis North Korea because it adds to a tiered, layered defense against incoming North Korean nuclear armed missiles by being able to effectively knock out those missiles before they might land. The United States and South Korea have

what is called “deterrence by denial.” That is, they deny North Korea the capability of actually hitting South Korean cities. Now, THAAD doesn’t make the defense perfect—nothing can—but the level of confidence will be high enough as long as North Korea is not able to launch a huge salvo: a couple dozen missiles or more. They probably don’t have that many missile launchers. The danger is that they might launch decoys and other means of confusing the American and

South Korean defense. But for the time being, I think THAAD really will enhance the defenses and will provide additional leverage by denying North Korea the capability to hit South Korea with nuclear weapons .”

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AT: China Fitzpatrick, 2016 [Mark, “THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia” “An Interview with Mark Fitzpatrick, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, fall 2016 pg 133. Executive Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies- Americas, https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_fitzpatrick_0.pdf, ]

Meanwhile, China’s role as an international player is more nuanced than in the Cold War. It cooperates with the United States and other Western countries in many ways to maintain the international order . It really is, in the words of Robert Zoellick, a “responsible stakeholder.” So I think the days of the Cold War confrontation between blocs are over. That doesn’t mean that there

isn’t a strengthening of relations between the respective parties. It is very good that the United States, Japan, and South Korea are strengthening their trilateral relationship. But it’s mainly vis-à-vis North Korea; it has nothing to do with forming forces up against China, at least not in the case of the South Korea leg of the triangle.

Fitzpatrick, 2016 [Mark, “THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia” “An Interview with Mark Fitzpatrick, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, fall 2016 pg 130. Executive Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies- Americas, https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_fitzpatrick_0.pdf, ]

“THAAD does not fundamentally change the balance of power in so far as China is concerned. It adds only

incrementally to a potential American first strike capability, which is what China is worried about. It’s not worried just about

THAAD; it’s more worried about systems such as Prompt Global Strike and other ways that America has technological advantages over China.”

Kim, 2017 [Yu Bim, March 22, “Hey, China: Deploying THAAD is South Korea’s Sovereign Right” http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/]

Moreover, two implications could be drawn from China’s response to THAAD. First, the role of nationalism in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy will only increase over time. If not managed properly, it could not only spin out of control, but also lead to unintended

consequences; simply put, it’s a double-edged sword. Second, in order to get what it wants, Beijing will continue to rely on the use of economic coercion. However, Chinese decision-makers should remember what John Mearsheimer — arguably the father of “offensive realism ” — said in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: “If you do not survive, you cannot prosper.” At the end of the day, security interests trump economic ones; Beijing cannot succeed in using economic tools to make its neighbors forfeit their own security.

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AT: Deterrence North Korea spends about US$4 billion a year on its missile and nuclear programs, which accounts for approximately 24 percent of the country’s GDP. North Korea’s relatively large spending on ICBM technology and nuclear development could be attributed to its desire to show the United States that it has the power to shoot a nuclear missile to Washington. An ICBM would be a significant improvement from the

Taepodong-2, a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometers that North Korea currently possesses. As it is clear that North Korea is in the process of developing an ICBM with a minimum range of 5,500 kilometers, the US government urged the installment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea, and the South Korean government approved the deployment of THAAD in the country’s south. The international community must acknowledge that military pressure, containment, and simply waiting for the regime in Pyongyang to collapse have failed to stop North Korea’s military aggression. THAAD deployment in South Korea is not only a potential obstacle for achieving the denuclearization of North Korea, but is also a repetition of past mistakes, encouraging further isolation of North Korea, an arms race in East Asia, and a revival of Cold War tensions.

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AT: Diplomacy

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Readable 1. Diplomacy isn’t the intention of THAAD. Reporter Guy Taylor of the Washington Times reports that Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for east Asian and pacific affairs, rejected the notion that THAAD was being used as a leverage in U.S.-Chinese talks on North Korea. Russel stated, “THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip.”

2.

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Cards Taylor, 2017 [Guy, The Washington Times, “THAAD missile shield to South Korea gives Donald Trump advantage over China on North Korea.” Mar. 8, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/thaad-missile-shield-to-south-korea-gives-donald-t/]

During negotiations toward the system’s deployment in February, Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, rejected the notion that THAAD was being used as leverage in U.S.-Chinese talks on North Korea.

“THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip,” Mr. Russel said at the time.

The Trump administration has given little indication on whether it will use THAAD’s deployment as leverage against China, although Mr. Trump has repeatedly touted his skills as a businessman who knows how to cut a deal.

“The deployment of the THAAD system is critical to [South Korea‘s] protection,” White House spokesman Sean Spicer said Wednesday. He added that Beijing and Washington “both understand the threat that North Korea poses to the region, and I think that there’s areas of concern that we can work together.”

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AT: Economic Benefit 1. US Korea Trade more important

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