Religion (1987) 17, 15-28

SOME FUNDAMENTAL comma?Ts OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

N. Ross Reat

If, rather than accepting uncritically the traditional commentarial interpreta- tion of the Pali sutlas, one looks to Upanisadic terminology for an insight into some of the fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology, a more integrated and satisfying interpretation of some of the ancient material is possible. This is particularly true in the case of the term mima-tipa, which is routinely understood by many as a twofold classification of the five aggregates as comprising mind and body. If, however, mima-rzipa is construed in the Upanisadic sense as denoting the conceptual and apparitional aspects of a given object, the Buddhist use of the term in the pu.ticcasamuppt?du formula becomes more coherent and considerably more sophisticated than in the traditional exegesis. Such an interpretation also makes possible an interpreta- tion of the paticcasamuppdda formula which is consistent with the ancient Pali texts, which bears much in common with the Uidhyamika and VijiZnavtida understandings of essential Buddhist doctrine, and which anticipates some modern trends in Western psychology and philosophy.

While the Pali commentarial literature is clearly invaluable in under- standing the ancient suttas, a consideration of the terms and concepts of contemporary and antecedent psychological thought in India is also histori- cally imperative. For the purposes of such an investigation, the ancient Upani!uds are the most useful surviving material. Admittedly, it probably would be even more useful to have a clear picture of the early doctrines of the various heterodox schools, such as the Jains and &vikas, with whom the early Buddhists were in more intimate contact than with representatives of the Upanisadic tradition. Unfortunately, the early Upani;ads and some Brcihmana and AraFyuka material are all we have in the way of psychologically significant literature preceding the early Buddhist suttas. Psychologically speaking, the Upani;ads are by far the more relevant of these sources. It is not clear how much access the Buddha had to the Upanisadic tradition, which, though orthodox, must not be imagined to represent the standard Brahmaqism which the Buddha often criticized on the basis ofcaste discrimination, ritualism and dogmatism. Nonetheless, it seems safe enough to assume that Upanisadic

0048-721X/87/010015 + 14$02.00 0 1987 Academic Press Inc. (London) Ltd.

16 N. Ross Reut

terminology represents more or less the prevalent verbal conventions of the age contemporary with and immediately prior to the time of the historical Buddha, and that the Buddha did not deviate from these conventions without a compelling cause.

The obvious place to begin this study of the fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology and their antecedents is with the term viiiKipz (con- sciousness). The best initial approach to viiin’dpa is at the basal level of mere vitality. The most detailed ofthe early Buddhist treatments ofhuman life at its basal level occur in the MuhZ and Cziia Vedallasuttas of the Majjhima-nikzyu, where Sariputta says:

With regard to this body (&~a), sir, when three things leave-vitality (ZJU), heat (usma) and consciousness (vinliiap)-then does this body lie cast away, flung aside like a senseless log.

Ml:296

On the basis of the characteristics of vij&ina as described in the Upani!ads, Sariputta’s location of viC@a at the basal level of mere life is not surprising. In the l&an&ads, vijicina is often associated with deep sleep, and in the Taittirga UpanQad it is identified as the second most basic essence of the person.’

The similar Buddhist association of viiiiicina with basal consciousness is also apparent in the importance of vifir’@a in the mechanism of rebirth, which in several passages is described as the descent (avakkanti) of viEfi@za into the womb.2 In the Upani,sads, the departure at death of the soul (&man or purqa), the breath (pr@a) and vij%na is described in similar terms with various modifications of the verbal root kram.3 The Buddha, possibly because of a widespread association of basal consciousness with the Ztman, took pains to emphasize that viiCI@a must not be thought of as a soul. In addition to his frequent characterization of the five aggregates, including viii%ipa, as non- soul he sternly rebukes the monk Sati for teaching that viri%ga survives death as an entity.4 Elsewhere, the Buddha observes that it would make more sense to think of the body as soul since it may persist for some time.

But this, monks, which is called thought (citta), mind (manas), consciousness (~iiii@za), that arises as one thing, ceases as another, night and day.

s2:95

This continual arising and ceasing of vi6Epz, this perpetual changing which prevents it being construed as a soul, is described in considerable detail in the Pali suttas. Somewhat like a stream, viE&Qza is said to change in relation to its environment. In the case of viE@a, this environment is comprised of the objects of consciousness. Without an object (irammana), vii&i~a does not arise or ‘become established’ (patijtha).5 Given an object, it arises conditioned by that object. The nature of viiitirIpa at any given time is determined by the nature of its object, in the absence of which there is no vi%Z~a. The most general designation for the necessary objective counterpart

Concepts of Buddhist Psychology 17

of vi%ipz is nlma-tipa (name and form). This term is employed in early Buddhist literature in much the same way that it is used in the Upanisads, as the conceptual and apparitional aspects of any individual object.

There is a tendency, however, among scholars of early Buddhism, to construe nlma-tipa as a general designation for mind and body.6 Interpreted thus, the intriguing term is oversimplified and glossed, often with the dubious assertion that mima represents the four non-material aggregates (vedanz, s&Z, sankhdru and viX@a), and that rzipa, the fifth aggregate, represents the body. Even Buddhaghosa, who is normally careful to avoid this over- simplification of mima-tipa, does at one point in the Visuddhimagga suggest that nttma-tipa is a twofold designation of the five aggregates.’ His usual care in this matter is probably a result of the fact that at no point in the early Nikzya literature is ncma defined as the four non-material aggregates. Instead, it is defined as, or more properly, said to involve, vedana, saGi& cetanci, phassa and manasik&a; while rtipa is consistently defined as the four great elements.’ l&pa, moreover, means ‘form’ in general, not specifically ‘body’. KZya is the standard term for ‘body’, which, of course, is one type of ‘form’, and as such is said to be composed of the four great elements. When the physical and conscious aspects of the individual are specifically intended, kzya indicates body and either cittag or virii@za’O indicate consciousness in general.

If mima-rzipa is taken to mean ‘consciousness and body’, the paticca- samufi&ida formula may be, and often is, interpreted as simply an explanation of rebirth. The phrase ‘viiiti@a conditions mima-tipa’ seems then to mean simply that consciousness somehow enters or arises in the womb and that a mind and body start to develop. There is, however, no indication in the suttas that the first four links of the standard enumeration of pa@ccasamuppZda, culminating with the phrase ‘viGi@a conditions mimatipa’, are to be con- strued as confined to an explanation of rebirth. Instead, the conditioning of mima-rtipa by viiiii@a refers to the arising of any instance of consciousness. The conditioning of nama-tipa by viiii@a may describe the arising of consciousness in rebirth,” but this is only a specific instance of the general arising of consciousness. Rebirth is also described as the descent of mima- tipa.” One passage, which describes rebirth as being the result of vi%i&za, omits mima-tipa altogether and starts with the six senses, i.e. the six types of viiiri~~a, as the condition for sensory contact (phassa).‘”

Many more general and specific inconsistencies result from interpreting mima-tipa as consciousness and body, and pa[iccasamuj@ida as merely an explanation of rebirth. Suffice it to say that if the Upani+ads are taken as the source of our understanding of the term ndmatipa, .the bulk of the psycho- logical material in the early Buddhist suttus will be explained more satisfactorily and consistently than if the term is taken to mean consciousness and body.

18 N. Ross Reat

The following discussion assumes what would appear obvious: that the Buddha chose to use the term mima-rtipa because, in the common parlance of his age, it meant approximately what he wanted to say.

There is no doubt that the term literally means ‘name and form’. At the time of the Buddha, however, and for several hundred years before and after his lifetime, the term implied ‘individuality’, a connotation which was based on the theory that names are inherent qualities of individual things. More abstractly, name is that which was thought to account for the relationship among different forms which are nonetheless similar enough to be given the same verbal designation. In this sense, the term nZma is similar to ‘a concept’. When it is said in the UpaniSads that creation consisted of the differentiation of the universe by means of mima-rEpa, what is implied is that the myriad discrete entities thus produced were and still are related in an orderly fashion by virtue ofthe fact that they bear names, which makes possible the conceptual ordering of manyness.14 Language w a thought of as a discovery of the s inherent conceptual relationships among things, so that from a very early period in Indian thought conceptualization was thought of as primarily a verbal phenomenon.

Early Buddhism, of course, rejected this and other orthodox linguistic notions. Nevertheless, the close association between verbalization and concep- tualization is accepted in early Buddhism, for example in the definition of vaci- sankhka (‘volitional speech formation’) as consisting of vitakka and vi&a (‘deductive and discursive thought’).15 In general, then, the term nima-tipa is a comprehensive designation of the individuality of a perceived thing. It refers to both the appearance and the conceptualization of a given object of consciousness, and as such is employed in early Buddhism in much the same way that it is used in the Upanisads.

There is just this body and external to it, name and form. This is a pair. Conditioned by this pair are (sensory) contact and the six (sense) spheres.

S2:24 A seeing man will see name and form. Having seen he will understand those (things). Let him at pleasure look at much or little, for the skillful do not say that purity is (attained) by that.

Sn. 909 Adopting as a hypothetical definition of mima-@a ‘a comprehensive

designation of the individuality of a perceived thing’ yields some surprising and convincing results when plugged into the early Buddhist theory of the arising of consciousness in relation to its objects. The suttas express this theory in two ways, treatments based on (1) analysis of vi%i~a into six types, comprising the five senses and mind, and (2) the conditioned arising of vifKkipa according to various forms of paticcasamuppida.

The former treatment provides the most common definition of uiZ@za as being of six kinds with refert ice to the five empirical senses and mind (manas).

Concepts of Buddhist Psychology 19

It is said to be dependent upon them as fire is upon its fuel, and to be defined by them as fire is characterized according to the nature of its fuel.‘” The conditions governing the arising of consciousness are given briefly in the following formula in the Madhupi&ika-sutta.

Conditioned by eye and form, sir, visual consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is (sensory) contact (phassa).

Ml:111

Elsewhere, it is made clear that sensory contact (phassa) does not refer to the mere juxtaposition of organ, object and consciousness. The object must be

_ - present to consciousness. There must be attention (samannahara, lit. ‘bringing well along’). The following passage from the Mahihatthipadopama-sutta speci- fies that this attention must be ‘appropriate’ (taja), in other words, effective in producing one of the six forms of consciousness. Clearly, phassa and samanmi- hdra are both necessary in making possible the arising of consciousness.

If, sir, the internal eye is intact and external forms (Spa) come within its range, but without appropriate attention (samannc?h~ra), then there is no appearance of the appropriate type ofconsciousness. But when, sir, the internal eye is intact, external forms come within its range and there is appropriate attention, then there is appearance of the appropriate type of consciousness.

Ml:190

Comparing the two preceding passages, two equations emerge: (1) facult) + object + viK@a = ~hassalsammantfhcira, and (2) faculty + object + phassalsamanmihdra = vz’ifiw. Sensory contact, accompanied by appropriate attention, is as necessary for consciousness as consciousness is for sensor) contact and appropriate attention. Consciousness is neither an epiphenom- enon nor is it independently existing.

The MahcZhatthipadopama-sutta continues its analysis by saying that, given faculty, object, appropriate attention and the appearance ofthe corresponding type of consciousness:

Whatever is the form (PI@) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping- aggregate of form (rzipa-@idana-khanda). Whatever is the feeling (ueduna) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping-aggregate of feeling. Whatever is the perception (saZ%) . mental formations (sunkhdra) . consciousness (z~iK+zi of what has thus come to be is called the grasping-aggregate of perception mental formations . . consciousness. Thus, one understands, ‘Thus indeed, there is the collecting, the assembling, the coming together of these five grasping- aggregates’.

Ml:190

Note that riipa first appears in this passage as the specific object of visual consciousness. It then reappears as the object of any type of consciousness. once it has actually become present to consciousness.

20 N. Ross Reat

The fascinating point about the above is that rzipa, as a khandha, an aggregate, is said to come into existence on the basis of the functioning of consciousness, even though, as the specific object of vision, rtipa is a condition for the arising of consciousness. In either case, it is manifestly impossible to construe @a-upddana-khanda as the body. Nonetheless, in the opening statement of the above passage, Spa is emphatically defined as a body, ‘a space enclosed by bones and sinews and flesh and skin’. This must be a non- technical use of the term or a corruption in the text. Such a definition of rripa is not characteristic of the suttas in general, and is absolutely inappropriate in either context in which the term is used in the Mahdhatthipadopama-sutta. These two contexts, again, are (1) as an aspect of that which arises when all of the conditions for any of the six types of consciousness are met, and (2) as the specific object of visual consciousness.

The common tendency in Indian psychology to substitute vision for all of the senses probably accounts for the two contexts in which rzipa is used here. When the arising of consciousness is being analysed, an appropriate object, riipa, in the case of vision, is a condition. From the opposite point of view, the arising of consciousness is a condition for the arising of an object, glossed above in visual terms as riipa. In any case, just as consciousness does not arise without an object, so does an object not arise without consciousness. This is borne out in many other passages, perhaps most specifically where it is said that the four great elements, which are the standard definition of @pa, cease when vin’ri&za ceases.”

The above considerations suggest that the five aggregate analysis is actually an analysis of consciousness as experienced. When sufficient conditions exist and consciousness arises, the five aggregates are brought into the picture as an analysis of that consciousness, and the nipa-khandha is the apparently external, objective content of that consciousness. This is consistent with the general meaning of riipa, which does not connote substance, but rather appearance. Thus, the four great elements, at least when they are enumerated as a definition of rzipa-khandha, are not necessarily a primitive periodic table, but rather an analysis of how ‘matter’ is experienced. It is well known that the four elements are construed in the Abhidhamma and commentarial literature as being representative of the various qualities of matter as experienced (i.e. solidity, fludity, heat and motion). There is little evidence of an abstract interpretation of the elements in the suttas themselves, but on the other hand, there is also little to suggest that they posit an independently existing material world.

In relation to this point, let us consider pa$ccasamup@da, which, as noted at the outset of these observations, is the second means by which the conditions for the arising of consciousness are set forth. In this formula, the relationship between vifiti@a and mima-tipa is very similar to what appears

Concepts of Buddhist Psychology 2 1

to be the relationship of vifiii@za and riipa in the Mahcihatthipadopama-sutta, where tipa is a condition for the arising of viiiii@a and the arising of viiiii@a is, in turn, a condition for the arising of rzipa. It is not uncommon to find the pa~iccasamup@ida formula, minus the first two links in the standard chain, beginning with the reciprocal conditioning of viiiri’@a by nana-tipa and mima-rtipa by viZ%i~a.‘8

The basic definition ofpa[iccasamuppada is the well-known phrase: ‘When this is, that is. From the arising ofthis, that arises. When this is not, that is not. From the cessation of this, that ceases’.lg Thus, the term may properly be applied to any set of results dependent upon necessary and sufficient conditions. The foregoing examined what is essentially a sixfold consideration ofpaticca- samupptida with reference to the six types of consciousness which arise only under the condition of interaction with an appropriate object. The Mahanidana- sutta lists a set of nine conditions and results which are entirely different from the standard twelvefold enumeration, but are dealt with using the standard terminology of paticcasamuppada. ” Thus, it is probable that the standard twelvefold formula developed over some time, though possibly within the Buddha’s lifetime, as a result of the consolidation of various cause and effect relationships governed by the general formula ‘When this is, that is, etc.‘.

In this connection, it is no doubt significant that the entire twelvefold enumeration ofpa!iccasamuppada is not listed anywhere in the Digha-nik@a.” Moreover, the tenfold enumeration of pa$cca.samuppZda in the Mahcpadana- sutta treats the mutual conditioning of mima-rtipa and viri&i~a in a way that would seem to preclude any further conditions beyond the ten commonly recognized in the Digha-nikcya.

When there is consciousness, there is name-and-form. Consciousness is the condition of name-and-form . Where there is name-and-form, there is consciousness. Name-and-form is the condition of consciousness Consciousness turns back from name-and-form, it does not go beyond. Only as follows can one be born, or age, or die, or pass away or arise, that is to say: consciousness conditions name-and- form; name-and-form conditions consciousness; name-and-form conditions the six (sense) spheres; the six (sense) spheres condition contact (phassa); contact conditions feeling (vedang); feeling conditions desire (tunha); etc.

D2:32

The Mah&id~na-sutta of the Digha-nikzya opens with an even shorter and no doubt archaic, ninefold enumeration ofpa+ccasamupp6da which omits the ‘six sense spheres’ (sa@yatana) from the standard tenfold Digha-nik<va formula. It thus has mima-Spa as the direct condition of sensory contact (phassa), as well as the reciprocal condition of viiEi~a. 22 Following this short list is an explanation of nlrma-rzipa which is highly instructive and which proves that the omission of the sense spheres was not merely an oversight.

Actually the arising of the sense spheres is implied by the arising of vi5iE~a. Even with regard to the more common tenfold and twelvefold enumerations of

22 N. Ross Rexit

pa$xasamu@ida it would be incorrect to think that first vi&i~a arises, then nama-rzipa, then the six sense spheres, then contact. In fact, all of these necessarily arise simultaneously. The passages examined above, from the Madhupiy&ka-sutta and the MahZhatthipadopama-sutta, deal with the mutual interdependence of consciousness, faculty, object and sensual contact. The paficcasamuppZda formula paints a similar picture, with mima-rtipa as a general designation for the object of consciousness.

As argued at the outset, however, the term n&a-tipa indicates an expanded concept of the object as having two aspects, an apparitional aspect (tipa) and a conceptual aspect (nama). This is clearly stated in the Mahlmidana-sutta.

‘That name-and-form conditions contact should be understood in the following way. If, Ananda, those qualities, characteristics, signs, and indications by which the name-group (ncima-k@a) is manifested . were absent, would there be the manifestation of verbal contact (adhivacuna-sum~hussu) in (i.e. ‘with regard to’) the form-group (rzi~ukcfyu)?’ ‘There would not, venerable sir.’ ‘If, Ananda, those qualities, characteristics, signs, and indications by which the form-group is manifested . were absent, would there be the manifestation of sensual contact (Jmfighu-sumphawu) in the name-group?’ ‘There would not, venerable sir’ . . ‘And if, Ananda, those qualities, etc. by which name and form are manifested were absent . . . would there by any manifestation of (any kind of) contact (phussu)?’ ‘There would not, venerable sir’. ‘Therefore, Ananda, this is the cause, the basis, the origin, the condition of contact, namely name-and-form.’

D2:62

Recalling the association of name and conceptualization in the general Indian context, it appears that this passage also states the interdependence of concept (nzma) and thing conceptualized (tipa), or name and named.

Significantly, the Mahanidana-sutta’s analysis of ndma-r@a specifies two types of contact (phassa) verbal (adhivacana) and sensory @a&gha, lit. ‘striking against’). It is this very contact which is said to be necessary for the arising of vi%ipa, although in the previous contexts, only one type ofphassa was recognized, sensual contact involving faculty, object and consciousness. This expression of a twofold concept of contact may well relate to the fact that in the atipa-loka or in the arzipa-jhZnas, ritpa technically is not possible as a condition for the arising of consciousness. Consciousness is nonetheless present in these states, except possibly the fourth ariipa-jhana. In these subtle states, consciousness is apparently conditioned by a verbal concept (mima) such as ‘space is infinite’, ’ consciousness is infinite’, or ‘there is nothing’, but not by a form (+a) .23

The adhivacuna, verbal-conceptual aspect of phassa is of more immediate importance here with reference to the conditioning of feeling (vedund) by phassa, and the implied conditioning of perception (saE&?) by vedami, in the normal course of human consciousness as described in the paticcasamuppada

Concepts of Buddhist Psychology 23

series. Like vifii@a, vedanc and sai&i may be classified as sixfold with reference to the five senses and manas. 24 Therefore both vedanlf and saKc have conceptual aspects in addition to their sensory aspects. Interestingly, vedami is specifically said to have both a physical (k@ikZ) and a mental (cetasika) aspect, 25 and both vedami and sa5tiZ are together said to comprise citta-sankhEra (volitional mental formations).26 The conceptual nature of vedami is evident in the standard enumeration of the three types of vedami. painful (dukkha), pleasant (sukha) and neutral (adukkhamasukha), for these in themselves are minimal verbal-conceptual constructs. The Suti~af~hana-sutta notes too that these three minimal concepts may also occur with reference to non-material (atita) things, presumably on the basis of adhivacana- samphassa. ” SuGZ is characterized as a more developed verbal conceptual- ization than vedand, as in the following definition, which obviously must bc taken as exemplary rather than exhaustive.

It is said, sir, ‘One perceives, one perceives (saiijhiti)’ therefore it is called ‘perception’. And what does one perceive? One perceives what is blue yellow . . red . . and white.

Ml:293

Though the three terms, viii&ip as consciousness in general, vedanli as hedonic feeling and saZ6 as perception of specific features, may be differen- tiated for the purpose of analysing conscious experience, they do not denotr separate things. They do not arise, each dependent on the former, in a temporal or even a logical causal sequence. Instead, they all occur together as interrelated aspects of the same thing, conscious experience in general.

That which is feeling, sir, that which is perception, and that which is consciousness. these things are associated, not dissociated. Having analysed and analysed, it is not possible to declare a basis ofdifferentiation. What one feels, sir, that one perceives. What one perceives, of that one is conscious.

Ml:293 Even though sun”& does not occur in the standard enumeration of patic-

cassamup@da, the relationship among these aspects of consciousness is de- scribed in the above passage as a type of cdnditioned arising. This relationship is further clarified by Mahakacclna in the Madhupip$ka-sutta as follows.

Conditioned by eye and form (r@a), sir, visual consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact (phassu). Contact conditions feeling (zwduna). What one feels, that one perceives (saZjiin&i); what one perceives, that one reasons about (vitakketi); what one reasons about, that one proliferates @$@ziiceti); what one proliferates, that is the source of the various perceptual proliferations which assail a person in the past, the future and the present with regard to forms of which the eye may be conscious.

Ml:lll-112

Thus, the arising of sari% is implied in the standard formula ofpa&ccasamupp~da, where the term itself is omitted, by the arising of vedami conditioned by phassa.

24 N. Ross Red

Beyond this point, the paficcasamu#ida formula deals with psychopatho- logy, rather than theoretical psychology, by enumerating desire, grasping, etc. Leaving this part of the formula aside, the relationships noted thus far among the fundamental theoretical concepts of Buddhist psychology lend themselves to an integrated interpretation of the early Buddhist theory of consciousness that is remarkably consistent with later, Mahiyina theories. Thus interpreted, it is also remarkably contemporary in outlook.

In the passages considered above, the initial stages of the interdependent arising of consciousness and object of consciousness reciprocally condition each other and form a self-contained process, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. From Ml: 11 l-l 12, 190, 293; arrows show direction of influence.

When several versions of these relationships are considered, there is seen to be no starting point as such in the process diagramed above. Yet, in a sense, vin’@za is the focus of these relationships in that, having arisen on the basis of contact with an object of consciousness, it recycles into itself, as it were, through vedarui and saGi& Consciousness is depicted as being like a dog chasing its own tail. It takes aspects of itself as objects and may arise on the basis thereof.

When viiiikipa arises on the basis of vedanti and saiiE, the contact (phassa) said to be necessary for the arising of viiE@ must be conceptual (adhivacana), rather than sensual (pafigha). Such contact, it must be supposed, occurs on the basis of the sixth sense, manas. An interpretive diagram of the foregoing material, then, would appear as shown in Figure 2.

Concepts of Buddhist Pychology 25

Figure 2. From D2:62.

The distinction between mima and Gpa in the above diagram is justified in that the Ma&nidcina-sutta, in its archaic ninefold treatment of pa@samupptida, omits the six sense spheres as a separate casual link between mima-rzipa and phassa. It simply states that name and form is the condition of contact, which, rather than being of six kinds, with reference to five senses and manas, is characterized as being of two kinds, verbal (adhuacana) and sensual (patigha). It would seem that adhiuacana-samphassa is the specific privilege of manas while the senses ‘strike against’ (pafigha) their grosser objects. In other words, it appears that in this archaic formula adhivacana (verbal) and parigha (sensual), as categories ofphassa, are an alternative to the more commonly enumerated six kinds ofphassa, and thus that mima-@a is a dual categorization of the six types of objects of consciousness. This is precisely how the commentary construes the interpretation of this passage, supporting the conclusion that if ntzma-Spa is to be identified with any other set of terms in early Buddhist thought, it must be with the six ‘external’ sense spheres and not with the five aggregates. The present interpretation of the preceding passages also suggests the conclusion that the so-called ‘external’ object (dhamma) of manas, the sixth type of virX@a, is the conceptual content of previous consciousness as indicated by the terms vedand and saEE.

Recalling the components of mima listed in the early Nik@a literature as vedami, sash, cetanri, phassa, and manasikdra,28 it will be recognized that this interpretation is borne out to a considerable degree in the terminology of early Buddhist literature. The enumeration of the components of nlma found in the early NikZya literature seems to be an enumeration of the conditions surround- ing consciousness of a name, i.e. a concept generated by previous conscious- ness. If this is so, then of these components of n?ima, phassa is to be inter- preted specifically as adhivacana-samphassa, based on the conceptual content of uedami and safi%i (for example, ‘pleasant and red’), and its perception by

26 N. Ross Reat

manas. The term manasikira, often translated as ‘attention’ but meaning literally ‘making or doing in the mind’, apparently refers to the specific functioning of manas in perceiving the conceptual (ncima) aspect of a given object (tipa). It will be noted as well that since vedani and san’iig are invariably aspects of the arising of consciousness, there can be no actual instance of consciousness of a form without an accompanying verbal<onceptual content, in other words, no rzipa without a mima. This situation is reflected no doubt in the status of manas as sensus communis. The five empirical senses ‘resort to’ manas in two ways. First, the mind as sensus communis sorts and arranges the information they convey. Second, as the faculty responsible for adhivacana-samphassa, ‘verbal-conceptual contact’ manas supplies the mima, partly on the basis of previous consciousness, for the rzipa conveyed by the five senses.

The implication of the foregoing is that according to early Buddhist psychology, we never experience ‘external’ objects as such. We only experience apparent objects with an admixture of the objectivization of certain aspects of consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is depicted as depending on the fulfilment of certain minimum conditions, one of which is an appropriate external object. From an overarching point of view, what is described is the mutual interdependence of object and consciousness, each determining the nature of the other.

Though a full historical account is beyond the scope of the present study, it is obvious that such ideas naturally generate, from their own dynamism, the fundamental concepts of both the Madhyamika dialectic and VijrXvada meta- physics. The mutual interdependence of consciousness and its object precludes valid knowledge of any independent reality, whether objective or subjective. In terms of the Midhyamika dialectic, there can be no self-existent knower, no self- existent thing known, and no self-existent act of knowing. Section three of Nlggrjuna’s Mi&yamika-k&-ik% is dedicated to establishing this proposition.

1. Vision, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thought are the six senses faculties. The area of their concern is that which is seen [heard, smelled] and so forth . .

4. When no vision occurs, nothing whatsoever is being seen. How, then, is it possible to say: Vision sees?

5. Therefore vision does not see, and ‘no-vision does not see’. Nevertheless, it is explained that also the ‘seer’ is to be known only by his vision.

6. There is no ‘seer’ with vision or without vision; therefore, if there is no ‘seer’ how can there be vision and the object seen? . . .

9. [Likewise] hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thought are explained as vision. Indeed, one should not apprehend the ‘hearer’, ‘ what is heard’, etc., [as self-existent entities] .”

As classically formulated by Dharmakirti, VijGnavHda metaphysics does not depend upon refutation of objective reality. It depends rather upon the

Concepts of Buddhist Psychology 2 7

inability of any opponent to establish such a reality, and its own ability to proceed without reference to any objective reality. In highlighting the necessary subjective component in any experience ofan object, the Pali NikrIyas pave the way for discarding the objective referent of consciousness altogether.

Though archaic in terminology and less than rigorous in empirical basis and deduction, the Nikiya treatment of consciousness and its objects is in some ways more contemporary in outlook than either the Madhyamika or Vijiiina- v&da systems which superseded it in India. Rather than advancing an antiempirical metaphysical theory as such, it is merely critical of common- sense epistemology. It does not affirm or deny an independent, objective reality. It merely illustrates that the way in which reality is perceived is determined largely by subjective factors. This implicit critique of the possi- bility of objective knowledge, simultaneously recognizing the potency of objective reality, is in harmony with much contemporary philosophy. This same critique, couched as it is in psychological terms, also anticipates the fundamental tenet of modern psychotherapy, in that the way in which reality is perceived is determined largely by subjective factors, and therefore can be altered.

Traditionalist interpretations of the @aticcasamuppCda formula which insist upon interpreting mima-6pa as ‘mind and body’ obscure both the contem- porary relevance of early Buddhist psychology and the historical continuity in the development of Buddhist doctrine from early to later formulations.

ABBRE VIA TIONS

A, B., C., Q M, Mt., ML, PTS,

S, SBB, Sn., T., U., Ud., Vbh., Vsm.,

Anguttara Nikiya, PTS vol. and page. Bshadarapyaka. Chandogya. Digha NikrSya, PTS vol. and page. Majhima Nikcya, PTS vol. and page. Maitri. Mu&aka. Pali Text Society. Samyutta Niklya, PTS vol. and page. Sacred Books of the Buddhists. Suttanipcita with verse no. TaittirQa. Upani;ad. UdZna with verse no. VibhaFga. Visuddhimagga.

28 N. Ross Reat

‘NOTES

7

a 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28

T. U. 3:2-6. S2:13, 91, 101, 104; M1:265; A1:176; D2:62. Cp. D3:103 See B. U. 4.3.8; 4.4.2 M1:256-59. S2:65. C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, Buddhist Psychology, 1914, pp. 6-9. Rune Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvana, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, pp. 78-80. E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 2nd edn, 1951, pp. 63-70. Vsm. 14.11. Normally he defines ruima as comprised of vedami, sarir’i5 and sarizkhdra, as at Vsm. 17.187. This definition may be based on an inference from S3:58, where it is stated that there can be no vi%iipa without riipa, vedami, sa%i and salkhdra, while it is often said that there can be no viiii@a without ndma- nipa. S2:3; M1:53. M1:237, 276; M3:18; D1:20; D3:32; A2:137; S2:94; S3:2-5; S5:66, 74. D2:335, 338; M1:296; M2:17; M3:18. Cp. M1:144; D1:176. See D2:63; S2:91. s2:89-90, 104. S2:13. B. U. 1.4.7; C. U. 6.3.2-3; C. U. 8.14.1. M1:301. M1:259; S2:86. Cp. Mt. U. 6.34. D1:222-23. D1:223; D2:32; S2:104, 113. Cp. D2:62-3; S2:6, 8, 12; S3:102. Ml:262; M2:32; M3:63; S2:28, 65, 95; Ud. 1. See L. Poussin, Thlorie des Douze Causes, Luzac & Co., London, 1913, p. 50. Walpola Ruhala, What the Buddha Taught, 1967, p. 53. D2:58-62. See T. W. Rhys-Davids’ ‘Introduction to the Mahd-nid&a-suttanta’, SBB, Vol. 1111, p. 42. Cp. S2:104. D2:56. See L. Poussin, The’orie des Doure Causes, Luzac & Co., London, 1913, p. 16, who cites: Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ‘Cosmology’, Vol. IV, p. 137; Vbh: 138, where viiifi@a is said to condition only n6ma. D3:244; M1:398; M3:281. S4:231. Cp. M1:302, 398. M1:301. Ml:59 S2:3; M1:53.

N. ROSS REAT (M.A., Ph.D., Lancaster) is a Lecturer in the Department of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland.

Department of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4067, Australia.