soft policy on culture - sheila fitzpatrick

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The "Soft" Line on Culture and Its Enemies: Soviet Cultural Policy, 1922- 1927Author(s): Sheila FitzpatrickSource: Slavic Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1974), pp. 267-287Published by:Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2495794 .

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SHEILA FITZPATRICKThe "Soft"Line on Culture and Its Enemies:SovietCultural Policy,1922-1927The year 1928was a turning ointnot onlyfor Soviet cultural olicybutforpolicy nall fields. t was the beginning f a new revolution hichoverturnedeverythingut theStalinist eadership, n upheaval so violent hat t seemedthat the rulingpartyhad revolted imultaneouslygainst the society t gov-erned and its own governing nstitutions.mong these institutions as theCommissariatfEnlightenment,eadedby A. V. Lunacharskyndresponsiblefor mplementingolicy n the sphereofeducation nd thearts. In 1928 theCommissariat as accusedof"softness"n itsdealingswiththe ntelligentsia,lack of "Communist igilance," nd failure o understand he significance f''class war on the culturalfront."This "softness"was not peculiar to theCommissariat,xcept n degree.Rightdeviationn theparty,t was said,hadled a bureaucratized overnmentpparat n retreat rom ruecommunismoliberalism; nd the essence of this retreatwas conciliation f the bourgeoispeasantryndintelligentsia.The "soft" ine, n otherwords, was the official overnmentnd partyline before 928. I will argue in thisarticle hatthe line was neither iberalnornon-Communist,s its opponents elieved, uttheproduct f a policyofexpedientccommodation iththe ntelligentsia,n non-negotiableerms aiddownbytheparty eadershipndwzithoutnstitutionaluarantees.Culturalpolicy n the 1920s restedon thepremise hatthe Soviet stateneeded he ervices f"bourgeois pecialists" ndwould haveto payforthem.The state's nterest as in securinghecooperation fthe ntelligentsiaatherthanfurtherntagonizingt. The valueof nherited ulture nd inheritedech-nical skillsmust be recognized.Those who possessed such skillsmust beencouragedo workfor he Sovietstate nd rewarded ordoingso. Specialistsmust be supervisedbut not harassed. Komchvanstvo Communistconceit)and spetseedstvospecialist-baiting) ererepudiated.t was assumedthat nthe courseof time the Soviet state woulddevelop ts own intelligentsia,ndthatto facilitatehisprocesssomedegreeofpreferentialccess to educationmustbe given o "proletarians."' ducationcould not be ideologically eutral,

1. In discussionfeducationalroblemsheterm proletarian" as oftenoosely sedto covernot onlyworkers nd workers' hildren ut Communistarty members, om-somols, ndpoor peasants nd their hildren. owever, tatistical reakdownsf socialcomposition sotsial'nayi ostav) in the 1920s usually distinguishedbetween "proletarian"

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268 Slavic Reviewthereforets deological ontentmustbe Communist. he same appliedto art;but nbothcases the speed of ideological ransformationould be within helimits mposedby a working elationship ith the old intelligentsia.The "soft" ine was not liberal. t operatedwithin frameworkf ideo-logical ontrol hrough ensorship,ecurity olice, tatemonopoly f thepress,and restrictionf private ublishing. here was roomfordifferencef opinionamongCommunists n the proper cope of activity f these nstitutions; ndtheir onduct ould be criticized y Communists. ut this icensewas not ex-tended othe non-Communistntelligentsia,ince twas the objectofcontrol.According o theconventions f the 1920s,members f the ntelligentsia ightpetition ortheredressof individualgrievances, ut in doing so they wereappealing orfavor nd not nvoking ights.Similarly,he "soft" inemade it possibleforthe intelligentsiao formassociations-butas a matter f privilege, ot of right. ome cultural nstitu-tions were described s autonomous the Academy of Sciences,the old im-perial heaters), ut thiswas an act offavorwhichmight e revoked, s hap-pened n the cases of Proletkult nd theuniversities. he autonomousabelwas in facta warning gainstharassment irected t hardlineCommunists,not legal category.No associationwas autonomousnthe sense that tcouldexcludeCommunistsr protest gainst heorganizationf a Communistrac-tionwithin.The "soft" line mightpermitnon-Communisteadershipof anassociation, ut it did notguarantee t.In the1920sofficialultural olicieswerecarried utas a ruleby govern-ment gencies,notbytheparty.The cultural esponsibilitiesfparty gitpropand press departments ere narrowly nterpreted-press epartments einglargely oncernedwiththe partypress,and agitpropdepartments ithpartyschools and recommendationf partymembersforhighereducation.Onlyconventionimited he activityfthesedepartments;nd the convention ouldbe broken, s itwas in 1924when agitprops upervised heuniversity urge.But it was assumedthat "soft" ine on culturewas moreappropriate o theCommunist overnmenthanthe Communist arty, nd thatparty nterven-tionmeant t leastthreateneduspension f the"soft" ine.If this eemsparadoxical, twas partofthegeneralparadoxofparty ndgovernmentelations. he party eadershipwas, on the one hand,formulatorofthepolicieswhich hegovernmentxecuted.On theother,twas protectorof thespecial partyor "proletarian"nterest. t was possible-though politi-cally actless-forLunacharskyo imagine situationnwhich heparty ead-ershipwouldbe obliged o dissociate tself rompolicieswhichLunacharsky,a partymember fthegovernment,ould continue o implement. he 1924and "poorpeasants,"ometimes ith eparate ategories orchildrenfproletariansndchildrenfpoorpeasants,nd gave a separateisting or artynd Komsomolmembers.



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270 Slavic Reviewforthe wholerevolution nd that about 50 percent f our rural teachers reoffspringftheclergy.... Our rural partyforces . . will be threatenedfwe invite heteachersnto he party, f we begin o drawthem n. The teacherwillget moreauthorityn the village than our Communists. nd, comrades,you knowwhat hatmeans,when he teacherhas greater uthoritynd greatertrust hanour ruralCommunists..."4The "hard" line on culture-the line of komnchvanstvond spetseedstvo-was discriminatoryndcoercive, gnorant r contemptuousf nherited ul-tural radition,nthusiastic or "proletarian ulture" nd especially he domi-nance fproletarianultural nstitutions,nd relativelyndifferento the state'sneed for he services f technical xperts. ts watchwordwas "vigilance n theface of the class enemy,"whichto some supportersmeantsimplybei intelli-gentov. ts tactics angedfronmocal administrativeullying, hrough olenmicaljournalism, o backstairsntrigue gainstvulnerable oftlinersn the leader-ship.

I want o illustrate hesegeneral tatements ith hree xamplesofpolicyin specific reas-university enrollment, olicy toward rural teachers, ndliterature-wherewe can observe a shifting nd evolvingbalance betweenpoliciesofaccommodation iththe intelligentsia"soft" line) and pressurestoward oercion nd protectionftheproletariannterest"hard" line).The "soft" inewas at itsnlost lliberal n the issue ofuniversitynroll-mentntheearly1920s.This was inparta reaction o theeventsoftheCivilWar period.5The Commissariat f EnlightenmentNarkompros) had orig-inally llowedtheuniversitieso retain he autonomyheyhad receivedfromtheProvisionalGovernment; ut at the sametime thad declareduniversityentrancepen toall and created workers' aculties"rabfaks)for dultwork-erswithout henecessary ducational ualifications.he universities esentedtherabfaks,long withNarkomprosndthe Bolshevik overnments a whole,and refused o cooperate.At theend of 1920 theywereformally eprived fautonomy,nd Communistectorswereappointed yNarkompros. he inten-tionsofNarkomproswerestill,within he imits f thissituation, onciliatory;butthebehavior fsomeofits officialsnd appointeeswas not, nd probablyaccurately eflectedhegenerally elligerentemper fthepartyn 1921. D. P.Bogolepov ookup therectorshipfMoscowUniversitywith theuncompro-4. S. Bergavinov Kiev partyorganization),XIII s"ezd RKP (b): Mai 1924 g.(Moscow,1963),pp.469-70.5. Policytoward niversitiesn the Civil War period s discussedn my book, TheComnmissariatfEnlightenment:ovietOrganizationfEducation nd the Arts Un1derLunacharsky, ctober1917-1921 London and New York, 1970), and by James C.McClellandn "BolshevikApproacheso HigherEducation, 917-1921,"lavic Review,30,no.4 (December 971): 818-31.



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"Soft" ine on Culture 271mising tatementhat t was time "to put a most definite nd to everykindofuniversityutonomy nd freedom fteaching, nd not to give the profes-soriate ny greater ights hanotherSoviet employees," nd to fill he univer-sitieswith worker-Communistshrough he rabfaks, ince "only Communistspetsy an puttheeconomy fthe country n other ails and build ife new."6E. A. Preobrazhensky,ppointed o Narkompros s head of the technicaleducation dministration,as anotherhardliner. At the moment," e wrotein 1921, there s a genuine lass war at the doors of the higher choolbetweentheworker-peasant ajority f the countrywhich wants to have specialistsfrom mong ts own kind n its own state nd the [ex-]governing lasses andstrata inkedwith hem.The proletariantateopenly akestheside of its ownpeople."7But Bogolepov was quickly dismissed, s was Preobrazhensky fter awave of universitytrikesand conciliatory nterventionrom the CentralCommittee.When Preobrazhensky rotested hattheCentralComnmitteeadretreated oo farand injured the proletarian ause, he foundno supportersinthe eadership. enin criticized isadministrativeaivete ndthekornchvan-stvo of the rabfak tudentswho supportedhim.8The policy of the Sovietgovernmentt this timewas to avoid open conflictt all costs except that oflossofpolitical ontrol. he old professors ept heir obs, a fairpartof theirfreedom f teaching, nd a share n university dmninistration;he appointedrectorswere mild.The Communist hrust f policywas in recruitmentf thestudent ody:from heearly1920s therewas a verysmall "freeenrollment"to university,nd themajority fplaces went to nominees f party, oviet,and tradeunion organizationswho enteredeitherdirectly r through herabfak, epending n educational tandard.The system fkoniandirovanie as supposedto fill he universities ithreliable roletariannd Commmunisttudentswithout heupheavaland provo-cationof a major university urge. t had the considerable isadvantage flowering cademic standards nd removing he raison d'etreof the generalsecondarychool. But the status of the secondary choolwas controversial.Many Communists hought f it as an irredeemably ourgeois chool whichneeded obe radically eorganizeds a technical choolwithout ccess to uni-versity: n fact, rather rbitrarilyonstituted artymeeting n educationhadpasseda resolutiono thiseffectt thebeginning f 1921. But Narkom-pros, withsome supportfromLenin, ignoredthe resolution; nd only theKomsomol rotested.6. Pravda,Feb.27, 1921, . 1: D. Bogolepov,Vysshaia hkola kommunizm."7. E. A. Preobrazhensky,O professional'no-tekhnicheskombrazovanii," ravda,Sept.10, 1921, . 2.8. Odinntadtsatyi"ezd RKP(b): Mart-aprel' 922 g. (Moscow, 1961), pp. 85-86,142.



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272 Slavic ReviewThe party's im, as statedby Bukharin t the 1924 Party Congress,was

to turn heuniversitiesntotraining choolsfora new proletarian nd Com-munistgoverning lass by enrollingworkers nd Communists s students.9But theywere to be trained, or the time being,by the old "bourgeois"pro-fessors nder soft" in Bukharin's iew, xcessivelyoft) Narkompros uper-vision. t turned ut that he system f komiandirovanieas an unsatisfactoryone, beingill-coordinatednd indiscriminaten its selection ven from hesociopolitical ointof view. Academic standardsdropped sharply.The uni-versitieswere overcrowded,nd theirgraduatesof such poor qualitythatemployers omplained-particularly esenkha, the Supreme Council of theNational Economy.The last straw came with the leadership struggleof1923-24,when the future overning lass in theuniversity artycells cameout almostsolidlyfor Trotsky.The party eadershipdecided to purge thestudent ody not the faculty) f academically nsuccessfultudentsndthoseof "alien social origin," nd at the sametimeto conduct separatepurgetorid the university ells of Trotskyites.10he generaluniversity urge wasconductedn the summer f 1924 by Narkompros nd the agitpropdepart-mentsof the party,underthe supervision f Zinovievfor the Politburo."The purgeas an instrumentfpolicy was incompatible ith the "soft"line,for t meantboth directparty nterventionnd revitalization f the con-cept of "class war" in cultural nd intellectualife.Narkomproswas not in aposition o resist hepurging mpulse, avingno support orthis n the partyleadership, ut it did its bestto defuse t. Not onlydid it reinstate tudentsexpelledby ocal agitprop epartments12nd securetheright f aterre-entryfor hoseexpelled, tactually ublished denial that alien" students xpelledfor heir ocialoriginwerereally lien: "Owing to oversightsn thepartofsome commissions or hereviewofthestudent ody, he commentalien ele-9. Resolution n work anmongouth, hirteenth ongress.KPSS v re2oliutsiiakhresheniiakh"egdov, onferentsiiplenuf1movsK, vol.3 (Moscow, 1970), p. 109.10. Zinoviev iscussed hegeneral niversityurgewith hecollegiumfNarkomprosat its meeting f March 26, 1924 (Tsentral'nyi osudarstvennyirkhiv Oktiabr'skoirevoliutsii sotsialisticheskogotroitel'stva TsGAOR], Moscow, fond 2306, op. 1, d.2945). On Trotskyism,ee N. Akimov,Krasnoe studenchestvo,928-29,no. 14, p. 4:"Everyone emembershe Trotskyiteeverfromwhichthe universityells especiallysufferedn 1923-24.The partialpurgeof theparty t that timeaffectedrimarily heuniversityrganizations,ore han 5 percentf whosemembers erepurged s decadentand deologicallyostile lements."11.As a resultof thepurgeabout18,000 tudents13-14 percent f total) wereexpelled,ofwhich hree-fourthsereremovedor ompletelynjustifiedcademic ailureand the restforvariousother easons" Narodnoeprosveshchenie,925,no. 4, p. 118).But as I. I. KhodorovskyfNarkompros ad madeclear, cademic equirementsariedaccordingo thesocialorigin f the studentPraczda,May 17, 1924,p. 6).12. See, forexample, rotest rom molensk ubkomndagitpropo CentralCom-mittee gitprop epartment,ept. 27, 1924 SmolenskArchives,WKP 518,p. 71).



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"Soft" ine on Culture 273ment'was written n the documents f some of those expelled. . It isobvious hat n thesecases the descriptionalien element'meantpersonswhounder he present traitenedircumstances f higher ducational nstitutionsare the east suitable o go through niversity.... The persons xpelledfromuniversityre not disgraced, nd their expulsion fromuniversity oes notcarry ny imitationsf their ights."'13A side effect fthepurge was hardlineresurgencen other reas. TheKomsomol ook the opportunityo press its charges gainstthe "bourgeois"secondary chool n discussion f Bukharin'spaper at the Thirteenth artyCongress;and Narkomproswas subsequently bligedto reorganize he sec-ondary chools n a semitechnicalasis and formallyo acknowledge hattherabfak ad replaced he secondary choolas a channel o the university.14In theprovinces hepurge generated momentum hichnot only Nar-kompros ut the party eadership ounddifficulto control: t was as if localauthoritiesad beenonlywaiting orthe moment o settle ccountswithuni-versities,chools, eachers,nd thewholealienbodyofthe ntelligentsia.heexperiencemayhave been sobering ortheparty eadership.15t was not, atany rate,repeatedduring heremaining earsof NEP, and the vocabularyof class wartended ntheseyearsto dropout of officialse.There wereother actors ncouraging e-establishmentf the "soft" ine,notably ressure rom heeconomic ommissariatsorbetter ualitygraduatesand softlinenitiatives romRykovand Sovnarkom.n the summer f 1925Vesenkha skedtheCentralCommitteeo allow somethousands fengineer-ingstudents o study broad because ofthe low standards f Sovietuniver-sities.The requestwas refused, utprovoked re-examinationfthesituationinuniversitiesnd thetraining f specialistsed byRykov,president f Sov-narkom.16 s a resulta number fmeasureswere takento raise academicstandards. revised ystem f komandirovanie as still n force nuniversityenrollment,ut twas modifiedntheautumn nrollmentf 1925bythe addi-tionoftwospecial quotas: one of2,500forgraduates f secondary nd tech-nical schools, notherof 1,000 for distributiony trade unions amongthe"toiling ntelligentsia" otherwiseknownas "bourgeoisspecialists"). Thiswas surely move to conciliate heintelligentsias well as to raise academicstandards,incespecialistswereunlikely o workwithenthusiasm or a gov-ernment hich enied heir hildrenccesstouniversityt a timeofextremely

13.ResolutionfcollegiumfNarkompros,ept. 23,1924 (TsGAOR 2306/1/3328),publishednEzhenedel'nikKP, 1924, o.21(41), p. 2.14.Narodnoeprosveshchenie,924,no. 8, pp. 5, 51, and 73. The secondarychoolreorganizationdded "professionalias" (profuklon) o the two senior lasses,but theschoolwasstill lassifieds general-educational,ottechnical,ouniversity-entranceevel.15. See Bukharin'sommentsn Partiia vospitaniemeny Moscow,1924),p. 108.16.A. V. Lunacharsky,rosveshchenierevoliutsiiaMoscow,1926),pp. 415-16.



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274 Slavic Reviewhigh adolescent nemploymeint.The policy and aims of the Soviet govern-nment,"xplainedLunacharsky's eputy n 1925 when the nlewquotas wereannounced, are not at all directed owardclosing ccess to higher chool toall exceptworkers nd peasants.Each yearthe government ill further identhe pathsby which hildren f the toiling ntelligentsiandwhite-collar ork-ers can enter he school. . . Soviet power is concerned hat ts social baseshouldbecomewider,not narrower."'17This promisewas kept. n 1926 the system f komandirovanie as aban-doned, nd universitynrollment as thrown pen to free ompetitivenroll-ment.A secondary rocessof social selectionwas still operative, ut it dis-criminatedgainstonly partof the ntelligentsia,ince children f specialistsin state employment ere declared "equal" in social statusto childrenofworkers.18ut themainemphasiswas on the establishmentf academiccri-teria n university ntrance.After ll, as Lunacharsky heerfully emarked,it was no good admittingnqualified orkers nd peasants o be made "martyrsand eyesores bel'nmoa glazai] in the university,s oftenhappens."'9As had been expected, he percentage f workers nd partymembers nthe 1926 enrollment ropped,whilethe numbers f secondary chool grad-uatesgoingdirectlyouniversityosesharply. he effect fthenew enrollmentpolicywas to re-establish normalprogressionrom econdary choolto uni-versity nd to cutback adultenrollment. ven the rabfaks,whichcontinuedto supplybetween quarter nd a thirdof theenrollment, ere increasinglytraining dolescentsrather han adult workers. n otherwords, theywereevolving ntoa subsidiaryypeofsecondary chool.The number f workers'children howed n improvementntheworker ercentagenthe 1927 enroll-ment.Hardline criticismfthenewpolicywas muted.L. Milkh,ofthe CentralCommitteepparat, oldCommunist tudentsn 1927 that tlhe ewconditionsof enrollmentn universities re a retreat rom hepolicyof proletarianiza-tion."20 uthispublished ommentsnthe CentralCommitteegitprop ournalavoideddirect riticismfthepolicy,whilesuggestinghatNarkomproswasgiving t an unnecessarilysoft"interpretation.2't was always permissibleto attackNarkomprosfor "softness," nd particularlyo in this context:Vesenkha,whichprovidedpowerful ackingfor academic criteria n enroll-ment,was atthesametimenmountingcampaign o havethetechnical acultiesof universitiesemoved romNarkomprosontrol o its own. But the issueof

17.Narodnoe rosveshchenie,925, o. 7-8,pp.102-3.18. Izvestiia,May26,1926, .3,andJuly 0,p.5.19.Narodnoe rosveshchenite,927, o.4,p. 14.20. TsGAOR 5574/5/2,olnferencefProletstud,anuary927, .9.21. Komnmzunistichzeskaia-evoliitsiia,927, o.8, p.46.



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"Soft" ine on Culture 275proletarianizationnd classwar had, by 1927,been appropriated y the PartyOpposition.To all appearances he "soft" ine not only was in the ascendant t theFifteenth artyCongress f December1927 but was likely o remain o. Ac-cording o Stalin, hundreds nd thousands f the toiling ntelligentsia"ndthe industrial pecialists n particularwere eager and willing to cooperatewith heSoviet governmentn achieving he Five-Year Plan. Bukharin on-gratulatedMolotov on his new understanding f the need for educationalexpansion.Nobodymentioned lass war in the universities r took the oppor-tunityo criticizeNarkonipros a sure sign that the "hard" line was underconstraint),nd theNarkomprosournal, or he first nd only ime, ublishedtherelevant ebates fa party ongress erbatim.22

The status of ruralteacherswas a question on which Soviet attitudeswere traightforwardndpolicynot a matter f controversynthe eadership.The policywas "soft."Stalin, concluding is remarks n changing ttitudesofthe ntelligentsiat theFifteenth arty Congress, aid: "I don't even speakof the rural aboringntelligentsia,specially he ruralteacher,who has longturned oward Soviet power and cannot but welcomethe development feducationnthecountryside."23ural teachers rovidedno potential oliticalthreat s far as thecenterwas concerned, o the "soft" ine encountered oobstacle-except hat ocal authoritiesersistentlygnoredt. t is thiscentral/localdichotomy hich want to examine.The local "hard" line on teacherswas rooted n Civil War memories24andCommunistsolationnthecountryside.n 1918 the anti-Bolshevikeach-ers' unionhad goneon strikenthecapitals, nd localbranches ad cooperatedwiththe WhiteArmies. This briefly rovokeda hardline endency t thecenter, epresented ytheCommunistplinter roupof "teacher-international-ists" whichclaimedrightof successionto the teachers' union. But neitherNarkompros or the Central Councilof Trade Unions would recognize heteacher-internationalists,nd the new union which was established n 1919was a massprofessionalnion25withno restrictionsn entry nd nonmilitant

22. Narodnoe rosveshchenie,928, o. 1,pp. 1 ff.23. Ibid., . 26.24. Relations etween eachers nd the Soviet governmentn the earlyyears aredescribedndetail nRonaldHideo Hayashida, The ThirdFront: The Politics f SovietMass Education, 917-1918" Ph.D. diss.,ColumbiaUniversity, 973), and brieflynFitzpatrick,ommissariat f Enlightenmtent,p. 34-43. The major Westernwork onSoviet choolsn the 1920s s OskarAnweiler, eschichte er Schuleund Pddagogik nRussland omEnde des Zarenreiches is zumBeginnder Stalin-AraBerlin,1964).25. "Unionof workers n education nd socialist culture" Rabpros). The tradeunions bjected o Narkompros'hoice of the "political"word "socialist" n the title,and tdroppedutofuse intheearly1920s.



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276 Slavic ReviewCommunist eadership-a typical softline onception.The attitudeof Nar-komproswas that teachers, specially ural teachers,were potential llies ofthe Soviet governmentnd deserved sympatheticreatment. his was con-firmed y CentralCommittee irectiven 1921 that local party rganizationsmustgive up the ttitude hat heyhave so farconmmonlyeld thateducationalworkers re saboteurs, or heyhave ong ceased tobe so if they ver were."26Old Bolsheviksike Lenin,Krupskaia,Zinoviev, nd Kalinin had an emo-tionalattachmento the rural teacher s a humble nd underpaidbearer ofenlightenmento the people.27But the leadershipwas also bearing n mindthe practical onsideration hat rural Communists ere few and needed sup-port nthe countryside. t the Thirteenth artyCongress n May 1924 Zino-viev sponsored n official elcome o teachers s rural allies of Soviet power;and Krupskaia gave a moving ccount of theirmiserable onditions f life.The teacherswerepromised mprovementn material onditions, igherwages,considerate reatmentrom ocal officials,nd eventhe opportunityo join theparty. ome partymembersaw this as capitulationo the class enemy.28In January 925 an All-Union Teachers' Congress-genuinely epresen-tative f the nonparty eacher, s Narkompros omewhat efensivelylaimed-was held in Moscow. It was givenmaximumpublicity nd was attendedby no fewer han ix Politburomembers nd candidates,ll endorsing policyof conciliation nd deploringharassment f teachersby local authorities.Rykovpromised heteachers rotectionrom rbitraryismissal nd transfer.Zinoviev, without inning gainstthetenets fMarxism," rejected he ideaofclass war againstthe ruralintelligentsia,ince "the majority f teachersare part of the toilingmasses led by the proletariat,nd nmuste acceptedintoour milieu s toilershaving qual rights," nd staked heauthorityf theCentralConmmitteenhis claim hat ocalparty fficials ouldcooperate.29They did not.Arbitrary ismissals nd transfers nd (as Narkomprosput it) "mockery" f teachers ontinued o be reported n 1926 and 1927.Cases werecitedof local authorities epriving eachersof the vote as "alienelements,"axing hem ikeNepmen.A summaryf etters rom heprovincesconcludedhat arty fficialsreated eachers adly, sing commandmethods,"and Komsomolswere evenworse.30 he buoyantmood which had been ob-

26. DirektivyVKP (b) Po voprosam rosveshcheniiaMoscow,1931),p. 180.27. For an emotional tatementn the situation f teachers,heir ervices o thepeople, nd the identityf their ause of popular nlightenmentnd that of the Com-munists ee Zinov'ev, Proletarskaia evoliutsiia uchitel'stvo,"ravda,Apr. 24, 1924,pp.2-4.28. See V. Kolokolkin,O sel'skoiintelligentsii"discussion f comradeKalinin'stheses),Pravda,May 20, 1924,p. 6.29. Narodnoe rosveshchenie,925,no. 2, pp.39 (Rykov) and72-73 (Zinoviev).30. Ibid.,1927, o.4, p. 43; 1926,no. 1,p. 34; 1926,no.9, pp.85-86.



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"'Soft'Line otnCulture 277served nmongeachers fter he 1925congress aveway to "dissatisfaction,feeling f burden, pathy, pprehension,ears, nd hopelessness" n theyearsfollowing.31Centralpartypolicywas not without esponsibilityor this, despitethe"soft" ine. First, Zinoviev'swelcome o teachershad coincided xactlywithpreparations or he university urge and may havebeen ntended o preventa backlash ntheschools).Local officialsookthe purge s an indicationhatgeneralhardline ampaign gainst he ntelligentsiaadbegun, ndaccordinglyundertook o purgethe schoolsofsocially lien elements-expelling hildren,disnlissingeachers, ften losing econdarychools ltogethers "bourgeois."32Repeated Narkonmprosrohibitionis,ackedup by a "party nstructioniglnedby comradeAndreev,"were gnored r perhaps venmisunderstood: replyreceived romTonmsktated reassuringly,A purgehas not been conducted[in the schools],but t is proposed o conlduct ne before he begin-ningftheschoolyear."233 year laterthe impactof thepurgewas still beingfelt nthe provinces.Second, he teaclhers ere n constant onflict ith Pioneerorganizationsand theirKomnsomoleaders n the sclhools. his was notbecause thepartydirected oungConnmunistso attack heteachers: nthecontrary,heCentralCoimmitteen 1925 decreed hat theKomsomol mustdrawthe teachers ntoPioneer work, nd that "the chiefdutyof a Pioneer is to be an exemplarypupil n school."34t was simplybecausetheteachers,witl very fewexcep-tions,werenot Communistsnd the Pioneers, n theirown understanding,were.Neither heKoomsoniolor the Pioneers were massmllovementsn thetwenties,nd those school childrenwho joined did so withthe purestandmostprimitiventhusiasmorrevolutionind classwar. How couldtheyfighttheclasswarexcept ntheschool, gainstbourgeoisntelligentshchina,gainsttheir eachers?Partycalls for moderationi ere eitherunheardor taken asevidence hat heparty eadership ad become"degenerate" nd incapableofmilitanteadership.35It is also true hatparty alls formoderation ereoftenmbiguous, eingaddressedto bothsides. Buklharin,peaking,t the 1925 teachers'congress,said that eachers houlddefer o Komsomols n politicalmatters,void "cul-tural uperciliousness,"ndacknowledge omsomol re-eminenlcen eadership

31. Ibid., 929, o. 8-9,p. 103 oftheperiod 926-28).32. Ezhenedel'nikKP, 1924,no. 18(39), p. 12, andno. 21(41), pp.8-9; TsGAOR2306/1/3328,residiumf NKP collegium, ept.29,1924; SmolenskArchivesWKP 11,agitpropollegiumfSychevskykom,Aug. 12, 1924.33. Narodnoe rosveshchenie,924,no. 8, p. 9.34. Direktivy KP(b) povoprosam rosveshcheniia,. 194.35. See Btukharin'semarks n Komsomol nd Pioneer"avaiitgardisnm,"IV s"ezdVKP(b), 18-31dek.1926g. (Moscow,1926),p. 824.



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278 SlavtcReviewof thePioneers,whiletheKomsomiiollhould ehavetactfullyo theteachersand acknowledgeheir re-eminences leaders n theschool.36 fter hecon-gresstherewere reportsfrom he provinces hat this formulationad notimprovedheteachers' osition: The Pioneers lnd heir Komsomol] eadersisolatethenmselvesromnclhoolife as a whole,and the teacher s afraidtomeddle n their ffairs ecause Bukharin did not orderit at the teachers'congress"' (thoughthere were also teachers"who were not afraid of Bu-kharin" nd continuedo attack hePioneerleadersfor disorganizingchoollife).37Finally, he"soft" ine offeredheteachergood will but no weaponsofhis own: the teachers'union,at bothcentral nd local levels,was neitherstrongnor professional noughto figlt the teachers'battles.The branchsecretaries ecommendleedy ocalparty rganizations ereoftennotteachersbyprofessionut "candidatemembers ftheparty r experienceddmninistra-tors"; and theirelectionwas a formalityo which"ordinary otersare notaccustomedo object openly, onfininghemselves o indignantwhispers ndironical miles."38 he unionhad no influence n the appointmentr dis-missal ofteachers,whichwas conducted ythe educationdepartnlentf thelocal soviet;and victimizedeachers arely ppealedto theunionforsupport,since its officialsoften ct withthe administrativergans . . . againsttheteachersnstead fdefendinghem." n casesofarbitraryismissal rtransfer,"thetradeulnion rgansremain ompletelyndifferent,"nd onlythesel'kory(ruralnewspaper orrespondents)ometimes efendedheteachers.39

The conflictf "soft"and "hlard" ines in literatures remarkable othfor ts intensitynd itsapparent riviality-its eriplheralelation othto thereal concerns f literaturend to thoseof government.t is as an exercisein pure politics hat tdeserves ttentionn this article.40Theproletarianiterarymovement,rotagonistftlhelhard"ine, mergedinthefirst ears f NEP as a product fpostwar emobilizationndKomsomol36. Narodntoerosveshchenie,925, o. 2, p. 140.37. Ibid.,1926, o.9, p. 77.38. Ibid., 926, o.6,pp.108-9.39. Ibid., 926, o.9,p.82.40. Literary olicy, nliketseducationialounterpart,asbeen dmiirablyocumentedbybothWestern nd Sovietresearch, otablyn RobertA. Maguire'sRed Virgin oil:Soviet Literature tnthe1920's (Princeton, 1968), Edward J.Brown's ProletarianlEpisodein Rutssiani iterature,1928-1932 (New York, 1953), and S. I. Sheshukov's Neistovycrevniteli:z istorii iteraturnoior'by 0-khgodov (Moscow,1970). Since literaturesonly neof the hree ontextsnwhich discuss heoppositionf"hard" nd"soft" inesin thisarticle, have not attempted thoroughreatment: have assumed thattherelative amiliarityfthematerialllowsmetobemore elective erethan ntheearliersectionsf the rticle ealingwith ducationialroblemsnwhich here s little ublishedwork.



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280 Slavic ReviewAverbakh'sword), rejected hewholenotioli f proletarian ulture.Kamenev,whosenamewas listed nmongotruidnikifNa postitin its first ssues,meltedaway. Stalin and Zinovievwere simplynot interested. he one nlember fthe eadershipwho seemedto be in symnpathyith the proletarianswas Bu-kharin: cultural conoclast nd Proletkult upporter f the Civil War period,old opponent f the bien-pensantunacharsky n artistic uestions,43 atronof the Komsomol.But Bukharin, uffering changeof heartafterLenin'sdeath, ecameVAPP's most nergeticpponentnthe eadership.Nor could it be said that VAPP won favorby toadying o the CentralCommittee,r by unswerving oyalty o Stalin. Its early relationshipwiththeCentralCoinmittee ress departmelentas intense, n theproletarian ide,but ntensely ostile. n April 1925 Furrnanov eportedn his diarythathiscolleagues n VAPP were saying, Furnmanovs a traitor, ecause he wentto thealien (as faras literature oes) and hostileCentralCommnittee,o theenemy fproletarialniterature areikis, nd talked o himabout ouraffairs."In general, urmanov ommented,a tradition as beenestablished hat thepeople in the CentralCommittee,n the press department,re (except forthe ateKanatchikov) beyondhope, nd notonlyshouldonenot maintain restablishnysortofcontactwith hembutoneshould ttack nd irritate llemcontinually. . 'in the nterestsf iterature.'44As forpolitical eliability,heyoungproletarians-like heKonmsomol-werenotoriouslyusceptibleo outbreaks foppositionism,inceas a vigilantegroup theywere constantlyn guardagainst signsofparty "degeneration."Oftheearly eaders,Averbakh nd LelevichwereTrotskyitestltil heautumnof 1924. They felt,Averbakh xplained, hattheCentralCommittee as fol-lowinga "degenerate" ine while Trotsky, lthoughalso "degenerate"onliterarypolicy,was politicallyLeninist.45 ven when AverbakhinheritedVAPP leadership romnhe now Zinovievite elevich and Vardinin 1926,hedidnotbecome devoted talinist:we findhim n 1929supportinghatskin'sKomsomnoleviation. APP's sheerpolitical rrogance,tsunfailingUspicion

43. See, forexample,Bukharin'sall to "smash he old theater"n Pravda articlesof October16 and December16, 1919,and Lunacharsky's rotest irculated o partyleaders Lunacharsky,obraniteochineii,vol.3 [Moscow,1964],pp.100-105) his clashwithLunacharskyt the 1922 Komsonmolongress(V Vserossiiskii "evd RKSM[Moscow ndLeningrad, 927], p.127 nd141).44. Dmitrii urmanov,obranie ochinenii,ol. 4 (Moscow,1961), pp. 352-53.S. I.Kanatchikov who was in factstillalive in 1925) had headed theCentral Committeepressdepartmentt thebeginningf the wenties;. M. Vareikiswas its head n1924-26.45. Trotsky'sow assessmentf theachievementfproletarian ritersnd rejectiononprinciplefthepossibilityftrue"proletarianulture" evelopingn thetransitionalperiod o socialismweremade knownn his Literatura revoliultsia,rittenn 1923 ndpublisheds articlesn Pravda toward heendof thatyear.See LeopoldAverbakh, ashiliteraturnyeaznoglasiia Leningrad,927),p.34.



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"'Soft"ine on Culture 281ofthemotives nd intentionsf theparty eadership, stonished ontempo-raries.What other organizationwould lhave"demanded"that the CentralCommitteeorbid ravda and Bol'shevikto criticize t, as Averbakhdid in1927 46 And that was at a timewheniVAPP's positionwas dangerouslycloseto theOpposition's.Among the softliners, oronsky f Krasnaia nov' was the main targetoftheproletarians'ttack, ecause, n their iew,he deniedproletarianlritersaccesstothemainComlmunistiteraryournaland publishednstead heworkof "bourgeois pecialists"-the oyal non-CommunistriterswhomTrotskydescribed s "fellow ravelers."We mustassume theircampaignprovokedsome sympathy,r at least attention,n the CentralCommittee pparat,47sinceVardinwas allowedto put theproletarian ase againstVoronsky t aspecialmeetingnthepressdepartmentf the CentralCommitteenMay 1924.But the public responisewas whollynegative:amongthe speakersagainstVAPP wereTrotsky, ukharin, unacharsky,Meshcheriakov,nd Iakovlev,representinghepressdepartmenlt.nlytheBolshevikKerzhentsev, formerProletkultist,nd thepoetDemianBedny supportedheproletarianine.48But with n opponentikeTrotsky, APP hardlyneededfriends; ndtoits great good fortuneVoronskywas both politically ssociated with theTrotskyitesnd a supporter f Trotsky's iterary iews.49Because of his

46. Sheshukov, eistovyeev'niteli,.207.47. For evidence fpre-1923 entral ommitteenterestnliterary olitics ee A. F.ErmakovnObogashchenie letodaotsialistichlesleogoealiz'na problemtanogoobraziiasovetskogosklesstvaMoscow,1967),pp.356-62.48. A stenogramf thedebatewas publishedn K voprosuo politikeRKP(b) vkhudozhestvennoiiteratureMoscow,1924).49.Maguire Red Virgintoil, pp.417ff.)concludes hatVoronsky'sctualparticipa-tionintheTrotskyiteppositionemains nproved,ointingut thatthe abelof "Trot-skyism"was often ndiscriminatelynd vindictivelypplied.The same suggestion asbeen madeby somepost-1956 oviet writers n Voronsky. here is, in fact,no hardevidencefVoronsky'sctivemnembershipn thepost-1923pposition; ut it shouldberememberedhat nfoundedccusations factualopposition embershipre characteristicof the late thirtiesnd not of any periodof RAPP's activity. he mostscholarly fVoronsky'soviet ehabilitators-A. .DementlevnKratkaia iteratutrnaiantsiklopediia,vol.1 (Moscow,1962),p. 1046, heshukov, eistovyeevniteli,. 43,M. M. Kuznetsovn"Krasnaianov'," Ocherki storiirtssleoi ovetskoi hurnalistiki,917-1932 Moscow,1966),p. 229-agreethatVoronsky elongedo the1926-28 ppositionndwas expelledfrom hepartyn 1928forthatreason.Theircommonunidentified)ource s probablytheentryn Deiatelirevoliutsionnogovizheniia Rossii,5 vols. (Moscow,1927-33):"In 1926-28Voronsky elonged o theTrotskyite ppositionnd conductedctivefrac-tionalwork,nconnection ithwhichhe was expelled rom he ranksoftheVKP(b);however,aterhebrokewith heOppositionndwas reinstateds a member ftheparty.He nowworksnMoscow s a senior ditor f Russian ndforeignlassics" vol. 5, pt.2,p. 1030). My own impressions that thisentry s probably ccurate.Real oppositionmembershipas clearly mbarrassingo Voronsky's ost-1956ovietrehabilitators,ndthis couldexplain he hinted oubts o whichMaguirerefers. ut, if we take it that



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282 Slavic Reviewopposition onnections, oronsky'spositionon Krasnaia nov' was underconstant hreat rom1924 to 1927, whenhe was finally usted.VAPP-inspite fformerrotskyitessociations f tsown-did not neglect hisweapon.It made a strong id "to equateTrotsky'spoliticalpositionwithVoronsky'sline [on iterature]ndeven with he ineof all theparty omradeswho do notsupport VAPP's point of view."50What worriedLunacharskywas thatVAPP's smear tacticsmight inally iscredit he "soft" ine on culture lto-gether.He therefore oved oward uasi-alliancewithVAPP, declaring inm-self literaryproletarian"51repared o concede o theVAPPists everythingbutorganizationalontrol. his causedgreatoffenseoVoronsky,whorightlybelieved thatthe softlinerswere offering iimup as a sacrifice:"AnatoliiVasilevich" he addressedLunacharsky.You haveentered ntothe Na postuabode, nditwouldseemnhatyouarequite t hoomehere.... But if t s fatedthat mustaccepttheend,then et it not be from he handofAverbakh."52Voronsky,who had lost control f Krasnaia nov! n theautumn-f 1924with heappointmentfRaskolnikov an Old Bolshevik nd VAPP synmpa-thizer)as coeditor, egained t early n 1925; and itwas probably ecauseofthecontroversyurroundingim hat he ssueofproletarianulture emainedon theCentralCommitteegenda.A Politburo ommission eadedby Vareikisand including ukharin ndLunacharskymong tsnmenmbersorked hroughthespring f 1925onthe resolution inally assed in June:"On thePolicyoftheParty nthe Field of Artistic iterature."Whysuchextended eliberationwas necessarys notclear, s no disagreementnmong embers fthecommis-sion s recorded;but we do knowthatTrotsky ubmitted writtenmemoran-dumsetting uthisviews.53t is worthnoting hatwhileno influentialersonappearsto be arguing he case of theproletarians,he officialttitude owardthem ecomes onsistently ore ympathetichroughheresolution fthepressdepartmentnMay 1924, tsadoptionn slightlyditedformntheThirteentlParty Congress's esolutionOn thePress,"thereportedtatementsfmem-bersofthe Politburo ommission,nd theeventualCentralCommitteeesolu-tionofJune1925-which acknowledged,n direct pposition o Trotsky, he"historic ight"oftheproletariato "hegemony"n literature,ut proposedVoronsky as expelled romhepartys a Trotskyiten1928 ndreadmittedbout1930,whatplausible xplanations there xcept heobvious ne-thathe hadbelonigedo the1926-28 pposition?50. Lunacharsky,arly 925, ublishediteraturnoe,asledstvo,ol.64,p.35.51. See,for xample, isarticle n Na postu, 925,no. 1(6), June. unacharsky asnot nsincere,n thathe had alwaysbeenan advocate n principlefproletarianultureandreallydidobjectto Trotsky's iewson it.Buthe dislikedVAPP's modusoperandi,andtherapprochementasprimarilyactical.52. Voronsky,Mr.Britling rinks heCuptotheDregs,"Krasntaiaov',1926, o. 5,pp.202-3.53. Ermakov, bogashtheeniem,etoda,p.276-77.



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"Soft" ineon Culture 283thatproletarianwriters hould earn it for themselveswithout he "bureau-cratic" olution fparty nterventionn their ehalf.54In fact the party bureaucracywas already involving tself deeply inVAPP's affairs,houghnotaltogethern tokenof approval.One outcome fthe1925 discussionln literature as the decisionto create a FederationofSoviet Writers (FOSP), includingboth proletarian nd fellow-travelinggroups.The CentralCommittee ressdepartment, hichwas responsible ororganizingFOSP, passed the organizationalnitiative o VAPP,55 which,under he eadership f Vardin,Lelevich, nd Rodov, refused o take t on thegrounds hatVAPP was not guaranteed hegemony" n the federation. ormore thana yearVAPP and the press department restled ogetherwiththedemons f Zinovievismnd"leftdeviation."56 s a result,VAPP emergedwith new eader (Averbakh) and a newrelationship iththepress depart-ment-which, rom he spring f 1926,was headedby Gusev, n Old Bolshevikand old enemy fTrotsky rom hearmypolitical dministration.57The new VAPP was willing o organize he federationf writers, ndthenew press department as anxiousto support t in thisundertaking.VAPPis mechanicallycquiring-evidently,omradeGusev,withyourpermission-apredominantnfluencen the federation," rotestedVoronsky. Were thereorweretherenot, omradeGusev, ttempts o organize he federationn sucha way thatVAPP and its supporterswere in facthandedtwo-thirdsf thevotes? . . . I will say franklyhatyou have unleashedthe young VAPPcomrades, iventhemsuchrights nd suchprivileges hat theyhave lost asenseofproportion,ost humility. . . You have unleashed hem, omradeGusev."58On April18, 1927,Voronsky's ditorshipf Krasnaia nov' was discussedin the CentralCommittee ress department, ith reports by Gusev andVoronsky: The question fKrasnaia nov' and theTrotskyite ppositionwasquite harply aised. t was saidthat he ournal ould notbe calledopposition-ist,but itwas noticeable hatVoronsky'smembershipn the oppositionhadleft ts mark. . ."59 Raskolnikovwas once again appointed o the editorialboard, ndVoronskyeft hortlyfterwards.

54. PublishednPravda,July , 1925.55. Sheshukov, eistovyeevniteli,. 197.56. See, for xample,hespeech yBliakhin f thepressdepartmento the VAPPconference,iulleten'V.A.P.P., no. 1, Apr. 10, 1926, n SmolenskArchives,WKP 257.57.Trotsky,writingn 1930 on the occasionof Mayakovsky'suicide,describedGusev as Molotov'sright-handmnann the sphereof culturalrepressionBiulleten'Oppozitsii,930, o.11,p. 40).58.Voronsky,OpenLetter oComradeGusev,"Krasnaianov',1927, o.6, pp.241-42.59. Kuznetsov,Krasnaianov',"p. 229. SinceKrasnaianov' was a journal f politicaland socialcomments well as a literaryournal, heStalinist/Bukharinistnxiety veritscontroly n oppositionists neitherurprisingormisplaced.



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284 Slavic ReviewWithVoronsky one,therespectivetrenigthsf "hard" and "soft" ineemergedmoreclearly.VAPP had brought heCentralConmmitteeressde-partmentnto day-to-dayiterary olitics, utforthe specific urposeofup-rooting olitical ppositionisil.t had not aclhievedhegemony,"inceFOSPsimply ollapsed s a workingnstitutioninderheweight finternal icker-ing; Gosizdat,Narkompros,nd thethick ournalsPechat' i revoliitsiia andNovyi nir remained nder"soft"control;and evenKrasncaianov' did notfunctionfterVoronsky's epartures a VAPP organ.The censoring rgans,Glavlit ndthe heatrical lavrepertkom,ncluded manyardlinersndalwayshad,butVAPP didnotcontrol hem.Lunacharsky epthisgripon theatricalaffairs,hough ontinluallyubjectto hardlineharassmentwlhichVAPP didnot initiate r lead. Gorky'sreturn, utmoredt least fromthe autumnl f1927,representedpotentiallyowerful einiforcementor he "soft" ine.But aboveall,VAPP was embarrassedn 1927bythe virtual dentityfits"hard" ineonculture nd that f thepolitical pposition. he chief pposi-tion spokesmanon culturewas Preobrazhensky,upportedby Sosnovsky,Vaganian, nd the former APP leadersVardinand LelevichA.0he opposi-tion laimed hat heparty addegenerated,ndthisdegeneration as reflected

in its inability o meetthe bourgeoischallenge n culture.The bourgeoisieremainedupremen iteraturendthearts, ndkept tsmonopolyftechnicalexpertise nd consequent ontrol fhigher ducation.Buklharinad explicitlydisclaimed he conceptof cultural lass war,61 nd the partyhad adoptedapolicyof "stabilization" n culture,whichmeantthat it had given tip theattempto raisethecultural evelof theproletariato a pointwlheret couldeffectivelyompetewiththe old intelligentsia.he party hadsuccumllbedo"right deviation,"with Bukharin offering "classic image of cultural60. The opposition adenoreferenceo cultural olicyn itstheses o theFifteenthParty Congress Averbakh,Na literaturnomnostu,1927,no. 22-23,p. 21). Thle ocutsclassicuss Preobrazhensky'speech ni hephenomenonf"Eseninshchliina,"rdisillusion-ment nddecadence fyouth,n theCommuniistcademy ebate n thespring f 1927:commentn this speechis to be found n KEnorin'srticle in Komninunisticheskaiarevoliutsiia,927,no. 6, pp. 3 ff., nd in Averbakh, Oppozitsiia voprosykul'turnoirevoliutsii," a literaturnonmostut,928,no. 8, p. 10; the text is in the stenogrampublishedytheCommunistcademys Upadochnoe astrocnicredimnolodezh.iMoscow,1927). The literarymplicationsre developed y Lelevich,with acknowledgmielntoPreobrazhensky,n theSaratovgubkomournalKomirnunisticheskiiut',1927,no.21(84),pp.37 if., nd in his contributiono the almanacUdar,ed. A. I. BezymiienskyMoscow,1927),pp.94 ff.61. See Bukharin,The ProletariatndQuestions f Artistic olicy,"Krasnaianov',1925,no. 4, p. 266: "Our society as two levelsof conflict,nternalnd external. x-ternallyt stands acetofacewith hebourgeoisworld, ndthere heclasswarbecomessharper.... Inisidehecountryurpolicy ngenieraloes notfollow he ineof fanningclass warbut, n the ontrary,oessomewATayodampentdown...."



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"Soft" ine on Culture 285Stritvismp."62ence the contemporarycrisis in culture" Preobrazhensky'sphrase), and the prevalentmnoodf decadenlcend disillusionmentmongComnmunistouth.A change of tone can be observedvery shortly fterVoronsky'scon-demnation y the CentralCommittee ress departmentn April 1927. n Maythe gitprop epartment eld a meeting n tlheatricalffairs t which he mainspeakerswere Knorin,head of agitprop, nd Lunacharsky. norin (who hadjoined in the attack on Voronsky) now put his weight strongly ehindLunacharsky nd the "soft" ine,which n this contextmeantrepudiation f abelligerent olicy of "proletarianization" iirected gainst the traditionaltheaters. he "hiard" ine had considerable upport t the meeting rommem-bers of the agitprop epartmentsf the Central nd Moscow Comnmitteesfthe party, the Moscow education department,Glavrepertkom,nd otherbodies.But, as one speakernoted, he hardliners ere ntimidatedy Knorin'spaper nd did notfeelfree o attackhimIs theyhabitually ttacked unachar-sky.63Averbakh ried the snmearactic of associating ome minor softlinerswithTrotsky nd Voronsky, nd delicately aisedthe question f whyKnorinand Lunacharsky houldbothperceive he main enemy o the eft nd not theright.64 o that Lunacharsky eplied (against interjectionsromAverbakhandthehead of Glavrepertkom)hatone hitshard n the direction romwhichtrouble s coming: We have to strike blow at you so thatyou don't nterferewithus." He also confirmedhe assertion fanother peaker hatthepoliciesof thepresentVAPP leadershipwere denticalwith hoseof its oppositionistpredecessor.65norin n hiis onicludingpeech stated firmly hat so long asAverbakhput himselfwith the ultra-left,we cannot agree with him."66

NEP in culture ndedabruptlyn the springof 1928,whenthetrialofthe Shakhty ngineers ut the loyalty f the whole intelligentsian doubt.Conclusionsweredrawnby Krinitsky,lhe ewhead ofagitprop,t a meetingat theendofMay.67The new linewas the"hard" line of class war againstthebourgeois ntelligentsia,truggle gainst dangerfrom heright" n partyandgovernmentultural olicy.In thecourseof 1928,the "soft" inewas repudiatedn all areas.A new

62. Lelevich, Kommnunisticheskiiut',1927,no. 21(84), p. 40.63. S. N. Krylov, d.,Puti razvitiia eatra stenogramn f debate n agitprop,May1927), Ml 1927, .202 (Sapozhnikov).64. Ibid.,pp.220-21.65. Ibid., unacharsky'slosingpeech,p.227 ff.66. Ibid.,Knorin's losing peech, p.245ff.67. Stenogramublishedn B. Olkhovy, d., Zadachi agitatsii, ropagandy kZit'-turnogo troitel'stvaMoscowand Leningrad,928).



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286 Slavic Reviewpolicy fmassiveproletariannd party nrollmento the universityameintoforcewith he utumn nrollmentf 1928. Rykovprotested navailinglyn theCentralCommnitteehat the class issue was irrelevant o the main task ofexpanding technicaleducation to meet industrialneeds.68The secondaryschoolswere exposed in the party press as bourgeoiscenters of potentialjuvenile ounterrevolution.ocal authorities,eacting s theyhad donein theuniversityurge n 1924,tookthis s a directive o conduct social purges"ofbothpupils and teachers althoughno explicitdirectivewas ever issued,andNarkomprosnd thegovernmentontinuedo condemnhepurges).Komsomolactivistsharried he teachers; the militant theists ttacked hemfor theirreligious eliefs; nd evenNarkomproswas forced o withdraw he toleranceit had previously xtended o individual aith. My teacher n junior class,meetingmesixteenyears fter left chool,weptand told metllat he is evenafraid o live and work at thepresent ime,"wrote Voronezhreaderto theteachers' ewspaper. She hasnoregrets or hetsar-he droveher fiancentothegrave nd so she s stillunmarriedtforty. utthe conswlhichhey hrewoutof theschool-this was morethan she couldbear...."69VAPP received ffectiveowersto scourge nd chastise n thenameoftheparty,mounted successful ampaign gainst"rightism"n Narkompros'artsadministrationnd had Raskolnikov again!) appointed o its head,andbegani fierce trugglewitlh competing roupof hardliners rom heCom-munist cademy or ontrol fthe iterary ress.Lunacharsky esignedfromthe Commissariatn 1929; BukharinandRykovwere identifieds leadersof a "Right Opposition" n tlleparty.The"soft" ineon culturewas described s right eviationist,nd the governmentinstitutions hichhad carried t out wereextensivelyurged.The victory f the"hard" lineofcultural lass war overthe "soft" ineofconciliationoincidedntimewithStalin'svictoryverhisopponentsn thepartyeadership. houldwe concluldehatthepolicyofclasswarwas Stalin'sown? I thinknot.There is no evidence o suggest hatStalinhad anyfixedopinions n cultural olicy nthetwenties,nd his interventionsn cultural reducational debates were remarkably ew. The story (repeated to me inMoscow) that n 1928Stalinapproaclhedunacharskywith n offer fsupportforthe "soft" line in exchangeforLunacharsky'saterdenunciation f theBukharin/Rykov Right Opposition" appears to lhaveat least apocryphaltruth s far as Stalin's politicaltacticsare concerned.From 1932, Stalinreverted o policieswhichin outwardformcloselyresemblethose of thetwenties: e-establishmentf academic riterianuniversitynrollnment,evivalof thegeneral secondary chool,verbalencouragementnd practicalneglect

68. Lutchenko, oprosystorii PSS, 1966, o.2, p. 33.69. Quoted nNarodnoe rosveshchenie,928, o.10,p. 140.



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'"Soft"ineon Culture 287oftherural eacher, einstatementf "bourgeois" now "Soviet") specialistspurgedas class enemies,dissolution nd condemnation f the proletarianwriters' ssociation,nd formation fa newUnion of Soviet WritersunderGorky's eadership, ncludingboth Communist nd nonpartywriters.Ofcourse hesepolicieswere n effect astlydifferentrom hose ofthe twenties-not onlybecause, as Stalin said, "cadres decide everything" nd the oldsoftline olslhevikdministratorsad disappeared, utbecause tlhe roletarianattack had fragmentedhe intelligentsia nd destroyed ts old patternsofassociation.If Stalinhad no interestn class war policies s such,whydid he let thehardlinerswin? The answer, n political terms,mustbe that they were aconvenient eaponto use againsthisopponentsnparty nd governmentnd(if we assume thatStalinhad a generalconcernforthe extension f partycontrol) to intimidatehe intelligentsia.ut this fornitlationmay suggestwider rea ofchoicethanStalin n facthad. The proletarianhard" linewasalready dentifieds thepolitical lternative: t was understood ythepartyand had known upportwithin t.Probablytsstrengthnthepartywas not sogreat s toforce talin,or anyparty eader n 1928,to accept t (though hisnotion foverwhelmingonstituencyressure annotbe discounted, iventheincompletevidencewe have on local partyopinion nd its interpretationythe eadership).But itwas strong noughnotto be overlooked; nd coherentenough omakeanyselective se-such as the deal whichStalin is reportedtohave offeredunacharsky-extrenmelyifficulto carry hrough.As I understand he situation, talin accepteda predefinedppositionplatformnd supportwhenhe movedagainsthis colleagues n theleadershipin 1928, ust as a hypotheticalhallengero Stalin n (say) 1934wouldhavehadto do. His choicewas, given heplatformnd itspresumptiveupporters,whetherrnottomakethe move.Wl'en he did,the "soft" ineon culttire asautomaticallyanceled.

soft policy on culture - sheila fitzpatrick

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