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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE IMPACT OF THE U.S.
POSITION ON ELITE RELATIONS IN THAILAND:
A CASE STUDY OF THE 2013 THAI POLITICAL
CONFLICT UNDER THE YINGLUCK
ADMINISTRATION
BY
MR. ARCHAI SALUYA
AN INDEPENDENT STUDY SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2014
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE IMPACT OF THE U.S.
POSITION ON ELITE RELATIONS IN THAILAND:
A CASE STUDY OF THE 2013 THAI POLITICAL
CONFLICT UNDER THE YINGLUCK
ADMINISTRATION
BY
MR. ARCHAI SALUYA
AN INDEPENDENT STUDY SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2014
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
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Independent Study Title SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE IMPACT OF THE
U.S. POSITION ON ELITE RELATIONS IN
THAILAND: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2013
THAI POLITICAL CONFLICT UNDER THE
YINGLUCK ADMINISTRATION
Author Mr. Archai Saluya
Degree Master of Political Science (International
Relations)
Major Field/Faculty/University International Relations (English Program),
Faculty of Political Science
Thammasat University
Advisor
Co-Advisor (If any)
Attasit Pankaew, Ph.D.
-
Academic Years 2014
ABSTRACT
The interplay between social media and political communication has been
prevalent in the information-driven 21st century. Looking at social media as an
instrument for political discourse, this research investigates the wide-ranging effects
of the U.S. democracy-themed statements posted on Facebook in response to
Thailand’s political upheaval and multiple rounds of violence from November 2013 to
May 2014. With Thailand at a critical juncture in the 6-month political crisis that
followed the dismissal of a controversial blanket amnesty bill in November 2013,
these statements articulated by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S.
Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook page captured the attention of the political elite in
Thailand. The gist of this study zeroes in on the question of whether or not these
online postings – proliferated by an international actor wielding the rhetoric of
democracy as an antidote to Thailand’s political conflict – could exacerbate elite
relations and foment political instability in Thailand.
Keywords: Social media, Thai Political Conflict, U.S. Statements, Thai Political
Elite, Yingluck Administration
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The successful completion of my independent study would not have been
even remotely possible had it not been for the unflinching support I have received
from my family, friends, colleagues, and political science professors at Thammasat
University. There were times when I thought about backing down and quitting the
program for good because I could not keep my head above water with my grueling
work and study schedules. Granted, working as a full-time employee and sacrificing
my sacrosanct weekends to be enrolled as a part-time graduate student are no easy
tasks, but, throughout the ups and downs, I am very happy to have made my way to
the finish line and to have graduated within the projected 2-year timeframe. A good
number of people had reservations about my pursuit of a master’s degree in
International Relations. These naysayers told me I was overreaching as I only had a
degree in English, and that I would barely make heads or tails of the essence of world
politics. Despite all of those unvarnished criticisms pouring in from the get-go, I am
elated to have proven them wrong as I managed to rise to the challenge and cobble
together a mini-dissertation on the topic that could not be more relevant to the
information-driven 21st century and is considered by many as an emerging field of
International Relations. I wholeheartedly believe that my academic research stands
out from the rest, simply because it deals with the subject that no one in Thailand has
ever written about. Under the direct supervision of my advisor, Dr. Attasit Pankaew, I
spent one year and a half gathering, synthesizing, and analyzing all the information
elicited from many different sources and was able to flesh out some of the ideas and
arguments worth sharing with those interested in how international relations among
states could be impacted by the dissemination of political discourse on social media.
In addition, Dr. Attasit helped me learn the ropes of how to conduct research from
start to finish, and I would like to thank my trailblazer for all that he did to make me a
better political scientist. During the course of my 2-year academic journey, I
admittedly found myself in poor health several times due to sleep deprivation. My
heartfelt thanks go to my parents and brothers for looking out for me and for always
being there for me whenever needed. I could not ask for better parents and siblings. I
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hope they know how much indebted I am to their unwavering encouragement and
immeasurable moral support. I also would like to thank my coworkers who went out
of their way to take up the slack and cover for me when I had to be absent from work.
Their generosity did not go unappreciated in the slightest. Last of all, I would like to
thank my best friends – Gift, Man, and Pear – who have stuck with me through what
has been a pretty crazy roller coaster and kept me sane, optimistic, and reinvigorated
in moments of despair and mental exhaustion. I just could not thank them enough.
Mr. Archai Saluya
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT (1)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3)
TABLE OF TABLES (6)
TABLE OF FIGURES (7)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
Introduction and objectives 1
Benefits of research 4
Methodology 5
Research outline 6
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 7
Social media and theory of Constructivism 7
Social media and theory of Network Society 10
Social media and theory of “Second Image Reversed” 14
180th
anniversary of U.S.-Thai relations: what is in the pipeline? 16
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19
Limitations of constructivism 19
Second image reversed and U.S. position on thailand’s political conflict 21
Castells’ theory of network soceity and its relevance to digital diplomacy 22
Hybrid paradigm of second image reversed and network society 24
Research question and hypothesis 25
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 27
Quantitative approach: definition of democracy and U.S. statements 28
Responses and Thais’ sentiments towards U.S. government 31
U.S. statements and their effects on elite relations 34
Qualitative approach: interview with public diplomacy officers 37
Interview with Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn 42
Findings 47
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 49
From quantitative to qualitative: conclusion 49
REFERENCES 53
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A 61
APPENDIX B 65
APPENDIX C 76
BIOGRAPHY 77
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TABLE OF TABLES
Tables Page
1. Frequency analysis of key phrases in U.S. official statements 29
2. Thais' sentiments towards U.S. government amid the 2013 political 32
conflict in Thailand
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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1. U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook posting on violence and seizure of 9
public and private property
2. Internet penetration in ASEAN 11
3. Theoretical framework deployed to analyze the impact of the U.S. 25
position on Elite Relations
4. Pie chart demonstrating the frequencies of key phrases 29
5. Bar chart depicting Thais’ overall sentiments towards the U.S. government 33
6. Korn leads protestors to U.S. Embassy Bangkok 35
7. Abhisit joins forces with Korn at BTS Asoke Station 35
8. Antigovernment protestors rally in front of U.S. Embassy Bangkok 37
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Democracy is not just a tweet away (Morozov, 2011:37).”
Revolving around the multifaceted effects of social media on a wide array
of political events in the borderless world, this research paper aims to examine the
repercussions of the U.S. Department of State’s postings in relation to the 2013 Thai
political imbroglio through social media channels on elite relations in Thailand. In
essence, the attitude of the U.S. government towards the 2013 Thai political conflict
under the Yingluck regime through social media networks will be scrutinized, with an
emphasis on eliciting data from multiple sources to investigate their repercussions on
relations between the political elite on both sides of the conflict in Thailand. As such,
the central objective of this paper is to delve into the interplay between these actors
from international and domestic settings in exchanging opinions on the political
conflict in Thailand through social media platforms since it was quite endemic and
controversial during the time of the political crisis. Therefore, an attempt to fully
grasp their causal linkages is of paramount importance since their views exchanged at
the height of the political crisis, when studied theoretically, can foster a greater
understanding of how they could pose a strain on already frayed relations among state
actors still in dispute at the national level.
In light of the 2010 Arab Spring spawned by the fervent use of social
media by millions of young political activists to overthrow their leaders, the Internet
and social media have since become a platform for cybercitizens to freely engage in a
wide variety of subject matters, especially those in connection with politics in hopes
of bringing about political change through unconventional means. Over the years,
social networking sites and mobile devices have not only kept people instantaneously
up-to-date on any political phenomena of their interest, irrespective of where they
might be at any given time at their fingertips, but they have also changed the nature of
political participation and the way political discourse spearheaded by members of the
political elite and protesters is conducted. As Marshall McLuhan argued in his
seminal work entitled “The Gutenberg Galaxy,” the world is now a global village
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made possible by the advent of advanced media technologies. He highlights “how
cultural, societal, and communicative dynamics shift inside a highly technological
environment” (McLuhan, 1964: 36). Digital media, in this instance, is comprised of
those who have an eclectic mix of political views and standpoints. Serving as an
instrument for instant and real-time knowledge, these online sites, as a consequence,
can offer a wealth of information emerging from every corner of the world, which is
believed to either potentially reinforce users’ political engagement or proselytize their
political ideals.
In the information-driven 21st century, it goes without saying that media
technologies have a considerable hand to play in shaping how we interact with one
another. “Technological Determinism” – the concept that describes how technology
shapes social and cultural structures – changes how we as individuals in a society
think, feel, act, and how society functions as we move from one technological age to
another (McLuhan, 1964: 280). In addition, it is said to be an accelerant propelling a
new world order in which the information-based society is gaining momentum, with
the influence of traditional media on the decline. There is no denying that the
emergence of digital media and social media in particular has democratized the
fashion in which governments and ordinary citizens create and distribute their
opinions, providing them with a virtual public sphere to raise awareness about the
issues in which they are interested, and most importantly, to make their voices of
approval or dissent heard. While it is true that the democratizing effects of mass
media and other communication technologies have empowered digitally-savvy people
to be more of an active audience, it is worth bearing in mind that they also come with
the polarization of thoughts and emotions, which could potentially cause friction
among citizens of opposing views and, if worse comes to worst, could escalate into
unwanted violence.
Under the Yingluck administration in 2013, an amnesty bill was proposed
to exonerate those previously convicted for inciting incidents of political unrest in
Thailand, which was envisaged to be an integral part of the road map to reconciliation
aimed at easing political tensions between various groups of conflicting views.
Nonetheless, the contentious bill was greatly frowned upon by the antigovernment
protest movement, mounted by Suthep Thaugsuban, since the implementation of the
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bill would facilitate the return of self-exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra to Thailand. Even though the bill was subsequently dismissed, Thailand,
from that point forward, was beset by a series of protracted and unsettling protest
marches for and against the government, which also instigated repeated rounds of
violence. Amid these protests, leaders from Thailand’s prominent political factions,
both Pheu Thai and the Democrats, continuously took to their Facebook pages to
exchange dialogue and drum up support from their followers in addition to
disseminating their messages through traditional media. Equally noteworthy, in
response to the ongoing demonstrations in Bangkok in late November 2013, the
United States, a long-standing ally to Thailand, had, through social media, expressed
concern over the unresolved political differences plaguing Thailand, posting messages
construed as leaning in favor of an electoral democracy whose principles were
believed to put the perennial conflict to rest. Although well-received by those who
advocated Yingluck’s Administration, those messages came under fire and were
perceived by leaders of antigovernment protesters and key members of the Democrats
as carrying political connotations and propaganda. Worse still, they sparked a plethora
of hate speech from mushrooming nationalist groups, most of which expressed
disillusionment in the U.S. intervention in Thailand’s political affairs.
With Facebook predominantly wielded as an online tool to intensify
public opinion and political discourse during the 2013 Thai political crisis, this paper
aims to study the corollaries of the U.S. political stance laid out by the U.S.
Department of State on relations between and among members of the political elite
from both Pheu Thai and the Democrats during the Yingluck administration. It is
interesting to delve into how the political views, expressed through social media
channels by the United States of America – a country so rich in the rhetoric of
freedom of expression used as the primary means to promote the establishment of
democracy – could have a bearing on the political behavior of the Thai political elite
on both sides of the conflict. A few conceptual frameworks will be employed to
evaluate the impact of the U.S. position, articulated through the U.S. Embassy
Bangkok’s Facebook page, on Thailand’s political conflict during Yingluck’s
premiership.
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Objectives
The primary objectives for this research are:
1. To investigate the outcomes of the U.S. position – expressed through
social media channels – on the political behavior of the Thai political
elite during the 2013 political stalemate in Thailand.
2. To critically interpret the imposition of “western-style democracy”
used as an antidote to Thailand’s political unrest by the U.S.
Department of State upon competing political actors in Thailand.
3. To compare and contrast the perceptions between the U.S. Department
of State and the Thai political elite on both sides of the political divide
on the U.S. official statements that were publicized on social media at
the height of the political conflict in 2013.
4. To bring to light the potential power of social media in exacerbating
relations among state actors from international and domestic networks
when political discourse concerning the rhetoric of democracy is
propagated in an online sphere.
Benefits of this Research
Below are the benefits that will be gained from this research as far as the
realm of international relations is concerned.
1. The outcomes of the U.S. position on Thailand’s political conflict
could disclose the U.S. political ideals, which could be contributory to
the deterioration of elite relations in Thailand.
2. The interpretation of “western-style democracy” could reveal the U.S.
true intentions in relation to the political conundrum in Thailand. As a
world hegemon, it is important to know what political objectives or
gambits the U.S. attempted to achieve while imposing democratic
values upon state actors ensnared in Thailand’s political conflict.
3. These inside and never-before-heard perceptions of the U.S.
Department of State and the Thai political elite on the 2013 political
conflict could contribute to an understanding of how they evaluated the
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political effects of the U.S. democracy-oriented statements issued by
the U.S. Department of State.
4. It is hoped that the findings presented in this study would stimulate
discussion among international relations students about the potent
power – or lack thereof – of social media in affecting political affairs.
In connection with an international relations aspect, the study navigates
the uncharted territory of the nature of social media vis-à-vis the online
advocacy of democracy by the U.S. government for Thailand, amid a
growing concern over the irreconcilable differences among the Thai
political elite on both sides of the political divide and their supporters.
Methodology
The topic in question will be studied, using a combination of both
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. A quantitative analysis will, in
large part, deal with the interpretation of democracy – voiced by the U.S. Department
of State through those official statements – in the midst of the political crisis in
Thailand. It will also gauge the overall reactions of the Thai political elite and the
Thai public towards the democracy-themed postings on Facebook by the U.S.
Department and State. The qualitative approach will reveal the perceptions of the
Public Diplomacy Officers posted at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok on the U.S.
position on Thailand’s political conflict. Lastly, an interview with a Thai political
science veteran about the topic will provide a third point-of-view that will attempt to
balance out any biases.
Outline of this Research
In the following chapter, a comprehensive literature review on
International Relations theory as well as Castells’ theory of the Network Society will
be carried out. The third chapter will examine the chosen theoretical frameworks used
to analyze the situation, while the fourth chapter will provide readers with the data
analysis and findings of the study. At the end of the research, the final chapter will
unearth the effects of the U.S. imposition of the rhetoric of western-style democracy
embedded in these messages upon competing state actors and the political climate in
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Thailand. An in-depth analysis of these statements and their repercussions is hoped to
open readers’ eyes to why an anti-American sentiment transpired amid Thailand’s
political woes and to assess whether or not the postings of the U.S. Department of
State on the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook page were instrumental in affecting
relations among the Thai political elite, and by that extension, Thailand’s internal
political conflict.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Discussing the topic in connection with political communication and the
proliferation of ideas and norms in the midst of Thailand’s 2013 political conflict
centered in the context of the quintessential social media-driven 21st century, the
literature on International Relations theory and the theory of Network Society by
Manuel Castells will be critically reviewed. Also highly instrumental in explaining the
causal relationships between international and domestic politics is the “second image
reversed” approach conceived by Peter Gourevitch in 1978. In hopes of keeping
readers fully apprised of how the exogenous factors – the postings of the U.S.
Department of State through social media – could have a bearing on elite relations in
Thailand amid its six-month political unrest in 2013, the study will dig deeper into the
empirical literature on the egalitarian nature of social media, the information-based
society, and their polarizing effects on deepening and widening the political divide in
Thailand.
Social Media and Theory of Constructivism
As Michael Barnett puts it, the theory of Constructivism “generates a
distinctive approach for understanding how the world is made and re-made through
human action” (Barnett, 2011: 149). In other words, the human construction of reality
forged through the creation of ideas and norms could contribute to the shaping of
interactions of actors in the globalization of world politics. He further argues that the
core observation is the social construction of reality, positing that “symbols, rules,
concepts, and categories shape how individuals construct and interpret their world”
(Barnett, 2011: 155). Through the lens of a constructivist, it can then be extrapolated
that actors behave the way they do in international relations and have preferences in
responding to international problems because they are driven by their social and
cultural identities nurtured and molded through generation after generation. The
author, at the very end of the chapter, posits that actors try to lend significance to what
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they do in accordance with their culture. These cultural fault-lines, in return, shape
how they interpret their activities in the realm of international relations (Barnett,
2011: 156).
Constructivist thinking is central to the formation of political discourse on
the 2013 political conflict exchanged through social media platforms between the
representatives of the U.S. and Thai governments since late November 2013. With the
advent of technological advances, the interplay of their ideas and beliefs fueled by
their social and cultural representations was more pronounced in an online sphere than
before, which could easily cause resistance and dissidence among those of contending
views. In term of evaluating an array of messages on social media under the
“constructivist” rubric, constructivism is conducive to a deep understanding of how
“the impact of ideas and identities, how they are created, and how they evolve shapes
the way states respond to a situation” (Walt 1998: 4). Therefore, taking into
consideration what Stephen Walt postulates, it can then be inferred that the American
interpretation of the Thai political conundrum under the Yingluck administration
could have the propensity to create an even deeper dichotomy between the interests of
the Thai political elite on both sides of the conflict because not only did they pursue
different goals, but also their perceptions of “democracy” and of how the problem
should be approached and reconciled were premised on different ideologies.
Social constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt, also proffers another
intriguing revelation about the shifting sands of international relations in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks—the situation that neither Realism nor Liberalism could account for.
Each state is bound to view anarchy differently because the reality of the situation
facing them is socially constructed by individual states and leaders. In verbatim,
Wendt opined that, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992: 395). Judging
from Wendt’s statement about how each state might form different ideas of what
constitutes conflict and unrest, it can then be explained that both Thailand and the
U.S. were inevitably embroiled in a string of verbal fights amid the political tensions
in 2013, mainly because their notions of what triggered the political turmoil varied
according to their constructions of realities. In November 25, 2013, Jen Psaki, U.S.
Department of State spokesperson, called on Thailand through various channels,
including Facebook, to adhere to the democratic principles by finding its way out of
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the political turmoil through the means of “democracy” and “rule of law” (Psaki,
2013), as shown on the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook page below.
Figure 1. U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook posting on violence and seizure
of public and private property from U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook Page,
https://www.facebook.com/usembassybkk/posts/668817013139444
It is, however, worth pointing out that Thailand, on the other end of the
spectrum, was factionalized into two polarized groups mobilized by members of the
political elite of Pheu Thai and the Democrats. While the “democracy” paradigm
proffered by the U.S. could have served as a universal solution to the conflict playing
out on Bangkok’s streets, it actually created an even deeper rift in these two opposing
sides because their leaders, imbued with different political goals and propaganda,
exploited the U.S. criticism of Thailand’s political violence in a move to instigate
political action, manipulating it as a rationalization tool to take their grievances to the
streets in an effort to achieve their end goals.
Wendt further states that “power politics and self-help are socially
constructed under anarchy” (Wendt, 1992: 395). He regards identities as the basis of
interests because they define their interests in the process of defining situations
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(Wendt, 1992: 398). In other words, states act towards objects, including other actors,
on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them (Wendt, 1992: 396). Parlaying
Wendt’s contention into the U.S. position on the Thai political conflict, it can be
construed that political unrest in Thailand was reproached by U.S. State Department
representatives on the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook page because their posture
toward antigovernment protestors was nurtured by their constructed meaning and
fundamentals of democracy, the likes of which the leaders of the antigovernment
protests labeled as a manifestation of external interference orchestrated by a hegemon.
The basis of their interests, in other words, did not run in parallel with each other.
While the likes of the U.S. set out their fundamentals of democracy to be adhered to
in the midst of the simmering crisis, the political elite on the receiving end might
perceive their democracy-oriented statements as an attempt to assert authority in the
name of democracy by a hegemonic state despite the lack of a complete
understanding of the complexities of the crisis at hand. As such, the U.S. statements,
in this regard, could also be interpreted as an act of cultural imperialism whereby a
dominant culture imposes information and values on a less dominant one.
Social Media and Theory of Network Society
As far as making sense of the power of social media vis-à-vis an array
of political situations is concerned, the theory of the Network Society conceived by
Manuel Castells serves as another conceptual toolbox, putting emphasis on the
information society propped up by the advent of new information technologies,
changing the way people communicate with one another in the globalized world. He
argues that “networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the
diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in
processes of production, experience, power and culture” (Castells, 1996: 500). While
his argument was published prior to the emergence of social media, it does a good job
of predicting the overarching effects of network communications that would come to
pass in the foreseeable future. As Castells notes, “the Internet was expected to be an
ideal instrument to further democracy” (Castells 2001: 155). Fundamentally, the
theory of the Network Society can be brought into play to shed light on how the
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characteristics of social networks could give rise to deeper political engagement
owing to the strength of weak ties in social networking sites, the democratic nature of
online communication, and the anonymity on the Internet (Castell, 1996: 388).
Launched in 2004 and heralded as one of the most influential social
networking sites, Facebook has since morphed into a worldwide online tool that
allows people from across the globe to interact and share a myriad of information with
one another through what has since been defined as a social media network. Without
question, people these days are wired to instant information and have the luxury of
having access to a wide variety of information of their choice. As social media expert
Alex Newson points out, Facebook is one of the social networking sites that “interacts
with users while giving them information” (Newson, Houghton, & Patten, 2008: 3).
This give-and-take communication is crucial in understanding and analyzing the role
of social media in speeding up political activism among major actors involved. As of
September 2014, Facebook now has over 1.35 billion monthly active users (Facebook
Newsroom, 2014). Of all the social networking sites available, it goes without saying
that Facebook has become the most popular website where people of common or
different interests join to voice their opinions and share information that cater to their
interest groups. The popularity of each post is typically determined by the number of
“likes,” “comments,” and “shares” obtained from these netizens. Some of these posts
are made more enticing with the addition of pictures and videos attached to them, so
as to lure as many users into viewing and to garner as many likes and comments as
possible. This interactive mechanism of Facebook is central to the role social media
played during the 2013 political dilemma in Thailand.
According to the statistics by Zocial, Inc. on Internet users in ASEAN
(Zocial, Inc., 2014), Singapore has the most saturated Internet penetration with 80.7
percent of the whole population having access to the Internet. As depicted in the
below table, Thailand is ranked 5th
with just 37 percent Internet penetration.
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that 78.2 percent of online Thais use social media
on mobile devices with more than 28 million Thai accounts on Facebook.
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Figure 2. Internet Penetration in ASEAN
from Zocial, Inc., http://www.zocialrank.com
Overall, Thailand is currently the 9th
top Facebook-using country in the
world and 3rd
in ASEAN (Socialbakers, 2014). The largest age group of Facebook
users in Thailand ranges from 18-39 (Zocial, Inc., 2014). Considering the
demographic trend on Facebook, it looks to be leaning towards the young population
– and understandably so, because they have easy access to Facebook via their
smartphones. The question of how social media can help certain actors and
organizations further their goals will be explained at length by the theory of the
“Network Society” coined by Manuel Castells. In addition, the theory can also be
utilized to shed light on why a series of simple exchanges of political dialogue
between the leaders of the two leading political parties in Thailand and the U.S.
Department of State using social media channels could escalate into a string of
vociferous and politicized debates, affecting relations between these two countries
and imposing a strain on the political elite on both sides of the equations.
The correlation between social media and political engagement can be
demystified by Manuel Castells’ theory of the Network Society. As mentioned earlier,
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online communication technologies, such as social media, are instrumental in
“allowing the forging of weak ties with strangers, in an egalitarian pattern of
interaction where social characteristics are less influential in framing, or even
blocking communication” (Castells, 1996: 388). To put it in the context of the
globalized world, social media contains an assortment of social networking sites
which allow friends or strangers to engage in online conversations and network with
others without any geographical barriers. The theory of the Network Society serves as
a pertinent theoretical framework explaining the cathartic characteristics of social
media in that those who come in contact with one another have loose connections,
thereby enabling them to freely express their opinions in ways that oftentimes do not
show deference to those they dislike. Therefore, taking into account the weak ties
infiltrating Facebook, any posts about political issues can be fashioned by anyone and
can have much of an impact on those with impressionable minds.
Apart from the role of social media as a communication tool to generate
awareness about societal or political issues among netizens as a result of time and
space compression, Evgeny Morozov’s “Net Delusion” adds a caveat about the dark
side of Internet freedoms and its consequences on political activism. He first alludes
to the Egyptian evolution in 2011, which was ignited by the zealous use of social
media among Egyptian political activists, stressing that social media can be used as a
tool to share ideas and political standpoints without restrictions. One of the many
decent things about the Internet is, as he posits, “all Internet users can discover the
truth about the horrors of their regimes and about the secret charms of democracy by
turning to search engines like Google and by following their more politically savvy
friends on social networking sites like Facebook” (Morozov, 2011: 12). By doing so,
these Internet users can form public opinions through social networking sites to
cement their positions and therefore influence political action. In addition, he opines
that the country, like the United States of America, is truly committed to promoting
democracy in cyberspace (Morozov, 2011: 13). However, not only would the Internet
benefit cyber-utopians when it comes to voicing their grievances and opinions, but
Morozov cautions readers that Internet freedoms are like a double-edged sword, and
social media can also work both ways. For instance, the government can always use
"counter measures" through the means of Internet censorship to curb unnecessary
14
online political activity (Morozov, 2011: 101). At the tail end of the book, the author
also talks about Internet freedoms and their repercussions, pointing out that some of
the non-technological problems, especially those resulting from politics, cannot be
easily tamed and will only be exacerbated if cybercitizens try to solve them online
(Morozov, 2011: 309).
Social Media and Theory of “Second Image Reversed”
In 1978, Peter Gourevitch reexamined Kenneth Waltz’s “second
image” analysis and published the article focusing on what he coined “the second
image reversed.” Although Kenneth Waltz’s second image essentially deems the
international system irrelevant to domestic structure, Gourevitch postulates that
“instead of being a cause of international politics, domestic structure may be a
consequence of it and international systems, too, became causes instead of
consequences” (Gourevitch, 1978: 882). The article addresses the impact of the
international system on domestic politics (Gourevitch, 1978: 882) and further
examines the strain the international system imposes on domestic society as a whole
(Gourevitch, 1978: 899). In addition, the outbreak and outcomes of some of the
revolutions occurring in the past is incomprehensible without an examination of
international factors (Gourevich, 1978: 900). In a nutshell, because international
politics and domestic politics are interwoven, these two elements “should thus be
analyzed simultaneously” (Gourevitch, 1978: 911), so as to be able to clearly explain
the state of complex interdependent relations between international and domestic
politics.
A number of Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak’s academic journals zero in on
the impact of social media on Thai politics and political behavior. There is no denying
that social media these days can be used to bring about divisions among electoral
majorities and minorities since it “has exacerbated the trend toward polarization in
Thailand” (Pongsudhirak, 2013). When electoral minorities feel like their opponent’s
authority does not pay heed to their grievances, they may resort to “public platforms
like social media and the streets to advance their causes and undermine their
opponents” (Pongsudhirak, 2013). He also puts forth a caveat saying that social media
15
tends to deepen divisions between partisan groups, allowing like-minded groups “to
reaffirm rather than challenge each other’s beliefs” (Pongsudhirak, 2013). Worse still,
these online networking sites are overrun with users who cling to their pseudonyms,
so they can say whatever they want to say without regard for other people.
Nonetheless, Dr. Pongsudhirak recommends that more transparency and
accountability should be reinforced on social media, and a third party of impartial
individuals respected by all sides can encourage both majorities and minorities to go
beyond the media divide and at least keep an open mind about each other’s views
(Pongsudhirak, 2013).
More than twenty statements — both official statements and security
messages — originating from the official Facebook page of the U.S. Embassy
Bangkok had prompted the Thai Government on several occasions to show their
standpoints in terms of putting an end to the political crisis plaguing Thailand,
specifically calling for immediate action consistent with democratic norms. In light of
the U.S. Embassy’s issuance of a travel advisory to its citizens in Thailand to steer
clear of the protest sites and to stock up on one month’s worth of food, money and
water supply (“Security Message for U.S. Citizens,” 2014), Surapong
Tovichakchaikul, then Foreign Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called the
foreign Ambassadors posted in Thailand to brief them on the situation and convince
them of Thailand’s control over the security situation. On the other hand, the leaders
of the antigovernment protests, who were affiliated with the Democrats, took umbrage
at those statements, voicing their intentions to march to the Embassy premises
numerous times to cause disruptions (Bangkok Post, 2013), which they ultimately did.
Gourevich’s theory of “second image reversed” can thus be used to effectively
explain the impact of international politics on domestic politics. Based on these
various responses from the political elite in Thailand, it can then be extrapolated that
social media was deployed by the U.S. Department of State as a medium to underpin
its stance. In other words, state agents from one government are now capable of using
social media to stir up political will among political elites and citizens of another state
(Fung, 2012). Nonetheless, it wound up stirring trouble for the party leaders of both
Pheu Thai and the Democrats, prompting some of them to hurl disparaging comments
at the representative of the U.S. government in Thailand. Needless to say, both sides
16
of the conflict had reached out to the international community to justify their
movements in their own unique ways in order to avoid misinterpretations of events.
180th
Anniversary of U.S.-Thai Relations: What is in the Pipeline?
The highlights and dynamics of U.S.-Thai relations for the past 180 years
are worth probing prior to the analysis of the chosen conceptual frameworks in the
next section. In the midst of the Thai political conflict in 2013, then U.S. Ambassador
to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, addressed the contours of U.S.-Thai relations.
Nonetheless, following the postings of the U.S. statements calling for a quick return to
democracy vis-à-vis the conflict, Her Excellency, as a strong advocate of social
media, became the subject of heavy criticism as antigovernment protestors perceived
those statements originating from the U.S. Department of State as an act of the U.S.
meddling in domestic politics by the chief representative of the U.S. government.
Those widespread criticisms aside, it is worth mentioning that diplomatic relations
between these two countries were formalized on March 20, 1833, when the United
States and Thailand signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The Treaty of 1833
was the United States’ first treaty with a country in Asia, making Thailand the oldest
ally in the region (“Looking Back over the Years,” 2015). In the midst of what
appears to be a period of trying relations between the U.S. and Thailand following the
military takeover, the Chargé d'affaires Patrick Murphy has assumed duty ever since
Ambassador Kenney’s departure in November 2014. Despite the absence of the head
of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok for about nine months, it is worth mentioning that the
next U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Glyn Davies, was nominated by President Obama
in April 2015. In a nutshell, Ambassador Davies used to serve as a U.S. envoy for
North Korea policy and has been a distinguished career diplomat for more than 35
year (Varandani, 2015). Up until now, his official arrival in Bangkok has not yet been
announced.
Since the military coup d’état in May 2014, the United States has, time
and again, urged the early restoration of civilian rule and return to democracy through
elections (“Thailand: A Democracy at Risk,” 2014). With the messages indicative of
the U.S. leanings towards an electoral democracy as a result of the ascent to power of
17
the military government, bilateral relations between these two countries seem to have
turned sour, with Washington slashing military aid and cancelling joint exercises
(Nguyen, Poling, & Rustici, 2014: 1). The U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, also
issued a statement condemning the coup, opining that he was disappointed by the
army’s decision and “this act will have negative implications for the U.S. and
Thailand relationship” (Kerry, 2014). Taking into account their strained bilateral
relations, the question of what directions these long-time allies would take in an
attempt to patch up their frayed relations in the not-so-distant future has been a
subject of great debate among politicians and scholars, and therefore must be
addressed in due course.
Despite what appears to be a litmus test for the U.S. in terms of its
partnership with Thailand, it is undeniable that the U.S. still looks to Thailand as its
strongest treaty ally amid the changing Southeast Asian landscape due to their
partnership in many indispensable areas such as trade, technology, public health,
education, law enforcement, and security cooperation (“U.S. Relations with
Thailand,” 2014). As Joshua Kurlantzick, a Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia,
suggests, many American officials contend that Thailand is an indispensable partner
as far as counterterrorism cooperation is concerned (Kurlantzick, 2014). It would also
be difficult for the U.S to halt cooperation with Thailand since it has a strong foothold
and political clout when it comes to dealing with troublesome neighbors such as
Myanmar and Cambodia. Thailand, in other words, serves as a key U.S. security ally
in Asia, and much of the country’s stability and growth is vital to the maintenance of
peace and security in the region. In addition, ongoing U.S. support is geared towards
“strengthening humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and control of an
HIV/AIDS epidemic and other infectious diseases” (“U.S. Relations with Thailand,”
2014). On top of what is mentioned, the U.S. has also urged Thailand’s continued
active contributions to regional and global security, as well as streamlined Thailand’s
efforts to assist developing nations through the Lower Mekong Initiative (“U.S.
Relations with Thailand,” 2014). In terms of their joint security cooperation as a
treaty partner, the U.S. is still considerably dependent upon Thailand’s judicial
assistance when it comes to extraditing fugitives in both civil and criminal cases.
Without the generous helping hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of
18
the Attorney General, and the Royal Thai Police, the U.S. could not have succeeded in
lodging and expediting numerous provisional arrest requests. As a consequence, the
preponderance of evidence seems to suggest that the U.S. will continue to strengthen
bilateral ties with Thailand, although it is still under prolonged military rule. Granted,
army rule could last for a very long time, but the U.S., as a world hegemon, will most
likely continue to stick to its guns and pressure the military leaders to adhere to
democratic principles by pushing for general elections, so as to make Thailand return
to civilian rule as well as to reinvigorate a sense of democracy. Likewise, Thailand,
on the other end of the spectrum, cannot dispense with the military assistance of the
U.S. as the Thai military, and Thai elites in general, still very much need American
weaponry, training, and diplomatic ties (Kurlantzick, 2014). As a rule of thumb in
international relations, it can be surmised that Thailand and the U.S. will continue to
remain friends in spite of the changing atmosphere brought about by the ostensibly
indefinite maintenance of power of the army leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha. Nonetheless,
as interdependent as this alliance may be despite their differences in political beliefs,
Patrick Dory, a Southeast Asian History Professor at the University of Queensland,
still remains skeptical of their future bilateral ties, cautioning that Thailand, in
response to the mounting U.S. pressure on its military regime, may play the “China
Card” as a counterweight to the United States. Since the coup, Prayuth Chan-ocha
announced that “Thailand was now a partner of China at every level” (Jory, 2014). As
the development of their multi-dimensional partnership under Thailand’s ruling junta
is still ongoing, it is, nevertheless, quite difficult to pinpoint how their bilateral ties
will pan out in the future.
19
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As far as the topic germane to the impact of ideas through social media on
international and domestic politics is concerned, a few approaches can be looked at
and applied. In this chapter, a theoretical overview tailored to this study will be
dissected and presented. The most important theoretical framework associated with
the impact of international politics on domestic politics is Peter Gourevitch’s theory
of “second image reversed,” which will be used to explain in simple terms the causal
linkages between the U.S. official statements issued by the U.S. Department of State
and elite relations in Thailand. Another conceptual framework that can enhance our
understanding of the effects of political communication in the virtual world is Manuel
Castells’ theory of the “Network Society,” which encapsulates the fast-paced nature
of the network society in which the unfettered flow of information could trigger the
burgeoning emergence of ideological divisions and polarization among groups of
dissenting views. In line with the theoretical assumptions of the theory of “the
Network Society,” social media could be an accelerator propagating ideas and
opinions by state agents, which could influence the public mind in a manner favorable
to their political agenda. In the age of what is termed as “digital diplomacy,” the
theory of Network Society could spell out the multidimensional role of social media
in instigating political activism among the Thai political elite and their supporters in
Thailand as well as shaping relations between Thailand and the U.S.
Limitations of Constructivism in Understanding Competing Interests of Thai
Political Elite
One of the approaches that highlights the proliferation of ideas and their
wide-ranging relevance to state and human behavior in international relations is
Constructivism, which is heralded as a critical theory targeting underlying
assumptions of Realism and Liberalism. Constructivism holds that structures and
forces are socially constructed by actors whose behavior is determined by social and
20
cultural beliefs (Barnett, 2011: 159). That said, Constructivism places emphasis on the
creation of ideas, norms, values and their implications for world politics, all of which
are instrumental in explaining why actors behave as they do in their relations with
others. Analyzing the impact of political discourse exchanged between multiple actors
existing in both international and domestic politics, Constructivism, in this instance,
could prove conducive to a better understanding of how political dialogue on social
media, posted by the U.S. Department of State and certain U.S. state representatives,
could affect elite relations in Thailand as those messages predicated on the U.S. social
and cultural ideals have a proclivity to clash with the “Thai” political mindset. As
stated by Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, the use of social media vis-à-vis politics in many
countries has “a dividing rather than unifying impact,” stirring polarization as
opposed to democratizing societies (Pongsudhirak, 2013). Through the lens of a
constructivist, it can thus be extrapolated that the dissemination of political discourse,
whatever good intentions it purports to hold, by U.S. state officials in response to a
series of political demonstrations in Thailand could pit the Thai political elite on both
sides of the conflict against one another due to the existing incongruities resulting
from a clash of social and cultural principles between both countries.
While it is true that the theory of Social Constructivism was critically
reviewed in the former chapter due to its contributions to our understanding of the
differences in political beliefs and behavior among state representatives from the U.S.
and Thailand in the midst of Thailand’s political tumult in 2013, it will not be
incorporated into the main theoretical framework because of its limitations in
explaining and analyzing the competing interests represented by Thailand’s leaders of
two prominent political factions. Despite the salient theoretical contributions of
Constructivism in spelling out the virtual interactions among state actors from
Thailand and the U.S. during the political crisis, the theory itself is agnostic when it
comes to explaining the continuity of political contestation between the Pheu Thai-led
government and the opposition Democrat Party. Although Constructivism postulates
that the behavior of actors is ascertained by their inculcated social and cultural beliefs,
it fails to make heads or tails of why these two political camps have always been at
odds with each other despite hailing from the same background in terms of their social
and cultural beliefs. One example that supports this contention is their incongruent
21
notions of what should constitute democracy in Thailand. It had been proven on so
many occasions – especially during periods of political instability – that their political
dogmas ran in the opposite direction. In other words, Constructivism fails to explain
why the political stances of Yingluck Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and Suthep
Thaugsuban, did not align despite having the same cultural background. With all of
these factors considered, Constructivism cannot effectively assess the competing
interests of Bangkok’s political elite groups, and therefore, after a detailed review of
its literature, will not be coalesced into the other chosen theoretical frameworks.
Second Image Reversed and U.S. Position on Thailand’s Political Conflict in
2013
The most important theoretical framework that will be drawn on to bring
to light the ramifications of the views of the U.S. Department of State and some U.S.
state officials through social media on the political behavior of the Thai political elite
from both Pheu Thai and the Democrats is “the second image reversed” theory
conceived by Peter Gourevich in 1978. In the context of “intermestic1” politics, this
theory argues that internal politics and international politics are intertwined because
there exists the interpenetrated quality between these two forces (Gourevich, 1978:
911). Because international politics and domestic politics are interconnected, it can be
surmised that exchanges of political discourse on Thailand’s politics by the political
elites from these two countries on social media platforms will have an impact on elite
relations in Thailand. I believe that Gourevich’s seminal theory of “the second image
reversed” is the most fitting and central paradigm that could best answer my research
question in the most cohesive and systematic way. Along the lines of my defined
hypothesis and conceptual framework, I will, for the bulk of my research, rely on
Gourevich’s theory of the “second image reversed,” which will serve to provide an in-
depth analysis of the potential effects of the U.S. position towards Thai politics
1 Intermestic- the term was coined by Harry Kissinger to explain issues in which
international and domestic concerns are mixed. Source: Foreign Policy Vocabulary. Retrieved
May 28, 2015 from
www.auburnschools.org/ahs/wbbusbin/ap%20resources/foreign_policy_vocab.htm
22
(international politics) on elite relations in Thailand (domestic politics). Through the
lens of Gourevitch’s theory of second image reversed, I will pigeonhole the U.S.
Department of State’s postings about Thailand’s political conflict in 2013 and its
repetitive calls for Thailand’s quick return to civilian rule in accordance with
democratic values as a manifestation of international politics. In return, the
overwhelming number of responses by the Thai political elite, the leaders of the
antigovernment protests, and the Thai public to these democracy-themed messages on
social media will be categorized as a form of domestic politics. It is hoped that these
responses will reveal the overall sentiments of the Thai public and the Thai political
elite toward the U.S. government during the time of the crisis.
Castells’ Theory of Network Society and Its Relevance to Digital Diplomacy
Under the umbrella of the Second Image Reversed theory, another
conceptual framework crucial in accounting for the rapid movement of ideas on social
networking sites in the interconnected world is the theory of the Network Society
concocted by Manuel Castells. Alluding to the main elements of political
communication in the context of Internet politics, the theory of the Network Society
argues that not only do social networks make it much easier for people to
communicate with one another in a snap of fingers, but the major engine of change
driving the development of the network society originates from both political and
cultural factors (Stalder, 2006: 104). In “Informational Politics,” he further argues that
some audiences actively and subjectively interpret media messages on digital media
rather than passively receiving them, contrary to what conventional wisdom would
have us believe that mass media can significantly influence their audience (Stalder,
2006: 117). Such a phenomenon could explain why there were so many conflicting
views throughout the course of the Thai political conflict in 2013 as the political elite
on both sides of the political divide and their supporters formed opinions and
developed sentiments in a subjective manner. Placing the Network Society theory in
the context of this topic, I can analyze the role of social media in allowing the
political elites from both countries a lot of leeway to form political discourse online.
Furthermore, it can be used to explain how these opinions could escalate into a string
23
of highly politicized messages, perhaps unintentionally, regarding the political
conflict in Thailand, which could wind up antagonizing the target country and its
citizens as a result. For instance, in the wake of the postings of the U.S. statements on
social media, the U.S. Embassy Bangkok was widely perceived by antigovernment
leaders and protestors as having sided with the Pheu Thai-led government. Due to the
egalitarian nature of online communication, those messages repetitively voiced by the
U.S. Department of State and certain U.S. state officials in response to Thailand’s
political deadlock are bound to be spun and put in the wrong context in the media,
which could create a fork in the road for the Thai political elite on both sides of the
conflict.
Castells’ theory of the Network Society provides a critical analysis of the
era of digital communications driven by what is called informational capitalism. His
theory can account for the important features of innovative communication
technologies that “have permeated most societies in the world, in various cultural and
institutional manifestations, as the industrial society characterized the social structure
of both capitalism and statism for most of the twentieth century" (Castells, 2000: 22).
In the Internet galaxy, it is worth noting that the real power is the power of cultural
codes embedded in networks (Castells, 2000: 25). Communication technologies have
given way to the eradication of space and to globalization and have also undermined
hierarchical structures, triggering the rapid transition from vertical bureaucracies to
the horizontal corporation (Castells: 1996: 164). That being the case, the theory itself
provides insights into the implications for the social interactions through the use of
digital diplomacy on social media channels among actors from both international and
domestic milieus, and underpins the role of social media as a catalyst that could drag
these state actors into conflict. The question of whether or not the means of digital
diplomacy used by the U.S. government as an attempt to provide the prescription for
what could instigate Thailand’s outbreaks of violence during the Thai 2013 political
conflict has a bearing on the political behavior of members of the Thai political elite
will be answered by a detailed quantitative analysis of the U.S. statements focused on
“western-style democracy” on Facebook. It will, in the end, assess whether such a
western model of democracy is to blame for the souring of relations between the U.S.
and Thailand.
24
Hybrid Paradigm of Second Image Reversed and Network Society
Under the rubric of this seemingly outdated but still relevant Gourevitch’s
theory of second image reversed, the theory of the “Network Society” will also be
integrated because my topic is associated with political communication. It is hoped
that my conceptual framework crystallized through a wide variety of literature on
International Relations theory and the wide-ranging effects of social media on the
political landscape can shed light on the inherent characteristics of social media and
its potential in mobilizing political consciousness among concerned actors,
marshalling public support, or igniting political events in international relations.
Below please find my graphic conceptual toolbox for the topic under discussion.
25
Although these two paradigms were conceived 18 years apart from each
other, I believe that they, when hybridized, could unlock another hidden aspect of the
online mechanisms of international relations between Thailand and the U.S., which
were wielded to influence major stakeholders and the public in the midst of the
simmering political crisis from November 2013 to May 2014.
Research Question
Q1: How do the official statements of the U.S. Department of State in
relation to the 2013 political turmoil in Thailand, posted on Facebook, impinge on the
Figure 3. Theoretical Framework Deployed to Analyze the Impact of the U.S.
Position on Elite Relations amid Thailand’s Political Conflict in 2013.
26
political behavior of the Thai political elite on both sides of the political divide and
internal political conflict?
Hypothesis
H1: The more the Facebook postings, underlining the rhetoric of western-
style democracy, by the U.S. Department of State vis-à-vis the 2013 political crisis in
Thailand there are, the worse relations among members of the Thai political elite from
both sides of the conflict will be. As a result of their deteriorating relations,
Thailand’s internal political conflict is bound to be deepened. The repetitive use of the
rhetoric of democracy embedded in those statements on social media could also be
seen as an act of the U.S. meddling in Thailand’s political affairs, engendering the
souring of relations between these two nations.
27
CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In order to answer my defined research question as well as to test my
hypothesis mentioned earlier, I will opt for a mixed methodology, both qualitative and
quantitative. The reason I am combining these two methods in terms of collecting
primary and secondary data is because I am of the view that they would be able to
effectively help me to arrive at the results in a way that thoroughly explains the
underlying relationships between the views of the U.S. Department of State (central
independent variables) and the political behavior on both sides of the political divide
(central dependent variables). For starters, I had already conducted both documentary
and content analysis on the overarching effects of social media on politics in general,
so as to be able to situate the current Thai political crisis within the context of the
interconnected world in which the exchange of political views has become, if
anything, a cinch, transcending any geographical boundaries. In addition, I will also
analyze information from news reports, travel warnings, and messages put forth
through social media platforms by the U.S. Department of State at the time of the
political turmoil in Thailand, thereby interpreting how the representatives of the U.S.
Government deployed social media and digital diplomacy to engage their foreign
clients. In the first section of my quantitative approach, the frequencies of keywords
in those messages denoting “western-style democratic principles” will be measured in
an attempt to assess where the U.S. true intentions lie when putting out these
messages on Facebook in the wake of repeated rounds of antigovernment protests,
counter protests, and violence from November 2013 to May 2014 in Thailand. In the
second section, a detailed qualitative approach to analyzing the situation in question
will derive from a couple of interviews with the relevant actors who are in the
position to provide inside stories about the heated debate between the U.S. and
Thailand during the six-month period of political discord.
28
Definition of Democracy and its Correlation with U.S. Official Statements on
Thailand’s Political Conflict
It is, first and foremost, important to narrow down the definition of
democracy before the postings of the U.S Department State about the conflict in
Thailand can be analyzed. In his seminal book entitled “Polyarchy,” Robert A. Dahl
posits that democracy and democratization consist of two theoretical dimensions
(Dahl, 1971: 2-9): contestation and participation. The former denotes public
contestation and political competition, whereas the latter signifies participation,
inclusiveness, and the right to participate in elections and office. In this research, I
will measure the spectrum of democracy embedded in these U.S. official statements
based on Robert A. Dahl’s seven empirical conditions for democracy as follows
(Dahl, 1989: 233):
- Election of officials through free and fair elections in which coercion is
limited
- Inclusive suffrage (right to vote)
- Right of all citizens to run for public office
- Freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including
criticism of elected officials
- Right to information other than that monopolized by government officials
- Right to form political parties and interest groups
- Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally
vested in elected officials
It is worth mentioning that seven official statements – all of which are
provided in Appendix I – by the U.S. Department of State were issued in the wake of
the six-month political crisis in Thailand from late November to mid-May in 2013.
Overall, the tone of those democracy-themed messages appeared to be a plea to
Thailand and all parties concerned to respect the rule of law and resolve differences
through peaceful dialogue in ways that strengthen democracy. Below please take a
look at the frequencies of some of the key phrases written in those statements. Once
the outcome of the frequency analysis is revealed, it will then be juxtaposed with
29
Dahl’s conditions for democracy in order to assess whether Washington’s democracy-
oriented prescription for Thailand’s political turmoil played an adverse role in
affecting the political behavior of the Thai political elite on both sides of the conflict.
Table 1. Frequency Analysis of Key Phrases in U.S. Official Statements
Key Phrases Used to Underpin the U.S. Position on Thailand’s
Political Turmoil
Frequencies
1. Respect the Rule of Law IIII
2. Freedom of the Press/Freedom of Expression IIIII
3. Resolve Political Differences through Peaceful Dialogue IIIII
4. Democratic Values and Institutions IIIIIIIII
5. Political Violence IIIII
6. Refrain from Violence and Exercise Restraint III
7. Calls for Elections IIII
8. The Will of the Thai People III
Figure 4. Pie chart demonstrating the frequencies of key phrases used to underpin the
U.S. position on Thailand’s political turmoil
30
The chart above reveals the repetition of some of the key phrases
expressed by the U.S. Department of State with respect to Thailand’s political conflict
on Facebook. The mention of the phrase “Democratic Values and Institutions”
accounts for 24 percent of the entire U.S. official statements issued from November
2013 to May 2014. The other three phrases – “Resolve Political Differences through
Peaceful Dialogue, Political Violence, and Freedom of Speech” – share less than a
fifth of those statements. “Call for Elections and Political Violence” are neck and
neck in terms of their mentions, estimated at 11 percent, whereas phrases like “the
Will of the Thai People and Refrain from Violence and Exercise Restraint” account
for only 8 percent.
When putting these phrases next to Dahl’s conditions for democracy, it is
evident that those U.S. official statements are highly indicative of the American-
centric democratic values, upholding democratically elected governments, freedom of
expression, and the will of the people. Any actions that fly in the face of these ideals
would be condemned by the U.S. government because they do not serve their
interests. In addition, because its remedial measures for Thailand’s political deadlock,
punctuated by sporadic violence, were predicated on the strong advocacy of
democratic values and institutions, as repetitively glorified in their statements
espoused by Department of State officials like Secretary John Kerry and
Spokesperson Jen Psaki, they could precipitate the political conditions in which
members of the political elite from Thailand’s leading parties could easily come into
conflict, with their rivalry becoming more pronounced. Also noteworthy is the fact
that their statements were cryptic in terms of how democracy could become
successful in Thailand. For instance, the mention of “democratic values” was mostly
endemic in those statements, but there were neither guidelines nor explanations as to
how it could be acquired. These loopholes spotted in these statements could be
manipulated by the Thai political elite from major political parties to inflame further
conflict. They could wield these statements to provoke and nurture deep-seated
negative emotions among their hardliners so that they could take their grievances to
the streets in order to legitimize each of their positions. Another point worth
mentioning is that the U.S. failed to take into account the existing divisions and stark
polarization between members of the political elite on both sides of the conflict.
31
While the key leaders of the antigovernment protest movements demanded a royally
appointed government or an unelected people’s council in lieu of an elected
government, Abhisit Vejjajiva was against the February elections as he was more in
favor of political reform before the elections (Vejjajiva, 2013-2014), demanding that
the Pheu Thai Party opt out of the February general elections in hopes of
overthrowing Thaksin’s influence and giving Thailand and its democracy a clean
slate. He essentially believed that the government lost its legitimacy to rule since the
government-backed amnesty bill in November 2013, and thus should show
accountability (Prachathai, 2013). In the midst of the conflict, the Yingluck
government and the pro-government Red Shirt protest movements seemed to cozy up
to the U.S. government since these three entities markedly held onto the same belief
in fair elections without coercion of any sort, calling on the Thai public to cast their
votes in the February elections (Shinawatra, 2014). All of these varying standpoints
considered, it can be surmised that the U.S. democracy-themed statements demanding
the adherence of democratic norms following the crisis on social media did bring
about further conflict for Thailand’s political elite and their supporters since the U.S.
government was, to a certain extent, seen as being in Yingluck’s camp and tipping the
scales in her favor. As information continued unfettered from the U.S. Embassy
Bangkok’s Facebook page, it is worth pointing out that social media allowed
considerable leeway for Thailand’s political elite and their supporters to post their
comments in response to those statements without suppression. In the next section,
those responses – posted on Facebook by Thailand’s members of the political elite
from both the Pheu Thai and Democrat parties and their followers subsequent to the
U.S. statements – will then be measured and categorized into positive and negative
sentiments towards the U.S. Department of State and its state representatives at the
U.S. Embassy Bangkok in particular.
Analysis of Responses to U.S. Official Statements Negative or Positive?
In the months leading up to the coup in May 2014, the U.S. Embassy
Bangkok had been quite active on Facebook, posting messages — available for
viewing in Appendix II — in relation to the political conflict in Thailand, voiced by
32
the representatives of the U.S. Department of State, namely U.S. Department of State
Spokesperson Jen Psaki, Secretary of State John F. Kerry, and Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel. Responses to those postings
were varied and overrun with different sentiments towards the U.S. stance. Below
please take a look at the measurement of their attitude towards the U.S. government
from November 2013 to May 2014.
Table No. 2 Thais’ Sentiments towards U.S. Government amid the 2013 political
conflict in Thailand
Months/Number of
Statements
Positive Comments Hate
Comments
All
Comments
November-December 2013
(5 Statements)
62 Comments 115 Comments 418
Comments
January-February 2014
(1 Statement)
69 Comments 43 Comments 186
Comments
March-April 2014
(2 Statements)
8 Comments 4 Comments 76 Comments
May 2014 (2 Statements) 26 Comments 241 Comments 827
Comments
Total 165 Comments 403
Comments
1,507
Comments
33
Figure 5. Bar chart depicting Thais’ overall sentiments towards the U.S. government
amid Thailand’s political conflict from 2013-2014.
From November to December 2013, seven U.S. official statements and
three U.S. Embassy’s messages vis-à-vis Thailand’s political tensions were posted on
Facebook (U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 2013-2014), ushering in both positive and hate
comments. Some of the positive comments applauded the U.S. efforts in asking
Thailand and all parties concerned to resolve differences through peaceful dialogue
and in acting as a champion of democracy, whereas most of the hate comments
scorned the U.S. and Ambassador Kristie Kenney for interfering in Thailand’s
domestic affairs and purportedly siding with the Yingluck government. Since several
comments from January to February 2014 had to do with the rumors about
Ambassador Kristie Kenney being relieved of her position (U.S. Embassy Bangkok,
2014), the U.S. Embassy Bangkok had to dispel the rumors by posting another official
statement on the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s Facebook page, clarifying that
Ambassador Kenney would still remain focused on her responsibilities in Thailand
until the nomination of the next U.S. Ambassador to Thailand became official.
Surprisingly, the number of positive comments backing Ambassador Kenney
0
50
100
150
200
250
NOV-DEC 2013 JAN-FEB 2014 MAR-APR 2014 MAY-14
62 69
8 26
115
43
4
241
Thais' Sentiments towards U.S. Government amid Thailand's Political
Conflict from 2013-2014.
Positive Comments Hate Comments
34
surpassed the number of hate comments demanding her ouster. Nonetheless, it was
not until May 2014 when the military coup d’état took place that it became clear the
U.S. official statements regarding the military takeover were contributory to the
worsening of the political divide in Thailand, with the number of hate comments
going through the roof. According to the information statistically demonstrated on the
above chart, the overall sentiments of the Thai public towards the U.S. government
and state officials involved in propagating those messages to create diplomatic
dialogue at the time of the 2013 political conflict, at least in an online sphere, prove to
be negative.
Corollaries of U.S. Statements on Elite Relations in Thailand
As for the effects of the U.S. statements about Thailand’s political
stalemate on elite relations in Thailand, it is of interest to note that Abhisit Vejjajiva,
an opposition party leader, was also very active in terms of responding to the U.S.
official statements focused on the means of democracy as an antidote to political
unrest. The first protest march against the U.S. government was launched by Korn
Chatikavanij, Deputy Leader of the Democrat Party, who asked his followers on
Facebook to gather at BTS Asoke Station and march to the U.S. Embassy Bangkok to
submit a letter detailing the reason why the Yingluck government no longer had
legitimacy to govern the country (Bangkok Post, 2013). Below please find his
Facebook post soliciting the gathering at BTS Asoke station on November 29, 2013
following the U.S. statement pressing all sides to exercise restraint, refrain from
violence, and respect the rule of law to resolve political differences. Spotting the
request made by Korn Chatikavanij on Facebook, Abhisit Vejjajiva also joined forces
with him, mentioning on his subsequent Facebook post that he would also swing by
BTS Asoke station to join the rally (Vejjajiva, 2013). Equally noteworthy was the fact
that his post earned a whopping 222,746 likes, 6797 comments, and 3963 shares.
35
Figure 6. Korn leads protestors to U.S. Embassy Bangkok
from https://www.facebook.com/KornChatikavanijDP
Figure 7. Abhisit joins forces with Korn at BTS Asoke Station
from https://www.facebook.com/Abhisit.M.Vejjajiva?fref=ts
36
It is self-evident that their requests on Facebook roused and ignited the
emotions of numerous antigovernment protestors, leading them to do what they were
told to do on social media, as evidenced by the below photo taken in front of the
Embassy compound by the author. It can be seen that these politicians from the
opposition Democrat Party wielded social media as a communication tool to organize
protests and make political statements to marshal supporters. After their posts were
massively liked and reposted to a wider audience, it can be implied that the impact of
international politics on domestic politics was felt not only on social media, but also
in Thailand. If these postings on social media are treated as a form of international
politics and the responses of Thailand’s two prominent party leaders and its citizens
as a form of domestic politics, I believe that perceiving the situation this way helps us
to understand why there was an anti-American sentiment manifested among the
politicians of the opposition Democrat party, the leaders of the demonstrations, and
their followers. On the receiving end of that sentiment was former U.S. Ambassador
to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, who was bombarded with a lion’s share of hate
comments both on the U.S. Embassy’s Facebook page and on her Twitter’s page as a
result of the U.S. position — leaning in favor of fair elections — expressed through
social media channels by the U.S. Department of State. All in all, it can be concluded
that social media was used by the U.S. Department of State as a medium to underpin
its stance; nonetheless, it wound up stirring trouble for the party leaders of both Pheu
Thai and the Democrats since the U.S. official statements issued by state
representatives were seen as an act of favoritism toward the Yingluck regime by
antigovernment protestors and those politicians at the expense of the continuity of the
Thaksin-affiliated regime. Such being the case, these statements on social media
prodded and prompted some of their followers to hurl disparaging comments at the
representative of the U.S. government, even though such statements did not come
directly from her. Needless to say, both sides of the political divide had reached out to
the international community in their own unique ways to justify their movements in
order to avoid misinterpretations of events, according to the Facebook postings
outlined in Appendix II. Nevertheless, in order to remain neutral in the eyes of the
37
public in the middle of the conflict, Ambassador Kenney paid official visits to both
sides.
Figure 8. Antigovernment protestors rally in front of U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Photo courtesy of Archai Saluya
Qualitative Approach to Interpreting the Conflict between U.S. and Thailand:
Interview with Public Diplomacy Officers
With the help of the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok,
I managed to conduct an interview with two Public Diplomacy officers who are
involved in the running of the U.S. Embassy’s Facebook page. I obtained first-hand
information as to what they really thought and felt about the effects of the postings of
the U.S. Department of State on elite relations in Thailand. In addition, I sounded
them out about some of their optimal solutions geared towards grappling with the
phenomenon known as the “war of words” among Thailand’s political elite and their
followers from both sides of the fence. Throughout the process of elite interviewing,
they were forthcoming about how the U.S. mission takes public diplomacy online. In
addition, I was able to get a sense of how the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok advances
38
U.S. foreign policy and promotes U.S. interests in Thailand through the virtual
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The Public Diplomacy officers kept me
abreast of their intriguing perspectives and standpoints through a one-hour long
interview session.
1. Social Media and U.S. Mission in Thailand
According to the Public Diplomacy officers, social media is an important
vessel for the U.S. Mission in Bangkok to advance and achieve its U.S. foreign
policy. It is, in other words, a toolkit that helps the U.S. Department of State to raise
the profile of U.S. foreign policy and promote U.S. interests by amplifying messages
in addition to disseminating information through the primary means of traditional
media. In addition, these messages – regularly posted on the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s
Facebook page – concerning a wide array of issues and U.S.-affiliated outreach
programs serve as a public diplomacy effort to reach a wider audience in order to let
them get a real-time overview of what the U.S. mission does on a daily basis. In an
attempt to pique the interest of the public in an all-encompassing way, information
from Facebook will also be linked to the U.S. Embassy’s twitter page, abridged and
tweeted in only 140-character messages. Social media is also brought into play when
it comes to putting all the rumors about the role of the Embassy in certain events to
rest, providing clarification and addressing the scope and breadth of the issues under
discussion to demystify what would seem too cryptic for the public to understand
behind those diplomatic walls. Another point worth mentioning is that the main goal
of the U.S. Mission on the use of social media is to humanize those who work in the
diplomatic field, with the focus aimed at striving to put a human face on government
bureaucracies.
2. Social Media and Impact of U.S. Position on Elite Relations in
Thailand
Asked if the U.S. democracy-themed statements issued in response to the
simmering political crisis in Thailand had a bearing on the political behavior of the
Thai political elite on both sides of the conflict, the Public Diplomacy Officers
collectively opined that those statements “definitely drew strong reactions, both
39
positive and negative.” They made some followers of the U.S. Embassy Facebook’s
page switch sides. All of those positive and negative comments were thrown in the
mix by those of contending views. The main factor that could be attributed to their
varying emotions and feedbacks was probably the rhetoric for and against these U.S.
statements, created by the political elite from both sides of the conflict. These official
statements seen on social media were exploited by two groups, with each side
attempting to create their political discourse to gain more campaigners. Asked if
treating the U.S. postings on social media as a form of international politics and the
responses of Thailand’s two prominent party leaders and their followers as a form of
domestic politics could contribute to our understanding of why an anti-American
sentiment was palpable among the politicians from the opposition party and the
leaders of the demonstrations, the U.S. State Department Officials maintained that
some members of the Thai public seemed to have difficulty distinguishing the
meaning of the word “understand” from that of “agree.” The U.S. Department of State
had made it clear from the get-go that their statements signified how they understood
the political conflict; it never, not once, used the word “agree,” suggestive of its
support for one side over the other. They further stated that the Thai public and some
members of the political elite were not cognizant of the differences between de jure
diplomatic statements and opinions and commentary. The criticisms from these
groups could also be ascribed to the apparent lack of cultural and language
understanding among some Thais, which prompted them to have a set of
preconceived ideas against the U.S., and regarded these statements as an act of
intervention by the U.S. As for the U.S. posture subsequent to the conflict, such a
discourse approach should be respected as it was done in a manner consistent with
law and within the boundaries of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Thailand.
3. Source of U.S. Official Statements Vis-à-vis Thailand’s Political
Crisis
Bearing in mind the postings of the U.S. Embassy in relation to the
political conflict that had continued for six months from November 2013 to May
2014, it is worth pointing out that the source of these statements can be first traced
back to the information gathered by the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy
40
Bangkok. During the time of the conflict, this section dissected information from all
sides, and provided insights into the development of the political situation in Thailand
in a chronological and systematic order. Such detailed and analytical information
would then be relayed to the U.S. Department of State in Washington for final
clearance. Once Washington adjusted the content and wording of the language and
gave a stamp of approval, it would pass them back to the Public Affairs Section in
Bangkok so that the section could take a final look at them one final time before
publicizing them on social media. The Public Diplomacy Officers at the U.S.
Embassy Bangkok would slightly tailor the language of these statements coming from
Washington in an effort to make them “resonate with the Thai culture.” Despite these
tweaks and adjustments, it is, by all means, essential that the U.S. Mission in Thailand
stick with Washington’s protocol as far as each official statement is concerned.
4. Bombardment against U.S. State Agent in Thailand Following
U.S. Statements
During those six months of Thailand’s political upheaval, it is evident that
former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, was bombarded with a lion’s
share of hate comments either on Facebook or on her personal Twitter account as a
result of the position of the U.S. Department of State, expressed through social media
channels. Asked how the Public Diplomacy Officers dealt with those hate comments,
they said that the U.S Department State has always upheld free speech as long as it is
fashioned in a non-threatening way. Taking into consideration the status of the U.S as
a major exporter of free speech and freedom of expression, they, at the time, did not
delete or unfriend any followers who did not have nice or pleasant things to say in
response to each official statement. These followers of the U.S. Embassy Facebook’s
page were allowed considerable leeway to voice their opinions without the
administrator rising to the bait or trying to block them. Nonetheless, if they used
vulgar language, obscene photos, or sent in death threats targeting state agents, their
comments would be deleted without question. In the midst of the war of words among
these contending factions on social media, Ambassador Kristie Kenney became the
target of death threats in many instances, with these netizens calling her names, and
worst of all, sending ill wishes to her. At the peak of the conflict, one individual even
41
went overboard and took to Facebook to wish that her plane crashed on her next flight
out of Thailand. Another intriguing reason why she was the subject of ridicule and
hatred was because, as the Officers stated, she is a woman. Although she did not
encroach upon the lines of lawful diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Thailand,
some people perceived her as the messenger of these statements and, therefore, should
be culpable, or even relieved of her position. Nonetheless, as a long-time ally of 180
years, The U.S. could not discontinue engaging Thailand and all parties in
constructive dialogue aimed at bringing about peace and order to Thailand.
5. Policy Recommendations for Social Media Engagement by U.S.
Mission on Thailand’s Future Political Issues
In the context of globalization, the use of digital diplomacy via social
media platforms is inevitable. The U.S. Mission will continue to connect with the
public, share ideas, and promote democratic values and U.S.-Thai relations. They felt
that the U.S. Mission did not do anything wrong, nor did it meddle in Thailand’s
internal affairs when it issued official statements regarding its understanding of
Thailand’s political conflict. Those statements on social media were used as a
governance tool executed in ways that promote peaceful and constructive dialogue
among major actors in dispute at the national level. They also reaffirmed that there
were no political maneuverings behind the curtain. The fact that certain groups were
vocal about the U.S. ulterior intentions was because of the lack of cross-cultural
understanding. And even if the U.S. were to remain quiet, not showing their position
on the conflict, these groups would have scorned the U.S. for being indifferent
anyway. In other words, irrespective of the statements, the U.S., as a world hegemon,
has to bear the brunt of being a top dog in international relations. As a matter of fact,
there is no denying that people would always care what the U.S. thinks as it is
considered a big guy on top who can take any criticisms and negativity coming its
way. The U.S., as a consequence, will have to, time and again, cling to the “damned-
if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don’t” mentality when it comes to dealing with its
dialogue partners. It is worth mentioning that there were also some incidents
happening right around the same time as the 2013 Thai political conflict in which
some of the Thai netizens condemned the U.S. for not issuing official statements
42
showing their standpoints on those controversial issues (the Public Diplomacy
Officers could not tell what those incidents were right off the top of their heads). All
of these factors considered, the Public Diplomacy officers concluded that they did not
have to come up with any solutions for the use of social media by the U.S. Mission as
it did nothing out of line or inappropriate. They also would like to clarify that the U.S.
Mission has no problem with hate comments as its tolerance reflects the protection
and promotion of free speech and freedom of expression. That being the case, the U.S.
Mission will not shy away from using social media as a communication tool to project
its foreign policy and promote U.S.-Thai relations despite the effects it may have had
on certain groups of people.
Interview with Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn
Privy to Thai politics and its vicissitudes for a respectable period of time,
Associate Professor Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn has been regarded by many as a Thai
political science veteran. His profound knowledge in the field of international
relations is valuable to my research as he was able to provide illuminating insights
into the role social media played in the milieu of Thailand’s political crisis in 2013.
Since a number of actors from both international and domestic settings were
embroiled in the ratcheting up of tensions between Thailand and the U.S., Dr. Panitan
Wattanayagorn, as a distinguished academic, discussed his views on what might have
triggered the waning of relations between the U.S. and Thailand following the
dissemination of the U.S. official statements via social media channels.
1. Effects of Social Media on Political Events
Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn started off by saying that social media is a
promising networking tool that can be wielded to influence not only political events,
but also could have immediate and strong effects on societal and economic issues. It
has also been apparent in today’s world of globalization that social media is used to
streamline numerous marketing strategies aimed at gaining attention from more online
customers. Also noteworthy is that the momentum of social media varies according to
the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population of each country.
43
The more Internet connectivity one country is afforded, the more access to
information its population will have. Thanks to its multifaceted utilities, the centrality
of social media in spreading information is of great interest to politicians and
academics alike, although the effectiveness of the use of social media vis-à-vis
political events has been proven questionable in some instances. On the other end of
the spectrum, he cautioned that the use of social media – intended to influence and
stimulate political events – could engender a “boomerang” effect among groups of
dissenting views, displaying an act of resistance. However, it all boils down to the
question of how the mechanisms of social media are applied to the political sphere
and whom it specifically targets.
The advent of cutting-edge technologies – especially smartphones – have
enabled more people to be digitally savvy, with the persisting urge and demand to use
them on a day-to-day basis due to its convenience and portability. In the information
age, we can go so far as to say that social media has been acting as an emerging force
supplemental to traditional media – and understandably so. In the information-based
society in which the idea of “any-news-is-good-news” is ubiquitous, many nation
states and mainstream media outlets have turned to social media to publicize a wide
array of information on any significant issues in an effort to capture the attention of a
worldwide audience. The interconnected world made possible by these state-of-the-art
technologies has contributed to an amalgamation of information, speed, and accuracy
going hand in hand. As the name of the game suggests, those who first put out
newsworthy and eye-catching headlines on social media will garner public interest
more instantaneously than those in traditional media, who are put at a disadvantage as
they obviously lag behind in terms of getting their messages across. It is worth noting
that the power of social media in reproducing content germane to the issues
surrounding international politics plays a part in the creation of mental images – both
positive and negative – to achieve some hidden objectives or propaganda, though
some information on social media could be partially fabricated.
Granted, the seemingly potent power of social media sometimes can bring
about unprecedented changes, but its use in the parameters of international politics, as
past precedents show, could do more harm than good, especially when the questions
of ethics and norms are concerned. Many critics are still skeptical of the use of social
44
media in resolving or influencing political issues because there are several
counterfactual questions to be taken into account and many independent variables to
be considered. Despite some of its unexpected drawbacks, a champion of freedom of
speech and human rights like the U.S. still continues to hold onto social media as an
apparatus for political discourse to advance foreign policy and promote its values.
2. Impression of U.S. Statements on Thailand’s Political Conflict
from Academic Angle
Asked what he thought about the U.S. official statements from the U.S.
Department of State, which came out at the peak of Thailand’s political deadlock in
2013, Dr. Panitan stated that if we were to look at merely one statement, it probably
would not have that much of an impact because it is predicated on universally
accepted norms such as democratic values and peaceful settlement of disputes. In
reality, not only is the U.S. Department of State active in constructing and publicizing
these statements aimed at creating peaceful dialogue through media and diplomatic
channels, but other embassies are also deploying the exact same diplomatic response.
The crux of the problem is, however, attributable to the repetitive production of these
messages, insofar as some groups felt that the U.S. attempted to intervene in
Thailand’s political affairs. As a result of these burgeoning negative perceptions, they
might have spearheaded the protest movement to exhibit their resistance or rancor.
Those messages voiced by state agents could be spun and put in the wrong context,
further complicating things and deepening the divisions among groups of contending
views in Thailand or any political parties on the receiving end of the U.S. statements.
In these statements, there might have also been some “trigger” words or sentences that
ticked certain elite groups off, to a certain extent that they could exploit the U.S.
statements to stoke the flames of fiery political rhetoric that put themselves at an
advantage in the eyes of their followers, thereby intensifying the battle among these
opposing sides driven by different goals. Such being the case, chances are high that
those U.S. official statements could be perceived as biased toward one political party
in Thailand, and that explains why former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Kristie
Kenney, became one of the players dragged into domestic politics as well as the
subject of derision and criticism, alleged to have opened a can of worms in the midst
45
of the conflict. As a consequence, Ambassador Kenney, seen by the Thai public as the
messenger of the U.S. position, were persecuted and vilified with vitriolic comments,
and this is where the fault lines of the effectiveness of social media occur.
3. Traditional Diplomacy versus Digital Diplomacy
In principle, the official lines of traditional diplomacy entail sovereignty,
non-intervention, and peaceful ways of settlement. Those three elements are the gist
of traditional diplomacy exercised by nation-states. As an academic, Dr. Panitan
contended that, as inviolable as it would appear to be, traditional diplomacy does not
always work as intended in international relations among states. Neo-realism
postulates that acts of cheating and intervention oftentimes transpire behind those
diplomatic walls. Intervention is, by and large, normal because states would like to
acquire national prosperity. People cannot negate the fact that a mission to secure
either absolute or relative gains revolves around world politics. Nonetheless, in the
case of the U.S. official statements juxtaposed against the Thai 2013 political conflict,
it is worth observing that the movement of the U.S. Department of State was launched
and carried out in ways that yielded both direct and indirect results. Primarily, the
U.S. Department of State might have intended to disseminate these statements on
social media platforms in an effort to influence the decision-makers. As for the
indirect effects on the political behavior of the public, these statements were designed
to sway voters so that they could exert pressure on those decision makers and
stakeholders. The question of whether or not the U.S. statements on Facebook are
indicative of an act of intervention by the U.S. government is still debatable because
some of the audiences might appear disinterested and choose not to read those
statements. Those nonchalant emotions aside, a lot of Thais on social media, roused
and angered by these statements, had shared them to their groups of interest and had
hurled spiteful comments at the foreign government. Dr. Panitan further stated that
more attention has been paid to the use of the social media vis-à-vis politics because it
could morph passive diplomacy into active diplomacy. Most of the bureaucracies
stick with the former since it is what has been done in the past and has still remained
potent in the world of diplomacy nowadays. However, the ubiquity of social media
cannot be condoned as it has the potential to make headlines and spark ideas and
46
discussions instantly. Diplomats in the age of informational capitalism resort to social
media these days as it facilitates the proliferation of ideas in an instantaneous fashion.
They can even float any ideas and publicize them on social media channels to gauge
the responses of their dialogue partners. Social media also allows them leeway to fine-
tune their statements to mollify their counterparts prior to their negotiations on certain
issues in person. Certain embassies around the world gravitate toward what is termed
as “digital diplomacy” because, on the surface, it appears to be productive, and if
anything, enticing. Of all the foreign embassies in Thailand, it is self-evident the U.S.
Embassy in Bangkok is most attuned to and well-versed in the use of social media.
With this in mind, it is not surprising to see Ambassador Kenney regarded by many as
a celebrity or a public opinion leader on the U.S. side of the house. Equally
noteworthy is the fact that the active role of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok via social
media channels also ushered in new diplomatic behavior. For instance, in the midst of
the simmering political crisis, the U.S. Embassy put out a video featuring a group of
diplomats dancing and singing to the tunes of Thai traditional Songkran songs. While
the idea of the video was nifty and sensational, some groups were none too pleased
about it, reasoning that the U.S. government was ignorant of the deaths of the
protestors following episodes of violence erupting in central Bangkok, and did not
grasp the gravity of the political situation in Thailand. Dr. Panitan predicted that
Washington will continue to stick to its guns and subscribe to digital diplomacy for as
long as it can to raise the issues in which they are interested, and social media will
still remain one of the U.S. Embassy’s primary interactive channels to connect with
Thai audiences.
4. Social Media Policy Recommendations for U.S. Mission in
Thailand
As a hegemonic state in the free world, the U.S. government, as Dr.
Panitan argued, has never been inclined to change its stance. Granted, the U.S. might
have trouble communicating with its dialogue partners once in a while, but most of
the countries around the world has continued to respect the U.S. as a world
superpower since the post-Cold War era. However, in its relations with Thailand, the
U.S government should try its utmost to use social media in ways that add value to
47
old diplomacy without rubbing any particular groups the wrong way. Although it
would take years until the U.S. Department of State could reach an equilibrium point
and improve finesse in terms of the practice of social media engagement, it will be
worth the while in the end. In addition to the U.S. statements on the political conflict
in Thailand, the U.S. Department of State should annotate its intentions right from the
start, perhaps providing a preventative statement clarifying that under no
circumstances would the U.S. meddle in Thailand’s internal affairs. Dr. Panitan
further stated that doing so would allow the U.S. to raise red flags about the political
situation in Thailand in a less finger-pointing and ordering tone, and would gradually
reinvigorate Thailand-U.S. relations even at the time of the crisis.
From Quantitative to Qualitative Analyses: Findings?
In a nutshell, an in-depth quantitative study of the U.S. statements on
Thailand’s political tumult indicated that the U.S. imposition of western-style
democracy impinged on the political behavior of the political elite on both sides of the
political divide. Due to their incongruent notions of what should constitute democracy
in the midst of the crisis, these entities – the U.S. Department of State, the leaders of
Thailand’s leading political factions, and the leaders of antigovernment protests –
were ensnared in a series of verbal fights transpiring in an online sphere. To make
matters worse, the statistics on the overall sentiments of the Thai public towards the
U.S. government at the time of the crisis also demonstrated that U.S. Department of
State officials were chastised for their constant worship of democracy in the face of
Thailand’s political crisis, with the number of hate comments far exceeding that of
positive comments. The reason why most of the Thai public did not subscribe to the
U.S. statements was because their views were heavily swayed by the Thai political
elite. These elite groups exploited the U.S. statements as a forum to create a flood of
online impassioned statements and debates used to mobilize their supporters. All in
all, as a result of those democracy-themed statements posted online, it can be inferred
that the U.S. image had gradually gone downhill from November 2013 to May 2014
since those politicians on the receiving end of those statements perceived the U.S.
government as leaning in favor of the Thaksin-affiliated regime and rallying to
48
Yingluck’s side, deepening the dichotomy of thoughts, and at the same time,
increasing polarization among members of the political elite on both sides of the
political divide. The perceptions of the actors from international and domestic settings
– elicited from a couple of interview sessions – also demonstrated that social media
did have a hand in bringing about the impassioned debates among state
representatives in Thailand, with both sides attempting to rationalize their actions in
front of the international community. It is worth bearing in mind that taking the
discussion of politics online could also exacerbate relations between states since it
could be viewed as a display of intervention in Thailand’s domestic affairs,
oppressing a bevy of political players, pitting them against one another, and thereby
intensifying its internal political conflict.
49
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This research delves into the multidimensional role of social media and
the impact of the U.S. position on elite relations in Thailand, using a case study of
Thailand’s political imbroglio from November 2013 to May 2014. Throughout the
period of political cul-de-sac in Thailand, the U.S. Department of State wielded social
media as an instrument for disseminating political discourse to Thailand, its long-
standing ally. The gist of this research is to investigate the repercussions of such
online political discourse on the political behavior of the Thai political elite on both
sides of the conflict. With the inclusive analysis of primary and secondary sources
juxtaposed against one another, the empirical evidence from my findings and
theoretical framework points towards the same conclusion and reveals that the U.S.
official statements amplified on social networking sites had a hand in worsening elite
relations and indirectly impacting internal politics amid Thailand’s six-month political
conflict in 2013. The bickering of members of the Thai political elite from both Pheu
Thai and the Democrats, apart from their incongruent political goals, can also be
ascribed to the U.S. repetitive rhetoric of democracy, the negative perceptions of the
U.S. government in Thailand as a meddlesome international actor in internal politics,
and the role of social media and the network society as a facilitator in allowing
competing political elite groups and their followers a public sphere to challenge one
another through the exploitation of the U.S. official democracy-themed statements
issued by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Embassy Bangkok.
Heralded as an effective apparatus to advance U.S. foreign policy in the
age of globalization, social media has been deployed by the U.S. Department of State
to take diplomacy online in an effort to engage other state actors in constructive and
peaceful dialogue. Attempting to paint itself as the strongest democracy in the
anarchical world, the U.S. has sought to maintain its hegemony by proliferating the
rhetoric of freedom and democracy, and as track records show, has imposed it on
countries whose internal politics are characterized by the lack of democracy and
freedom of expression. Some critics may even go so far as to read between the lines
50
and say that these U.S. statements insinuated that the U.S. did not want to be knocked
off its perch and would like to contain its decline, while, at the same time, maintaining
its influence in Thailand, its key ally in the Southeast Asian region. It is, by and large,
in the nature of the U.S. to spread the rhetoric of democracy and take an
interventionist approach when any countries are fraught with political problems and
instability, mainly because the U.S. would like to be able to maintain its strategic
interests in those troubled foreign lands. In the case of the U.S. official statements
generated on social media in the wake of the political crisis under the Yingluck
administration, a quantitative approach to interpreting the situation in question
demonstrated that these statements tarnished the image of the U.S. government and
ostensibly generated more hate comments than positive comments, which was
suggestive of the Thai public’s feeling of antipathy towards the U.S. government and
its state representatives. On top of that, the repercussions of these online statements
on elite relations in Thailand included the fervent resistance of antigovernment
protesters and members of the political elite from the Democrats against the U.S.
government, undermining the security situation in Thailand and instigating further
protest marches against the U.S. Embassy and the pro-government factions. In terms
of a qualitative analysis, both interviews with relevant Public Diplomacy officials and
a political science expert from Chulalongkorn University also indicated that social
media technologies have played a huge role in shaping, driving, and at times,
polarizing both international and domestic movements. Digital media – social media
in particular – has become a public sphere in which online citizens are empowered to
voice their opinions and cement their political standpoints without restrictions.
Analyzing the role of social media vis-à-vis the 2013 political conflict in Thailand, I
can go so far as to say that Facebook, apart from being created for the purpose of
connecting and sharing personal thoughts, now serves as a new medium for the
exploitation of political matters. Given this, the U.S. Department of State must keep
in mind the consequences that might arise from the dissemination of those political
statements amid the crisis as they could pose a strain on state actors still in dispute at
the national level and could indirectly wreck the political affairs of its ally, slowing
down the process of recovery from its long-drawn-out political conflict. Devoid of the
complete understanding of the problematic nature of Thailand’s democracy with each
51
side attempting to abuse or hang onto some form of power, the U.S. risked prolonging
further conflict and creating additional roadblocks to democracy in Thailand.
To cut a long story short, social media played quite an extensive role in
straining relations between the U.S. and Thailand amid the 2013 political conflict in
Thailand. Because of its full-blown support for the freedom of expression and
democracy, The U.S. Department of State did not hold back from issuing official
statements on the U.S. Embassy’s Facebook page, expressing concern over the
simmering situation in Thailand. Nevertheless, little did it know that those
democracy-worshipping statements would backfire and end up antagonizing members
of the political elite in Thailand, thereby exacerbating internal political problems.
Their messages on Facebook, backing western-style democracy, were regarded by a
number of politicians from the Democrats as latent support for the Shinawatra-
affiliated government. All those exchanged messages among these actors in a virtual
space notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the political conflict in Thailand was
overshadowed by the orchestration of a military coup d’état in May 2014. While it is
true that social media acts as an accelerant and a platform facilitating information and
relaying it to a wider audience, I have come to the conclusion that some of the non-
technological problems, especially those resulting from politics, cannot be easily
restrained and solved online. At the end of the day, it is important to bear in mind that
the decision-making authority lies with those in power, not with social media users,
protestors on the streets, or foreign governments. As evidence shows, all that the U.S.
could do was only exert pressure on Thailand and the political elite on both sides at
the time of the conflict. All those implicit limitations of digital diplomacy aside,
social media will continue to impinge on the way that we communicate, interact with
one another, and form opinions in the midst of what is known as the era of the
information society in the 21st century. My case study, all in all, proves that the
governments, committed to the promotion of democracy through social media, should
exercise caution and judgment when it comes to posting messages directed at target
countries at times of political upheaval, as they, if perceived as a display of external
interference or an act of agenda setting, could worsen domestic politics and relations
between states as a whole. Furthermore, in order to retain a sense of impartiality, the
U.S. should also avoid reiterating the rhetoric of democracy on social media platforms
52
since democracy itself is still a contested term, especially in Thailand, whose
democratic realities stand in stark contrast to those of the U.S. Beyond a shadow of a
doubt, the interpretations of democracy in Thailand are, to a great extent, inconsistent
among the political actors in dispute. In this regard, my dissertation brings to light
another uncharted territory of international relations positioned in an online sphere
where the U.S. held onto to digital diplomacy to exert diplomatic pressure on
Thailand in the epoch of the information-based society. This case study serves as a
cautionary tale that the rhetoric of democracy proliferated through the means of
digital diplomacy, regardless of how understated it appears to be, should be exercised
in accordance with the complete understanding of the conflict and the intentions of all
actors involved. Otherwise, it will become nothing short of a problematic device that
could be maneuvered by various elite groups, which could wind up fanning the flames
of instability in a politically fragmented country like Thailand.
53
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
OFFICIAL REMARKS, STATEMENTS, AND SPEECHES
1. November 24, 2013
Protests in Thailand
Statement by Jen Psaki
Department Spokesperson
The U.S. Government is concerned about the rising political tension in
Thailand and is following the ongoing demonstrations in Bangkok closely. We urge
all sides to refrain from violence, exercise restraint, and respect the rule of law.
Violence and the seizure of public or private property are not acceptable means of
resolving political differences.
We call upon all sides to uphold international norms that guarantee freedom
of the press and the safety of journalists. The United States firmly believes all parties
should work together to resolve differences through peaceful dialogue in ways that
strengthen democracy and rule of law.
As long-time friends of Thailand, we strongly support the Thai nation and its
people during this period.
2. December 9, 2013
Political Tensions in Thailand
Statement by Jen Psaki
Department Spokesperson
The United States strongly supports democratic institutions and the
democratic process in Thailand, a long-time friend and ally. Prime Minister
Yingluck has called for elections as a way forward amid ongoing political tensions
and demonstrations. We encourage all involved to resolve political differences
62
peacefully and democratically in a way that reflects the will of the Thai people and
strengthens the rule of law
3. January 26, 2014
Election-related Unrest in Thailand
Statement by Jen Psaki
Department Spokesperson
The United States is deeply troubled by efforts to block polls and otherwise
prevent voting in Thailand, and by the most recent acts of political violence. While
we do not take sides in the political dispute and strongly support freedom of
expression and the right to peaceful protest, preventing citizens from voting violates
their universal rights and is inconsistent with democratic values.
We reiterate our call for all sides to refrain from violence, exercise restraint,
and commit to sincere dialogue to resolve political differences peacefully and
democratically.
4. February 28, 2014
Violence in Thailand
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
We are deeply concerned by the ongoing politically-motivated violence in
Thailand. As allies and close friends of the Thai people, we are profoundly saddened
by the deaths and injuries that have shaken the country. As a father and grandfather,
the death of several innocent children is particularly horrifying, and must at last be a
wake-up call to all sides to refrain from violence, exercise restraint, and respect the
rule of law.
63
I call upon Thai authorities to investigate these attacks swiftly and bring those
responsible to justice. Violence is not an acceptable means of resolving political
differences. We are also concerned by the employment of other tactics that
undermine Thailand’s democratic values and processes, inhibit compromise, and
further exacerbate political tensions.
The United States of America does not take sides in Thai politics. Ultimately, it is
up to the people of Thailand to decide how they will resolve their differences. All
sides should commit to dialogue in the spirit of seeking common ground to address
differences and find a peaceful, democratic way forward.
5. May 20, 2014
Statement by State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki: Thailand
We are aware of reports that Thailand’s army has declared martial law and are
monitoring developments closely. We remain very concerned about the deepening
political crisis in Thailand and urge all parties to respect democratic principles,
including respect for freedom of speech. We understand the Royal Thai Army
announced that this martial law declaration is not a coup. We expect the Army to
honor its commitment to make this a temporary action to prevent violence, and to not
undermine democratic institutions. The United States firmly believes all parties
must work together to resolve differences through dialogue and find a way forward.
This development underscores the need for elections to determine the will of the
Thai people.
6. May 22, 2014
Coup in Thailand
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
I am disappointed by the decision of the Thai military to suspend the
constitution and take control of the government after a long period of political
64
turmoil, and there is no justification for this military coup. I am concerned by reports
that senior political leaders of Thailand’s major parties have been detained and call
for their release. I am also concerned that media outlets have been shut down. I urge
the restoration of civilian government immediately, a return to democracy, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as press freedoms. The
path forward for Thailand must include early elections that reflect the will of the
people. While we value our long friendship with the Thai people, this act will have
negative implications for the U.S.–Thai relationship, especially for our relationship
with the Thai military. We are reviewing our military and other assistance and
engagements, consistent with U.S. law.
7. May 24, 2014
Cancellation of U.S.-Thailand Engagements
Statement by Marie Harf
Deputy Department Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
In response to the military coup in Thailand, we continue to review our
military and other assistance and engagements, consistent with U.S. law.
In addition to our previously announced suspension of foreign assistance to
Thailand,the Department of Defense announced today the cancellation of Exercise
CARAT, which had been underway, and some senior level exchanges. We have also
canceled a U.S. Government-sponsored firearms training program in Thailand for the
Royal Thai Police that had been slated to begin May 26, as well as a U.S.
Government-sponsored study trip to the United States, scheduled for June, for several
senior Royal Thai Police officers that would have included visits to FBI facilities and
meetings with U.S. law enforcement counterparts.
We urge the immediate restoration of civilian rule and release of detained
political leaders, a return to democracy through early elections, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
65
APPENDIX B
DATA ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
Abhisit on Social Media
66
67
68
69
Yingluck on Social Media
70
71
U.S. Embassy Bangkok on Social Media
72
73
74
75
76
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWS
First Interview
The Public Diplomacy Officers posted at the Public Affairs Section of the U.S.
Embassy Bangkok would like to remain anonymous despite their valuable
contributions to this research. I, however, talked to them in person in late February
2015. These interviewees are considered an asset to my research because they have
been career diplomats for a number of years. They also dealt directly with the day-to-
day management of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok Facebook’s page. Getting a broad
picture of what they thought about the situation was critical as they were able to
provide great insights into where the U.S. true intentions lie when it comes to voicing
those statements in relation to the Thai political conflict on social media platforms.
Second Interview
Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, a political science professor at Chulalongkorn University
and an advisor to the Ministry of Defence, is no stranger to Thai politics as he used to
assume the role of the spokesperson for the Abhisit government back in 2010. I spent
a good two hours engaging in an illuminating conversation with Dr. Panitan
Wattanayagorn about the impact of social media on politics. Privy to the inner circle
of Thai politics, he was so forthcoming right from the start, weighing in on the
potential effects of the U.S. position on the political behavior of the Thai political
elite. He also shed light on why U.S. state representatives came under fire during the
2013 political conflict in Thailand. I can say without hesitation that I left the interview
room getting all the information and insights I need.
77
BIOGRAPHY
Name Mr. Archai Saluya
Date of Birth July 26, 1987
Educational Attainment
2008: Bachelor of Arts in English, Faculty of
Liberal Arts, Thammasat University
Work Position Special Consular Assistant
U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Scholarship Year 2008: King Bhumibol’s Scholarship for
Academic Excellence and Achievement
Work Experiences Special Consular Assistant (2013-present)
U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Consular Assistant (2009-2013)
U.S. Embassy Bangkok