social and behavioural science - how academia & industry can play their part

8/8/2019 Social and Behavioural Science - How Academia & Industry Can Play Their Part

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Social andBehavioural

Science

Countering theterrorist threat:

How academia and industrycan play their part


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This booklet is or everyone inacademia, industry and otherresearch organisations whosework on social and behaviouralscience could help counter theterrorist threat to the UK.

nternational terrorism is acomplex social phenomenon.Application o social andbehavioural science canmprove our knowledge andunderstanding o terrorismand its consequences. Socialand behavioural science candirectly inorm strategy, policyand operations and help ensurethat the Governments responses robust and eective.

Foreword 02

Section 1: Social and behaioural

science in CONTEST 04

CONTEST: International terrorism

and the UK 04

CONTEST: Science and technology 05

CONTEST: Social and behavioural

science 06

Ethical considerations 06

Section 2: Ke challenges 07

Pursue

Improving decision-making with

intelligence data 08

Understanding capability,

vulnerability and attack

indicators in terrorist organisations. 09

Prevent

Rening our understanding

o radicalisation 10

Developing eective Prevent

interventions 11

Protect

Identiying suspicious behaviour 12

Improving protective security 13

Prepare

Understanding crowd behaviour

during terrorism incidents and

emergencies 14

Improving the operational

eectiveness o emergency

response teams 15

Cross-cutting challengesReducing alse positives in

our counter-terrorist work 16

Communicating with the public,

stakeholders and communities 17

Understanding the economic

and social impacts o terrorism and

counter-terrorism interventions 18

Section 3: How to get inoled 19

Im in academia or industry

with a bright idea. Who should

I contact? 20

How does the Government

gain scientic advice on

counter-terrorism? 22

How is the Government

communicating with academia? 24

How is Government communicating

with industry? 28

Where can I look internationally

or inormation and unding? 29

What should I do next? 31

Glossar 32

End notes 33

Contents

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his document, which has been

roduced by the Oce or Security and

ounter-Terrorism in the Home Oce,

the second in a series linked to the

cience and Technology Strategy or

ountering International Terrorism,

ublished in August 2009. Each o

hese booklets provides more detail

bout the security challenges we ace

nd explains the role that the sciences

an play in tackling them.

The intention o these documents

is to engage academia and industry

to reduce the risk to the UK and its

interests overseas rom international

terrorism, so that people can go about

their lives reely and with condence.

That is the stated aim o CONTEST, ourcounter-terrorism strategy, which we

revised and published in March 2009.

The rst o these booklets set out

how some o the security challenges

we ace can be addressed through

the use o technology and the physical

sciences. This booklet considers the

role o social and behavioural science.

It also identies sources o unding

and explains who to contact or more

inormation and advice. I hope you

nd it useul.

Admiral the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC

Parliamentary Under-Secretary o State

Home Oce

Adiral the Lord West o Spithead GCB DSCParliamentary Under-Secretaryo State Home Oce

3

Foreword

32


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Introduction

Section 1Social and behaiouralscience in CONTEST

CBRN strategy will be released shortly and published at

tp://security.homeoce.gov.uk

ONTEST: International terroris

nd the UK

he 2009 National Security Strategy1

entied international terrorism as the

most signicant immediate security

hreat to the UK. While terrorism is not

ew, the current threat is dierent romhose we have aced beore in its scope,

apability and ambition. Contemporary

ternational terrorist organisations

ave an international cause, plan and

onduct attacks in and rom a range o

ountries and aim to infict signicant

vilian casualties. Many seek to

ecruit people in this country. Some

rganisations aspire to use Chemical,

iological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN)

materials as weapons*.

he nature o the threat and the

overnments response is set out in

he revised UKs Strategy or Countering

nternational Terrorism (CONTEST),

ublished in 20092 (a brie review o

he rst year o the revised CONTEST

trategy will be published shortly).

he aim o CONTEST is:

to reduce the risk to the United

ingdom and its interests overseasom international terrorism, so that

eople can go about their lives reely

nd with condence.

CONTEST is based on a set o principles,

refecting our core values, the lessons

we and others have drawn rom our

experiences o terrorism to date, and

the broader security principles set out in

the 2009 National Security Strategy.

We regard the protection o humanrights as central to our counter-

terrorism work in this country and

overseas.

Our response to terrorism is and will be

based upon the rule o law.

We will always aim to prosecute those

responsible or terrorist attacks in this

country.

We will tackle the causes as well as

symptoms o terrorism.

We will work towards reducing support

or terrorism and preventing people

becoming terrorists: without popular

support terrorism is unsustainable.

We will be responsive to the threat

that can be created by rapidly evolving

technology.

We recognise that partnerships in this

country and overseas are essential

to our success and that these

partnerships depend on openness and

trust.

The threat we ace crosses our borders

and is international in scope. We will

depend upon our allies as they will

depend on us.

CONTEST is based on our workstreams,

each with a clear objective:

Pursue : to stop terrorist attacks.

Prevent : to stop people becoming

terrorists or supporting violent

extremism.

Protect : to strengthen our protectionagainst terrorist attack.

Prepare : where an attack cannot be

stopped, to mitigate its impact.

Work on Pursue and Prevent reduces

the threat rom terrorism while work

on Protect and Prepare reduces the

UKs vulnerability to attack. Together,

they reduce the overall risk rom

international terrorism. The revised

strategy also emphasises a number o

priorities common to all the our main

workstreams: one o these is science

and technology.

CONTEST: Science and technolog

In August 2009, the Government

published the UK Science and

Technology Strategy or Countering

International Terrorism3. The strategy

outlines how science and technology

(including social and behaviouralscience) can better enable us to

pursue terrorists, prevent radicalisation,

protect essential services and

inrastructure and prepare or a terrorist

attack. It also sets out our objectives

or the next three years:

To use horizon scanning to understand

uture scientic and technical threats

and opportunities and inorm our

decision making on counter-terrorism.

To ensure the development and

delivery o eective counter-terrorism

solutions by identiying and sharing

priority science and technology

requirements.

To enhance international collaboration

on counter-terrorism related science

and technology.

Section 1

CONTEST

Section 1

CONTEST

4

Countering the terroristthreat: Social andbehaioural scienceHow academia and industrycan play their part

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he strategy commits the Government

o producing a series o brochures or

cademia, industry and other research

rganisations about science and

echnology in counter-terrorism. The

rochures outline our research and

evelopment requirements.he rst o these brochures was

ublished alongside the strategy and

entied counter-terrorism challenges

hat could be addressed by technical

cience4. This brochure explains the

hallenges that may be addressed

hrough the application o social and

ehavioural science.

ONTEST: Social and behaioural

cience

ocial and behavioural science includes

many separate disciplines including

ociology, psychology, criminology,

nthropology, economics, political

cience and communication studies.

he common themes o social and

ehavioural science are, respectively,

the study o society and the manner

which people behave and impact

he world around us5; and the study

the actions and reactions o peoplehrough observational and experimental

methods.

pplying scientic method to such

omplex subjects requires a range

approaches including surveys,

uestionnaires, interviews, ethnographic

tudies, ocus groups and observations.

hese approaches generate both

ualitative and quantitative data which

an be used to draw conclusions about

ociety and the individuals within it. In

his context, quantitative approaches

deal with numerical measurements

whilst qualitative approaches deal

with how people understand their

experiences. Providing the methods

used are robust, both qualitative

and quantitative approaches are

equally valid.Social and behavioural science is

essential to understanding why

individuals and groups behave as they

do, knowledge o which is essential

or countering terrorism. There are

challenges related to social and

behavioural science in all parts o

CONTEST and Section 2 o this brochure

describes these in detail.

Ethical considerations

Work carried out by social and

behavioural scientists on behal o

Government is carried out in accordance

with strong ethical principles, such as

those laid out in the Government Oce

or Sciences Universal Ethical Code

or Scientists6 and the Government

Social Research Services guidance.

Researchers ollow the guidelines and

ethical codes o their proessional

organisations and where appropriate,studies have ull independent

ethical review.

This section outlineschallenges or UK counter-terrorist work that may beaddressed by social andbehavioural science.

In each part we have identieda core challenge, some oits associated social andbehavioural eatures, and thesocial and behavioural workthat could help us in the uture.

Section 2Ke challenges

The section is structured around each

o our main workstreams o our counter-

terrorist strategy:

Our Pursue work depends not just on

understanding terrorist intent and

planning, but also on eective analysis

and decision making during complexand ast moving counter-terrorist

investigations;

For Prevent to make a dierence

we need to understand why people

become radicalised, how and where

we can intervene most eectively in

the radicalisation process and how

we can then assess our progress and

identiy best practice: in this context,

radicalisation is the process by which

people come to support violent

extremism and, in some cases, to

participate in terrorist groups7.

Our Protect work will benet rom

accurate detection o suspicious

behaviour, whether rom an individual

in a crowd or an employee inside

a key organisation. Our protective

security measures depend not only

on new technology but also on a

better understanding o associated

human actors.

For our Prepare work we want to

understand more about crowd

behaviour during an emergency

incident and about how the response

o the emergency services can then

be made more eective.

Section 1

CONTEST

Section 2

Key challenges

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he Pursue workstream aims to reduce

he terrorist threat to the UK through

he detection and investigation o

errorist networks and the disruption

their activities. Terrorists operate in

ecret and intelligence is vital to detect

nd disrupt their activities. In the pastve years there has been a rapid and

gnicant increase in intelligence

esources at home and overseas,

or the intelligence agencies and the

olice. These resources have been

rganised into new structures which

nsure unprecedented interagency

ollaboration, recognised internationally

s a model or successul joint working.

proing decision-aking with

ntelligence data

he Challenge:

ntelligence and law enorcement

gencies identiy and disrupt terrorist

ctivities. But the investigation

individuals engaged in a covert

onspiracy to commit a crime is

herently challenging. Inormation is

mbiguous, complicated, constantly

volving and not always accurate.

ecisions must oten be made inast-moving and complex situations.

Ke challenges:Pursue

Common eatures o the challenge:

Inormation about terrorist activities

comes rom numerous sources,

including digital (e.g. inormation in

ocial databases, phone records,

online activity), human (e.g. rom

members o the public, inormants andthe security agencies) and orensic.

Investigations are oten carried out

across multi-agency and sometimes

multi-national teams.

Decision-makers must take account

o public saety, political, legal, ethical

and practical concerns.

How can industry and academia help?

Industry and academia may be able

to apply existing or new research

to develop:

Eective methods o eliciting and

assessing inormation.

Improved methods or recording,

searching and displaying digital

inormation.

Techniques that acilitate and enhance

eective decision-making in multi-

agency teams.

Eective training to enhance

investigational skills.

Understanding capabilit,

ulnerabilit and attack indicators

in terrorist organisations.

The Challenge:

We also need to constantly improve

our understanding about how terroristorganisations work how capability

develops, what capability creates

most risk, what infuences the choice

o target, how behaviours may reveal

intent, and what determines motivation.


Terrorist groups operate in secret

and their activities are oten hard

to distinguish rom those o the law

abiding public.

Terrorist attacks are usually planned

and conducted by groups rather than

individuals.

Terrorist activities are infuenced both

by actors external to the group and by

internal group dynamics.

A terrorist group must develop and

maintain motivation and capability,

whilst remaining hidden rom law

enorcement, the attention o

communities and, sometimes,

rom riends and amily.


Industry and academia may be able to

apply existing or new research to:

Understand how terrorist groups

develop the technical and psychological

capability to conduct an attack and

how this might be infuenced bygovernment actions.

Identiy actors which infuence a

terrorist groups choice o method and

target o attack (e.g. individual, social,

ideological, security and broader

political actors).

Identiy how terrorist behaviours

change as they move into attack phase

and how those behaviours might be

identied and distinguished rom the

activities o innocent members o the

public.

Understand how and why terrorists or

terrorist groups develop and lose the

motivation to conduct an attack, what

the indicators o these changes might

be and the associated implications or

government policy.

Section 2

Key challenges

Section 2

Key challenges

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Ke challenges:Prevent

reventing individuals rom supporting

r engaging in terrorism is one o the key

bjectives o CONTEST.

he most signicant international

errorist threat to this country currently

omes rom individuals and groups who

ttempt to justiy murder by reerence todistorted interpretation o Islam and

ho try to recruit people to their cause

om among Muslim communities. But

the recent past other international

errorist groups have targeted dierent

ommunities here and have justied

lling on other grounds.

he numbers and percentiles o people

ho are recruited to violent extremism

re very small. But the impact they can

ave is disproportionately large.

omestic violent extremist groups (e.g.

om the ar right) are also active in this

ountry. They have their own message,

xploit a dierent community and seek

dierent range o targets.

efning our understanding o

adicalisation

he Challenge:

iolent extremist groups would not beble to operate without recruiting people

ho are vulnerable to their extremist

message. We need to better understand

ulnerability and the processes o

adicalisation. It is particularly important

o understand the comparative infuence

ideological, psychological and social

actors operating in this country and

n this country rom overseas8. The

overnment can continue to identiy

ppropriate responses and evaluate

he impact o existing counter-

adicalisation projects9.


Radicalisation is occurring or a range

o reasons

Ideology (both extremist and violent

extremist) and ideologues play a

key part.

But people appear to be vulnerable orreasons which are more psychological

than simply political.

And very local grievances may be as

important as protest against global

developments.

Group behaviour can be a important

actor: recruitment may precede

radicalisation.

Communities in this country are

subject to infuence rom here and

overseas.

Prevent works in an area o high

political sensitivity: it can wrongly be

construed as a critique o Muslim

communities.




Understand the reason or and

process involved in the transition rom

extremism to violent extremism.

Explore the techniques used byradicalisers and determine who and

what makes an eective recruiter.

Develop a greater understanding o

the needs and challenges aced by

communities who are targeted by

radicalisers and establish what actors

have made and still make communities

resilient to violent extremism.

Develop an understanding o the

comparative infuence o international

and domestic actors on the

radicalisation process.

Investigate the role played by new

and conventional media (notably the

internet) in the radicalisation process.Understand how perceived or real

grievances are used by radicalisers

to justiy violence.

Deeloping eectie Prevent

interentions

The Challenge:

We need to develop eective ways to

challenge the radicalisation process.

Some interventions, which have been

developed to address this challenge

in this and other countries, seek to

change behaviours (i.e. disengagement);

others aim to change attitudes (i.e.

de-radicalisation). Some aim to do

both. Government is already unding

interventions and best practice is

emerging. But we need to do more.


Measuring attitudinal or behavioural

change can be dicult.

Evaluating outcomes is more

problematic than measuring process.

Many eective international

interventions have developed outsidegovernments and in some cases in

other policy areas.

Data on the extent o radicalisation

internationally and trends up and down

is not consistent or always reliable.




Capture best practice rom around

the world, notably in communities and

Non-Government Organisations.

Understand the comparative merits o

approaches based on attitudinal and

behavioural change.

Understand what works rom other

elds o intervention such as health

and crime, and investigate their

application to preventing radicalisation.

Improve methods o outcome

evaluation drawing on knowledge o

successul assessments in other elds

Better understand the broader globaltrends: how prevalent is radicalisation

to violent extremism?

Section 2

Key challenges

Section 2

Key challenges

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Ke challenges:Protect

ne o the objectives in CONTEST

to reduce the vulnerability o the UK

nd its interests to terrorist attack.

his is the purpose oProtect. It

equires protection o critical national

nrastructure, crowded places, the

ansport system, our borders, andur interests overseas; and protection

gainst threats rom insiders.

educing our vulnerability to terrorist

ttack involves developing ways to

dentiy terrorist behaviours and the

eployment o counter-measures

hat deter, disrupt and minimise the

arm caused by those engaging in

errorist activities. In responding to

his challenge we need to ensure that

ecurity measures command public

onsent, minimise intrusion and do

ot create disproportionate disruption

o everyday lie.

dentiing suspicious behaiour

he Challenge:

n individuals behaviour may contain

ues as to their intent. We need

o develop techniques that enable

entication o terrorist actions and

ehaviours in a range o contexts:

hese might include crowded places,

ey inrastructure locations or security

heckpoints, such as the airport or UK

order. Any approach must be proven,

minimise intrusion and enable people to

o reely about their day to day activities.


There is no unique set o behaviours

or prole that always reveals terrorists

or their intentions.

Many behaviours which may be thought

suspicious can be entirely innocent

Crowded places present high-volumemovements o people.

Insiders have legitimate access

to their organisations assets and

premises which they can exploit or

unauthorised purposes.




Improve understanding o the

behavioural indicators o concealment

o small arms, explosives or other

materials associated with attack

planning.

Develop methods and approaches

that might acilitate the detection o

terrorist research, reconnaissance

and attack planning, or help rustrate

and deter such activities.

Improve systems and human

processes to automate the detection

o these indicators.

Iproing protectie securit

The Challenge:

Protective security requires eective

monitoring, detection, searching

(e.g. o people at transport hubs) and

response (e.g. to a suspect package).We need to improve these processes.

We also need to improve the design

and management o environments to

make them harder targets or terrorists.

And we need to make it easier or

the public and employees to ollow

security instructions, ensuring minimal

disturbance and intrusion.


Repetitive security procedures are oten

poorly understood and sometimes are

circumvented or ignored.

Operators become subject to

complacency, atigue and boredom.

Large numbers o people requireprocessing at checkpoints.

Most positives will be alse.




Develop techniques that promote

security awareness and vigilance

amongst employees, notably in

national inrastructure organisations.

Develop ways to improve the

attention and response-time o

security personnel.

Combine the social and physical

sciences to optimise the perormance

o security personnel and improve

the design and management o

vulnerable sites.

Develop techniques that help the

public to understand and ollow

security measures.

Inormation about the Governments approach to reducing

the vulnerability o crowded places to terrorist attack will

be published shortly and can be ound at http://security.

homeoce.gov.uk

Section 2

Key challenges

Section 2

Key challenges

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Ke challenges:Prepare

hePrepareworkstream aims to mitigate

he impact o a terrorist attack where

cannot be stopped. This includes

ork to manage an ongoing attack as

ell as to recover rom its atermath.

ective Prepare work means ensuring

hat capabilities are in place to dealith a range o terrorist incidents, that

here is continuity or swit recovery

our critical national inrastructure

ollowing an incident, and that crisis

management structures are appropriately

quipped and trained. It is essential

hat emergency services can respond

ectively to a wide range o incidents

nd recover as quickly as possible.

nderstanding crowd behaiour during

erroris incidents and eergencies

he Challenge:

he behaviour o crowds ollowing an

cident can determine its impact.

rowd behaviour may help to alleviate

otential problems: members o the

ublic may be the rst responders on

he scene and appropriate action may

elp to save lie or prevent injury. But a

rowd may create additional problems:

anic and chaotic behaviour may hindervacuation, the handling o casualties

nd public health interventions. We

eed to understand the reaction o

rowds to dierent situations and

ow to respond.


Multiple situations causing variable

levels o ear and public concern (or

example radiation, biological, chemical

incidents).

Multiple audiences, some with existing

relationships to others in the group(e.g. amilies).

Complex links between group and

individual behaviour.

Varying levels o leadership.




Enhance our understanding o how

crowds behave in emergencies.

Understand the implications

o collective resilience or the

management o crowds.

Collect evidence regarding the

relationship between communications

and crowd behaviour.

Provide clear guidance about the

relative importance o pre-event and

post-event (early) communications.

Provide clear guidance about the

impact o eective command and

control on crowd behaviour.

Develop communication tools andstrategies or managing crowds.

Iproing the operational eectieness

o eergenc response teas

The Challenge:

Emergency Response Teams (Police,

Fire and Ambulance Services), provide

crucial assistance during the earlystages o an incident and will help

determine long-term recovery. We need

to understand the actors which make a

team eective, including coordination,

communication, command and

control, and training. We also need to

understand the expectations and needs

o people at the scene o an incident,

and the roles and actions o Emergency

Response Teams.


No two emergency situations will be

exactly the same. There will be a

degree o uncertainty about every

emergency situation.

Multi-agency response teams have

dierent priorities, training andexpectations.

Group behaviour occurs among

those involved in an incident and in

Emergency Response teams.

There are varying levels o eective

leadership in command, control,

advice and coordination roles during

and ollowing an incident. Emergency

advice may come rom multiple

sources.




Develop training to improve the

eectiveness o Emergency Response

Teams.

Understand the impact o eective

leadership, communications and

coordination on the operational

eectiveness o Emergency Response

Teams.

Understand how the expectations othose aected by an incident will t

with the capabilities o Emergency

Response Teams.

Section 2

Key challenges

Section 2

Key challenges

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Ke challenges:Cross-cutting

ome challenges apply across more

han one o the CONTEST work-streams

nd may impact on all aspects o

ounter-terrorist work in the UK.

educing alse posities in our

ounter-terrorist work

he Challenge

Many activities and characteristics

terrorists are common to those

innocent members o the public.

Methods o detecting possible terrorist

ctivity can produce many alse alarms.

We need to nd ways to reduce them.

ommon eatures o the challenge:

The number o terrorists is very small

compared to the number o people who

pass through any security system.

There is a very high cost (human,

social and nancial) to the UK i a

genuine positive signal is missed

There is also a lower but still

substantial cost or each alse

positive to which we respond

Rapid expert judgements need

to be made repeatedly.




Develop ways to help security experts

and ront-line workers to understand

and improve their own judgements

and decision making

Reduce the number o alse positives

by improving our processes or the

detection o signicant signals

Reduce the impact o alse positives,

and the chance o missing a true

positive, by improving our processes

or investigating and reacting to

apparently signicant signals.

Counicating with the public,

stakeholders and counities

The Challenge:

Communicating with the public,

stakeholders and communities is a vital

part o our counter-terrorism work. Usedwell, communications can protect the

public rom terrorist attacks by keeping

them inormed and alert, aware o both

the threat we ace and the measures we

have in place to manage it.

Communications can deliver a clear and

persuasive statement o the reasons

or Government policy, in particular

around questions o balancing public

saety with the protection o individual

human rights.

Communications can also create

resilience to terrorist propaganda.

Eective communications o this kind

depend on an understanding o actors

which make violent extremism attractive

or protect communities and individuals

against it.

Dierent audiences can react in a

range o ways to the same message.

Understanding how messages should

be constructed and the eects theycan have are vital to Governments

continuing dialogue on counter-terrorism

with the public.


Delivering clear and consistent

messages which are also fexible

enough to reach multiple audiences

that hear the same message in

dierent ways

measuring and infuencing complexattitudes on counter-terrorism issues

across a wide range o audiences,

where these attitudes are privately

held and sensitive

Some o the populations we need to

understand better i we are to reach

them successully are small, dicult to

access and already heavily surveyed.




Develop robust ways to understand the

relationship between communications

and attitude and behaviour change,

and to measure the eect o counter-

terrorism communications in changing

attitudes or behaviour (or example

public understanding o Government

counter-terrorism policy or o levels

o threat, or community resistance

to radicalisation)

Understand the right (and wrong)audiences or communications aimed

at changing attitudes to violent

extremism

Understand the relative importance o

broadcast press, other media sources,

communities, groups and individuals

in communicating Government policy

relating to the CONTEST strategy or

shaping support or or resistance to

violent extremism.

Section 2

Key challenges

Section 2

Key challenges

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Section 2

Key challenges

nderstanding the econoic and social

pacts o terroris and counter-

erroris interentions

he Challenge:

alculating the wider impact o terrorist

vents is a complex problem as suchvents are low-probability and high-

mpact (also known as shocks). They

an cause signicant loss o lie. They

may also have nancial and social

mpacts resulting rom disruption and

amage to inrastructure, rom loss o

ondence and enorced change o

estyle and work patterns.

he aim o CONTEST, the Government

ounter-terrorist strategy, is to reduce

he risk to the UK and its interests

verseas rom international terrorism,

o that people can go about their lives

eely and with condence. But counter-

errorism policies inevitably also have

ome economic and social impact.

is essential that we understand

oth the eects o terrorism and

ounter-terrorism in order to develop

he best policies or addressing the

hreat we ace.

ommon eatures o the challenge:The risk rom terrorism is low-

probability but high-impact which

makes it dicult to compare to the

costs o tackling it.

A balance needs to be drawn

between measures intended to

preserve our right to security and

our rights to privacy.

People will experience and respond to

counter-terrorist measures in dierent

ways and have variable understanding

about them.

In common with many other policies,

counter-terrorist work will have

unintended consequences.How can industry and academia help?



Understand the cost o shocks

(low-probability, high-impact events),

and how society responds to them.

Understand the priorities people

attach to privacy and security.

Understand how people value

protection rom potential terrorist

attacks in dierent circumstances,

rom everyday commuting to attending

major events.

Understand how this changes with

any shit in public perception o the

likelihood and eect o a terrorist

attack.

Improve our estimates o cost-benet

ratios or individual policies.

Identiy the direct impact o counter-

terrorist measures and policies on

individuals and communities.Assess societal attitudes towards

counter-terrorism measures and

communications.

Understand how interventions

will eect the complex dynamics

o the social systems and predict

at least some o the unintended

consequences.

In this section we explain howacademia, industry and otherresearch organisations canengage with Government andother relevant bodies. We setout what we are doing to developour links with academia andindustry bodies engaged insocial and behavioural science.

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 2

Key challenges

18


19


12/19

SCT

he Oce or Security and Counter

errorism (OSCT) was set up as part

the Home Oce in March 2007. It

upports the development, direction,

mplementation and governance o

ONTEST. It also delivers those aspects CONTEST that all to the Home Oce.

n relation to science and technology,

cluding social and behavioural

cience, its role is to coordinate and

rect research and development

elevant to counter-terrorism. OSCT

eriodically releases open research

alls in counter-terrorism science and

uns the INSTINCT programme, which

ms to improve the Governments

bility to be an eective customer o

novation. The Science and Technology

eam in OSCT will help academics or

epresentatives rom industry access

he relevant department and provide

urther inormation about research calls

nd INSTINCT.

mail: [email protected]

m IN ACADEmIA OR INDUSTRy WITH ABRIGHT IDEA. WHO SHOULD I CONTACT?

CPNI

The Centre or the Protection o National

Inrastructure (CPNI) is the Government

body responsible or protective security

advice to owners and operators o the

UKs Critical National Inrastructure.

CPNI aims to ensure researchersunderstand security needs in order to

stimulate and give direction to uture

research eorts. CPNI will also identiy

existing research that relates to their

own research interests. CPNI works

directly with individuals and research

groups, supporting/unding council

activities and commissioning work

rom university consultancies.

www.cpni.gov.uk

mINISTRy OF DEFENCE CT CENTRE

With terrorist threats becoming

increasingly sophisticated and diverse,

science and technology is playing an

ever more important role in the planning,

preparation and prosecution o military

and security operations. The Counter-Terrorism Centre serves as a hub to

make the most o resources in the MOD.

While the primary objective o the Centre

is to ocus on MOD requirements, it can

also help other government departments

engaged in domestic counter-terrorism.

www.ctcentre.mod.uk

HOmE OFFICE SCIENTIFICDEvELOPmENT BRANCH

The Home Oce Scientic Development

Branch (HOSDB) is a core part o

the Home Oce that helps to apply

technology to reduce crime and counter

terrorism. It provides expert advice

and support to the Home Oce and its

partners on any issue relating to science

and technology, creating new and

innovative technical solutions.

HOSDB helps the Home Oce meet its

strategic objectives in policing, crime

reduction, counter-terrorism, border

security and identity management.

Examples o HOSDBs work include:

providing technical know-how to

improve video and CCTV operations.

developing techniques or identiying

and detecting chemical and biological

material.

developing techniques or ensuring

the physical saety o government and

other key buildings.

developing techniques or detecting

hidden weapons and explosives

evaluating methods o passenger

screening.

Although not directly involved in socialand behavioural science, HOSDBs work

oten touches upon this area, especially

as regards human actors.

scienceandresearch.homeoce.gov.uk/hosdb

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

20

Countering the terroristthreat: Social andBehaioural ScienceHow academia and industrycan play their part

21
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HE HOmE OFFICE SCIENCE ADvISORyOmmITTEE (HOSAC)

OSAC is the overarching scientic

dvisory committee at the Home

ce. Chaired jointly by the Permanent

ecretary and an independent member

the Committee, HOSACs membership

omprises individuals nominated by

earned societies rom both the social

nd physical sciences and the Chairs o

he other science advisory committees

the department. HOSAC currently has

everal sub-committees, including the

BRN advisory sub-committee and the

urveys, Design and Statistics sub-

ommittee. HOSAC annually advises on

he Home Oces science and research

ans and on a range o work across the

epartment. Last year the Committee

dvised on the Science and Technology

trategy or Countering International

errorism.

THE GOvERNmENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE

The Government Oce or Science

(GO-Science) is led by the Government

Chie Scientic Adviser (GCSA).

GO-Science works to ensure that

Government policy and decision making

is underpinned by robust science andengineering evidence and long term

thinking. The GCSA reports to the Prime

Minister and Cabinet and works with all

Government departments. GO-Science

also supports the community o Chie

Scientic Advisers (CSAs) across

Government. There is a CSA in all major

science-using departments and they are

responsible or the quality o science

advice in their area. This includes

seeking independent advice on scientic

and ethical issues. CSAs have a mix o

expert backgrounds, including natural

science, engineering and social science.

SOCIAL AND BEHAvIOURAL SCIENCE INGOvERNmENT

There are our umbrella bodies within

Government that oversee work in social

and behavioural science:

The Goernent Social Research

Serice (GSR) provides governmentwith objective, reliable, relevant and

timely social research. It also supports

the development, implementation,

review and evaluation o policy and

delivery and ensures policy debate is

inormed by the best research evidence

and thinking rom the social sciences 10.

The Goernent Statistical Serice

(GSS) is a decentralised community

which is spread across most

Government Departments, the Oce

or National Statistics and the devolved

administrations in Scotland and

Wales. The primary unction o GSS

is to collect, analyse and disseminate

ocial statistics11.

The Goernent Econoic Serice

(GES) is a similar community covering

economists working in Government12.

The Goernent Operational Research

Serice (GORS) is a community o

operational researchers which seeks

to maximise the benets Departmentsobtain rom deploying OR skills in the

design, implementation and evaluation

o their policies and strategies13.

Associated with the above umbrella

bodies are proessional social and

behavioural scientists, who are

embedded in departments across

Government, and who specialise in

counter-terrorism research. These

scientists work collectively to enhance

the evidence base or CONTEST and to

improve the delivery o the CONTEST

strategy.

HOmE OFFICES SCIENTISTS ANDRESEARCHERS

The Home Oce has skilled specialist

sta including social researchers,

statisticians, economists, operational

researchers, engineers, physical

scientists and veterinarians who provide

support or all aspects o the Home

Oces remit.

Home Oce scientists and researchers

provide objective, scientic advice to

help evidence-based policy decisions

and support the delivery o our policies.

This includes high quality economic

analysis and operational research to

understand the costs and benets o

Home Oce policies and initiatives.

In addition, our scientists have two

important unctions regulating the use

and practice o science through the role

o the Forensic Science Regulator and

implementing the Animals (Scientic)

Procedures Act 1986.

The Home Oce carries out its own

research and uses external academic

review to ensure quality is maintained.

Many o the departments social

researchers are embedded in policy

directorates and agencies to promote

close collaborative working with policy

teams.

HOW DOES THE GOvERNmENTGAIN SCIENTIFIC ADvICE ONCOUNTER-TERRORISm?

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

22


23


14/19

HOW IS THE GOvERNmENT COmmUNICATINGWITH ACADEmIA?

ESEARCH COUNCILS

he Research Councils are an important

oute or Government to access the

ider research community that we

eed to deliver the science we require.

overnment has, or some time, had

ery productive relationships with aumber o Research Councils. We also

ave a long-standing concordat with the

conomic and Social Research Council

ESRC) and have recently put in place a

oncordat with the Arts and Humanities

esearch Council (AHRC) to ormalise

hese relationships.

We work with the Research Councils to

vestigate areas o common interest

both research and regulatory roles

hrough, or example, providing expertise

o contribute to research programmes or

hrough joint unding programmes.

esearch Councils UK (RCUK) is a

artnership between the seven

K research councils (RCs). RCUK

oordinates the delivery o multi-

sciplinary research in six priority areas.

One o these is Global uncertainties:

security or all in a changing world.

The RCs will work together to address

ve interrelated global threats to

security Poverty (and Inequality and

Injustice), Confict, Transnational Crime,

Environmental Stress and Terrorism.RCUKs mission is to optimise the ways

that Research Councils work together

to deliver their goals, to enhance the

overall perormance and impact o

UK research, training and knowledge

transer and to be recognised by

academia, business and government or

excellence in research sponsorship. 14

Councils within RCUK that undertake

social and behavioural research include:

The Econoic and Social Research

Council (ESRC), which is the UKs

primary research council or unding

economic and social science

research. The ESRC strategic plan or2009-2014 identies security, confict

and justice as an area o particular

challenge in the social sciences.

As their plan states The challenge

is about understanding the causes

o insecurity, including criminal and

terrorist activity, and developing

eective means or promoting

security, addressing vulnerabilities and

encouraging resilience. Research will

explore the contemporary drivers o

insecurity; why competition sometimes

develops into violent confict; the

nature o contemporary conficts, how

they might be resolved and the eects

mitigated; and how social injustice

perpetuates insecurities. It explores

how notions o sel, community rights,

ethics and competing ideas o justice

can be incorporated into new ways

o predicting, managing and avoiding

insecurity.15

Previous work by ESRC has included

work with AHRC (see below) and

the FCO to better understand

radicalisation and violence, and

research into new security challenges

including confict in cities, the

globalisation o private security, the

role o military orce in the security

o civil society, and psychological

dimensions o human security. Future

work will include work on the causes o

non-violent versus violent responses

to social injustice and improving

resilience in communities.

http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInoCentre/index.

aspx

The Arts and Huanities Research

Council (AHRC), which unds research

to improve understanding o humanculture and creativity. Previous

programmes have included work

to understand how individuals and

communities develop their ideas and

belies about security and insecurity,

why some ideas and belies lead to

confict, violence or criminal activity,

and whether there is an acceptable

balance between national security

and the protection o civil liberties

and human rights.

http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/Pages/deault.aspx

The medical Research Council (mRC),

which promotes research into all areas

o medical and related science with

the aims o improving the health and

quality o lie o the UK public and

contributing to the wealth o the nation.

http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index.htm

Although these are the primary research

councils concerned with social and

behavioural science, human sciences

cross into the work o all the Research

Councils in the UK. The remaining

RCs are:

Biotechnology and Biological Sciences

Research Council (BBSRC).

Engineering and Physical Sciences

Research Council (EPSRC).

Natural Environment Research Council

(NERC).

Science and Technology Facilities

Council (STFC).

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

24


25
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AURIL

AURIL is the Association or University

Research and Industry Links.

Organised by university sta, its

membership comprises around 1,400

academics, nearly 100 universities,

and other research establishments andcompanies. We use AURIL as one route

to the research base in UK universities.

We encourage researchers who would

like to contribute to counter-terrorism

research to join AURIL.

www.auril.org.uk

K ACADEmIC INSTITUTIONS

he UKs universities are renowned or

orld-class research, and so have an

mportant role to play in developing the

ocial and behavioural understanding

e need to protect the UK. In addition

o working through the researchouncils, we are keen to engage directly

ith universities and other research

stablishments to ensure that we are

making the best use o research in

he UK. We use a variety o inormal

nd ormal contacts to achieve this,

cluding academic liaison, networking

t conerences, issuing ormal contracts

or research work, open research calls

nd exploring opportunities or joint

orking on specic projects.

he Government has links with many

cademic institutions in the UK. These

stitutions have a large amount o

xpertise, particularly in social and

ehavioural science. Over the last ew

ears several have ounded institutes

pecically concerned with security and

ounter-terrorism and we will continue

o work with these organisations.

UNICO

Unico is the UKs leading representative

body o proessionals realising the

potential o university and public sector

research through commercialisation.

It provides a orum or the exchange

o best practice in knowledge transerthrough conerences and other events.

Its membership includes over 90

universities and other public sector

research organisations.

http://www.unico.org.uk/

THE LEARNED SOCIETIES

We will continue to work closely with the

relevant learned societies, working with

them on matters o mutual interest and

prioritising research. The Royal Society

has taken a positive interest in counter-

terrorism issues and we have workedclosely with them. With respect to social

and behavioural sciences we will work

with the British Academy, the Academy

o Social Sciences and other social

science learned societies.

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

26


27


16/19

HOW IS GOvERNmENT COmmUNICATINGWITH INDUSTRy?

SCT works with industr through

ariet o routes including trade

ssociations, ehibitions, industr

ries and the Technolog Strateg

oard. In counter-terroris, our ain

oute to industr is through RISC.

RISC THE UK SECURITy AND RESILIENCEINDUSTRy SUPPLIERS COmmUNITy

RISC provides a ocal point or the

Government to communicate with

industry about its counter-terrorism

needs. RISC is an alliance o suppliers,

trade associations and academics,

representing over 2,000 companies

ranging rom prime contractors and

global leaders through to small and

medium enterprises and start-ups.

The trade associations are:

A|D|S, the trade body advancing UK

AeroSpace, Deence and Security

industries ormed rom the merger o

the Association o Police and Public

Security Suppliers (APPSS), the

Deence Manuacturers Association

(DMA) and the Society o British

Aerospace Companies (SBAC).

the British Security Industry

Association (BSIA).

Intellect (the UK trade association

or the technology industry).

We will continue to work with industry

and academia through other routes.

These will include industry liaison,

responding to enquiries, networking at

conerences, exhibitions and eventsand through exploring opportunities

in existing science and technology

projects.

http://www.riscuk.org/

US DEPARTmENT OF HOmELAND SECURITy

The Department o Homeland Security

works to secure the United States

against threats. This includes counter-

terrorism, border security, immigration,

and disaster response.

The department has a Human FactorsBehavioural Science Projects section o

its science and technology work. These

projects develop and apply the social,

behavioural, and physical sciences to

improve identication and analysis o

threats, to enhance societal resilience,

and to integrate human capabilities into

the development o technology.

The UK Government is working with the

DHS on some o these projects and

more inormation can be ound on the

DHS website.

http://www.dhs.gov/les/programs/

gc_1218480185439.shtm

WHERE CAN I LOOK INTERNATIONALLy FORINFORmATION AND FUNDING?

US NATIONAL CONSORTIUm ON THE STUDyOF TERRORISm AND THE RESPONSES TOTERRORISm (START)

START is a US Department o Homeland

Security centre o excellence based at

the University o Maryland. It uses state-

o-the-art theories, methods, and data

rom social and behavioural science toimprove understanding o the origins,

dynamics, and social and psychological

impacts o terrorism.

START conducts cutting-edge research

related to the terrorist threat and

includes the ull range o disciplines

within social and behavioural science,

including sociology, criminology,

political science, psychology,

communication, geography, economics,

and anthropology. The work also

includes experts in public policy, history,

public health, oreign languages, and

engineering. The research team provides

the homeland-security community and

the public with insights about how and

why terrorist groups orm, about the

decisions and behaviours o individual

terrorists and terrorist groups, and

about how societies can best respond

to and prepare or terrorist threats.

http://www.start.umd.edu/start/

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

28


29
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1218480185439.shtmhttp://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1218480185439.shtmhttp://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1218480185439.shtm


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U RESEARCH FUNDING

he EU invests in several research

rogrammes in security and resilience.

hese include:

Framework Programme 7 (FP7):

http://ec.europa.eu/research/p7/index_

en.cm?pg=security

European Security Research and

Innovation Forum (ESRIF):

www.esri.eu

the European Justice Research Area:

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unding/

intro/unding_intro_en.htm

European Technology Platorms (ETPs):

http://cordis.europa.eu/technology-platorms

EU: FRAmEWORK PROGRAmmE 7

O the above EU research programmes,

FP7 has in the past awarded most

unding to UK organisations. Security is

one o the ten themes o FP7.

The Security theme will award 1.4

billion or the seven year period2006-2013 or research related to a set

o security topics dened by the EU. The

topics are usually announced ormally

in July, inviting responses by November.

Most bids are rom consortia;

consortium members may come rom

the private sector, the public sector or

academia.

The bids submitted in 2008 led to the

provisional award o around 14 million

to UK organisations.

The UK Government contributes to the

debate that leads to the selection o

topics, but plays no part in determining

which proposals are selected or

unding. We encourage you to

participate in bidding or this unding.

http://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/

science_and_innovation/eu_ramework_

programme

cordis.europa.eu/p7

We have set out in this booklet the wide range o challenges that social and

behavioural science can address. I you are in academia or industry and are working

in this area or have the potential to support our securit y and counter-terrorism work,

we want to hear rom you.

I you are unsure about which is the best department or body or you to contact in the

rst instance, please get in touch with the CONTEST Science and Technology Unit inthe OSCT. We will be happy to advise you

Email: [email protected]

WHAT SHOULD I DO NExT?

Section 3

How to get involved

Section 3

How to get involved

30


31
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=securityhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=securityhttp://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/funding_intro_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/funding_intro_en.htmhttp://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/science_and_innovation/eu_framework_programmehttp://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/science_and_innovation/eu_framework_programmehttp://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/science_and_innovation/eu_framework_programmehttp://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/dc/index.cfmhttp://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/dc/index.cfmhttp://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/science_and_innovation/eu_framework_programmehttp://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/funding_intro_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=security


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www.cabinetoce.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspx1

security.homeoce.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy2

http://security.homeoce.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/Science-3

Technology-strategy/index.html

http://security.homeoce.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/Science-4

Tech-Booklet/index.html

http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInoCentre/what_is_soc_sci/5

http://www.berr.gov.uk/les/le41318.pd6

security.homeoce.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy Section 5.07



http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/my-civil-service/networks/proessional/gsr/index.aspx10

http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/ns-standard/roles/gss/index.html11

http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/my-civil-service/networks/proessional/ges/index2.aspx12

http://www.operational-research.gov.uk/recruitment13

http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/aboutrcuk/org/deault.htm14

http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/15

securityandconfict.aspx

End notes

32 33

bbreiation meaning

|D|S Aerospace Deence and Security

HRC Arts and Humanities Research Council

PPSS Association o Police and Public Security Suppliers

URIL Association or University Research and Industry Links

BSRC Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council

SIA British Security Industry AssociationBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

ONTEST The United Kingdoms Strategy or Countering International Terrorism

PNI Centre or the Protection o National Inrastructure

SA Chie Scientic Adviser

T Counter-Terrorism

HS Department o Homeland Security

MA Deence Manuacturers Association

PSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

SRC Economic and Social Research Council

SRIF European Security Research and Innovation Forum

TP European Technology Platorm

U European Union

P7 Framework Programme 7 (an EU programme)

CSA Government Chie Scientic Adviser

ES Government Economic Service

ORS Government Operational Research Service

O-Science Government Oce or Science

SR Government Social Research Service

SS Government Statistical Service

OSAC Home Oce Science Advisory Committee

OSDB Home Oce Scientic Development Branch

NSTINCT INnovative Science and Technology IN Counter-Terrorism

MOD Ministry o DeenceMRC Medical Research Council

ERC Natural Environment Research Council

SCT Oce or Security and Counter-Terrorism

C Research Council

CUK Research Councils UK

ISC UK UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Community

BAC Society o British Aerospace Companies

TART US National Consortium on the Study o Terrorism and the

Responses to Terrorism

TFC Science and Technology Facilities Council

Glossar End notes

Glossar
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspxhttp://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspxhttp://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/securityandconflict.aspxhttp://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/securityandconflict.aspxhttp://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/securityandconflict.aspxhttp://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/securityandconflict.aspxhttp://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspx


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Crown copyright

Produced by the Oce or Security

and Counter-Terrorism, a Directorate

o the Home Oce, March 2010

ISBN

978-1-84987-195-2

social and behavioural science - how academia & industry can play their part

Documents