PRAISEFORSOCCERNOMICS“Soccernomicsisthemostintelligentbookeverwrittenaboutsoccer.” —SanFranciscoChronicle

“Manyexplanations[ofEngland’spoorform]canbefoundinthebookSoccernomicsinasegmententitled‘WhyEnglandLoses.’(ThisiswellworthareadforanyEnglishfootballfan; essentially, you overvalue your football heritage and undervalue the benefits ofinnovation.)” —StephenJ.Dubner,co-authorofFreakonomics

“Fascinating.” —VanityFair.com

“Theauthorstakewhat‘everybody’knowsaboutsuccessandfailureinsoccerandsubjectittorigorousempiricalanalysisembeddedingoodstoriesthatcarrythenarrativealong….Highlyrecommended.Allreaders.” —Choice

“It’s a reallygoodbook. Ifmorepeople read it, they’dunderstand someof the reasonswhy England [doesn’t] win. Everyone can have an opinion, but they back it up withstats.” —JamieCarragher,LiverpoolF.C.

“Soccernomics [is] a sharplywritten and provocative examination of theworld’s gameseenthroughtheprismofeconomicsandstatisticaldata.Itdemolishesalmosteverythingthatmostsoccer fansbelieveabout thegameandhowprofessionalsoccer teamsshouldoperate.” —GlobeandMail(Canada)

“Oh,Rooney’s thebest. [Myson]Benthinks thatEnglandmightbe in the topfour,butthat’s it.Heknows the starting lineupof everyEuropean team.We’re reading thisveryinteresting book about [soccer] together.” —LorrieMoore, author ofAGate at theStairsandBirdsofAmerica

“With Soccernomics, the Financial Times’ indispensable Simon Kuper and top-flightsports economist Stefan Szymanski bring scrupulous economic analysis and statisticalrigor to a sport long dependent on hoary—and, it seems, unfounded—assumptions… .Grippingandessential.” —Slate.com,BestBooksof2009

“[The book] is a sporting tale in theFreakonomics mode of inquiry, using statistics tocomeupwithfascinatingconclusions.” —Independent(UK),BestBooksof2009

“[SzymanskiandKuper]entertaininglydemolishsoccershibboleths….Wellarguedandclearheaded.” —FinancialTimes,BestBooksof2009

“Usingdataanalysis,historyandpsychology,[Soccernomics]puncturesdozensofclichésabout what it takes to win, and who makes money in soccer—and in sports ingeneral.” —AssociatedPress“There just aren’t that many interesting, intelligent, analytical books about the world’smostpopulargame,butthisisone.” —Blogcritics

“Amustreadforanyfanofthebusinessofsoccer….” —Footiebusiness.com

“Soccernomics…tacklesthesoccerworld’smostprobingquestionswithadispassionate

analysis based on economic formulas, which separate fact from accepted-as-factmythsperpetuatedbylegionsoffans.”—Forbes.com

“It’squiteabook….SoccernomicsexplainshowthelessonsofMoneyball(sportsteamsarenotcompletelyrational)applytotheworld’sfavoritesport.” —HuffingtonPost

“[KuperandSzymanski]doforsoccerwhatMoneyballdidforbaseball.Itputsthegameunderananalyticalmicroscopeusingstatistics,economics,psychologyandintuitiontotrytotransformadogmaticsport.” —NewYorkTimes

“It’s a fascinating book with the potential to effect genuine change in thesport.” —Booklist(starred)

“Smallbook,bigwallop!…Enthusiasticallyrecommendedtoallsoccerfans,generalandspecialized,aswellasthosethinkingofbecomingone.” —LibraryJournal

“[KuperandSzymanski]havecreatedablendofFreakonomicsandFeverPitch,bringingsurprisingeconomicanalysis tobearon theworld’smostpopular sport… .Thismixofeconomic analysis and anecdote makes for a thought-provoking, often amusing read.Here, at last, is a British answer to Michael Lewis’s baseball-meets-cash bestsellerMoneyball.” —BloombergNews

“[Kuper and Szymanski] combine their skills to entertaining and mostly convincingeffect.” —Economist

“Ifyou’reafootballfan,I’llsaveyousometime:readthisbook…compulsivereading…thoroughlyconvincing.” —DailyTelegraph(UK)

“Szymanski has recently published the best introduction to sports economics…whileKuper is probably the smartest of the new generation of super-smart sportswriters …fascinatingstories.” —Observer(UK)

“[Kuper andSzymanski]basically trash every cliché about football youeverheld tobetrue.It’sbravurastuff…thestudyofmanagersbuyingplayersandbuildingaclubisoneyou’llfeellikephotocopyingandsendingtoyourteam’schairman….” —Metro(UK)

“More thoughtful than most of its rivals and, by football standards, positivelyintellectual… . Kuper, a brilliantly contrary columnist, and Szymanski, an economicsprofessor…findplentyoffertileterritoryintheircommendabledeterminationtooverturnthelazypreconceptionsrifeinfootball.” —TheTimes(UK)

“Kuper and Szymanski are … a highly effective and scrupulously rational team,combiningtheformer’sdetailedandnuancedunderstandingofEuropeanfootballwiththelatter’s sophisticated econometric analysis. With a remarkable lightness of touch, theydemonstratethelimitsofconventionalthinkinginfootball,aswellastherealpatternsofbehaviourthatshapesportingoutcomes.” —Prospect(UK)

“Booksabout sport are abit likeplayers—someareprettydreadful,most are about thesamestandardandsodon’treallystandout,andoccasionallyonecomesalongthatexcelstothepointthattheychangethewayyouwatchandthinkaboutthegame.SoccernomicsbySimonKuperandStefanSzymanskiissuchabook….AnyfanoftheSoccerooswho

readsSoccernomicsorindeedanysportsfanreadytotakeonboardnewwaysofthinkingmight, likeme,never lookatapenaltykickora leaguetableandcertainlynotfollowamajor international tournament quite the same way again.” —Peter Newlinds,ABCNews(Australia)

“Should still be compulsory reading for all poor suffering England fans.” —JimO’Neill,FormerChairmanofGoldmanSachsAssetManagement

SOCCERNOMICS

ALSOBYSIMONKUPER

RetourtjesNederland(Atlas,2006)

SoccerAgainsttheEnemy(NationBooks,2006)

SoccerMen:ProfilesoftheRogues,Geniuses,andNeuroticsWhoDominatetheWorld’sMostPopularSport(NationBooks,2011)

Ajax,theDutch,theWar:TheStrangeTaleofSoccerDuringEurope’sDarkestHour(NationBooks,2012)

ALSOBYSTEFANSZYMANSKI

FansoftheWorld,Unite!ACapitalistManifestoforSportsConsumers(withStephenF.Ross;StanfordUniversityPress,2008)

Ilbusinessdelcalcio(withUmbertoLagoandAlessandroBaroncelli;Egea,2004)

NationalPastime:HowAmericansPlayBaseballandtheRestoftheWorldPlaysSoccer(withAndrewZimbalist;BrookingsInstitution,2005)

PlaybooksandCheckbooks:AnIntroductiontotheEconomicsofModernSports(PrincetonUniversityPress,2009)

WinnersandLosers:TheBusinessStrategyofFootball(withTimKuypers;VikingBooks,1999;PenguinBooks,2000)

BOOKSEDITED:

HandbookontheEconomicsofSport(withWladimirAndreff;EdwardElgar,2006)

TransatlanticSports:TheComparativeEconomicsofNorthAmericanandEuropeanSports(withCarlosBarrosandMuradIbrahim;EdwardElgar,2002)

Copyright©2014bySimonKuperandStefanSzymanski

PublishedbyNationBooks,AMemberofthePerseusBooksGroup

116East16thStreet,8thFloor

NewYork,NY10003

NationBooksisaco-publishingventureoftheNationInstituteandthePerseusBooksGroup.

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermissionexceptinthecaseofbriefquotationsembodiedincriticalarticlesandreviews.Forinformation,addressthePerseusBooksGroup,250West57thStreet,15thFloor,NewYork,NY10107.

BookspublishedbyNationBooksareavailableatspecialdiscountsforbulkpurchasesintheUnitedStatesbycorporations,institutions,andotherorganizations.Formoreinformation,pleasecontacttheSpecialMarketsDepartmentatthePerseusBooksGroup,2300ChestnutStreet,Suite200,Philadelphia,PA19103,orcall(800)255-1514,ore-mailspecial.markets@perseusbooks.com.

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

Kuper,Simon.

Soccernomics:whyEnglandloses,whyGermanyandBrazilwin,andwhytheU.S.,Japan,Australia,TurkeyandevenIndiaaredestinedtobecomethekingsoftheworld’smostpopularsport/SimonKuperandStefanSzymanski.—Thirdediton.

p.cm.

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.

ISBN978-1-56858-480-5(e-book)

1.Soccer—Socialaspects.I.Szymanski,Stefan.II.Title.

GV943.9.S64K882014

796.334—dc23

2014005100

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

FromSimon:

ToPamela

(whodoesn’tknowaboutsoccer,

butknowsaboutwriting)forherastonishingtolerance.

Andto

Leila,Leo,andJoey,

forallthesmiles.

FromStefan:

Tomyfather.

Weneversaweyetoeye,

buthetaughtmetoquestioneverything.

CONTENTS1 DrivingwithaDashboard:InSearchofNewTruthsAboutSoccer

PARTI TheClubsRacism,Stupidity,BadTransfers,CapitalCities,

theMirageoftheNFL,andWhatActuallyHappenedinThatPenaltyShoot-OutinMoscow

2 GentlemenPreferBlonds:HowtoAvoidSillyMistakesintheTransferMarket

3 TheWorstBusinessintheWorld:WhySoccerClubsDon’t(andShouldn’t)MakeMoney

4 SaferThantheBankofEngland:WhySoccerClubsAlmostNeverDisappear

5 InPraiseofSugarDaddies:Why“FinancialFairPlay”IsBadforSoccer

6 NeedNotApply:DoesEnglishSoccerDiscriminateAgainstBlackPeople?

7 DoCoachesMatter?TheCultoftheWhiteManager

8 TheEconomist’sFearofthePenaltyKick:ArePenaltiesCosmicallyUnfair,orOnlyIfYouAreNicolasAnelka?

9 TheSecretofClaudeMakelele:How“MatchData”AreChangingtheGameontheField

10 TheSuburbanNewsagents:CitySizesandSoccerPrizes

11 FootballVersusFootball

PARTII TheFansLoyalty,Suicides,Happiness,andtheCountrywith

theBestSupporters

12 TheCountryThatLovesSoccerMost

13 AreSoccerFansPolygamists?ACritiqueoftheNickHornbyModelofFandom

14 AFan’sSuicideNotes:DoPeopleJumpOffBuildingsWhenTheir

TeamsLose?

15 Happiness:WhyHostingaWorldCupIsGoodforYou

PARTIII CountriesRichandPoor,TomThumb,GuusGhiddink,

England,Spain,Saddam,andtheChampionsoftheFuture

16 WhyEnglandLosesandOthersWin

17 TheCurseofPoverty:WhyPoorCountriesArePooratSports

18 TomThumb:TheBestLittleSoccerCountryonEarth

19 MadeinAmsterdam:TheRiseofSpainandtheTriumphofEuropeanKnowledgeNetworks

20 CoretoPeriphery:TheFutureMapofGlobalSoccer

21 Afterword:TheBestofTimes

Acknowledgments

NotefromtheAuthors

SelectBibliography

Index

1DRIVINGWITHADASHBOARDInSearchofNewTruthsAboutSoccer

A fewyears ago, the data department atManchesterCity carried out a study of cornerkicks.Cityhadn’tbeenscoringmuchfromcorners,andtheanalystswantedtofindoutthebest way to take them. They watched more than four hundred corners, from differentleagues, over several seasons, and concluded: the most dangerous corner was theinswingertothenearpost.

The beauty of the inswingerwas that it sent the ball straight into the danger zone.Sometimes an attackerwould get a head or foot to it and divert it in from point-blankrange.Sometimesthekeeperoradefenderstoppedtheinswingerontheline,whereuponsomeonebasheditin.Andoccasionallytheballjustswungstraightinfromthecorner.Allinall,theanalystsfound,inswingersproducedmoregoalsthanoutswingers.

Theytooktheirfindingstotheclub’sthenmanager,RobertoMancini,wholikealmostallmanagers isanex-player.Heheard themoutpolitely.Thenhesaid,moreor less:“Iwasaplayerformanyyears,andI justknow that theoutswinger ismoreeffective.”Hewaswrong,butwecanunderstandwhyhemadethemistake:outswingerstendtocreatebeautiful goals (ball swings out, playermeets itwith powerful header, ball crashes intonet) and beautiful goals stick in the memory. The messy goals generally produced byinswingersdon’t.

It’s a story that captureswhere soccer is today.On the one hand, theMarch of theGeeks has advanced fast since we first published Soccernomics in 2009. Soccer isbecomingmoreintelligent.Theanalystswhonowcrunch“matchdata”atalmostallbigEuropeanclubs(andatmanysmallerones)arejustonesymptomoftheshift.

Today’splugged-inclubsknowstats like“passcompletion rates in the final thirdofthe field,” kilometers run in each phase of the game, and pace of sprints for all theirplayers.Thesenumbers increasingly informdecisionsonwhichplayers tobuyandsell.SigiSchmid,coachof theSeattleSounders,says thatbeforeSeattle’sexpansiondraft in2008,theclub’sexecutivesheadeddowntotheMatchAnalysiscompanyinEmeryvilleinNorthernCalifornia to study players’ statistics.MatchAnalysis’s numbers helped guidethe club’s choices. Schmid thinks that is why Seattle’s expansion draft was moresuccessfulthanPortland’sorVancouver’s.

On the other hand, as Mancini’s certainty about corner kicks shows, there is stillwidespreadsuspicionofnumbersinsoccer.JohnCoulsonofthedataproviderOptatoldus,“Therearestillmaybealotofteamsthatviewdataasathreatratherthanasatool.”Baseball has had its “Moneyball” revolution, but in soccer, the transformation has onlyjustbegun.Thisnew,updated,expandededitionofSoccernomics—Soccernomics3.0,aswe think of it—uses data to clarify thinking on topics ranging from tackles through

transferstotheriseofSpain.

Soccernomics began in the Hilton in Istanbul one winter’s day in 2007. From theoutsidethehotelissquatandbrutalist,butoncethesecuritymenhavecheckedyourcarforbombsandwavedyou through, theplace issosoothingyouneverwant togohomeagain.Havingescapedthe14million–personcity,theonlystressisoverwhattodonext:aTurkish bath, a game of tennis, or yet more overeating while the sun sets over theBosporus?Foraficionados, therewasalsoaperfectviewoftheBesiktassoccerstadiumright next door.And the staffwere so friendly, theywere even friendlier than ordinaryTurkishpeople.

The two authors of this book, Stefan Szymanski (a sports economist) and SimonKuper (a journalist), met here. Fenerbahce soccer club was marking its centenary bystaging the“100thYearSportsandScienceCongress”andhadflownusboth in togivetalks.

Over beers in the Hilton bar we found that we thought much the same way aboutsoccer.Stefanasaneconomististrainedtotorturethedatauntiltheyconfess,whileSimonas a journalist tends to go around interviewing people, but those are just surfacedifferences. We both think that much in soccer can be explained, even predicted, bystudyingdata—especiallydatafoundoutsidesoccer.

Untilveryrecently,soccerhadescaped theEnlightenment.Soccerclubsarestill runmostlybypeoplewhodowhattheydobecausetheyhavealwaysdoneitthatway.Thesepeople used to “know” that black players “lacked bottle,” and they therefore overpaidmediocrewhiteplayers.Todaytheydiscriminateagainstblackmanagers,buythewrongplayers, and then let those players take corners and penalties thewrongway. (We can,incidentally,explainwhyManchesterUnitedwonthepenaltyshoot-outintheChampionsLeaguefinalin2008.It’sastoryinvolvingasecretnote,aBasqueeconomist,andEdwinvanderSar’spowersofdetection.)

Entrepreneurs who dip into soccer also keepmaking the samemistakes. They buyclubspromisingtorunthem“likeabusiness”anddisappearafewseasonslateramidthesamepublicderisionasthepreviousowners.“Iscrewedup,”TonyFernandes,chairmanof Queens Park Rangers, told us. Fans and journalists aren’t blameless, either. Manynewspaper headlines rest on false premises: “Sunderland Lands World Cup Star” or“World Cup Will Be Economic Bonanza.” The game is full of unexamined clichés:“Soccerisbecomingboringbecausethebigclubsalwayswin,”“Soccerisbigbusiness,”andperhapsthegreatestmythintheEnglishgame,“TheEnglandteamshoulddobetter.”Noneoftheseshibbolethshasbeentestedagainstthedata.

Most male team sports have long been pervaded by the same overreliance ontraditionalbeliefs.Baseball,too,wasuntilquiterecentlyanoldgamestuffedwitholdlore.Sincetimeimmemorial,playershadstolenbases,hitsacrificebunts,andbeenjudgedontheirbattingaverages.Everyoneinbaseballjustknewthatallthiswasright.

ButthatwasbeforeBillJames.LikeDorothyinTheWizardofOz,Jamescamefromrural Kansas. He hadn’t donemuch in life beyond keeping the stats in the local Little

Leagueandwatchingthefurnacesinapork-and-beansfactory.However,inhissparetimehe had begun to study baseball statisticswith a fresh eye and discovered that “a greatportion of the sport’s traditional knowledge is ridiculous hokum.” James wrote that hewanted toapproach thesubjectofbaseball“with thesamekindof intellectual rigoranddiscipline that is routinely applied,by scientistsgreat andpoor, to trying tounravel themysteriesoftheuniverse,ofsociety,ofthehumanmind,orofthepriceofburlapinDesMoines.”

In self-published mimeographs masquerading as books, the first of which soldseventy-fivecopies,Jamesbegandemolishingthegame’smyths.Hefound,forinstance,that the most important statistic in batting was the rarely mentioned “on-basepercentage”—how often a player manages to get on base. James and his followers(statisticiansofbaseballwhocametobeknownassabermetricians)showedthatgoodoldsacrificebuntsandbasestealingwereterriblestrategies.

HisannualBaseballAbstractsturnedintorealbooks;eventuallytheyreachedthebest-sellerlists.Oneyearthecoverpictureshowedanape,posedasRodin’sThinker,studyingabaseball.AsJameswroteinoneAbstract,“Thisisoutsidebaseball.Thisisabookaboutwhatbaseballlookslikeifyoustepbackfromitandstudyitintenselyandminutely,butfromadistance.”

SomeJamesiansstartedtopenetrateprofessionalbaseball.Oneofthem,BillyBeane,generalmanager of the littleOaklandA’s, is the heroofMichaelLewis’s earth-movingbookMoneyball and the film starring Brad Pitt. In recent years Beane, like so manyAmericans, has become a soccer nut. He spends a lot of time thinking about how hisinsightsintobaseballmightapplytotheverydifferentsportplayedontheothersideoftheworld.(We’llsaymorelateraboutBeane’sbrilliantgamingofbaseball’stransfermarketanditslessonsforsoccer.)

For several seasons Beane’s Oakland A’s did so well using Jamesian ideas thateventually even people inside baseball began to get curious about James. In 2002 theBostonRedSoxappointedJames“seniorbaseballoperationsadviser.”ThatsameyeartheRed Sox hired one of his followers, the twenty-eight-year-old Theo Epstein, as theyoungest generalmanager in thehistoryof themajor leagues. (Beanehad saidyes andthen no to the job.) The “cursed” club quickly won two World Series. Today largestatisticaldepartmentsarethenormatMajorLeagueBaseballclubs.

NowsoccerisembarkingonitsownJamesianrevolution.

ANUMBERSGAME

It’sstrangethatsocceralwaysusedtobesoaversetostudyingdata,becauseonethingthatattractsmanyfanstothegameispreciselyaloveofnumbers.

The man to ask about that is Alex Bellos. He wrote the magnificentFutebol: TheBrazilianWay of Life, but his book aboutmath,Here’s Looking at Euclid, appeared in2010.“Numbersareincrediblysatisfying,”Bellostellsus.“Theworldhasnoorder,andmathisawayofseeingitinanorder.Leaguetableshaveanorder.Andthecalculationsyouneedtodoforthemaresosimple:it’snothingmorethanyourthree-timestable.”

Thoughmostfanswouldprobablydenyit,aloveofsoccerisoftenintertwinedwithalove of numbers. There are thematch results, the famous dates, and the special joy ofsitting in a café with the newspaper on a Sunday morning “reading” the league table.Fantasysoccerleaguesare,atbottom,numbersgames.

Inthisbookwewanttointroducenewnumbersandnewideastosoccer:numbersonsuicides,onwagespending,oncountries’populations,onpassesandsprints,onanythingthathelpstorevealnewtruthsaboutthegame.ThoughStefanisasportseconomist,thisisnot a book about money. The point of soccer clubs is not to turn a profit (which isfortunate,asalmostnoneofthemdo),norareweparticularlyinterestedinanyprofitstheyhappen tomake. Rather, wewant to use an economist’s skills (plus a little geography,psychology,andsociology)tounderstandthegameonthefield,andthefansoffit.

Some people may not want their emotional relationship with soccer sullied by ourrationalcalculations.Ontheotherhand,thenexttimetheirteamlosesapenaltyshoot-outinaWorldCupquarterfinalthesesamepeoplewillprobablybethrowingtheirbeerglassesat the TV, when instead they could be tempering their disappointment with somereflectionsonthenatureofbinomialprobabilitytheory.

Wethinkit’sagoodtimetoberewritingthisbook.Theworldhasenteredtheeraof“bigdata.”Thephrasedescribes theunprecedentedmountainof informationthat isnowcollectedeveryday.ThisinformationcomesmostlyfromtheInternet(frominnumerablesearch terms, Facebook pages, and e-mails) and from sensors that are attached to evermore physical objects—among them, soccer players during training sessions. By oneestimate,thedailyamountofdatageneratedworldwidedoublesapproximatelyeveryfortymonths.

Bigdatahasreachedsoccertoo.Forthefirsttimeinthesport’shistory,therearealotofnumbers tomine.Traditionally theonlydata thatexisted in thegameweregoalsandleaguetables.(Newspaperspublishedattendancefigures,butthesewereunreliable.)Nowclubsareceasingtorelyongutalone.IncreasinglytheyworkwithdatacompaniessuchasProzone and Opta to analyze games and players. Every day, data analysts collect evermoreinformationabouteveryplayer’severymoveonthepitchorthetrainingground.

Academics are pitching in aswell.At the end of the 1980s,whenStefanwent intosportseconomics,onlyabout twentyor thirtyacademicarticlesonsportshadeverbeenpublished.Nowcountlessacademicsworkonsoccer.Manyof thenew truths theyhavefoundhavenotyetreachedmostfans.

Anothernewsourceofknowledgeisthebulginglibraryofsoccerbooks.WhenPeteDaviespublishedAllPlayedOut:TheFullStoryofItalia’90, therewereprobablyonlyabouttwentyorthirtygoodsoccerbooksinexistence.Now—thankspartlytoDavies,whohas been described as John the Baptist to Nick Hornby’s Jesus—there are thousands.Manyof thesebooks(includingBellos’sFutebol)contain truthsabout thegamethatwetrytopresenthere.

Sounstoppablehas the streamofdatabecome thatevenpeople inside thegamearefinallystartingtosiftit.MichaelLewis,authorofMoneyball,wrotein2009,“Thevirus

thatinfectedprofessionalbaseballinthe1990s,theuseofstatisticstofindnewandbetterways tovalueplayersandstrategies,has found itsway intoeverymajor sport.Not justbasketballandfootball,butalsosoccerandcricketandrugbyand,forallIknow,snookeranddarts—eachonenowsupportsasubcultureofsmartpeoplewhoviewitnotjustasagametobeplayedbutasaproblemtobesolved.”

Thisstatisticalvirushasevenspreadfrombaseballtomoreseriousactivities.BeforetheUSelectionsof2004,theRepublicancampaignmanagerKenMehlmantoldhisstaffto readMoneyball.Michael Turk, whoworked at the RepublicanNational Committee,recalledfortheNewYorkTimesyearslater:“Iwaslike,‘Whatdoesabaseballbookhaveto dowith politics?’Once I actually took the time to digest it, I realizedwhat hewastrying todo—whichwasexactly thekindof thing that theObama team justdid [in the2012 elections]: understanding that not every election is about home runs but insteadgettingawholebunchofsinglestogetherthateventuallyadduptoawin.”

Or look at the career of Nate Silver. In childhood he was an obsessive fan of theDetroitTigers. Soon after leaving college, he developed a statisticalmethod to forecastperformance and career development for baseball players. He also dabbled in soccer:during theWorld Cup of 2010, he correctly predicted the outcomes of thirteen of thesixteengamesintheknockoutstages.Buttheonetimesabermetricianisbestknownasapolitical analyst. In the US presidential elections in 2008, Silver correctly called thewinnerinforty-ninestates.In2012hegotallfiftyplustheDistrictofColumbia.Inotherwords:NateSilverwontheUSelection.Afterwardhereturnedtosports,joiningESPNasanall-purposeguru.SilverstandsfortheMarchoftheGeeks.Smartpeoplelikehimareontheriseinsidesportsandbeyond.

Insoccer,thesesmartmen(it’spartofthegame’sown“ridiculoushokum”thattheyhave tobemen)have evenbegungainingkey roles at someofEurope’s biggest clubs.English soccer, professional on the field since the late nineteenth century, is finallycreakingintoprofessionalismoffthefield,too.Giventheglobalobsessionwiththegame,therecouldcomeatimewhensomeofthebestandbrightestyoungpeopleareworkinginthe front offices of soccer clubs. Already the rising generation of club executivesunderstandsthatinsoccertoday,youneeddatatogetahead.Ifyoustudyfigures,youwillseemoreandwinmore.

YetanotherharbingeroftheJamesiantakeoverofsocceristheMilanLab.Earlyon,ACMilan’sin-housemedicaloutfitfoundthatjustbystudyingaplayer’sjump,itcouldpredict with 70 percent accuracy whether he would get injured soon. Later it begantesting,almostdaybyday,eachplayer’smuscleweaknesses, themovementofhiseyes,theriseandfallofhisheartrate,hisbreathing,andmanyotherobviousandlessobviousindicators.Jean-PierreMeersseman,thelab’scigarette-puffingdirector,wasgivenapowerofvetoovertheclub’sprospectivesignings.“Thelastsignatureonthecontractbeforethebigboss signs ismine,”he toldus in2008.By2013 the labhadperformed1.2millionphysical tests on Milan’s players, collected millions of pieces of data on computers,loggedeventheslightestinjurytoeveryplayer,andintheprocesshadstumbleduponthesecretofeternalyouth.(It’sstillasecret:nootherclubhasaMilanLab,andthelabhasn’t

divulgeditsfindings,whichiswhyplayersatmostotherclubsaregenerallyfinishedbytheirearlythirties.)

MostofMilan’sstartingelevenwhobeatLiverpoolintheChampionsLeaguefinalof2007were thirty-one or older: PaoloMaldini, the captain,was thirty-eight, andFilippoInzaghi,scorerofbothofMilan’sgoals,wasthirty-three.(Afterthefinalwhistle,Inzaghistillhadenoughjuicetokickaballaroundonthefieldforfun.)Inlargepart,thattrophywaswon by theMilan Lab and its database. It is another version of theMarch of theGeeksstory. In recentyears,cash-strappedACMilanhas reduced the lab’s fundingandpower.However,otherbigclubsalloverEuropearenowcrunchingdatatofindouthowtoreduceinjuries,andhowtopredictwhichtwelve-year-oldwillgrowintothenextXavi.Meerssemansaysthelab’sdata-drivenscientistsseemtobebetterthanexperiencedyouthcoachesatmaking thosepredictions.He toldus: “In soccer, they say, ‘Youknowaboutsocceroryoudon’t.’Andwhenyougoandtesttheoneswho‘know,’it’ssurprisinghowlittletheyknow.It’sbasedontheemotionofthemoment.”

AsStefanandSimontalkedmoreandbegantothinkharderaboutsocceranddataforthisbook,webuzzedaroundallsortsofquestions.Couldwefindfigurestoshowwhichcountry loved soccer the most? Might the game somehow deter people from killingthemselves?Andperhapswecouldhaveashotatpredictingwhichclubsandcountries—theUnitedStatesmostlikely,perhapsevenIraq—woulddominatethesoccerofthefuture.Whenwebeganwriting,StefanlivedinLondonandSimoninParis,sowespentayearfiringfigures,arguments,andanecdotesbackandforthacrosstheEnglishChannel.

What started as a book turned into a long-term collaboration. Together with BenLyttleton we founded the Soccernomics consultancy. On its website, Soccernomics-agency.com,webeganpublishinganoccasionalblogwithourthoughtsonsoccer.Andwekeptrewritingandupdatingthisbook,throughabouttwentydifferentforeigneditionsandthreeAmericanversionssofar.

Forthislatestedition,ourcontactwastransatlantic:StefanisnowattheUniversityofMichigan in Ann Arbor. The new edition comes with a new chapter on how UEFA’s“financial fairplay” rulesmight change thegame, andanafterwordarguing that soccerhas never had it so good. We have also expanded our thoughts on some mystifyingquestions, such as: How do clubs use data to judge, buy, and sell players?Andwe’vewatched fans andmedia shift to our point of view on certain issues:most people nowrecognize that hostingWorld Cups doesn’t make you rich, and that England shouldn’texpecttowintrophies.(Sadly,wecannotclaimresponsibilityforshiftingglobalopinion.)Ineverychapterinthebookwefoundstoriesandanalysestoupdate,andnewthoughtstoadd.

Allthewhile,wehavecontinuedtodistrusteverybitofancientsoccerlore,andtesteditagainst thenumbers.AsMeerssemansays,“Youcandriveacarwithoutadashboard,without any information, and that’s what’s happening in soccer. There are excellentdrivers,excellentcars,butifyouhaveyourdashboard,itmakesitjustalittlebiteasier.Iwonderwhypeopledon’twantmoreinformation.”Wedo.

PARTI

TheClubsRacism,Stupidity,BadTransfers,

CapitalCities,theMirageoftheNFL,andWhatActuallyHappenedinThat

PenaltyShoot-OutinMoscow

2GENTLEMENPREFERBLONDS

HowtoAvoidSillyMistakesintheTransferMarketIn1983ACMilanspottedatalentedyoungblackforwardplayingforWatfordjustoutsideLondon.ThewordisthattheplayertheItalianslikedwasJohnBarnesandthattheythenconfusedhimwithhisblackteammateLutherBlissett.Whateverthetruth,MilanendeduppayingWatforda“transferfee”of$1.4millionforBlissett.*

AsaplayerBlissettbecamesuchajokeinItalythatthename“LutherBlissett”isnowusedasapseudonymbygroupsofanarchistwriters.HespentoneunhappyyearinMilan,beforetheclubsoldhimbacktoWatfordforjustoverhalfthesumithadpaidforhim.Atleastthatyeargavesocceroneofitsbestquotes:“Nomatterhowmuchmoneyyouhavehere,”Blissett lamented, “you can’t seem togetRiceKrispies.”MoreonRiceKrispieslater.

TransfersinsoccerareverydifferentfromtradesinAmericansports.Insoccer,whenagoodplayermoves,hisnewclubusuallypaysa“transferfee”tohisoldclub.Moreover,theplayer’sold contract is tornup, andhenegotiates anewdealwithhisnewclub. In2013European clubs paid eachother a total of about $2.3 billion in transfer fees.ThatyearRealMadridbroke theworld record fora transfer fee (a record italreadyheld)bypayingTottenhamHotspurareported$132millionforGarethBale.

FIGURE2.1.PremierLeagueandChampionshipteams:2003–2012

Unfortunately,muchofthemoneythrownaroundinthetransfermarketiswasted.Infact, the net amount that almost any club spends on transfer fees bears little relation towhere it finishes in the league.Westudied the spendingof fortyEnglishclubsbetween1978and1997,andfoundthattheirnetoutlayontransfers(i.e.,eachclub’stransferfeespaidminus transfer fees received) explained only 16 percent of their total variation inleagueposition.Inotherwords,takenovermanyyears,themerefactofbeinga“buyingclub”inthetransfermarketdidn’thelpateamperformsignificantlybetterthana“sellingclub.”

Bycontrast,clubs’spendingonsalarieswasextremelytelling.Thesizeoftheirwagebillsexplainedamassive92percentofvariationintheirleaguepositions,ifyoutookeachclub’saveragefortheentireperiod.Thatcorrelationshowslittlesignofgoingaway.WeshowthesameresultusingdataforthePremierLeagueandtheChampionship(thesecondtier of English soccer) for the decade through 2012 (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In thatperiod, wage spending still explained more than 90 percent of the variation in leagueposition. It seems that over the long term, highwages help a clubmuchmore than dospectaculartransfers.

FIGURE2.2.Themoreyoupayyourplayers,thehigheryoufinish:2003–2012

Obviouslywedon’tbelievethatifyoutookarandombunchofplayers,anddoubledtheirsalaries,theywouldsuddenlyplaytwiceaswell.It’snotthathighpaycausesgoodperformance.Rather,wethinkthathighpayattractsgoodperformers.ManchesterUnitedcanaffordtopayWayneRooney’swages,whereasNorwichCitycannot.AndifyouhaveRooneyandothergoodplayers,youwillwinlotsofmatches.Richclubspayhighsalariestogetgoodplayerstowintrophies.

Itmust be said that for any one given season, the correlation between salaries andleaguepositionisweaker.That’sbecauseinsuchashortperiod,luckplaysabigroleinperformance.Injuries,dodgyreferees,poorform,andanyhostofotherfactorscausebigswings in performance from year to year. For any one season, clubs’ wage spendingexplainsonlyabout70percentofthevariationinleagueposition.

Buttrueluck(i.e.,statisticalrandomness)tendstoevenoutovertheyears.Soifyoutrack each club’s performanceover a longer period—fifteenor twenty years, say—thensalariesexplainabout90percentofthevariationinleagueposition.

Inshort,themoreyoupayyourplayersinwages,thehigheryouwillfinish,butwhatyoupayforthemintransferfeesdoesn’tseemtomakemuchdifference.

Whilethemarketforplayers’wagesisprettyefficient—thebetteraplayer,themorehe earns—the transfer market is inefficient. Much of the time, clubs buy the wrongplayers.Evennowthattheyhavebrigadesofinternationalscouts,theystillwastefortuneson flops likeBlissett. (The transfermarket is also of dubious legality—do clubs reallyhavearightto“buy”and“sell”employees?—butthat’sanothermatter.)

Asacasestudyofbadtransferpolicy, let’s takeLiverpoolfrom1998through2010.Theclub’smanagersinthisperiod,GérardHoullierandRafaelBenitez,keptsplashingoutonbig transfer fees,yetLiverpoolhardlyevereven threatened towin the league.JamieCarragher,whoplayed forLiverpool throughout theseyears,providesadolefullycomiccommentary on some of the club’s misguided signings in his excellent autobiography,Carra:

• “SeanDundeewasnotaLiverpoolfootballer.”

• “The signing I didn’t rate was SanderWesterveld… . I thought he was anaveragegoalkeeperwhoseemedtothinkhewasGordonBanks.”

• “WhataboutJosemi?Hestruggledtofindateammatesixyardsaway.DjimiTraorehadthesameweakness.”

• “Tobeblunt,[Christian]Ziegecouldn’tdefend.”

• “ThenamesEl-HadjiDioufandSalifDiaonowmakethelegsofthetoughestLiverpudliansshudderinfear….ThefirstconcernIhadwithDioufishispace.Hedidn’thaveany….Doyourememberbeingatschoolandpickingsidesforagameof football? We do this at Liverpool for the five-a-sides. Diouf was ‘last pick’withinafewweeks.”

“‘Youpaidtenmillionforhimandnoonewantshimintheirteam,’Ishoutedto

Gérard.”

• “If Diouf was a disappointment, Diao was a catastrophe… . But even hewasn’t the worst arrival of this hideous summer [of 2002]. Houllier also signedBrunoCheyrou.”

• OnDjibrilCissé,whocostLiverpool$26million:“Hewassupposedtobeastrong,physicaltargetmanwhoscoredgoals.Hewasneitheronenortheother.”

• “ThegreatestdisappointmentwasFernandoMorientes….Hewasayardoffthepace.”

WhenBenitezreplacedHoullierin2004,writesCarragher, theSpaniardencountered“a host of poor, overpaid players and expectations as great as ever.” But the newmandidn’tdomuchbetterthanhispredecessor.Carragher’sbookisgentlerwithBenitezthanwithHoullier,presumablybecause theSpaniardwasstillhisbosswhenhewrote it,butthewaste of theBenitez years is remarkable.Most strikingly, perhaps, in 2008BenitezhandedTottenhamHotspur£20million(thenabout$40million)forthetwenty-eight-year-oldforwardRobbieKeane.Themuch-toutedfactthatKeanewasalifelongLiverpoolfanturned out not to helpmuch. Sixmonths after buying the player, Benitez decided thatKeanewasn’t thethingafterallandshippedhimbacktoTottenham(whichitselfwouldsoon regret buying him) at a loss of £8 million ($12 million). Virgin Trains took outnewspaper advertisements that said, “A Liverpool to London return faster than RobbieKeane.”

Forallthespending,mostofLiverpool’sbestperformersduringtheHoullier-Benitezyearswerehomegrownplayerswhohadcost theclubnothing:StevenGerrard,MichaelOwen, andCarragher himself.Another stalwart for a decade, centerback SamiHyppiä,had come for only$4.1million from littleWillem II in theNetherlands. In short, theredidn’tseemtobemuchcorrelationbetweentransferspendingandquality.

In October 2009, after Benitez’s sixth and last summer masterminding Liverpool’stransfers,Britain’sSundayTimesnewspapercalculatedthedamage.ItfoundthatinthosesixyearsatAnfield,Benitezhadspent£122million (about$220million)more thanhehadreceivedintransferfees.AlexFerguson’snetspendatManchesterUnitedinthesameperiodwasonly£27million($49million),yetinthoseyearsUnitedhadwonthreetitlesto Liverpool’s none.ArsèneWenger atArsenal had actually received £27million ($49million) more in transfer fees than he had spent during the period, the newspaperestimated.From2005through2009,BenitezhadevenoutspentChelseaontransfers.Yetattheendofthisperiodhehadthenervetocomplain,“ItisalwaysdifficulttocompeteinthePremierLeaguewithclubswhohavemoremoney.”Fergusonlatercommentedthathehadn’tbeenabletoseeany“strategy”inBenitez’sbuying.“Itamazedmethatheusedtowalk intopressconferencesandsayhehadnomoney to spend,”Fergusonwrote inhis2013 autobiography. “Hewas given plenty. It was the quality of his buys that let himdown. IfyousetasideTorresandReina, fewofhisacquisitionswereof trueLiverpoolstandard.Therewereserviceableplayers—MascheranoandKuyt,hard-workingplayers—butnotrealLiverpoolquality.”

Benitez’s failure at Liverpool was partially disguised by one night in Istanbul: thevictoryintheChampionsLeaguefinalof2005,afterhavingbeen3–0downtoMilanattheendofthefirsthalf.However,aswe’lldiscusslaterinthebook,alargechunkofluckis involved inwinningknockout competitions—even leavingaside the fact thatBenitezgot his tactics wrong going into the game and had to turn his team upside down athalftime.Themostreliablegaugeofateam’squalityisitsperformanceintheleague,andhere Houllier and Benitez failed. Their expensive transfers didn’t bring commensurateresults. If you add in agents’ fees, taxeson transfers, and the constant disruption to theteam, all this wheeling and dealing helps explain how Liverpool got left behind byManchesterUnited.ToquoteCarragher,“AsIknowtomycostatAnfield,havingmoneyisnoguaranteeofsuccess.Theskillisspendingitontherightplayers.”

Thequestion,then,iswhatclubscandotoimprovetheirstatus.IfyouareLiverpoolnow, run by a man like John Henry who understands statistics, and you have thisknowledgeof the relative importanceofwages andunimportanceof transfers, howcanyouwinmorematches?Theobviousansweristospendlessofyourincomeontransfersandmore of it onwages. In general, itmay be better to raise the pay of your leadingplayers than to risk losing a couple of them and have to go out and buy replacements.Benitez had a net transfer spend ofminus $220million in six years. If he hadmerelybalancedhistransferbudgetinthatperiod,letalonemadeaprofitasWengerdid,hecouldhaveraisedhisteam’ssalariesby$36millionayear.Inthe2008–2009season,thatboostwouldhavegivenLiverpoolaslightlylargerwagebillthanUnited.Unitedwonthetitlethatyear.

Soccerclubsneedtomakefewertransfers.TheybuytoomanyDioufs.Buttheywillkeepbuyingplayers,andthetransfermarketisprobablytheareainwhichclubscanmosteasily improve theirperformance.Theyneed to learn from the fewclubsandmanagerswhohaveworkedoutsomeofthesecretsofthetransfermarket.

Anyinefficientmarketisanopportunityforsomebody.Ifmostclubsarewastingmostof their transfermoney, thenaclubthatspendswiselyisgoingtooutperform.Indeed,ahandfulofwisebuyershaveconsistentlyoutperformedthetransfermarket:BrianCloughandhisassistant–cum–soulmatePeterTaylorintheiryearsatNottinghamForest,WengerduringhisfirstdecadeatArsenal,and,mostmysteriouslyofall,OlympiqueLyon,whichrosefromobscureprovincialclubtoaperiodofdictatorialruleoverFrenchsoccer.From2002 through 2008,Lyonwon theFrench league seven times running.That era is nowover,andtheclubhasmademistakessince,asithastriedandfailedtocompetewithclubswithmuch higher revenues, likeRealMadrid orManchesterUnited. Lyon got temptedintopayingbigtransferfeesforsupposed“stars”—forinstance,gambling$28milliononthe slow French playmaker YoannGourcuff in 2010. Nonetheless, its seven-year reignremains an extraordinary feat. The usual way to win things in soccer is to pay highsalaries.Theseclubs foundadifferent route: theyworkedout thesecretsof the transfermarket.

Thereisafourthmasterofthetransfermarketwhoisworthalook,evenifheworksina different sport across an ocean: Billy Beane, general manager of the Oakland A’s

baseballteam.InhisbookMoneyball,MichaelLewisexplainshowforafewyearsBeaneturnedoneofthepoorestteamsinbaseballintooneofthebestbythesimplemethodofrejecting what everyone in the sport had always “known” to be true about trading forplayers. Lewis writes, “Understanding that he would never have a Yankee-sizedcheckbook, Beane had set about looking for inefficiencies in the game.” It’s odd howmanyofthesameinefficienciesexistinsoccer,too.

MARKETINCOMPETENCE

Ifwestudythesemastersoftransfers,itwillhelpusuncoverthesecretsofthemarketthatalltheotherclubsaremissing.Firstofall,though,wepresentafewofthemostobviousinefficiencies in the market. Although it doesn’t take a Clough or a Beane to identifythese,theycontinuetoexist.

ANewManagerWastesMoney

Typically thenewmanagerwants toputhismarkonhisnewteam.Sohebuyshisownplayers. He then has to “clear out” some of his predecessor’s purchases, usually at adiscount.

Strangely,it’sTottenhamduringitsyearsunderafamouslytightfistedchairman,AlanSugar,thatprovidestheworstexample.InMay2000theclub’smanager,GeorgeGraham,paid Dynamo Kiev $16.5 million—nearly twice Spurs’s previous record fee—for theUkrainianstrikerSergeiRebrov.ClearlyRebrovwasmeanttobealong-terminvestment.

Butninemonthslater,SugarsoldhisstakeinTottenham,whereuponthenewownerssackedGrahamand replacedhimwithGlennHoddle.Hoddledidn’t appreciateRebrov.The record signing endedup on the bench,was sent on loan to aTurkish team, and in2004movedtoWestHamonafreetransfer.

Thisformofwasteiscommonacrosssoccer:anewmanagerisallowedtobuyandsellon the pretense that he is reshaping the club for many years to come, even though inpractice he almost always leaves pretty rapidly.A terrible recent examplewasPaolo diCanioatSunderland in2013: in thesixmonthsand thirteengames thathemanaged theclub,hespentabout$30millionon transfers,brought infourteenplayersand let fifteenleave.Whenhewassacked,he lefthissuccessor,GusPoyet,a teamin lastplace in thePremierLeague.TonyFernandes,theQueensParkRangerschairmanwhospentanet$65millionon transfer feeswhilegetting relegated from thePremierLeague in2012–2013,toldusmournfully:“Sunderland’sgoing through, insomeways,whatwewent through.Themanagercomesin,hechangeseveryone,andGusPoyetisalreadysaying,‘Iwanttocontrolthetransferbudget.’Ifyouchangeamanager,Idon’tcarewhotheyare, they’regoing to have a different opinion, right? Mark Hughes liked a certain player, Harry[Redknapp]doesn’tlikeacertainplayer.”

Butwhycouldn’tachairmanjustsaynotoashopaholicnewmanager?“Youyourselfseetheresults,”repliedFernandes,“andyouthink,‘God,weneedsomechange.’”

Amanagertypicallydoesn’tcarehowmuchhiswheeler-dealingcosts:hedoesn’tgetabonusiftheclubmakesaprofit.BillyBeanetoldus,“Whenyouthinkofthestructureof

mostsportsteams,thereisnobenefittoaheadcoachintheNFLorasoccermanagertothinkyearsahead.Thepersonwhohasaccesstothegreatestexpenditureinthebusinesshasnoriskinthedecision-making.”HeaddedthattheexceptiontothisrulewasWenger.Beanesaid,“WhenIthinkofArsèneWenger,IthinkofWarrenBuffett.Wengerrunshisfootballclublikeheisgoingtoowntheclubforonehundredyears.”

StarsofRecentWorldCups,orEuropeanChampionshipsAreOvervalued

The worst time to buy a player is in the summer when he’s just done well at a bigtournament.Everyone in the transfermarkethas seenhowgood theplayer is, buthe isexhausted andquite likely satedwith success.AsFerguson admitted after retiring fromUnited: “I was always wary of buying players on the back of good tournamentperformances.Ididitatthe1996EuropeanChampionship,whichpromptedmetomovefor JordiCruyff andKarel Poborský.Both had excellent runs in that tournament, but Ididn’treceivethekindofvaluetheircountriesdidthatsummer.Theyweren’tbadbuys,but sometimes players get themselves motivated and prepared for World Cups andEuropeanChampionshipsandafterthattherecanbealevelingoff.”

Moreover,ifyoubuyaplayerbecauseofagoodtournament,youarejudginghimonavery small sample of games. Take, for instance, Arsenal’s purchase of the DanishmidfielderJohnJensen inJuly1992.Thepreviousmonth,Jensenhadscoredacrackinglong-range goal in the European Championship final against Germany. Arsenal’s thenmanager, George Graham, told the British media that Jensen was a goal-scoringmidfielder.

Buthewasn’t.ThegoalagainstGermanyhadbeenaone-off.Jensenwouldgoyearswithout scoring forArsenal.Over time this failingactually turnedhim into a culthero:whenever he got the ball, even in his own penalty area, the crowd atHighburywouldjoyouslyshout,“Shoot!”BythetimeJensenleftArsenalin1996,hehadscoredonegoalin four years. (Arsenal fans printed T-shirts saying, “I was there when John Jensenscored.”)Graham’smistakehadbeentoextrapolatefromthatsinglefamousgoalagainstGermany.This isanexampleof theso-calledavailabilityheuristic: themoreavailableapiece of information is to thememory, themore likely it is to influence your decision,evenwhentheinformationisirrelevant.

Signing these shooting stars fits what Moneyball calls “a tendency to be overlyinfluencedbyaguy’smostrecentperformance:whathedidlastwasnotnecessarilywhathewoulddonext.”

Real Madrid is of course the supreme consumer of shooting stars. This is largelybecausetheclub’sfansdemandit.Madrid(orSpurs,orMarseilleinFrance)probablyisn’teven trying to be rational in the transfermarket. The club’s aim is not to buy the bestresults for as little money as possible.When it handed over a combined total of $226millionforCristianoRonaldoandKakáin2009,itprobablysuspecteditwaspayingmorefor the duo than the benefit it was likely to get in results or higher revenues. But bigsigningsofthis type(likeNewcastlebuyingfragileMichaelOwenfromMadridfor$30million)arebestunderstoodasmarketinggiftstoaclub’sfans,itssponsors,andthelocalmedia.(It’shugelyintheinterestofMarca,theSpanishsportsnewspaper,forRealalways

tobebuyingplayers,orelsehardlyanyonewouldbotherreadingthepaperoverthethree-monthsummerbreak.)AsFergusonexplainedReal’spurchaseofRonaldo:“Madridpaid£80million incash forhim,anddoyouknowwhy?ItwasawayforFlorentinoPérez,theirpresident,tosaytotheworld,‘WeareRealMadrid,wearethebiggestofthelot.’”In2013,Madrid’spurchaseofBalemade the same statement.ProbablynobodyatMadridbelievedthattheWelshmanwastwiceasgoodaplayerasMesutÖzil—soldtoArsenalforhalfBale’s transfer fee—but hewas deliciously new.His record fee only enhanced hisglamour.The$132millionisunlikelytobringcommensuratereward,butRealprobablydoesn’tcareverymuch.Theclubisnotabusiness.It’sapopulistdemocracy.Fewsoccerclubspursuebean-countingquestsforreturnoninvestment.

Buyingabignamemakeseverypersonintheclubfeelbigger.ChristophBiermann,inhispioneeringGermanbookonsocceranddata,DieFussball-Matrix,citesthepresidentofaBundesligaclubwhosaidhiscoachgotveryexcitedwhenevertheclubpaidalargetransfer fee.Biermannexplains,“For thiscoach itwasastatussymbol tobeallowed tobuyplayerswhocostmanymillionsofeuros.Mycar,myhouse,mystarsigning!”

Buyingnamesalsogivessupportersthethrillofexpectation,asensethattheirclubisgoing somewhere, which may be as much fun as actually winning things. Buying bignames is how these clubs keep their customers satisfied during the summer shutdown.(And somemanagers buy players tomake themselves some illicit cash on the side, asGeorgeGrahamdidwhenhesignedJensen,butthat’sanotherstory.)

CertainNationalitiesAreOvervalued

Clubs will pay more for a player from a “fashionable” soccer country. AmericangoalkeeperKaseyKellersaysthatinthetransfermarket,it’sgoodtobeDutch.“GiovannivanBronckhorst is the best example,”Keller toldChristophBiermann. “Hewent fromRangerstoArsenal,failedthere,andthenwheredidhego?ToBarcelona!YouhavetobeaDutchmantodothat.AnAmericanwouldhavebeensentstraightbacktoDCUnited.”

More recently Belgian players have come into fashion. But the most enduringlyfashionable nationality in the transfer market is Brazilian. As Alex Bellos writes inFutebol: The Brazilian Way of Life, “The phrase ‘Brazilian soccer player’ is like thephrases‘Frenchchef’or‘Tibetanmonk.’Thenationalityexpressesanauthority,aninnatevocationfor the job—whatever thenaturalability.”ABrazilianagentwhohadexportedveryhumbleBrazilianplayers to theFaeroeIslandsandIceland toldBellos,“It’ssad tosay,but it ismucheasierselling,forexample,acrapBrazilianthanabrilliantMexican.TheBraziliangetsacrosstheimageofhappiness,party,carnival.Irrespectiveoftalent,itisveryseductivetohaveaBrazilianinyourteam.”

Awiseclubwillbuyunfashionablenationalities—Bolivians,say,orBelorussians—atdiscounts.

GentlemenPreferBlonds

OnebigEnglishclubnoticedthatitsscoutswhowatchedyouthmatchesoftencamebackrecommendingblondplayers.Thelikelyreason:whenyouarescanningafieldoftwenty-twosimilar-lookingplayers,noneofwhomyethasagiantreputation,theblondstendto

standout (except, presumably, inScandinavia).The color catches the eye.So the scoutnoticestheblondboywithoutunderstandingwhy.Theclubinquestionbegantotakethisdistortionintoaccountwhenjudgingscoutingreports.Wesuspectthebiastowardblondsdisappears when scouts are assessing adult players who already have establishedreputations. Then the player’s reputation—“World Cup hero,” say, or simply“Brazilian”—guidesthescout’sjudgment.

Similarly,BeaneattheOaklandA’snoticedthatbaseballscoutshadallsortsof“sight-basedprejudices.”Theyweresuspiciousoffatguysorskinnylittleguysor“shortright-handedpitchers,”andtheyovervaluedhandsome,strappingathletesofthetypethatBeanehimselfhadbeenatageseventeen.Scoutslookforplayerswholookthepart.Perhapsinsoccer,blondsarethoughttolookmorelikesuperstars.

This taste for blonds is another instance of the “availability heuristic”: the piece ofinformationisavailable,soitinfluencesyourdecision.Blondsstickinthememory.

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The inefficiencies we have cited so far are so-called systemic failures: more than justindividualmistakes, theyaredeviations fromrationality.All this iswhatyoumightcallTransferMarket101.Tolearnmoreabouthowtoplaythemarket,weneedtostudythemasters.

DRUNKS,GAMBLERS,ANDBARGAINS:CLOUGHANDTAYLORATFOREST

“Cloughielikesabung,”AlanSugartoldtheHighCourtofEnglandandWalesin1993.Sugar’sformermanageratSpurs,TerryVenables,hadtoldhimso.

A“bung”isBritishslangforanillegalunder-the-tablepaymenttosweetenadeal.ThecourtheardthatwhenCloughboughtorsoldaplayerforNottinghamForest,heexpectedtoget a bung. In a perfectworld, he liked it to be handedover at a highway rest stop.Cloughdeniedeverything—“Abung?Isn’tthatsomethingyougetfromaplumbertostopupthebath?”—andwasneverprosecuted.Yetwhatseemslikelyisthis:“OldBigHead”(asCloughcalledhimself)wassogoodattransfers,makingprofitsevenwhileturningalittle provincial club into European champions, that he felt he deserved the odd bonus.More than anyone else in his day, Clough and his right-hand man, Peter Taylor, hadsucceededingamingthetransfermarket.

CloughandTaylormetwhileplayingina“ProbablesversusPossibles”reservegameatMiddlesbroughin1955.Theyseemtohavefalleninloveatfirstsight.Prettysoontheywere using their free time to travel around the North of England watching soccer andcoaching children together. Taylor never became more than a journeyman keeper, butCloughscoredthefastest twohundredgoalsevernotchedinEnglishsocceruntil,at theageoftwenty-seven,hewreckedhisrightkneeskiddingonafrozenfieldonBoxingDayin1962.ThreeyearslaterhephonedTaylorandsaid,“I’vebeenofferedthemanagershipof Hartlepools and I don’t fancy it. But if you’ll come, I’ll consider it.” He thenimmediately hung up. Taylor took the bait, though to get in he had to double asHartlepool’smedicaldepartment,runningontothefieldwiththespongeonmatchdays.ItwasthepreludetotheirlegendaryyearstogetheratDerbyandNottinghamForest.

DavidPeace’snovelTheDamnedUnited—andTomHooper’s filmof it—is in largepartthelovestoryofCloughandTaylor.Themen’swiveshaveonlywalk-onparts.Asinall good couples, each partner has an assigned role. As Peace’s fictional Clough tellshimself,“Peterhastheeyesandtheears,butyouhavethestomachandtheballs.”Taylorfoundtheplayers,andCloughledthemtoglory.

Therelationshipendedin“divorce”in1982,withTaylor’sresignationfromForest.Itseemsthattherifthadopenedtwoyearsbefore,whenTaylorpublishedhisexcellentbutnowforgottenmemoir,WithCloughbyTaylor.Moreofthisinamoment,becauseitistheclosestthingwehavetoahandbooktothetransfermarket.

Butclearlythecouplehadotherproblemsbesidesliterature.PerhapsCloughresentedhis partner because he needed him so badly—not the sort of relationshipClough liked.Indeed,thefilmTheDamnedUniteddepictshimfailingatLeedspartlybecauseTaylorisnottheretoscoutplayers,andfinallydrivingdowntoBrightonwithhisyoungsonstobeghispartner’sforgiveness.HefindsTaylordoingthegardening.AtTaylor’sinsistence,hegets down on his knees in the driveway and recites, “I’m nothingwithout you. Please,please,baby,takemeback.”AndTaylortakeshimback,andbuyshimthecut-priceForestteamthatwinstwoEuropeanCups.Whatevertheirpreciserelationship,theduocertainlyknewhowtosignplayers.Hereareafewoftheircoups:

• BuyingGaryBirtlesfromthenonleagueclubLongEatonfor$3,500in1976andsellinghimtoManchesterUnitedfouryearslaterfor$2.9million.AmeasureofwhatagooddealthiswasforForest:Unitedforkedoutabout$500,000moreforBirtles than itwould pay to signEricCantona fromLeeds twelve years later, in1992.BirtlesendedupcostingUnitedabout$175,000agoal,andafter twoyearswassoldbacktoForestforaquarteroftheinitialfee.

• BuyingRoyKeane froman IrishclubcalledCobhRamblers for$80,000 in1990andsellinghimtoManchesterUnitedthreeyearslaterfor$5.6million,thenaBritishrecordfee.

• Buying Kenny Burns from Birmingham City for $250,000 in 1977. TaylorwritesinWithCloughbyTaylorthatBurnswasthenregardedas“afighting,hard-drinking gambler … a stone [fourteen pounds] overweight.” In 1978, EnglishsoccerwritersvotedBurnstheleague’splayeroftheyear.

• TwicebuyingArchieGemmillcheaply.In1970,whenGemmillwasplayingforPreston,CloughdrovetohishouseandaskedhimtocometoDerby.Gemmillrefused.Cloughsaidthatinthatcasehewouldsleepoutsideinhiscar.Gemmill’swife invited him to sleep in the house instead. The next morning at breakfastCloughpersuadedGemmill to sign.The feewas$145,000, andGemmill quicklywontwoleaguetitlesatDerby.In1977CloughpaidDerby$35,000andthenowforgotten goalkeeper John Middleton to bring Gemmill to his new club Forest,wheretheplayerwonanotherleaguetitle.

If therewasoneclubwherealmosteverypennyspenton transfersbought results, itwas Forest under Clough. In the 1970s the correlation must have been off the charts:

ForestwontwoEuropeanCupswithateamassembledlargelyforpeanuts.Sadly,therearenogoodfinancialdatafor thatperiod,butwedoknowthatevenfrom1982to1992, inClough’sdecliningyears,afterTaylorhadlefthim,Forestperformedaswellonthefieldasclubsthatwerespendingtwiceasmuchonwages.Cloughhadbrokentheusuallyironlinkbetweensalariesandleagueposition.

Clough himself seemed to think that what explained Forest’s success was his andTaylor’s eye for players, rather than, say, anymotivational gift or tactical genius. PhilSoar, the club’s chairmanandchief executive for fouryears at the endof the1990s, e-mailedus:“InhoursofmusingswithClough(Ihadto try todefendhimfromthebungcharges)Iobviouslyaskedhimwhatmadethisalmostabsurdlyirrelevantlittleprovincialclub(myhometownofcourse)intoashootingstar.Andhealwaysusedtosay,‘Wehadsomeprettygoodplayersyouknow.’”

It’shardtoidentifyallofCloughandTaylor’stransfersecrets,andiftheirrivalsatthetimehadunderstoodwhat theywereup to, everyonewouldhave simply imitated them.Taylor’s bookmakes it clear that he spent a lot of time trying to identify players (likeBurns) whom others had wrongly undervalued due to surface characteristics, but theneveryone tries to do that. Sometimes Forest did splurge on a playerwhowas rated byeverybody, like Trevor Francis, soccer’s first “million-pound man,” or Peter Shilton,whomitmadethemostexpensivegoalkeeperinBritishhistory.

YetthankstoWithCloughbyTaylorwecanidentifythreeoftheduo’srules.First,beaseager tosellgoodplayersas tobuythem.“It’sas important insocceras in thestockmarkettosellattherighttime,”wroteTaylor.“Amanagershouldalwaysbelookingforsignsofdisintegrationinawinningsideandthenselltheplayersresponsiblebeforetheirdeterioration is noticed by possible buyers.” (Or in Billy Beane’swords: “You have toalwaysbeupgrading.Otherwiseyou’refucked.”)

Themomentwhenaplayer reaches the topofhisparticularhill is like themomentwhen the stock market peaks. Clough and Taylor were always trying to gauge thatmoment,andsell.Eachtimetheysignedaplayer,theywouldgivehimasetspeech,whichTaylorrecords inhisbook:“Son, thefirst timewecanreplaceyouwithabetterplayer,we’lldoitwithoutblinkinganeyelid.That’swhatwe’repaidtodo—toproducethebestsideandtowinasmanythingsaswecan.Ifweseeabetterplayerthanyoubutdon’tsignhimthenwe’re frauds.Butwe’renot frauds.” In1981, justafterKennyBurnshadwoneverythingwithForest,thecluboffloadedhimtoLeedsfor$800,000.

Second,olderplayersareoverrated.“I’venoticedovertheyearshowoftenLiverpoolsellplayersas theynearorpass their thirtiethbirthday,”notesTaylor inhisbook.“BobPaisley [Liverpool’s then manager] believes the average first division footballer isbeginning to burn out at thirty.” Taylor added, rather snottily, that that was true of a“running side likeLiverpool,” but less so of a passingone likeForest.Nonetheless, heagreedwiththeprincipleofsellingolderplayers.

ThemasterofthattradeformanyyearswasWenger.Arsenal’smanagerisoneofthefewpeopleinsoccerwhocanviewthegamefromtheoutside.Inpart,thisisbecausehehas a degree in economic sciences from the University of Strasbourg in France. As a

trained economist, he is inclined to trust data rather than the game’s receivedwisdom.Wenger sees that in the transfer market, clubs tend to overvalue a player’s pastperformance. That prompts them to pay fortunes—in transfer fees and salaries—forplayerswhohavepassed their prime.FIFATMS (thedepartmentofFIFA thatoverseesinternational transfers)analyzedthepayofplayerswhomovedinternationally toBrazil,Argentina,England,Germany,Italy,andPortugalin2012,andfound,remarkably,thattheaveragemanearnedhispeakfixedsalaryattheripeoldageofthirty-two.

Allplayersaremeltingblocksofice.Thejoboftheclubistogaugehowfasttheyaremelting,andtogetridofthembeforetheyturnintoexpensivepuddlesofwater.Wengeroften lets defenders carry on until their mid-thirties, but he usually gets rid of hismidfieldersandforwardsmuchyounger.HegotridofPatrickVieirafor$25millionatagetwenty-nine,ThierryHenryfor$30millionatagetwenty-nine,EmmanuelPetitfor$10.5millionatagetwenty-nine,andMarcOvermarsfor$37millionatagetwenty-seven,andnone of them ever did as well again after leaving Arsenal. (Wenger’s uncharacteristicdecision at the very end of August 2011 to sign twenty-eight-year-old Andre Santos,twenty-nine-year-old Mikel Arteta, and thirty-one-year-old Yossi Benayoun shows hispressingneedatthatmomentforquicksuccess.Inanycase,hehadbuiltupthecashboxtoaffordit.Itdidn’tworkoutwell.)

Curiously, precisely the same overvaluation of older players exists in baseball, too.The conventionalwisdom in the gamehad always been that players peak in their earlythirties.ThenalongcameBillJamesfromhissmalltowninKansas.Inhismimeographs,thefatherofsabermetricsshowedthattheaverageplayerpeakednotinhisearlythirties,but at just twenty-seven. Beane told us, “Nothing strangulates a sports clubmore thanhavingolderplayersonlongcontracts,becauseoncetheystopperforming,theybecomeimmoveable.Andastheybecomeolder, theriskofinjurybecomesexponential.It’slesscostlytobringayoungplayer.Ifitdoesn’twork,youcangoandfindthenextguy,andthenextguy.Thedownsideriskislower,andtheupsidemuchhigher.”

Finally, Clough and Taylor’s third rule: buy players with personal problems (likeBurns, or the gambler Stan Bowles) at a discount. Then help them deal with theirproblems.

Clough, a drinker, and Taylor, a gambler, empathized with troubled players.Whilenegotiatingwithanewplayertheywouldaskhimastockquestion,“towhichweusuallyknow the answer,” wrote Taylor. It was: “Let’s hear your vice before you sign. Is itwomen,booze,drugs,orgambling?”

CloughandTaylorbelievedthatoncetheyknewthevice,theycouldhelptheplayermanage it.Cloughwas so confident of his psychological skills that he even thought hecould handleManchester United’s alcoholic womanizing genius George Best. “I’d sortGeorgeoutinaweek,”heboasted.“I’dhidethekeytothedrinkscabinetandI’dmakesurehewastuckedupwithnothingstrongerthancocoaforthefirstsixmonths.Women?I’dlethimhometoseehismumandhissisters.Nooneelseinaskirtisgettingwithinamillionmilesofhim.”

Taylor says he told Bowles, who joined Forest in 1979 (and, as it happens, failed

there),“Anyprobleminyourprivatelifemustbebroughttous;youmaynotlikethatbutwe’ll prove to you that our way ofmanagement is good for all of us.” After a playerconfided a problem, wrote Taylor, “if we couldn’t find an answer, we would turn toexperts: we have sought advice for our players from clergymen, doctors and localcouncilors.” Taking much the same approach, Wenger helped Tony Adams and PaulMersoncombattheiraddictions.

All thismight sound obvious, but the usual attitude in soccer is, “We paid a lot ofmoneyforyou,nowgetonwithit,”asifmentalillness,addiction,orhomesicknessshouldnotexistaboveacertainlevelofincome.

RELOCATION,RELOCATION,RELOCATION:THERICEKRISPIESPROBLEM

CloughandTaylorunderstoodthatmanytransfersfailbecauseofaplayer’sproblemsoffthefield.Inasurprisingnumberofcases, theseproblemsare theproductof the transferitself.

Movingtoajobinanothercityisalwaysstressful;movingtoanothercountryisevenmore so.Thechallengeofmoving fromRiode Janeiro toManchester involvesculturaladjustments that just don’t compare with moving from Springfield, Missouri, toSpringfield,Ohio.Anuprooted soccerplayerhas to findahomeandanew life forhisfamily,andgainsomegraspofthesocialrulesofhisnewcountry.YetEuropeanclubsthatpaymillions of dollars for foreign players are often unwilling to spend a few thousandmore tohelp theplayerssettle in theirnewhomes. Instead theclubs typically tell them,“Here’saplaneticket,comeover,andplaybrilliantlyfromdayone.”Theplayerfailstoadjusttothenewcountry,underperforms,andhistransferfeeiswasted.“Relocation,”asthe industry of relocation consultants calls it, has long been one of the biggestinefficienciesinthetransfermarket.

All the inefficienciessurrounding relocationcouldbeassuaged.Mostbigbusinessesknowhowdifficultrelocationisanddotheirbest tosmooththepassage.WhenaseniorMicrosoft executive moves between countries, a relocation consultant helps his or herfamily findschoolsandahouseand learn thesocial rulesof thenewcountry. IfLutherBlissett had beenworking forMicrosoft, a relocation consultant could have found himRice Krispies. An expensive relocation might cost $25,000, or 0.1 percent of a largetransferfee.Butinsoccer,possiblythemostglobalizedindustryofall,spendinganythingatallonrelocationwasuntilveryrecentlyregardedasawasteofmoney.

BoudewijnZenden,whoplayed in fourcountries, for clubs includingLiverpool andBarcelona,toldusduringhisstintinMarseillein2009:

It’stheweirdestthingeverthatyoucanactuallybuyaplayerfor20mil,andyoudon’tdoanythingtomakehimfeelathome.Ithinkthefirstthingyoushoulddoisgethimamobilephoneandahouse.Gethimaschoolforthekids,getsomethingforhismissus,geta teacher inforbothof themstraightaway,becauseobviouslyeverything goes with the language. Do they need anything for other familymembers,dotheyneedadrivinglicense,dotheyneedavisa,dotheyneedanew

passport?Sometimesevenatthebiggestclubsit’sreallybadlyorganized.

Milan: best club ever. AC Milan is organized in a way you can’t believe.Anythingisdoneforyou:youarrive,yougetyourhouse,it’sfullyfurnished,yougetfivecarstochoosefrom,youknowthesky’sthelimit.Theyreallysay:we’lltake care of everything else; you make sure you play really well. Whereasunfortunatelyinalotofclubs,youhavetogetafterityourself….Sometimesyouget to a club, and you’ve got people actually at the club who take profit fromplayers.

Foranyforeignplayer,orevenaplayerwhocomesinnew,theycouldgetonemanwho’s actually there to take care of everything. But then again, sometimesplayers are a bit—Idon’twant to say abusive, but theymight takeprofit of thesituation.Theymightcallinthemiddleofthenight,justtosaythere’snomilkinthefridge.Youknowhowtheyaresometimes.

Insoccer,badrelocationshavetraditionallybeenthenorm.In1961,twofifteen-year-olds from Belfast took the boat across the Irish Sea to become apprentices withManchesterUnited.GeorgeBestandEricMcMordiehadnever lefthomebefore.WhentheylandedatLiverpooldocks,theycouldn’tfindanyonefromtheclubtomeetthem.Sotheyworked out for themselves how to get a train toManchester, eventually found thestadium,andwoundupsolonelyandconfusedthatontheirseconddaytheytoldtheclub:“Wewanttogobackonthenextboat.”Andtheydid,recountsDuncanHamiltoninhisbiography ofBest, Immortal. In the end,Best decided to giveManchester one last try.McMordierefused.Hebecameaplasterer inBelfastafter leavingschool, thoughhedidlatermakearespectablesoccercareerwithMiddlesbrough.JustimaginehowthebotchedwelcomeofBestmighthavechangedUnited’shistory.

Yet bad relocations remained the norm for decades, like Chelsea signing Dutchcosmopolitan Ruud Gullit in 1996 and sticking him in a hotel in the ugly LondondormitorytownofSlough,orIanRushcomingbacktoEnglandfromabadyearinItalymarveling, “It was like another country.”Many players down the decades would haveunderstood that phrase. But perhaps the great failed relocation, one that a Spanishrelocationconsultantstillcitesinherpresentations,wasNicolasAnelka’stoRealMadridin1999.

AhalfhourofconversationwithAnelkaisenoughtoconfirmthatheisself-absorbed,scaredofotherpeople,andnotsomeonewhomakescontacteasily.Nordoesheappeartobe good at languages, because afterwell over a decade inEngland he still speaks verymediocre English. Anelka is the sort of expatriate who really needs a relocationconsultant.

Realhadspent$35millionbuyinghimfromArsenal.Theclubthenspentnothingonhelpinghimadjust.Ondayone theshy,awkward twenty-year-old reported toworkandfoundthattherewasnobodytoshowhimaround.Hehadn’tevenbeenassignedalockerinthedressingroom.Severaltimesthatfirstmorning,hewouldtakealockerthatseemedtobeunused,onlyforanotherplayertowalkinandclaimit.

Anelkadoesn’tseemtohavetalkedabouthisproblemstoanyoneatMadrid.Nordidanyone at the club ask him. Instead he talked toFrance Football, a magazine that hetreated as his newspaper of record, like a 1950s British prime minister talking to TheTimes.“Iamaloneagainsttherestoftheteam,”herevealedmidwaythroughtheseason.HeclaimedtopossessavideoshowinghisteammateslookinggloomyafterhehadscoredhisfirstgoalforRealaftersixmonthsat theclub.Hehadtriedtogivethisvideotothecoach,but thecoachhadn’twanted tosee it.Also, theotherblackFrancophoneplayershadtoldAnelkathattheotherplayerswouldn’tpasstohim.Madridendedupgivinghimaforty-five-dayban,essentiallyforbeingmaladjusted.

ParanoidthoughAnelkamayhavebeen,hehadapoint.Theotherplayersreallydidn’tlikehim.Andtheynevergottoknowhim,becausenobodyattheclubseemsevertohavebotheredtointroducehimtoanyone.Ashesaidlater,all thatMadridhadtoldhimwas,“Lookafteryourself.”TheclubseemstohavetakenthestrangelymaterialisticviewthatAnelka’s salaryshoulddeterminehisbehavior.Buteven inmaterialistic terms, thatwasfoolish.Ifyoupay$35millionforanimmatureyoungemployee,itisbadmanagementtomakehimlookafterhimself.WengeratArsenalknewthat,andhehadAnelkaonthefieldscoringgoals.

Evenaplayerwithanormalpersonalitycanfindemigrationtricky.TyroneMears,anEnglishdefenderwhospentayearatMarseille,wherehisbestrelocationconsultantwashisteammateZenden,said,“Sometimesit’snotaproblemoftheplayeradapting.Alotofthetimesit’sthefamilyadapting.”Perhapstheplayer’sgirlfriendisunhappybecauseshecan’t find a job in the new town.Or perhaps she’s pregnant and doesn’t know how tonegotiatethelocalhospital,orperhapsshecan’tfindRiceKrispies(“orbeansontoast,”addedZenden,whentoldabouttheBlissettdrama).Theclubdoesn’tcare.Itispayingherboyfriendwell.Hesimplyhastoperform.

Soccer clubs never used to botherwith anything like anHRdepartment.As late asabout 2005, there were only a few relocation consultants in soccer, and most weren’tcalledthat,andwerenothiredbyclubs.Insteadtheyworkedeitherforplayers’agentsorforsportswearcompanies.IfNikeorAdidasispayingaplayertowearitsshoes,itneedshimtosucceed.Iftheplayermovestoaforeignclub,thesportswearcompany—knowingthat theclubmightnotbother—sometimessendsaminder to live in that townand lookafterhim.

The minder gives the player occasional presents, acts as his secretary, friend, andshrink, and remembers hiswife’s birthday.Theminder of a youngmidfielderwhowasstrugglinginhisfirstweeksatMilansaidthathismaintask,whentheplayercamehomefromtrainingfrustrated,lonely,andconfusedbyItaly,wasto takehimout todinner.Atdinnertheplayerwouldgrumbleandsay,“TomorrowI’mgoingtotell thecoachwhatIreallythinkofhim,”andtheminderwouldsay,“Thatmightnotbesuchabrilliantidea.Here,havesomemorelinguineallevongole.”Tomostplayers,thissortofthingcomesasabonusinastressfullife.Toafew,itisessential.

Yearsafterinternationaltransfersbecamestandard,mostclubsstilldidnothingaboutrelocation.DidierDrogbainhisautobiographyrecountsjoiningChelseafromOlympique

Marseille in 2004 for $44 million. He writes, “I plunged into problems linked to mysituationasanexpatriate.Chelseadidn’tnecessarilyhelpme.”Nobodyattheclubcouldhelphimfindaschoolforhischildren.AllChelseadidtogethimahousewasputhimintouchwith a real estate agentwho tried to sell himone for$18million.For “weeksofirritation”theDrogbafamilylivedinahotelwhileDrogba,whoatthatpointbarelyspokeEnglish,wenthousehuntingafterpractice.

All Chelsea’s expensive foreign signings had much the same experience, Drogbawrites. “We sometimes laughed about itwithGallas,Makelele,Kezman,Geremi. ‘Youtoo,you’restilllivinginahotel?’Afteralltheseworries,Ididn’tfeellikeintegrating[atChelsea]ormultiplyingmyefforts.”

Chelseawasnoworsethanotherclubs.ThesamesummerDrogbaarrivedinLondon,Wayne Rooney moved thirty-five miles up the motorway from Everton toManchesterUnitedandhadanalmostequallydisorientingexperience.Unitedhadpaid$49millionforhimbutthenstuckitseighteen-year-oldstarassetinahotelroom.“LivinginsuchaplaceIfoundhorrible,”reportsRooneyinhisMyStorySoFar.Thenearestthingtoarelocationconsultant he found at United seems to have been a teammate: “Gary Neville tried topersuademetobuyoneofhishouses.Idon’tknowhowmanyhehas,orwhetherhewasboastingorwindingmeup,buthekepttellingmeaboutthesepropertieshehad.”

AtaconferenceinRomein2008,relocationconsultantsliterallylineduptotelltheirhorrorstoriesaboutsoccer.Lotsofthemhadtriedtogetintothesportandbeenrebuffed.ADanish relocatorhadbeen toldbyFCCopenhagen thather servicesweren’t requiredbecausetheplayers’wivesalwayshelpedoneanothersettle.Manyclubshadneverevenheardofrelocation.Moreover,theyhadneverhiredrelocationconsultantsbefore,sogiventhe logicof soccer, not hiring relocation consultantsmust be the right thing todo.OneSwedishrelocatorsurmised,“Iguessitcomesdowntothefactthattheyseetheplayersasmerchandise.”

Theonlyrelocationconsultantswhohadpenetratedsoccerhappenedtohaveafriendinsideaclubor,inthecaseofoneGreekwoman,hadmarriedaclubowner.Shehadtoldherhusband,“All theseguyswouldbehappierifyoufindoutwhattheirneedsare,andaddresstheirneeds.”

Another relocatorhadenteredaGermanclubas a language teacher andworkedherwayup.Shesaid,“Iwas theirmother, theirnurse, their realestateagent, theircleaninglady, their everything.Theydidn’thavea car; theydidn’t speak the language.”Didherwork help them play better? “Absolutely.” The club was happy for her to work as anamateur,butassoonasshefoundedarelocationcompany,itdidn’twantheranymore.Shehadbecomethreatening.

Andsocountlessnewsigningscontinuedtoflopabroad.Clubsoftenanticipatedthisby avoiding players who seemed particularly ill-equipped to adjust. For instance, onaverage Brazilians are the world’s best players. Yet historically, English clubs rarelybought them,becauseBraziliansdon’tspeakEnglish,don’t likecoldweather,anddon’ttendtounderstandthecoretraditionsofEnglishsoccer,likedrinkingtwentypintsofbeerinanight.FewBraziliansadjusteasilytoEnglishsoccer.

InsteadofBrazilians,English clubs traditionallyboughtScandinavians.Onaverage,Scandinavians areworse soccer players thanBrazilians, but they are very familiarwithEnglish,coldweather,andtwentypintsofbeer.ScandinaviansadaptedtoEngland,andsothe clubs bought them. But the clubs were missing a great opportunity. Anyone whoboughtagreatBrazilianplayerandhiredagoodrelocationconsultanttohelphimadjustwouldbeontoawinner.Yetfewclubsdid.YearsusedtogobywithoutanyEnglishclubbuyingaBrazilian.

In2008ManchesterCitytookagambleonRobinho.AsaBrazilianforwardwhohadhadhismomentsintheWorldCupof2006,hewasboundtobeovervalued,andwasalsoverylikelytorelocatebadly.Soit’s littlewonderthatCitypaidaBritishrecordtransferfeeof$55millionforhim,orthateighteenmonthslateritgaveuponhimandsenthimhome to Santos on loan. Robinho never returned to English soccer. The experienceobviously taught City a lesson, because for the next two years the club switched to apolicyofbuyingonlyplayerswhohadalreadyestablishedthemselvesinEngland.Italsofinallybegantotakerelocationseriously.

Bitbybitinrecentyears,thesoccerbusinesshasstartedtobecomesmarter.Waybackin the mid-1990s, Liverpool had become one of the first clubs to hire some sort ofemployee tohelpnewplayerssettle.AjaxAmsterdamwasanotherpioneer.ThewomanwhofirsthandledrelocationsatAjaxfoundthatsomeoftheproblemsofnewplayerswereabsurdly easy to solve.When Steven Pienaar and another young South African playercame to Amsterdam, they were teenagers, had never lived on their own before, andsuddenlyfoundthemselvessharinganapartmentinacoldcountryattheotherendoftheearth. Inevitably, they put their music speakers on the bare floor and cranked up thevolume.Inevitably,theneighborscomplained.TheSouthAfricanshadamiserabletimeintheir building, until the woman from Ajax came around to see what was wrong andsuggestedtheyputtheirspeakersonatableinstead.Theydid.Thenoisediminished,theirlivesgoteasier,andthatmightjusthavemadethembetterabletoperformforAjax.

MostclubsinthePremierLeaguenowhave“playerliaisonofficers”—soccercodeforrelocation consultants. Some of these officers are full-timers, others not. Some do aserious job. Manchester City in particular learned from Robinho’s failure. When wevisitedtheclub’straininggroundin2012,onawalljustbehindreceptionwesawamapofManchester’s surroundings, designed to catch the eyes of passing players. The maphighlightedeightrecommendedwealthytownsandsuburbsforthemtolive;notonthelistwasManchester’scitycenterwithitsvibrantnightlife.

Theserecommendationsarejustthestart.City’s“player-caredepartment”aimstotakecareofalmosteveryneedanewimmigrantmighthave,whetherit’sanannyora“discreetcarservice.”Evenbeforeanewplayersigns,theclubhasalreadyresearchedhisoff-dutyhabitsandhisgirlfriend’stasteinrestaurants.Whenhearrivesforpreseasontraining,theclubmightsaytohim,“Well,you’regoingtobebusyforacoupleofweeks,buthere’salittle restaurant your girlfriend might like.” It’s not true that behind every successfulsoccerplayerthereisahappywife,butitprobablydoeshelp.AnyLatinplayersneedingadditional help could consult City’s Argentine fullback Pablo Zabaleta, who after four

MancunianyearswasconsideredpracticallyEnglishbyhisteammates.

In2011CitysignedZabaleta’scompatriotSergioAgüero.Nobodydoubtedtheyoungstriker’stalent.However,manydoubtedwhetherhewouldadapttoEnglishfootballandrainy provincial life. His transfer fee of $61 million seemed a gamble, even forManchesterCity.ButAgüeroscoredtwiceondebut.HefinishedhisfirstEnglishseasonwith thirtygoals, including the last-second strike in the last gameof the season againstQueens Park Rangers that won City their first league title since 1968. In part, Agüerosucceeded thanks to City’s excellence at relocation. Gavin Fleig, the club’s head ofperformance analysis, told us: “The normal transition time for a foreign player isconsideredintheindustrytobeaboutayear.Normallythoseplayersareinahotelforthefirstthreemonths.WewereabletogetfromagreeingafeetoSergiolivinginhishousewithintwoweeks,withaSpanishsat-nav[GPS]systeminhiscar,linkedtotheSpanishcommunityinManchester.Wehadourprizeassetreadytogofromdayone.”

Still, a few clubs continue to neglect relocation. One player liaison officer in thePremier League told us, “Some verywell-knownmanagers have said tome they can’tunderstand why you can possibly need it. They have said, ‘Well, when I moved to aforeign country as a player I had to do itmyself.’Well, yes, but that doesn’tmean it’sright.Youprobablyhadtocleanboots,too,butnobodydoesthatnow.”

THENICESTTOWNINEUROPE:HOWOLYMPIQUELYONBOUGHTANDSOLDTHEIRWAYTOTHETOP

Ifyouhadtolocatethemiddle-classEuropeandreamanywhere,itwouldbeinLyon.It’satown the size of Oakland, about two-thirds of the way down France, nestled betweenriversjustwestoftheAlps.OnawarmJanuaryafternoon,drinkingcoffeeoutsideintheeighteenth-centuryPlaceBellecourwhere thebuildingsareasprettyas thewomen,youthink:nice.Here’sawealthytownwhereyoucanhaveagoodjob,niceweather,andabighousenearthemountains.

LyonalsohassomeofthebestrestaurantsinEurope,knownlocallyasbouchons,or“corks.” Even at the town’s soccer stadium you can have a wonderful three-coursepregamemealconsisting largelyof intestinesorheadcheese,unlessyouprefer toeatatlocalboyPaulBocuse’sbrasserieacross theroadand totter into thegrounds justbeforekickoff. And then, for a remarkable decade or so, you could watch some very decentsoccer,too.

Untilabout2000Lyonwasknownas thebirthplaceofcinemaandnouvellecuisine,butnotasasoccertown.Itwasjusttoobourgeois.Ifforsomereasonyouwantedsoccer,youdrovethirty-fivemilesdownthehighwaytogrittyproletarianSaint-Étienne.In1987OlympiqueLyon,orOL,orlesGones(theKids),wasplayinginFrance’sseconddivisionon an annual budget of about $3million. It was any old backwater provincial club inEurope.From2002through2008LyonruledFrenchsoccer.Theclub’sascentwasinlargepartastoryoftheinternationaltransfermarket.BetterthananyotherclubinEurope,forawhileLyonworkedouthowtoplaythemarket.

In 1987 Jean-Michel Aulas, a local software entrepreneur with the stark, grooved

features of a Roman emperor, became club president. Aulas had played fairly goodhandballasayoungmanandhadaseasonticketatOL.

“Ididn’tknowtheworldofsoccerwell,”headmittedtousin2007overabottleofOLmineralwater in his office beside the stadium (which hewas aiming to tear down andreplacewithabiggerone).Hadheexpectedthetransformationthathewrought?“No.”

Aulassetouttoimprovetheclubstepbystep.“Wetriedtoabstractthefactor‘time,’”heexplained.“Eachyearwefixasanaimtohavesportingprogress,andprogressofourfinancialresources.It’slikeacyclistriding:youcanovertakethepeopleinfrontofyou.”OthersinFrancepreferredtolikenAulasto“unbulldozer.”

In1987eventhelocalLyonnaisdidn’tcaremuchaboutlesGones.YoucouldliveinLyon without knowing that soccer existed. The club barely had a personality, whereasSaint-Étiennewas the “miners’ club” thathad suffered tragicdefeatsongreatEuropeannightsinthe1970s.Saint-Étienne’spresidentatthetimesaidthatwhenitcametosoccer,LyonwasasuburbofSaint-Étienne,aremarkthatstillrankles.AtonederbyafterLyon’sdomination began, les Gones’ fans unfurled a banner that told the Saint-Étiennesupporters,“Weinventedcinemawhenyourfathersweredyinginthemines.”

AulasappointedlocalboyRaymondDomenechashisfirstcoach.InDomenech’sfirstseason,OLfinishedat the topof theseconddivisionwithout losingagame.Rightafterthat it qualified for Europe. Aulas recalled, “At a stroke the credibility was total. Theprojectwasenroute.”

It turnedout that the second city inFrance, even if itwas a bit bourgeois,was justhungryenoughforadecentsoccerclub.TheLyonnaiswerewillingtobuymatchticketsifthings went well, but if things went badly, they weren’t immediately waving whitehandkerchiefsinthestandsanddemandingthatthepresidentormanagerorhalftheteambegottenridof.NordidtheFrenchmediatracktheclub’sdoingshourbyhour.It’smucheasiertobuildforthelongterminaplacelikethatthanina“soccercity”likeMarseilleorNewcastle.Moreover, playerswere happy tomove to a town that is hardly a hardshipposting.Almostnothing theygot into inLyonmade it into thegossippress.AnotherofLyon’s advantages: the locals had money. “It allowed us to have not just a ‘popularclientele,’butalsoa‘businessclientele,’”saidAulas.

TalkingaboutmoneyissomethingofatabooinFrance.Itisconsideredagrubbyandprivatetopic.Socially,you’reneversupposedtoaskanyoneaquestionthatmightrevealhowmuchsomebodyhas.Soccer,tomostFrenchfans,isnotsupposedtobeaboutmoney.Theyfindthenotionofawell-runsoccerclubhumorless,practicallyAmerican.

It therefore irritated them thatAulas talked about it so unabashedly.Hemight haveinventedthewordmoneyball.Aulas’s themewasthatover time, themoremoneyaclubmakes,themorematchesitwillwin,andthemorematchesitwins,themoremoneyitwillmake. In theshort termyoucan loseamatch,but in the long termthere isa rationalityeventosoccer.(Andtobaseball.AsMoneyballdescribesit,Beanebelievesthatwinning“issimplyamatteroffiguringouttheodds,andexploitingthelawsofprobability….Togetworkedupoverplays,orevengames,isasunproductiveasacasinomanagerworrying

overtheoutcomesofindividualpullsoftheslotmachines.”)

InAulas’s view, rationality in soccerworksmore or less like this: if you buy goodplayersforlessthantheyareworth,youwillwinmoregames.Youwillthenhavemoremoneytobuybetterplayersforlessthantheyareworth.Thebetterplayerswillwinyoumore matches, and that will attract more fans (and thus more money), because Aulasspotted early thatmost soccer fans everywhere aremuchmore like shoppers than likereligiousbelievers:iftheycangetabetterexperiencesomewherenew,theywillgothere.Hetoldusin2007,“Wesold110,000replicashirtslastseason.Thisseasonwearealreadyat200,000.IthinkOlympiqueLyonhasbecomebyfarthemostbelovedclubinFrance.”

Pollssuggestedhewasright:inSport+Markt’ssurveyofEuropeansupportersin2008,Lyonemergedasthecountry’smostpopularclubjustaheadofOlympiqueMarseille.Thispopularity was a new phenomenon. In 2002, when Lyon first became champions ofFrance, the overridingFrench emotion toward the club had still been, “Whatever.”TheeditorofFranceFootballmagazinecomplainedaroundthattimethatwhenLyonwonthetitle,hismagazinedidn’tsell.Butastheclubwonthetitleeveryyearfrom2002through2008—the longest period of domination by any club in any of Europe’s five biggestnationalleaguesever—manyFrenchfansbegantocareaboutthem.

Withmorefans,Lyonmademoremoney.OnmatchdaysyoucouldgetahaircutatanofficialOLsalon,drinkanOLBeaujolaisatanOLcafé,bookyourholidayatanOLtravelagency,andtakeanOLtaxitothegame—andmanypeopledid.Lyonusedthatmoneytobuybetterplayers.

But for all Aulas’s OL mineral water, what made the club’s rise possible was thetransfermarket.Onthatwarmwinter’safternooninLyon,Aulastoldus,“WewillinvestbetterthanChelsea,Arsenal,orRealMadrid.Wewillmakedifferentstrategicchoices.Forinstance,wewon’ttrytohavethebestteamonpaperintermsofbrand.Wewillhavethebestteamrelativetoourinvestment.”HereareLyon’srulesofthetransfermarket:

Use thewisdomofcrowds.WhenLyonwas thinkingofsigningaplayer,agroupofmenwouldsitdowntodebatethetransfer.Aulaswouldbethere,andBernardLacombe,onceabull-likecenterforwardforLyonandFrance,andformostofthepasttwenty-fiveyearstheclub’stechnicaldirector.LacombeisknownforhavingthebestpairofeyesinFrenchsoccer.HecoachedLyonfrom1997to2000,butAulasclearlyfiguredoutthatifyouhavesomeonewithhisknackforspottingtherighttransfer,youwanttokeephimattheclubforeverratherthanmakehisjobcontingentonfourlostmatches.ThesamewentforPeterTayloratForest.

Whoever happened to be Lyon’s head coach at the moment would sit in on themeeting, too, and sowould four or fiveother coaches. “Wehave a group that gives itsadvice,”Aulasexplained.“InEnglandthemanageroftendoesitalone.InFranceit’softenthetechnicaldirector.”Lacombetoldusthat thehouserulewasthatafter thegrouphadmadethedecision,everyonepresentwouldthenpubliclygetbehindthetransfer.

Like Lyon, the Oakland A’s sidelined their manager, too. Like Lyon, the A’sunderstoodthathewasmerely“amiddlemanager”obsessedwiththeveryshortterm.The

A’slethimwatchbaseball’sannualdraft.Theydidn’tlethimsayawordaboutit.

Lyon’smethod for choosing players is so obvious and smart that it’s surprising allclubsdon’tuseit.Thetheoryofthe“wisdomofcrowds”saysthatifyouaggregatemanydifferentopinionsfromadiversegroupofpeople,youaremuchmorelikelytoarriveatthebestopinionthanifyoujustlistentoonespecialist.Forinstance,ifyouaskadiversecrowdtoguesstheweightofanox,theaverageoftheirguesseswillbeverynearlyright.Ifyouaskadiversesetofgamblerstobeton,say,theoutcomeofapresidentialelection,the average of their bets is likely to be right, too. (Gambling markets have provedexcellent predictors of all sorts of outcomes.) The wisdom of crowds fails when thecomponents of the crowd are not diverse enough. This is often the case in Americansports.ButinEuropeansoccer,opinionstendtocomefrommanydifferentcountries,andthathelpsensurediversity.

CloughandTayloratleastwereacrowdoftwo.However,thetypicaldecision-makingmodelinEnglishsoccerisnot“wisdomofcrowds,”butshort-termdictatorship.Atmostclubs themanager is treated as a sort of divinely inspiredmonarchwho gets to decideeverythinguntilheissacked.Thenthenextmanagerclearsouthispredecessor’ssigningsatadiscount.Lyon,noteda rivalFrenchclubpresidentwithenvy,neverhadexpensivesigningsrottingonthebench.Itneverhadrevolutionsatall.Itunderstoodthatthecoachwasonlyatemp.OLwonitssevenconsecutivetitleswithfourdifferentcoaches—JacquesSantini, Paul Le Guen, Gérard Houllier, and Alain Perrin—none of whom, judging bytheir subsequent records, was exactly a Hegelian world-historical individual. When acoachleftLyon,notmuchchanged.Nomatterwhohappenedtobesittingonthebench,theteamalwaysplayedmuchthesamebrandofattackingsoccer(byFrenchstandards).

EmmanuelHembertgrewup inLyonsupportingOLwhen itwas still in the seconddivision. Later, as head of the sports practice of the management consultancy A. T.KearneyinLondon,hewasalwayscitingtheclubasanexampletohisclientsinsoccer.“Abigsecretofasuccessfulclubisstability,”Hembertexplainedovercoffee inParisafewyearsago.“InLyon, thestability isnotwith thecoach,butwith thesportsdirector,Lacombe.”

AnotherLyonrule: thebest time tobuyaplayer iswhenhe is inhisearly twenties.Aulas said, “We buy young playerswith potentialwho are considered the best in theircountry, between twenty and twenty-two years old.” It’s almost as if he has readMoneyball.Thebookkeepsbanging away about a truthdiscoveredbyBill James,whowrote,“Collegeplayersareabetterinvestmentthanhighschoolplayersbyahuge,huge,laughablyhugemargin.”

Baseballclubstraditionallypreferredtodrafthighschoolplayers.Buthowgoodyouareatseventeenoreighteenisapoorpredictorofhowgoodyouwillbecomeasanadult.Bydefinition,whenaplayeristhatyoungthereisstilltoolittleinformationtojudgehim.Beane himself had been probably the hottest baseball prospect in the United States atseventeen, but hewas already declining in his senior year at high school, and he thenfailed in the major leagues. Watching the 2002 draft as the A’s general manager, he“puncheshisfistintheair”eachtimerivalteamsdraftschoolboys.

It’s the same in soccer, where brilliant teenagers tend to disappear soon afterward.Hereareafewwinnersof theGoldenBall forbestplayerat theunder-seventeenWorldCup: Philip Osundo of Nigeria,William deOliveira of Brazil, Nii Lamptey of Ghana,Scottishgoalkeeper JamesWill, andMohammedal-KathiriofOman.Onceupona timetheymust have all beenbrilliant, but noneof themmade it as adults. (Will endedup apolicemanintheScottishHighlandsplayingforhisvillageteam.)ThemostfamouscaseofateenagerwhoflamedoutisAmericanFreddyAdu,whoatfourteenwasthenextPeléandMaradona.

Onlyahandfulofworld-classplayersineachgeneration,mostofthemcreators—Pelé,Maradona,Wayne Rooney, LionelMessi, Cesc Fabregas—reach the top by the age ofeighteen.Mostplayersgetthereconsiderablylater.Almostalldefendersandgoalkeepersdo.Youcanbeconfidentoftheirpotentialonlywhentheyaremoremature.

Beaneknowsthatbythetimebaseballplayersareincollege—whichtendstoputtheminLyon’smagical age range of twenty to twenty-two—you have a pretty good idea ofwhattheywillbecome.Thereisalotofinformationaboutthem.Theyhavegrownupabit.Theyareoldenoughtobenearlyfullyformed,but tooyoungtobeexpensivestars.FIFA TMS analyzed international transfers to England in 2013 and found that playersmovingatagestwentytotwenty-twowere18percentcheaperthanplayersagestwenty-five to twenty-seven.Betteryet, theyoungerplayers tended tohave lower salaries, andhigherfutureresalevalues.

Lyonalwaystriedtoavoidpayingapremiumforastarplayer’s“name.”Here,again,itwasluckytobeaclubfromaquiettown.Itsplacidsupportersandlocalmediadidn’tdemandstars.Bycontrast,theformerchairmanofaclubinamuchmoreraucousFrenchcity recalls, “I ran [theclub]with themission tocreatea spectacle. Itwasn’t tobuildaprojectfortwentyyearstocome.”Ateamfromabigcitytendstoneedbigstars.

Soccer being barely distinguishable from baseball, the same split between big andsmalltownsoperatesinthatsport,too.“Big-marketteams,”liketheBostonRedSoxandthe NewYork Yankees, hunt players with names. Their media and fans demand it. InMoneyball,Lewis calls this the pathologyof “many foolish teams that thought all theirquestions could be answered by a single player.” (It’s a pathology that may soundstrangely familiar to European soccer fans.) By contrast, the Oakland A’s, as a small-market team, were free to forgo stars. As Lewis writes, “Billy may not care for theOaklandpressbutit isreallyverytamenexttotheBostonpress,anditcertainlyhasnoeffectonhisbehavior,other than to infuriatehimonceaweekor so.OaklandA’s fans,too,wereapatheticcomparedtothemaniacsinFenwayParkorYankeeStadium.”ButasBeane told us,English soccer is “evenmore emotional” than baseball. “It’s the biggestsportintheworld,”hesaid.“Andthat’sthebiggestleagueintheworld,andthenyouputin sixtymillion people and a four-hour drive from north to south, and that’swhat youhave.”

That’swhymostEnglish soccerclubsarealwaysbeingpushedby their fans tobuystars.Happyistheclubthathasnoneedofheroes.LyonwasfreetobuyyoungunknownslikeMichaelEssien,FlorentMalouda,orMahamadouDiarrajustbecausetheyweregood.

And unknowns accept modest salaries. According to the French sports newspaperL’Equipe, inthe2007–2008seasonLyonspentonly31percentofitsbudgetonplayers’pay. The average in the English Premier Leaguewas about double that. LikeClough’sForest,Lyonformanyyearsperformedthemagictrickofwinningthingswithoutpayingsillysalaries.

Hereare a fewmoreofLyon’s secrets.First, trynot tobuycenter forwards.Centerforward is themost overpriced position in the transfermarket. (Goalkeeper is themostunderpriced,eventhoughkeepershavelongercareersthanoutfieldplayers;inbaseballthemostoverpricedpositionpre-Moneyballwaspitcher.)AdmittedlyLyon“announced”itselftosoccerbybuyingtheBraziliancenterforwardSonnyAndersonfor$19millionin1999,but the club mostly scrimped on the position afterward. Houllier left OL in 2007grumblingthatevenaftertheclubsoldMaloudaandEricAbidalforacombinedtotalof$45million,Aulasstillwouldn’tbuyhimacenterforward.

Second,helpyourforeignsigningsrelocate.AllsortsofgreatBrazilianshavepassedthroughLyon:SonnyAnderson;thelongtimeclubcaptain,Cris;thefutureinternationalsJuninhoandFred;andtheworldchampionEdmilson.Mostwerebarelyknownwhentheyjoinedtheclub.Aulasexplainedthesecret:“Wesentoneofouroldplayers,Marcelo,toBrazil.Hewasanextraordinaryman,becausehewasbothanengineerandaprofessionalsoccerplayer.Hewas captainofLyon for fiveyears.Thenhebecameanagent, butheworksquasi-exclusivelyforOL.Heindicatesallmarketopportunitiestous.”Asajudgeofplayers,MarcelowasclearlyintheLacombeorPeterTaylorclass.

Marcelo said he scouted only “serious boys.”Or as the former president of a rivalFrenchclubputsit,“Theydon’tselectplayersjustfortheirqualitybutfortheirabilitytoadapt.Ican’tseeLyonrecruitinganAnelkaoraRonaldinho.”

AfterLyonsignedtheseriousboys,itmadesuretheysettled.Drogbanotedenviously,“AtLyon,a translator takescareof theBrazilians,helps them to findahouse,get theirbearings,triestoreduceasmuchaspossiblethenegativeeffectsofmoving….EvenataplaceofthecalibreofChelsea,thatdidn’texist.”

Lyon’s “translator,” who worked full-time for the club, sorted out the players’homesickness, bank accounts, nouvelle cuisine, andwhatever else. Other people at theclub taught the newcomers Lyon’s culture: no stars or showoffs. By concentrating onBrazilians,theclubcouldofferthematailor-maderelocationservice.AlmostalltheotherforeignplayersLyonboughtspokeFrench.

Finally,sellanyplayerifanothercluboffersmorethanheisworth.ThisiswhatAulasmeant when he said, “Buying and selling players is not an activity for improving thesoccerperformance.It’satradingactivity,inwhichweproducegrossmargin.Ifanofferforaplayerisgreatlysuperiortohismarketvalue,youmustnotkeephim.”TheghostofPeterTaylorwouldapprove.

Like Clough and Taylor, and like Billy Beane, Lyon never got sentimental aboutplayers.Intheclub’sannualaccounts, itbookedeachplayerforacertaintransfervalue.(Beanesays,“Knowexactlywhateveryplayerinbaseballisworthtoyou.Youcanputa

dollar figure on it.”) Lyon knew that sooner or later its best players would attractsomebodyelse’sattention.Becausetheclubexpectedtosellthem,itreplacedthemevenbeforetheywent.FergusonatUnitedalsopursuedastrategyofearlyreplacement:“Ididfeelsentimentalaboutgreatplayersleavingus.Atthesametime,myeyewouldalwaysbeonaplayerwhowascomingtoanend.Aninternalvoicewouldalwaysask,‘When’shegoingtoleave,howlongwillhelast?’Experiencetaughtmetostockpileyoungplayersinimportantpositions.”

Bringinginreplacementsbeforetheyareneededavoidsatransitionperiodorapanicpurchaseaftertheplayer’sdeparture.Aulasexplained,“Wewillreplacetheplayerinthesquad sixmonths or a year before. So whenMichael Essien goes [to Chelsea for $43million],wealreadyhaveacertainnumberofplayerswhoarereadytoreplacehim.Then,whentheopportunitytobuyTiagoarises,for25percentofthepriceofEssien,youtakehim.”

Before Essien’s transfer in 2005,Aulas spentweeks proclaiming that theGhanaianwas“untransferable.”Healwayssaidthatwhenhewasabouttotransferaplayer,becauseitdroveuptheprice.Inhiswords,“EveryinternationalatLyonisuntransferable.Untiltheoffersurpassesbyfartheamountwehadexpected.”

ABSTINENCE:JUSTSAYNOTOTRANSFERS

There’s one other kind of mastery of the transfer market to discuss: abstinence. Someclubs—notablyBarcelona formost of this century—understand the inefficiencies of thetransfermarketandthereforeavoidbuyingplayerswhereverpossible.Theseclubstrytojustsayno.

OneSaturdaylunchtimeinJuly2009wecaughtupwithJoanOliverinhisofficeattheNouCamp.Barcelona’s thenCEO had escaped there for a rare bit of peace and quiet,awayfromthemadnessofthesummertransfermarket.

Barça’saim,Olivertoldus,was“tohaveoneofthebest,perhapsthebest,teamintheworld,without having to spendXmillion on players. The image of that is the final inRome this year [against Manchester United], with a team of seven players from ouracademy. The total acquisition cost of our team has been—I don’t remember, butsomething below 70million euros.” (In 2011 Barça againwon the Champions Leaguefinal,havingstartedthegamewithsevenhomegrownplayers.)

Itmayseemoddthatabig-cityclublikeBarcelonacanmostlyabstainfromthemarket—buying one great player for a large fee every year or so rather than constantlyoverhaulingitsteam.Afterall,wehaveseenthatotherbigclubswithafrenziedlocalfanbaseandmediaarepractically forced tokeepbuying“stars.”Barcelona fordecadesdidthesamething.Butthen,underPresidentJoanLaportafrom2003,theclubbegantomakegreater use of its peculiar profile. Barça presents itself as “the unarmed army ofCatalonia.”That imagemeansalot totheclub’sfans.ItmeanstheyareashappytoseelocalboyslikeSergioBusquets(sonofaBarçagoalkeeper)orGerardPiqué(grandsonofaBarçadirector)breakintotheteamastheyaretoseeaforeignstarbrandishinghisnewshirtattheflashbulbsofthelocalnewspapers.AndsoBarcelonadiscoveredthatitcould

please its fans by avoiding transfers and bringing in kids instead. The club’s mostsuccessfulcoach,JosepGuardiola,waspraisedforhiswillingnesstothrowteenagersintothefirstteam,buthecoulddoitbecausethecrowdsupportedthepolicy.Oliversaidoftherelianceontheclub’sacademy,theMasia,“It’snotonlyaneconomicstrategy.It’spartoftheidentityoftheclub.”GrowingitsownplayersboostsBarcelona’sbrand,andthebrandmakestheclubmoney.

There’sanotheradvantagetoshunningthetransfermarket,Oliveradded.Hecalleditthe“one-secondrule.”Thesuccessofamoveonthepitchisdecidedinlessthanasecond.If a player needs a few extra fractions of a second towork outwhere his teammate isgoing,becausehedoesn’tknowtheotherguy’sgamewell, themovewillusuallybreakdown. You can therefore lose a match in under a second. A corollary of that, thoughtOliver,isthatanewsigningislikelytounderperforminhisfirstseason.Thenewmanisstillworkingoutwhathisroleintheteamis,andwhateveryoneelseistryingtodo.Thatmeansthatifyoudobuyaplayer,it’sonlyworthitifyoukeephimaroundforthelongerterm.

All this sounds worthy, and easy to say when things are going well. However,Barcelonainrecentyearshaslargelystucktotheseprincipleseveninbadtimes.Afterthefailed2007–2008season,whenanotherclubmighthaveloadeduponstars,BarcelonadidbuyDaniAlvesfor$50million,butitalsosoldtwoofitsbiggestnames,RonaldinhoandDeco.Whentheclubdoesbuy,itrightlytendstofocuson“topten”players:menwhoarearguablyamongthetenbestfootballersonearth,suchasZlatanIbrahimovic,DavidVilla,Fabregas,orNeymar.Thoseplayerscostalot,buttheriskoftheirfailingissmall(unlessyoubuythemwhentheyaregettingold,likeThierryHenry).Partofbeingoneofthetenbestplayersonearthisthatyouperformalmostwhateverthecircumstances.

Oliver and Laporta have since been ousted, but Barcelona still tries to field anunchanginghomegrowncoresupplementedonlybyrare(andusuallyexpensive)transfers.Abstinenceworks forBarça.Other big clubs likeManchesterUnited andChelsea havealsorecentlytriedtokeepthecoresoftheirteamstogetherforyearsatatime.Thismaybeanewtrendinsoccer.Nonetheless,manyotherclubsarestillwithSaintAugustine:“Givemechastityandcontinence,Lord,butnotyet.”

“Theproblemwith the footballbusiness,”saidOliver,“is thatusually it ismanagedwith very, very short-term goals. After a bad year, it’s very difficult not to fall in thetemptation of buying a lot of people. Clubs spend irrationally and compulsively onplayers.Andthat’sverydifficult torestrain.Youhavealwaysthetemptationofthinkingthat if you buy two or three players, perhaps you will reverse the situation. That wasperhaps the caseofChelsea in thepast, and the caseofManchesterCityor, I think, ofRealMadridnow.”

Ifclubsfeelboundtocontinuetobuyplayers,wecanatleastofferthemafreeservice.Herearethetwelvemainsecretsofthetransfermarketinfull:

Anewmanagerwastesmoneyontransfers;don’tlethim.

Usethewisdomofcrowds.

StarsofrecentWorldCupsorEuropeanchampionshipsareovervalued; ignorethem.

Certainnationalitiesareovervalued.

Olderplayersareovervalued.

Centerforwardsareovervalued;goalkeepersareundervalued.

Gentlemenpreferblonds:identifyandabandon“sight-basedprejudices.”

Thebesttimetobuyaplayeriswhenheisinhisearlytwenties.

Sellanyplayerwhenanothercluboffersmorethanheisworth.

Replaceyourbestplayersevenbeforeyousellthem.

Buy players with personal problems, and then help them deal with theirproblems.

Helpyourplayersrelocate.

Alternatively,clubscouldjuststickwiththeconventionalwisdom.

*Anoteaboutcurrencies:almostalwaysinthisbook,wehavecitedsumsofmoneyindollars.Whenconvertingfrompoundsorothercurrencies,wehaveusedthedollarequivalentatthetimethesumwasspent.(ABritishpoundboughtmoredollarsin1980thanin2013,forinstance.)

3THEWORSTBUSINESSINTHEWORLDWhySoccerClubsDon’t(andShouldn’t)MakeMoney

AmanweknowoncetriedtodobusinesswithareveredinstitutionofEnglishsoccer.“Ican do business with stupid people,” he said afterward, “and I can do business withcrooks.ButIcan’tdobusinesswithstupidpeoplewhowanttobecrooks.”

It was a decent summary of the soccer business, if you can call soccer a business.Peopleoftendo.WilliamMcGregor,theScottishdraperwhofoundedtheEnglishFootballLeaguein1888,wasprobablythefirstpersontodescribesocceras“bigbusiness,”butthephrasehassincebecomeoneof thegame’sgreatclichés.Infact,McGregorwaswrong.Soccerisneitherbigbusinessnorgoodbusiness.Itarguablyisn’tevenbusinessatall.

“BIGBUSINESS”

Few people have heard of United Natural Foods. The company was formed out of amergeroftwofooddistributorsin1996.Todayitdistributesnatural,organic,andspecialtyfoods,andithasdonewelloutoftheriseoffoodiesinNorthAmerica.Still,ithasn’tquitemade itswayonto the list of the fivehundredbigpublicly tradedAmerican companiesthatmakeup theS&P500. Itsannual revenues for theyear toAugust2013were$6.06billion,fornetincomeof$108million.UnitedNaturalFoods,whoseheadquartersareonIron HorseWay in Providence, Rhode Island, is not big business. For comparison: in2012–2013thebiggestcompanyintheS&P500,Wal-MartStores,hadrevenuesthatweremorethanseventy-fivetimesbigger.

ButUnitedNaturalFoodsisamuchlargerbusinessthananysoccerclubonearth.InSeptember2013RealMadridreportedrecordrevenuesof€520.9million(or$688million)forthefiscalyear2012–2013.That’satidysum,morethananyotherclubinanysporthaseverachieved.However,it’sjustone-eighthofUnitedNaturalFoods’revenues,andbarely0.2 percent the size ofWal-Mart’s. To put it very starkly: the Finnish financial analystMatiasMöttöläcalculates that in termsof revenue,RealMadridwouldstillonlybe the120thlargestcompanyinFinland(acountrywithapopulationofjust5.4millionpeople,oraboutthesameasMinnesota).

It’sworthnoting,too,thatDeloitte’s“FootballMoneyLeague”ranksclubsbasedonhowmuchtheysell.Whenbusinessanalystsjudgenormalcompanies,theyusuallyfocusonprofits,orthecompany’svalueifitweresoldonthemarket.However,neitherofthosemethods works with soccer clubs. Because hardly any clubs are quoted on the stockmarketanymore, forextremelygood reasons, it ishard toworkout theirvalue.WecancertainlysaythatnotevenRealMadridorBarcelona—Deloitte’stoptwoin2013—wouldgetanywhereneartheS&P500.

AndifDeloitterankedclubsbytheirprofits, theresultswouldbeembarrassing.Notonlydomost clubsmake lossesand fail topayanydividends to their shareholders,but

manyof the“bigger”clubswould ranknear thebottomof the list.Chasingprizes, theyspendthemselvesintothered.

Whichever way you measure it, no soccer club is a big business. Even Madrid,Barcelona, andManchesterUnited aredwarfedbyUnitedNaturalFoods.As for all therest, the authorAlexFynnnoted in the1990s that the averageEnglishPremierLeagueclubhadaboutthesamerevenueasaBritishsupermarket—notachainofsupermarkets,butonesingle largeTescostore.True,soccerclubshavegrownsince then:by2012 theaverage club in the Premier League had a turnover of nearly $190 million. However,Tesco has around twenty superstores that each generate more revenue than this.Rememberalso thatPremierLeagueclubsare thegiantsofglobal soccer.UEFA’smostrecentannualclub licensing report found that theaverage revenueof the235clubs thatplayinUEFAcompetitionswasamere€33million($44million).

AgoodwaytovisualizethesizeofthesoccerindustryistovisittheheadquartersofUEFA, theEuropeansoccerassociation, in theSwiss townofNyon.ThebuildinghasalovelyviewofLakeGeneva,but it looks like theofficesofasmall insurancecompany.Soccerissmallbusiness.

This feels like a contradiction.We all know that soccer is huge. Some of themostfamouspeopleonearth are soccerplayers, and themostwatched televisionprogram inhistoryisgenerallythemostrecentWorldCupfinal.Nonetheless,soccerclubsarepunybusinesses.Thisispartlyaproblemofwhateconomistscallappropriability:soccerclubscan’tmakemoneyoutof(can’tappropriate)morethanatinyshareofourloveofsoccer.

Itmaybe that season ticketsareexpensiveand replicashirtsoverpriced,butbuyingthese things once a year represents the extravagant extreme of soccer fanaticism.Mostsocceriswatchednotfrom$1,500seatsinthestadiumbutonTV—sometimesatthepriceofasubscription,oftenatthepriceofwatchingafewcommercials,orforthepriceofacoupleofbeers inabar.Comparethecostofwatchingagameinabarwith thecostofeatingoutorwatchingamovie,letalonegoingonvacation.

Worsestill,soccergenerateslittleincomefromrerunsofmatchesortransferstoDVD.Andwatchingsoccer (evenonTV) isonlya tinypartof the fan’sengagementwith thegame.Therearenewspaperreportstoberead,Internetsitestobetrawled,andagrowingarrayofcomputergamestokeepupwith.Thenthereisthesoccerbanterthatpassestimeatthedinnertable,work,orthebusstop.Allthisentertainmentismadepossiblebysoccerclubs,but theyusuallycannotappropriateapennyof thevalueweattach to it.Chelseacannot charge us for talking or reading or thinking about Chelsea. As the Dutchinternational Demy de Zeeuw says, “There are complaints that we [players] earn toomuch, but the whole world earns money from your success as a player: newspapers,television,companies.”Infact,theworldearnsmorefromsoccerthanthesoccerindustryitselfdoes.

BADBUSINESS

Soccerisnotmerelyasmallbusiness.It’salsoabadone.Untilveryrecently,andtosomedegreestilltoday,anyonewhospentanytimeinsidesoccersoondiscoveredthatjustasoil

waspartoftheoilbusiness,stupiditywaspartofthesoccerbusiness.

This becameobviouswhenpeople in soccer encounteredpeople in other industries.Generally the soccerpeoplegotexploitedbecausepeople inother industriesunderstoodbusiness better. In 1997PeterKenyon, then chief executive of the sportswear companyUmbro,invitedafewgueststowatchaEuropeangameatChelsea,theclubhewouldenduprunningafewyearslater.Afterthegame,Kenyontookhisguestsoutfordinner.Overcurryhereminiscedabouthowthesportswearindustryusedtotreatsoccerclubs.Beforethe1980s,hesaid,bigEnglishclubsused topay companies likeUmbro to supply theirclothing.ItwasobviouslygreatadvertisingforthegearmakerstohavesomeofEngland’sbestplayersrunningaroundintheirclothes,buttheclubshadnotyetfiguredthatout.Andsosportswearcompaniesusedtogetpaidtoadvertisethemselves.

In fact,whenEnglandhosted theWorldCup in1966, ithopedmerely that itsusualsupplier would give it a discount on shoes and shirts, “particularly in the openingceremony…withtheQueenpresent,”writesMihirBoseinTheSpiritoftheGame.Asithappened, theEnglish did even better:Umbro offered to supply the team for free. ThecompanymusthavebeenpleasedwhenEnglandbecameworldchampion.

RickyGeorge saw the ignoranceof soccer in thosedays frompoint-blank range. In1972, when George scored the famous goal for little semiprofessional Hereford thatknockedNewcastleoutoftheFACup,hewasworkingforAdidasasa“soccerPR.”Hisjob was to represent Adidas to England players, former world champions like BobbyMoore,BobbyCharlton, andGordonBanks. Therewas little need to persuade them tochooseAdidas.Mostof themworethethreestripesforfreeanyway.Georgesays,“It isquitea fascinating thing ifyoucompare itwith today.Therewerenogreat sponsorshipdealsgoingon.Allthathappenedisthatyouwouldgivetheplayersboots.Buteventhen,atthebeginningofeveryseasontheclubswouldgototheirlocalsportsretailerandjustbuytwenty,thirtypairsofbootsandhandthemout.ForacompanylikeAdidas,itwasthecheapesttypeofPRyoucouldimagine.”

Only on special occasions didGeorge have to pay players. “When it came to a biginternational,andthegamewasgoingtobetelevised,myjobwastogototheteamhotel,hangaroundthere,makemyselfknown,andacoupleofhoursbeforethegameIwouldgointotheplayers’roomsandpaintthewhitestripesontheirbootswithluminouspaintsoitwasmorevisible.Mybossesusedtobekeenlywatchingthetelevisiontomakesurethestripeswerevisible,andiftheyweren’tIwouldbeinforbollocking.”

For this service, an England player would receive seventy-five pounds per match,which was then about two hundred dollars—not a princely sum even in 1972. Georgerecalls,“Bobby[Moore],themostcharmingofpeople,didn’ttakethemoneyonthedayofthegame.Hejustusedtosaytome,‘Letitbuildupforafewgames,andI’llringyouwhenIneedit.’Andthat’swhathedid.”Thenthemostfamousdefenderoftheerawouldpocketacumulativefewhundreddollarsforhavingadvertisedaninternationalbrandtoacumulativeaudienceoftensofmillions.

Only in the late1980sdidEnglishsoccerclubsdiscover thatpeoplewerewilling tobuyreplicasoftheirteamshirts.Thatmadeitplaineventothemthattheirgearmusthave

some value. They had already stopped paying sportswear companies for the stuff; nowtheystartedtochargethem.

Graduallyovertime,soccerclubshavefoundnewwaysofmakingmoney.However,theideasalmostnevercamefromtheclubsthemselves.Whetheritwasbrandedclothing,orthegamblingpools,ortelevision,itwasusuallypeopleinotherindustrieswhofirstsawtheremightbeprofitstobemade.ItwasRupertMurdochwhowenttoEnglishclubsandsuggestedputting themonsatelliteTV; theclubswouldneverhave thoughtofgoing tohim.Infact,theclubsoftenfoughtagainstnewmoneymakingschemes.Until1982theyrefusedtoallowanyleaguegamestobeshownliveonTV,fearingthatitmightdeterfansfromcomingtothestadium.Theycouldn’tgraspthatgamesontelevisionmeantbothfreemoneyandfreeadvertising.ThereisnowagooddealofresearchintothequestionofhowmanyfansarelostwhenagameisshownonTV.Almostalltheevidenceshowsthatthenumber is tiny, and that the gate revenue that would be lost is usually well below theamountthatwouldbemadefromsellingextramatchesfortelevisioncoverage.

It took clubs a long time to realize just howmuch soccer was worth to television.WhenGregDykewaschairmanoftheUK’sITVSportinthe1980s,heofferedfivebigclubs£1millioneachfortheTVrightsforEnglishsoccer.Dyke,whotodayischairmanofEngland’s Football Association, fondly recalls: “It’s funny now, when you look at themoney that’s involved: these chairmen had eyes bulging. They couldn’t believe it.” Intotal,DykeboughttheentireTVrightsforEnglishprofessionalsoccerfor£12millionayear—abitunder$20millionatthetime.Soonafterward,hewentuptoNottinghamtotrytotalkBrianClough,Forest’sthenmanager,intocomingbackonTVasapundit.WhenDykearrivedattheclub,Cloughcameuptohimandsaid:“Thankyou.Iwanttoshakeyourhand,Mr.Dyke,becauseyou’re thefirstpersonthat’sgivenfootballwhat it’sdue:twelvemillionquid.”

In1992RupertMurdochbeganpayingabout$100millionaseasonforthetelevisionrights to the new Premier League. Now the league gets nearly thirty times as much aseason fromworldwideTV. “I’ve been screwed by television,” admitted Sir JohnHall,thentheNewcastlechairman,onerowdynightatTrinityCollegeDublinin1995.“ButI’lltellyouonething:Iwon’tbescrewedagain.”

Or take the renovation of English stadiums in the early 1990s. It was an obviousbusinessidea.Supermarketsdon’treceivecustomersinshedsbuiltintheVictorianeraandgonetoseedsince.Theyareforeverrenovatingtheirstores.Yetsoccerclubsneverseemto have thought of spending money on their grounds until the Taylor Report of 1990forcedthemto.Theydiduptheirstadiums,andbingo:morecustomerscame.

All this proves how much like consumers soccer fans are. It’s not that they comerunningwhenateamdoeswell.Rather,itseemsthatsoccercanquicklybecomepopularacrossawholecountry.Allteamsthenbenefit,butparticularlythosethatbuildnicenewstadiumswhere spectators feel comfortable and safe.Thatwould explainwhy the threeEnglish clubs whose crowds grew fastest over the 1990s were Manchester United,Sunderland,andNewcastle.Later,whenArsenalmovedfromHighburytothemuchlargerEmirates,thenewstadiumfilledupdespitethefactthattheclubstoppedwinningprizes.

Inotherleagues,clubssuchasJuventus,Ajax,andCeltichavealsodrawnbignewcrowdsto their new grounds. There is such a close link between building a nice stadium anddrawingmore spectators that the traditional fans’ chant of “Wherewere youwhen youwereshit?”shouldberevisedto“Wherewereyouwhenyourstadiumwasshit?”

Yet likealmostallgoodbusiness ideas insoccer, theTaylorReportwas imposedonthegamefromoutside.Soccerclubsareclassiclateadoptersofnewideas.SeveralyearsaftertheInternetemerged,Liverpool,aclubwithmillionsoffansaroundtheworld,stilldidnothaveawebsite.It’snowonderthatfrom1992throughMay2008,evenbeforethefinancialcrisisstruck,fortyofEngland’sninety-twoprofessionalclubshadbeeninvolvedininsolvencyproceedings,someofthemmorethanonce.TheproportionshavebeenevenhigherinSpanishsoccerinrecentyears.

HOWTHETRIBECHOOSESITSCHIEFS

Rather than stack up endless examples of the dimness of soccer clubs, let’s take onecontemporarycasestudy:howclubshirethepersontheybelievetobetheirkeyemployee,themanager.EnglishfansarestillaskingthemselveshowSteveMcClarenevergottobeappointed England manager in 2006, but in fact it is unfair to single him out. Theprofusion of fantasy soccer leagues, in which office workers masquerade as coaches,indicates the widely held suspicion that any fool could do as well as the people whoactually get the jobs.The incompetence of soccermanagersmayhave something to dowiththenonsensicalandillegalmethodsbywhichtheyaretypicallyrecruited.

Soccer “is a sad business,” says Bjørn Johansson, who runs a headhunting firm inZurich.Likehiscolleaguesinheadhunting,Johanssonisneverconsultedbyclubsseekingmanagers.Insteadaclubtypicallychoosesitsmanbasedonthefollowingfactors.

TheNewManagerIsHiredinaMadRush

InapanelattheInternationalFootballArenaconferenceinZurichin2006,Johanssonsaidthat in “normal” business, “an average search process takes four to five months.” Insoccer, a clubusually findsacoachwithinacoupleofdaysof sackinghispredecessor.“Hesitation is regarded as weak leadership,” explained another panelist in Zurich, IljaKaenzig, then general manager of the German club Hannover 96. Brian Barwick, theEnglish Football Association’s former chief executive, has noted that McClaren’srecruitment “took frombeginning to endnineweeks,”yet themedia accused theFAofbeing“sluggish.”Ifonlyithadbeenmoresluggish.

A rare slowhire in soccerbecameperhaps themost inspiredchoiceof thepast twodecades:Arsenal’s appointment ofArsèneWenger in 1996.Wenger,working in Japan,wasnotfreeimmediately.Arsenalwaitedforhim,operatingundercaretakermanagersforweeks, and was inevitably accused of being sluggish. Similarly, in 1990 ManchesterUnited’schairman,MartinEdwards,wasderidedassluggishwhenherefusedtosackhislosingmanager,AlexFerguson.Edwards thought that in the long term,Fergusonmightimprove.

TheNewManagerIsInterviewedOnlyVeryCursorily

In “normal” business, a wannabe chief executive writes a business plan, gives apresentation, and undergoes several interviews. In soccer, a club calls an agent’s cellphoneandoffersthejob.

TheNewManagerIsAlwaysaMan

Theentireindustrydiscriminatesillegallyagainstwomen.Thenewmanagerisalsoalmostalwayswhite,withaconservativehaircut,agedbetweenthirty-fiveandsixty,andaformerprofessionalplayer.Clubsknowthatiftheychoosesomeonewiththatprofile,theneveniftheappointmentturnsouttobeterribletheywon’tbeblamedtoomuch,becauseatleasttheywillhavefailedinthetraditionalway.Astheoldbusinesssayingwent,“NobodyevergotfiredforbuyingIBM.”

The idea is that there is somethingmystical aboutmanaginga team, something thatonlyformerplayerscantrulyunderstand.Naturally,formerplayerslikethisidea.Onceinthe1980s,whenKennyDalglishwasinhisfirstspellmanagingLiverpool,ajournalistatapress conference questioned one of his tactical decisions. Dalglish deadpanned, in hisalmost impenetrable Scots accent, “Who did you play for, then?” The whole roomlaughed.Dalglishhadcomeupwiththekillerretort:ifyoudidn’tplay,youcouldn’tknow.

AformerchairmanofaPremierLeagueclubtoldusthat themanagersheemployedwouldoftenmake thatargument.Thechairman(arichbusinessmanwhohadn’tplayed)neverknewhowtorespond.Hehadn’tplayed,soiftherereallywassomekindofmysticalknowledgeyougainedfromplaying,hewouldn’tknow.Usuallyhewouldbackdown.

“Who did you play for, then?” is best understood as a job protection scheme. Ex-playershaveusedittocornerthemarketinmanagerialjobs.

Butintruth,theirargumentnevermadesense.Thereisnoevidencethathavingbeenagoodplayer(orbeingwhiteandofconservativeappearance)isanadvantageforasoccermanager.Way back in 1995StefanSzymanski did a study of 209managers inEnglishfootball from 1974 to 1994, looking at which ones consistently finished higher in theleaguethantheirteams’wagebillspredicted.Hereported:

Ilookedateachmanager’sfootballcareer,firstasaplayer(includingnumberofgamesplayed,goalsscored,positiononthefield,internationalappearances,numberofclubsplayedfor)andthenasamanager(yearsofexperience,numberofclubsplayed for,andagewhile inmanagement).Playinghistoryprovidesalmostnoguide,except thatdefendersandgoalkeepers inparticulardonotdowell (mostmanagersweremidfielders,forwardsareslightlymoresuccessfulthanaverage).

Dalglish finished at the topofStefan’s sampleof209managers, just aheadof JohnDuncan,BobPaisley,GeorgeCurtis,KenFurphy,andBillShankly.(Cloughwasn’tinthesample because no good financial data existed for his clubs, Derby County andNottinghamForest,orelsehe’dhavesurelywon.Stefanrecentlyupdatedhisstudy,andwe’llsaymoreabouthisnewfindingsinChapter6.)

Dalglishwasagreatplayerandanoverperformingmanager.However,BobbyMoore,anothergreatplayer,was193rdon themanagers’ list.Takenoverall,agoodcareerasaplayerpredictedneithersuccessnorfailureasamanager.Thetwojobsjustdidn’tseemtohavemuchtodowitheachother.AsArrigoSacchi,aterribleplayerturnedgreatmanagerofMilan,phrasedit,“Youdon’tneedtohavebeenahorsetobeajockey.”

A horse’s knowledge doesn’t help a jockey. Here is one player-turned-managertestifyinganonymouslyinFootballManagement,aninsightfulbookbySueBridgewaterofWarwickBusinessSchool:

IgotthejobandonthefirstdayIshowedupandthesecretaryletmeintomyoffice,themanager’sofficewithaphone inand Ididn’tknowwhere Iwassupposed tostart. Iknewabout football, Icoulddo theon-pitchthings,butIhadneverworkedinanofficeandIjustsatthereandIwaitedforsomethingtohappenbutnoonecameinsoafterawhileIpickedupthephoneandrangmyMum.

Eventhisman’sclaimthat“Iknewaboutfootball,Icoulddotheon-pitchthings”isdubious.DoesDiegoMaradonaknowmoreaboutthegamethanJoseMourinho?DidRoyKeane’s knack for geeing up teammates on the field translate once he had become ajockey?

Playingandcoachingaredifferentskillsets.Mourinho,whobarelyeverkickedaballfor money, is match for match among themost successful coaches in soccer’s history.WhenMilan’sthencoachCarloAncelottinotedhisalmostnonexistentrecordasaplayer,thePortuguesereplied,“Idon’tseetheconnection.Mydentististhebestintheworld,andyethe’sneverhadaparticularlybadtoothache.”Askedwhyfailedplayersoftenbecomegoodcoaches,Mourinhosaid,“Moretimetostudy.”

Theproblemwithex-prosmaybepreciselytheirexperience.Havingbeensteepedinthegamefordecades,theyjustknowwhattodo:howtotrain,whotobuy,howtotalktotheirplayers.Theydon’tneedtoinvestigatewhethertheseinheritedprejudicesareinfactcorrect.Rareistheex-prowhorealizes,likeBillyBeaneattheOaklandA’s,thatheneedstojettisonwhathelearnedalongtheway.MichaelLewiswritesinMoneyball,“Billyhadplayedproball,andregardeditasanexperienceheneededtoovercomeifhewantedtodohisjobwell.‘Areformedalcoholic,’ishowhedescribedhimself.”EvenAncelottiseemsto have changed his mind about the usefulness of a playing career. Once a cannymidfielderwithMilan,andnowcoachofRealMadrid,hetoldusin2013:“Experienceasaplayercanhelpyoujustinonesituation:Icanunderstandwhattheplayersarethinking.Butthejobisdifferent.Youhavetostudytobeamanager.”

Therearesomerecentsignsthatex-playersarelosingtheirmonopolyonmanagerialjobs.Byearly2014,threemenwhoneverplayedprofessionallyweremanagingPremierLeague clubs: Mourinho at Chelsea, Brendan Rodgers at Liverpool, and ReneMeulensteenatFulham.ThePremierLeague’shistorical average is justonenonplayingmanager out of twenty. Moreover, Roy Hodgson—whose career peaked in CrystalPalace’s youth team—was the England manager.Meanwhile, former great players likeRoyKeane,RuudGullit,MarcovanBasten,PaulInce,TonyAdams,andDiegoMaradonano longer seem to be in demand asmanagers of serious clubs. This looks like anotherindicationthatsoccerisslowlybecominglessstupid.

ManagersDon’tNeedProfessionalQualifications

Only in 2003 did UEFA insist that newmanagers in the Premier League pass the ProLicence course. In England’s lower divisions this remains unnecessary. Yet SueBridgewatershowedthatmanagerswiththeProLicencewonsignificantlymorematchesthan managers without it. She also showed that experienced managers outperformed

novices. That qualifications and experience are useful is understood in every industryexceptsoccer,whereamanagerisexpectedtoworkthemagicheacquiredasasuperheroplayer.

TheNewManagerIsOftenUnderqualifiedEvenIfHeHasQualifications

ChrisBrady, a business school professor, has taught finance and accounting in the ProLicencecourse.He toldushis entiremodule tookhalf aday.Nowonder someEnglishmanagersmismanagemoney:theydon’tunderstandit.Clubsareceasingtoentrust theirfinancestomanagers,givingtheminsteadtomorequalifiedexecutiveslikeKaenzig,whoguarantee stability by staying longer than the clubmanager’s average two-year tenure.That at least is the theory: theweek after that conference inZurich,Hannover releasedKaenzig.

ImmediateAvailability

Thenewmanagerisappointedeitherbecauseheisabletostartworkimmediately(oftenasaresultofhavingjustbeensacked),orbecausehehasachievedgoodresultsoverhiscareer, or, failing that, because he achieved good results in the weeks preceding theappointment.McClarenbecameEnglandmanageronlybecausehisteam,Middlesbrough,reachedtheUEFACupfinal in2006andavoidedrelegationjustas theEnglishFootballAssociationwas decidingwho to pick. By the timeMiddlesbroughwaswaxed 4–0 bySevillainthefinal,McClarenalreadyhadthejob.

Hisperiodunderreviewwassoshortastobearandomwalk.ThesamewentforthemaincandidatestomanageEnglandin1996:BryanRobson,FrankClark,GerryFrancis,andtheeventualchoice,GlennHoddle.Todaynoneofthemworksasamanager,nonehadhis last job in the Premier League, and nonewill probablywork that high again. Theywere in the frame in 1996 because they had had good results recently, had been goodplayers,andwereEnglish—anotherillegalconsiderationinhiring.

StarPower

Thenewmanagerisgenerallychosennotforhisallegedmanagerialskillsbutbecausehisname,appearance,andskillsatpublicrelationsareexpectedtoimpresstheclub’sfans,itsplayers, and the media. That is why no club hires a woman—stupid fans and playerswould object—andwhy it was so brave ofMilan to appoint the unknown Sacchi, andArsenaltheunknownWenger.TonyAdams,Arsenal’sthencaptain,doubtedtheobscureforeigneronfirstsight.Inhisautobiography,Addicted,theplayerrecallsthinking,“Whatdoes this Frenchman know about soccer? He wears glasses and looks more like aschoolteacher. He’s not going to be as good as George. Does he even speak Englishproperly?”

Amanager must above all look like a manager. Clubs would rather use traditionalmethodstoappointincompetentsthanriskdoinganythingthatlooksodd.

BADSTAFF

Themostobviousreasonsoccerissuchanincompetentbusinessisthatsoccerclubshavehistoricallytendedtohireincompetentstaff.Themanagerisonlythestartofit.Yearsago

oneofusrequestedaninterviewwiththechairmanofanEnglishclubquotedonthestockmarket.Thepressofficeraskedmetosendafax(a1980stechnologyreveredbysoccerclubs).Isentit.Shesaidshenevergotit.OnrequestIsentthreemorefaxestodifferentofficials.Shesaidnonearrived.Thisisquiteacommonexperienceforsoccerjournalists.Because soccer clubs are the only businesses that get daily publicitywithout trying to,they treat journalistsashumble supplicants insteadofasunpaidmarketersof theclubs’brands. Themedia often retaliate by beingmean. This is not very clever of the clubs,becausealmostall their fans follow themthrough themedia rather thanbygoing to thestadiums.

Amonthafterall the faxes, Iwasgrantedpermission tosendmyrequestbye-mail.WhenIarrivedattheclubfortheinterview,Imetthepressofficer.Shewasbeautiful.Ofcourseshewas.Traditionally,soccerclubsrecruitthewomenontheirofficestafffortheirlooks,andthemenbecausetheyplayedprofessionalsocceroraresomebody’sfriend.

If soccer clubs wanted to, they could recruit excellent executives. Professors atbusiness schools report that many of their MBA students, who pay on average about$40,000ayear in tuitionfees,dreamofworking insoccerforapitifulsalary.Often thestudentsbegclubs to let themwork for freeas summer interns.Theclubs seldomwantthem(thoughhereagain,as thesoccerbusinessgraduallygetssmarter,moreMBAsarecreepingin).Ifyouworkforasoccerclub,yourgoalisgenerallytokeepworkingthere,not to be shown up by some overeducated young thing who has actually learnedsomethingaboutbusiness.

Inpartthisisbecausemuchofthetraditionallyworking-classsoccerindustrydistrustseducation.Inpart,saysEmmanuelHembertofA.T.Kearney,itisbecausemanyclubsaredominated by a vain owner-manager: “Lots of them invested for ego reasons,which isneveragoodthinginbusiness.Theyprefernottohavestrongpeoplearoundthem,exceptthecoach.Theyreallypaylowsalaries.”Ifyouworkforasoccerclubasanythingbutaplayerormanager,yougetpaidinstardust.

Historically, only Manchester United recruited respected executives from normalindustries (such as PeterKenyon fromUmbro), though now a few other big clubs likeBarcelonahavestartedtodoso,too.

Baseball for a long time was just as incompetent. InMoneyball Lewis asked why,amongbaseballexecutivesandscouts,“therereallyisnolevelofincompetencethatwon’tbetolerated.”Hethoughtthemainreasonwas“thatbaseballhasstructureditselflessasabusinessthanasasocialclub….TherearemanywaystoembarrasstheClub,butbeingbadatyourjobisn’toneofthem.ThegreatestoffenseaClubmembercancommitisnotineptitude but disloyalty.” Club members—and this applies in soccer as much as inbaseball—are selected for clubbability.Cleveroutsiders arenot clubbable, because theytalk funny, andgo aroundpointingout the things that people inside theClub aredoingwrong.“Itwasn’tassimpleastheuneaseofjocksinthepresenceofnerds,”wroteLewis—butthatuneasedoeshavealottodowithit.

The staff of soccer clubs tends not merely to be incompetent. They are also oftennovices. This is because staff turnover is rapid. Whenever a new owner arrives, he

generallybringsinhiscronies.Thedepartingstaffrarelyjoinsanewclub,becausethatisconsidered disloyal (Kenyon, an exception, was persecuted formoving fromUnited toChelsea),eventhoughplayerschangeclubsallthetime.Sosoccerexecutivesarealwayshavingtoreinventthewheel.

Worse, the media and fans often make it impossible for clubs to take sensibledecisions. They are always hassling the club to do something immediately. If the teamlosesthreegames,fansstartchantingfortheclubtosackthecoachorbuyanewplayer,inshort tearuptheplansitmighthavemadeamonthago.TonyFernandes, theMalaysianbusinessmanwhohad runa tight shipathis airlineAirAsia, couldn’tdo the sameaftertakingoverQPR in2011. “Two things aredifferent fromAirAsia,” he toldus in2013.“One is I can control almost everything inAirAsia.You can dowhatever youwant infootball,butit’suptotheelevenguysonthepitchattheendoftheday,right?Thesecondthing is, you have a very vocal bunch of shareholders—called fans. Everyone has anopinion.Theplansget thrownoutof thewindowwhenyoustart losing.Theexcitementyougetwhenyouwina footballgame isunbelievable.Thedownside is thatwhenyouloseyouwanttokillyourself.”

“Consumer activism in this industry is extreme,” agreedA.T.Kearney in its reportPlayingforProfits.Hembertsays,“Thebusinessplan—assoonasyousignaplayerfor£10million, you blow up your business plan.Commercial employees have to fight for£100,000ofspendinghereorthere,butthensuddenlytheclubspends£10million.”

Ormore.SvenGoranErikssononceflewintoZurichtotelltheInternationalFootballArena a “good story” about his time managing Lazio. “The chairman I had was verygood,” Eriksson recalled for an audience ofmostly Swiss businessmen. “If I wanted aplayer,hewouldtrytogetthatplayer.OnedayIphonedhimupandIsaid:‘Vieri.’”

ChristianVieriwasthenplayingforAtleticoMadrid.ErikssonandLazio’schairman,SergioCragnotti, flew to Spain to bid for him.Atletico told themVieriwould cost 50billionItalianlire.Atthetime,in1998,thatwasnearly$29million.Erikssonreminisced,“Thatwasthebiggestsumintheworld.Noplayerhadbeeninvolvedforthat.”Hesaidthetalksthenwentmoreorlessasfollows:

CRAGNOTTI:That’salotofmoney.

ERIKSSON:Iknow.

At this point Atleticomentioned that it might accept some Lazio players in partialpaymentforVieri.

CRAGNOTTI:Canwedothat?

ERIKSSON:No,wecan’tgiveawaytheseplayers.

CRAGNOTTI:Whatshallwedothen?

ERIKSSON:Buyhim.

CRAGNOTTI:Okay.

ErikssonrecalledinZurich:“Hedidn’teventrytopay49.Hejustpaid50.”

Ninemonths after Vieri joined Lazio, InterMilanwanted to buy him. Once again,Erikssonreportedtheconversation:

CRAGNOTTI:WhatshallIaskforhim?

ERIKSSON:Askfordouble.Ask100.

CRAGNOTTI:Ican’tdothat.

Eriksson recalled: “So he asked 90.And he got 90. That’s good business.” (Or theultimateexampleofthegreater-foolprinciple.)

SomeoneintheaudienceinZurichaskedErikssonwhethersuchbehaviorwashealthy.After all,Lazio ranout ofmoney in 2002whenCragnotti’s food company,Cirio,wentbelly-up.Cragnottilaterspenttimeinprison,whichevenbythestandardsofItaliansoccerisgoingabitfar.

Eriksson replied,“It’snothealthy.And ifyouseeLazio, itwasnothealthy.Butwewontheleague.AndwewontheCupwinnersCup.Wewoneverything.”

The point is that soccer clubs, prompted by media and fans, are always makingfinancially irrational decisions in an instant. They would like to think long term, butbecause they are in the news every day they end up fixating on the short term.As theBritishwriterArthurHopcraftwroteinhisbookTheFootballManin1968,“Itisthefirstcharacteristic of football that it is always urgent.” An executive with an Americanentertainmentcorporationtellsastoryabouthislong-arrangedbusinessmeetingwithRealMadrid.Hiscompanywashopingtobuildarelationshipwiththeclub.Butonthedayofthemeeting,Madridrituallysackeditsmanager.Theusualchaosensued.Twooftheclubofficials scheduled toattend themeetingwith theAmericanexecutivedidnot showup.That’ssoccer.

NOTBUSINESSESATALL

Whenbusinesspeoplelookatsoccer,theyareoftenastonishedathowunbusinessliketheclubsare.Everynowandthenoneofthemtakesoveraclubandpromisestorunit“likeabusiness.” Alan Sugar, who made his money in computers, became chairman ofTottenhamHotspurin1991.HisbrilliantwheezewastomakeSpurslivewithinitsmeans.Neverwouldheforkout50billionlireforaVieri.AfterNewcastleboughtAlanShearerfor$23millionin1996,Sugarremarked,“I’veslappedmyselfaroundthefaceacoupleoftimes,butIstillcan’tbelieveit.”

Hemoreorlesskepthisword.InthetenyearsthatheranSpurs,theteamlivedwithinitsmeans.Butmostofthefanshatedit.TheonlythingSpurswoninthatdecadewasasolitaryLeagueCup.ItspentmostofitstimeinmidtableofthePremierLeague,fallingfarbehind itsneighborArsenal.Nordid it evenmakemuchmoney:about$3millionayearinprofitsinSugar’sfirstsixyears,whichwasmuchlessthanArsenalandnotverygoodforacompanyitssize.Sugar’sSpursdisappointedbothonandoffthefield,anditsexperiencealso illustratedaparadox:whenbusinesspeople try to runa soccerclubasabusiness,thennotonlydoesthesoccersuffer,butsodoesthebusiness.

FIGURE3.1.Pretaxprofit/lossofPremierLeagueclubsbyleagueposition:1993–2012

OtherbusinessmenpursueadifferentstrategythanSugar’s.Theyassumethatiftheycanget their clubs towinprizes,profitswill inevitably follow.But they tooarewrong.Eventhebestteamsseldomgenerateprofits.Weplottedtheleaguepositionsandprofitsofall theclubs thathaveplayed in thePremierLeaguefromits inauguralseasonof1992–1993untilthe2011–2012seasoninFigure3.1.

Thefigureshowshowspectacularlyunprofitablethesoccerbusinessis.Eachpointonthechartrepresentsthecombinationofprofitandpositionforaclubinaparticularyear.Oneobviouspointtonoteisthatmostofthedotsfallbelowzeroontheprofitaxis:theseclubsweremakinglosses.Butthefigurealsoshowsthattherewasbarelyanyconnectionbetweenfinishinghighandmakingmoney.Althoughthereissomesuggestionthatafewclubsatthetopofthetablemakemoremoneythanotherclubs,thechartalsoshowsthatotherclubsin thesepositionscanmakehugelosses.ManchesterUnited’sprofitability isclearlytheexception.InthethirtyyearsbeforebeingtakenoverbytheGlazerfamilyin2005, the club generatedmore than £250million (about $400million) in pretax profitswhilealsowinningeight league titles. Indeed,otherAmericanownersmightneverhavebotheredbuying intoEnglish soccerwithoutUnited’sexample.Butnootherclubcouldreplicateitssuccess.

FormostEnglishclubs,ourgraphshowsthatthereisnotevenaconnectionbetweenchanging league position and changing profits. In 45 percent of all cases,when a clubchanged its leagueposition, its profitsmoved in theoppositedirection:higherposition,lowerprofitsorlowerposition,higherprofits.Only55percentofthetimedidprofitsandpositionmoveinthesamedirection.Hadtherebeennocorrelationatallbetweenwinningand making profits, that figure would have been much the same, namely, 50 percent.Clearly, winning games is not the route to making money. As Francisco Pérez CutiñonotesinanunpublishedMBAthesisatJudgeBusinessSchoolinCambridge,it’snotthatwinningmatches can help a clubmake profits. Rather, the effect works the other wayaround:ifaclubfindsnewrevenues,thatcanhelpitwinmatches.

Ithasinfactprovedalmostimpossibletorunasoccerclublikeasolid,profit-makingbusiness. This is because there are always rival owners—the Cragnottis, theAbramoviches,ortheGadhafis,whoownedachunkofJuventus—whodon’tcareaboutprofits and will spend whatever it takes in the hope of winning prizes. All other clubownersareforcedtokeepupwith them.Ifoneownerwon’tpaylarge transferfeesandsalaries, somebody elsewill, and that somebody elsewill get the best players andwinprizes.Theconsequenceisthatthebiggestsliceofmoneythatsoccermakesgetshandedovertothebestplayers.AsA.T.Kearneysays,youcouldevenarguethatsoccerclubsarenothingmore thanvessels for transporting soccer’s income toplayers. “Theplayers arecompletelyfreetomove,”explainsHembert.“Theyareakeyfactorinwinning,andalsoin the ego, in pleasing the fans.And they all have pretty savvy agentswho are able tomaximizetheirbargainingpower.”

Itmeans that even the cautiousSugar type cannotmakedecent profits in soccer. Infact,becausehisteamwillwinfewermatchesthanitsfree-spendingrivals,somefanswilldeserthim.Thatwilleatfurtherintohisprofits.From1991to1998averageattendancein

thePremierLeaguerose29percent,butTottenham’scrowdsfell5percent.

“Ithoughtwecouldmakeit[QPR]profitable,definitely,”Fernandesadmittedtous.“Ihaven’tyet,”headded,laughing.Eveninthe2011–2012season,whentheclubsurvivedinthePremierLeague,itlost£22.6million.Thenextseason,whenitkeptbuyingplayersbutgotrelegatedregardless, it losta lotmore.“Onthepitchitwasjustadisaster,”saidFernandes.Hemused:“Footballhassurvivedonbenefactors.Shareholderscominginandpumpingmoney in, and then the next sucker comes in and pumpsmoney in.” Did heconsiderhimselfasucker,abenefactor,orabusinessmaninsoccer?“NowIwoulddefinemyselfasasucker,”hereplied.“Andbenefactor.AndIhopeIwillbecomeabenefactor-stroke-businessman.”

Good luck to him. So far in soccer’s history, running a club as a profit-makingbusinesshaslookedlikealostcause.StefanandtheSpanisheconomistPedroGarciadelBarrio (of the Universidad Internacional de Cataluña) were curious to know whetheranyone even aspired to do it. They studied the behavior of Spanish and English clubsbetween1993and2005toseewhethertheclubswerechieflypursuingprofitsoffthefieldorvictoriesonit.

If a clubwanted tomakeprofits, clearly itwouldhave to spend less than it earned.Thatwouldmeanlimitingitsplayers’wages.Anyclubthatpaidplayerslesswouldsufferon the field, because as we have seen, paying high wages wins soccer matches. It’s atrade-off:ifyouwantglory,youhavetoforgetmaximizingprofits.Ifyouwantmaximumprofits,giveuphopeofglory.StefanandPedroestimated,forinstance,thatifBarcelonawantedtomaximizeprofits,itwouldhavetoaimtofinishfifteenthintheleague,becauseitwouldneed to slash itswages.Aprofit-drivenRealMadrid should expect to finish amere seventeenth, just above the relegation spots. Most other teams—such as AtleticoMadrid,AthleticBilbao,Sevilla, orVillareal—wouldmaximize their profit potential byplayingintheseconddivision.Theretheycouldsavealotofmoneyonplayers’wages.

Ontheotherhand, ifaclub’smainaimwastowinmatches, itwouldhavetospendevery cent it earned (andborrowmorebesides).Sowhatwere clubs chasing, profits orwins?

Stefan and Pedro estimated how each club in the top two Spanish divisions wouldhavebehavedonaverageinthe1994–2005periodifitwerepursuingprofits,andhowitwouldhavebehavedifitwantedwins.Thentheylookedathowclubsbehavedinreallife.Theirunambiguous finding:clubsdidn’tcareaboutprofits.Theywerespendingwhat ittook towin games. “On average,” Stefan andPedro concluded, looking at ten years ofleague tables, “the Spanish teams were twelve places above their profit-maximizingposition over the sample period, but less than half a place below theirwin-maximizingposition.”Inshort,clubpresidentswerespendingwaymorethantheywouldhavedoneiftheywerehardheadedbusinessmenout tomakeprofits.Thoughmanyof thepresidentswereinfacthardheadedbusinessmeninreallife,theyweren’ttreatingtheirsoccerclubsas businesses.Norwas there any sign that any other actors—lendingbanks, say—werepressuringthemtomakeprofits.

BuildingmagnateslikeFlorentinoPérezandJesúsGilyGilseemedespeciallyprone

to blowing what looked like absurd sums of money on players. Possibly they werepursuingabusiness logicafterall: theymayhavereasoned thatmakinganamein localsoccer would help them befriend bankers and get planning permission from localgovernment for their construction projects. That would have boosted their non-soccerbusinesses. FredWilpon, the real estate developer who took over theNewYorkMets,discoveredthatasimilareffectoperatedinbaseball.JeffreyToobinwroteinaprofileofWilponintheNewYorkermagazine:

Hedidn’tanticipatethatowningtheMetswouldboosthisseeminglyunrelatedbusinessinterests.“Noonehadheardofusbeforewebought theMets, andafterward the changewasdramatic,”Wilpon toldme. “Idon’tthinksomeonehasnotreturnedoneofmytelephonecallsinthirtyyears.It’sasmallclub,owningabaseballteam,andpeoplewanttobenearit.”

Owningasoccerteammighthelptheowner’sotherbusinesses.ButallSpanishsoccerclubstendedtopursuewinsratherthanprofits.Inasense,theyhadto.Ifyourrivalsarespending whatever it takes to win, then you must as well. Any team that pursued thehighest possible profitswould probably end up being relegated, because itwouldn’t bespendingenoughtohiregoodplayers.Andiftheclubgotrelegated,itwouldlosemuchofits revenues. So soccer becomes an arms race: every club overspends for fear of theneighbors.

Nomatter howmuchmoneySpanish clubs got their hands on, they spent it. In thedecadethatStefanandPedrostudied,theaveragerevenuesofaclubintheSpanishfirstdivision (PrimeraDivisión) rose nearly fourteenfold, from €4.3million in 1994 to €59millionin2004.(By2011thefigurewas€85million.)Yettheshareofrevenuethatclubsspent on player wages didn’t drop much throughout the period: in that decade, first-division clubs paid over an average of 62 percent of their revenues to their players. Inotherwords,theclubsweren’tabletosavealltheadditionalmoneyordomuchelsewithit, suchasbuildnewstadiumsorcut ticketprices.Mostof themoney thatcame in justwentstraightoutagainintoplayers’bankaccounts.Intheseconddivision,awhopping93percent of clubs’ revenueswent to the players. These clubs reallywere just vessels fortransportingmoneytoplayers.

The clubsweren’t contentwith giving the playerswhatmoney they had.They alsogave themmoneytheydidn’thave.Accordingto theSpanisheconomistsAngelBarajasAlonso andPlácidoRodriguezGuerrero, in the2007–2008 season clubs includingRealMurcia, Real Zaragoza, Real Betis, Valencia, La Coruña, and Atletico Madrid werespendingmorethantheirentireannualoperatingrevenuesonplayers.Theconsequencesofthissortofarmsrace,pursuedovermanyyears,arepredictable.ProfessorJoséMariaGaydeLiébanaoftheUniversityofBarcelonacompiledthisauthoritativelistofthedebtsofclubsinthePrimeraDivisiónattheendofthe2009–2010season:

Allthisaddeduptoatotaldebtof€3.43billion,orabout$4.7billion.Itmustbesaidthat this figure includesa lotofunpaid interclubdebt,which therefore inflates thedata.Still, it’s an astonishing figure. ClearlyAtleticoMadrid andValencia, in particular, arenevergoingtorepaytheircreditors.Ineffect,banksandlocalgovernmentsandthereforethe poor Spanish treasury (and possibly European taxpayers too) are subsidizing theseclubs.Ordinarycitizensarepayingforthecenterforward’sFerrari.

Bythestandardsofanormalbusiness,thissortofdebtspendingisnuts.Butforsoccerclubs,itmakessense:theonlywaytowinmatchesistooverspend.Nobodyrunsasoccer

clubtoturnatidyannualprofit.

Nor,itmightbeargued,shouldanyoneattemptit.Mostofaclub’scustomers(itsfans)andemployees(itsplayersandcoaches)andevenusually itsownerswouldsay that theclub exists to playgood soccer andwin things, not to turn a profit.That’swhy a 1974report by the British Commission on Industrial Relations quoted an anonymous clubchairman as saying, “Any clubmanagementwhich allows the club tomake a profit isbehaving foolishly.”Traditionally soccer clubshavebehavedmore like charitable truststhan like businesses. In the not-so-distant past theEnglishFootballAssociation used toforbidclubownersfromprofitingfromtheirinvestment.Directorscouldn’tgetpaid,anddividendswerecapped.Theaimwastoensurethatclubswererunby“therightclassofmenwholovefootballforitsownsake.”Theseruleswereabolishedintheearly1980s.Iftheystillexisted,theymighthavestoppedthebusinessmenTomHicksandGeorgeGillettatLiverpoolandtheGlazerfamilyatManchesterUnitedfromburdeningtheseclubswithacombined$1.5billionindebtsimplytofinancetheirtakeovers.

Makingprofitsdeprivesaclubofmoneythatitcouldspendontheteam.Thebusinessofsoccer issoccer.Almostall soccerclubs thatarenotManchesterUnitedshouldditchthefantasyofmakingaprofit.Butthatdoesn’tmeantheyshouldcontinuetobebadlyrun.The weight of money that now washes through soccer demands a more businesslikeapproachtomanagingcash.Bungsmighthavebeennobigdealwhentransferfeesweremeasuredinthehundredsofthousandsofdollars,buttheybecomeaproblemwhentheyrunintothetensofmillions.

Soccerclubsneedtoknowwhattheyare.Theyshouldn’tkidthemselvesthattheyareUnitedNatural Foods.Rather, they are likemuseums: public-spirited organizations thataimtoservethecommunitywhileremainingreasonablysolvent.Itsoundslikeamodestgoal,butfewofthemachieveeventhat.

4SAFERTHANTHEBANKOFENGLAND

WhySoccerClubsAlmostNeverDisappearOnSeptember15,2008,theinvestmentbankLehmanBrotherscollapsed,followedalmostimmediatelybytheworld’sstockmarkets.

Anysoccerclubonearthwasamidgetnext toLehman. In thefiscalyearending inSeptember2007, thebankhad incomeof$59billion(148 timesManchesterUnited’satthetime)andprofitsof$6billion(fiftytimesManchesterUnited’s),andwasvaluedbythestockmarketat$34billion.IfUnited’sshareshadbeentradedonthemarketatthetime,theyprobablywouldhavebeenworth less than5percentofLehman’s.YetLehmannolongerexists,whileUnitedverymuchdoes.

In the years before the global economic crisis, peopleworried a lotmore about thesurvivalofsoccerclubsthanthatofbanks.Yetitwasmanyoftheworld’slargestbanksthat disappeared. Then, after the recession began, worries about soccer clubs increasedagain.ManypeoplepointedoutthatwhenChelseametManchesterUnitedinthefinaloftheChampionsLeague in2008, the twoclubshadacombineddebtofabout$3billion.Michel Platini, president of UEFA, warned in 2009 that half of Europe’s professionalclubshadfinancialtroublesofsomekind.“Ifthissituationgoeson,”headded,“itwillnotbelongbeforeevensomemajorclubsfacegoingoutofbusiness.”

Yet the notion that soccer clubs are inherently unstable businesses is wrong. Theyvirtuallynevergobust.Despitebeingincompetentlyrun,theyaresomeofthemoststablebusinesses on earth.Not onlydo the soccer authoritiesworry far toomuch about clubsgoingoutofbusiness,buttheyworryaboutthewrongclubs.

First,somefacts.In1923theEnglishFootballLeagueconsistedofeighty-eightteamsspreadoverfourdivisions.Inthe2011–2012season,eighty-fiveoftheseclubsstillexisted(97percent),*andeightyremainedinthetopfourdivisions(91percent).Fortywereinthesamedivisionastheyhadbeenin1923.Andonlysixteamsstillinthetopfourdivisionsweretwoormoredivisionsawayfromwheretheyhadbeenin1923.(NoteamthatwasintheFirstDivisionin1923wasplacedlowerthanthethirdtierin2012.)Itisahistoryofremarkablestability.

YouwouldhaveexpectedtheGreatDepressionofthe1930s,inparticular,toposetheclubssomethingofathreat.Afterall,theDepressionbitdeepestintheNorthofEngland,wheremostofthecountry’sprofessionalclubswerebased,andallromanticrhetoricaside,youwould think thatwhenpeoplecannotafford tobuybread theywouldstopgoing tosoccermatches.

Crowds in the Football League did indeed fall 12 percent between 1929 and 1931.However,by1932 theyweregrowingagain, even though theBritisheconomywasnot.And clubs helped one another through the hard times.WhenOrient in east London hit

troublein1931,Arsenalwroteitstinyneighboracheckfor£3,450totideitover.Clubsknow they cannot operate without opponents, and so unlike in most businesses, thecollapseofarivalisnotcauseforcelebration.

The Depression culled only a couple of clubs. Merthyr Town, after failing to bereelectedtotheleaguein1930,foldedafewyearslater,thevictimofeconomichardshipin the Welsh valleys (as well as competition from far more popular rugby). WiganBoroughwentbankruptafewgamesintothe1931–1932season.Itlefttheleague,anditsremainingfixtureswereneverplayed.Aldershotwaselectedtoreplaceit,andsixtyyearslater,inanotherrecession,itbecameonlythesecondEnglishclubinhistorytowithdrawfromtheleaguewithfixturesunplayed.

AlmostequallyhardastheDepressionforEnglishclubswasthe“Thatcherrecession”of the early1980s.Againmanyworking-class fans lost their factory jobs.The league’sattendance dropped from 24.6 million to 16.5 million between 1980 and 1986. Soccerseemedtobeinterminaldecline.AsKenFriar,thenmanagingdirectorofArsenal,putit,“Footballistheoddestofindustries.Itsellsoneproductandhasninety-twooutletsforit.Inanyotherbusiness,ifnotallninety-twooutletsweredoingwell,therewouldbesometalkofclosingsomeofthemdown.Butinfootball,allninety-twooutletsclaimanequalrighttosurvive.”

Manyclubsintheearly1980sseemedtobedicingwithdeath.Lookingatoneofthediciest,BristolCity,willhelpusunderstandjusthowsoccerclubsalmostalwayssurvive.

BristolCityisoneoftwoprofessionalteamsthatsharethemidsizetownofBristolinwesternEngland.Citygotintotroubleinthesamewayalotofclubsdo.In1976ithadbeenpromotedtotheoldfirstdivision,thenthehighesttierinEnglishsoccer,astatustheclubhadlastenjoyedbeforeWorldWarI.Thefanswereexcited:attendancejumpedfrom14,000pergamein1974–1975to24,500in1976–1977.Theaverageticketthencostlessthan£1,butthehigherticketsalesstillboostedtheclub’sincomefromaround£250,000peryearto£665,000.Citysurvivedthreeseasonsinthetopflight.Aswe’vealreadyseen,that took money. The club paid handsomely in the transfer market, and its wage billdoubled:allCity’sextraincomewaschanneledstraighttoplayers.

Sadly,themoneydidn’tdothetrick.Inthe1979–1980season,theclubwasrelegatedjustasBritain,inthefirstyearofthenewThatchergovernment,wasenteringrecession.First-divisionattendancesdropped5percent that season,butBristolCity’sgates fell15percentwhileitswagecostsrose20percent.

Clearly the club needed to lose some of its expensive players. Unfortunately, themanager,AlanDicks,whohadjustoverseenthemostsuccessfulperiodinBristolCity’smodernhistory,hadsignedmanyofthemonextraordinarilylengthycontracts—someaslongaselevenyears.Soonafterrelegation,Dickswassacked.Butbytheendofthenextseason,1980–1981,City’saverageattendancehadcollapsedto9,700pergame(half thelevelofthepreviousseason)andtheclubwasrelegatedtothethirddivision.Incomewastumbling, yet most of the squad was still drawing first-division wages. When City’saccountswerepublishedonOctober15,1981,itwasapparentthat theclubwasindeeptrouble,butthebesttheclub’snewchairmancouldsayinhisreportwasthat“somuchof

thisdependsonsuccessontheplayingfield.”

It is doubtful that promotion back to the second divisionwould have improved theclub’sfinancialpositionmaterially in1981–1982,but that’sapurelyacademicquestion,sinceby theendof1981BristolCitywasheadingfor the fourthdivision.By thenonly6,500 fans were showing up each week, about a quarter the number from four yearsearlier. An independent financial report produced that December showed that the clubowedfarmore(over£1million)thanitcouldrealisticallyrepayintheforeseeablefuture.Early in 1982 Bristol City Football Club PLC—the limited company that owned thestadiumatAshtonGate,theplayers’contracts,andashareintheFootballLeague—wasonthevergeofappointingatrusteetoliquidatethecompany.Thatwouldhavemeanttheend. In a liquidation all the players’ contracts would have been void, the share in theleaguewouldhavebeen returned to the league, and the stadiumwouldhavebeen sold,probablytoapropertydeveloper,withanyproceedsusedtopaycreditors.LikesomanyBritishcompaniesatthetime,BristolCityseemedheadedforextinction.

But soccer clubs commandmore love thanwidgetmakers. Just before Bristol Citycouldfold,DerynCollerandsomeotherlocalbusinessmenwhowerealsofansofferedtotakeovertheclub.Itwasatthispointthatthe“phoenixing”planemerged.

Collerandhisassociatescreatedanewcompany,BCFC(1982)PLC,whichwastobeanewBristolCity:aphoenixfromtheashesoftheoldclub.TheCollergroupaimedtosellsharesinthenewcompanytofans.Withthemoney,thegroupwouldbuyAshtonGatefromthetrustee.ThegroupalsoaskedtheFootballLeaguetoacquiretheoldclub’sshareintheleague.ThenthenewBristolCitycould“replace”theoldoneinthefourthdivision.In short, the newcompanywould take over almost everythingof the old club—except,crucially, its debts andunaffordable players.Coller’s group intended to askCity’smostexpensiveplayers,leftoverfromtheclub’sfirst-divisiondays,totearuptheircontracts.Youcanseetheappealoftheplan,aslongasyouwerenotoneofthoseplayers.

The Football League said the planwas fine as long asGordon Taylor, head of theProfessionalFootballAssociation (PFA),wouldagree to thedealon theplayers.TaylorwasbynomeanssurethatthingswereasbadatBristolCityasthedirectorssaid(afterall,directorsarealwayscomplainingaboutwages),buteventuallyhewasconvincedthatthedeal was the only way to save the club. No union wants to see an employer go bust,especiallynotanancientemployerlovedbythousandsofpeople.

Thefinaldecisionwasdowntotheplayers.Naturallytheywerereluctantmartyrs.Butthepressureonthemwasintense,includingsomethreatsfromfans.Intheend,afterafewsweetenerswerethrownin,theplayersagreed.PeterAitken,ChrisGarland,JimmyMann,JulianMarshall,GeoffMerrick,DavidRodgers,GerrySweeney,andTrevorTaintonarenotthebiggestnamesinsoccer’shistory,butfewplayerscanclaimtohavegivenmorefortheir clubs. On February 3, 1982, the “AshtonGate Eight” agreed to tear up contractsworth£290,000(thebetterpartof$1.5millionintoday’smoney)andacceptredundancytosavetheiremployer.Bythestandardsofthetime,theywereonverygoodpay.Mostofthem,nearingtheendoftheircareers,wouldneverearnasmuchagain.Theygotamiserlypayoff of twoweeks’wages, and afterward they retired from soccer,moved abroad, or

joined lower-division clubs.The eight reallydeserve statuesoutsideAshtonGate.TheygaveBristolCityafuture.

The phoenix rose from the ashes: the club was transferred as an entity from theownershipofBristolCityPLC,acompanyheadingforliquidation,toBCFC(1982)PLC.ThedirectorsofthenewbusinessstillfacedtheformidabletaskoffindingthemoneytobuyAshtonGate.Theyhadnegotiatedapricewiththetrusteeofjustover£590,000.Theyraised£330,000bysellingshares in thenewclub to fansandwell-wishers.Theymighthaveraisedmore,buttheyfeltobligedtoclosetheshareofferearlywhenrumorsemergedthatanunknownbidderwasconsideringbuyingamajorityofthesharesonoffer,possiblywith the aim of selling off the ground to property developers. (AshtonGate is handilylocatedclosetodowntown.)Therestofthecashwasraisedfromshort-termloans.

Today Bristol City still plays at Ashton Gate, in League One, the third tier of theEnglishgame.(AndAshtonGateisnowmuchmorethanameresoccerstadium.“AshtonGate Stadium,Bristol’s premier conference and events venue, features awide range offunction rooms available for both corporate and private hire,” proclaims its website,Ashtongatestadium.co.uk.) The “phoenixing” ofBristolCitywas the first of its kind inEnglishsoccerandestablishedatemplatethat,liketheclubitself,survivestothisday.

Other clubs quickly cottoned onto the joy of phoenixing. Between 1982 and 1984Hereford, Hull, Wolves, Derby, Bradford, and Charlton went through much the sameexperience as Bristol City. All these troubled clubs survived either by creating a new“phoenix”company(Wolves,Bradford,andCharlton)orbygettingcreditorstoagreetosuspend their claims (a moratorium), under the threat that a phoenix might be thealternative.Inallcases,thebankruptcompanywasditched,buttheimmortalclubinsideitsalvaged.

Phoenixing—thecreationofanewcompany—turnedout tobeabrilliantwheeze toescapecreditors.Clearlythereissomethingsuspectaboutthemethod.Phoenixingalloweddisastrousdirectors to escape the consequencesof theirdecisions.Their clubs survived,butattheexpenseofcreditors(oftenplayers,banks,andthetaxman),whoneversawtheirmoneyagain.

Still, thiswasjustwhathaplesssoccerclubsneeded.ManyofthemstruggledduringtheThatcherrecession,andseveralsurvivedonlythankstoa“sub”—financialsupport—fromthePFA.CharltonandBristolCity’sneighborBristolRovershadtomovegroundsbecausetheycouldnotpaytherent.However,nobodyresignedfromtheleague.

Soonafterthatrecession,anewlawmadeiteveneasierforBritishclubstosurvive.TheUK’straditionalmethodofliquidation—thebankruptcompany’sassetsweresold,thedebts repaid as far as possible, and the company liquidated—had become discredited.Criticssaiditgavestrickencompanieslittlechancetorecover.TheypraisedtheAmericanapproach,whichtreatedfailureasafrequentlynecessaryprecursortoeventualsuccess.In1979theUShadintroducedthenowfamousChapter11provisions.Theseprotectafirmfromitscreditors,while it tries toworkoutasolutionthatsavesthebusiness.Britain—where insolvencies hit an all-timehighduring theThatcher recession—wanted someofthat.

The British Insolvency Act of 1986 introduced a new procedure called“administration.” Now when a company went into administration, an independentinsolvencypractitionerwascalledin,andchargedwithfindingawaytokeepthebusinessrunningwhile repaying asmuchmoney as possible to the creditors.After the new lawcamein,strickensoccerclubstypicallyenteredadministration,struckdealswithcreditors,andthenswiftlyemergedfromadministration.That’swhatTranmereandRotherhamdidinspring1987,forinstance.Formostclubs,financialcollapsewasbecomingsomethingofabreeze.

True,AldershotFCwasliquidatedin1992,butsupporterssimplystartedanewclubalmostidenticaltotheoldone.The“new”AldershotTownAFChasabadgethatshowsaphoenixrisingfromtheashes.AldershotreenteredtheFootballLeaguein2008.OthertinyBritishclubsthatfolded—MaidstoneUnited,NewportCounty,AccringtonStanley—alsowereeventually resuscitatedandnowstumbleon somewhere in the semiprofessionalorprofessional game. Accrington Stanley’s rebirth was surely the most drawn-out: itresignedfromtheFootballLeaguein1962withdebtsof£63,000,gotliquidatedin1966,wasnewlycreatedbyfansin1968,andreturnedtotheFootballLeaguein2006,itsbrandstillverymuchalive,probablyevenenhancedby thedrama.“Above the turnstilesnow,thewelcomingsignis,‘TheClubthatWouldn’tDie,’”Accrington’sthenchairman,IlyasKhan,toldusproudlyin2012.

The newBritish lawwas so kind to insolvent companies that evermore companiesdecidedtoenterinsolvency.Somediditjusttowipeofftheirdebts.Themethodbecamemorepopularevenas theeconomyimproved.Companyinsolvencies in therecessionofthe early 1980s had run at an average of around 10,000 per year. In the boom periodbetween1994and2001theyranat16,000peryear.Soccerclubs,too,lovedthenewlaw:moreofthemwentinsolventinthe1990sboomthanintheearly1980sbust.Theyrarelyevenneededtobothertocreateanew“phoenix”companyanymore.Clubswouldrunupunpayable debts, go insolvent, and hey presto,months laterwould be fine and signingexpensive players again. Better-run rivals complained that insolvency and phoenixingweregivingtheculpritsanunfairadvantage.In2004thisargumentpromptedtheleaguetointroduceaten-pointpenaltyforclubsthatwentintoadministration.Still,ithasn’tprovedahugedeterrent.

There’ssomethingelsetonoteaboutthesenear-deathexperiences:theyalmostalwayshappenonly to small clubs.Therewasagreatkerfuffle inEngland in early2010whenPortsmouthFCofthemightyPremierLeagueenteredadministration.TheclubhadbeenonmuchthesamejourneyasBristolCitythirtyyearsearlier,justwithlargersums.Ithadoverspentongoodplayers,wonanFACup,andendedupintrouble.

On theonehand,Portsmouth’s storywasall too familiar: soccerclubgoesbustandaftermanyprematurereportsofitsdemiseisreborn.Thesharedfanangstabouttheirclubdisappearing has a useful psychological function: it’s a communal ritual that givessupporters a chance to join together to affirm their love of the club. As we write,PortsmouthisbumpingalonginLeagueTwo,thebottomtierofEnglishsoccer.Ithashadamiserablefewyears,butlikeeveryotherprofessionalclubinEngland,it’sstillaround.

Yet in another way, Portsmouth’s story was exceptional. No club in the PremierLeaguehadevergoneintoadministrationbefore.Theothersixty-sixcasesofinsolvencyinEnglishsoccerfrom1982through2010involvedteamsinthelowerdivisions.ThatissomethingthatdoomsayerslikePlatinishouldnote.Theyoftencomplainaboutthedebtsof rich clubs: the hundreds of millions of dollars owed by the likes of Real Madrid,Barcelona, and Manchester United. They ask how Chelsea would survive if RomanAbramovichfallsunderabus.

Infact,though,bigclubsarenottheproblem.AcrossEurope,lower-tierteamsliveontheedgeofinsolvency,whilethetop-tierteams,eventhoughtheytoomostlylosemoney,seldombecomeinsolvent.Thehighestriskofallisforrecentlyrelegatedteams.WehavebeenabletoidentifyaboutadozenEuropeanclubsthathavedisappearedsincethestartoftheeconomiccrisisin2008:UDSalamanca,Lorca,andCDBadajozinSpain;Haarlem,Veendam,AGOVV, andRBCRoosendaal inHolland;Beerschot inBelgium;Gretna inScotland;ArsenalKyivinUkraine;andUnireaUrziceniinRomania.Thereisnotasinglebig name among them. Admittedly Unirea played in the Champions League in 2009–2010, but historically it was a tiny club from a small town. It owed its brief rise to apassingsugardaddy.Whenhelostinterest,Unireaexpired.

Noneoftheseclubsgotintotroublebygamblingtensofmillionstocompetewiththebigboys.Rather,theyweretinyoutfits(Badajozinits107yearsofexistenceneveroncemadeittoSpain’stopdivision)whohadsoldieredongamelythroughtheyears.Whenthecrisis hit, their relativelypunydebts overwhelmed them.Haarlem, for instance, owed afairlymanageable$2.5million.It’sjustthathardlyanybodywasinterestedenoughtofightfortheclub’slife.Anyway,severalofthedefunctclubswereimmediatelyrefoundedinaslightlydifferentform.Gretna2008nowplaysamateursoccerinScotland,asdoRBCandAGOVV in Holland. Salamanca actually has three successor clubs, each claiming themantle.

Perhaps because English professional clubs are older established brands than mostcontinental teams, even the littlest among them survived the crisis. But if Platini isdeterminedtoworryaboutclubsgoingbust, it’s theSalamancasheshouldworryabout,nottheRealMadrids.Andheprobablyshouldn’tworrytoomuchabouttheissueatall.IfEuropean soccer clubs really did collapse beneath their debts, there would now bevirtuallynoEuropean soccer clubs left. “Wemustbe sustainable,” clubs saynowadays,parrotingthelatestbusinesscliché.Infact,theyarefantasticallysustainable.Theysurviveevenwhentheygobust.Youcan’tgetmoresustainablethanthat.Match-fixing,say,isamuch bigger problem for European soccer than bankruptcy. The near immortality ofsoccer clubs makes you wonder exactly what problem UEFA’s rules on “financial fairplay”aremeanttosolve.

Platini worries about clubs’ debts. But it’s precisely because clubs are practicallyimmortalthattheyhavesuchlargedebts.Theyknowfromexperiencethattheycantakeonwhateverdebttheylike,andsurvive.Ifthingsgowrong,theysimplydon’trepaytheirdebt,theolddirectorswalkaway,andnewonescomeinpromisingtosweepupthemess(while also buying shiny new Brazilian center forwards). A club like BayernMunich,

which shunsdebt, is in factmissinga trick.Bayerncouldeasilyborrowa fewhundredmilliondollarstomakeitselfinvincibleagainsthumanoppositiononthelongterm.Evenifitflushedthemoneydownthetoiletandthensaid“Nanananana”tothelenders,theclubwould survive. Right now Bayern is a marvelous self-sustaining debt-free business,whereas most English clubs aren’t. But the point of a soccer club isn’t to have niceaccounts—after all, the clubswithhorrible accounts survive, too.Thepointof a soccerclubis towintrophies.BayernwontheChampionsLeaguein2013,but inthepreviousthirty-sixyears it hadwon the trophyonlyonce.That’s ameager return for thebiggestclubofWesternEurope’sbiggestcountry.

Onceagain,thecomparisonbetweensoccerclubsand“real”businessesbreaksdown.Whenclubsgetintotrouble,theygenerally“doaLeeds,”amaneuvernamedinhonorofthe spectacularly badly run Leeds United of the early 2000s. “Doing a Leeds” meanscutting yourwages, getting relegated, and competing at a lower level. Imagine if otherbusinessescoulddothis.SupposethatFordcouldsackskilledworkersandhireunskilledones to produceworse cars, or that AmericanAirlines could replace all its pilots withpeoplewhoweren’taswellqualifiedtoflyplanes.Thegovernmentwouldstopit,andinanycase,consumerswouldnotputupwith terribleproducts. (PresidentRonaldReagandidsackstrikingair-trafficcontrollersin1981andreplacedthemwithnewhires,butthatwassomethingofaone-off.)

Soccer clubs have it easy. Recall that almost every English professional club hassurvived the Great Depression, the Second World War, recessions, corrupt chairmen,appallingmanagers,andthecurrenteconomiccrisis.Bycontrast,economichistorianLesHannahmadealistofthetoponehundredglobalcompaniesin1912,andresearchedwhathad become of them by 1995. Nearly half the companies—forty-nine—had ceased toexist.Fiveofthesehadgonebankrupt,sixwerenationalized,andthirty-eightweretakenoverbyother firms.Evenamong thebusinesses thatsurvived,manyhadgone intonewsectorsormovedtonewlocations.

Whatmadethesenon-soccerbusinessessounstablewas,aboveall,competition.Thereis such a thing as brand loyalty, but when a better product turns up, most people willswitch sooner or later. So normal businesses keephaving to innovate or die.They faceendlesspitfalls:competitorspullahead,consumers’tasteschange,newtechnologiesmakeentire industries obsolete, cheap goods arrive from abroad, the government interferes,recessionshit,companiesoverinvestandgobustorsimplygetunlucky.

Bycontrast,soccerclubsareimmunefromalmostalltheseeffects:aclubthatfailstokeep upwith the competitionmight get relegated, but it can always survive at a lowerlevel.Somefansloseinterest,butclubshavegeographicalroots.Abadteammightfinditscatchment area shrinking, but not disappearing completely. The “technology” of soccercan never become obsolete, because the technology is the game itself.Atworst soccermightbecomelesspopular.

Foreignrivalscannotenterthemarketandsupplysocceratalowerprice.Therulesofsoccerprotectdomesticclubsbyforbiddingforeigncompetitorsfromjoiningtheirleague.Englishclubsasawholecouldfallbehindforeigncompetitorsandlosetheirbestplayers,

butforeignclubshavefinancialproblemsandincompetentmanagementoftheirown.

Thegovernmentisnotabouttonationalizesoccer.

Clubsoftenoverinvest,butthisalmostneverdestroystheclub,onlythewealthoftheinvestor.Atworst,theclubgetsrelegated.

A club’s revenues might decline in a recession, but it can always live with lowerrevenues.

Inmostindustriesabadbusinessgoesbankrupt,butsoccerclubsalmostneverdo.Nomatterhowmuchmoneytheywaste,someonewillalwaysbailthemout.Thisiswhatisknown in financeas“moralhazard”:whenyouknowyouwillbe savednomatterhowmuchmoneyyoulose,youarefreetolosemoney.

There is a strangeparallelherebetweenprofessional soccerandcommunism.Whenweask,“Whydosoccerclubsalmostalwayssurvive?”weareechoingthegreatquestionaskedaboutcommunismbyoneofourfavoriteeconomists,theHungarianJánosKornai.HegrewupinHungary,brieflyworkedforacommunistnewspaperdespiteknowingthatthe systemwas all nonsense, and aftermaking hisway to theWest tried to answer thequestion:Whyexactlydidcommunismnotwork?

Kornai’s answer could be summed up in four words: “the soft-budget constraint.”Imagine thatyouare a tractor factory in communistHungary.Eachyear the stategivesyouabudget.Butifattheendoftheyearyou’veoverspentthebudgetandhaven’tmadeany profits, the state just gives you a bit more money to make up the difference. Incommunism, bad companies were propped up forever. In other words, the “budgetconstraint”oncommunistfirmswassoft.Iftheywantedtooverspendtheirbudgets,theycould.Theobviousconsequence:unprofitableoverspendingbecamerife.

AsscholarssuchasWladimirAndreffandRasmusStormhavenoted,Kornai’s“soft-budget constraint” applies beautifully to soccer clubs. Like tractor factories incommunism,clubslosemoneybecausetheycan.Theyhavenoneedtobecompetent.Theprofessionalinvestorswhobrieflyboughtclubsharesinthe1990sgotoutassoonastheydiscoveredthis.

Luckily, as we’ve seen, society can keep unprofitable soccer clubs going fairlycheaply.ThetotalrevenuesofEuropeanprofessionalclubsforthe2011–2012seasonwere$24.6billion,accordingtoDeloitte.That’sjustone-fifthoftherevenuesofMcKesson,theUS pharmaceutical supply-chain company. The two-bit losses of soccer clubs hardlymatterwhensetbesidetheenormouslovetheycommand.Thesetinybusinessesaregreatenduringbrands.Creditorsdarenotpush themunder.Nobankmanageror taxcollectorwants tosay,“Thecentury-old localclub isclosing. I’m turningoff the lights.”SocietyswallowsthelossesandletsevenaBristolCitysoldieron.Inasense,theseclubsaretoosmalltofail.

Unlikemostbusinesses,soccerclubssurvivecrisesbecausesomeof theircustomersstickwith themnomatterhowlousy theproduct.Calling thisbrand loyalty isnotquiterespectfulenoughofthesentimentinvolved.ToquoteRoganTaylor,aLiverpoolfanand

LiverpoolUniversity professor, “Soccer ismore than just a business. No one has theirashesscattereddowntheaisleatTesco.”

*ThethreelostclubsareAberdare(disbanded1928),NewBrighton(whichfoldedin1983,wasreborn,thenfoldedagainin2012),andSouthShields(takenoverbyGatesheadin1930).Severalotherclubshavefoldedandbeenreborn,suchasAccringtonStanley,BradfordParkAvenue,DurhamCity,HalifaxTown,MerthyrTown,Nelson,andNewportCounty.

5INPRAISEOFSUGARDADDIESWhy“FinancialFairPlay”IsBadforSoccer

When theRussianoligarchRomanAbramovichdecided tobuya soccer club, hehad alookaroundinSpainandItaly.Butownershipthereseemedcomplicated.InItaly,manyofthefamilieswhoownedclubshadbeendoingbusinesswitheachotherforgenerations.InSpain, horror of horrors, the fans themselves owned the biggest clubs. As for theBundesliga,Abramovichneverseemstohaveconsideredit.

Andso inApril2002heflewtoManchester towatchUnited.After thegame,writeDominic Midgley and Chris Hutchins in their biography Abramovich, Rio FerdinanddrovehimtoManchesterairport,andtheRussiancharmedtheplayerbyjoininginasing-alongwithafellowpassenger,Ferdinand’sfour-year-oldhalf-brother.

Notlongafterthat,thestorygoes,AbramovichwasflyinginahelicopteroverLondonwhenhespottedasoccerstadiumhandilylocatednearhishouseinwestLondon.“What’sthat?”hereportedlyasked.ItwasChelsea.Heboughttheclub,sealingthedealwiththedepartingowner,KenBates,overabottleofEvianwaterinLondon’sDorchesterHotel.TheRussianwasthenstillhappytotalktojournalists.WhentheFinancialTimesrangtoask about his purchase, he revealed that his favorite playerwasThierryHenry (then atArsenal),andexplainedwhyhehadboughtChelsea:“I’m lookingat it as something tohave funwith rather than having to realise a return. I don’t look at this as a financialinvestment.” He has barely spoken another word in public since, but two things havebecomeclear:(1)Buyingasoccerclubmadethisunknownbillionaireworld-famous.(2)Ashepredicted,thepurchasehasn’tbeena“financialinvestment.”Inhisfirsteightyearsasowner,Chelsealostatotalofabout$1billion.

Despite the losses, Abramovich seems to have inspired the era of billionaire sugardaddies in global soccer. Men like him have taken overManchester City, Paris Saint-Germain, Monaco, and most big Russian clubs. Sugar daddies in soccer aren’t likeinvestorsinnormalbusinesses.Theyarewillingtolosemoneyjusttobepartofthegame.Theyhavehelpeddriveupwagesandsalariesforthebestplayerstounprecedentedlevels.NowUEFAistryingtoendthat.In2010theEuropeansoccerassociationintroducedruleson“financialfairplay”thataim,aboveall,tostopclubsspendingmorethantheyearn.Ifaclub’sannualrevenuesare$400million,say,itwon’tbeabletospend$500millionevenif anAbramovichwants to give it themoney.Any offending club can be banned fromEuropeancompetition.

UEFAseemstohavecomeupwithFFPlargelyoutofasensethatsoccer’sdebthadgottenoutofhand,andthatwhatwasneededwasadoseofausterity.Inthatsense,FFPmirrorsthe“austerity”policiesimposedbyEuropeangovernmentsataboutthesametime.The“FFPrules”arefullofloopholes,andtakefulleffectonlyin2018,buttheydoseemaimedatthesugardaddies.Theideaseemstobe,ifnottodrivetheAbramovichesoutof

soccer,atleasttocurbtheirspending.Thatwouldallowrivalclubstospendless,andletthemmakeprofitsatlast.Arsenal’sArsèneWenger,forone,haswelcomedthenewrules.“Financialfairplaywillmakeabigdifference,”hesays,“becauseyoucannotimaginetheworldwillgoonjustsplashingmoneyoutwithoutanyreturn.”Manyfans, too,seemtoregard “FFP” as soccer’s long-needed dose of sanity. We disagree. We don’t thinkfinancialfairplaywillbefullyimplemented,butifitis,wethinkitwillbebadforsoccer.Andwedon’t thinkclubs shouldmakeprofits.Onbalance,we think theAbramovichesaregoodforthegame.

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FFPitselfhas twodimensions,oneofwhich isuncontroversial: thateveryclubmustbesolvent. Solvency means the capacity to pay your debts—that is, the reasonableexpectation that your future income will be enough to pay what you owe. In mostEuropeancountries,solvencyisabasicrequirementfordoingbusiness.Ifthedirectorsofacompanyknowitisinsolvent,thenlegallytheyshouldstopdoingbusinessuntileithersolvencyisrestoredorthecompanyisshutdown.Solvencycanberestoredifthecreditorsagreetowriteoffsomeoftheirdebts.Ifthecreditorswon’tdothat,thenthebusinesscanbeclosed,theassetssold,andthecreditorspaidofftothegreatestextentpossible.

Insolvencyisaverycommonbusinessproblem.Thereare thousandsofcasesacrossEuropeeveryyear.Generallytheproblemaffectssmallbusinesses,andsotheseeventsgounnoticedbymostofus.Occasionally,though,verylargecompaniesgoinsolvent,anditbecomes headline news. But as we’ve already shown, soccer clubs almost never closedown. They are practically always bailed out. This appears to be one reason Europeanclubsseemforevertobeinfinancialtrouble:theyoverspendbecausetheycan.Inthepastmanyclubshaverestoredtheirfinancesbyrefusingtopaysmallcreditors,banks,andthetaxman—daringanyof them to takeon the labelof thecreditor thatdestroyeda soccerclub.Very few creditors have chosen to tread this path.And perhaps in the dayswhentherewasalmostnomoneyinsocceritdidn’tmatter.Localbankscanusuallywriteoffadebtthatmightbenomorethanafewtensofthousandsofdollars(alottoanindividualperhaps,butnotmuchforamodestlysizedbank).

Now, though, the income generated by European soccer is starting to add up tosomething.Thesedays,whenaclubcan’tpay,alotofcreditorsgethurt.Oftenthevictimsare small local businesses, or even charities—notably St. John’s Ambulance, whichprovidesemergencymedicalaidtofansinBritishsoccergrounds.Clearlyit’swrongforaclub to pay its players millions and then try to get out of paying its creditors. So weapplaudFFP for demanding solvency.The solvency rulemostly affects smaller clubs—which,aswehaveseen,are theonesthat tendtobecomeinsolvent.Inthebigcountriessmallerclubstendtoplayinthelowerdivisions,whichmeansUEFA’srulesareirrelevantto themanyway.Financial fair play applies only to teams enteringUEFAcompetitions.The requirement for solvency would therefore mostly impact clubs qualifying forEuropeancompetitionsfromsmallerorpoorercountries:Finland,Romania,andthelike.Itshouldn’taffecttheChelseasandRealMadrids.

The second, controversial element of FFP is the breakeven rule. This requires that,

averaged over a three-year period, a club’s “relevant income”mustmatch its “relevantexpenses.”Inotherwords,clubscanspendonlywhattheyearn.Thisrulewillexclusivelyimpactbigclubs.Thatisbecausethebreakevenrulesallowafinanciallossof€5million(nearly$7million).AccordingtoUEFA,in2011only77outof726top-divisionclubsinEuropehadannualincomeover€50million,andwerethereforelikelytomakelossesofover€5million.Hardlyanycluboutsidetheelitewillnoticetheeffectofbreakeven.

Thechieftargetofbreakevenseemstobethesugardaddies.ThisisbecauseUEFA’sdefinitionof“relevantincome”includesgatemoney,broadcastincome,andincomefromsponsorshipandmerchandising,butexcludestheowner’sownmoney.Breakevenisnotasolvency issue—it’s not as if Chelsea faces any real risk that Abramovich will beunwilling or unable to cover losses as long as he owns the club. Indeed, in 2009 heconverted the hundreds ofmillions of dollars that Chelsea theoretically owed him intosharesintheclub.Thatmeansthatifhewalksawaytomorrow,hecan’taskChelseaforhismoneyback.

UEFApresumably isn’tworried aboutChelsea’s solvency.Rather, it seems to thinkthatmoney fromanowner somehowgivesaclubanunfair competitiveadvantage.TheFFPrulesallowaclubowner toputmoney into the stadiumoryouthacademy,butnotintobuyingstarsforthefirstteam.

The breakeven rules shouldn’t hurt the old “aristocrats” of soccer, the likes ofManchesterUnited,Arsenal,andBayernMunich.Theseclubsgenerateplentyofincomefrom “relevant” sources—chiefly fans, sponsors, and TV companies. No wonder, then,thatthearistocratssupportfinancialfairplay.FFPwouldtendtoweakentheirrivals,whocancompetewiththearistocratsonlybyborrowingfortunes(somethingbannedundertheinsolvencyrule)orbygettingfortunesfromasugardaddy(somethingbannedunderthebreakevenrule).IfFFPworks,thearistocratswillcelebrate.

Let’scompare thebreakevenrule to thesalarycap,widelyused inAmericanmajor-league sports. A salary cap generally restricts teams’ spending on players to a fixedpercentage of average club income (55 percent, say). UEFA’s breakeven rule restrictsplayerspending to the levelofclub incomedefinedas“relevant.”Thekeydifference isthattheUScapisthesameforallclubs,whereasbreakevencapseachclubatthelevelofitsownresources—alotforthelargerclubs,notsomuchforthesmallerclubs.Sowhilethe American salary cap encourages competitive balance between clubs (it stops theDallas Cowboys from spending infinitelymore than the Jacksonville Jaguars), UEFA’sbreakevenrulecementsinequalitybymakingitharderforsmallerclubstocompetewiththearistocrats.Thishardlyseemsfair,unlessby“fair”youmeanthe idea thatbigclubsshouldbeprotectedfromcompetitionfromupstarts.

Jean-Louis Dupont, a lawyer who helped bring about the Bosman ruling in 1995,decided in 2013 to challenge the FFP rules under European competition law.Hismainargument was not that FFP is unfair to smaller clubs. Rather, he said it was unfair onplayersandtheiragents.FFPwillsurelyputdownwardpressureonplayers’salaries,sinceitaimstostopatleastsomeclubs(suchasChelseaandManchesterCity)fromspendingasmuch as theywant. Stefan and the Flemish economist Thomas Peeters developed a

modeltoestimatetheeffectthebreakevenrulewillhave.Notethattheruleputsindirectaswellasdirectdownwardpressureonwages.Thedirectpressurewouldworklikethis:ManchesterCitycomplieswithbreakevenbyspendinglessonplayers’salaries.Butontopof that comes the indirect effect: by spending less, City becomes less of a competitivethreattootherclubs.Thecostofwinningfortheseotherclubsfalls,andsotheyneedtospendlessonwagestoachievesuccess.

If theFFPruleshaveenoughbite,clubswillbeable tochoose their strategy.Eithertheycancontinue tospend thesameproportionof their“relevant income,”even thoughthey need to spend less now to win, or they can aim for the same level of on-fieldperformance as before FFP, and pocket the surplus as profits. Either way, Stefan andPeeterspredictedaverylargefallinspendingonplayersasaresultofFFP.Using2010asabenchmark,andusingdatafromthetopdivisionsofEngland,France,Italy,andSpain(financial data for individual German clubs is not available), the model suggests thatplayerspendingwouldhavebeenbetween€400millionand€800millionlowerinthosefourleagueshadtheFFPrulesapplied.Thatwouldrepresentafallinwagespendingofupto15percent.Thehigherspendingtheleague,thelargerthefallinwages—soFFPwouldbeworstnewsofallforplayerstryingtoearnacrustinthePremierLeague.

Somepeoplemightthinklowerplayers’wageswouldbejustificationenoughforFFP.Butremembertwothings:First,FFPmakessocceratthetoplesscompetitive.ImagineifFFP had been in force since 2003, andAbramovich atChelsea andSheikhMansour atManchesterCityhadn’tbeenallowedtospendtheirfortunes tobuyEnglishtitles.Whatwould have happened instead? Quite likely, Manchester United would have won thePremier League ten years running.With FFP, as GabrieleMarcotti warned in theWallStreetJournal,“insteadofsoccerhavinga1percentlordingitovereveryoneelse,itcouldbecomea0.1percent.”

Second,ifFFPdoescutplayers’wages,thereisnopromisethatthemoneysavedwillgo back into soccer.More probably, the money will go into the pockets of billionaireowners.

Weshouldsayat thispoint thatFFPmightnotactually takeforceasplanned.Morelikely,clubsandUEFAwillbothgiveabit.UEFA’smainconcernwillbetostoppennilessclubsriskinginsolvency,andsoitwillenforcethesolvencyrulehard.AnyBulgarianclubthat has lost over €5 million in three years will find itself chucked out of Europeancompetition.Bycontrast,bigclubswithsugardaddiesmaybecutmoreslackiftheyfailto break even. In any case, some of these clubs are already findingways around FFP.Manchester City, for instance, has signed a ten-year deal believed to be worth aflabbergasting $550 million with Etihad Airways for stadium naming rights and shirtsponsorship.SkepticsnotethatEtihad,likeCity’sowners,comesfromAbuDhabi.Theyhint that thedeal isa trick toallowCity to injectoutsidemoneywhileevadingtheFFPrules.

However,UEFAmightstruggletoproveincourtthatthe$550millionwasexcessive,orthatEtihad’sownershadanythingtodowithCity’sowners(beyondbothsetsofpeoplecomingfromtheeliteofthesametinyemirate).Thesugar-daddyclubswillhireexpensive

lawyers todefendthem,andwilldareUEFAtobanteamsfullofgreatplayersfromtheChampions League. Thatwill giveUEFA pause. It doesn’twant to stage aChampionsLeaguewithoutParis’sZlatan IbrahimovicorManchesterCity’sSergioAgüero. Itmustalsoworrythatanyexcludedclubsmight try tostart theirownrivalcompetition.UEFApresidentMichelPlatinisoundedcautiouswhen telling theLondonEveningStandard in2013,“Sanctionswillbedecidedupon.DonotthinkwearegoingtotakefivetotenclubsoutoftheEuropeancompetition.Definitelythatwouldbethevery,verylaststraw.Ifwehaverepeatoffenders,okay,yes,theywillhavetobepunishedseverely—possibly.Wearenotouttokilltheclubs.”

Presumably, then, deals like City’s with Etihad will be left to stand. FFP may nottransformsoccer.IvanGazidis,chiefexecutiveofArsenal,toldus,“ArethereloopholesinthewayFFPworks?Quitepossibly.FFPisnotpartofourstrategy.”

Still,ourquestionis:WhatifFFPactuallyhappens,andworks?IfUEFAdoesmanageto force clubs to spend onlywhat they earn, then sugar daddieswould drift out of thegame.Afterall,therewouldn’tbemuchpointinbuyingChelseaifyoucouldn’tspendanymoneytowin trophies.Youmightstillwant tobuyahugeclub likeManchesterUnitedthatcanchallengefortrophieswithoutyourcash,buttherearen’tmanyclubslikethat.IfFFPtriumphs,theAbramovicheraends.Wethinkthatwouldbebadnewsforsoccer.

Sugar daddies are often depicted as a curse on the game. It’s easy to see why aManchester United fan, or an Arsenal fan, would dislikeManchester City or Chelsea.Setting aside local rivalry, it’s the age-old disdain of the aristocracy for the nouveauxriches.City andChelsea are upstartswho have usedwallets full of foreign currency tobargetheirwayontothetoptable.WhenCitywonthePremierLeaguein2012,itdidsowithseveralplayersboughtfromArsenal,andattheexpenseofUnited.OfcourseUnitedfansopposesugardaddies.

What’s less clear is why fans of smaller clubs should care. It’s not as if the sugardaddyclubsaretakingtheirplaces.Smallerclubsneverwinanythinganymoreanyway.Intwenty-plus years of the Premier League, only the sugar-daddy clubsManchester City,Chelsea,andBlackburn(whenfundedbyJackWalkerin1995)havewrestedtitlesfromtheviselikegripofManchesterUnitedandArsenal.Sugardaddiesthreatenthestrong,buttheyhardlythreatenthealreadyweak.

Inmostotherwalksoflifewewelcometheoutsiderwhocomesinandshakesuptheexistingorder.Takingthearistocratsdownanotchistheplotofendlessfeel-goodmovies.Why should it be different for soccer? It certainly seems thatwhen fans of a particularclublearnthatasugardaddyisintheoffing,theyperkup.SoonafterAbramovichboughtChelseaandbeganbuyingexpensiveplayers,theclub’sfanscameupwithasonginhishonor(moreorless):

He’sgotVeroninhispocket

WegotJohnsonfromWestHam

Ifyouwantthebest

Thendon’taskquestions

CosRoman,he’sourman

Whereitallcomesfromisamystery

Isitguns?Isitdrugs?

Thesentimentof thesongisclear: findingasugardaddyis likewinningthe lottery.Formostclubs,it’stheironlyhopeofcompetingwiththearistocrats.

Someargue that the“excessive”spendingofsugardaddiesdrivessmallerclubs intobankruptcy. In fact, if anything, the opposite is true. Sugar daddies buy players in thetransfermarketandthenpaythemveryhighwages.Theusualargumentisthatthisforcesotherclubstopaytheirplayershighersalariestostay.However,(a)thiswillapplyonlytoasmallnumberofplayers,and(b)noclubcanbeforcedtopaymorethanitcanafford.Certainlyifclubswithoutasugardaddytrytomatchtheambitionsofthesugardaddies,thatwillendintears,butthenthatmustalsobethecaseforclubsthattrytocompetewitharistocrats. Whether you want to be a Manchester United or an Abramovich-fundedChelsea,ifyouhavenosugardaddy,youwillfail.Theproblemforsmallclubsisthattheyjustdon’thavetheresourcestocompetewiththedominantclubs,andhavenothadthemforhalfacenturyormore.Thishasverylittletodowithsugardaddies.

Butsugardaddiesaregoodforthesoccereconomyforonebigreason:thecashtheyinject supports other clubs. In SheikhMansour’s first five years of owningManchesterCity, from 2008 through 2013, the club spent £505 million net on acquiring players(around $800 million). This money was pumped into a European market where top-divisionclubsin2011alonelostacumulative€1.6billion(over$2billion).Someofthesheikh’smoneyendedupwithagents,butbyfarthebiggestchunkoftransferfeeswenttoclubs.DeloittecalculatesthatthePremierLeaguebenefitedfromatotalof£2billion($3.2billion)ofadditionalfinancecomingfromwealthyownersfrom2006through2013.Andofcoursethenewtransferspendingdidn’tallgotootherPremierLeagueclubs.Someofitwent toclubsplaying in lowerdivisions inEngland,or in leaguesabroad.Someof thatmoneywasspentonplayers,andsomeonimprovingtrainingfacilitiesorbuildingbetterstadiums.

We lament the seizing of so much of the world’s wealth by a small number ofbillionaires—manyof themheirs,criminals,or taxdodgers—but ithasbeengoodnewsforsoccer.Aftersomeonebecomesabillionaire,hetendstowanttoconvertsomeofthatmoneyintoexcitementandprestige.Perhapsthebestwaytodothatisbybuyingasoccerclub.IfAbramovicheverwantedtosellChelsea,sugardaddieswouldprobablybeliningup trying to buy it from him. EhudOlmert, the former Israeli primeministerwho hassupportedManchesterUnitedsincetheMunichaircrashof1958,toldusastoryaboutthe“easterninvestor”whosenthimtovisittheGlazerfamilywithanoffertobuyUnited.Forthe many people wanting to buy United, an early obstacle is the difficulty of actuallymeeting theGlazers.Theydon’t get outmuch.But theyaregreat friendsof Israel, andweredelighted tomeetOlmert.At theircountryclub inPalmBeach,hehanded themacheckforabout$1.6billiontotakeoverUnited.TheGlazerssaidnostraightaway.“This

isthestrongestbrandnameinthesportsworld,”theyexplained.Still,iftheyeverdecidetosell,we think thata fewof the1,426billionairesonForbesmagazine’s list for2013mightbeinterested.

To understand how sugar daddies help soccer, it’s instructive to study the Glazers,becausetheyaretheoppositeofsugardaddies.MostUnitedfansblamethemforsuckingcashoutoftheclub.IthasbeenestimatedthatthenetcostoftheGlazerstotheclubsincetheirtakeoverin2005ismorethan£500million(over$800million).Soifsuckingmoneyoutofclubsisabadthing,thenputtingmoneyintothemissurelyagoodthing.

IfFFPsucceeds,sugardaddiesmightfadeoutofsoccer.Ifthathappens,theremustbea real danger that investment in European clubs will dry up. If so, more clubs willprobably go insolvent. In the nightmare scenario, the sugar daddies’ money might bechanneled into emerging leagues elsewhere (theUnited States, China, the Gulf?). Thatcould undermine Europe’s dominance. It’s hard to think of any other activity inwhichorganizationsactivelyseektostopwealthypeoplefrominvesting.Notmanyuniversities,artgalleries,operahouses,oraidagenciessaynotosugardaddies.

HORROROFHORRORS:MIGHTBIGSOCCERCLUBSBECOMEPROFITABLE?

We’ve shown in the previous chapters that soccer clubs almost never make profits.However,inpartbecauseofFFP,thatmaysoonchange,atleastforsomeofthebiggestclubs.

Losseswerealwaysafactoflifeinsoccer,andasmoremoneycameintothegame,the losses just kept growing. Every year, UEFA’s “club licensing benchmark report”summarizes financial information for around 650 clubs playing in the top divisions ofEurope’snational leagues.Betweenthefinancialyear2008and2012,revenuesgrew15percent (pretty impressive in an economic crisis), yet the number of clubs declaring anoperatinglossrosefrom54percentto63percent.

Then something changed. Late in 2013, UEFA trailed some figures from its as yetunpublished report for the financial year 2012 (to appear early in 2014). Themessage:lossesweredownby36percent.Variousfactorsprobablycontributedtothatdecline.FFPmayalreadybestartingtocurbclubs’spending.ThejumpinglobalbroadcastincomeforBundesliga andPremierLeagueclubspresumablyhelped too.Andwith thewidespreadpanic about clubs’ losses, the Spanish government in particular has cracked down onclubs’spending.

Allthismaysoundlikegoodnews.Theoppositeofalossisaprofit,soiflossesarebad, thenprofitsmustbegood, right?But that takesusback to theGlazers: theymakesureUnitedmakesaverylargeprofit.Yetthatprofitrepresentsmoneythattheownerscanthen takeoutof thebusiness.That’spreciselywhymostUnitedfansresent theGlazers.United’s profits would have been more welcome had they been reinvested in buyingplayers,orbuildingabiggerstadium,orevenfundingacutinticketprices—butthenofcoursetheywouldhaveceasedtobeprofits.

We expect more owners of European clubs to follow the Glazers’ lead. Six of the

twentyPremierLeagueclubsarenowownedbyAmericans.Thesepeoplecomefromacountrywheremanysportsfranchisesactuallymakemoney.Mostofthesepeopledidn’tbuy into soccer because they love the game, but as a business proposition. They thinksoccerhasthepowertocaptureforeignmarketsinawaythatAmericansportsdon’t.Theysee the ceaseless rise in thePremierLeague’sbroadcast income.TheybelieveFFPwillstopsugardaddiesfromdrivingupwagesandtransferfees.NodoubtencouragedbytheAmerican owners, the Premier League has backed FFP, and is even consideringintroducingitsownversionofFFPinEngland.FFPcouldturnintoabluntinstrumenttomakesoccermorecapitalist.Intheend,theseprofit-drivenownershopetotakemoneyoutofthegame.

To imagine what the future might look like, think of Arsenal. Wenger, the club’smanager,doesn’tlikespendingmoney.Hisausteritywonzerotrophiesfrom2006to2013,but it probably pleasedArsenal’s Americanmajority owner, StanKroenke. From 2002throughearly2013,Arsenal’ssharepricejumpednearly1,200percent,comparedwithariseofjust60percentforBritishsharesingeneral.

Arsenalhasn’tbeenagreatsoccerclublately,butithasbeenagoodbusiness.Thisiswhat a soccer club run as a business looks like: high ticket prices, little desire to wintrophies,andrespectableprofits.IfFFPtakesforce,andotherbigclubsendupbeingrunlikeArsenalratherthanlikeAbramovich’sChelsea,thenwepredict:

• Afallinplayers’wages

• Afallintransferfees,whichwouldmeanlessmoneytricklingdownfrombigclubstotherest

• Ariseinclubprofits,whichwouldmeanmoremoneybeingtakenoutofthegamebypeopleliketheGlazers

It’s often said, in current jargon, that a profitable soccer club is “sustainable.”Wedisagree.Fansshouldn’twanttheirclubstomakeprofits.Ifsoccerbecomesahard-nosedprofit-makingindustry,supportersmayenduppiningforthedayswhenitwastheworstbusinessintheworld.

6NEEDNOTAPPLY

DoesEnglishSoccerDiscriminateAgainstBlackPeople?In1991RonNoades,chairmanofCrystalPalace,poppeduponBritishTVtalkingaboutblacks.“Theproblemwithblackplayers,”explainedNoades,whoseheavilyblack teamhadjustfinishedthirdinEngland,“isthey’vegreatpace,greatathletes,lovetoplaywiththeballinfrontofthem….Whenit’sbehindthemit’schaos.Idon’tthinktoomanyofthemcanread thegame.Whenyou’regetting into themidwinteryouneedafewof thehardwhitementocarrytheathleticblackplayersthrough.”

Noades’s interview was one of the last flourishes of unashamed racism in Britishsoccer.Through the1980s racismhadbeenmoreor less taken forgranted in thegame.Fans threw bananas at black players. Pundits likeEmlynHughes explained the curiousabsence of black players at Liverpool and Everton by saying, “They haven’t got thebottle.” The writer Dave Hill summed up the stereotypes: “‘No bottle’ is a particularfavorite, lack of concentration another. ‘You don’t want too many of them in yourdefense,’ one backroom bod told me, ‘they cave in under pressure.’ Then there is thecuriousconvictionthatblacksaresusceptibletothecoldandwon’tgooutwhenitrains.”

It’s clear thatEnglish soccer in those dayswas shot throughwith racism: prejudicebased on skin color. But what wewant to know is whether that racism translated intodiscrimination:unfairtreatmentofpeople.PeoplelikeNoadesmayhavebeenprejudicedagainstblackplayers,butdidtheymakeitharderfortheseplayerstogetjobsinsoccer?The’80sblackstrikerGarthCrooksthoughttheydid:“IalwaysfeltIhadtobe15percentbetterthanthewhitepersontogetthesamechance,”hesaid.

Yet thenotionof discrimination against blacks clasheswith somethingwe thinkweknowabout soccer: thaton the fieldat least, thegame is ruthlessly fair. In soccergoodplayersofwhatevercolorperformbetterthanbadones.FansandchairmenandmanagersmaywalkaroundwithNoadesianfantasiesintheirheads,butwhenablackplayerplayswell,everyonecansee it.NickHornbywrites inFeverPitch, inhis famousriffonGusCaesar,“Oneofthegreatthingsaboutsportisitscruelclarity;thereisnosuchthing,forexample,asabadone-hundred-metrerunner,orahopelesscenter-halfwhogotlucky;insport,yougetfoundout.Noristheresuchathingasanunknowngeniusstrikerstarvinginagarretsomewhere.”

Inshort,itwouldseemthatinsoccerthereisnoroomforideologies.Youhavetoberight,andresultsonthefieldwilltellyouveryquicklywhetheryouare.Sowouldclubsreally discriminate against blacks at the cost of winningmatches? After all, even RonNoadesemployedblackplayers.(Heseemstohaveknownsomethingaboutsoccer, too:afterleavingPalaceheboughtBrentford,appointedhimselfmanager,wonpromotion,andwasvotedmanageroftheyearintheseconddivision.)Infact,theverysuccessofblacksonthefieldmightbetakenasevidencethattheopportunitieswerethere.

It’salsooftenhardtoproveobjectivelythatdiscriminationexists.Howcanyoushowthat you failed to get the jobbecause of prejudice rather than just because youweren’tgoodenough?LiverpoolandEvertonmightarguethattheyemployedwhiteplayersinthe1980ssimplybecausethewhiteswerebetter.

Luckily,thereisnoneedtogetintoa“hesaid,shesaid”argument.Wehavedatatoprove that English soccer discriminated against black players.We can showwhen thisparticular kind of discrimination ended. And we can predict that the new forms ofdiscriminationthatpervadeEnglishsoccertodaywillbehardertoshift.

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The first black person to set foot in the British Isles was probably a soldier in JuliusCaesar’s invading army, in 55 BC. The “indigenous” English themselves arrived onlyaboutfourhundredyearslater,duringthecollapseoftheRomanEmpire.

Much later, underVictoria, Britain’s own empire ruled a large share of theworld’sblackpeople.Afewof thebetter-educatedorentrepreneurialonesmade theirwayfromtheBritishRajinIndia,theCaribbean,orAfricatoBritain.ArthurWharton,bornin1865intheGoldCoast(nowGhana),becametheworld’sfirstblackprofessionalsoccerplayer.Aswell askeepinggoal forPreston,he set theworld recordof ten seconds for theonehundred–yardsprint.

But until the 1950s most Britons had probably never seen a black person. UnlikeAmericans,theyneverdevelopedanykindofrelationshipwithblacks,whetherpositiveornegative. Then, after the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of colonialimmigrantsbeganarriving.Theinfluxwassmallenough—lessthan5percentofBritain’stotalpopulation,spreadoveraquarterofacentury—toposelittlethreattotheconceptsofEnglishness,Scottishness,orWelshness.Nonetheless,thesignswentupinthewindowsofboardinghouses:

NOCOLOUREDS

Oneof theauthorsof thisbook,StefanSzymanski, is thesonofan immigrant fromPolandwhohadescapedtoLondonin1940andjoinedtheBritisharmytofighttheNazis.StefanremembershisfathertellinghimaboutlookingforlodginginLondonintheearly1950sandfindingsignsinthewindowssaying

ROOMSTOLET—NOPOLES,NOHUNGARIANS

Notonlywas thiskindofdiscrimination legal,butStefan’sfatheraccepted it. Inhismind,hewastheimmigrant,anditwashisjobtofitin.Luckilyforhim(andforStefan),hewasaneducatedman,abletofindareasonablejobandmakeareasonableliving.Hewas also a racist. Thismight sound harsh, but by today’s standardsmostBritish adultsseemed to be racist in the 1970s,whenStefanwas growingup. In the popular comedyseries of the time, Till Death Us Do Part, the hero, Alf Garnett, was a ludicrouslyprejudicedLondonerwhofavoredlabelslike“coon,”“nig-nog,”“darky,”“Paki,”and“theJewsupatSpurs”(GarnettsupportedWestHam).NotonlywerethesewordsusedontheBBC,but theywereaccompaniedbycanned laughter.Admittedly the jokeof the series

wasultimatelyonGarnett,whowasregularlyexposedtothefalsityofhisownprejudices.ButStefanusedtoarguethattheselabelswereoffensive.Hisfathertookthisasevidenceofalackofasenseofhumor.

Itwas against this 1970s background of instinctive racism that black players beganarrivinginEnglishsoccer.MostweretheBritish-bornchildrenofimmigrants.Thatdidn’tstopthemfrombeingtreatedtomonkeynoisesandbananas.(AsHornbynotesinFeverPitch,“Theremaywellbeattractive,articulateandelegantracists,buttheycertainlynevercome to soccermatches.”)For awhile, neo-Nazi parties even imagined that they couldleadarevolutionfromthesoccerterraces.

Giventheabusetheearlyblackplayersreceived,itwouldhavebeeneasyforthemtogiveuponsoccer.Itwasthinkablethattheywouldbedrivenoutofthegame.Insteadtheystayed,played,andtriumphed.In1978,whenVivAndersonbecamethefirstblackmantoplay forEngland, itbecameapparent thatchildrenofCaribbean immigrantsmighthavesomething of a role to play in English soccer. Still, even after the black winger JohnBarnes scored his solo goal to beat Brazil in Rio in 1984, the Football Association’schairmanwasharanguedbyEnglandfansontheflightbackhome:“Youfuckingwanker,youprefersambostous.”

Aslateas1993youcouldstillwitnessthefollowingscene:acrowdofpeopleinapubinLondon’sbusinessdistrict,the“City,”iswatchingEngland-HollandonTV.EverytimeBarnesgetstheball,oneman—inshirtsleevesandatie,justoutofhisCityoffice—makesmonkey noises. Every time, his coworkers laugh. If anyone had complained, let alonegoneoff to findapolicemanandaskedhim toarrest theman, the responsewouldhavebeen:“Where’syoursenseofhumor?”(Hornby’slineonthissortofproblem:“IwishIwere enormous andof a violent disposition, so that I could dealwith anyproblem thatarisesnearmeinafashioncommensuratewiththeangerIfeel.”)

Wheneverpeoplereminisceabout thegoodolddays,whenordinaryworkingpeoplecould afford to go to soccermatches, it’sworth scanning the photographs of the cloth-capped masses standing on the terraces for the faces you don’t see: blacks, Asians,women. It’s true that today’s all-seaters in the Premier League exclude poor people.However,theterracesbeforethe1990sprobablyexcludedrathermorevarietiesofpeople.Inthe1970sand1980s,whensoccergrewscary,theviolenceforcedoutevenmanyolderwhitemen.

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In the late 1980s Stefan began thinking about the economics of soccer. He was thenworkingfortheCentreforBusinessStrategyatLondonBusinessSchool.Everyoneinthecenter was an economist, and therefore tempted to think that markets more or less“worked.” The theory was that any businessperson who came up with a brilliantinnovation—inventing the telephone, say—would not keep his advantage for long,becauseotherswouldimitatehimandcompete.

Buttheeconomistswereinterestedinthefewcompaniesthatstayedsuccessfuldespitecompetition. Clearly there must be something to learn from them. Stefan suggested

lookingfortheseparagonsinsoccer.Itwasobviouslyahighlycompetitiveindustry,yetsomeclubssucceededindominatingforyearsonend.Howdidtheymanagetostayaheadforsolong?

StefanenlistedthesupportofRonSmith,whohadtaughthimwhenhewaswritinghisPhD. Smith, as well as being an expert on Marxist economics and the economics ofdefense, is awell-known econometrician. Econometrics is essentially the art of findingstatisticalmethods to extract information from data—or, as a lawyer friend of Stefan’slikes to put it, taking the data down into the basement and torturing them until theyconfess.Studyingtheaccountsofsoccerclubs,StefanandRoncouldseehowmucheachclubspentonsalaries.The twodiscovered that thisspendingaloneexplainedalmostallthe variation in positions in the English Football League. When Stefan analyzed theaccounts of forty clubs for 1978 through 1997, he found that their wage spendingaccountedfor92percentofthevariationintheirleaguepositions.

Clearlythemarketinplayers’paywashighlyefficient:thebetteraplayer,themoreheearned.Andthismadesense,becausesoccerisoneofthefewmarketsthatindisputablymeetstheconditionsinwhichcompetitioncanworkefficiently:therearelargenumbersofbuyersandsellers,allofwhomhaveplentyofinformationaboutthequalityoftheplayersbeing bought and sold. If a player got paid less than hewasworth, he couldmove toanotherclub.Ifhegotpaidmore,hewouldsoonfindhimselfbeingsoldoffagain.

But what about the variation in league position that remained unexplained afteradjusting for players’ pay? If buying talentwas generally enough towin titles—as richclubchairmenlikeJackWalkeratBlackburnRoversandRomanAbramovichatChelseawouldsoondemonstrate—whatelseaccountedforateam’ssuccess?Ifitwassomethingthatwaseasytocopy—anewtactic,forinstance—thenotherteamswouldcopyit,andtheadvantagewoulddisappear.ThatgotStefanthinkingaboutdiscrimination.Whatifownersweresimplynotwillingtocopythesecretofothers’success,becausetheydidn’twanttohirethekindsofplayerswhobroughtthatsuccess?Hebegantosearchfordiscriminationagainstblackplayers.

Inmost industries, there isaway todemonstrate thatdiscriminationexists.Supposeyou could construct a sample of all applicants for a job, and also of all their relevantqualifications. If you then found that a much larger proportion of relevantly qualifiedwhiteapplicantsreceivedjoboffersthanrelevantlyqualifiedblackapplicants,youcouldreasonablyinferthepresenceofdiscrimination.Forexample,if50percentofwhiteswithdoctorates inphilosophygot joboffersfromuniversityphilosophydepartmentsbutonly10percentoftheirblackequivalentsdid,thenyoushouldsuspectdiscrimination.

This is essentially how economists have tried to identify job discrimination. Themethodalsoworksforwagediscrimination.Ifequivalentlyqualifiedblacks(orwomen,orleft-handers, or whoever) get lower wages for equivalent jobs, then there is probablydiscriminationgoingon.Researchershaveputtogetherdatabasesofthousandsofworkers,eachidentifiedbydozensofrelevantqualifications,totestwhetherdiscriminationexists.Whenitcomestoethnicminoritiesandwomen,theevidenceusuallyshowsthatitdoes.

Theproblemisthattherearefewmeasurablequalificationsthatmakesomeoneagreat

soccerplayer.Whenacompanyisaccusedofracism,itoftensaysthatwhiletheblack(orpurple,or female)candidatesmaypossesssomeof therelevantcharacteristics, thereareother,lessquantifiablecharacteristicsthattheydon’thave.Intellectually,thispointishardto overturn. Hundreds of cases of racial discrimination have been fought in Americancourts,andevidencebasedonthekindsofstudieswehavementionedhasoftenrunintotrouble.

Happily,thereisanotherwaytotestfordiscriminationinsoccer.Onceagain,itreliesonevidencefromthemarket.Asageneralrule,thebestwaytofindoutwhatpeopleareuptoistoseehowtheybehavewhenfacedwithaprice.Don’tknowwhetheryoupreferCoke to Pepsi?Well, let’s see what you choose when they both cost the same. (Mostpeople chooseCoke.)Domanagers preferwhite players to blacks?Well, let’s see howtheyspendtheirclubs’money.

If clubs discriminate, then theywill prefer to hire awhite player to an equivalentlytalented black player. If they do that, then blacks will find it harder to get jobs asprofessional soccerplayers.Theblackswill thenbewilling toaccept lowerwages thanequivalentlytalentedwhites.Afterall,whendemandforwhatwesellislower,wetendtolowerour askingprice.Soblackplayersbecomecheaper thanwhiteplayers. If there isdiscrimination,wewouldexpect to findblackplayersearning less thanequally talentedwhites.

Ifblackplayersarebeingdiscriminatedagainst,thatcreatesaneconomicopportunityforunprejudicedclubs.Byhiringblackplayerstheycandojustaswellintheleagueasanequivalently talented (but more expensive) team of whites. That means that a simpleexperiment will reveal whether discrimination exists: if teams with more black playersachievehigheraverageleaguepositionsforagivensumofwagespending,thentheteamswith fewer black players must have been discriminating. Otherwise, the whiter teamswouldhaveseenthatblackplayersweregoodvalueforthemoneyandwouldhavetriedtohirethem.Thenblackplayers’wageswouldhaverisenduetoincreasedcompetitionfortheirservices,andtherelativeadvantageofhiringblackplayerswouldhavedisappeared.

Note that the argument is not that some teams hiremore black players than others.Thatcouldhappenformanyreasons.Rather,wecaninferdiscriminationif(a)someteamshavemore black players than others and (b) those same teams consistently outperformtheircompetitorsforagivenlevelofwagespending.

After Stefan figured this out, he had the luck of running into just the right person.Around that time he was also researching the relationship between the pay of seniorexecutivesinthebiggestBritishcompaniesandtheperformanceoftheircompanies.(Veryunlikesoccerplayers’wages,thereturnedouttobealmostnocorrelationbetweenthepayofseniorexecutivesandtheperformanceofacompany’sshareprice,untilshareoptionsbecamecommoninthe1990s.)StefanwasinterviewedforaBBCprogrambythepoliticaljournalistMichaelCrick.OvertimeheandCrickgottotalkingaboutsoccer.

Crickisafamouslythoroughresearcher.Bookreviewersdelightinfindingerrors,nomatter how trivial, but they never succeedwithCrick’s political biographies.And as ithappens,CricksupportsManchesterUnited.In1989hewroteafascinatinghistoryofthe

clubwithDavidSmith,describinghowUnitedpackageditslegendforcommercialgain.About this timeCrick became interested inwhether soccer clubs discriminated in theirhiring.Everyoneknewofthesuspiciouscasesoftheday,chieflyLiverpoolandEverton.

Crickbegancollectingdatafromthe1970sonwardtoseewhichclubshadhiredblackplayers. This was no easy task. How do you decide who is “black”? Crick took acommonsense approach. He started with the old Rothmans Football Yearbooks, whichpublishedaphotographofeveryEnglishleagueteam.Fromthishemadeajudgmentastowhichplayers“lookedblack.”Hethenfollowedupbyaskingclubsandsupporters’clubstofillinanygaps.Ittookhimmonthstocomeupwithalistofplayerswho,tomostfans,would have appeared to be black. This sounds arbitrary, but it is precisely what wasrequired.Prejudiceisbasedonappearance.Forexample,severalyearsafterCrickdidhisresearch,itemergedthatRyanGiggs’sfatherwasblack.GiggsevenspokepubliclyabouthisprideinhisCaribbeanancestry.However,untilthatpoint,mostpeoplewouldnothaveconsideredGiggsablackplayer.Hedidn’tlookblack,andforthatreasonhewouldhavebeenunlikelytofacediscrimination.SoCrickwasrightnottocountGiggsasblack.

WhenCricktoldStefanabouthislistofblackplayers,itwasacinchtocreateatestfordiscrimination.Allthatwasnecessarywastocounthowmanytimeseachblackplayerhadplayed for his club in a given season. Itwould then be clearwhich teams employed alargerproportionofblackplayers.

Stefan thenmatched these datawith figures on each team’s league position and itsspendingonwages.Iftherewerenodiscriminationinthemarket,thenwagesalonewouldalmostentirelyexplainleagueperformance.Everythingelsewouldjustberandomnoise—”luck.”But if blackplayerswere systematicallybeingpaid less than equally talentedwhite players, then logically the teams that hired an above-average proportion of blackplayerswoulddosystematicallybetterthantheirwagebillalonewouldpredict.

Back in the1970s, therewerevery fewblackplayers inEnglish soccer.CombiningourdataonwageswithCrick’sdatabasehadgivenusasampleof thirty-nineoutof theninety-twoprofessional league teams. In the1973–1974 seasononly twoof these clubshad fieldedanyblackplayersatall.By1983–1984 therewere still twenty teams inoursamplethatdidnotfieldablackplayerallseason.However,atthispointthereseemstohavebeenamajorbreakthrough.By1989every teamin thesamplehadfieldedat leastoneblackplayeratsomepoint.By1992,whenthePremierLeaguewasfounded,onlyfiveteams in thesampledidnot fieldablackplayer that season.This implied thatabout90percentofclubswereputtingblacksinthefirst team.Attitudeswerechanging.Bananasleftthegame.WhenNoadesvoicedhistheoriesonblackplayersin1991,hewaswidelymocked.

ItisinterestingtolookatthecharacteristicsoftheblackplayersintheEnglishgameintheseyears.Forpurposesofcomparison,Stefanconstructedarandomsampleofanequalnumber of white players with similar age profiles. Almost all the black players (89percent)wereborninBritain,notverydifferentfromthewhiteplayers(95percent).Mostof theblackplayerswerestrikers (58percent),comparedwithonly33percentofwhiteplayers.Therewerenoblackgoalkeepersat thetime.Noadeswouldhavenotedthefact

that blackplayers seemedunderrepresented indefense.But then strikers always carry apremiumtodefendersinthemarket:ittakesmoretalenttoscorethantostopotherpeoplefromscoring.

Certain facts about the sample stood out: the careers of the black players averagedmore than six years, compared to less than four for thewhites. And 36 percent of theblackshadplayedfortheircountries,comparedwithonly23percentofthewhites.Onthisevidence,itlookedsuspiciouslyasiftheblackplayerswerebetterthanthewhites.

The proof came when Stefan deployed the economist’s favorite tool, regressionanalysis.Heusedittoisolatethedistincteffectsofwagesandtheshareofblackplayersoneachclub’sleagueperformance.Whathefoundwasdiscrimination.Thedatashowedthatclubswithmoreblackplayersreallydidhaveabetterrecordintheleaguethanclubswith fewer blacks, after allowing forwage spending. If two teams had identical annualwage budgets, the team with more blacks would finish higher in the league. The testimpliedthatblackplayersweresystematicallybettervalueformoneythanwhites.Certainteamsof the 1980s likeArsenal,Noades’sPalace, andRonAtkinson’sWestBromwichAlbion (this was years before Atkinson called Marcel Desailly “a fucking lazy thicknigger”onair)benefitedfromfieldingblacks.

Theclubswith fewerblackswerenot suffering froma lackof information.Anyonewhoknewsoccercouldjudgefairlyeasilyhowgoodmostplayerswerejustbywatchingthemplay.So the only credible reason clubswould deny themselves the opportunity tohire these players was prejudice. Clubs didn’t like the look of black players, or theythoughttheirfanswouldn’t,eithersimplybecauseofskinhueorbecausetheyperceivedweaknesses that just were not there. By testing the behavior of managers against themarket,itprovedpossibletouncoverevidenceofdiscrimination.

Insocceryoucanjudgesomeone’sperformanceonlyagainstothercompetitors.ThismeansthatIlosenothingbybeinginefficientifmycompetitorsareinefficientinthesamewayasIam.Icangoonhiringmediocreplayersaslongasotherclubsdo,too.Aslongasallclubsrefusedtohiretalentedblackplayers,thecostofdiscriminatingwaslow.Whatthe data showed was that by the beginning of the 1980s, so many teams were hiringtalentedblacksthatthecostofdiscriminatinghadbecomequitehigh.Teamsthatrefusedto field black playerswere overpaying forwhite players and losingmorematches as aconsequence.Yetsomelevelofdiscriminationpersisted.Evenbytheendofthe1980s,anall-whiteteamlikeEvertonwouldcostaround5percentmorethananequallygoodteamthat fieldedmerely an average proportion of black players. As Dave Hill wrote in thefanzineWhenSaturdayComesin1989,“HalfacenturyafterJesseOwens,aquarterofacentury afterMartin Luther King, and 21 years after two American sprinters gave theBlackPowersalutefromtheOlympicmedalrostrum,someofthesedickheadsdon’tevenknowwhatablackpersonis.”ButbythetimeHillwrotethat,preciselybecausesoccerisso competitive, more and more clubs had begun to hire black players. In 1995 evenEvertonsignedtheNigerianDanielAmokachi.Theeconomicforcesofcompetitiondrovewhitementoditchtheirprejudices.

Quitesoon,enoughclubswerehiringblacksthatblackplayerscametobestatistically

overrepresented inEnglish soccer.Onlyabout1.6percentofpeople in the1991Britishcensus described themselves as black. Yet in the early 1990s about 10 percent of allplayers in English professional soccer were black. By the end of the decade, after theinfluxofforeignplayers,thesharewasnearer20percent.

Sodidclubslearntoovercometheirprejudices?AfewyearsafterStefanranhisfirsttest for discrimination, he badgered some studentswhowere looking for undergraduateprojectsintocompilingalistofblackplayersforanothersixseasons.Thattookthedatasetuptothe1998–1999season.OnceagainStefanmergedthedatawithfiguresonwagesand leagueperformances.Nowhecould run the regression to theendof the1990s.Forthesesixadditionalyears,therewasnoevidencethattheshareofblackplayersinateamhad any effect on team performance, after allowing for the team’s wage bill. In otherwords,bythenblackplayerswereonaveragepaidwhattheywereworthtoateam.

Perhaps the bestwitness to the acceptance of blacks in soccer is Lilian Thuram.AblackmanbornontheCaribbeanislandofGuadeloupeandraisedinatownjustoutsideParis,Thuramplayedprofessionallyfrom1991to2008andbecameFrance’smostcappedplayer.HewontheWorldCupof1998withthatfamousmulticoloredFrenchteam.HeisalsoaFrenchintellectual,possiblytheonlysoccerplayerevertohavespokenthewords,“There’saninterestingyoungethnographerattheMuséedel’Homme…”

Thuram is acutely sensitive to racism. He now runs an antiracism foundation.Nonetheless,in2008,inthefinalmonthsofhislongplayingcareer,heinsistedtousthatsoccerwasinnocentofthesin.Overlate-nightpastainanItalianrestaurantinBarcelona,heexplained,“Insoccerit’shardertohavediscrimination,becausewearejudgedonveryspecificperformances.Therearenotreallysubjectivecriteria.Sincerely,I’venevermetaracistpersoninsoccer.Maybetheywerethere,butIdidn’tseeit.”Infact,headded,“Insport,prejudicesfavortheblacks.Inthepopularimagination,theblackisinhisplaceinsport.Forexample,recentlyinBarcelona,thefitnesscoachsaidaboutAbidal[theblackFrenchdefender],‘He’sanathleteoftheblackrace.’It’snotbecausehestaysbehindaftertrainingtorun.No,it’sbecausehe’sblack.”

Sobythe1990sdiscriminationagainstblackplayershaddisappeared.Graduallytheycametofeelathomeintheindustry.HereisascenefrominsidethemarblehallsoftheoldArsenalstadium,afteragamein1995:Arsenal’sblackDutchwingerGlennHelderisintroducinghisblackteammateIanWright(oneofRonNoades’sformerplayers)tosomeDutch people. ThenHelder says, “Ian, show these guyswhat I taught you.”A look ofintenseconcentrationappearsonWright’sface,andhebeginsjumpingupanddownandshouting in Dutch, “Buzz off! Dirty ape! Dirty ape!” He and Helder then collapselaughing.Therewasstillracisminsoccer,butbythenblackscouldmockitfromtheinnersanctumsofthegame’sestablishment.

ThestoryofracisminAmericansportsfollowedmuchthesamearc.RightthroughtheSecondWorldWar,baseballandbasketballhadsegregatedblacksintoNegroLeagues.In1947BranchRickey of theBrooklynDodgers broke an unspoken rule among baseballowners and hired black infielder Jackie Robinson to play for his team. Robinsoneventually became anAmerican hero.However, the costar of his storywas economics.

TheDodgershadlessmoneythantheircrosstownrivals,theNewYorkYankees.IfRickeywanted awinning team, he had to tap talent that the other owners overlooked.Racismgavehimanopportunity.

Ofcourse,discriminationagainstblackplayerspersistedinAmericansportslongafterRobinson. Lawrence Kahn, an economist at Cornell University, surveyed the data andfound littleevidence thatbefore the1990sbaseball teamswerewithholding jobsorpayfromblacks.But hedid think theywere giving black players unduly short careers, andusing them only in certain positions. In basketball,Kahn did findwage discrimination.Whenherepeatedhisstudy in2000,hediscovered, likeStefan thesecondtimearound,thatdiscriminationwasfading.BritishandAmericansportswerebecomingfairtoblackathletes.

Wesuspect thatdiscriminationstillexists insomeothersoccer leagues. InRussia in2012forinstance,fansfromZenitSt.Petersburg’slargestsupporters’group,Landscrona,wrotetotheirclubdemandingthatblackandgayplayersbeexcludedfromtheteam.Theysaid that black players were “forced down Zenit’s throat,” while gay players were“unworthyofourgreatcity.”Theseviewsareprettycommon inRussian soccer, and ineasternEuropemore generally. In that kind of atmosphere, a club brave enough not topracticeracialdiscriminationcanstillexpecttopickupgoodplayerscheaply.

Wehad thought that inwesternEuropeat least, thiskindofdiscriminationhaddiedout. But there is a strange postscript to our story. In April 2011, the French websiteMediapartleakedtheminutesofasecretmeetingatFrance’ssoccerfederation.

The meeting, held in November 2010, had begun fairly innocuously. At first theofficialshadmusedaboutadmittingfeweryoungstersofdoublenationality(oftenFrenchplusAfrican)intothefederation’sacademies.ItbotheredtheofficialsthatsomeoftheseyoungsterseventuallychosetoplayforAlgeria,say,ratherthanforFrance.However,thediscussionquicklyspreadtoscarierterritory:complaintsaboutblackplayersperse.

France’s coach, Laurent “Le Président” Blanc (a French hero who had playedalongsideThuramintheblack-white-ArabFrenchteamof‘98),wasquotedastellingthemeeting,“Youhavethefeelingthatweareproducingreallyonlyoneprototypeofplayer:big,strong,fast…andwhoarethebig,strong,fastplayers?Theblacks.That’sthewayitis.That’sthewaythingsaretoday.”

Accordingtotheleakedminutes,Blanccontinued,“Ithinkweneedtorefocus,aboveallforboysofthirteen-fourteen,twelve-thirteen—introduceotherparameters,adjustedtoourownculture….TheSpanishsaytome:‘Wedon’thavethisproblem.Wedon’thaveany blacks.’” Blanc did add that he was talking about soccer qualities, not color. Hewouldn’tmindifthewholeFrenchteamwasblack,hesaid,aslongastherewasabalanceofsizeandskill.

Even so, it’s difficult to know where to start with a critique of his position. Mostobviously, Blanc seemed to be conflating the dull uncreative physical French style ofrecent yearswith the presenceof blackplayers. Second, the issue of double nationalityscarcelymattered: a player of African origin good enough to play for France, like the

Senegalese-born Patrick Vieira, will choose France. It’s generally only French-raisedplayers rejected by France, such as Marouane Chamakh (Morocco) or Benoit Assou-Ekotto(Cameroon),whowillrepresentanothercountry.

Yet some inside the French federation seemed towant to let fewer boys ofAfricanorigin into the academies.Blocking thepipeline to professional soccerwouldmean jobdiscriminationagainstblacks.ItwouldbeareturntothepracticesofEnglishsoccerofthe1980s.Nobody—wehadpreviouslythought—wasbarredfromtop-classsoccerinwesternEuropeanymorebecauseofhisskincolor.WhereasordinaryArabsandblacksinFrancestruggledtofindjobs,wehadimaginedthatArabandblacksoccerplayersinFrancedidnot.

Butevenbeforethefederation’ssecretmeeting,manyFrenchsoccerfanshadstartedto call for discrimination.There had long been popular grumbling about the number ofnonwhite players in the national team. Every year France’s National ConsultativeCommissiononHumanRightspublishesabigsurveyonracistattitudes.In1999anewquestionwasinsertedintothesurvey:Werethere“toomanyplayersofforeignoriginintheFrenchsoccerteam?”Youwouldnothaveimaginedanyonethoughtso.Theplayersofforeign origin had just made les Bleus world champions. Yet in 1999, 31 percent ofrespondentseithertotallyormostlyagreedwiththisstatement.In2000,36percentagreed.MorethanathirdofFrenchpeopledidnotwantthisteamevenwhenitwasthebestonearth.Jean-MarieLePen,thenleaderofFrance’sracistFrontNationalparty,knewexactlywhathewasdoingwhenheledthegrumblesaboutFrance’sblackplayers.

Astheteambeganplayingworseafter2000andbecameblacker,publicdisquietonlygrew.ThephilosopherAlainFinkielkraut(andinFrance,philosophersareheard)voicedthe thoughts of many French people when he complained that the “black-black-black”teamhadbecomeaninternationaljoke.

In2010France’sthencoach,RaymondDomenech,omittedthreegiftedyoungmenofnorthAfricanoriginfromhissquadfortheWorldCup:SamirNasri,KarimBenzema,andHatem Ben Arfa. We are sure that Domenech made his choices without any racistintention.Thereweresoccer-basedargumentsagainsteachofthetrio.Nevertheless,saystheFrenchsociologistStéphaneBeaud,authorofTraîtresà laNation? (“Traitorsof theNation?”),abookonlesBleusandethnicity,Domenechseemedunabletodealwithanew,moreassertivegenerationofnorthAfricanyouth.

TheBleusof2010weredifferentfromthoseof1998,explainsBeaud.The’98teamhadcomemostlyfromstable,fairlycomfortablyoffworking-classfamiliesnotallthatfarfromtheFrenchmainstream.Thuram,forinstance,hadgrownupplayingforanethnicallyPortuguese teamin thefar-from-deprivedParisiansuburbofFontainebleu.But the2010teamreflected the laterwaveof immigration toFrance:manyplayerswere frompoorerandbrokenimmigrantfamilieswholivedintheghettosoutsideFrance’sbigcities.Thesemenhadgrownupatadistance fromtheFrenchmainstream.Andwhereasmostof theheroes of ‘98 had spent many years earning relatively modest salaries in the Frenchleague, gettingmarried, and raising children, the new lot tended to havemoved abroadveryyoung,hadspent theirwholecareersplaying for top-level teamsamidhugestress,

andoftenhadchaoticprivatelives,saysBeaud.

The new generation can be harder to deal with for an older white Frenchman likeDomenech (himself of Spanish descent). He was furious when Benzema (of Tunisiandescent)saidhedidn’twanttocomeonasasubinagameagainstRomania.InthemindsofmanywhiteFrenchmen,theimageoflesBleusbecamethatofspoiledyoungglobalizedmultimillionaires slouched on the teambuswearingmassive headphones, ignoring fanswhohadwaitedhourstoseethem.Andofcourse,theseBleusweren’twhite.

Popular anger eruptedoneSundaynight during theWorldCupof 2010.FrenchTVshowedlivehowtheplayers,angrywithDomenechattheirtraininggroundintheSouthAfricantouristtownofKnysna,reachedforanauthenticallyFrenchremedy:theywentonstrike.Theygotontotheirbusrefusingtotrain.NicolasAnelkasworeatDomenech.Thephrase“thebusofshame”enteredtheFrenchlanguage.Knysnawas“anationalaffair,apolitical affair,” says Beaud. Thesemostly black and brown players were perceived asrejectingFrance.WorsethanlosingtoMexicoandSouthAfrica,theyhad(briefly)refusedtosweattheblueshirt.France’snationalangeragainsttheyoungblackplayersechoedthenationalangerof2005againsttheyoungblackriotersintheethnicghettos.“Scum,”theninterior minister Nicolas Sarkozy had called the rioters. In 2010 President Sarkozyinstitutedaninquiryintothefootballteam.

Afewmonthslatercamethefederation’smeetinginParis.Inahorriblewayitmadesensethatofficialsofanationalfederationshouldbetemptedbydiscrimination.Clubsareallaboutwinning.Nationalteams,however,haveanadditionalfunction:toincarnatethenation. Many white French people—and of course the federation’s officials wereoverwhelmingly white—seemed to feel that their nation could not be incarnated by anonwhiteteam.Iftheofficialshadcomplainedaboutblackplayerspubliclyratherthaninsecret,alotofFrenchpeoplewouldhavebeendelighted.

AfterMediapartleakedtheminutesofthemeeting,ThurambroketheunwrittensocialcodeofsoccertoattackhisoldteammateBlanc.ThreeyearsearlierThuramhadtoldusthatdiscriminationinsoccerwasimpossible.NowhearguedthatBlanchadbeenguiltyatleastof“unconsciousracism”andpromoting“racialstereotypes.”Ifyousay thatblacksare stronger and faster than whites, Thuram argued, you open the door to saying thatwhitesaremore intelligent thanblacks.Vieira,anotherblackheroof1998,complained,too.“IknowLaurentBlancandIdon’tthinkheisracist,”hesaid.“ButIdon’tunderstandhowanyoftheofficialspresentatthatmeetingcanstayintheirjob.”

Intheend,Blancandtheothersdidstayintheirjobs,clearedbyagovernmentinquiry,tothejoyofmostFrenchfans.

Thesecretmeeting,and thescandal that followed it,hadchangednothing.Even theblackplayersstayedontheteam.Theywerethebest,andthatisstill(almostalways)whatmattersinsoccer.

7DOCOACHESMATTER?TheCultoftheWhiteManager

Trevor Phillips points a finger at his own shaven black head: “Excuseme, here I am:bull’s-eye!”The son of an earlyCaribbean immigrant toBritain, Phillipswas raised inLondonandhassupportedChelseaforoverfiftyyears.Butinthe1970s,whenthrowingdartswasthefavoritesportofChelsea’sShedStand,hedidn’tgotomatches.Hisheadfeltlikeanobvioustarget.HardlyanyblackpeoplewenttoChelseathen.“NowIcantakemydaughters,”hemarvels.

Yet thelongtimeheadofBritain’sEqualityandHumanRightsCommission(heheldthepostuntil2012)doesn’tthinksoccerhasslaindiscriminationyet.Overbreakfastonesnowymorningafewyearsago,PhillipsidentifiedanenduringtypeofdiscriminationinBritishsoccer:“Loadsofblackplayersonthefieldandnoneinthedugout.”

Youmight think this formofdiscriminationwouldeventuallydisappear, that just ascompetitionpushed clubs intobuyingblackplayers, itwill push them intohiringblackmanagers.Butinfact,theprejudiceagainstblackmanagershasprovedhardertoshift.Assoonasyougettothinkingaboutwhatitwilltaketogetmoreblackpeopleintocoachingjobs,youarebroughtfacetofacewiththegreatquestionaboutthesoccercoach:Doeshereallymatter?Itturnsoutthatcoachesormanagers(callthemwhatyoulike)simplydon’tmake that much difference. Consequently, themarket in soccermanagers is much lessefficientthanthemarketinsoccerplayers.Thatmeansblackswillcontinuetohaveahardtimefindingcoachingjobs.

Likediscriminationagainstblackplayers,discriminationagainstblackmanagersfirstbecamevisible inAmericansports.Asearlyas1969JackieRobinson,whohadbecomequiterebelliousashegrewolder,refusedtoattendOldTimers’DayatYankeeStadium,inprotestofbaseball’sshunningofblackcoachesandmanagers.

TheissuehitBritainonlywhenthefirstgenerationofblackplayersbegantoretire(itbeing a long-standing article of faith in soccer that only ex-players hadwhat it took tobecomemanagers).TheformerEnglandinternationalLutherBlissett,whoasaplayerhadmade that ill-fated transfer toMilan, applied for twenty-two jobs as a manager in the1990s.Hedidnotget a single interview.StellaOrakwue,who recountshis story inher1998 book,Pitch Invaders, concludes, “I feel a British black managing a Premiershipteamcouldbeaverylongwayoff.”Indeed,onlyin2008,tenyearsaftershewrotethis,did Blackburn give Paul Ince a chance. After Ince’s appointment, John Barnes, whohimselfhadstruggledtogetworkasamanagerinBritain,stillmaintained,“Ibelievethesituationforblackmanagersislikeitwasforblackplayersbackinthe1970s.”IncelastedlessthansixmonthsatBlackburn.Hehasn’thadachanceinthePremierLeaguesince.

NotevengoodresultswithNewcastlecouldsavetheblackmanagerChrisHughtonin

2010:hehadwontheclubpromotiontothePremierLeaguetheseasonbefore,butfourmonthsintothenewseason,withNewcastlesafelyineleventhplaceinthetopdivision,hewas sacked. “Regrettably the board now feels that an individualwithmoremanagerialexperienceisneededtotaketheclubforward,”theclubexplained.Newcastlefinishedtheseasonintwelfthplace.

True, the black managers Ruud Gullit and Jean Tigana did get longer stints in thePremierLeague.ButasOrakwuenotes,thecrucialpointisthattheywereforeigners.Theywereperceived inBritain firstofallasDutchorFrench,andonlysecondarilyasblack.GullitwascastasatypicalsophisticatedDutchmanager,notasanuntried“black”one.

Atthetimeofwriting,inearly2014,HughtonatNorwichistheonlyblackmanagerinthePremierLeague.The“RooneyRule”intheNFL—whichrequiresteamstointerviewatleastoneminoritycandidatewhenrecruitingaheadcoachorotherseniorofficials—hasnoequivalentinEuropeansoccer.That’sashame,astherulehasmadequiteadifferenceintheNFL.

Youwouldthinkthatgiventhisdiscrimination,unprejudicedsoccerclubscouldcleanup by hiring the best black (or female) managers at low salaries. A small club likeTranmereRovers,say,couldprobablytakeitspickoftheworld’sblackmanagers.Itcouldgetthebestfemalemanagerinhistory.Yetitprobablywon’t.That’sbecausethemarketinsoccermanagers is sodifferent from themarket inplayers.Markets tend toworkwhentheyaretransparent—whenyoucanseewhoisdoingwhatandplaceavalueonit.Thatispreeminentlytrueofsoccerplayers,whodotheirworkinpublic.Whenyoucan’tseewhatpeople do, it’s very hard to assign a value to their work. Efficient markets punishdiscrimination inplainviewof everyone, and sodiscrimination tends toget rootedout.Inefficientmarketscanmaintaindiscriminationalmostindefinitely.

Blacksoccerplayersbecameacceptedbecausethemarketinplayersistransparent.Itis pretty obviouswho can play andwho can’t,who’s “got bottle” andwhohasn’t.Themarketinplayers’salaries,aswehaveseen,issoefficientthatitexplainsabout90percentofthevariationinclubs’leaguepositionsinthelongrun.Typicallytheclubwiththebest-paid players finishes at the top, and the one with the worst-paid finishes in the cellar.However, the market in managers doesn’t work nearly as well. If players’ salariesdetermineresultsalmostbythemselves,thenitfollowsthatthevastmajorityofmanagersarenotveryrelevant.

Still, there is an important caveat: players’wages don’t explain everything—merelyalmosteverythingatmostclubs.Thatleavessomeroomforafewgoodmanagerstomakeadifference.Thequestion then is:Whichelitemanagers finishconsistentlyhigherwiththeirteamsthantheirwagebillswouldpredict?Inotherwords,toborrowaphrasefromJoséMourinho:Whoarethespecialones?Stefanhastriedtoanswerthatquestion.

FirsthegotaholdofthefinancialaccountsofEnglishclubsinallfourdivisionsfrom1973–1974through2009–2010.Thisisnotashardasitsounds.Allclubsexceptonewerelimitedcompaniesduringthisperiod,andthereforeobligedbylawtofileannualaccountswithCompaniesHouse.Youcanobtaincopiesonlineforasmallfee(ifyouwanttobuyyourclub’saccountsfor lastyear, itwillcostyouallof$1.50).Goingbackthirty-seven

yearsisabitmorecomplicated.Fivepercentofaccountsweremissing,while15percentofclubshadfiledabbreviatedaccountsthatdidn’trevealwagespending.ThatleftStefanwithwagedatafor80percentofclubsforthethirty-seven-yearperiod.

Stefanbeganbyidentifyingallmanagerswhohadbeenwithaclubforatleastafullseason.Therewere699oftheminthedatabase.However,it’sunfairtojudgeamanageronjustacoupleofseasons,becauseinsuchashortperiod,luckplaysabigrole.SoStefanranked onlymanagerswho hadworked in the game for five ormore full seasons: 251men.Itmustbesaidthatfewoftheother448managers,theoneswhoworkedfewerthanfiveseasons,lookedlikeoverachievers.Indeed,mostofthemhaddriftedoutofthegameearlybecauseof theirpoor records.Someof theworstperformersexited theprofessionfastest.

Stefanthenexaminedhowour251survivorshadperformedrelativetotheirplayers’wagebills.Thetellingstatisthesizeofaclub’swagesrelativetothoseofitsrivals.Thereare twenty clubs in the Premier League, which means that the average club spends 5percent of the league’s total wages. Roughly speaking, if a club spending 5 percentfinishedinthetophalfofthetable,themanagerappearedtohavebeenoverachieving.Ifitfinished in the bottom half, he appeared to be underachieving. One season ofoverachievementdoesn’tmakeastar.Thatcouldbeduetoanynumberofthings,aboveallluck.Whatcountedwasthemanager’srecordmeasuredoverfiveyearsormore.

Onlyavery fewof these251managerswereunderachievers:menwhoconsistentlyfinishedlowerwiththeirteamsthantheplayers’wagebillwouldhavepredicted.MalcolmAllison(afêtedassistantmanagerwithManchesterCityinthelate1960s,butafailureasa go-it-alone manager afterward) made our list of shame, as did Alan Mullery, HarryGregg,andafewlesser-knownnamesitwouldbekindestnottomention.However,eventhishandfuloffailuresdidn’tseemtobeterriblemanagers.Theirunderachievementwasnotwhatstatisticianscall“statisticallysignificant.”InsimpleEnglish:itcouldhavebeenduesimplytochance.

Stefan didn’t treat all divisions equally. There are ninety-two professional teams inEngland,spreadoverthefourdivisions.Amanagerinthebottomtier,LeagueTwo,whohastheninetiethbudgetinEnglandbutmanagestofinisheightiethinthecountryisdoingwell. However, a manager with the third-highest budget in England who succeeds inwinning the Premier League is probably doing even better. At the top of soccer,competition is fiercer, the amountofmoney typically required to jumpaplace ismuchhigher,andsoStefan’smodelgavemorecredittooverachievingmanagersinthePremierLeaguethantooverachieverslowerdown.Still,hismodeldoesallowsomelower-divisionmanagerstomakeittothetopofourrankings.

Allinall,heestimatedthatsomewherebetweenfortyandseventyofthemanagersinoursampleseemedtomakeapositivedifference:thatis,theyusuallyoverachievedwiththeirteams.Notethatthat’satmost28percentofthe251survivorsinourdatabase—andthesesurvivorswould themselves tendtobe theelite,becauseunderachievingmanagersrarely survive five years in the game. In other words, at best 10 percent of the 699managerswehaveobservedsince1973looklikeoverachievers.Thesemanagerstendto

havestayedintheirpostsrelativelylong,whichmakessense.

Weendedupwithtwolistsofoverachievers.Forourfirstlist,weputallEnglishclubstogether and ranked each club’s wage spending relative to the other ninety-one. Thesecond list separated the clubs into four divisions, andmeasured each club’s spendingrelativetotheotherclubsinitsdivision.Wementionthisbecauseeachmethodproducedaslightlydifferentlistofoverachievingmanagers.(PleaseseeFigure7.1onpage116.)

It should be noted that the great Brian Clough, who appears on one of our lists,undoubtedlywouldhaverankedsomewhereinthetoponbothifonlywe’dhadfinancialdataforhisgloryyearswithNottinghamForestinthe1970s.Uniquelywithinthe(then)FootballLeague,Forestwasnotalimitedcompanyat thetime.Itwasamembers’club,andthereforedidn’tlodgeannualaccountsatCompaniesHouse.Ourlistshowsthateveninhisdecliningalcoholicyearsfrom1982onward,Cloughwasamongtheelite.

Ourfinalrankingofmanagerswhomadebothlistscanbefoundonpage117.

ThislistofnineteennamesmuststandasourbeststabatidentifyingthebestmanagersinEnglandintheseyears.Paisley,forthosewhoarenewtosoccer,wonsixleaguetitlesandthreeEuropeanCupswithLiverpoolfrom1974to1983.

FIGURE7.1.OverachievingmanagersinEngland,1974–2010

FIGURE7.2.Thespecialones

Ofcourse,thereareallsortsofcaveatstoattach.First,ourvaluationsarebynomeansprecise.WengerranksatouchhigherthanDalglishinourtable,butpleasedon’treadthatas saying thatWenger is the bettermanager. Our list cannot be that exact.Working atArsenal in the 1990s and 2000swas a different experience fromworking at Liverpool,Blackburn, and Newcastle in the 1980s and 1990s. Many other factors besides themanager might have caused each club’s overachievement. It’s notable that Paisley andBenitez also overachieved with Liverpool relative to wages, and George Graham withArsenal.Perhaps it’s easier tooverachieveatArsenal andLiverpool thanat other clubsbecausethesetwohaveproducedmanyexcellentyouthplayers,allowingmanagerstodowellwithoutspendingafortuneonwages.PerhapsLiverpool’sfamous“bootroom”ofthe1970sand1980s—thegangofold-timecoachesandscoutswhowouldsitarounddrinkingwhiskey and scheming for games together—gave Paisley and Dalglish the wisdom ofcrowds.QuitelikelyPaisley,Dalglish,Wenger,andGrahamlandedinhelpfulsettings.Yettheydoseemtohavebeengoodmanagers,too.

There’sanothercaveat tomake.Our tablemeasuresonlyspendingonwages,notontransfers.WesawinChapter2thatWengerandFergusonhadrelativelylownetspendingon transfers,whichmakes theirhigh rankings inour list evenmore impressive.ButwealsosawthatBenitez(likewisehighonourlist)blewfortunesontransfersatLiverpool.Soeventhoughheeconomizedonwages,hedidn’tgethisleaguepositionscheaply.

Infact,everymanagerinthistablerequirescloseranalysis.Justasyoucannotsignaplayersimplyonthebasisofhismatchdata,youcannotsimplyhireamanagerfromourlistandsitbackandwaitforthetrophiestorollin(althoughitwouldcertainlybeamuchbettermethodthanhiringaguybecausehewasagoodplayer).Somemanagersonourlistsucceeded in circumstances that might not be repeatable elsewhere. For instance, wesuspectBobbyRobsondidsowellforIpswichinthe1970sbecausehewasoneofthefewmanagers of the time to strive for passing soccer and to scout on theContinent.Todayhe’dhavehadtofindnewtricks.

Criticswillaskwhysuchahighproportionofourhighest-rankedmanagersworkforgiantclubs.Well,forastart, thebestmanagerstendtoendupatthebestclubs.ArsenalhiredWenger after he’d excelled atMonaco;Manchester United signed Ferguson afterhe’d broken the Celtic-Rangers duopoly with Aberdeen in Scotland. In fact, Fergusonmight have ranked even higher in our table had we been able to include his brilliantAberdeenyears.Unfortunately,wehad toomitScottishclubsbecause thefinancialdatawasn’tdetailedenough.

Asecond reason thatmanagersofgiant clubsdominateour list:bydefinition,moreoverachievingclubswillendupatthetopoftheleaguethanatthebottom.Andthird,aswe’vesaid,thetopofsoccerismorecompetitivethanthebottom,andsowehavegivenextracredittomanagerswhooverachieveatthesummit.

Some may wonder whether a manager of Manchester United and Arsenal canoverachievebymuch.After all,Unitedhas the highest revenues inEnglish soccer, andArsenalisn’tfarbehind.Surelyclubsthatrichoughttobewinningleaguetitles?(Indeed,wemustadmitthatweusedtothinksoourselves.Simonnowblusheswithshametothink

thatheoncewrotethat ifhemanagedUnited,withall itsmoney,hewouldprobablydoaboutaswellasFergusondid.)

Certainly,even ifUnited’s squadwere tooperateasananarchistworkers’collectivewithoutamanager,itwouldprobablydoverywell.ButFergusonandWengerdoseemtohave added value. Once you look at the numbers, it turns out that for many yearsFerguson’sUnitedandWenger’sArsenalspentlittleornomoreonwagesthandidsomeoftheirfrustratedrivals.Bothclubshabituallylivewithintheirmeans.ManchesterUnitedalmost alwaysmakesoperatingprofits, used to paydividends to shareholders, andnowforksout largesumseachyear to repay thedebtsof itsowners, theGlazer family.Thatdidn’tleaveFergusonfortunestospendonplayers’wages.Hedidn’tseemtoneedit.

We’ve seen that the average club in the Premier League spends 5 percent of thedivision’s totalwage bill.Of courseManchesterUnited is always above that 5 percentline, but especially in the 1990s it wasn’t above it by very much. In 1995–1996, forinstance,theclubspentjust5.8percentofthePremierLeague’stotalwagesyetwonthetitle.From1991through2000,United’saverageleaguepositionwas1.8(i.e.,somewherebetweenfirstandsecondplace)andyetinthatdecadetheclubspentonly6.8percentofthePremierLeague’saverageonwages.Fergusonwasgettingimmensebangforhisbuck.In part, he owed this to the Beckham generation. Beckham, the Neville brothers, PaulScholes,NickyButt, andRyanGiggswere excellent playerswhoperformedwith greatmaturityalmostassoonas theyentered thefirst team,butgiven theiryouth theywouldthenhavebeenearninglessthanestablishedstars.Furthermore,becauseFergusonwasatOldTrafford from1986until 2013,hehadchoseneveryplayer at theclubhimself.Hewasn’tpayingtheunwantedsigningsofhispredecessorslargesumstorot inthestands.ThathelpedkeepUnited’swagesdown.

Fergusoncontinued tooverachieve in the2000s, evenafter theBeckhamgenerationhad become big names earning top dollar. Admittedly his overperformance was lessstrikingthaninthe1990s.From2001through2010United’saverageleaguepositionwasagain1.8,but in thisdecadehe spentnearly9percentof thePremierLeague’s totalonwages.Anotherwayof putting it: in the1990she spent only35percentmore than thedivision average, whereas in the 2000s he spent 80 percent more than the average toachievethesameresult.Nowonder,becauselifehadbecomeevermorecompetitiveatthetop, with Chelsea and Manchester City getting shots of oil money and Arsenal andLiverpool receiving ever more income from the Champions League. None of that hadhappenedinthe1990s.

TheamountofmoneyFergusonrequiredtodominateseemedtokeeprising.In2010,the last year in our database, United’s share of the Premier League’s wage spendingpeaked at just over 10 percent.Yet even thatwasn’t outsize.ManchesterCity that yearspent about the same proportion, and Chelsea accounted for 14 percent of the PremierLeague’s totaloutlayonwages from2004 through2010—the largest share forany top-divisionclubinthethirty-sevenyearsofourdatabase.Otherclubs,too,haveexceeded10percentof thedivision’s total spending in thepast,notablyLeedsUnited,whichwasatnearly12percentwhenCloughspenthisinfamousforty-fourdaystherein1974.Inshort,

Fergusonwas a phenomenon formost of his time atOldTrafford. From 2003 through2013 he consistently had to compete against clubswith higherwages.Mostly hewon.Evenso,it’shardtoworkoutexactlywhathewasdoingright.Ifitwereobvious,othermanagerswouldsimplyhavecopiedhim.

Wenger’s record is almost as awesome. In his first seven seasons at Arsenal, from1996–1997 onward, the Frenchman achieved an average league position of 1.6 whileaccountingfor7.5percentof thePremierLeague’swages.Thatwasabiggershare thanFerguson was spending then, but hardly plutocratic. AdmittedlyWenger’s performancehas declined slightly in recent years. In the six seasons to 2009–2010, Arsenal had anaverageleaguepositionof3.3whilespending8.8percentofthePremierLeague’swages.That’sstilloverachievement,butlessstrikingthanbefore.

Wecanexplainwhyhemighthavedeclined.WhenWengerarrivedininsularEnglandin1996, therewere stillknowledgegaps toexploit.Hebroughtknowledge thatnobodyelseinthecountrypossessedatthatpoint.Hewasoneoftheonlymanagersalreadyusingstatistics toanalyzeplayers’performance;heknewwhatfoodsoccerplayersshouldeat;andaboveall,heknewforeigntransfermarkets.HeseemstohavebeentheonlymanagerinEngland to realize thatMilan’s reservePatrickVieira and Juventus’s reserveThierryHenryweregreatplayers.Spottingthatdidn’trequiremysticalinsight—Vieiraconvincedthe Highbury crowd of the same fact inside forty-five minutes on his debut againstSheffieldWednesday—butnoneofWenger’sBritishrivalsappearedtohaveevenwatchedVieirabefore.AndsoWengeroverachievedmagnificently.

Hisproblemwasthathewastoosuccessfulforhisowngood.Othermanagersbegantostudywhathewasdoing.Theycopiedhisinnovationsindiet,scouting,andstatistics.Meanwhile, like many brilliant pioneers,Wenger seems to have fallen into the trap ofbecoming more like himself—less willing to learn new tricks or listen to intelligentcriticism—ashegotolder.

Eventually, when everyone had more or less the same knowledge, Arsenal wasovertakenbyclubswithbiggerwagebills.Thatiswhathappenstoknowledgegapsinsidea league: they close fast.Thiswould explainwhyWenger’sArsenalwonnothing from2005through2013.

Yet during his worst moments, especially after the 8–2 defeat at Old Trafford inAugust2011,hiscriticsweremuchtooharshonhim.Giventhathewasupagainstseveralricherclubs,andagainstanothergreatoverachievingmanagerinFerguson,itwouldhavebeenastonishinghadArsenalcontinuedtowintitles.ItwasparticularlyunfairtocastigateWenger for fielding teams thatkeptgettingoutmuscledbyChelsea.There is acommonbeliefthatWengeractivelydoesn’twantplayerswhoarebothbrilliantandstrong,suchasDidier Drogba, Cristiano Ronaldo, and Vieira himself. In fact, Wenger built his firstArsenal teamaroundVieira,andprivatelyregrets thathenevermanagedtosignDrogbaandRonaldowhenhecouldafford them. It’s just thatheknows thatnowadaysArsenalcannot afford players who have it all. The club has to economize on one quality oranother,andforcedtochoose,Wengerhastendedtopreferplayerswhoaregiftedandfastbutnotstrong.Chelseahasn’thadtomakethatchoice.

Arsenal’sboardcannotverywelltellthefans,“Forgetit.Weprobablycan’tcompetewithUnited,Chelsea,andCityoverawholeseason.”Buttheboardknowsthatthisistrue.Itdoesn’texpectWengertowintitlesanymore.That’swhy,eveninthedarkestmomentsof2011,theboardneverevenconsideredsackinghim.

Aswe’veseen,sinceAbramovichtookoverChelseain2003,hehasthrownmoneyattheproblem.Inthe1970sChelseawasstillspendingatouchlessthantheaverageinthetopdivision.Onlyfromthemid-1990sdidtheclub’sspendingstarttorise,andattheendof the 1990s it hit 8 percent of the Premier League’s total. By about 2000 the ItalianmanagerGianlucaVialliwasspendingmorethan10percentofthePremierLeague’swagebill,yetFergusonrepeatedlywontheleagueonless.

WhenAbramovichboughtChelsea,hegavehismanagerClaudioRanieriamammoth16 percent of the Premier League’s wage spending for 2003–2004. Of course, Ranieriought tohavewon the league that season.However,we shouldn’tbe tooharshonhim.Evenwith thehighestwagebill, it’s tricky to finishon top,becauseyouarecompetingagainstbothbad luckand thewell-fundedoverachieversWengerandFerguson.ThoughJoséMourinho’sChelseaoutspent its rivals,hedeservescredit forwinning twostraighttitles.ButMourinho spentonly three full seasons inEnglandbeforehis return in2013,andthereforedoesn’tfigureinourrankings.

Chelseawasthecountry’sbiggest-spendingclubforsixorsevenyearsuntiltheriseofManchesterCity,andAbramovich’smoneyboughthimthreeleaguetitles.By2013,Cityalmost certainly had the highest wage bill in England. Yet Ferguson kept his neighborfromatitle,confoundingtheoddsonelasttime.

So far we’ve discussed only overperforming managers of giant clubs. However,severalofourbestmanagersof thepast thirty-sevenyears—mensuchasPaulSturrock,Steve Parkin, Ronnie Moore, and John Beck—have spent their careers in the lowerreachesofthegame.Aswewrite,inearly2014,MooreismanagingTranmereinLeagueOne,England’s third tier, Parkin is assistantmanager ofBradford in the samedivision,while Sturrock andBeck don’t have clubs at all. (Beck left semiprofessional KetteringTownin2012,escortedfromthestadiumjustbeforeagame,andSturrockwassackedbySouthendin2013.)Thesemenaretitansofthelowerdivisions,buthardlyanybodyhigheruppaysanyattentiontotitansofthelowerdivisions.Itseemsthatthemarketinmanagersdoes not work very efficiently: many of the best do not seem to get rewarded, whilehundredsofmanagerswhoaddnovaluecontinuetomuddleonandgetjobs,oftengoodones.

Admittedly someofour lower-division titanshave succeededbyplayinga long-ballgamethatmightnotworkhigherup.“Ithinkmystyleofplayhasbeensuccessfulinthelower leagues,” Sturrock told us cautiously in his bare little office at Southend onewinter’s night. Yet most good managers could surely adjust their methods to betterplayers.Wesuspectthesemenarebeingundervaluedbecausetheydon’tphysicallylookthe part, or lack charisma, or have had their reputations unfairly tarnished somewherealong the way. Sturrock thinks this happened to him during his only, brief stint in thePremier League: his thirteen matches with Southampton in 2004. He complains,

“EverybodytothisdaythinksthatIwasfired.Iwalkedoutofthefootballclub.Itwasanagreementbetweenmeandthechairman.Itwasthebestforbothofus.SomaybepeopletaggedmethatI’dfailedinthatenvironment.Butifyoulookatmygamesratiotoanyofthe other managers that were round about me at that time, I probably had the mostsuccessful thirteengamesanymanager’shad there.” Indeed,Sturrockwonfiveof thosegames—prettygoodat a small club—but fell outwithSouthampton’s chairman,RupertLowe.Henevergot a chanceat the top level again. InhisSouthendoffice,he reflects,“‘I’ve been to the show,’ as the Americans would say. The one thing I’ll say is that Ienjoyedeveryminuteofit.”

We’renottellingManchesterCityorNewcastletogoandhireSturrockoroneoftheotherlower-leaguetitansonourlisttomorrowmorning.Butitcouldn’thurttotakealook.

We’vefocusedhereonoverachievingmanagers.However, thekeypoint is that theyare theexceptions.Thevastbulkofmanagersappear tohavealmostno impacton theirteams’performanceanddonotlastverylonginthejob.Theyseemtoaddsolittlevaluethat it is tempting to think that they could be replaced by their secretaries, or theirchairmen,orbystuffedteddybears,withouttheclub’sleaguepositionchanging.Intypicalsoccer talk, the importance of managers is vastly overestimated. As Sturrock says,“Money talksandmoneydecideswhereyou finishup in the leagues.”All inall, JamieCarraghergetsthesignificanceofmanagersaboutrightinhisautobiography:

Thebottom line is this: if youassemble a squadofplayerswith talent and the right attitude andcharacter,you’llwinmorefootballmatchesthanyoulose,nomatterhowinventiveyourtrainingsessions,whatsystemyouplayorwhat team-talksyougive.But anything that cangiveyou theextra10per cent,whether that’sthroughdiet,yourgeneralfitnessorthecorrectwordinyourear,alsohasmerit.

TonyFernandesofQPRinsists:“I thinkmanagersdoplayabigpart.”Butheadds:“Ultimately,ifyouhaverubbishplayers,there’snothingamanagercando.”Perhapsthemain service amanager can perform for his club is to avoid spendingmuchmoney ontransfers.Afterall,transfersusuallyfail,andtheywastefundsthatcouldhavebeenspentonboostingtheall-determiningplayers’wages.WengerisabettermanagerthanBenitezinpartbecauseheblowslessofhisbudgetontransferfees.Butthereisn’tmuchelsemostclubmanagers can do to push their teams up the table. After all, playersmattermuchmore.AsJohanCruijffsaidwhenhewascoachingBarcelona,“Ifyourplayersarebetterthanyouropponents,90percentofthetimeyouwillwin.”

Therecannotbemanybusinesseswhereamanagerwouldmakesuchanextravagantclaim.ThechairmanofGeneralMotorsdoesnotsaythattheartofgoodmanagementissimplyhiring thebestdesignersor thebestproductionmanagers. Insteadhe talksaboutorganization,motivation,orbuildingateam.Wetypicallythinkofbusinessesascomplexorganisms. Yet when it comes to soccer, someone as insightful as Cruijff describesmanagementaslittlemorethanassemblingthebestplayers.Seldomhasaprescriptionforsuccessfulmanagementbeensosimple.

Aswe’ll argue later in the book, we think thatmanagers of national teams have abetterchanceofmakingadifference.Amanagercanoutperformwhenhebringshisteamforeign knowledge that it didn’t previously have. Fabio Capello arguably did that forEngland,andGuusHiddink for the foreigncountrieshemanageduntilhisdeclineafter

2008.Thesemenpassedon to theirplayers someof the latestwesternEuropeansoccerknow-how. However, it’s very rare for such knowledge gaps to exist in a league likeEngland’s.AllseriousEnglishclubsarenowstuffedwithpeoplefromallovertheworldandhaveaccesstocurrentbestpractice.ThePremierLeagueislikeamarketwithalmostperfectinformation.Consequently,veryfewclubmanagerscanmakemuchdifference.

Thecounterargument toourswouldbe that theclubs thatpay theirplayers themostalsotendtopaytheirmanagersthemost.Sotheclubswiththebestplayerswouldalsobetheclubswiththebestmanagers.

Webelievethisargumentisfalseinmostcases.First,ifsomemanagersaregoodandothersarebad,whydoestheperformanceofmanagersovertimevarysomuchmorethantheperformanceofplayers?WayneRooneyandFrankLampardarealwaysgoodplayers.Theywillhavetheoddbadmatch,butovertheyearsnobodyeverthinkstheyareterribleand in needof sacking.Thehistoryofmanagement, by contrast, is litteredwithblokesappointedastheMessiahandsackedasaloserafewmonthslater.Mostmanagers’careersseemtofollowarandomwalk:somegoodseasons,somebadones.Andanyway,howcanmanagersmakemuchdifferencewhenmostofthemlastsobrieflyineachjob?In1992theaveragemanager’stenureinEnglishsoccerwas3.5years.Bythesummerof2013,itwas little over a year, and of the ninety-two managers of English league clubs, onlyWengerhadheldhisjobformorethansevenyears.

ChrisAndersonandDavidSallytakeonourargumentaboutmanagersintheirbookTheNumbersGame. They say thatmanagersmatter rathermore thanwe say, and theypoint to studies of chief executives making a difference in other industries. However,soccerisn’tlikemostotherindustries.Forastart,CEOsinotherindustriestendtostayintheirjobsformuchlonger.In2011,theaveragetenureofchiefexecutivesofcompaniesrankedintheS&P500(thestock-marketindexoffivehundredbigAmericancompanies)was 8.4 years.These people havemore time tomake a difference than amanager of asoccerclub.Secondly,althoughCEOsinall industries like tomakespeechesabout“thetalentofourpeople,”individualtalentprobablymattersmoreinsoccerthanitdoesat,say,Wal-Mart.Forabigretailer,havingtherightprocessesandtechnologyisprobablywhatmattersmost.ButifyouwanttobeatChelsea,youneedelevenexcellentsoccerplayers.Thatmighthelpexplain thedifference inwagesbetween soccerplayers andworkers inotherindustries.

Furthermore,theindividualsoccermanagerhasprobablybecomeevenlessimportantinrecentyears.Managersatbigclubsnowtendtoworkwithdozensofstaffers,rangingfromphysicaltrainerstodefensivecoachestodataanalysts.Oftenthesestaffershavebeenappointedbytheclubchairmanor thetechnicaldirector,andwillstayintheir jobslongafter themanager leaves.Themanager still appears at thepost-matchpress conference,andgetspublic credit forvictory andblame fordefeat.Day today, though,his staffersmayhaveabiggerimpactonresults.Fernandessayscoachingstaffare“underrated….Ithinkcoachingstaffmakeabigdifference.”

Mostmedialovetofocusongreatmen,buttodayitprobablymakesmoresensetotalkofmanagement teamsrather than individualmanagers. Indeed,youcouldargue that the

mainpointofthe“topjob”nowisasafocusofcompetitionfortheotherstaffers,whocanaspire to become manager one day. Brendan Rodgers, André Villas-Boas, and SteveClarke,forinstance,allmadeitfromMourinho’sstaffatChelseatomanagingbigclubsoftheirown.

It’s doubtful anyway whether many clubs or countries choose a manager chieflybecausetheythinkhewillmaximizeperformance.Oftenthemanagerischosenmoreforhissuitabilityasasymbolicfigureheadthanforhisperceivedcompetence.Inotherwords,he’smoreofaking,orheadofpublicrelations,thananexecutive.

WhenacluborcountryappointsasmanageraformericonicplayerlikeMaradonaorBryanRobson,itisnotsimplybettingthathewillgarnermorepointsthansomeunknownblokelikeAvramGrantorVillas-Boas.Performanceisonlyoneofthethreemaincriteriaused for hiring a manager. That’s because a club or country exists only partly to winmatches.Itsotherjobistoincarnatethecluborcountry’seternalspirit.Soanationalteamhastobethenationmadeflesh.NobodycouldincarnateArgentinabetterthanMaradona,andsohewasmademanager.Winningsoccermatcheshad little todowith it.Whereasplayersarealmostalwaysemployedbecausetheclubthinkstheyhelpwinmatches,thatdoesn’t go for managers. Popular ex-players often get the job because they are easilyacceptedbyfans,media,players,andsponsors.Theyarehiredasmuchforwhotheywereasforwhattheycando.

Thethirdcriterioninhiringamanager is typicallyhisgift forPR.Amanagermightnotaffecthisteam’sresult,butafterthegamehe’sthepersonwhoexplainstheresultatthepressconference.Heistheclub’sfaceandvoice.Thatmeanshehastolookgood—whichiswhysomanyofthemhaveglossy,wavyhair—andsaytherightthingsinpublic.This aspect has become ever more important as soccer has received ever more mediacoverage.The lateHelenioHerrera, InterMilan’s legendarymanager in the1960s,oncetoldusthatbeforehistime,managerswereunpaidmenoflowstatus.“Inthosedaysitwastheplayerswho ran the teams,”he said. “Youhad the teamofDiStefano, the teamofMazzola, the teamofSivori,and the trainerwas themanwhocarried thebags,”andhemimickedanoverburdenedporter.

Televisedpressconferenceshaveprobablydonemorethananythingelsetocreatethemodernmythoftheomnipotentmanager.NowonderthatthethingTonyBlairseemedtolikebest about soccer (according tohis former right-handman,AlastairCampbell)wasthepost-matchpressconference.WhenBlairwasBritishprimeminister,he’doftenspendtimeonweekendsslumpedonthesofawatchingsocceronTV.HetookamildinterestinBurnley, the clubCampbell supported.ButCampbell tells us thatBlair grew fascinatedwiththethenBurnleymanagerStanTernent,acharacterwithathicknortheasternaccentand a gift for exuding gloom.After gamesBlair, a born actor, liked to put on his bestBurnleyaccentandringCampbell:“Reet,Ally,’owdidBurnleygetontoday,then?”

Theforteofmostmanagersisnotwinningmatches—somethingoverwhichtheyhavelittlecontrol—butkeepingall theinterestgroupsinandaroundtheclub(players,board,fans,media,sponsors)unitedbehindthem.That’swhysomanymanagersarecharismatic.Theircharismamaynothelptheirteamswinmatches,butitdoeshelpthemanagerskeep

support.

ThegeneralobsessionwithmanagersisaversionoftheGreatManTheoryofHistory,theideathatprominentindividuals—GenghisKhan,orNapoleon,orevenStanTernent—causehistoricalchange.Academichistorians,incidentally,binnedthistheorydecadesago.

Themythofmanagerialomnipotencehasbeenbothgoodandbadformanagers.Whenthemanagerbecamethefaceoftheclub,hissalaryandfamerose.Ontheotherhand,healsobecamemorevulnerable.Iftheteamwaslosingmatches,theobviousthingtodowastogetridofitssymbolicfigurehead.

Sacking the manager has become a ritual, soccer’s version of the Aztecan humansacrifice.Englishclubsspentanestimated$157millionsacrificingtheirmanagersinthe2010–2011 season, if you add up the cost of compensation, legal fees, and “doublecontracts” (paying theoldandnewmanagerat thesame time),according to theLeagueManagersAssociation.All thismoneycouldhavebeenmoreusefully spentonplayers’wagebillsoronimprovingstadiums.

As it happens, after the manager is sacrificed, a team’s performance does tend toimprove briefly. Sue Bridgewater, professor at Warwick Business School in the UK,analyzed sackings in thePremierLeague from1992 to 2008 and found that “there is aboost for a short honeymoonperiod.”For instance, afterManchesterCity sackedMarkHughesatChristmas2009,itwonitsfirstfourgamesunderRobertoMancini.However,that’s not because Mancini or any other new manager can work magic. The shorthoneymoon is easy to explain. Typically the average club earns 1.3 points a match.Typically,Bridgewater found, a club sacks itsmanagerwhen it averagesonly1point amatch—thatis,atalowpointinthecycle.Anystatisticiancanpredictwhatshouldhappenafter a low point: whether or not the club sacks its manager, or changes its brand ofteacakes,itsperformancewillprobablyregresstothemean.Simplyput,fromalowpointyou are always likely to improve. The clubmay have hit the low due to bad luck, orinjuries,oratoughrunoffixtures,or—asperhapsinManchesterCity’scase—thetimeittakesforalargelynewteamtogel.

Whateverthereasonforhittingalow,thingswillalmostinevitablyimproveafterward.Thenewmanager rarelycauses thependulum to swing.He’s just thebeneficiaryof theswing.Perhapssomeplayersdobrieflyworkhardertoimpresshim,thoughonthatlogicclubsshouldsackmanagersevenmoreoften.

Eventually results regress to themean.Bridgewater found that threemonths after asacking,thetypicalclubaveragedthestandard1.3pointsagame.SheikhMansour,City’sbillionaireowner,shouldprobablyhavejuststuckwithHughesandwaitedforresultstorebound, but in business doing nothing is often the hardest thing. (And not just inbusiness.HaroldMacmillan,BritishprimeministerduringtheCubanmissilecrisis,musedthen“onthefrightfuldesiretodosomething,withtheknowledgethatnottodoanything…wasprob.therightanswer.”)

Inevitably Mancini was credited with City’s short honeymoon. “Mancini really ismagic,” proclaimed The Sun newspaper, and people began to whisper that the Italian

might win that season’s Premier League. No wonder, because the wavy-glossy-hairedItalian looks like a manager and boasts a glittering résumé as a player. Those factsreassure fans, media, players, and sponsors, even if they don’t help City winmatches.Mancini’s salary—like anymanager’s—therefore reflected his iconic status and his giftforPRasmuchashisexpectedcontributiontoperformance.Soitwillnotbethecasethatthebest-paidmanagersarethebestperformers.

It’sdifferentforplayers.Theyarejudgedalmostsolelyonresults.Veryoccasionallyaplayerdoesgetboughtbecauseheisanicon,orgoodatPR.However,thosequalitiesinthemselveswon’tsustainhimintheteam.Anyplayerwhodoesn’tplaywellwillbeoutthedoorswiftly,nomatterhowwavyhishairorhowwhitehisskin.Aswe’vejustshown,beingaplayerisallaboutperformance.Beingamanagerisn’t.Althoughclubspayplayersonlyfortheircontributiontoperformance,that’snottrueofhowtheypaymanagers.

Perhapsonedayclubswilldispensewithmanagersaltogetherandletalargesampleoftheir fans pick the team instead. In 2007 the English semiprofessional side EbbsfleetUnitedgaveits30,000fan-owners—whohadeachpaid£35for theprivilege—avote inplayerselection.Coincidenceornot(andthemoneythefan-ownersputinprobablymadethe biggest difference), Ebbsfleet almost immediately experienced its greatest triumph,victory in the FA Trophy Final at Wembley in May 2008. Afterward the club’sperformancedeclined,asmanyofthefansstoppedpaying,andmostoftheplayershadtobeletgo.Still,itwasinterestingtoseeaclubselectitsteamusingthewisdomofcrowds.Itwouldbeevenmore interesting to seewhathappened ifmoreclubsdid this—if theystoppedhiringmanagersandallowedanonlinesurveyofregisteredfanstopicktheteam.Wesuspecttheclubwouldperformdecently,perhapsevenbetterthanmostofitsrivals,because it would be harnessing the wisdom of crowds. And it could use themoney itsavedonmanagerstoupthosecrucialplayers’wages.

None of this is good news for blackmanagers. Because it is so hard tomeasure amanager’s performance without complex grinding of stats over many seasons, it willprobably never become painfully obvious that clubs are undervaluing black managers.Thatmeansclubscancontinuetochoosetheirmanagersbasedonappearance.Anyclubappointingsomeonewhoisnotawhitemaleex-playerwithaconservativehaircutmustworryaboutlookingfoolishifitschoicefails.Hiringablackmanagerfeelsrisky,becauseasBarnessays,“Blackguyshaven’tprovedthemselvesasmanagers.”Whiteguyshave—oratleastsomeofthemappeartohave.

Soccerplayersgetmoreorlessthejobstheydeserve.Ifonlyotherprofessionswereasfair.

8THEECONOMIST’SFEAROFTHEPENALTY

KICKArePenaltiesCosmicallyUnfair,orOnlyIfYouAreNicolas

Anelka?Afamoussoccermanagerstandsupfromthetable.He’sgoingtopretendheisChelsea’scaptain, John Terry, about to take the crucial penalty againstManchesterUnited in theChampionsLeaguefinalinMoscowin2008.

Themanager performs the partwith schadenfreude; he is no friend of Chelsea.Headjustshisfaceintoamaskoftension.HetellsuswhatTerryisthinking:“IfIscore,wewintheChampionsLeague.”Andthen,terrifyingly,“ButfirstIhavetoscore.”

Themanagerbeginspullingatthearmofhissuitjacket:heismimickingTerrypullingathiscaptain’sarmband.Terryistellinghimself(themanagerexplains),“Iamcaptain,Iamstrong,Iwillscore.”

Stillpullingrhythmicallyathissuit,themanagerlooksup.Heiseyeinganimaginary,grotesquely largeEdwin van der Sar,who is guarding a goal a very long twelve yardsaway. Terry intends to hit the ball to Van der Sar’s left.We now know that a Basqueeconomist told Chelsea that the Dutch keeper tended to dive right against right-footedkickers.Terryrunsup—andherethemanager,cackling,fallsonhisbackside.

VanderSar did indeeddive right, as theBasque economist had foreseen, butTerryslippedonthewetgrass,andhisshotintotheleft-handcornermissedbyinches.

“Thisreallyisfootball,”themanagerconcludes.Aplayerhitsthepost,theballgoesout, and Chelsea’s coach, AvramGrant, is sacked even though he is exactly the samemanager as if the ball had gone in.All in all, Terry’s penaltymay have been themostexpensivemiskickinthehistoryofsoccer.

Thepenaltyisprobablythesinglethinginsocceraboutwhicheconomistshavemosttosay.Thepenaltyfeelscosmicallyunfair;economistssayotherwise.Penaltiesareoftendismissed as a lottery; economists tell both kicker and goalkeeper exactly what to do.(Indeed,ifonlyNicolasAnelkahadfollowedtheeconomist’sadvice,Chelseawouldhavewon the final.) And best of all, penaltiesmay be the best way in the knownworld ofunderstandinggametheory.

DIABOLICAL:AREPENALTIESREALLYUNFAIR?

Atfirstsight,thepenaltylookslikethemostunfairdeviceinallofsports.Firstofall,itmaybeimpossibleforarefereetojudgemostpenaltyappealscorrectly,giventhepaceofmodernsoccer,thetangleoflegsandball,andthelevelsofdeceptionbyplayers.WhentheCanadianwriterAdamGopnikwatched theWorldCupof1998onTV for theNew

Yorker, he as an outsider to soccer immediately focused on this problem. The “morecustomarymethodofgettingapenalty,”hewrote,“…istowalkintothe‘area’withtheball,getbreathedonhard,and then immediatelycollapse…armsand legssplayedout,whileyoutwistinagonyandbegformorphine,andyourteammatessmitetheirforeheadsatthetragicwasteofayounglife.Therefereebuysthismoreoftenthanyoumightthink.Afterwardthepostgamedid-he-fall-or-was-he-pushedargumentcangoonforhours.”Ordecades.Thefanathomeisoftenunsurewhetheritreallyshouldhavebeenapenaltyevenafterwatchingseveralreplays.

Andthereferee’smisjudgmentsmatter,becausethepenaltyprobablyhasmoreimpactthan any other refereeing decision in sports.Umpires in baseball and tennis often fluffcalls, but there are fifty-four outs in a baseball game, and countless points in a tennismatch,andsonoindividualdecisiontendstomakeallthatmuchdifference.Refereesinrugbyandfootballblunder, too,butbecausethesegamesarehigherscoringthansoccer,individual calls rarely change outcomes here, either. In any case, officials in all thesesportscannowconsultinstantreplays.

Butsoccerrefereescannot.Andsinceimportantsoccermatchesusuallyhingeononegoal, the penalty usually decides the match. As Gopnik says, the penalty “creates anenormousdisproportionbetweenthefoulandthereward.”

Nowonderthepenaltydrivesmanagerscrazy.AsArsèneWengerlamentedattheendofthe2007–2008season,“EverybiggameI’veseenthisyearhasbeendecided,offsideornot offside, penalty or not penalty.” Indeed, it’s now a standard tactic formanagers inEngland, after their teams have lost, to devote the post-match press conference to apenaltygivenornotgiven.It’saritualsongoflament,whichgoeslikethis:Thepenaltycompletely changed the outcome of the game. We were clearly winning/tying but lostbecauseofthe(diabolical,unjust)penalty.

Themanagerknowsthatmostmediaprefercoveringpersonalityclashestotactics,andsothe“match”reportswillbedevotedtothepressconferenceratherthanhisteam’slosingperformance.Meanwhile,thewinningmanager,whenaskedaboutthepenalty,recites,Itmadenodifferencewhatever to theoutcomeof thegame.Wewereclearlywinningandwouldinevitablyhavedonesowithoutthe(entirelyjust)penalty.

These two ritual managerial chants amount to two different hypotheses about howpenalties affect soccer matches. The first manager is claiming that randomly awardedpenaltiesdistortresults.Thesecondmanager issayingpenaltiesmakenodifference.Onoccasion, eithermanagermight be right. But over the long term, one of themmust bemorerightthantheother.Sowhichisit—dopenaltieschangeresults,ordon’tthey?Wehavethedatatoanswerthisquestion.

OurguruisDr.TundeBuraimo.Oneofthegrowingbandofsportseconometricians—theBritish equivalent of baseball’s sabermetricians—Tundeworks, appropriately, in theancientheartlandofprofessionalsoccerattheUniversityofCentralLancashireinPreston.Asthesayinggoes,thepluralof“anecdote”is“data,”andTundepreferstoworkwithtensofthousandsofpiecesofevidenceratherthanafewrandomrecollections.Tohelpuswithour book, he examined 1,520 Premier League games played over four years, from the

2002–2003seasonuntil2005–2006.Foreachgameheknewthepatternofscoringand,crucially,whichteamwasexpectedtowingiventheprematchbettingodds.

Our test of the two rival hypotheses about penalties is simple.We asked Tunde todividethegamesintotwogroups:

1.Gamesinwhichpenaltieswereawarded

2.Gamesinwhichtheywerenot

We then asked him to compare how often the home team won when there was apenalty,andhowoftenwhentherewasn’t.Figure8.1showswhathefound.

Lookatthelastcolumnfirst.Takingallgamesinthedatabase,47.30percentendedinhome wins, 27.37 percent in away wins, and 25.33 percent in ties. These frequenciesreflecttheintrinsicadvantageofhometeams.Nowimaginethatthefirstmanagerisright:penalties change the outcome of the game. How will they do that? It might be thatpenalties always favor home teams (because referees are cowards), in which case wewould expect the percentage of home wins to be greater when penalties are given.Alternatively, itmightbe thatpenalties favoraway teams (perhapsenablinga team thathas itsbackagainst thewall tomakeanescape). If so, theproportionofawaywins (orties)wouldrisewithpenalties.

FIGURE8.1.Comparisonofhometeamandpenalties

Butinfact,asthefirsttwocolumnsshow,thepercentagesforallresultsbarelychangewhether a penalty is given or not. The percentage of home wins is about three pointshigher when there is a penalty (up from 46.76 percent to 49.65 percent), and thepercentageoftiesiscommensuratelylower(downto22.38percentfrom26.01percent).The percentage of away wins remains almost identical (27.97 percent against 27.23percent) with or without penalties. So in games with penalties, there are slightlymorehomewinsandslightlyfewerties.

It’s tempting to readsignificance into this: to think that the rise inhomewinswhenthere is a penalty big enough to show that penalties favor the home team. However,statisticians warn against this kind of intuitive analysis. The absolute number of homewinswhen therewerepenalties in thegamewas142.Had the frequencyofhomewinsbeenthesameas ingameswhentherewasnopenalty, thenumberofhomewinswouldhave been 134. The difference (eight extra home wins) is too small to be consideredstatistically significant and the difference is likely due to chance. Itwould have been adifferentmatterhadthenumberofhomewinswhentherewasapenaltyexceeded150(or52 percent of the games concerned). Then the increase would have met the standardgenerally used by statisticians for confidence that there was a statistically reliabledifference in outcomes depending on the award of a penalty.As it is, though, the datasuggestthatawardingapenaltydoesnotaffecthomewins,awaywins,orties.

FIGURE8.2.Penaltyeffectsonmatchresults

But perhaps penalties have a different effect on match results. Perhaps they helpfavorites (if refs favor the big team).Or do they help underdogs (if penalties truly aregivenrandomly,theyshouldhelptheworseteammorethanthebetterone)?Tundetestedthesehypotheses,too.

It’sobviouseventothenakedeyethatpenaltieshavenoimpactatallonwhetherthefavoritewins: favoriteswin 51.3 percent of gameswithout a penalty, and 51.4 percentwithapenalty. It’s true thatunderdogswinnearly3percentmoreoftenwhen there isapenaltythanwhenthereisnot,butonceagainthetestsdemonstratethatthisfacthasnostatisticalsignificance.Wecanput theincreasedowntochance.Matchresultsappeartobethesamewithorwithoutpenalties.Penaltiesdonotmatter.

Now,thisisastatisticalstatementthatrequiresaverypreciseinterpretation.Penaltiesdomatterinthattheyoftenchangetheoutcomeofindividualgames.Clearlyateamthatscoresfromapenaltyismorelikelytowin,andso,whateveramanagersays,aconvertedpenaltywillaffecttheevolutionofalmostanygame.

However,onaverage,takenoveralargesampleofgames,apenaltydoesnotmakeitanymorelikelythathometeamsorawayteamsorfavoritesorunderdogswin.Ifpenaltieswereabolishedtomorrow,thepatternofsoccerresultswouldbeexactlythesame.

This sounds counterintuitive. After all, we argued that penalties look like themostunfair device in sport. They are oftenwrongly awarded, they cause a lot of goals, andmanyofthesegoalsdecidematches.Sosurelypenaltiesshouldmakeresultslessfair?

Toexplainwhypenaltiesdon’tchangethepatternofmatchresults,weneedtoconsultGrahamTaylor.Theretiredmanagerisnowrememberedasthe“turnip”whoselong-ballgamecostEnglandqualificationfortheWorldCupof1994.However,thelong-ballgamehadpreviouslyservedTaylorverywellathisclubsWatfordandAstonVilla.Nowonder,because it restedononecrucial insight intosoccer:youwillscoregoalsonly ifyougetpossessionintheopposition’sfinalthirdofthefield.

Muchthesameinsightappliestopenalties:inpracticeyouwillgetthemonlyifyouhave possession (or at least a decent chance of winning possession) in the opponent’spenaltyarea.Apenaltyisoftenwronglygiven.Butitisalmostalwaysarewardfordeepterritorialpenetration.Thatmakesit,onaverage,amarkerofthebalanceofpowerinthegame.That’swhygoodteamsgetproportionatelymorepenaltiesthanbadteams,andwhyhometeamsgetmorethanawayteams.Onaverage,apenaltyisgivenwiththegrainofagame.

RIGHT,LEFT,ORLETVANDERSARDECIDEFORYOU?GAMETHEORYINBERLINANDMOSCOW

Thenextquestionishowtotakethem.Economistsmayhavenoideawhenhousingpriceswillcrash,buttheydoknowsomethingaboutthisone.

Asurprisingnumberofeconomistshavethoughthardaboutthehumblepenaltykick.Even Steve Levitt, author ofFreakonomics and winner of perhaps the most importantprizeineconomics(theClarkMedal,whichsomeinsidersthinkoutrankstheNobel),once

cowrotealittle-knownpaperonpenalties.Probablyonlyatrioofeconomistswouldhavewatchedvideosof459penaltiestakenintheFrenchandItalianleagues.“TestingMixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks inSoccer”isoneofthoseyoumighthavemissed,butitalwayswonLevitthandshakesfromEuropeaneconomists.Here’sanAmericanwhogetsit,theymusthavethought.Levitt,P.-A.Chiappori,andT.Grosecloseexplainthattheywrotethepaperbecause“testinggametheoryintherealworldmayprovideuniqueinsights.”Economistsreverethepenaltyasareal-lifeexampleofgametheory.

Gametheorywasdevelopedinthe1940sbythelikesofJohnvonNeumann,abrilliantmathematicianwhoalsohelpedcreate thearchitectureof themoderncomputer. It is thestudyofwhathappenswhenpeoplefind themselves insituationsexactly likeapenalty-takerfacingagoalkeeper:whenwhatIshoulddodependsonwhatyoudo,andwhatyoushoulddodependsonwhatIdo.

TheAmericangovernmentusedgametheoryextensivelyduringthecoldwartoplanits interactionswith theSovietUnionand to try topredictSovietmoves. (It is said thatgame-theoretic advice was given during the Cubanmissile crisis to consider questionslike,“IfwebombCuba,thentheRussianswillseizeWestBerlin,andthenwe’llhavetoattack Russian troops, and then they’ll use nuclear bombs, and then …”) Todayeconomists use game theory all the time, particularly to plan government policies oranalyzebusinessstrategy.Gametheoryevenplaysabigroleinresearchonbiology.

Thekeytogametheoryistheanalysisofhowthestrategiesofdifferentactorsinteract.In a penalty kick, for instance, the kicker and the keepermust each choose a strategy:wheretokicktheballandwheretodive.Buteachperson’sstrategydependsonwhathethinkstheotherpersonwilldo.

Sometimesingametheory,what’sbestfortheactorsisiftheybothdothesamething—goingtothesamerestauranttomeetfordinner,forinstance.Thesekindsofsituationsareknownascoordinationorcooperativegames.Butthepenaltykickisanoncooperativegame:theactorssucceedbyachievingtheirobjectivesindependentlyofothers.Infact,thepenaltyisa“zero-sumgame”:anygainforoneplayerisexactlyoffsetbythelosstotheotherside(plusonegoalformeisminusonegoalforyou).

The issue of game theory behind the penaltywas best put in “TheLongest PenaltyEver,”a short storyby theArgentinewriterOsvaldoSoriano.Amatch in theArgentineprovinces has to be abandoned seconds before timewhen a bent referee, who has justawardedapenalty,isknockedoutbyanirateplayer.Theleaguecourtdecidesthatthelasttwentysecondsofthegame—thepenaltykick,ineffect—willbeplayedthenextSunday.Thatgiveseveryoneaweektoprepareforthepenalty.

Atdinnerafewnightsbeforethepenalty,“GatoDíaz,”thekeeperwhohastostopit,musesaboutthekicker:

“Constantekickstotheright.”

“Always,”saidthepresidentoftheclub.

“ButheknowsthatIknow.”

“Thenwe’refucked.”

“Yeah,butIknowthatheknows,”saidelGato.

“Thendivetotheleftandbeready,”saidsomeoneatthetable.

“No.HeknowsthatIknowthatheknows,”saidGatoDíaz,andhegotuptogotobed.

Gametheoriststrytoworkoutstrategiesforplayersindifferenttypesofgames,andtry to predictwhich strategy eachplayerwill pursue.Sometimes the prediction is easy.Considerthegameinwhicheachplayerhasonlytwochoices:either“developanuclearbomb”or“don’tdevelopanuclearbomb.”Tomakeaprediction,youhavetoknowwhatthepayoff is to eachplayer dependingon thegame’s outcome. Imagine theplayers areIndiaandPakistan (but it couldbe Israeland Iran,oranyotherpairofhostilenations).InitiallyPakistandoesnotknowifIndiawillorwon’tdevelopabomb,soitfigures:

ifIndiahasnobomb,then

(a) We don’t get a bomb: we can live alongside each other, but there willalwaysbeincidents.

(b) Wegetabomb:Indiawillhavetotreatuswithrespect.

ifIndiahasabomb

(c) Wedon’tgetabomb:wecan’tresistanythingIndiadoes.

(d) Wegetabomb:Indiawillhavetotreatuswithrespect.

Plainly,ifyouarePakistan,youwillendupdevelopingthebomb,whetherIndiahasthebombornot.Likewise,Indiawillchoosethesamestrategy,andwilldevelopthebombwhetherPakistandoesordoesn’t.So theequilibriumof thisgameis forbothnations toacquireabomb.Thisisthegloomylogicofanarmsrace.Thelogicofsoccerismuchthesame,andtherearemanyexamplesofarmsracesinthesport,frominflationofplayers’wagestoillegaldoping.

PIECESOFPAPERINSTUTTGART,MUNICH,BERLIN,ANDMOSCOW

Theproblemforexperiencedpenalty-takersandgoalkeepersisthatovertime,theybuilduptrackrecords.Peoplecometospotanyhabitstheymighthave—alwaysshootingleft,oralwaysdivingright,forinstance.Levittandhiscolleaguesobserved“onegoalieinthesamplewhojumpsleftonalleightkicksthathefaces(onlytwoofeightkicksagainsthimgototheleft,suggestingthathisproclivityforjumpingleftisnotlostonthekickers).”

There have probably always been people in the game tracking the past behavior ofkickersandkeepers.Backinthe1970s,aDutchmanagernamedJanRekerbegantobuildupanarchiveofindexcardsonthousandsofplayers.Onethinghenotedwaswheretheplayerhithispenalties—oratleastthepenaltiesthatRekerhappenedtoknowabout.TheDutchkeeperHansvanBreukelenwouldoftencallRekerbeforean internationalmatchforabriefing.

Nobody paid much attention to this relationship until 1988. That May, VanBreukelen’s PSV reached the EuropeanCup final against Benfica. Before thematch inStuttgart, thekeeperphonedReker. Inevitably thegamewent toapenaltyshoot-out.At

firstReker’sindexcardsdidn’tseemtobehelpingmuch—Benfica’sfirstfivepenaltiesallwentin—butVanBreukelensavedthesixthkickfromVeloso,andPSVwastheEuropeanchampion.Amonthlater,sowasHolland.TheywereleadingtheUSSR2–0inthefinalinMunich when a silly charge by Van Breukelen conceded a penalty. But using Reker’sdatabase,hesavedIgorBelanov’sweakkick.

InBerlin in2006, theWorldCupquarterfinalbetweenGermanyandArgentinaalsowent topenalties. JensLehmann, theGermankeeper, emergedwith a crib sheet tuckedintohissock.Onalittlepageofhotelnotepaper(“Schlosshotel,Grunewald,”itsaid),theGerman keeper’s trainer, Andreas Köpke, had jotted down the proclivities of somepotentialArgentinepenalty-takers:

1.Riquelme left

2.Crespo longrun-up/right

shortrun-up/left

3.Heinze 6[Hisshirtnumber,presumablygivenforfear

thatLehmannwouldnotrecognizehim]

leftlow

4.Ayala 2[shirtnumber]

waitslongtime,longrun-upright

5.Messi left

6.Aimar 16,waitalongtime,left

7.Rodriguez 18,left

Apparently theGermans had a database of 13,000 kicks. The crib sheetmight justhave tipped the balance. Of the seven Argentines on the list, only Ayala and MaxiRodríguez actually tookpenalties.However,Ayala stuck exactly toLehmann’s plan: hetook a long run-up, the keeper waited a long time, and when Ayala dutifully shot toLehmann’sright,thekeepersaved.Rodríguezalsodidhisbesttooblige.HeputtheballinLehmann’sleft-handcorneraspredicted,buthititsowellthatthekeepercouldn’treach.

By the time of Argentina’s fourth penalty, Germany was leading 4–2. If LehmanncouldsaveEstebanCambiasso’skick,theGermanswouldmaintaintheirrecordofneverlosing a penalty shoot-out in a World Cup. Lehmann consulted his crib sheet. SönkeWortmann, theGermanfilmdirector,whowasfollowing theGerman teamfora fly-on-the-walldocumentary,reportswhathappenednext:“LehmanncouldfindnoindicationonhisnoteofhowCambiassowouldshoot.Andyetthepieceofpaperdiditsjob,becauseLehmannstoodlookingatitforalongtime.Köpkehadwrittenitinpencil,thenotewascrumpledandthewritingalmostillegible.”

Wortmann says that as Cambiasso prepared to take his kick, he must have beenthinking,“Whatdotheyknow?”TheGermansknewnothing.ButCambiassowaspsyched

outnonetheless.Lehmannsavedhisshot,andafterwardtherewasamassivebrawlonthefield.

Both Van Breukelen’s and Lehmann’s stories have been told before. What is notpublicly known is that Chelsea received an excellent crib sheet before the ChampionsLeaguefinalinMoscowin2008.

In 1995 the Basque economist Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, who was then a graduatestudentat theUniversityofChicago,beganrecordingthewaypenaltiesweretaken.Hispaper,“ProfessionalsPlayMinimax,”waspublishedin2003.

One friendof Ignacio’swhoknewabout his researchwas aprofessor of economicsandmathematicsatanIsraeliuniversity.ItsohappenedthatthismanwasalsoafriendofAvramGrant.WhenGrant’sChelseareachedthefinalinMoscowin2008,theprofessorrealized that Ignacio’s researchmighthelpGrant.Heput the twomen in touch. IgnaciothensentGrantareportthatmadefourpointsaboutManchesterUnitedandpenalties:

1. VanderSartendedtodivetothekicker’s“naturalside”moreoftenthanmostkeepersdid.Thismeantthatwhenfacingaright-footedkicker,VanderSarwouldusuallydivetohisownright,andwhenfacingaleft-footedkicker,tohisownleft.SoChelsearight-footedpenalty-takerswouldhaveabetterchance if theyshot totheir“unnaturalside,”VanderSar’sleft.

2. Ignacioemphasizedinhisreportthat“thevastmajorityofthepenaltiesthatVanderSarstopsarethosekickedtoamid-height(say,between1and1.5meters),andhence thatpenaltiesagainsthimshouldbekicked juston thegroundorhighup.”

3. Cristiano Ronaldo was another special case. Ignacio wrote in the report,“Ronaldooftenstopsintherunuptotheball.Ifhestops,heislikely(85%)tokicktotheright-handsideofthegoalkeeper.”IgnacioaddedthatRonaldoseemedabletochangehismindaboutwheretoputtheballattheverylastinstant.Thatmeantitwascrucialfortheopposingkeepernottomoveearly.Whenakeepermovedearly,Ronaldoalwaysscored.

4. Theteamthatwinsthetossbeforetheshoot-outgetstochoosewhethertogofirst.But this isano-brainer: it shouldalwaysgo first.Teamsgoing firstwin60percent of the time, presumably because there is toomuch pressure on the teamgoingsecond,whichisalwayshavingtoscoretosavethegame.

Fewseemtoknowthisinitialadvantageexists.TVcommentatorsrarelyevenmentionthetoss.Bookmakersdon’tshifttheiroddsimmediatelyafterthetossisdone—amistakefrom which gamblers could benefit. A month after Chelsea–Manchester United inMoscow,Italy’scaptain,GianluigiBuffon,mayhavedecidedtheoutcomeofEuro2008whenhewonthetossforashoot-outagainstSpainbutlettheSpaniardsshootfirst.Theywon—not necessarily gladdening the heart of the Basque Ignacio—and then won thetournament.

Ignaciodoesn’tknowhowhisresearchwasusedbyChelseainMoscow,butwatching

theshoot-outonTV,hewascertainitwasbeingused.Indeed,onceyouknowthecontentofIgnacio’snote,it’sfascinatingtostudytheshoot-outonYouTube.TheChelseaplayersseemtohavefollowedhisadvicealmosttotheletter—exceptforpoorAnelka.

United’scaptain,RioFerdinand,wonthetoss,andturnedtothebenchtoaskwhattodo.Terrytriedtoinfluencehimbyofferingtogofirst.Unsurprisingly,Ferdinandignoredhim.Unitedwent first,meaning that theywere now likely towin.CarlosTevez scoredfromthefirstkick.

Michael Ballack hit Chelsea’s first penalty high into the net to Van der Sar’s left.JulianoBellettiscoredlowtoVanderSar’sleft.IgnaciohadrecommendedthatChelsea’sright-footedkickerschoosethatside.Butatthisearlystage,hestillcouldn’tbesurethatChelseawasbeingguidedbyhisreport.Hetolduslater,“Interestingly,mywifehadbeenquiteskepticalabout thewhole thingasIwaspreparingthereportforCoachGrant,noteven interested in lookingat it.But then thegamewent intoextra time,and then intoapenaltyshoot-out.Well,stillskeptical.”

At thispointCristianoRonaldosteppedup to takehiskick forUnited.WatchingonTV,IgnaciotoldhiswifethepreciseadvicehehadgivenChelseainhisreport:Chelsea’skeeper shouldn’t move early, and if Cristiano paused in his run-up, he would mostprobablyhittheballtothekeeper’sright.Cristianodidindeedpauseinhisrun-up.

To Ignacio’s delight, Chelsea’s keeper, Petr Cech, stayed motionless—“not evenblinking,”intheSpanishfootballphrase.Then,whenCristianodulyshottoCech’srightaspredicted,thekeepersaved.Ignaciorecalledlater,“Afterthat,Istartedtobelievethatthey were following the advice quite closely.” As for his wife, “I think she was a bitshocked.”

What’s astonishing—though it seems tohavepassedunnoticedat the time—iswhathappenedafterthat.Chelsea’snextfourpenalty-takers,FrankLampard,AshleyCole,JohnTerry,andSalomonKalou,allhittheballtoVanderSar’sleft,justasBallackandBellettihaddone.Inotherwords,thefirstsixChelseakickswenttothesamecorner.

AshleyColewastheonlyoneofthesixwhopartlydisregardedIgnacio’sadvice.Colewasleft-footed,sowhenhehittheballtoVanderSar’sleft,hewasshootingtohisown“naturalside”—theside that IgnaciohadsaidVanderSar tendedtochoose. Indeed, theDutchmanchosecorrectlyonCole’skick,andverynearlysavedtheshot,butitwaswellstruck,low(asIgnaciohadrecommended),andjustwriggledoutofthekeeper’sgrip.ButallChelsea’s right-footedpenalty-takershadobeyed Ignacio to the letter andkicked theballtotheir“unnaturalside,”VanderSar’sleft.

Sofar,Ignacio’sadvicehadworkedverywell.Muchastheeconomisthadpredicted,VanderSarhaddivedtohisnaturalsidefourtimesoutofsix.Hehadn’tsavedasinglepenalty.FiveofChelsea’ssixkickshadgonein,whileTerry’s,asthewholeworldknows,flewoutoffthepostwithVanderSarinthewrongcorner.

It was Anelka’s turn to kick. On United’s bench, Alex Ferguson was growingfrustratedwithhiskeeper.“AsAnelkajoggedtothepenaltyspot,”Fergusonlaterrecalled,“Iwasthinking,‘Divetoyourleft.’Edwinkeptdivingtotheright.”

Butaftersixkicks,VanderSar,orsomeoneelseatManchesterUnited,hadfiguredoutthatChelseawaspursuingastrategy.TheDutchmanhadnoticedthattheteamwasputtingallitskickstohisleft.

AsAnelkaprepared to takeChelsea’sseventhpenalty, theganglingkeeper, standingonthegoalline,extendedhisarmstoeithersideofhim.Then,inwhatmusthavebeenachillingmoment forAnelka, theDutchmanpointedwithhis lefthand to the leftcorner.“That’swhereyou’reallputtingit,isn’tit?”heseemedtobesaying.(Thisiswherebooksfallshortasamedium.Weurgeyoutowatchtheshoot-outonYouTube.)

NowAnelkahadaterribledilemma.Thiswasgametheoryinitsrawestform.Unitedhad comepretty close to diviningChelsea’s strategy: Ignacio had indeed advised right-footedkickerslikeAnelkatoputtheballtoVanderSar’sleftside.

SoAnelkaknewthatVanderSarknewthatAnelkaknewthatVanderSartendedtodive right against right-footers.What was Anelka to do? He decided to avoid the leftcorner,where he had presumably planned to put the ball. Instead he kicked toVan derSar’sright.Thatmighthavebeenfine,exceptthathehittheballatmid-height—exactlythe level that Ignaciohadwarned against.Watching thekickonTV, Ignaciowas “veryupset.”PerhapsAnelkawasatseabecauseVanderSarhadpressuredhimtochangehisplans at the last moment. Van der Sar saved the shot. Ferguson said afterward, “Thatwasn’tanaccident,hispenaltysave.Weknewexactlywherecertainplayerswereputtingthe ball.” Anelka’s decision to ignore Ignacio’s advice probably cost Chelsea theChampionsLeague.

RANDOMIZATION:FRANCKRIBÉRYCRACKSGAMETHEORY

Crib sheets likeLehmann’smight justworkonpenalty shoot-outs.Manyof theplayerswho take kicks in a shoot-out aren’t regular penalty-takers. (After Gareth SouthgatemissedEngland’scrucialkickatEuro’96,hismothersaidthatthelasttimehe’dtakenapenaltywas three years before, and he’dmissed that one, too.) These inferior penalty-takers are not skilled or steady-headed enough to be able to vary their strategy. Quitelikely,theywilljustaimfortheirfavoritecorner,hopingthattheirlackofatrackrecordmeanstheothersidewon’tknowtheirpreference.

However,thatisnothowagoodpenalty-taker—histeam’sregularman—thinks.

Supposethegoodkickeralwayschosethesamecornerforhispenalty(gametheoristscallthisa“purestrategy”).Itwouldbeeasytooppose:ifthekickeralwayskicksleft,thenthegoalkeeperknowswhattodo.Purestrategiesdon’tworkforpenalty-taking.AsLevittand company found, “There are no kickers in our samplewith at least four kickswhoalways kick in one direction.”Take that, JensLehmann.According to the goalkeeper’scribsheet,Messi’spenaltiestendedtogoleft.Infact,themini-Argentinerandomizeshisspotkicksalmostperfectly.“Hecanalsochangehismindat thevery last instant,”addsIgnacio.SometimesMessiwaitsforthekeepertoshifthisweightveryslightlytooneside,thenshootstotheothercorner.

Evenamorecomplicatedpurestrategythanalwayschoosingthesamecornerdoesnotwork.Forexample,supposethekickeralwaysshootsintheoppositecornertotheonehe

chose last time. (DiegoForlán tended to do this.)Then a future opponent studying thisplayermightdiscover the sequence—left, right, left, right, left, right—andwithabitofthoughtguesswhatcomesnext.Theessenceofgoodpenalty-takingisunpredictability:agoodpenalty-takerwillbeonewhosenextpenalty cannotbepredictedwith confidencefromhishistoryofpenalty-taking.

Thisisaparticularkindofunpredictability.Itdoesnotmeanthatthekickershouldgolefthalfofthetimeandrighthalfofthetime.Afterall,mostkickershaveanaturalside,and favoring that sidegives themahigher chanceof scoring.But even ifyounaturallyshoottothekeeper’sright,asmostright-footedkickersdo,sometimesyouhavetoshoottohis left, just tokeephimhonest. Infact, ifakickerknowshischancesofscoringforeither corner of the net (depending also on which way the goalkeeper dives), he canchoose the proportion of kicks to his natural side that maximizes the probability ofscoring.Aright-footedkickerwon’tput100percentofhiskickstohisnaturalrightside,becausethatwouldgivethegoalkeepercertainty.Evenasmallchange,likekickingrightonly99percentofthetime,wouldraisethechancesofscoringconsiderablybycreatinguncertaintyinthegoalkeeper’smind.

Kicking to the left 50 percent of the time would leave the keeper very uncertain.However,itwouldalsoentailthekickerhittingmanypoorshotstohisunnaturalside.Sothekickerdoesbestbyhittingsomewhereoverhalfhiskickstohisnaturalrightside.

Likewise,we can calculate the proportion of times a goalkeeper should dive left orright.(Notethatweareassumingthegoalkeepercannotknowwhichwaytheballisgoingbefore he decideswhichway to dive.)Kickers andkeeperswhomix it up like this arepursuingwhatgametheoristscall“mixedstrategies.”

Mixedstrategiesarepeculiarbecausetheyrequiretheactortoincorporaterandomnessintodecision-making.ShouldIgotothepuborthecinema?Amixedstrategyrequiresmeto toss a coin,which soundsodd, sinceonemight expect that Ipreferone to theother.Withamixedstrategy,youletthecoinmakethedecisionforyou.

Game theorists have wondered for years whether people in the real world followmixed strategies. They have found in tests that people tend not to usemixed strategiesevenwhen it isprofitable for themtodoso. In fact,ourbehaviorseems to fallshortofmixedplayinaveryspecificway:inmostcasesoursequenceofchoicesispredictable,becausepeopletendtodotheoppositeofwhattheyhavedoneinthepast.Forinstance,they choose first left, then right, then left, then right, left, right, left, right, confusingchangewithrandomness.Theseguineapigswouldnotmakegoodpenalty-takers.

Eventuallygame theoristsbegan to testmixed strategies in thenatural laboratoryofpenalty-taking. Years before Ignacio Palacios-Huerta advised Chelsea, he collected adatabase of 1,417 penalties taken between 1995 and 2000. First he calculated theproportionofsuccessfulkicksbasedonwhetherthekickerwenttohisnaturalside(leftorright). The success rate was 95 percent if the kicker went to his natural side and thegoalkeeperwenttotheoppositeside(theremaining5percentofkicksmissedthegoal).The success rate was 92 percent if the kicker went to his “unnatural” side and thegoalkeeperwenttohisownnaturalside.Obviouslythekicker’ssuccessrateswerelower

ifthekeeperchosecorrectly:ascoringrateof70percentifbothkeeperandkickerwenttothekicker’snaturalside,and58percentifbothwenttotheotherside.

Using these figures, Ignacio calculated the optimalmixed-strategy choices for eachplayer.Tomaximizethechanceofscoring,animaginarypenalty-takerwouldhavetohit61.5percentofhiskickstohisnaturalsideand38.5percenttotheotherside.Inreality,the penalty-takers Ignacio observed got pretty close to this: they hit 60 percent to theirnaturalsideand40percenttheotherway.

Akeeper’sbeststrategy(ifheinsistsondivingratherthanstandingstill)istodivetothekicker’snaturalside58percentofthetimeandtotheotherside42percentofthetime.The actual figures, Ignacio found, were scarily close: 57.7 percent and 42.3 percent.Levitt’steam,usingadifferentdatabaseofpenalties,foundthatkeeperswenttotheright57percentofthetime.So,itlooksasifkeepersaswellaspenalty-takersreallydofollowmixedstrategies.

Butwhatwemostwanttoknowarethechoicesofindividualkickersandgoalkeepers,nottheoverallaverages.Ignaciostudiedtwenty-twokickersandtwentygoalkeepers,eachof whom was involved in more than thirty penalties in his database. Again, Ignaciocalculated thesuccess ratesdependingon theside thekickerandgoalkeeperchose,andcalculated thefrequencies ineachdirection thatwouldmaximize thechancesofsuccessforkickersandkeepers.

Inreallife,theactualfrequenciestheplayersobservedwereindistinguishablefromthebestmixed-strategy choices inmore than 95 percent of cases.We can saywith a highdegreeofconfidence thatpenalty-takersandgoalkeepers reallydousemixedstrategies.Levitt’spaperfoundthesamething:exceptforthebizarrekeeperwhoalwaysdivedleft,almostalltheotherkickersandkeepersplayedmixedstrategies.

FinallyIgnaciotestedthemostimportantquestionofall:Aresoccerplayerscapableofconstructing a truly random sequence in their penalty-taking decisions, as the mixed-strategy theoryrequires?Carefulstatistical testingshowed that indeed theyare. Inotherwords,itisimpossibletopredictwhichwayaregularpenalty-takerwillkickbasedonhishistoryofkicks.Eachtimehechooseshiscornerwithoutanyreferencetowhathedidthelasttime.

Randomizationofpenalties isacompletely logical theory thatagainstallodds turnsouttobetrueinpractice.Aslongasthepenalty-takerisapro,ratherthansometerrifiedSouthgateian innocent roped in for a job that he doesn’t understand, simple lists likeLehmann’sarenotmuchuse.

All this shows the extraordinary amount of subconscious thought that goes intoplaying top-level soccer. Previous studies in game theory had shown that people couldconstruct random sequences if the problemwas first explained to them in some detail.Nobodyissuggestingthatsoccerplayershavesatathomecomingupwithmixed-strategyequilibria.Rather,thebestplayersintuitivelygraspthetruthofthetheoryandareabletoexecuteit.Thatiswhatmakesthemgoodplayers.

Franck Ribéry takes penalties for BayernMunich and France. Needless to say, the

scar-facedlittleplaymakerplaceshiskicksaccordingtoarandomizedmixedstrategy.Butmorethanthat,oneofhisformermanagersexplains,evenonceRibéryhasembarkedonhis jagged hither-and-thither run-up, he himself does not know which corner he willchoose. When the born economist Arsène Wenger was told this, he gushed withadmiration.

AsgoodaplayerasRibéryis,hemightdoevenbetterasagametheorist.

THEECONOMISTINTHEWORLDCUPFINAL

IgnacioPalacios-HuertawatchedtheWorldCupof2010fromhishomeinSpain’sBasquecountry, in between bouts of child care. It baffled him, he told Simon over the phoneduringthetournament,thatheprobablyknewmoreaboutthepenalty-takerstherethandidany team in SouthAfrica. “I have nothing at stake,” he reflected. “They have lots: thewholenation.”

Four years on from2006, some teams did have crib sheetsmore sophisticated thanLehmann’s.Oneteaminthequarterfinalstoldusithadanhour’sfilmofpenaltiestakenbyplayersof thecountry itwasdue to face,plusapenaltydatabase.That’swhy itwassillyofEngland’scoach,FabioCapello,toannouncehisdesignatedpenalty-takersbeforeplayingGermany.Hepotentiallygavetheoppositiontimetostudytheirhabits.

Still, Ignacio reckoned that even the smartest teams in South Africa probably justcountedwhoshothowoftentowhichcorner.“Iwouldbesuper-surprisediftheydoanykindofstatistical test,”hesaid.Hehimselfruns two.Thefirst:Doesaparticularkickerfollow a truly random strategy? If the kicker does randomize, then the direction hechooses for his next kick—right of the keeper, through the middle, or left—cannot bepredictedfromhispreviouskicks.

But Ignaciohaddetectedpatterns in severalof thepenalty-takers at theWorldCup.Argentina’sGonzaloHiguain, for instance, before theWorldCuphad been kicking toooften to the keeper’s right. Germany’s keeper Manuel Neuer had also been failing torandomize: too often in club games, Neuer had dived to the opposite corner from hispreviousdive,goingfirstright,thenleft,thenright,etc.

NextIgnacioteststhekicker’ssuccessratewitheachstrategy.Thekickershouldhaveanequallyhigh scoring ratewhetherhe shoots right,middle,or left.Butgoing into theWorldCupbothArgentina’sSergioAgüeroandGermany’sMiroslavKlosewerescoringmoreoftenwhenshootingrightofthekeeper.ThatwouldlogicallyencouragethemtoaimrightiftheyhadtotakeakickinSouthAfrica.

Only rarely does Ignacio find a kicker with a very skewed strategy, but England’sFrankLampardwassuchaman.ForyearsLampardhadrandomizedhiskicksbeautifully.Butinthe2009–2010season,Ignacionoted,“hekicked13outof15timestotherightofthegoalkeeper—andthetwoleftswereinthesamegamewhenhehadtoretakethesamepenaltythreetimes.”

No wonder Lampard had developed a habit of missing penalties. Keepers werefiguringhimout.Portsmouth’sDavidJames, for instance,hadchosen thecorrectcorner

forLampard’spenaltyforChelseaintheFACupfinalheldamonthbeforetheWorldCup—perhapswith help from Ignacio,who had sent Portsmouth a briefing note before thegame. As it happened, Lampard’s shot went wide. Admittedly Kevin-Prince BoatengmissedhispenaltyforPortsmouthinthematch,butthenhehadignoredIgnacio’sadvicetokickleftofPetrCech.It isprobablyharderforpenalty-takers thanforgoalkeeperstofollowsomeoneelse’sadvice.

On the phone Ignacio told Simon, “I don’t think serious analysis of the data hasarrivedyetinsoccer,butit’scoming.Ithinktheworldwillbeadifferentplaceinadecadeorso.”

Thatphonecall gotSimon thinking.WhenHollandandSpainmade theWorldCupfinal,Simon,alifelongfanoftheDutch,e-mailedanofficialheknewinHolland’scamp.Would the Dutch be interested in a penalty analysis of the Spaniards provided by aspecialist?Theofficialsaidtheywould.AndsoIgnaciobeganpullingall-nighterstodrawupa reportonhis fellowcountrymen ready for July11,2010.Moreon this later in thebook.

9THESECRETOFCLAUDEMAKELELE

How“MatchData”AreChangingtheGameontheFieldEarlyin2011oneofus,Simon,visitedManchesterCity’stranquiltraininggroundinthevillage of Carrington. It was a glorious sunny winter’s morning, and outside the gateshiredhandswerewashingsoccerplayers’SUVsandsportscars.ThedefenderKoloTourécoastedpastinagiantblackcontraptionstraightoutofTheGodfather.Carringtonisusedtocarslikethat:ManchesterUnitedtrainsinthevillage,too.

“AbuDhabiTravellersWelcome,”saidthemessageonthefacadeofCity’ssky-bluetraining center. AbuDhabi’s ruling family ownsManchester City, and one thing it hasdonesincebuyingtheclubin2008ishirealargeteamofdataanalysts.InsidethebuildingwasGavinFleig,City’sheadofperformanceanalysis,apolite,sandy-hairedmaninaneatblackCitysweater.HardlyanyoneoutsideCarringtonhasheardofhim,andyetFleigisaprimemover in English soccer’s data revolution. Largely unseen by public andmedia,dataonplayershavebegundrivingclubs’decisions—particularlydecisionsaboutwhomto buy and sell. At many clubs, obscure statisticians in back rooms are helping shapetransfers.

Fleiggavemethesortofprofessionalpresentationyou’dexpectfroma“quant”inaninvestmentbank.Lately,tohisexcitement,CityhadacquiredstatsoneveryplayerinthePremier League. Imagine, said Fleig, that you were thinking of signing an attackingmidfielder. You wanted someone with a pass completion rate of 80 percent, who hadplayedagoodnumberofgames.Fleigtypedthetwocriteriaintohislaptop.PortraitsofthehandfulofmeninthePremierLeaguewhometthemflasheduponascreen.Acouplewereobvious:CescFabregasandStevenGerrard.Youdidn’tneeddatatoknowtheyweregood.Butbesidethemwasamoresurprisingface:KevinNolan,thenwithNewcastle.Thenumberswouldn’timmediatelyspuryoutosignhim.Buttheymightpromptyoutotakeacloserlook.

Inrecentyears,aftermanyfalsestarts,thenumbercrunchersatbigEnglishclubshavebegun to unearth the stats that matter. For instance, said Fleig, “The top four teamsconsistently have a higher percentageof pass completion in the final thirdof thepitch.SincetherecruitmentofCarlosTevez,DavidSilva,AdamJohnson,andYayaTourétoourteam, in six months, our ability to keep the ball in the final third has grown by 7.7percent.”

That stathadnotnecessarilydriven their recruitment,Fleigcautioned. Indeed, someEnglishclubsleanfarmoreonstatsthanManchesterCitydoes.Mostofthemrarelytalkabout it, though, for fear of sharing their secrets or getting ridiculed for relying onnumbers. Few outsiders know just how far soccer’s data revolution has progressed.“We’vesomewherearound32milliondatapointsover12,000,13,000gamesnow,”saidMike Forde, Chelsea’s then director of football operations, one morning in the empty

standsofStamfordBridgein2011.Socceronthefieldisstartingtobecomeclever.

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CharlesReep, awing commander inBritain’sRoyalAir Force,made possibly the firstrecordedattempttologmatchdataatasoccergame.Reephadbecomeinterestedinthetopic in the 1930s, recounts Jonathan Wilson in Inverting the Pyramid. He begancollectingstatsduringthesecondhalfofaSwindonTowngamein1950.Inthatonehalf,he recorded 147 attacks by Swindon. Extrapolating from this small sample, Reepcalculatedthat99.29percentofattacksinsoccerfailed.

Hekeptloggingmatches,andovertimehedevelopedatheory—basedonextremelyshakynumbers—thattoomuchpassingwasariskywasteoftime.Mostgoalscamefromveryshortmoves,hesaid.Thewaytowin,heconcluded,waslongballsforward.

ReepadvisedthestrongWolvesteamofthe1950s,andintheearly1980sinfluencedGrahamTaylor, the futureEnglandmanager, andCharlesHughes, theEnglish FootballAssociation’s future director of education and coaching. Using his dodgy stats, Reepencouragedbothmentodevelopthelong-ballthinkingthatwouldeventuallyculminateinEngland’sfailuretoqualifyfortheWorldCupof1994.

Reep’scrudemodelsprobablydidmoretodiscredittheprojectofmatchdatathantofurtherit.However,oneofhisassociatesdidputdatatogooduseinthelowerreachesofEnglishsoccer.NeilLanham,atidymustachedauctioneer,hadgottentoknowReepintheSuffolk villagewhere bothmen lived. In the 1960s Lanham began logging games, butwith rathermore rigor than thewingcommander.“The findings that I talkof,”Lanhamwrote in a paper for Soccer Journal in 2008, “are based on hand-recording everypossessionforeveryteaminmorethan4,000games….Whenyousit inthestandsandwritedowneverypossessionbyhand,youseeandvirtuallykickeveryball.”

His methods led him to some startlingly exact findings. For instance, Lanhamreckonedthatteamsscoredonaverageonceevery180possessions,afigurethathesaidwas “near constant” for any division of English soccer and for the World Cup. Thisfinding,headded,wasbasedon“328,018hand-notedpossessions.”

LanhamcametothesameconclusionasReep:thesecretofsoccerwasputtingtheballnear theother team’sgoal fast. “Two thirdsofgoalscome frompossessionswon in thefinal thirdof thefield,”helectured.Thegreatsin, tohim,waslosingtheballnearyourowngoal.

Sometime in the 1980sLanhamwrote to clubs offering his analysis.Many ignoredhim, but Wimbledon’s manager, Dave Bassett, replied at once. Advised by Lanham,Wimbledonwon two promotions. Generally, long-ball soccer seemed to work better atlower levels than it would in the early 1990s for Taylor’s England. Lanham, billinghimselfwiththestartlingtwenty-first-centurytitle“soccerperformanceanalyst,”wentontoadviseSheffieldUnited,CrystalPalace,andCambridgeUnitedastheyusedlong-balltactics toclimb thedivisions.“Eightpromotions,” read thestatonLanham’s letterhead.Healsodid“variousworksforinternationalmanagers,”hetoldusinaletterin2011.

ThoughLanhamwasdeterminedlyartisanal, in1985hebeganfeedinghisshorthandcodes into what he called “a database computer system.” Computers were about torevolutionizematchdata.Inthelate1980s,theyoungFrenchmanagerofMonaco,ArsèneWenger, a keen mathematician, began using a computer program called Top Score,developedbyafriend,whichgavemarksforeveryactperformedduringagame.“Mostplayerswhohadveryhighscoreswentontohavesuccessfulcareers,”Wengersaidlater.

Alesslikelypioneerofmatchdatawasthelate,greatvodkasoddenUkrainianmanagerValeri Lobanovsky. When Simon visited Kiev in 1992, Lobanovsky’s pet scientist,professorAnatolyZelentsov, had him play the computer games thatDynamoKiev haddevelopedtotestplayers.WhenLobanovskysaidthingslike,“Ateamthatcommitserrorsin no more than 15 to 18 percent of its actions is unbeatable,” he wasn’t guessing.Zelentsov’steamhadrunthenumbers.

Meanwhile up in Norway, one of Reep’s disciples was making great strides. TheMarxistEgilOlsenandWingCommanderReephadbecomeunlikelyallies.Theysharedalove of stats thatwent far beyond soccer.Olsen knows (andwill sometimes name) thehighestmountainofeverycountryintheworld.AsmanagerofNorway,heusedtogatherhisplayersbeforegamestoshowthemtheirlatestindividualstatsonabigscreen.ItgottothepointthatwhenthemidfielderLarsBohinenmis-hitapassattheWorldCupof1994,he’dinstantlythink,“Ohno—I’vegotan‘M’”—Olsen’scodeforamisplacedpass.Still,themethods seemed towork. Norway briefly rose to second place in FIFA’s rankings.WhenOlsenbecameWimbledon’smanagerin1999,theninety-five-year-oldReep—stillbillinghimselfas“wingcommander”—offeredhisservicesasananalyst,writesWilson.But Olsen, Wenger, and Lobanovsky were years ahead of their time. The broaderbreakthrough for statscame in1996,whenOptaConsulting inLondonbegan tocollectmatchdatafortheEnglishPremierLeague.Themanagementconsultancy’smainaimwasto build its own brand by creating soccer rankings. The Premier League’s sponsor,Carling,paid for the so-calledOpta Index.Clubs andmediagot thedata for free.Eachclub received an Excel report with some basic statistics. By today’s standards, it wasprimitive.Butinsoccerthen,itwasrevolutionary.

Withinjustafewyears,thegamemovedfromapaucityofdatatoastateoftoomuchinformation.PrettysoonOptaanditsrivalsweresendingoutthousandsofnewdatapointseachweek.Clubslearnedfactstheyhadnevercontemplatedbefore:howmanykilometerseachplayerranpermatch,andhowmanytacklesandpasseshemade.

Collectingthesenumberstook—andstilltakes—meticulouswork.Mostpeopleknowtheimpactofcomputersonourlives,buttheworkofthegruntsisoftenforgotten.Theyare like the farm laborers of the preindustrial age who were required to bring in theharvest.Opta’stenth-floorofficesnexttoLondon’sWaterloostationprovideaspectacularviewofthecity,butthedozensof“analysts”barelynotice.

SimonvisitedOpta’sofficesthedayafterManchesterCitywon1–6atOldTraffordinOctober2011.Twoyoungmenweresittingsidebyside,eachinfrontofacomputer,bothwatching thesame images fromthegameonascreen.One loggedallofCity’sactions,andtheotherallofManchesterUnited’s.Twootherpeoplehadloggedthegamelivethe

daybefore,withathirdpersonwatchingforqualitycontrol,butOptalikestorepeattheprocessthenextday“withadifferentsetofeyes,”saidJohnCoulson,headofprofessionalsoccerservicesatthecompany.“We’recollecting2,000eventsagameliveasithappens,witheveryeventloggedwithatimecodeandapitchcoordinate,soyouhavetokeepupwithit,”heexplained.

Opta’sanalysts type in theminutiaeofevery televisedgame theycanfind, fromthePremier League to theMLS or theMontenegrin league.Most of the analysts work inLondon,butotherssit inregionalofficesfromjustoutsideVenice toNewYork.All theoneswe sawweremen, generally in their twenties, kitted out in regulation grunge andlookingwan.Mostwerecollegegraduateswhohadn’tbeenabletoresistthetemptationofearningpitifulamountsofmoneytowatchsoccer.“Wetakeononepersonofthetwentyorthirtywhoapplyfor thesejobs,”saidCoulson.Notthat theanalystscanreallywatchthegames,astheysitthereloggingeverysingleeventinendlessdetail(longpass,weighton the ball, origin of the ball, where the ball lands). In all, Opta now collects severalhundredcategoriesofdata.Doingtheanalysislookslikeaharderjobthanplayingsoccer.Mostofthegruntsareburnedoutafteracoupleofyears,butthenthereareplentymorepeoplewillingtogiveitago.

Gradually managers started to look at the stats being pumped out by the datacompanies.In2001AlexFergusonofManchesterUnitedsuddenlysoldhisdefenderJaapStam to Lazio Roma. The move surprised everyone. Some thought Ferguson waspunishingtheDutchmanforasillyautobiographyhehadjustpublished.Intruth,althoughFergusondidn’tsay thispublicly, thesalewaspromptedpartlybymatchdata.Studyingthe numbers, Ferguson had spotted that Stam was tackling less often than before. Hepresumed the defender, then twenty-nine, was declining. So he sold him. It was amilestoneinsoccer’shistory:amajortransferdrivenlargelybystats.

AsFergusonlateradmitted,itwasalsoamistake.Likemanysoccermenintheearlydaysofmatchdata,theScothadstudiedthewrongnumbers.Stamwasn’tindeclineatall:hewouldgoontohaveseveralexcellentyearsinItaly.NateSilverpointsoutinhisbookTheSignalandtheNoisethatasmoredatabecomesavailable,webecomemorelikelytouse them tomakemistakendecisions.Often, themassesofdata seem to formapatternthat just isn’t there. That’s why you often see false positives for breast cancer inmammograms,orfalseassessmentsofsoccerplayers.

Despite thedangers,Ferguson’s rivalWengerembraced thenewmatchdata.Hehassaidthatthemorningafterthegamehe’slikeajunkiewhoneedshisfix:hereachesforthe spreadsheets. “Wenger always used to love the averages, the trends,” Opta’s chiefexecutive, Aidan Cooney, told us. Dennis Bergkamp, in his book Stillness and Speed,describeshowWenger“usedstatisticsonme”duringtheDutchman’sdecliningyearsasaplayeratArsenal.Theirconversationswouldgosomethinglikethis:

BERGKAMP:WhereinyourstatisticsdoesitsaythatIchangedthegamewithakillerpass?

WENGER: You run less in the last thirty minutes and you’re more at risk ofgettinginjured,andyourpaceisdropping.

FewwouldsuspectitofWestHam’smanager,“BigSam”Allardyce,buthissomewhatNeolithicappearancealsoconcealsaprofessorialmind.AsaplayerAllardycespentayearwithTampaBay,wherehegrew fascinatedwith thewayAmerican sports used scienceanddata.In1999hebecamemanageroflittleBolton.Unabletoaffordthebestplayers,hehired good statisticians instead. The analysts fixed upon one particular number thatenchantedAllardyce. “The average game, the ball changes hands four hundred times,”recitedChelsea’sForde,whogothisstart insoccerunderAllardyce.BigSamloved thefigure and would drum it into his players. To him, it summed up the importance ofswitchinginstantlytodefensivepositionsthemomenttheballwaslost.

Moreconcretely,statsledAllardycetoasourceofcheapgoals:corners,throw-ins,andfreekicks.Fleig,anotherAllardycealumnus,recalledthatBoltonusedtoscore45to50percentoftheirgoalsfromsuch“setpieces,”comparedwithaleagueaverageofaboutathird. Fleig said, “Wewould be looking at, ‘If a defender cleared the ball from a longthrow,wherewould theball land?Well, this is thearea itmostcommonly lands.Right,well,that’swherewe’llputourman.’”

In 2003 soccer’s data revolution got a new impetuswhenMichaelLewis publishedMoneyball. “I bought twenty copies and sent them out to all the Premier Leaguemanagers,” recalled Cooney. He pauses and chuckles. “Didn’t get one response.”Nonetheless, a few people in English soccer read the book and sat up. They beganthinking about doing “aMoneyball of soccer”: using stats to find newways of valuingplayers.

It so happened that just as soccer executiveswere getting interested inMoneyball’shero,BillyBeane,Beanewasgettinginterestedinsoccer.OnaLondonvacationwithhiswife,he’dencounteredthegameandfallenhardforit.Forde,whohadstudiedinBeane’shometownofSanDiegoandfollowedAmericansports,madethepilgrimagetoOaklandtoquizBeaneabouttheusesofdata.Thatprovedtricky:Beanespentthefirstfewhoursof theconversationquizzingFordeabout soccer. “In the lasthalf anhour Imanaged toturnitaroundtotalkabouthisroleinbaseball,”Fordetoldus,laughing.

Earlyin2011SimonvisitedBeaneintheOaklandColiseum.Wespokeinwhatlookedlikethejunkroombutinfactistheclubhouse.BeanecanoftenbefoundsprawledonadilapidatedsofaherewatchingEuropeansoccermatcheswhileskepticalbaseballplayerswatchhim.WhenBeanewatchessoccer,heseesagamefullofemotion,andwherethereisemotion,heknowspeoplewillbemakingemotionaldecisions.

Soccerwill followbaseball in turning into “moreof a science,”Beanepredicted. “Ialwayssay,inacasinothere’sareasonguyswhocountcardsgetkickedoutandguyswhobetongutfeeldon’t.”Beaneagreedthatdataprobablywouldn’ttransformsoccerastheyhadbaseball,butthentheydidn’tneedto,hesaid.Ifusingstatisticsinsoccergivesyouanedge,thenallclubswillenduphavingtousestatistics.Heexplained,“Ifsomebody’sright30percentofthetimeusinggutfeel,andyoucanfindawaytoberight35percent,youcreatea5percentarbitrage,andinsports thatcanmakethedifferencebetweenwinningandlosing.”

Beane’s closest friend in soccer was the Frenchman Damien Comolli, a former

assistantofWenger’s.ComollihadlivedinNorthernCaliforniaforayearasa teenager.Hebecameabaseball fan, andanA’s fan, and the ideal readerofMoneyball.WhenhetookoverasdirectorofsocceratTottenhamin2005,hebeganusingdata to informtheclub’sdecisionsontransfers.

The surprise isnot that thishappenedbut that ithappened so late.Londonhas longsincebeentakenoverbyhighlyeducatedprofessionals.Everyotherseriouscompanyintownusesdataandcomputers.ItjusttookLondon’ssoccerclubsawhiletocatchup.

YetComolli’sthreeyearsatSpursencapsulatedmanyoftheearlystrugglesofsoccer’sdatarevolution.Britishsoccerhadalwaysbeensuspiciousofeducatedpeople.Thetypicalmanager was an ex-player who had left school at sixteen and ruled his club like anautocrat. He relied on gut, not numbers. He would have noticed that in many otherindustries,lesser-educatedworking-classmenlikehimhadbeenreplacedbypeoplewithdegrees or by computers.Hewasn’t about to obey a bespectacled Frenchmanwho hadneverplayedprofessionally.

Themanager’s suspicionmight sound perverse: after all, Comolli’s numbersmighthavehelpedtheclubwingames.However,manypeopleinsoccerclubsarelessbotheredaboutwinningthanabouthangingontotheirownjobandpowerbase.

Infact,thetraditionalistsshouldn’thavebeensoworried.Insoccertherewillalwaysbeaplaceforgutalongsidenumbers.FergusConnolly,aperformanceconsultantwhoseclients include PremierLeague soccer andNBA teams, says, “Some coaches are afraidthatdatawilltellthemwhattodo.Itcannevertellthemwhattodo.Itcanneverbeblackand white.” The work of data companies is “supplementary,” agrees Rob Bateman ofOpta.Datacansupportadecisionaboutaplayer,butnotdetermineit.AsSilversays,anexpertneedstousehisjudgmenttointerpretthestats,ratherthanimaginethatthestatsarespeaking an unmistakable truth. No dataset will do away with the need for soccermanagers.

Even so, the traditionalists worried. Comolli at Spurs was always having to fight“nerds versus jocks” battles. In hindsight, he unearthed some excellent players forTottenham: Luka Modric, Dimitar Berbatov, and a seventeen-year-old left-back fromSouthamptonnamedGarethBale.Someofhischoicesdidn’tpayoff:usingdatacanonlyraise your probability of finding the right player, not guarantee success. On balance,Comollididprettywell.However,hewaseventually forcedout.The forcesof traditionweretoostrong.

When it comes to knowledge, the world divides into liberals and conservatives.Conservatives tendtobelievethatwehavereachedthe limitsofwhatwecanknowandthatdelvingfurtherisnotonlyfutilebutimmoral—somethingsarebetterleftunknown.Liberals, on theother hand, tend tobelieve that even ifwedon’t knowhow somethingworks,patientanalysiswilleventuallyreducetheproblemtoamanageablesetofprovenrelationships. Ever since Renaissance scholars began figuring out where a cannonballwouldland,theconservativeshavebeenontheretreat.Somanythingsweoncethoughtwere beyond analysis are nowwell understood, from the aerodynamics of flight to themechanisms of disease. Now neuroscientists are starting to find answers to questions

abouthowweknowwhatwelike,howwefallinlove,andwhatweachieveinlife.Theconservative’sultimate fear is thatonedaywemayknowsomuchaboutwhathappensnextthattherearenochoiceslefttobemade;theuniversewillseemsopredeterminedthatnoonewillbothertogetoutofbed.

Insoccer theconservatives foughtback.Therewasonequestion thenewnerdskepthavingtoanswer.Yes,theconservativeswouldsay,statsmaywellbeusefulinastop-startgamelikebaseball.Thepitcherpitches,thebatterhits,andthateventprovidesoodlesofcleardatafornerdstocrunch.Butsurelysocceristoofluidagametomeasure?

Forde responded, “Well, I think it’s a really genuine question. It’s one that we askourselvesallthetime.”However,thenerdscananswerit.Forastart,goodmathematicianscanhandlecomplexsystems.AtChelsea,forinstance,Fordeemployedastatisticianwhohad a past in insurance modeling. Soccer—a game of twenty-two people played on alimitedfieldwithsetrules—isnotofunparalleledcomplexity.

Second,inrecentyearsthefluidgameofbasketballhasfoundexcellentusesfordata.Beanesaid,“Ifitcanbedonethere,itcanbedoneonthesoccerfield.”Andthird,athirdofallgoalsinsoccerdon’tcomefromfluidsituationsatall.Theycomefromcorners,freekicks, penalties, and throw-ins—stop-start set pieces that you can analyzemuch like apitchinbaseball.

Thenerds could point to somanyobvious irrationalities in soccer, especially in thetransfer market, so many areas where smart clubs could clean up. For instance,goalkeepershave longer careers than forwards, yet earn less and commandmuch lowertransfer fees. Clubs often sign large players but actually tend to use the smaller ones,having belatedly realized that they have overvalued size. And few clubs have askedthemselves even basic questions, such as whether they earn more points when certainplayersareonthefield.

Giventhatyoucanhireperhapsthirtystatisticiansfortheapproximately£1.5million($2.5million)thattheaverageplayerinthePremierLeagueearns,you’dthinkitmightbeworthpayingsomenerdstostudythesequestions.Yetsoccer’sdistrustofnumbershasnotentirely faded.“Lettingevena top-level statistician loosewithamore traditionalsoccermanagerisnotreallytherightcombination,”saidForde.

Giventheprevailingsuspicion,theclubsthathaveledthedatarevolutionaretypicallytheoneswhere themanagerhimself has trustednumbers.By the early2000sWenger’sArsenalandAllardyce’sthenclubBoltonwerevaluingplayersinmuchthewayfinancialinvestors value cattle futures. TakeBolton’s purchase of the thirty-four-year-old centralmidfielderGarySpeedin2004.Onpaper,Speedlookedtooold.ButBolton,saidFleig,“wasabletolookathisphysicaldata,tocompareitagainstyoungplayersinhispositionatthetimewhowereatthetopofthegame,theStevenGerrards,theFrankLampards.Forathirty-four-year-oldtobeconsistentlyhavingthesamelevelsofphysicaloutputasthoseplayers,andshowingnodeclineovertheprevioustwoseasons,wasacontributingfactortosay:‘Youknowwhat,thisisn’tgoingtobeahugeconcern.’”SpeedplayedforBoltontillhewasthirty-eight(and,tragically,committedsuicideatforty-two).

JustwhenBoltonwasbuyingSpeed,Wengerwassearching foranheir toArsenal’sall-action midfielder Patrick Vieira. As Christoph Biermann recounts in his bookDieFussball-Matrix,Wengerwantedaplayerwhocouldcoverlotsofground.Hescannedthedata from different European leagues, and spotted an unknown teenager at OlympiqueMarseillenamedMathieuFlaminiwhowasrunning14kilometersagame.Alone,thatstatwasn’tenough.DidFlaminirunintherightdirection?Couldheplaysoccer?Wengerwentto look, established that he could, and signed him for peanuts. Flamini prospered atArsenal, and after a fewyearswithMilan is nowback thereprospering again.Wenger,saidBeane,“isundoubtedlythesportsexecutiveIadmiremost.”

Conversely, the clubs that stuckwith “gut” rather than numbers began to suffer. In2003,RealMadridsoldClaudeMakeleletoChelseafor$27million.Itseemedabigfeeforanunobtrusivethirty-year-olddefensivemidfielder.“WewillnotmissMakelele,”saidMadrid’s president Florentino Pérez. “His technique is average, he lacks the speed andskill to take the ball past opponents, and 90 percent of his distribution either goesbackwardsorsideways.Hewasn’taheaderoftheballandherarelypassedtheballmorethanthreemetres.YoungerplayerswillcauseMakeleletobeforgotten.”

Pérez’s critique wasn’t totally wrong, and yet Madrid had made a terrible error.Makelele would have five excellent years at Chelsea. There’s now even a position insoccernamedafterhim:the“Makelelerole.”IfonlyMadridhadstudiedthenumbers,itmighthavespottedwhatmadehimunique.Fordeexplained:“Mostplayersareveryactivewhenthey’reaimedtowardstheopposition’sgoal,intermsofhigh-intensityactivity.Veryfewplayersareverystronggoingtheotherway.IfyoulookatClaude,84percentofthetimehedidhigh-intensitywork,itwaswhentheoppositionhadtheball,whichwastwiceasmuchasanyoneelseontheteam.”

Ifyouwatchedthegame,youcouldmissMakelele.Ifyoulookedatthedata,therehewas.Similarly, ifyoulookedatManchesterCity’sYayaTouré,withhislanguidrunningstyle,youmightthinkhewasslow.Ifyoulookedatthenumbers,you’dseethathewasn’t.Beanesaid,“Whatstatsallowyoutodoisnot take thingsat facevalue.Theidea thatItrustmyeyesmorethanthestats,Idon’tbuythatbecauseI’veseenmagicianspullrabbitsoutofhatsandIjustknowthatrabbit’snotinthere.”

Yetbythemid-2000s,thenumbersmeninsoccerwerebecominguneasilyawarethatmanyofthestatstheyhadbeentrustingforyearswereuseless.Inanyindustry,peopleusethe data they have. The data companies had initially calculated passes, tackles, andkilometersperplayer,andsotheclubshadusedthesenumberstojudgeplayers.However,itwasbecomingclearthattheserawstats—whichstillsometimesgetbeameduponTVduringgames—meanlittle.

Forderememberedtheearlyhuntformeaninginthedataonkilometers.“Canwefindacorrelationbetweentotaldistancecoveredandwinning?Andtheanswerwasinvariablyno.” You might know how many passes a player had given, but that didn’t tell youwhethertheyweresplittingthrough-ballsorsidewaysshovesintoateammate’sfeet.

Tacklesseemedapoorindicatortoo.TherewastheawkwardcaseofthegreatItaliandefender PaoloMaldini. “Hemade one tackle every two games,” Forde noted ruefully.

Maldinipositionedhimselfsowellthathedidn’tneedtotackle.Thatratherarguedagainstjudgingdefendersontheirnumberoftackles,thewayFergusonhadwhenhesoldStam.Fleigsaid,“Tacklestomeareameasureofbeingunderpressure.”

Forde reflected, “I sat inmanymeetings atBolton, and I look back now and think‘Wow, we hammered the team over something that now we think is not relevant.’”Looking back at the early years of data, Fleig concluded, “We should be looking atsomethingfarmoreimportant.”

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That is starting to happen now.Almost unseen by fans, somebig clubs have arrived atstatistical insights that are incrementally changing the game.Especially inEngland andGermany,whereclubshavetendedtolookmoreatmatchdatathaninSpainorItaly,the“quants”areisolatingthenumbersthatmatter.“Alotofthatisproprietary,”Fordetoldus.“Theclubhasbeenverysupportiveofthisparticularspace,sowewanttokeepsomeofitback.”Butthequantswilldiscusscertainfindingsthatarebecomingcommonknowledgeinsoccer.Forinstance,ratherthanlookingatkilometerscovered,clubsnowprefertolookatdistances runat topspeed.“There isacorrelationbetween thenumberofsprintsandwinning,”DanieleTognaccini,ACMilan’schiefathleticscoach,toldusin2008.

That’s why Fleig cares about “a player’s high-intensity output.” Different datacompaniesmeasuredthisqualitydifferently,hesaid,“butultimatelyit’saplayer’sabilityto reach a speed threshold of sevenmeters per second.” If you valued this quality, youprobably would never have made the mistake Juventus did in 1999 of selling ThierryHenrytoArsenal.“ForHenrytoreachsevenmeterspersecond,it’sarelativecoast,”saidFleigadmiringly.TheFrenchmangottherealmostwheneverheran.

Equallycrucial is theability tomakerepeatedsprints.Tevez,ManchesterCity’sstarplayer until he fell outwith the club,was a bit like awindup doll: he’d sprint, brieflycollapse,thenverysoonafterwardbesprintingagain.Fleigsaid,“Ifwewanttopressfromthefront,thenwecanlookatCarlos’sphysicaloutputandknowthathe’scapableofdoingthat for ninety minutes plus.” Fleig didn’t mention it, but the data show that Tevez’ssuccessor, SergioAgüero, doesmuch less defensive running. Thewhole team needs toworkhardertoallowAgüerotoscorehisgoals.

Thequantshavealsogottenbetteratvaluinggoalkeepers.Theyusedtorankkeepersbywhatpercentageof shotseachone stopped.However, that technique tended to favorkeepers from big clubs, who play behind tight defenses and therefore see a higherproportionofeasyshotsfromoutsidethepenaltyarea.Onceclubsstartedcountingonlyshotsfrominsidethearea,therankingsbecamemoretelling.

By now statisticians have developed endlessmetrics for judging keepers. ColumbiaUniversityinNewYorkdidasophisticatedanalysisofthePremierLeague’skeepersforthe2009–2010season.Inthetenth-floorofficeatWaterloo,theOptamenflashedituponascreen forus.Columbiahadworkedouthowmanyshotseachgoalkeeper faced fromdifferentpartsofthefield,measuredthestrengthofthoseshots,clockedwhatproportioneach keeper stopped, and ended up with a surprising number one: Craig Gordon of

ScotlandandSunderland.Gordonwasconsistentlyaboveaverageinallareas,whereasallthe other keepers seemed to have at least one significantlyweaker spot. Second in therankingswasLiverpool’sJoseReina,andthirdwasHeurelhoGomesofSpurs(anotherofComolli’ssignings,laterbanishedbytheclubintoouterdarkness).Oureyesflitteddownthelist,throughgreatkeepersfromallovertheworld,untilwereachedthebottomfourinthe rankings:David James, PaulRobinson,RobertGreen, andChrisKirkland.All fourwererecentEnglandgoalkeepers.Itshouldbenotedthatthiswasonlyoneseasonofdata,butEnglish soccerprobablyneeds to rethinkhow itdevelopsgoalkeepers; even theUSseemstodoamuchbetterjob.

Of course, not all clubs care about the same stats. Somemanagers request custom-madenumbers from thedata companies: howmanyplayers each team stationsby eachpostatcornerkicks,forinstance.Favoredstatsdifferpercountry,too.Italianclubs,saidCooneyofOpta,don’tusetheconcept“tackle.”Germanclubslovewhattheycall“duels”between players. They even track duels when there is no ball nearby. And the dataprovidershavemade it evereasier forclubs touse the stats.For instance,youcannowcrunch data in umpteen categories to identify the right-back in the German secondBundesliga who best meets your specifications, and then click on a button and watchvideo of every through-ball he has hit in the pastmonth.Or, if you are Liverpool andlookingforthenextGerrard,youcanaskthecomputertofindthemidfieldersinEuropeunderagetwenty-threewhoseattributesmostcloselyresemblehis.

Bitbybit,thedatarevolutioninsoccerprogresses.Partlybecausenumbercrunchingsucceededinbaseball(theNewYorkYankeesrecentlyhiredtwenty-onestatisticians)andis now sweeping almost all ballgames, it has arrived in European soccer larded withprestige.And it keeps gettingmore useful. Just as clubs have learned to isolate sprintsfromother running, theyhave learned to isolate tellingpasses frommeaningless squareballs.On the screen inCarrington,Fleig flashedup a list ofManchesterCity’splayers,ranked by howmany chances each had created.One name stood out:David Silva hadpassed fora thirdmoregoal-scoringopportunities (irrespectiveofwhether thegoalwasactuallyscored)thananyofhisteammates.

THEMONEYBALLOFSOCCER:ATALEOFONECITYANDTWOCLUBS

Themosttellingstatisticsintheworldaren’tmuchuseifyouignorethem.Atmanyclubs,the “data analyst” is still just a guywho has branched out frommaking videos. Theseclubsfindthefloodofdatathatarriveseachweekoverwhelming.Theyaredrowningininformation.OptahasvideoofsomegamesfromLiechtenstein,Lesotho,andNicaragua.Whohastimetowatchthat?Andevenwhenaclub’sdataanalystsdocomeupwithaninsight, themanager is liable to ignore them.Knowledge is no use if people in powerwon’tuseit.

ManchesterUnitedunderFergusonwasanexampleofaclubwithonlylimiteduseforstatistics. Ferguson did employ a large data department, but then he was alwaysvacuumingupinformationfromallsources:fromex-managershespoketoonthephonealldayaswellasfrommathematicsgraduates.Andhecouldn’tdowhatWengerdoesandcrunch numbers himself. “If you showed him a laptop,” growled an employee of

Ferguson’s,“he’dthinkitwasaplacemat.”

It’s worse at some other clubs, where analysts get locked in computer-filled backroomsandnevermeetthemanager.Akeyquestioninanycompanyis,“Whocontrolsthebudget?” In English soccer, typically the manager does. The quants advise, but theyalmostnevermakethefinaldecisiononwhogetsboughtorsold.CoulsonofOptathoughtin 2011 that data played a big role in recruitment at only “four or five teams” in thePremierLeague.AswedescribedinChapter2,notallclubshaveentirelyperfectedtheirtransferpolicies.

Lately,however,onecityappearstohavetakenovertheleadinEnglishsoccer’sdatarevolution.InOctober2010BostonRedSoxownerJohnHenryboughtLiverpool.Henry,whomadehismoneytradingcommodities,believesinnumbers.In2002hehadtriedtobringBillyBeane toBoston, and subsequentlywon twoWorldSeries usingMoneyballmethods.Hewantedtodo“aMoneyballofsoccer”atAnfield.Theonlyproblemwasthatheknewnothingaboutsoccer.HecalledBeanetoaskforadvice.BeanetoldhimtohireComolli.TheFrenchmanwasmadeLiverpool’sdirectorofsoccer.Often,duringhistimeatAnfield, he’d exchange ideaswith the father ofMoneyball 5,000miles away.Beanetoldus,“Youcancallhimanytime.I’lle-mailhimanditwillbetwointhemorningthereandhe’llbeup,andhe’lle-mailmeandsay,‘Hey,I’mwatchingtheA’sgame,’becausehewatchesalotofA’sgamesonthecomputer.Theguyneversleeps.”

Comollibecametheposterboyforthe“Moneyballofsoccer.”WhenhewassackedinApril 2012, the experiment accordingly appeared discredited.His experience atAnfieldtarnishedtheimageofstatsinsoccer.Butitwouldbewrongtowriteoffthewholeprojectbased on his case alone.While Comolli was floundering at Anfield, just across town,almost unnoticed, Liverpool’s rivals Everton were doing very well playingMoneyball.The story of Liverpool and Everton illustrates both the scope and the shortcomings ofMoneyballinsoccer.

AtLiverpool,Comollihadthepowertousedatatoshapeclubpolicy.InJanuary2011heboughtAndyCarrollandLuisSuarezforacombined$93million,andsoldFernandoTorrestoChelseafor$80million.“Whenyoufindyourselfhandlingthreeofthebiggesttransfers inEnglish football history in the last daysof themarket,”Comolli said at thetime,“precisefiguresallowyounottodothatblind.”Hedidn’tsaymuchmorethanthat,butbeforesellingTorres,heundoubtedlywouldhavetrackedtheplayer’srateofdecline.Witholderplayers—andat twenty-sixapacystriker isgettingold—thekeyquestionis,“How fast is he fading?”You canmeasure that by comparing the player’s key outputsfromyear toyear. If, for instance, his top sprintingpace, numberof shotsongoal, andnumberofcompletedpasses in the final thirdaregraduallydeclining,youcanprobablyseehisfuture.(ComollipresumablyknewthatStevenGerrard’snumberofshotsontarget—akeystat—hadbeenfallingsincehewastwenty-six.AcannyunsentimentalLiverpoolmighthavesoldGerrardattwenty-eight,beforeothersnoticedhisdecline.)

Gettingastatistical takeonSuarezwasharder.Theforwardhadneverplayed in thePremierLeague.Whatformuladoyouusetotranslategoals,shots,orassistsintheeasyDutchleagueintotheirequivalentsintougherEngland?Luckily,Suarez’sDutchnumbers

spokeloudly.BeanetoldusafewdaysafterSuarezmoved:“Hewassodominant therethat even though hewas jumping into a bigger league, I think they felt like theyweregoingtohaveatleastacertaincaliberofplayernomatterwhat.”Onedaytherewillbesomanyyearsof statistical analysisonplayers fromeverybig foreign league thatEnglishclubswillbemuchbetterabletopredicthowwellanewcomerfrom,say, theMLSwillmakethejump.

Inthesummerof2011,numbersguidedComolliagain.FewfollowersofsoccerhadidentifiedStewartDowningasagreattalent,butthedatashowedthathewasoneofthemost prolific dribblers and creators of chances in the Premier League. According torankings produced by Opta with the CIES Football Observatory in Switzerland, themidfielderwasresponsiblefor17percentofAstonVilla’s“overallclubproduction”inthe2010–2011season,agreatersharethananyotherplayeratanyotherclubinthePremierLeague.Comolli bought him and JordanHenderson,who, age just twenty,was alreadySunderland’s link man, responsible for 13.6 percent of the team’s passing. Together,HendersonandDowningweresupposedtoprovidethecrossesforCarrolltoheadhome.

It didn’tworkout. Just as previousLiverpoolmanagersGérardHoullier andRafaelBenitez had relied on experience and gut feel to make bad transfers (as discussed inChapter2),Comolli’sdata-drivenpurchaseof theCarroll-Henderson-Downing triowenthorriblywrong. It begged the question:CanMoneyball thinkingwork in soccer? EvenJohnHenryhassaidsocceris“toodynamic”toallowstatstoguiderecruitment.

Yet Comolli’s experiences need to be examined more carefully—and then setalongsidewhatEverton’sthenmanagerDavidMoyeswassimultaneouslydoingwithstatsatLiverpool’scrosstownrival.

What theComolli experiment showed is that theMoneyball of soccer is still in itsinfancy.Hehadassembledthebestpossibleplayersforacrossingstrategy.Theproblemisthataswelearnmoreaboutmatchdata,wearelearningthatcrossesfromopenplayareapoorwaytoscoregoals.Muchofthebestworkonmatchdataisdonenotinsoccerclubsbutbyamateursonthesofa.Manyoftheseamateurshavedayjobsinstatistics—workingininsurance,doingmathPhDs,andthelike.Oneexcellentbloggerwhoidentifieshimselfmerely as “a Liverpool-supporting atmospheric scientistwho spends far toomuch timelookingatnumbers” analyzedLiverpool’splay in the2011–2012 season.He found thatLiverpoolhadhitmorecrossesthananyotherteaminthePremierLeague.However,hewrote:“Theirconversionfromcrosseswassimplyatrocious.Theyrequiredastaggering421open-playcrossestoscoreasinglegoalinopen-playonaveragelastseason.Thiswastheworstrateinthewholeleague.”

Itturnsoutthatcrossingisnotthewaytovictory.Comollihadbetthecompanyonabadstrategy.Acrossfromafreekickmakessense,becausetheplayerhittingithastimeandspacetoachieveprecision.Buttosendamansprintingdownthewingwithadefenderinhisface,andthencountonhiscrossbeingnoddedin,isusuallyhopeless.

Anotherproblem for soccer’sMoneyballershas todowith thegame theory thatwediscussedinthelastchapter.It’sonethingtoplanastrategy—forinstance,ofheadingincrosses—and to show statistically that this strategy has produced goals in the past. It’s

quiteanothertodeclarethatthisstrategywillkeepworkinginthefuture.Onceyouhavesignedagoodcrosserandatallstriker,itisperfectlyobvioustoyouropponentswhatyouaregoingtodoandthereforehowtheyshouldsetaboutdefendingagainstyourstrategy.Insomeextremecases(MessiandCristianoRonaldospringtomind),defendingmaybeimpossibleevenifyouknowwhatyouropponentsareplanning,butgenerallythisisnotthecase.Telegraphingyourstrategymaybethebiggestpitfallwhenitcomestousingbigdatainsoccer.

At least the Liverpool experiment taught usmore aboutwhich datamatter: crossesrarelywork.Thatknowledgeisprogressofsorts.It’salsowrongtodismissComolliasafailure:this,afterall,isthemanwhorecruitedBaleandSuareztothePremierLeague,andsoldthedecliningTorresforthelargestfeeeverpaidbyanEnglishclub.Inpart,Comolligot scapegoated because he’s exactly the type of person media, fans, and ex-players–turned pundits are quick to scapegoat: a bespectacled Frenchman who never playedprofessionallyandisn’tveryeasygoingorclubbable.Hishabitofclaimingcreditforgooddecisionscanalsobitehiminthelegwhenthere’sabaddecisionlookingforanowner.

But there’s more toMoneyball in soccer than Comolli. Everton is the smaller andpoorerofLiverpool’stwoclubs,yetinboth2012and2013,itfinishedtheseasonaboveLiverpoolinthetable.Inpartatleast,thiswasthankstodataanalysis.OnedayinMarch2013, Simon visited the club’s training ground at Finch Farm, on the city’s semi-ruraloutskirts.ItwasaMondaymorning,twodaysafterEvertonhadbeatenManchesterCity,possibly theworld’s richestclub,yet thereweren’thordesof fanswaitingoutsideFinchFarm.Infacttherewasnobodywaitingthereatall.

Inthediningroomafewplayersinshortswereeatinglunch.AttheotherendoftheroomwasatablewithfourmembersofmanagerDavidMoyes’ssupportstaff.Oneofthemen,DavidWeir,aquietScotsmaninacardigan,hadplayedforEvertonforyearsbeforebecoming a coach there; but the other three were unknown outside Finch Farm. SteveBrown, James Smith, and Dan Hargreaves, in their blue elephant-adorned training kit,were Everton’s unheralded assets, who earn dozens of times less than the players theyworkwith.YetMoyesobviouslytookthemseriously.SmithandBrown,theclub’smainperformanceanalysts,weren’thiddenawayinsomebackroomwherenobodycouldhearthemscream.TheirofficeswereonthecorridordirectlyoppositeMoyes’s.

OftenMoyeswouldmarch into their rooms firing out questions:How efficientwasnextSaturday’sopponentatscoringfromcrosses,orthrow-ins?Whattypesofpassesdidtheirmidfieldersmake?WhenEverton facedGarethBale at Tottenham,Moyeswanted“anassessmentofwhereBaleisactuallypickinguptheballcomparedtotheareaswhereyouthinkheisworking,”saidBrown.Smithadded:“He[Moyes]isquitedemandingintermsofdata.Intermsofmanagers,heisprobablyasintoitasany.”(Ameasureofthestaff’s awe forMoyes is that they rarely referred to him by name—what to call him?“Moyes”?“Mr.Moyes”?“David”?)

Moyeshadnoparticularideologyofhowhewantedtoplaysoccer.InsteadhetailoredEverton’sstyle toeachnewopponent.Heworkedoutwhat theoppositiondid,and thentriedtostopit.BeforefacingManchesterCity,forinstance,hefoundthepositionswhere

City’splaymakerSilvausuallyreceivedtheball,andputmenthere(this, incidentally, isexcellentgametheory).

TheinsightsthatMoyesandhisstaffgleanedfromvideoandstatisticswereconstantlytransmittedtoEverton’splayers.Brownsaid,“Thereisapost-matchdatasheetthatgoesupinthechangingroom.SomeplayerswillactuallysitdownandlookattheProzonedatawithus;theywilllookatpass-mapsandtheir‘receivepositions,’theircrossingdata.Wehaveonecentralmidfielderwhocomesineveryweekandlooksathispasscompletion.”The analysts cautioned that you always need to understand the context of any piece ofdata. For instance,whatwas a player’s role in a particular game?Whowas he playingalongside?Matchdatawithoutcontextismeaningless.

Weren’t someplayers skepticalofnumbers? “There is abit of that,” agreedBrown.But mostly, the analysts said, Everton’s players appreciated the help. Many playersconsidered stats (about themselves and aboutopponents) a survival tool that couldhelpkeep them afloat a little longer in the lucrative higher reaches of soccer. Smith said,“GoingouttoplayinthePremierLeagueisadauntingthing.TheywantDavidMoyestotellthemwhattodo.That’sreassuring.Oneplayeroncesaidtome,‘Theymightcomplainabout a meeting, but if it wasn’t there they would be the first to say, ‘Where is themeeting?’”

Thestaffersnotedthatmostfansandmediaseemunawareofalltheanalysisthatwentintopreparinggames.Often,inpubsandTVstudios,agameisdiscussedasifitwereamix of bursts of inspiration, individual blunders, and amanager’smotivational powers.Hargreaves said, “What thepublic sees isn’tnecessarilywhat’shappening.The levelofex-player punditry doesn’t lend itself to what’s happening behind the scenes.” In part,that’sbecausemanagerslikeMoyeswon’trevealtheirtacticalsecrets.Sojournalistsendupwritingabouthowawinningmanager“psychedout”hisopponentwith“mindgames.”

It’snotthatMoyesatEvertonbasedhiseverydecisionondata.Rather,datawasoneofthethingsheconsidered.Itmadesigningaplayer,forinstance,alittlelessofaleapinthedark.“Watchingplayers isactuallyaverysubjectivething,aninexactscience,”saidSmith. “There are all kinds of inputs: live player reports, extensive video analysis,speaking to peoplewho haveworkedwith them, and data is one of those layers.Dataplaysarole—notamassiveroleatthemoment.”

Oneoccasionwhendatadidmatterwasin2008,whenEvertonwastryingtoreplacemidfielderLeeCarsley. Smith said, “We needed someone to replace things that he hadbeen doing: possession regains,winning tackles and headers, protecting the back four.”Theclub’seyefellona twenty-year-oldBelgian,obscurebut forhisenormousmaneofhair,namedMarouaneFellaini.“We’dfollowedhimat the2008Olympicsbuthedidn’thaveagreattournament,andactuallyhegotsentoffquiteearlyon,”Smithrecalled.Therewere fewmatch stats for Fellaini, because at the time there was no data available forBelgianleaguematches.AndsoEvertonwatchedvideosofhimtocompiletheirownsetofstats,usingkeyperformanceindicatorsthatseemedrelevant.Smithsaid,“Fellainiwasoneofthosewhereeverythingsaid,‘Yes,doit’:thedata,thesubjectivereports,theage,thefactthathewasalreadyplayingforBelgium,hissize.”AndsoEvertongambled$28

milliononhim—still theclub’srecordtransferfee.Itpaidoff. InSeptember2013,afterMoyeshadmovedtoManchesterUnited(undoubtedlybringinghisdata-drivenmethodswithhim),heboughtFellainifor$43million.

Everton’sperformance analystswanted to improve their useofdata.Theyhadbeenpickingbrainsinsideandoutsidesoccerfornewinsights.Theywerepainfullyaware,forinstance,thatnooneintheirgrouphadsomuchasamathdegree.Still,soccerclubsmaynowbemoreadvancedthanmostcorporationsinusingdatatorecruitemployees.Inthetypical corporation, very few human-resources staff have college degrees involvingnumbers,saysRobSymes,whomadethedocumentaryfilmOutsideViewonsportsanddata.DanielKahneman,thepsychologistwhowontheNobelPrizeforeconomicsin2002,saysinthefilmthatakeytogooddecision-makingistoletstatistics“nothumansmakethefinaldecision.”Increasingly,thatishappeninginsoccer.

Soccer’s data revolution is only just getting started.Clubs still have great room forimprovement.Forinstance,youstillconstantlyseeplayersshootatgoalfromoutsidethepenalty area.YetOpta’s data show that in the PremierLeague, only 2 percent of shotsfrom just outside the area produce goals. Presumably the players have in their mindsimagesofcrackersflyingintothetopcorner:thesearethebeautifulgoalsthatstickinthememory long after all the balls that disappear into the crowd have been forgotten.Statisticianshavealobbyingjobtodohere.

There’s a particular problem with direct free kicks. Whenever a team gets oneanywherenearthepenaltyarea,theteam’sbiggestnamegenerallygrabstheball,makesagreatshowofplacingit,andthenwhamsitintothecrowd.It’sasuperstar’sperk,ratherlike the film star’s trailerwith his name on it inHollywood. In the 2010–2011 season,writeAndersonandSallyinTheNumbersGame,theaverageteaminthePremierLeaguescoredfromjustoneofevery35direct freekicks.Yeta freekickshouldbe theperfectopportunitytopass.Youropponentshavetoretreatnineyards,andtheyneedtoputtwoorthreepeopleinthewallincaseyoushoot.Thatleavesvastspacestopasstorunnersinthepenaltyarea.Almost inevitably, teamswillstart todo that insteadofshootingfromfreekicks.

SomeonewhohasthoughtharderthanmostaboutwhatshapeaMoneyballofsoccermighttakeisthedirectorofbaseballoperationsattheOaklandA’s.FarhanZaidiisalittleroundMITeconomicsgraduatewithasenseofhumor.He’sthesortofguyyou’dexpecttomeet lateonenight inabar inacollege townafteragig,notataprofessionalsportsclub.Forwork,Zaidicrunchesbaseballstats.ButheandBeanespendmuchoftheirtimearguingabouttheirotherloves:theBritishbandOasisandsoccer.In2006,inthemiddleofthebaseballseason,heandBeanetraveledtotheWorldCupinGermanytogether.“Wespendsomuch time together,”chucklesZaidi, “that if allweever talkedaboutwas thenumbersonthesespreadsheets,wewouldhavekilledeachotheralongtimeago.”

Because Zaidi knowswhere the data revolution in baseball has gone, he canmakepredictions for soccer,which lagsbaseball byperhaps adecade.Soccer’sholygrail, hethinks,isastathecalls“goalprobabilityadded.”Thatstatwouldcapturehowmucheachplayer’sactionsoverhiscareerincreasedthechanceofhisteamscoring,ordecreasedit.

Zaidi explains, “With some of the tools that are being created now to track everythingthat’s happening on the soccer field, I really feel like this is the next frontier: havingenoughdatasothatwheneveraplayeradvancestheballfrompointAtopointBonthefield, you know that play has happened a hundred times before, and you know exactlyhowvaluableitis.Soifaballisingridoneofthefield,youknowthattheteamoverthenextfiveminutesscoresagoal0.5percentofthetime.Nowthatplayeradvancesittogridsix,say.Youknowthattheteamfromtherescoresagoalinthenextfiveminuteswithaprobabilityof2percent.He’sraisedtheprobabilityofscoringby1.5percent.”

Does thismean that onedaypunditsmight say things like, “LuisSuarezhas agoalprobabilityaddedof0.60,butCarroll’sGPAisonly0.56”?

Zaidi replies, “I tend to think that will happen, because that’s what happened inbaseball.We talk now about players inways thatwewouldn’t have dreamed of ten orfifteen years ago.” In their ancient battle against the jocks, the nerds are finally takingrevenge.

10THESUBURBANNEWSAGENTS

CitySizesandSoccerPrizesThe scene: theVIP roomat theAthensOlympicStadium, a coupleof hoursbefore the2007ChampionsLeaguefinalbetweenMilanandLiverpoolkicksoff.MichelPlatiniandFranzBeckenbauerarebeingbuttonholedeverycoupleofyardsbyothermiddle-agemenin expensive suits.There is a crushat thebuffet, andanother across the room,where afamiliarsilvercupwith“bigears”standsonadais.Youlineup,assumeaconqueringposebeside theChampions League trophy, and grin.Nice young ladies fromUEFA slip thepictureintoaframeforyou.

An Englishmanwatching the scene, a soccer official, confides that he first got thisclose to thecup thirtyyearsago.Where?InBramcote,asuburbofNottingham.OneofBrianClough’s brothers ran the local post office–cum–newsagents, andClough himselfwouldsometimespopinandservecustomers,orjuststandbehindthecounterreadingthepapers.OneSundaymorningwhenthefutureofficialwentinwithhisgrandfather,therewas the EuropeanCup freshlywon by Forest, plunked on top of a pile ofNottinghamEveningPosts.BehinditstoodBrianClough,holdinganopennewspaperinfrontofhisface. He neither moved nor spoke, but he knew the boy would remember the sceneforever.Theofficialremembers,“Iwastooyoungandshytospeaktotheman,whichIregrettothisday.”

It’soddtothinkofthegame’sbiggestclubtrophyendingupinaplacelikeBramcote(population 7,318). Yet it’s not that exceptional. Provincial towns like Nottingham,Glasgow,Dortmund,Birmingham,andRotterdamhaveallwonEuropeanCups,whilethefourbiggestmetropolitanareasinEurope—Istanbul,Paris,Moscow,andLondon—neverhaduntilChelseafinallygotonein2012.Thispointstoanoddconnectionbetweencitysize, capital cities, and soccer success. Here’s why London took so long to win theChampions League—and why Europe’s biggest cities might now start adding sometrophies.

GENERALFRANCO’STRANSISTORRADIO:THEERAOFTOTALITARIANSOCCER

Thebestmeasureof success in club soccer is a simple list: thenamesof the clubs thathave won the European Cup since the competition began in 1956. Study this list, andyou’llseethatthehistoryoftheEuropeanCupbreaksdownintothreeperiods.

Thefirst,from1956throughthelate1960s,isdominatedbythecapitalcitiesoffascistregimes. Of the first eleven European Cups, eight were won by either Real Madrid(favoriteclubofGeneralFranciscoFranco)orBenfica(fromthecapitalofthePortuguesedictator Salazar). In seven of the first sixteen finals, the losing teams also came fromfascistcapitals:Real,Benfica,andin1971,PanathinaikosfromtheAthensofthecolonels’

regime.

Butby the startof the1970s, thedominanceof fascist capitalswaseroding.Fascistgovernments seldom outlast their leaders, and Portugal’s had entered a twilight afterSalazardiedin1970.Meanwhile,everyonewaswaitingforFrancotogo,too.

Yetevenafterfascismdisappeared,teamsfromEurope’sremainingdictatorialcapitalscontinued to thrive. Steaua Bucharest, run by a son of the Romanian dictator NicolaeCeauşescu,wonthecupin1986.RedStarBelgradetriumphedin1991justasYugoslaviawasbreakingintopieces.Thesamephenomenonwasatworkinthecommunistcountriesasinthefascistcapitalsbeforethem.Dictatorssendresourcestothecapitalbecausethatiswhere they and their senior bureaucrats and soldiers and secret policemen live. So thedictators do up themain buildings, boost the local economy, and help the soccer club.That’stotalitariansoccer.

A communist takeover of Britain could have done wonders for a capital team likeArsenal.JustlookatthetriumphsofDynamoBerlin,foundedintheformerEastGermanywiththeexpresspurposeofkeepingtheleaguetitleinthecapital.TheclubpresidentuntiltheBerlinWallfellwasErichMielke,fearedoctogenarianchiefoftheEastGermansecretpolice, theStasi.MielkelovedDynamo.Hemadeall thebestEastGermanplayersplayforit.Healsotalkedtoreferees,andDynamowonalotofmatcheswithpenaltiesintheninety-fifthminute.Dynamowaspopularlyknownas theElfSchweine, theelevenpigs,but it did win the East German league title every year from 1979 to 1988. This waspossiblyEurope’smostextremecaseofpoliticiansriggingthesoccermarket.

DynamonevergotfarintheEuropeanCup,butGeneralFranco’slocalteamdid.Thegeneralmade a point of catchingRealMadrid’s games on the radio, taking a transistoralongwithhimifhewasoutpartridgeshooting,writesJimmyBurnsinWhenBeckhamWenttoSpain.Itwasn’tsomuchthatFrancofixedrefereesorgaveRealmoney.Rather,he helped the club indirectly, by centralizing Spain’s power and resources. And hebelieved that Real’s European Cups helped him. Fernando María Castiella, foreignministerunderFranco,calledRealMadrid“thebestembassywehaveeverhad.”

DOWNANDOUT,PARISANDLONDON:THEFAILUREOFDEMOCRATICCAPITALS

TotalitariancapitalsgotofftoagreatstartintheEuropeanCup.Butforthefirstforty-twoyearsofthetrophy’slife,thedemocraticcapitalsofEuropeneverwonit.

Thereisonlyonecaveat:AmsterdamisnominallytheDutchcapital,andAjaxofthatcitywontheChampionscupfourtimes.However,Amsterdamreallyisonlynominallythecapital.Thegovernment,parliament, theking’spalace,and theembassiesareall inTheHague,acity thathasoftengoneyearsat a stretchwithouthavinga team in theDutchpremierdivision.TheHague’sonlyprofessionalclub,ADO,traditionallyplaysitsgamesinfrontofafewthousandpeople,alargeproportionofwhomarenuts.Littlehappensonthe field beyond the occasional smoke bomb or plague of rabbits.Only in the last fewseasonshasADOevenestablisheditselfasaregularinthetopDutchdivision.Thisisthecurseofthedemocraticcapital.

Instead of western capitals, provincial western European cities have dominated theEuropeanCupandChampionsLeague.The ruleof theprovincesholds trueeven in themostobsessivelycentralizedcountries.TeamsfromfiveprovincialBritishcitieswontheEuropeanCup before London finally got one. (The town ofNottingham still hasmoretrophies—two—thanLondon,Paris,Istanbul,Berlin,andMoscowcombined.)OlympiqueMarseillewonthecupin1993,butParisSaint-Germainneverhas.Portohaswonittwicesince Portugalwent democratic, while the Lisbon clubs have beenwinless since 1962.ClubsfromMilanandTurinhavewonacombinedtotaloftwelvetrophies;Romanclubs,zero.ThecuphasgonetoMunichandHamburg,butnevertoBonnorBerlin.Formanyyears,infact,neitherofthosecitiesevenhadateamintheBundesliga.HerthaBerlin,theonlybigclubinthecurrentcapital,hasnotbeenchampionofGermanysincetheWeimarRepublic.

Capitals—especially London, Paris, and Moscow—tend to have the greatestconcentrationsofnationalresources.It’sthereforestrikinghowbadlytheirclubsseemtounderperform.We can speculate aboutwhy this is. But perhaps themain reason teamsfromdemocratic capital cities are not up tomuch is psychological. In capital cities, nosoccerclubcanmatterallthatmuch.Therewasaninstructivesight,sometimeinthelate1990s, of a group of visiting fans from an English provincial town wandering downLondon’s Baker Street yelling their club songs at passersby. In their minds, they wereshaming the Londoners, invading the city for a day, making all the noise. But theLondonerstheywereshoutingat—manyofthemforeignersanyway—didn’tcare,orevenunderstandthepointtheyweremaking.

Capitalssimplyhavelesstoprovethanprovincialcities.Theyhavebiggersourcesofpride than theirsoccer teams.Londonersdon’tgoaroundsingingsongsabout theircity,andtheydon’tbelievethataprizeforArsenalorChelseawouldenhanceLondon’sstatus.RomanAbramovich andDavidDein helped bring trophies toChelsea andArsenal, butneitherevercouldhavebeenvotedmayorofLondon.Soccermattersevenless inParis,whereit’spossibletospendalifetimewithouteverknowingthatsoccerexists.ParisSaint-Germain, whose ground is only just inside the city’s Péripherique ring road, is hardlygoingtobecomethemainfocusofParisianpride.

London,Paris,andMoscowdon’tneedtowintheChampionsLeague.Itisadifferenttype of city where a soccer club can mean everything: the provincial industrial town.ThesearetheplacesthathaveoustedthefascistcapitalsasrulersofEuropeansoccer.

DARKSATANICMILLS:WHYFACTORYTOWNSBECAMESOCCERTOWNS

In1878asoccerclubstartedupjustbythenewishrailwayline inManchester.BecausetheplayersworkedattheNewtonHeathcarriageworksoftheLancashireandYorkshireRailway Company, their team was called Newton Heath. They played in work clogsagainstotherworkteams.

Famously,NewtonHeathbecameManchesterUnited.Butwhatmattershereare theclub’sorigins,wellrecountedinJimWhite’sManchesterUnited:TheBiography.Whitedescribes the L&YR’s workers, “sucked in from all over the country to service thegrowingneedforlocomotivesandcarriages.”LifeinManchesterthenwasneitherfunnor

healthy, he writes. “In the middle of the nineteenth century the average male lifeexpectancy in Little Ireland, the notorious part of Manchester … was as low asseventeen.”Thiswasstill thesamebrutalManchesterwhereafewdecadesbefore,KarlMarx’s pal Friedrich Engels had run his father’s factory, the industrial city so awful itinspiredcommunism.

IndustrialManchester had grown like no other city on earth. In 1800 it had been atranquil littleplaceof84,000 inhabitants, so insignificant that as lateas1832 itdidnoteven have a member of Parliament. It was the Industrial Revolution that changedeverything.WorkerspouredinfromEnglishvillages,fromIreland,fromfeebleeconomieseverywhere. For instance, the great-grandparents of Simon, one of this book’s authors,cametoManchesterfromLithuania.

By1900allthesenewcomershadmadeManchesterthesixth-biggestcityinEurope,with1.25millioninhabitants,morethanMoscowatthetime.Itwasstillahardcity.Intheearly twentieth century Simon’s great-grandparents emigrated on to much healthiersouthernAfrica,aftertwooftheirchildrenhaddiedinManchesterofscarletfever.

Inevitably,mostoftheearly“Mancunians”wererootlessmigrants.Unmooredintheirnewhome,manyofthemembracedthelocalsoccerclubs.Soccermusthavegiventhemsomethingofthesenseofthecommunitythattheyhadpreviouslyknownintheirvillages.

ThesamethinghappenedinBritain’sothernewindustrialcities:themigrantsattachedthemselves tosoccerclubswitha fervorunknowninmoreestablished towns.When theEnglishFootballLeaguewasfoundedin1888,sixofthetwelvefoundingmemberscamefrom industrial Lancashire, while the other six were from the industrial Midlands.Montague Shearman wrote that year, “No words of ours can adequately describe thepresentpopularity[ofsoccer]which,thoughgreatinthemetropolis,isinfinitelygreaterinthe large provincial towns… . It is no rare thing in the north andmidlands for 10,000people to pay money to watch an ordinary club match, or for half as many again toassemblefora‘CupTie.’”IthelpedthatworkersinthetextileindustryintheNorthwestbegantogetSaturdaysoffinthe1890s,aluxurythatworkerselsewhereinBritaindidnotenjoy.

By 1892, all twenty-eight English professional clubs were from the North or theMidlands.Soccerwasasnorthernagameasrugbyleague.ThechampionsintheVictorianeracame fromnorthern industrial towns suchasPreston,Sheffield,orSunderland, thenstill among the richest spotsonearth.When theseplacesbecame toopoorand small tosupportsuccessfulclubs,theleaguetitlemerelymigratedtolargernortherncities.

The legacy of the Industrial Revolution still shapes English fandom. Today thecombinedpopulationofGreaterMerseyside,GreaterManchester,andLancashireCountyis less than 5.5 million, or a little more than 10 percent of the English population.Nonetheless, as we write, in January 2014, four of the top seven clubs in the PremierLeague table—the two Manchester teams, Liverpool, and Everton—are based in thisregion. Their advantage: more than a century of brand building. Manchester UnitedbecamearguablythemostpopularclubonearthlargelybecauseManchesterhadbeenthefirstindustrialcityonearth.Theclubisonlythebiggestlocalsoccerrelicofthatera.The

forty-threeprofessional clubswithin ninetymiles ofManchester probably represent thegreatestsoccerdensityintheworld.

FIGURE10.1.Europe’spreferredclubs

AlmostallofEurope’sbestsoccercitieshaveaprofilelikeManchester’s.Theywereoncenewindustrialcentersthatsuckedinhaplessvillagers.Thenewcomerscastaroundfor something to belong to, and settled on soccer. Supporting a local club helped themmakeaplace for themselves in thecity.Soclubsmatteredmorehere, andgrewbigger,thanincapitalcitiesorancientcathedraltownswithold-establishedhierarchies.

ThemarketresearchcompanySport+Markthasbeenstudyingfandomsince1994.In2008itasked9,600peopleinterestedinsoccer,spreadoversixteenEuropeancountries,tonametheir“preferred”club.Thetoptwentyareshowninfigure10.1.

Itwouldbewrongtotreattheresultsasatallprecise.Thefiguresdifferedsignificantlyfrom those in Sport+Markt’s survey of the previous year. In that one yearChelsea, forinstance, had supposedly gained almost 6 million fans. Enormous numbers of peoplechangetheiranswerstothequestion,“Whichisyourpreferredteam?”dependingonwhojust won the league or where Cristiano Ronaldo happens to be playing. However, thesurveydoes tellus something.Fewwoulddispute that this top twenty includesmostofEurope’s best-supported clubs. And there is something remarkable about this list: thebiggestclubsarenotinthebiggestcities.Theyareintheformerlyindustrialones.

FIGURE10.2.Favoriteteamsofeachlargecountry

Ofcourse,someteamsfromcapitalsarepopular.Theywouldbe,giventhatLondon,Paris,Rome,andMoscowarebyfarthelargestcitiesintheircountries.Clubsincapitalshaveunparalleledcatchmentareas,evengiventheprofusionoflocalteams.ButinnoneofthesevenlargestEuropeancountriessurveyeddoesthebest-supportedclubcomefromacapital city. Figure 10.2 shows the favorite team of each large country, according toSport+Markt.

Insixoutofsevencountries,thenumber-oneteamcomesfromaprovincialtownwithastrongindustrialhistory.ThesoleexceptionisFrance,whereLyonisaprovincialtownbutwasmostlybypassedbytheIndustrialRevolution.Wesawhowtheclub’spopularitycamefromnowhereafterjust2002,thankstoLyon’sclevergamingofthetransfermarketunderpresidentJean-MichelAulas.

Takentogether,theprovincialindustrialtownsinSport+Markt’stoptwentydominateEuropean soccer. Between them they won thirty out of fifty-one European Cups from1963 through 2013. The smaller industrial or port cities Glasgow, Nottingham,Birmingham,Porto,Dortmund,Eindhoven, andRotterdamhavewon an additional ninebetween them. And all these industrial cities have a story much like Manchester’s,although their growth spurts happened later. Peasants arrived from the countryside,leaving all their roots behind.Needing something to belong to in their new cities, theychosesoccer.That’swhyinalltheseplaces,thesoccerclubsarosesoonafterthefactories.

InmostofthecitiesonSport+Markt’slist,theindustrialmigrantsarrivedinawhoosh

inthelatenineteenthcentury.Munichhad100,000inhabitantsin1852,andfivetimesasmanyby1901.Barcelona’spopulation trebled in thesameperiod to533,000.Turin, forcenturiesaquietPiedmontesetown,beganacquiringfactoriesinthe1870s.MilansurgedwiththenewrailwaysthatfollowedItalianreunification.

Once the local merchants had grown wealthy and discovered English ways, theyfoundedsoccerclubs:Juventusin1897,BarcelonaandACMilantwoyearslater,Bayernin 1900. The clubs then grew with their cities. Newly industrial Milan, for instance,suckedinsomanymigrantsthatitcouldeventuallysupporttwoofthethreemostpopularteamsinthecountry.

Thesecondstageofthesoccerboominthecontinent’sindustrialcitieshappenedafterthewar.The1950sand1960sweretheyearsofItaly’s“economicmiracle,”whenflocksofpoorsouthernItalianpeasantstookthe“trainofthesun”north.ManyofthesepeopleendedupinTurin,makingcarsforFiat.ThehistorianPaulGinsborgwrites,“SogreatandpersistentwastheflowfromtheSouth,thatbytheendofthesixtiesTurinhadbecomethethirdlargest‘southern’cityinItaly,afterNaplesandPalermo.”Themigrantsfoundjobs,but not enough schools or hospitals or apartments. Often therewas so little space thatroommates had to take turns sleeping. Amid such dislocation, soccer mattered all themore.GoffredoFofi,authorofastudyofsouthernimmigrationtoTurininthe1960s,saidthat“duringaJuventus-Palermomatch, thereweremanyenthusiastic immigrantSicilianfanswhosesons,bynow,likeeveryrespectableFIATworker,backedthehometeam.”

It’soneoftheflukesofhistorythatthismassmigrationtoTurinbegansoonaftertheSupergaairdisasterof1949haddecimatedthecity’spreviousmostpopularteam,Torino.ThemigrantsarrivedsoonafterJuvehadestablisheditselfasthelocaltopdog,andtheyhelpedmakeitaglobaltopdog.Forstarters,theytransmittedthepassiontotheirrelativesdownsouth.

BarcelonaexperiencedthesamesortofgrowthspurtataboutthesametimeasTurin.Inthe1950sand1960sperhaps1.5millionSpaniardsmovedtotheBarcelonaarea.Entirevillagesinthecountry’sinteriorwereleftalmostempty.OnwastelandsoutsideBarcelona,self-builtshantytownssprangup—thesortofthingyoumightnowseeontheoutskirtsofJakarta—packed with peasants who had left behind everything they knew.Many wereilliterate.Hardlyanyspokethelocallanguage,Catalan.AlotofthemattachedthemselvestoBarça.InSpain’snewManchester,itwasthequickestwaytobelong.

The linkbetween industryandsoccer isalmostuniversalacrossEurope.The largestaveragecrowdsinEuropeinthe2012–2013seasonwereatBorussiaDortmund(average:80,558),oneofmanyclubsintheindustrialGermanRuhrregion.InFrance,too,itistheindustrialcitiesthathavehistoricallylovedtheirclubsbest.Thecountry’sfewtraditionalhotbeds of soccer are the mining towns of Lens and Saint-Étienne, and the port ofMarseille.

Alltheseindustrialcitieswereproductsofaparticularera.InallofthemtheIndustrialRevolutionended,oftenpainfully.Butbesidestheemptydocksandfactorybuildings,theother legacyof industrializationwasbelovedsoccerclubs.Thequirkofaparticulareragave Manchester United, Barcelona, Juventus, Bayern Munich, and the Milan clubs

enoughfanstodominatefirsttheirowncountries,andthenEurope.

If Sport+Markt had polled the popularity of soccer clubs in Turkey, it would havefoundtheuniversalprincipleholdingthere,too.Thecountry’scapitalofsoccerisnotthecapitalcity,Ankara,butthenewindustrialpowerhouse,Istanbul.ThecityishometoallthreeofTurkey’smostpopularclubs:Galatasaray,Fenerbahce,andBesiktas.

It’struethatIstanbul,likeSaintPetersburg,wasoncetheseatofgovernment,butbothcitieslostthatrolemorethanninetyyearsago,longbeforesocceramountedtoanythingintheir countries.Even as late as 1950, Istanbulwas a sleepy placewith barely amillioninhabitants.ThenitbecamepossiblythelastbigEuropeancitytoexperienceanindustrialrevolution. Migrants were sucked in from all over Anatolia. Between 1980 and 1985alone,Istanbul’spopulationdoubled.TodayitisthelargestmetropolitanareainEurope,with nearly 14million inhabitants.The rootless peasants needed somehow to belong intheirnewhome,andsotheyattached themselves tooneof thecity’sgreatclubs.Often,soccerprovidedtheirstrongestloyaltiesinIstanbul.

Admittedly,almostallcitiesinEuropehavesomeexperienceofindustrialization.Butvery fewhavehad asmuch asManchester,Turin,Milan, Istanbul, orBarcelona.Thesewere the European cities with the most flux, the fewest long-standing hierarchies, theweakest ties between people and place. Here, there were emotional gaps to fill. Thisbecomes obvious when we contrast the industrial cities with old towns that have atraditional upper-class streak. InEngland,Oxford,Cambridge,Cheltenham,Canterbury,York,andBath(includingitsruraloutskirts)arealldecent-sizedplaces,withsomewherebetween100,000and175,000inhabitantseach.Manyindustrialtownsofthatsizeorevensmaller—Middlesbrough,Reading, Ipswich,Blackburn,Watford,Burnley—haveserioussoccer traditions. Yet Oxford, Cambridge, Bath, Canterbury, York, and Cheltenhambetween them currently have just three small teams in the English Football League:Cheltenham Town, which joined it only in 1999, Oxford United, which reentered theleagueonly in2010,andYorkCity,which returned in2012.All threeclubsplay in thefourth(orbottom)tieroftheEnglishleague.Intownslikethese,withage-oldhierarchiesandfewincomingpeasants,peoplesimplydidn’tneedsoccerclubstorootthemselves.

Oxford’s face to theworld is theuniversity. In industrial cities it is the soccer club.Barcelona, Marseille, and (until recently) Newcastle are the pride of their cities, asymbolictwofingersupatthecapital.WhenBarcelonawinssomething,thepresidentofCatalonia traditionallyhoists himself upon thebalconyofhis palaceon thePlaçaSantJaumeandshoutsatthecrowdsbelow,“Barçawins,Cataloniawins!”

Theseprovincialclubshavearmiesoffans,playerswhowillbleedfor theclub,andbacking from local plutocrats. Bernard Tapie putmoney intoOlympiqueMarseille, theAgnellifamilyintoJuventus,andSirJohnHallintoNewcastlebecausetheywantedtobekingsoftheirtowns.Localfansandsponsorsinvestintheseclubspartlybecausetheyfeelcivicprideisatstake.IntheMiddleAgestheywouldhavebuiltacathedralinstead.

Usually,provincialcitiessuchasthesehaveonlyonemajorclub,whichoftenbecomesthe only thingmany outsiders know about the place. For instance, theremust bemanyManchesterUnited fans around theworldwhodon’t know thatManchester is a city in

England. True, most provincial cities have two teams that compete for top-dog status:UnitedandCity inManchester, InterandMilan inMilan,TorinoandJuventus inTurin,UnitedandWednesdayinSheffield,CelticandRangersinGlasgow,ForestandCountyinNottingham,EvertonandLiverpoolFCinLiverpool,Bayernand1860inMunich,BarçaandEspanyolinBarcelona.Manyoftheserivalrieshavesomethingtodowithreligionorpolitics or both. But usually one team struggles. Manchester City, Torino, and 1860Munichhaveallspentlongphasesinthelowerdivisions.CityonlyreachedthetopthankstothearrivalofabillionaireArabsheikhin2008.Evertonlastwontheleaguein1987.FCAmsterdamwentbust.Midsizeprovincialcitiesaresimplynotbigenoughtosustaintwobigclubsforlong.Almostalways,oneclubpullsahead.

FIGURE10.3.EuropeanCupwinners

“THEYMOVEDTHEHIGHWAY”:THERISEANDFALLOFSMALLTOWNS

Provincial industrial towns began to dominate theEuropeanCup in the late 1960s.Buttheirrulebreaksdownintotwomainperiods.Thefirst,from1970to1981,isthesmall-townera,whenclubsfromsomeverymodestplaceswontheEuropeanCup.Figure10.3shows them, with the populations not just of the cities themselves but of their entiremetropolitanareas,includingpeopleinallthelocalsuburbs.

Note that we are estimating the size of these places very generously, going waybeyond thecityborders.The figure forLiverpool, for instance, includesallof the localMerseysideregion.

The rule of the small is evenmore striking when you consider some of the losingteamsinEuropeanCupfinalsinthisera.Inaremarkablefour-yearperiodfrom1976to1979,thetownsofSaint-Étienne,Mönchengladbach,Bruges,andMalmöallhadteamsinthefinal.

FIGURE10.4.Winningtowns

Perhaps the emblematic small-town team of the seventies is BorussiaMönchengladbach,whoseriseandfallencapsulatesthatofallthesetowns.

Inthe1970sGladbachwonfiveGermantitlesandreachedfourEuropeanfinals.TheBökelberg stadium, perched on a hill among the gardens of smart houses, saw the bestyears of Gunter Netzer, Rainer Bonhof, and Alan Simonsen. Fans drove in fromneighboring Holland and Belgium, as well as from the town’s British army barracks.Decades later, aGermanmarketing company showed that theknee-jerk responseof thecountry’sfanstothewordcounterattackwasstillGladbach.

Itwasacozylittleclub:BertiVogtsspenthiswholecareerhere,andwhenNetzerlaterplayedinZurichheoftenusedtodriveup,sometimestoscoutplayersforSpanishclubs,butoftenjusttoeatsausagesinthecanteen.

LikeDavidCassidy,Gladbachwouldhavedonewelltocombustspontaneouslyattheendoftheseventies.In1980theclublostitslastUEFACupfinaltoEintrachtFrankfurt,andthedecadessincehavebeendisappointing.Therewasthespellin1998,forinstance,when it just couldn’t stop getting thrashed. “We can only get better,” announcedGladbach’scoach,FriedelRausch,justbeforehisteamlost8–2toBayerLeverkusen.“IfeelIcansolveourproblems,”hesaidafterward.WhenGladbachlostitsnextmatch7–1toWolfsburg,Rauschwassacked.GladbachspenttimeinGermany’sseconddivision,andhasneverregaineditsformerheights.

This upsets leftist, educated fiftysomethings all over Germany, who still dislikeBayern,reverethesocialistNetzer,andonSaturdayafternoonschecktheGladbachresultfirst.Butthereisnothingtobedone.Theglorydayscannotcomeback,becausewhatdidinGladbachwasthemodernera.

InthewordsofNormanBatesinHitchcock’sPsycho:“Theymovedthehighway.”IntheseventiesGladbach’scoach,HennesWeisweiler,wasabletobuildateamofboysfromthe local towns. The part-Dutch Bonhof came from nearby Emmerich, Vogts was anorphan from Neuss-Buttgen, and Hacki Wimmer, who did Netzer’s dirty work, spentdecadesafterhisplayingcareerrunninghisparents’stationeryshopjustdowntheroadinAachen.

These stars stayed atGladbach foryearsbecause therewas littlemoremoney tobeearnedanywhereelse in soccer,becausemost richclubswereallowedonlyacoupleofforeign players at most, and because their own club could generally stop them fromleaving.Inshort,thereweremarketrestraints.That’swhyGladbach,NottinghamForest,Bruges, and Saint-Étienne could thrive in the 1970s. Even then, big cities had moreresources,buttheyhadlimitedfreedom,orlimiteddesire,tousethem.

ThebeginningoftheendforsmalltownswasthedayinFebruary1979whenTrevorFrancisbecamesoccer’sfirst“million-poundman.”Infact,Cloughagreedtoafeeofonly£999,999(thenabout$2million)tobringhimfromBirminghamtoForest,butthereweretaxesontop.ThreemonthslaterFrancisheadedthegoal(againstMalmö)thatgaveForestthe European Cup. But the swelling of the soccer economy that he embodied wouldeventuallydoinsmallclubslikeForest.

In the 1980s TV contracts grew, and Italy opened its borders to foreigners. Later,teamsaroundEuropebeganrenovatingtheirstadiums,whichallowedtheoneswithalotof fans tomakemoremoney.After theEuropean court of justice’s “Bosman ruling” in1995,bigclubscouldeasilysignthebestplayersfromanycountryintheEuropeanUnion.Aroundthesametime,theclubswiththemostfansbeganearningmuchmorefromtheirtelevisionrights.Bigclubseverywheregotbigger.BayernMunich,previouslyGladbach’smainrival,mushroomedinto“FCHollywood.”

After that, clubs like Gladbach could no longer keep their best players. Lothar

Matthäusmadehisdebutfor“DieFohlen”attheendofthegoldenera,butwhenhewasonly twenty-three he graduated to Bayern. The next great white hope, the local ladSebastianDeisler,leftGladbachforHerthaatagenineteenin1999,assoonashedistantlybegantoresembleNetzer.Smalltownscouldn’taffordthenewsoccer.

“THAT’SNOTCOCAINE,IT’SSAFFRON”:THEDEMISEOFTHECATHEDRALCITIES

WanderingaroundFlorence,youcanstillimagineitasthecenteroftheuniverse.Itistheeffectofthegreatcathedral,theendlessMichelangelos,andallthetouristspaying$10foranorangejuice.AMedicirulerreturningfromthedead,asinoneofFlorence’sumpteenpaintingsoftheDayofJudgment,mightfeelhiscityhadwonthebattleofprestigeamongEuropeancity-states.

But hewouldbewrong.These days amidsize city inEuropederives its status lessfrom its cathedral than from its soccer club.Here towns the size of Florence (600,000peopleinitsmetropolitanarea)haveslippedup.

Fiorentina’s last flurry came in 1999,when it beatArsenal in aChampionsLeaguematchatWembleythankstoagoalbyGabrielBatistuta,withGiovanniTrapattonisittingon the bench. In those days “Trap’s” biggest problems were his players’ insistence onbusing the 150 yards from the locker room to the training ground and BrazilianEdmundo’sritual latereturnfromtheRioCarnaval.Butthosedayswillneverreturn.IntheChampionsLeague,themidsizecitiesarenowfinished.

Fiorentina’sdemisecanbedatedtothedayinJuly2001thattheItalianpoliceraidedthehomeoftheteam’sowner,theItalianfilmbaronVittorioCecchiGori.Whathappenedwasexactlywhatshouldhappenwhenpoliceraidafilmbaron’shome,asifCecchiGorihadreaduponJackieCollinsbeforehand.

Thepolicebrokeintohisapartment in thePalazzoBorgheseinRome,but thentookninetyminutes to findhim.Thiswasbecausehisbedroomdoorwasconcealed insideamirroredwall.OnlyaftertheFilipinamaidhadpointedthisoutdidtheyenterthebedroomtofindCecchiGoriasleepwithhisgirlfriend,ValeriaMarini,aCaprice-likefigurewhocallsherselfasinger-actressbutinfactcandoneither.

ThepolicetoldCecchiGoritoopenhissafe.Donninghissilkdressinggown,hedidso.Whenthepoliceremarkedonthestashofcocainestoredinside,CecchiGorirepliednonchalantly,“Cocaine?That’snotcocaine,it’ssaffron!”

Meanwhile,hisbusinessempirewasunraveling.Itshouldbesaidthatheacquiredtheempireonlybyinheritancefromhisfather,Mario,whobeforedyingin1993hadwarnedhisoldbusinesspartner,SilvioBerlusconi,“TakecareofVittorio,heissoimpulsiveandnaive.”

Vittorio’s problemwas that hewanted to beBerlusconi.Hebought commercialTVchannels (a failure), pumped fortunes into his soccer team (no titles), and dabbled inpolitics (getting no further than senator), but might have been okay had he not gottencaughtinadivorceexpectedtobesoexpensivethatitalonecouldhavefundedFiorentina

foryears.CecchiGori remainedadmirablyupbeatevenafterall this, leaningoutof thewindowof hisMercedes limousine onRome’sViaVeneto to shout “Ladolce vita!” tofriends.However,heruinedFiorentina.

ItwashardtoworkoutwhichbitofCecchiGori’sempireowedwhattowhich,butitwasclearthathehadborrowedtensofmillionsofdollarsfromtheclub.Aftereverythingwentwrong,hetriedthetraditionalItalianremedy,puttinghiseighty-two-year-oldmotherincharge,butevenshecouldnotsaveFiorentina.AfaxfromaColombianbankofferingtopayofftheclub’sentiredebtproved,amazingly,tobeaforgery.

In2002Fiorentinawentbankrupt,slippingintoItaly’sfourthdivision,whereithadtovisitTuscanvillageteamswhoseplayersweremostlyFiorentinafans.Nowit isbackinSerie A, but the days of Trap, Batistuta, and “The Animal” Edmundo won’t return.Florenceisjusttoosmallnow.

Florence is typical. Midsize European cities (between 150,000 and 1 millioninhabitants) have all but dropped off themap of European soccer. They can no longeraffordtocompetewithclubsfrombiggerplaces.Inearly2004itwastheturnofParma,whoseowners, thedairycompanyParmalat, turnedout tohavemislaid10billioneuros.Leeds United is the great English example. In Spain Deportivo La Coruña, pride of amidsizeGaliciancity,suddenlydiscoveredthatitsdebthadhitthestrictlynotionalfigureof178millioneuros.Valenciafollowedafewyearslater.Theseclubsfellshortbecausethey had hardly any supporters outside their own city walls. Other midsize cities—Glasgow,Amsterdam,Nottingham—have retreatedwith less fanfare, but they toomustknow theywill never again produce aEuropean champion.EvenNewcastle has slowlyemergedfromdenial.

The third period of theEuropeanCup began in 1982 and hasn’t ended yet: rule bysturdyprovincialcity.Therewerestillafewundersizewinners:PortoandLiverpooltwiceeach, and Eindhoven,Marseille, and Dortmund. However, these towns are not exactlymidgets. Four of the five are agglomerations of 1.2 million inhabitants or more. OnlyEindhoven has just 210,000 people and a metropolitan area—if you draw it verygenerously—of only 750,000. In general, European champions are getting bigger. Inmoderntimes,theracehasusuallygonetotherich.

Theswellingofthesoccereconomy—thebiggerTVcontracts,thenewstadiums,thefreer movement of players, and so on—favored the most popular clubs. For historicalreasons,thesetendedtobetheonesinbigprovincialcities.TheirteamscametodominatetheChampionsLeagueinasortofendlessloop.Everyclubthatwonthetrophyfrom1998through2011hadwonitatleastoncebefore.Mosthadwonitseveraltimesbefore.Aretheir fans growing blasé?When you havewon the thing nine times, the buzz probablystartstofade.

Thedominantclubsuntilnowhaven’tbeenfromthemegacitiesofMoscow,London,Paris, or Istanbul but from urban areas with about 2 million to 5 million inhabitants:Milan,Manchester,Munich,Madrid,andofcourseBarcelona.Thesecitiesarebigenoughtoproducetherequiredfanbaseyetprovincialenoughtogenerateayearningforglobalrecognition.

Strangely,oneofthesecities,Madrid,isademocraticcapital.HowcouldRealbreakthegolden ruleof theChampionsLeagueandwin the trophy in1998,2000,and2002?Because ithadbuilt itsmammothstadium,brand,andsupport in thedayswhenMadridwas the capital of a dictatorship. Spain may have gone social democratic, but Real’splayers still enter the SantiagoBernabeu in thosewhite “meringue” shirts as if itwere1955.Theclub’sglobalstandingisarelicofthefascistera.

GEORGEZIPFCOMESTOLONDON:THEFUTUREMETROPOLITANERA?

GeorgeKingsleyZipfisanalmostforgottenHarvardlinguist.Bornin1902,diedin1950justashewasstartingtomakeaname,Zipfisnowknownonlyforhavingformulatedalawthatexplainsalmosteverything.Amongotherthings,Zipf’slawtellsusthatLondonorMoscowshouldstartwinningChampionsLeaguessoon.

Considerthefollowing:ifyourankeveryAmericancitybythesizeofitspopulation,the difference in population between two consecutive cities is simply the ratio of theirranks.Soifyoucomparecitiesnumber1and2,city2hashalf(or1/2)thepopulationofcity1.Ifyoucomparecitiesnumber2and3,city3hastwo-thirds(2/3)thepopulationofcity 2. City 100 has 99/100ths the population of city 99 and so on down the list.Statisticallyspeaking,thefitofthisrelationshipisalmostasperfectasitispossibletobe.

ThisisaparticularlyelegantexampleofamoregeneralrelationshipknownasZipf’slaw,anditappliestoalotmorethancitysizes.Forinstance,itisalsotrueofthefrequencywith which words are used in English. The is the most commonly used word in thelanguage,ofissecond,andsoofisusedabouthalf(1/2)asoftenasthe.Allinall,Zipf’slaw has been called possibly “the most accurate regularity in economics.” (The NobelPrize–winning economist Paul Krugman says, “Anyone who spends too much timethinkingaboutZipf’slawgoesmad,”butwehopethatisajoke.)

Zipf’slawworksforEuropeancities,too,thoughnotquiteasneatlyasforAmericanones.CitysizesinmostEuropeancountriesaremorecloselybunched,andsothesecondcityisclosertothefirstcity’ssizethanintheUnitedStates,thethirdclosertothesecond,andsoon.

Whymightthisbe?Zipf’slawmusthavesomethingtodowithmigration.Peoplewillalwaystrytomigratetowherethemoneyis.IntheUnitedStates,withitsopenmarketsandveryhighmobilityof labor, theygenerallydo.But inEurope,politicalandculturalbarriershavecurbedmigration.Thatmightexplainwhycitysizesaremorecompressedthere. Nonetheless, the academics Matthieu Cristelli, Michael Batty, and LucianoPietroneroshowedinanarticleintheprestigiousjournalNaturein2012that“Zipf’sLawholdsapproximatelyforthecitysizesofeachEuropeancountry(France,Italy,Germany,Spain, etc).” They add that the law “completely falls apart” if you rank them as citieswithina single state, i.e., theEuropeanUnion,but then that isno surprise—thesecitiesgrewbigintheirnation-stateslongbeforetheEUwaseverthoughtof.

For a long time, nobody couldunderstandwhyZipf’s law shouldhold for somanydifferent phenomena. Now, though, economists and scientists are starting to generatemodelsofgrowthinwhichthenaturaloutcomeofaprocessisdistributionobeyingZipf’s

law. Recently the economist Xavier Gabaix of New York University came up with anexplanationforwhyZipf’slawappliestocitysizes.HesaidZipf’slawemergeswhenallcities grow at the same rate, regardless of their size and their history, but subject torandomvariation.This implies that common factors drive the growth of citieswithin acountry,whilethedifferencesingrowthareduetoaseriesofrandomevents(“shocks,”inthe economic jargon), such as bombing during thewar,which in principle could occuranywhere.AstorythissimpleisenoughtoexplainthecitysizesthatZipf’slawpredicts.

Two consequences of Zipf’s law are crucial to soccer. First, giants—whether giantcities,giantsoccerclubs,orgiantsofanyotherkind—arerare.Thatisbecausebecominga giant requires a long sequence of positive shocks, like tossing a coin fifty times andcomingup“heads”everytime.Itcanhappen,butitisrare.Second,onceacitybecomesagiant, it isunlikely toshrinkinto themiddleranksunless itexperiencesa longseriesofrepeatedmisfortunes(fifty“tails”inarow).Bycontrast,smallcitiesareunlikelyevertobecomegiants. Inotherwords, thehierarchyof cities,whichhas established itself overcenturies,probablywon’tchangemuchintheforeseeablefuture.

This “law of proportionate growth” has some other consequences. What’s true forcitiesisalsotrueformanyothersocialphenomena.Forexample,ifyourkidisbehindatschool, don’tworry: he or shewill almost certainly catch up, since all children tend tolearnat thesamerate,plusorminusa fewshocks.Likewise, ifyou thinkyourbrilliantsix-year-oldsoccerplayer isgoing tobecomeanotherBeckhamorRooney,don’t.Morelikelytheboyhadafewpositiveshocksinhisearlyyears,whichwillcancelout.Rooneysand Beckhams almost never happen. The distribution of talent is thus a bit like thedistribution of city sizes: a few great talents stand out at the top, the Maradonas andMessis,butasyougodownthelist,thedifferencesbecomesmallerandsmaller.

ThisbringsusbacktoEuropeancities: thereareonlyafewgiants,chieflyMoscow,Istanbul,Paris, andLondon.Youwouldexpect thesegiant cities toproduce thebiggestclubs,yettheyhavewonjustonesingleChampionsLeaguebetweenthem.

But soon theymight winmore. Soccer is changing. It is becomingmore of a freemarket, as fascist dictators no longer interfere and the best players can move betweenclubs almost at will. Inevitably, the best players are starting to move to the biggestmarkets,ashappens inMajorLeagueBaseball.Andsoyouwouldexpectdominance inEuropeansoccertomove,too:afterrulebydictatorialcapitals,midsizeprovincialtowns,andbigprovincialcities,nowLondonandpossiblyMoscowandParisshouldgetinontheactionatlast.

Moscow might, because it is Europe’s last large nondemocratic capital. Russia’sresourcesarebeingsenttothecenter,andwithallthatoilandgasunderthesoil,that’salotofresources.Parismight,becauseithasnearly12millioninhabitantsandonlyonetop-division soccer club, Paris Saint-Germain,whichwas appallingly run for years but hasnow been taken over byQatariswho have converted oil into soccer players.AndwithChelsea’s victory over Bayern on penalties in 2012, London has already gotten there.(This is one prediction we got right in the original 2009 edition of Soccernomics. Wewrote then that “soon”Arsenal orChelsea “could become the first London team to be

championsofEurope.”)

It’slittlesurprisethatLondonhasfinallybecomeafront-ranksoccercity.Evenafterthe implosion of British banks, it has the largest local economy in Europe. It alreadysupportstwoofEurope’sbiggestsoccerteamsandcouldprobablycopewithmore.Thisrepresents quite a change. In the early 1990s London rather resembled Moscow circa1973. Tired people in gray clothes waited on packed platforms for 1950s Tube trains.Coffeewasanexoticdrinkthatbarelyexisted.Eatingamealoutsidewasforbidden.Thecitycenterwasalmostuninhabited,andclosedat11P.M.anyway.Therewasasenseofpermanentdecline.

NorhadLondoneverbeenthesoccercapitalofBritain.Onlyin1931didasouthernclub—Arsenal—first win the league. Even after that, though, the title generally wentnorth.

Butinthe1990sLondontransformed.CheapflightsfromfiveairportstookLondonersaroundEurope.TrainsbeganrunningtoParisandBrussels.Todayitisquickertogettherethan to the shrinkingnorthern cities ofLiverpool andManchester, and less of a cultureshockwhenyouarrive.LondonbecameaEuropeancity,detachedfromtherestofBritain.The geographer Daniel Dorling said Britain was starting to look like a city-state.Moreover,thecitywasstartingtogrowagain.GreaterLondonhadbeenlosinginhabitantsfrom theSecondWorldWar until the 1980s, but boom-timeLondon changed that. Justbetween 2001 and 2011, the city’s population jumped 12 percent to 8.17 million—thefastestgrowthofanyregionofEnglandorWalesinthatperiod.

Fromthelate1990suntiltoday,eventhroughthefinancialcrisis,LondonhasofferedaTechnicolorvistaofraucousyoungpeoplefromallovertheworlddressedinweirdyouth-culture outfits chucking cash at each other. The Tube trains have ceased to be antiquecurios.Theplacesmellsofmoney.AllthishasraisedLondon’sstatusinsoccer.

At the same timeas thecitybecame fully international, sodid themarket in soccerplayers. The best ones can now work wherever they want.Many of them—like manyinvestmentbankersandactors—havechosenLondon.

Blackandforeignplayerslikelivinginacitywhere95percentoftheinhabitantsagreewith the statement, “It is a good thing that Britain is a multicultural society.” WhenThierry Henry was spending his best years at Arsenal, he said, “I love this open,cosmopolitancity.Whateveryourrace,youneverfeelpeople’sgazeonyou.”Inavirtuouscycle,foreignersattractforeigners.TheFrenchmanJacquesSantini,Tottenham’smanagerforaboutfiveminutes,wantedtocometoLondonbecausehissonSebastienalreadylivedthere—aclassicexampleofchainmigration.

Equallytothepoint,eveninthecurrenteconomiccrisisasoccerplayercanstillearnalivinginLondon.Thecapital’sclubshavebeencoiningit.First,theircustomerscanstillafford to pay the highest ticket prices in global soccer. In 2013–2014Arsenal charged£985(nearly$1,600)foritscheapestseasonticket,whichwasthehighestrateinEnglishand probably in global soccer. Somany Londoners are happy to fork out this kind ofmoneythatArsenalhasbeenabletobuildanewstadiumwith60,000seatsandsellitout.

NoclubinLondon’shistoryhasdrawnsuchalargeregularcrowd.In2012–2013ArsenalandChelseaachievedrevenuesperseatpergameofover£50(about$80),according tothefinancialanalystStephenClaphamoftheLondon-basedresearchconsultancyBehindtheBalanceSheet.Thosewere the highest figures inEngland, andprobably inEurope.Over the 2011–2012 season, the business advisory firm Deloitte ranked Arsenal andChelseaamongEurope’ssixrichestclubs.

NootherEuropeancityhasasmanyinvestors.WhenAbramovichdecidedtobuyanEnglish soccer club, it was always likely that hewould end up owning Chelsea in hisadoptedcityratherthan,say,Bolton.WhentheAmericanbillionaireShahidKhanboughtFulhamin2013,itmatteredtohimthatitwasaLondonclub.EvenQueensParkRangersare owned by the Malaysian Tony Fernandes and Indian Lakshmi Mittal, the world’sforty-first-richestman,accordingtoForbes,whoofcourse livesaround thecorner fromthe club in Kensington. Yes, other rich foreigners have bought Liverpool, ManchesterCity, Blackburn, and Aston Villa, but London is still a touch more appealing tobillionaires.

Thehandfulof thebiggestprovincialclubs—ManchesterUnited,Liverpool,Bayern,Barcelona,thetwoinMilan—havebuiltupsuchstrongbrandsthattheywillremainatthetop of European soccer. However, their new challengers probably will not be otherprovincialclubsbutteamsfromLondon,Paris,andMoscow.

Atlast,beinginagiantcapitalcityisbecomingastrategicassettoasoccerclub.NoLondon team had ever reached the Champions League final before 2006. From 2006through2012,ArsenalgotthereonceandChelseatwice,winningone.Soon,ifwe’renotcareful,thecitywilldominateeveryaspectofBritishlife.

11FOOTBALLVERSUSFOOTBALL

WhenNelsonMandelawasateenagerintheTranskeiregionofSouthAfrica,hewassenttoamockBritishboardingschool.TheClarkeburyInstitutetaughtblackstudentsbutwasofcourserunbyawhiteman, theReverendC.Harris.“Theschool itselfconsistedofacluster of two dozen or so graceful, colonial-style buildings,” Mandela recalled in hisautobiography,LongWalktoFreedom.“ItwasthefirstplaceI’dlivedinthatwaswestern,notAfrican,andIfeltIwasenteringanewworldwhoseruleswerenotyetcleartome.”

LiketheVictorianBritishschoolsthatitimitated,Clarkeburyaimedtoturnitspupilsinto Christian gentlemen. A gentleman, to Victorian Britons, was someone with poshmannerswhospokeEnglishandplayedBritishgames.AsMandeladescribedhisschooldays,“IparticipatedinsportsandgamesasoftenasIcould,butmyperformanceswerenomore than mediocre… . We played lawn tennis with home-made wooden rackets andsoccerwithbarefeetonafieldofdust.”

HehadencounteredtheBritishEmpire.TheBritishcolonialofficers,merchants,andsailorswhowentaroundtheworldinthenineteenthcenturydidn’tmerelyaimtoexploitthe natives. They also tried to teach themBritish values. They succeeded spectacularlywithMandela,whoatanearlier schoolhadacquiredanewfirstname(AdmiralNelsonwas a British naval hero) and eventually became the epitome of the courtly Britishgentleman.However,hisstoryisexemplaryofmillionsofpeoplearoundtheworld,bothinBritain’sofficialcoloniesand in the“informalempire,” thecountrieswhere theBritssupposedlydidn’trule.

Fromabout1917to1947,theBritishgraduallystoppedrunningtheworldandhandedover the keys to theAmericans.But theAmerican empirewasmuch less ambitious. Itbarely spread Americanism. Football, the American empire’s most popular sport, stillhardly exists outside the home country. In fact, when American troops in Afghanistanwanted to woo natives, they were reduced to handing out soccer balls. (The exercisefailed:Allah’snamewasfoundtobeprintedonaball,ablasphemyforanobjectdesignedforkicking.)

At this point, let’s agree to call the global game “soccer” and the American game“football.” Many people, both in America and in Europe, imagine that soccer is anAmerican term invented in the late twentieth century to distinguish it from gridiron.Indeed,anti-AmericanEuropeansoftenfrownontheuseoftheword.TheyconsideritamarkofAmerican imperialism.Even someAmerican soccer fans seemembarrassedbytheword.Thisisasillyposition.“Soccer”wasthemostcommonnameforthegameinBritainfromthe1890suntilthe1970s.Asfarasonecantell,whentheNorthAmericanSoccer League brought soccer to the Americans in the 1970s, and Americans quitereasonablyadoptedtheEnglishword,theBritishstoppedusingitandrevertedtothewordfootball.

It’sactuallypossibletoshowthislittlebitoflinguisticsnobberyonachart.TodothisweengagedthehelpofAntoinetteRenouf,professorofEnglishlanguageandlinguisticsatBirminghamCityUniversityintheUK.Renoufisa“corpus”linguist,whichmeansthatshe trawls electronic “text collections” for the purpose of empirical language study.Corporacomeinallsizesandshapes,butsheworksmainlyonacorpusderivedfromtwoBritishnationalnewspapers,theGuardianandIndependent,whichshehasbeenbuildingwith successive software research teams since 1984. So far her corpus containsapproximately 1.3 billion words of running text. This supports a short-term diachronicapproachtolanguageresearchandlexico-semanticlanguageuse—ortosayitinEnglish,wecanseefromthecorpushowtheuseofwordschangesover time.Renoufgeneratedtwo charts for us, one showing the frequency of use of theword football, the other ofsoccer,from1984to2011.

Back in 1984 theword football appeared about fifty times permillionwords used,whilesoccerappearedabouttentimespermillion.Theyear1984isclosetothenadirofthegameinEngland:thetimeofhooligans,collapsingstadiums,andcheaptickets.SincethenEnglishsoccer’srenaissancehasbroughtmillionsofnewfansandbillionsofdollarsinto the game. The game became a talking point in all walks of life from politics tofashion.As result, the frequencyofuseof football rose steadily up to theyear 2000 toabouttwohundredtimespermillion,whereithasstabilizedforthepastdecadeorso.Bycontrast, the relative use of the word soccer didn’t increase in the ’80s, ’90s, andnoughties,butremainedataroundtentimespermillionuntilaround2008.Sincethen,itsusagehasactually fallen toabout five timespermillionwords.Anotherway toexpressthisisasfollows:in1984about17percentofreferencestotheEnglishgame(“football”or“soccer”)employedthewordsoccer,butby2011onlyabout2percentdid.Inthespaceof thirty years soccer has become a bad word in Britain. We, however, will comparesoccerwithfootball,andthereaderswillknowwhatwemean.

Whatfollowsisataleoftwogamesandtwoempires.Soccerspreadaroundtheworldwhereas football did not, largely becauseVictorianBritonswere instinctive colonialistswhereas today’s Americans are not. But now, for the first time, the empires are goinghead-to-headasifinakid’scomputergame.BoththePremierLeagueandtheNFLwanttoconquernewterritories.Thisisastrugglebetweentwoverydifferenttypesofempire:the British (which contrary to popular opinion still exists) and the American (whichcontrarytopopularopinionmayneverhaveexisted).Emergingfromthestruggleisanewbreedofsportsfan.

GENTLEMENWITHLEATHERBALLS

In1884anine-year-oldboynamedCharlesMillerembarkedontheSSElbeinBrazilandsetoff forEngland.Miller’s fatherhad emigrated fromBritain toBrazil, towork as anengineer for the São Paulo Railway Company. Now Charles was making the returnjourney, to enroll at anEnglish boarding school.LikeMandela atClarkebury,Miller atBanisterCourtlearnedgames.“Justasaschoolboy,intheGardenofChildhood,listenstotheteacher,soI,fascinated,sawmyfirstgameofAssociationFootball,”helaterwrote.

In1894MillerreturnedtoBrazilwithaleatherballandasetofrulesinhisluggage.

HesetupthefirstBraziliansoccerleague.HealsointroducedrugbytoBrazil,thoughwithratherlesssuccess.Hediedin1953,havinglivedlongenoughtoseeBrazilhosttheWorldCupof1950andreachthefinal.

Miller’sstorywastypicalofsoccerpioneersinmanycountries.First,hewasposh,oratleastposhenoughtogotoboardingschool.(Contrarytomyth,itwasn’tonthewholeBritishsailorswhogavetheworldsoccer.Theupperclasseshadconsiderablymoresoftpower.) Second,Miller was typical in that he spread soccer to a country that wasn’t aBritishcolony. In thecolonies,places likeAustraliaor India,Britishschoolteachersandadministratorsmostlytaughtthenativescricketandrugby.Soccerdidbestintheinformalempire, the non-colonies: most of Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia. Here, itprobablybenefited fromnotbeingseenasacolonial ruler’sgame.Brits in the informalempirewere supposedly just businesspeople, even if in practice their commercial cloutgavetheBritishprimeministervastinfluenceovermanyunlikelycountries.

Fromabout1850untiltheFirstWorldWar,Britainwasthesoleeconomicsuperpower.Aslateas1914,Britonsstillownedabout42percentofalltheworld’sforeigninvestment.TheBritishexpatswhoinhabitedtheinformalempirerepresentedtheempire’seconomicmight.Thementendedtowork in therailways(likeMiller’sfather),orasbusinessmen(like the Charnock brothers, who set up Russia’s first soccer club, the future DynamoMoscow,fortheirmillemployeesoutsideMoscow),orasschoolteachers(likeAlexanderWatson Hutton, the Scottish teacher who in the early 1880s introduced soccer inArgentina).

Thesepeoplehadonlysoftpower: thewealthandprestigeof theBritishgentleman.Thatwasenoughtospreadtheirgames.MenlikeHuttontaughtforeignerstoseesportsasa British upper-class and hence aspirational product. If you were a young man likeMandelawhowantedtobecomeaBritishgentleman,oneofthethingsyoudidwasplaysoccer. That’s why the game’s early adopters in the informal empire tended to be richpeoplewhohadcontactwithBritishgentlemen.PimMulier,forinstance,whointroducedawhole listofsports to theNetherlands, firstencounteredsoccerasa five-year-oldataDutchboardingschoolthathadsomeBritishpupils.In1879,whenMulierwasfourteen,hefoundedthefirstDutchsoccerclub.

SoccerconqueredtheworldsofastlargelybecausetheBritishgentlemanwassuchanattractive ideal. A century later a newBritish archetype, the hooligan, in his ownwayprobablyaddedtothegame’sglamour.

By the 1930s, when Mandela went to Clarkebury, the British Empire had alreadybegun to fade.However,manyof the empire’s global networksoutlived the loss of thecolonies.ThemostimportantsurvivorwouldbetheEnglishlanguage,evenifitsustaineditsglobalreachlargelythankstotheAmericans.EnglishgavepeoplearoundtheworldaneasyconnectionwithBritain.StevenStark,anAmericansoccerfan,formerspeechwriterof Jimmy Carter, and a teacher of English rhetoric, asks, “Isn’t the best thing thePremiershiphasgoingfor it is that it’s inEnglish? Imean, ifeveryone inFrancespokeEnglishandeveryoneinEnglandspokeFrench,we’dallbefollowingtheFrenchleague.Inaninternationaleconomy,Englishtrumpsthecompetition.”

ManypeopleinformerBritishcoloniesgrewupabsorbingBritishsoccerfromBritishmedia outlets that had also outlived the empire. Peter Draper, when he wasmarketingdirectorofManchesterUnited,notedthatEnglishsoccerhasbeentelevisedfordecadesinmanyAsiancountries.Thathadbuilt loyalty.RealMadrid,Draper toldus,“didn’thavetheplatform.SpanishtelevisionisnowhereinAsia.Bestteamofthe1950s?Sorry,didn’tseetheminAsia.”

Mike Abrahams is a gangster-turned-intellectual who grew up in a poor, nonwhiteCape Flats township outside Cape Town. As a child he used to sit in the local libraryreadingBritishboys’magazineslikeShootandTiger.HeadmitsthatclassicBritishsoccercartoonslikeBilly’sMagicBootsshapedhim.

Abrahams was a leftist who identified with only one product of white capitalistimperialist Britain: soccer. He says, “People in the Cape follow English football veryseriously. One of my friends, his first child’s name is Shankly [after Bill Shankly, theformerLiverpoolmanager].And this is an activist!You can sayEngland is a bitch onFridaynight,andonSaturdayafternoonyougotoasportspubtowatchEnglishsoccer.”

PeoplearealwayscomplainingthatAmericanculturehasconqueredtheworld.Infact,British culture probably remainsmore dominant. This fadingmidsize island has kept abizarre grip on the global imagination. It’s not only their sports that the Brits haveexported.Theworld’ssixbest-sellingnovelsofthepasthundredyearsareallBritish:fourHarry Potters, one Agatha Christie, and one J. R. R. Tolkien. The world’s best-sellingbandeveristheBeatles.AndthesportsleaguewiththebiggestglobalimpactissurelythePremier League. England has produced few great soccer players, yet on an averageSaturday people in SanFrancisco andShanghai gather in bars for the kickoff atWhiteHartLaneratherthanforanythingfromGermany.

They certainly aren’t watching the NFL. In fact, the United States has rarely evenaspired to vast cultural reach. The Americans fought wars, but mostly tried to avoidcreatinglong-termcolonies,notesJohnGray,emeritusprofessorattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.InVietnamandIraq,forinstance,theaimwasto“goin,dothejob,getout.”UnlikeBritons,Americansgenerallydidn’twanttobeinthebusinessofempire.WeknowanAmericanlawyerwhospentafewmonthsworkingfortheBritishgovernmentduringtheoccupationofIraq.Inthe“GreenZone”inBaghdadhenoticedadifferencebetweenthe way Brits and Americans worked.When American officials wanted an Iraqi to dosomething,thelawyersaid,theywouldgenerallycallthepersonintotheGreenZoneandifnecessary“bawlhimout.”Sometimesthisstrategyworked.Sometimesitdidn’t.ButtheAmericanssummonedIraqisonlywhensomethingneededfixing.Britishofficialsworkeddifferently, said the lawyer. Theywere always inviting Iraqis in, for parties or just forchats, evenwhen therewas nothing in particular to discuss. This was exactly how theBritishhadoperatedbothintheircoloniesandintheir“informalempire”:theymadelong-termcontacts.TheReverendHarrisatClarkeburyschoolmaynotentirelyhaveknownit,butineffecthewasaBritishagentchargedwithteachingMandelaBritishness.

Bycontrast,fewAmericanHarrisesevertaughtbaseballorfootballtobuddingforeignrulers.TherehavebeenahandfulofprominentAmericancolonialists,buttheyaresorare

as to stand out. Douglas MacArthur ruled Japan for years. Hollywood makes itsblockbusterschieflyfortheglobalmarket.Andinsports,theNBA’sformercommissioner,David Stern, spent thirty years interesting foreigners in basketball. ButmostAmericansportingmoguls,likemostAmericanproducersingeneral,havebeensatisfiedwiththeirgiantdomesticmarket.Baseball’slastgreatoverseastourwasin1913–1914,afterwhichAmericansbarelyeventriedtospreadbaseballorfootballabroaduntilthe1990s.

TheAmericanempire’sfavoritegameshavebeennogoodatculturalimperialism.It’sastory told inonestatistic:SuperBowlXLIVin2010brieflybecamethemostpopularTV program in American history, with 106.5 million domestic viewers, yet the mediaagencyFuturesSport+Entertainmentestimatesthatonly4millionpeopleoutsideNorthAmericawatchedit.

WHILEAMERICASLEPT:HOWSOCCERINVADEDTHEUS

After theBritishVictorians spread their games, sports experienced a centuryof relativestability. The Indians played cricket, the US resisted soccer, and the isolated town ofMelbourne favoredAustralian Rules football, which barely existed even in some otherparts of Australia. But from the 1980s, new TV channels—free, cable, and satellite—began mushrooming almost everywhere. They took up the burden of carrying sportsaroundtheworld.WhenBritain’sChannelFourwascreatedin1982,forinstance,itbeganbroadcastingNFL games. Theywere a hit. Suddenly there were people in Norwich orManchester who called themselves 49ers fans. William “the Refrigerator” Perry, thesupersizeChicagoBears lineman,becamea cult hero inBritain.AlistairKirkwood, theNFL’sUKmanagingdirector,fondlyrecallsthatforayearortwointhe1980s,theSuperBowlhadhigherratingsinBritainthanthebelovedsoccerprogramMatchoftheDayonthesameweekend.

Itdidn’tlast.Englishsoccercleanedupitsstadiums,kickedoutmostofitshooligans,solditsrightstoRupertMurdoch’sSkyTelevision,andrevived.EventuallyChannelFourdropped the NFL. The halfhearted American invasion—albeit led by British TV—hadbeenrepelled.

Meanwhile,acrosstheocean,soccerwasslowlyinfectingAmericanlife.EventhoughtheUSalreadyhad fourbig teamsportsandseemed tohavenoneedofanother, in the1970sthegamecamefromalmostnowheretoconquerAmericanchildhoods.ItturnedouttherewasagapintheAmericansportsmarketafterall.ThemostpopularsportintheUS,football,was toodangerous, toomale, and too expensive formassparticipation.Fittingout a kid with all the necessary equipment for football costs around $300 to $400, asignificant expense, especially if the child quickly decides that he doesn’t like beingbeatenup.Today,probablyfewerthan1millionpeopleintheworldplaytacklefootball,comparedtothe265millionwho(accordingtoFIFA)playedsoccerin2006.

VictorianBritonshadconceivedofsoccerasa“man’sgame.”ButAmericanssawthatitwasasoftsport,safeforgirlsaswellasboys.SosoccerintheUSbecameanunlikelybeneficiary of feminism. It did almost as well out of another post-1960s social trend,Mexicanimmigration.Theestimated53millionpeopleofHispanicoriginnowlivingintheUS(upmorethanthreefoldsince1980)outnumberthepopulationofSpain.

The upshot is thatmoreAmerican children under twelve play soccer than baseball,football,andicehockeyputtogether.Contrarytopopularopinion,soccerinAmericahasbeenasuccess.WhenDavidBeckhamjoinedtheLAGalaxy,theclichéwasthathistaskwasto“putsocceronthemap”inAmerica.Infact, thiswasimpossible,becausesoccerwas already “on the map” in America. The US has a strong soccer culture. It’s justdifferentfromanyothercountry’ssoccerculture.Inparticular,itdoesn’trequireastrongdomesticmen’sprofessionalleague.

MajorLeagueSoccerisnotAmericansoccer.It’sjustatinypieceofthemosaic.Kids’soccer, college soccer, women’s soccer, indoor soccer, Mexican, English, and Spanishsoccer,theChampionsLeague,andtheWorldCupbetweenthemdwarftheMLS.Tocitejustoneexample:19.4millionAmericanssaw theircountry lose toGhanaat theWorldCupof2010.InAmericandaytimeonaSaturday,foraroundofsixteengame,thatwasabigger audience than the Fox network averaged for five baseball World Series gamesplayed inprime time later thatyear.That summerof2010,US-Ghanaalsooutdrew theaveragegameintheNBAfinalsbetweentheBostonCelticsandtheLALakers—itselfthemost popular NBA matchup in many years. Moreover, soccer has penetrated mostbranches of the American entertainment industry, from The Sopranos to presidentialelectionsinwhich“soccermoms”havebeentoutedaspivotalfigures.

American soccer people often fret over theMLS’smarginality.AsAmericanwriterDaveEggershasnoted,“Newspapercoverageofthegamesusuallyisfoundinthenetherregions of the sports section, near the car ads and the biathlon roundups.” Some TVratingsforMLSgames“are in therealmof—or, insomecases,actuallybelow—tractorpulls, skateboarding competitions, and bass fishing tournaments,” writes AndreiMarkovits, politics professor at the University ofMichigan. The lowliestMLS playersearnedamodest$35,125ayearin2013.

But to worry about the MLS—which is growing in popularity anyway—is tomisunderstand why so many American suburban families like soccer. The game hasthrivedasapastimeforupscalekidsinpartpreciselybecausethereisnobigsoccerintheUS.ManysoccermomsaregladthatsoccerisnotabigprofessionalAmericansportlikebasketballorfootball.LikealotofotherAmericans,theyarewaryofbig-timeAmericansports,whosestarsdolousyandunethicalthingslikeshootingtheirlimousinedrivers.

By contrast,manymoms see soccer as an innocent game, free of certain aspects ofmodernAmerica:notviolent,notdrenchedinmoney,andnotveryblack.AlargenumberofMLSplayersarewhitecollegeboys.AmericansoccerhasnoCharlesBarkley.

ANYGIVENSUNDAY:ISTHENFLREALLYSOEQUAL?

Clearly,though,theNFLisdoingsomethingright.Herearetheaverageattendanceratesofthemost-watchedleaguesofalltheworld’sballgames:

TheNFLcomes topmeasuredbyattendancepergame,whileMLBiswayahead interms of attendance for the whole season. Aussie Rules clearly dominates in terms ofattendancepercapita(i.e.,attendancedividedbythecountry’spopulation)butthePremierLeague is not far behindwith a rate of 26 percent for the season, compared to only 5percentfortheNFL(andonly16percentforthemuch-fetedBundesliga).Butmeasuredbythenumberoffansinsidethestadiumforanygivengame,noprofessionalleaguecanbegin to rival the NFL. When people try to explain the NFL’s popularity, they oftenmention its famousslogan:“OnanygivenSundayany team inour leaguecanbeatanyother team.”This isaboast thePremierLeaguewouldneverdaremake.Englishsoccerlooks horribly unbalanced, with a few rich teams perennially dominating at the top,whereastheNFLclaimstobealeagueofequals.

Indeed, the NFL is often called “the socialist league.” Its clubs share TV incomeequally, and 40 percent of each game’s gate receipts goes to the visiting team. Thisaspiration to equality is a generalAmerican sporting trait. Clubs inAmerican baseball,basketball,andtheMLSalsosharefarmoreoftheirincomethanEuropeansoccerdoes.TaketheubiquitousNewYorkYankeesbaseballcap.OutsideofNewYork,theYankeesreceiveonlyone-thirtiethoftheprofitoneachcapsold,thesameaseveryotherteaminbaseball. By contrast, Manchester United wouldn’t dream of giving Norwich orSunderlandacutofitsshirts.

Many inEuropeansoccer,andparticularly inEngland,havecome toenvy theNFL.English fansoften complain that their sport is gettingboringbecause thebig clubswineverything.Ahandful of clubs—chieflyManchesterUnited,Chelsea,Arsenal, and nowManchester City—dominate the Premier League. In the Champions League, onlyBarcelonaandBayernMunichusuallybeatthem.EvenEmilioButragueño,whenhewassportingdirectorofpluckylittleRealMadrid,toldtheBBC,“Youneeduncertaintyatthecoreof every competition… .Wemayeventuallyhave something similar to the [salarycap]systemintheUS,togiveachancetoalltheclubs.”

In 2008 Andy Burnham, Britain’s then culture secretary, warned that although the

Premier League was “the world’s most successful domestic sporting competition,” itrisked becoming “too predictable.”He added, “I keep referring to theNFL,which hasequalsharing….In theUS, themostfree-marketcountry in theworld, theyunderstandthatequaldistributionofmoneycreatesgenuinecompetition.”

UEFA’s president Platini seems to agree. Searching for away to even things out inEuropeansoccer,heonceputateamofUEFAofficialsonaplanetotheUS.Perhapstherewassomethingovertherethatsoccercouldcopy.

Peoplewhothinklikethis tendtoaccept twotruisms:TheNFLismuchmoreequalthan European soccer. And sports fans like equality. Unfortunately, neither of thesetruismsistrue.First,theNFLisn’tnearlyasbalancedasitpretends.Second,wehavedatatoshowthatoverall,fanspreferunbalancedleagues.

Atfirstglance,youcouldbeforgivenforbelievingthattheNFLreallyismuchmoreequalthanthePremierLeague.Inthedecadethrough2011,sevendifferentteamswontheSuper Bowl. In the same period, only three teams won the Premier League, withManchester United bagging a snore-inducing five titles. On any given Sunday (orSaturdaylunchtime,Tuesdaynight,whenever),SunderlandorCardiffcanbeatUnited,butthefactisthattheyusuallydon’t.

YetistheNFLmuchmoreequalthanthePremierLeague?Doesithaveamoreevendistributionofwins?Measuringthelevelofequalityinbothleaguesistricky,firstbecausetherearenotiesintheNFLandsecondbecausetheNFL’sregularseasonconsistsofjustsixteen games and the Premier League’s of thirty-eight. In any given season, a weakEnglishteamhasmanymorechancestogetlucky.

Happily,thereisawaytoallowforthesedifferencessothatwecancomparethetwoleagues.Wewilldothisbydreamingupanotherleague,atotallyequaloneinwhicheveryteamalwayshasanequalchanceofwinninganygivengame.Thisequalleaguewouldbealeagueofcoinflips.Obviously,inthecoin-flipleagueeachteamwouldbeexpectedtowinanaverageof50percentofitsgames.Evenso,theoutcomeofanysixteen-orthirty-eight-game sequencewould produce some random inequalities.Hardly any team in thecoin-flip league would win exactly half its games. Rather, the win percentages for theseason would be randomly dispersed around 50 percent. The question then is: Whichlooksmorelikethetotallyequalcoin-flipleague,theNFLorthePremierLeague?

Toworkthisout,wemustcalculatehowrandomthedispersionofwinsisineachofourthreeleagues.Themeasureofdispersioniscommonlycalledthestandarddeviation.Let’scalculatestandarddeviationfor thecoin-flip league,and thenfor theNFLand thePremier League. (And please feel free to skip the next few paragraphs if you aren’tinterestedinthemath.)

Thestandarddeviationofwinpercentagesforanyleagueiscalculatedbyfirsttakingthedifferencebetweeneachteam’swinpercentageand50percent(thedifferencewillbepositive when the team has a winning season, negative for a losing season). Then wesquarethedifference,tomakesureplusesandminusesdon’tcancelout.Nextweaddupthedifferenceforall teamsin the league,andtake thesquareroot.Thatgivesanumber

thatiscomparabletotheaveragewinpercentage.

Nowwearereadytofindthefigurewewant:thestandarddeviation,ordispersionofwin percentages. If our averagewin percentage is 50, a standard deviation of 1wouldmeanthatmostteamsareclosetotheaverage.Ifthestandarddeviationwere20,itwouldmean that there is quite a lot of dispersion. In coin-tossing leagues,we knowwhat thestandard deviation should be: close to half of the reciprocal of the square root of thenumberofgamesplayed.Thisiseasytocalculate.Ifyouplaysixteengames,thesquarerootisfour,thereciprocalisone-quarter,andhalfofthatisone-eighth,or12.5percent.

ThatiswhatthestandarddeviationofwinpercentageintheNFLwouldbeifonanygiven Sunday any team in the league really had a fifty-fifty chance of beating itsopponent.Well, theNFL isnot a coin-tossing league. In thedecade from2002 through2011,thestandarddeviationofwin-lossrecordshasfluctuatedbetween16percentand21percent, and has averaged 19 percent. That’s well above the 12.5 percent of the coin-tossingleague.

ThePremierLeague isonlyslightly lessequal than theNFL. If thePremierLeaguewereacoin-tossingleague,theexpectedstandarddeviationwouldbejustover8percent.In fact, in thedecade from2002 through2011 thePremierLeague’s standarddeviationaveraged 14 percent. So it’s not a coin-tossing league, either, but the difference is notmuchgreaterthanfortheNFL.Toputitanotherway,theNFLhasastandarddeviationabout54percent larger thanacoin-tossing league,while theEnglishPremierLeague isabout74percentlargerthanacoin-tossingleague.Thisisadifference,butinthescaleofthingsnotaverybigone.

Youmightobjectthatevenifthereisn’tahugedifferenceinthestatisticalbalanceoftheNFLandPremierLeague, the identityof thedominant teamsanddoormatschangeseach season in theNFLbutnot in thePremierLeague.Afterall, each season theworstNFLteamgets thefirstdraftpick,avery largehumanbeingwhois infactadeviceforbouncingback.SuddenreversalsoffortunearemuchmorelikelyintheNFL.In2011theIndianapolisColts,havingbeendominant foradecade,enduredaseasonwithonly twowins after their star quarterback,PeytonManning,was injured.This dismal recordwasrewarded with first pick of the 2012 draft. Naturally they chose the Stanford graduateAndrewLuck,thoughttobeoneofthebestquarterbackprospectstocomeoutofcollegeinrecentyears.Thisallowedthemtoreturntotheirwinningwaysthefollowingseason.As thedistinguished“Chicago school” economistsSherwinRosenandAllenSandersonhavepointedout,thePremierLeaguepunishesfailure,whiletheNFLrewardsit.

ButforalltheNFL’sefforts,theidentityofwinnersandlosersisprettystableinbothleagues. The best team in the NFL, the New England Patriots, won 77 percent of itsregular-seasongamesfrom2002through2011.TheColtswon69percentinthatperiod,and thePittsburghSteelers66percent.Well, in thesamedecade in thePremierLeague,ManchesterUnitedwon76percent,Chelsea74percent,Arsenal71percent,andLiverpool65 percent. In otherwords, in theNFL three teams out of thirty-two dominated. In thePremierLeague four out of twentydominatedmarginallymore. It’s hard to sayon thatbasiswhichleagueismorebalanced.

Likewise, thereareasmanylosers intheNFLasin thePremierLeague.From2001through 2010, the Detroit Lions won fewer than a quarter of their games. A very fewteams in thePremierLeaguehavebeen as badorworse—DerbyCounty in 2007–2008managedtowinonematchallseason—butthere’sadifference.CalamitousteamsinthePremierLeaguegetrelegated,whereastheLionssustainedtheirpeculiarbrandofmiseryforadecade.

SotheNFLisn’tmuchmoreequalthanthePremierLeague.Itjustlookslikeitis.Itmanagestolookmoreequalthankslargelytorandomizationdevicesthatensurethatthebest teamdoesn’talwayswin theSuperBowl: first, thesmallnumberof regular-seasongames; second, the playoffs. Both these devices ensure that no NFL team is likely todominateforyearslikeManchesterUnitedhas.However,thisrandomizationcomesattheexpenseof justice.Fansoften feel that thebest team in theNFLdidnotwin theSuperBowl.Infact,theNFLlooksalotliketheChampionsLeague,wheretheknockoutroundsaddarandomelementthatoftenambushesthebestteam.

Thisdisposesofourfirsttruism:theclaimthattheNFLismuchmoreequalthanthePremier League. What about the second one, the notion that sports fans, like Frenchrevolutionaries,desireequality?

If fans want all teams to be equal, then they will shun games in which results arepredictable.Ifso,moreofthemwillwatchgameswhoseoutcomeisveryuncertain.Howto test whether fans really behave like that? Researchers have tried to gauge expectedoutcomesofgameseitherbyusingprematchbettingoddsortheformofbothteamsovertheprevioushalf-dozengames.Studiesofsoccer,mostlyinEngland,showmixedresults.Somestudiesfindthatmorebalancedgamesattractmorefans.Othersfindthereverse.

TheBritisheconomistsDavidForrestofSalfordBusinessSchoolandRobertSimmonsofLancasterUniversityhavedonesomeofthebestworkinthisfield.TheyfoundthatabalancedEnglishgamecouldsometimesincreaseattendance.However,theyalsocarriedouta simulation toshow that if theEnglish leaguesbecamemorebalanced, theywouldattractfewerfans.Thatisbecauseabalancedleague,inwhichallteamsareequallygood,would turn into an almost interminable procession of home wins. By contrast, in realexistingsoccer,someofthemostbalancedgamesoccurwhenaweakteamplaysathomeagainstastrongteam(StokeversusManchesterUnited,forinstance).

ForrestandSimmonsfoundthatthepeoplewhocaremostaboutcompetitivebalancearetelevisionviewers.Thespectatorsatthegroundstendtobethehardcore:theysimplywant to see their team. However, most TV viewers are “floating voters.” When theoutcomeofagameseemstoopredictable,theyswitchoff.ThetwoeconomistsfoundthatthecloseratelevisedEnglishsoccergamewasexpectedtobe(measuredbytheformofboth teams going into the game), the higher the viewing figures onSkyTV inBritain.Still,thesizeofthiseffectwasmodest.ForrestandSimmonssaidthatevenifthePremierLeaguewereperfectlybalanced(in thesense thateachteamhadanequalprobabilityofwinningeachgame),TVaudienceswouldrisebyonly6percent.Thatwouldbeasmalleffectforsucharevolutionarychange.

Amoment’sthoughtsuggestswhysomeunequalgamesmightbeveryattractive.Most

fansinthestadiumarefansofthehometeam,andsotheydonotreallywantabalancedoutcome. Often the most attractive games involve strong home teams playing weakvisiting teams (Manchester United versus Stoke, again), in which case the home teamtypicallyhasalotofsupporterswhoenjoywatchingtheirheroesscorealotofgoals,orthey are games between weak home teams and strong away teams (Stoke versusManchesterUnited),inwhichlocalfanscometoseethevisitingstars.

Furthermore,bigteamshavemorefansthansmallones,andsoifManchesterUnitedbeatsStoke,morepeoplearehappythanifStokewins.Also,fansaresurprisinglygoodatlosing.Psychologicalstudiesshowthattheyareskilledattransferringblame:“Weplayedwell,buttherefereewasgarbage.”Thismeansthatfanswilloftenstickwithateamevenifitalwaysloses.Italsoexplainswhy,themorningaftertheirteamgetsknockedoutoftheWorldCup,peopledon’tsinkintodepressionbutgetonwiththeirlives.

Last,dominantteamscreateaspecialinterestoftheirown.MillionsofpeoplesupportManchesterUnited,andmillionsofothersdespiseit.Inaway,bothgroupsarefollowingthe club. United is the star of English soccer’s soap opera. Everyone else dreams ofbeatingit.MuchofthemeaningofsupportingasmallerclublikeWestHam,forinstance,derivesfromdislikingManchesterUnited.KevinKeegan,whenhewaschasingthetitleasmanager of Newcastle in 1996, thrillingly captured that national sentiment with hisfamous,“Iwillloveitifwebeatthem!Loveit!”monologue.(Unitedbeathiminstead.)BigbadUnitedmakesthePremierLeaguemorefun.

Anotherwayoflookingatcompetitivebalanceistoviewtheleagueasawhole,ratherthanmatchbymatch.Domorespectatorscomewhenthetitleraceisexcitingthanwhenoneteamrunsawaywithit?

Itturnsoutthatathrillingtitleracedoeslittletoimproveattendance.Englishfanswillwatchtheirteamsplayintheleagueevenwhentheyhaven’tahopeofwinningit(orelsedozensofEnglishclubswouldnotexist).

Itistruethatagamehastobesignificanttodrawfans,butthatsignificanceneednothaveanythingtodowithwinningthetitle.AstudybyStephenDobsonandJohnGoddardshowed that when amatchmattersmore either for winning the league or for avoidingrelegation to a lower league, then attendance tends to rise. In every soccer league inEurope,thebottomfewteamsare“relegated”attheendoftheseasontoalowertier.TheworstthreeteamsinthePremierLeague,forinstance,droptotheChampionship.It’sasifthecellarteamsinMajorLeagueBaseballgotexiledtoTripleA.Relegationisbrutal,butthedevicehasageniustoit.TheannualEnglishrelegationbattleboostsfans’interesttothepointthatteamsatthebottomoftenoutdrawteamsatthetopastheseasoncomestoanend. TheNFL, too, could dowith a system of relegation. It would replace loserswithrisingteams.Thiswouldbeinthefans’interest,butnotintheowners’.

Fansneed a reason to care.Mostmatches in thePremierLeague are significant forsomething or other, even if it’s only qualifying for European competition. Given thatgames can be significant in many different ways, it is unclear why a more balancedPremierLeaguewouldcreatemoresignificance.

Thereisathirdwayoflookingatbalance:thelongterm.Doesthedominanceofthesameteamsyearin,yearoutturnfansoff?

Let’s compare a long period with dominance in English soccer to a long periodwithoutdominance:thefairlyequalerathatranfrom1949to1968,andthe“unfair”eraofthePremierLeaguefrom1993to2012.

Inthefirst,“equal”twenty-yearperiod,elevendifferentteamswontheEnglishleague.Themostfrequentchampion,ManchesterUnited,wonfivetitlesintheperiod.Thesecondperiod was far more predictable: only five teams won the title, with United taking itthirteen times. Yet during the first “equal” period, total annual attendance in the topdivisionfellfromanall-timehighof18millionin1949toonly15millionin1968(andeven that figure got a temporary boost fromEnglandwinning theWorldCup in 1966).Duringthesecond,“unequal”period,totalattendancerosefrombelow10milliontoover13million,eventhoughticketsbecamemuchmoreexpensiveandpeoplehadmanymorechoicesofhowtospendtheirfreetime.

AnyonewhodismissesthePremierLeagueas“oneofthemostboringleaguesintheworld”(in thewordsofKevinKeegan),aclosedshopthatshutsoutsmallerclubsfromthelowerdivisions,hastoexplainwhysomanypeoplenowwatchall levelsofEnglishleague football. In the2009–2010season, in thepitsof recession,more than30millionspectatorspaidtoseeprofessionalgamesinEngland,“alevelnotseensincewellbeforethe introduction of all seated stadia [in the early 1990s],” commented Dan Jones ofDeloitte’s Sports Business Group. The Premier League pulled fans even though, asKeeganhasnoted,everyoneknewthetopfinishersinadvance.Yetmorethanhalfofthose30 million–plus spectators watched the Football League, the three divisions below thePremierLeague.Infact,theFootballLeaguethatseasondrewitsbiggestcrowdsinfiftyyears.TheclubsintheChampionship,thesecondtierofEnglishsoccer,havesupposedlybeendoomedtoirrelevancebyManchesterUnitedandcanonlydreamofonedayclingingonatthebottomofthePremierLeague,yettheirdivisionin2010–2011wasthefourth–bestattendedleagueinEurope,rankedbytotalnumberofspectators.

The Premier League’s inequality coexists with rising crowds, revenues, and globalinterest,notleastfromNorthAmericanbusinessmenschooledinAmericanmajorleaguesports: notably, the Glazer family at United itself, Stan Kroenke at Arsenal, and JohnHenryatLiverpool.ThesepeopledonotseemtooworriedaboutcompetitivebalanceinEnglishsoccer.

They have reasons to feel relaxed. The Premier League’s TV income is starting tocatchupwiththeNFL’s.Inthe1970stheNFLgeneratedhundredsofmillionsofdollarsannuallywhensoccerinEuropewasgeneratingalmostnothing.By1980theaverageNFLteamstillhadnearlyasmuchincomeayearasalltheclubsintheEnglishtopdivisionputtogether.In2010–2011theaveragePremierLeagueteamearnedabout$80millionayearfrom TV, while its NFL counterpart did only slightly better with $95.8million. That’spretty good given that England has about 265 million fewer inhabitants than the US.Moreover, the gap between the two leagues has been closing fast, and before long theEnglishmightevenpull aheadas they finally startmakingbigmoneyoutof theglobal

market.OnedaywemightseeEnglishsoccerchairmenbuyingNFLteams.

SomeofEnglishsoccer’scriticshavenotdigestedthesefigures.Whenwepointedoutto Platini at UEFA’s headquarters on Lake Geneva that English stadiums are fullnowadays,hereplied,“Notall.They’refullattheteamsthatwin.”Thisargumentisoftenmadebutflawednonetheless.Wheneverrowsofemptyseatsappearatstruggling teamslikeBlackburn,itisback-pagenews,andregardedasominousforthePremierLeagueasawhole.Yet it’s natural that some fans shoulddesert disappointing teams in small towns(especiallyduringarecession),whileothersflocktoexcitingones.Sunderland,Arsenal,ManchesterUnited,andotherclubshavebuiltbiggerstadiumsandfilledthem.NoteveryEnglishteamhasgainedspectatorssince1992–1993,butmosthave.AlltwentyclubsinthePremierLeaguein2011–2012hadahigheraverageattendancethanin1992–1993.IftheteamhadbeeninthePremierLeaguein1992,theaverageincreasewas48percent;ifithadrisenfroma lowerdivision, theaverageincreasewasanevenmorehandsome93percent.EventeamsthatwereinthePremierLeaguein’92–’93butnotin’11–’12usuallyhad higher attendance—only LeedsUnited, SheffieldWednesday, andOldhamAthleticlostspectators.TherisingEnglishtidehadliftedalmosteveryboat.

Admittedly, today’s large crowds don’t in themselves prove that dominance attractsfans.Afterall,manyother thingshavechanged inEnglandsince themoreequal1949–1968 period. Crucially, the country’s stadiums have improved. However, the risingattendance rates do make it hard to believe that dominance in itself significantlyundermines interest. Indeed, pretty much every soccer league in Europe exhibits moredominancethantheAmericanmajorleagues,yetfansstillgo.

WHYDAVIDBEATGOLIATH

Strangely,itwastheBritishfanzineWhenSaturdayComesthatbestexpressedthejoysofan unbalanced league.WSC is, in large part, the journal of small clubs. It publishesmovingandfunnypiecesbyfansofminnowslikeCreweorSwansea.FewofitsreadershavemuchsympathywithManchesterUnited(thoughsome,inevitably,areUnitedfans).Many of WSC’s writers have argued for a fairer league. Yet in September 2008 IanPlenderleith,acontributorlivingoutsideWashington,DC,arguedinWSCthatAmerica’sMLS,inwhich“allteamsstartedequal,withthesamesquadsize,andthesameamountofmoneytospreadamongitsplayers’wages,”wasboring.Thereason:“Notrulymemorableteamshavethespacetodevelop.”The“MLSiscryingoutforacoupleofbig,successfulteams,”Plenderleithadmitted.“Teamsyoucanhate.Dynastiesyoureally,reallywanttobeat. Right now, as LA Galaxy coach Bruce Arena once memorably said: ‘It’s acrapshoot.’”

In short, theMLS lacks one of the joys of an unbalanced league: theDavid versusGoliath match. And one reason fans enjoy those encounters is that surprisingly often,giventheirrespectivebudgets,theDavidswin.TheeconomistJackHirshleifercalledthisphenomenon “the paradox of power.” Imagine, he said, that therewere two tribes, onelarge,one small.Eachcandevote its efforts to just twoactivities, farmingand fighting.Eachtribeproducesitsownfoodthroughfarming,andstealstheothertribe’sfoodthroughfighting.Whichtribewilldevotealargershareofitseffortstofighting?

Theanswer is thesmall tribe.Thebestwaytounderstandthis is to imagine that thesmall tribe is very small indeed. It would then have to devote almost all its limitedresources to either fighting or farming. If it chose farming, it would be vulnerable toattack.Everythingitproducedcouldbestolen.Ontheotherhand,ifthetribedevotedallits resources to fighting, itwouldhave at least a chanceof stealing some resources.SoHirshleiferconcludes—andproveswithamathematicalmodel—thatsmallercompetitorswilltendtodevoteagreatershareofresourcestocompetitiveactivities.

He found many real-world examples of the paradox of power. He liked citingVietnam’sdefeatof theUS,butonemightalsoadd theAfghan resistance to theSovietUnion in the1980s, theDutch resistance to theSpanish in the sixteenth century, or theAmericanresistancetotheBritishintheRevolutionaryWar.Inthesecasesthelittleguyactuallydefeatedthebigguy.Inmanyothercases,thelittleguywaseventuallydefeated,butatmuchgreatercostthanmighthavebeenexpectedbasedonphysicalresources(theSpartansatThermopylae,theAfrikanersintheBoerWar,theTexansattheAlamo).

Insoccerasinwar,theunderdogtendstotryharder.Bigteamsfightmorebigbattles,andsoeachbigcontestweighsslightly lessheavily than itdoes for theirsmaller rivals.Little teamsunderstand that theymayhave fewopportunities to compete at thehighestlevel, and so theygive it everything.They therefore probablywinmoreoften thanyouwouldpredictbasedonabilityalone.

NOTHINGWORSETHANNEWMONEY

Fansenjoyunbalancedmodernsoccer.Yet thecomplaintsabout its imbalancecontinue.Thecuriousthingisthatthesecomplaintsarerelativelynew,aproductofthepastfifteenor so years. Contrary to popular opinion, soccer was unbalanced in the past, too, butbeforethe1990sfewerpeoplecomplained.

It is a fantasy that Europe was ever a very balanced soccer continent. In smallercountries, clubs from the capital have tended to rule. The Italian league was alwaysdominatedbyJuventus,Milan,andInter,andtheSpanishleaguebyBarcelonaandRealMadrid.Bythe1980sBayernMunichcontrolled theBundesliga,and in thepostwareraEnglishsoccerhasmostlybeendominatedbyManchesterUnited,Arsenal,andLiverpool.United’s thirteen titles in the twenty seasons through 2013 may sound boring, butLiverpoolwontenintwentybetween1969and1988.AlmostallotherclubsaresofirmlyexcludedfrompowerthatevenverybigNewcastlehasnotwonthetitlesince1927.Theimbalance in England as in all European leagueswas reinforced by the European Cup(nowtheChampionsLeague),whichhandedthedominantteamsmoremoney.

TheoldEuropeanCupwasseldommuch fairer than theChampionsLeague isnow.Wesawearlierinthebookthatonlybetween1970and1981didclubsfrommodest-sizetownsregularlywinthetrophy.Usuallythecupwenttothebiggestprovincialcities,ortoMadrid. Even Platini admits, “For forty years it’s been the biggest clubs that won theChampionsLeague;whenIplayed,too.Withorwithouthomegrownplayers,itwasRealMadrid,Liverpool,Manchester,Juventuswhowon.Englishclubswonthecuptentimesinarow,Ithink.No?Inthe1980s.”

Oh,dear.Platini is not going towin anybar quizzes anytime soon. In fact,Englishclubs won six straight European Cups from 1977 through 1982. But his point stands:inequalityinEuropeansoccerisnothingnew.

Platini smiles, thinking again of that English dominance in the 1980s: “It’s funny.Therewerenogreatdebatesthen,saying,‘Wehavetochangeeverything.’Todayit’sthemoneythatmakesthedifference.”

Thatispreciselythepoint.Today’sinequalityinsoccerbotherspeoplenotbecauseitisunprecedented,butbecause it ismoredrivenbymoney than itused tobe. In theolddays,amiddlingsoccerteamcouldsuddenlyenjoyyearsofdominanceifithappenedtohire an excellent manager who signed excellent players. That’s what happened in the1970s to Liverpool under Bill Shankly, or to Nottingham Forest under Brian Clough.Todayamiddlingteamcansuddenlyenjoyyearsofdominanceifithappenstobeboughtbyabillionairewhohiresanexcellentmanagerwhosignsexcellentplayers.ThatiswhathappenedtoChelseaunderAbramovich,andwhatmayhappentoManchesterCityunderAbuDhabianrule.Soinequalityinsoccer,aswellasnotbeingboring, isnotevennew.Allthat’snewisthemoney.

Manypeopletendtofeelthatinequalitybecomesunfairwhenitisboughtwithmoney.ItdisguststhemthatChelsea(ortheNewYorkYankees)cansignthebestplayerssimplybecauseitisarichclub.Thisisamoralargument.It’saformofidealisticegalitarianism,whichsays thatall teamsshouldhavemoreor lessequal resources.Thisstancemaybemorallyright(wecannotjudge),butitisnotapracticalpoliticalagenda,anditprobablydoesn’t reflectwhatmostsoccer fanswant.Spectatorsvotewith their feet. It’scertainlynotthecasethatmillionsofthemareabandoningthePremierLeaguebecausethemoneyoffendsthem.Basedontheevidenceofwhattheygotowatch,theywanttoseethebestplayerscompetingagainsteachother.ManypeoplewillsaytheyfindManchesterUnitedevil.Notmanyseemtofindthemboring.

COUCHPOTATOESANDTHESTRUGGLEFORWORLDDOMINATION

Sometime in the early2000s,whenPaulTagliabuewasNFLcommissioner, he told theteamownerssomethinglikethis:“Youhavetoaskyourself,‘Doyouwantapotentialfanbase of 400million or 4 billion in twenty or thirty years?’”His pointwas that if theywanted4billion,they’dhavetofindthemabroad.

ThatwaswhenthesportingstrugglebetweentheAmericanandBritishempiresfinallygotserious.TheNBAhadbeentryingtoconquertheworldsincethe1980s,butatlasttheNFLplungedin, too.InrecentseasonsithasplayedgamesinLondonandToronto,andthatmaybejustafirststep.

Themarket in sports fans is becomingmore global. Thismeans that a century-oldmodeloffandom—themanwhosupportsthehometownteamheinheritedfromhisfather—iscollapsing.Thenewglobalizedsportsfanwillhappilysnubhislocaldomesticleague.IfyouliveinLondonandyoulikefootball,youprobablysupportanNFLteamratherthansomebunchofno-hopersplayingonaconvertedrugbyfieldafewmilesfromyourhouse.Similarly,ifyouliveintheUSandlikesoccer,youaremorelikelytosupportManchester

UnitedthanyourlocalMLSteam,whichinanycasemaybehundredsofmilesfromyourhouse.EveninArgentina,withitsgreathistoricsoccerclubs,people increasinglywatchUnitedonTV.That’sallthemoretrueintheUS,China,orJapan,countrieswhosesoccerfansmostlycameofageduringthesecondwaveofsportingglobalization.

Thesepeoplewanttoseetherealthing.Globalfanswantgloballeagues.Formostofthem, thatmeans theNBA, theNFL,or thePremierLeague. Itwas thereforewrong toimaginethatBeckhamcouldsaveAmericansoccerbyplayingfortheGalaxy.AmericansoccerisaliveandwellandlyingonthesofawatchingManchesterUnitedonNBC.

The Premier League is going to spread ever further, and the NFLwill try to. Thisstrugglewon’tbe fought to thedeath.There is room for themboth. “Ipersonallydon’tknowanybodywhofollowsonlyonesportandnothingelse,”Kirkwood, theNFL’sUKmanagingdirector,toldus.“Idon’tthinkit’sascompetitiveasitlooks.Wedon’thaveavisionofbeingatop-threesport inBritain.Ifyougointoabigenoughmarket,youcancarveaniche.SoyoucanbeanArsenalfanandaNewYorkGiantsfan.”

SomeArsenalfanshaveprobablybecomeGiantsfans,butwesuspectthatalotmoreGiantsfansarebecomingArsenalfans.LongafterthesunsetontheBritishEmpire,itisachievingaposthumousvictoryinsports.

PARTII

TheFansLoyalty,Suicides,Happiness,andtheCountrywiththeBestSupporters

12THECOUNTRYTHATLOVESSOCCERMOSTWhichcountrylovessoccermost?

Thismightsoundlikeamatteroftheheartthatishardtomeasure,butinfactthedataexist.Lovingsoccerexpresses itself in threemainways:playing thegame,going to thestadium,andwatchingsoccerontelevision.Wehaveinternationalfiguresforallthree.

First, a caveat: not all the numbers are reliable. There are lies, damned lies, andstatistics, and statistics fromoutside theWesternworld tend to be evenworse.WewillthereforelimitourquesttoEurope.Usingabitofjudgment,bytheendofthechapterwewillbeable tosaywithsomeconfidencewhichEuropeancountrycaresmostabout thegame.

PLAYERS:OH,TOBEATINYISLAND

In 2006 FIFA tried to count how many people in the world played soccer. The “BigCount” cameupwith 265million soccer players,more than 90 percent of themmales.Some were registered with proper clubs. The overwhelming majority, though, were“unregistered occasional players” who kicked around with friends on playgrounds andbeaches and five-a-side courts. The only way to find out whether these people playedsoccerwasbyaskingthem—oratleastatinyrepresentativesampleofthem.

Noneof theseobstaclesputoffFIFA.Theorganization is abit vagueabout exactlyhowitgotaholdofthefigures,sayingitused“thestandardpracticeofaquestionnaireaswellasanonlinetool.”ItalsothrewinitsBigCount2000,plusaUEFAsurveyandother“internal analyses,” to “supplement missing data from associations and for plausibilitypurposes.” Reading between the lines of the survey, it seems thatmore than a fifth ofnational FAs didn’t even bother to take part. The whole endeavor was “scientificallyobservedbyLamprecht&StammSFBAG,asocialresearchcompanybased[handily]inZurich.”

FIGURE12.1.Mostenthusiasticsoccer-playingcountries

Anyway,themostambitioussurveyofsoccerparticipationinhistorycameupwithalist of themost enthusiastic soccer-playing countries. China and theUSwere found tohave themost players (26million and 24million, respectively), but of course the keyquestioniswhichcountrieshadthelargestproportionoftheirinhabitantsplaying.Figure12.1showsFIFA’slist.

It’s striking howmany of themost enthusiastic soccer players live on little islandswheretherepresumablyisn’tmuchelsetodobutplaysoccerandwatchthewavesrollin.TheFaeroeIslands,Aruba,Barbados,Vanuatu,Anguilla,Bermuda,Iceland,andtheCookIslands(combinedpopulationabout1million)allmakethetoptwenty.

FIFA’slistisinterestingiftrue.Let’stakethecaseofMali,tenthonthelist.Thisisavastunstablecountrywithpoorornonexistentroads.ItstretchesmuchofthewayacrosstheSahara.Theaverageinhabitanthasadailyincomeofaboutthreedollars.Whoworkedoutthat11percentofthe12millionMaliansplaysoccer?

EventheEuropeanfiguresaredubious.WhentheMulierInstituutintheNetherlandssetouttocollatedataonsportsparticipationintheEU,itbeganitsreportwithaseriesofcaveats. Different countries use different methods to establish how many people playsports,itsaid.“Evenwithinasingleyear,researchconductedinoneandthesamecountrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesintherecordedfiguresforsportparticipationforupto40percent.”

Still, when it comes to European countries at least, FIFA’s list probably has somevalue.That’sbecauseEuropeisanorganizedsortofcontinentwhereahighproportionofthepeoplewhoplay soccerareactually registeredwithaclub.Wehaveagood ideaofhowmanyregisteredsoccerplayersthereare,becauseeveryoneof thembelongstothecountry’ssoccerfederation.SothenumberofregisteredplayersinaEuropeancountryisafair indicator of the total of all its soccer players. By way of reality check, let’s seewhether theEuropeancountriesonFIFA’soverall listofmostenthusiasticplayershadalotofregisteredsoccerplayers,too.

ItturnsoutthatGermany,Holland,Austria,andSweden—allinthetoptwentyofmostenthusiasticsoccercountriespercapita—alsofiguredinFIFA’stoptwentycountrieswiththemost registeredplayers.Furthermore,Slovakiawas in the top twentycountrieswiththemost registeredmaleplayers,even though ithasonly5.4million inhabitants. In theFaeroes,Norway,andIreland,alsoonFIFA’slistofenthusiasticcountries,amammoth10percentorsoofthepopulationwereregisteredplayers.OfthemostenthusiasticEuropeancountries identified byFIFA, only Iceland lagged a bit in registration: just 7 percent ofIcelanderswere registeredplayers.However, aswe’ll see, Iceland—withartificialmini-pitchesatmostofitsschools,andindoorarenasallovertheplace—nowseemstoharboranunusuallyhighamountofcasualkick-aroundsoccer.

So itseemsthat theEuropeancountries inFIFA’s top twentypercapitamightreallyplay a lot of soccer. Without treating the Big Count as gospel, let’s give those nineEuropeancountriesonFIFA’slistalittlestareach,andcontinueourquesttofindthemostenthusiasticofthemall.

SPECTATORS:GREATHORDESOFPEOPLENOTGOINGTOSOCCERMATCHES

Playingisonewayofexpressingaloveofsoccer.Goingtowatchmatchesisanother.

When you think of packed soccer stadiums, you think of England.Visually, soccercrowds are one of the things that the English do best. And everyone knows that thePremierLeaguehasthebiggestcrowdsintheworld.

Well, the second-biggest crowds, anyway. The average attendance in the PremierLeague in 2012–2013 (the season for which we have compared attendances aroundEurope)was35,921.Thatwasnearly7,000fewerthanwenttoseetheaverageBundesligagamethatsameyear.

This fact comes from a weirdly addictive statistics website. The best thing aboutEuropean-football-statistics.co.uk is its collectionof average attendance rates for almosteverysoccerleagueinEurope.ThesestatsgivesurprisinginsightsintofandomandhelprevealwhichEuropeancountryismaddestaboutthegame.

The first thing you notice on thewebsite is howmuch attendance figures fluctuateovertime.Thedataonthesitegobackdecades.Backinthe1980s,whenItalianstadiumswere as safe as family restaurants and Serie A was the world’s best league, ItalianswatchedfarmoresoccerthantheEnglish.Inthe1984–1985seasontheaveragecrowdinSerieAwas38,872.Meanwhile, in theEnglish first division in that year of theHeyseldisasterandthefatalfireatBradfordCity,only21,080bravedtheaverageleaguematch.

How times change.By the 2012–2013 season,SerieA and thePremierLeaguehadprettymuchchangedplaces: theaverage Italiangamedrewonly23,234people, agood12,000fewerthanthePremierLeague.

ManyotherEuropeanleaguesalsohavesharptrendsinattendanceovertime,furtherevidencethatfansbehavemuchmorelikeconsumersthanlikeaddicts.French,German,andDutchattendancerateshavesoaredsincethe1990s.IneasternEurope,bycontrast,weseewhatBrianCloughoncecalledthegreathordesofpeoplenotgoingtosoccermatches.These empty stadiums are a post-communist phenomenon. Back in 1989, NicolaeCeauşescu’slastyearinpower,theaveragecrowdataRomanianfirst-divisionmatchwasofficially 17,000, nearly as many as in England at the time. In 2012–2013 it was just5,184.

The leastpopular league inEuropewasEstonia’s,withanaverageattendance in thecountry’s top division of 215 (presumably not so hard to count). And even given thatRussian men are dying at such a startling rate, it’s disappointing that only 13,180 onaveragebotheredtoturnuptoPremierLeaguematchesthere.TheEnglishChampionship,the level below the Premier League (average: 17,488), was more popular, and in factoutdreweveryleagueinEuropeeastofGermany.TheEnglishandGermansaretheonlyEuropeanswhogotowatchmediocresoccerinnumbers.

However, as a friend of ours inMoscowonce advised, “Never believe anyRussianstatistic.”Paul in ‘tHout, longtimebossofEuropean-football-statistics.co.uk, toldushe

doubted the stats for certain eastern European countries. He got particularly suspiciouswhen the official attendance for a game was reported as a round number—3,000, forinstance—asopposedtoapreciseone,like3,142.Hee-mailed:“InsomeleaguesIfoundfiguresforonegameofforexample2,000and5,000.”HisdoubtsrecallBenford’sLaw,atheoryaboutthefrequencywithwhichdigitswillappearindata.Oneimplicationofthislawisthatdatasetswithlotsofzeroesattheendoftenturnouttobefraudulent.

The western European data on attendances tend to be more reliable. Even there,though,therearedoubts.InEngland,istheattendancethenumberofpeoplewhoactuallywent to the game or the numberwho held tickets for it? After all, many season-ticketholders skip somematches.At a small club at the end of a disappointing season, theymighthavetroublepassingontheir tickets.IncountriessuchasItaly, ticketsellershavebeenknowntowavethroughhundredsofscary-lookingawayfanswithoutanyonepaying.Someturnstileattendantsmightsliptheoddbribeintotheirpocketsandclicksomebodythrough,orletinfriendsforfree.Clubsinsomecountriesmightreportalowerattendancenumber than thereal figure, to reduce the tax theypayon their ticket income.Anyway,there’softennobodyassiduouslycountingbuttsinseats.

Still, the figures onEuropean-football-statistics.co.uk do tell us something.Most ofthemare notmadeup.Especially inwesternEurope, theyprobably correlate to a largedegreewith the number of peoplewho actuallywent to games.Andwe can accept thegeneralfindingthateasternEuropeancrowdsarelow.AglanceatthepicturesonTVtellsus that.Admittedly,wecan’tmakeaprecise rankingofaveragecrowds inallEuropeancountries, but we can identify a few countries where attendance at soccer seems to beparticularlyhighasashareoftheirpopulations.

Thewaytoidentifythesehotspotsisfirsttocountthecombinedaveragecrowdsforthe main professional divisions in each country. Let’s start with the largest Europeancountries,whichtypicallyhavethreeseriousdivisionseach.Englandhasfour,butsoastocompare it to France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, we will analyze only its top threedivisions.

The sixty-eight English league clubs in those three divisions averaged about 1.29million spectators between them in 2012–2013. (The clubs inLeagueTwo, theEnglishfourthtier,averagedanadditional105,000combined,toofewtomakemuchdifferencetothenational total.)That is, over twonormalmatchdays, inwhich every clubplayed athomeat least once, youwould expect1.29millionpeople to showup inEngland’s topthreedivisions.Thatisbynomeansaprecisefigure,butitisprobablyadecentindication.

We thendivided that spectator averageby the country’spopulation.Englandhas53million inhabitants; 1.29 divided by 53 = 0.024. That means that the total combinedspectatoraverageofEnglishclubsequaled2.4percentoftheEnglishpopulation.

It turns out the English were the most enthusiastic stadium-goers of all the largeEuropeancountries.Figure12.2showsthe(veryrough)statsforthetopthreedivisionsofeachbigcountry.

Spain has experienced a sharp fall since 2007–2008,whenwe last calculated these

numbers.Probablybecauseoftherecession,itspercentagedroppedfrom1.9percentthento1.5percenttoday.Spain’saverageinbothcasesincludedonlythetoptwodivisions—all thatEuropean-football-statistics.co.uk had.However, in the other large countries thecrowds for the third division added only between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points to thenationaltotal.

FIGURE12.2.Totalspectatoraverageaspercentageofpopulation,part1

FIGURE12.3.Totalspectatoraverageaspercentageofpopulation,part2

SofartheEnglishhaveliveduptotheirreputationasgreatconsumers(ifnotplayers)of soccer. But when we compare them to the smaller western European nations, theirspectatingbecomeslessspectacular.TheScots,forone,aremuchmoreeagerwatchersofsoccer.CelticandRangersbetweenthemdrewaveragecrowdsofover92,000in2012–2013.That’snotbadinanationof5.3million,particularlyinaseasonwhenRangerswereplaying in the third division. In the typical fortnight that year, a combined total of 1.7percentofScotswatchedeitherCelticorRangersplayathome.The twomostwatchedclubsinEngland,ManchesterUnitedandArsenal,wouldneedhomecrowdsof450,000eachtodrawthesameproportionoftheEnglishpopulation.YoumightevensaythattheEnglisharesomewhatlacklusterfans,giventhattheyhavethebestteamsonearthplayingontheirdoorsteps.Ontheotherhand, theyalsohave topay thehighest ticketpricesonearth.

TheScotsareamongtheEuropeanspectatingelite,ifnotattheverytop.Figure12.3shows the European countries whose inhabitants, according to European-football-statistics.co.uk,weremostinclinedtowatchprofessionalsoccerin2012–2013.

ForScotland,Norway,andtheNetherlands,wecountedattendancefiguresinthetoptwodivisions; for even smallerCyprus, Iceland, and theFaeroes, only the top one.Alltwelveclubs in theIcelandic topdivisionput togetherhada totalaverageattendanceofjust12,684in2013,abitlessthantheSanJoseEarthquakesallbythemselves.However,thatwasprettygoodforacountryofabout320,000peoplewhohadjustdecimatedtheirowneconomybybuyinguphalftheworld’stoxicassets.

Butevenamong thesehigh-flyingcountries,one standsout: the freezingwindsweptFaeroeIslandsofthenorthAtlantic.TheFaeroes’tenfirst-divisionclubs,staffedmostlybymenwhowork infishingorwhaling,havecombinedaveragehomecrowdsof5,070people.Thatfiguremaynotsoundmammoth,butitamountstoawhopping10percentoftheFaeroes’population.Bytradition,thecrowdinvadestheartificialpitchathalftimeandafterthegame.

Internationalgamesdrawabout5,000people to thenationalstadium(whichhandilyhouses a bed-and-breakfast). However, VirgarHvidbro, general secretary of the FaeroeIslandsFootballAssociation, recalls8,000cramming in foragameagainstMalta in thegood old days when regulations were less strict. A rare foreign observer of Faeroesesoccer,theBritishphotographerAndrewTobinexplains:“Watchingthelocalteamisoneof themain activities available in the small townswhich,while oftenverypicturesque,lackmanyother formsofentertainment.”According toTobin,manyFaeroese introducethemselvesfirstwiththeirownname,andsecondwiththenameoftheEnglishclubtheysupport.

Whenitcomestowatchinglivesoccer,noothercountryinEuropeevencomescloseto the Faeroes.We’ve already seen that 17 percent of the islanders played the game in2006. These fishing folk sure do like their soccer. “The importance of football to theFaeroes is almost the same as it is for the Brazilians,” says prime minister Kaj LeoJohannesen,whoisofcourseaformerinternationalsoccergoalkeeper.

Itwouldbesillytotreattheattendancefiguresforthesetopsixnationsasexacttothedecimalpoint.Ontheotherhand, thesearecountries that tend toproducefairlyreliablestatistics. Norway and the Netherlands are wealthy and hyperorganized. Iceland waswealthyuntilitdiscoveredtoxicassetsandremainshyperorganized.TheFaeroesarefairlywelloff, and those5,070 spectators can’tbeverydifficult to count.Scottish soccerhassomemodernstadiumsandvoraciousmarketingofficials,whokeepelaborateelectronicdatabasesoftheirsupporters.Theyhaveaprettygoodideaofhowmanycometomatches.In ‘tHout toldus that he considered theNorwegian, Icelandic, andScottish attendancedata quite reliable, because they were reported as exact figures—3,921 or 5,812spectators.Hewasmore suspiciousofCyprus,where (as ineasternEurope) the figureswerereportedasroundnumberslike2,000or9,000.

Still, we can saywith some confidence that all these top six nations love going towatchsoccer.Theirpositionatthetopoftheserankingsisnotaone-shotdeal.Whenwedidthisexercisein2008,Cyprus,Iceland,Scotland,andNorwaywereallinthetopfour(the website had no attendance figures for the Faeroes back then). People in thesecountrieswatchinastonishingnumbers,givenhowpoortheirleaguesare.ToquoteNickHornby,marvelingatthethousandsofpeoplewhowatcheventhemostpatheticEnglishclubs,“Why,really,shouldanyonehavegoneatall?”

InthecaseofNorwayinparticular,itshouldbenotedthatNorwegiansdon’tjustgotowatchtheirownsoccer.TheygoandwatchEngland’s,too.ObsessionwithEnglishsoccerisnowalmostahumanuniversal—SouthAfricancabinetmeetingshaveoccasionallybeeninterrupted by quarrels over the previous night’sEnglish games—butNorway got therefirst.On Saturday,November 29, 1969, decades before the Premier League hatched itssecret plans for world domination, Norwegian TV broadcast its first-ever live Englishsoccermatch:Wolves1,Sunderland0.Naturally, thenationwashooked.TheSaturdaygame from England fast became an institution. “The most important thing in NorwaywhenitcomestoaffectionforsocceristheSaturdayTVgames,”saysAndreasSelliaas,whoworksforNorskTipping,theNorwegiannationallottery.“MyfathersupportsLeyton

Orient.Why?”

Orient isn’t even the worst of it. Tiny British neighborhood teams like Barnet andRushdenandDiamondshaveNorwegianfanclubs(KingHaraldisanhonorarymemberoftheSpurssupporters’club).ThentherearetheplaneloadsofNorwegianswhocommuteto Old Trafford. According to the British national tourist agency VisitBritain, 80,000NorwegianscametoseeasoccermatchinBritainin2011,morethananyothervisitingnationalityexcepttheIrish.Andwhiledoingallthis,theNorwegiansstillfindtimetoleadtheworldatwintersports.

Norwayandtheotherfiveleadingspectatingcountrieseachgetastarinourquesttofind Europe’s most enthusiastic soccer nation. Four of the top six—Faeroes, Norway,Iceland,andtheNetherlands—alsoappearedinourverycautiouslistofthecountriesthatplayedthemostsoccer.TheFaeroeswereaheadoftheirnearestrivalsinbothcategories,sotheycurrentlyleadtheEuropeanpack.ButtheNorwegians,Icelanders,andDutchalsoenterthefinalroundofourcontestwithtwostarseach.

NATIONSOFCOUCHPOTATOES:THEMOSTPOPULARTVPROGRAMSINHISTORY

Inourquesttoestablishwhichcountrycaresmostaboutsoccer,onestatistictowersoveralltheothers:TVviewingfigures.Afterall,relativelyfewpeopleactuallyplaysoccer—seldom more than 10 percent of a country’s inhabitants—and even fewer watch it instadiums.Inanycase,wehaveseentheflawsinthedataforplayingandspectating.Butwedohavegood figures for themostpopularway to consume soccer:watchingWorldCupsandEuropeanchampionshipsonTV.Viewingfiguresarethefinalpieceofevidencetoassessbeforewecannamethemostsoccer-madcountryinEurope.

TV ratings have plunged over the past thirty-odd years.Once upon a time only theBBCbroadcastinBritain,andsoeveryprogramtheBBCairedhadamarketshareof100percentofviewers.Thentelevisionexpanded:firstcameotherfreechannelslikeITVandChannel Four, and later satellite and broadband cable. Audiences in all rich countriessplintered among the different channels. The share that any one show could commandslumped. In theUS, for instance, thirty-six of the top forty-five shows ever airedwereshown before 1990. No longer does the whole family sit down together to watchM*A*S*HorCheers.Buthere’sthething:allthetopnineAmericanprogramsfrom1990through2008weresportsevents.SevenwereSuperBowls,andtheothertwowereladies’figure skating events from the 1994 Winter Olympics, which people watched largelybecausetheyknewthatoneAmericanskaterhadpaidsomeonetohobbleherrivalonthenationalteam.OnlysportscouldstilluniteAmericansonthesofa.

ItisthesameinGermany,wheresevenoutoftheeighthighest-ratedprogramsfromthestartofTVviewingdatathrough2008involvedtheGermansoccerteamplayinginamajor tournament. InBritainonly the1966WorldCupfinaland the1970FACupfinalreplaybetweenLeedsandChelseamadethetopten.Still,heretoobigsoccertournamentsprovide someof thecommunalglueonce suppliedby tradeunions, churches, and royalweddings.PossiblythebestchanceEnglishpeoplegettobondwitheachothernowadays,unlesstheyareweepingoverthepassingofaroyalorareality-TVstar,isduringaWorld

Cup.BigsoccermatcheshavethatsortofunifyingroleinmostEuropeancountries.

BeforewecanworkoutwhichcountrywatchesthemostinternationalsocceronTV,weneedtoseparatethereliableviewingdatafromthefalseones.OrganizationslikeFIFAandtheInternationalOlympicCommitteereportthehighestnumberstheycan.ThemoreTVviewersaneventattracts, themoreadvertisingwill flow to theevent, and themorebroadcasterswillpaytoscreenit.Hencetheimprobabletalliesthatorganizerssometimescitefortheirevents.AccordingtoFIFA,acool715millionpeoplewatchedtheWorldCupfinalin2006.Eventhisclaimlooksmodestcomparedtothe1.5billionwhosupposedlysawtheopeningceremonyoftheCommonwealthGamesinMelbournein2006.Whattobelieve?

ThisiswhereKevinAlavycomesin.AlavyismanagingdirectoroftheFuturesSport+Entertainmentconsultancy.His job is to sit inLondonworkingouthowmanypeoplereallywatch different sporting events, though in fact he is farmore charming than thatdescriptionimplies.Thisishowhedefineshiswork:“Verysimply,arethesesportseventsworth themassive investment that they typicallycost, andhowcanmyclientsgetevenmorevaluefromtheirassociationwithsport?”

Alavycanbothexplainhowtheinflatednumberswereinventedandgiveadvertisers(and someof the rightsholders) themore reliableestimates theyneed.Healsoextractstrends from themountains of broadcasting data that exist nowadays. For this book, hegaveus some insight into thedatahehasbeengatheringonWorldCups andEuropeanchampionships since1998.Using it,wecan identify themost fanatical soccernation inEurope.

Aroundtheworld,TVdataareextrapolatedfromtheviewinghabitsofasampleofthepopulation—in theUS,about10,000people. Individualsused togetpaida small fee tokeepadiaryof theirTVconsumption.Thencamethe“peoplemeter”:a littleelectronicboxattachedtoaTVsetthatallowseachpersoninahouseholdtoindicatewhentheyarewatching.InventedinBritain,thepeoplemeterisnowusedinmostwealthycountriestomeasureviewing.Alavycallsit“thegoldstandardofglobalmediaresearch.”

Toseehowpeople-meterdatadifferfromtheinflateddata,considertheSuperBowl.ItisindisputablythemostwatchedeventintheUS.ThetenSuperBowlsthrough2008werethe tenmostwatchedAmericanTVprogramsof that decade.But exactlyhowwatchedwerethey?Figuresof750millionto1billionglobalviewerspergamearecited.Instead,usingthepeople-meterdata,AlavyputsatypicalSuperBowl’saverageliveaudienceinthoseyearsatabout100millionviewers,oraboutone-thirdofallAmericansexcludingthe under-five set. (That is a mammoth figure, except when compared to the viewingfigures forbig soccergames.For instance, sixmatches atEuro2004drewa larger liveglobal audience than that year’s Super Bowl.) The inflated figure of “750million to 1billion”isnotanoutrightlie.Rather,itisareasonableguessastothenumberofpeopleintheworldwhocouldhavewatchedtheSuperBowlonTVbecausetheysubscribetotherightchannels.

Using the peoplemeter,Alavyhas collected verifiable viewing figures for sports infifty-fourcountries.Thirty-oneofthecountriesonhislistareinEurope,twelveinAsia,

ten in theAmericas, and only one (SouthAfrica) inAfrica, a continentwhere there isalmostnoseriousmeasurementofviewinghabits.Manypoorercountriesstillusediariesrather than people meters. Even so, for thirty-three of Alavy’s fifty-four countries, wehavefiguresforatleastfourofthesixmajorsoccertournamentscoveredfromtheWorldCupof1998throughEuro2008.

TheviewingfigureAlavyusesforanygivengameoreventisthe“averageprogramaudience.”Thatistheaveragenumberofviewersduringtheentireevent,ratherthanthepeakfigure,whichwouldtypicallybeoneandahalftimeshigher,orthe“reach,”whichincludes anyonewhocaught at least threeminutes.Theaverage audience formanyTVprograms is frighteningly low. In fact, Alavy estimates that on current trends, over aquarter of sports programs around theworld are nowwatchedbynobody. That is, theyhavenomeasurableaudience.

Happily, big international soccer tournaments arewatched bymany people, and notonlybymen.FortypercentoftheglobalaudienceforEuro2004wasfemale,forinstance.It’s precisely the long-term rise in female viewers that hasmade televised soccermorepopular than ever before.Almost any game at aWorldCup andmany in theEuropeanChampionshipnowadayswillbeatthemagicmarkof100millionglobalviewers.Hardlyanything else on television can match that, not even iconic events like the Oscars orBarackObama’sinaugurationorPrincessDiana’sfuneral,saysAlavy.

HereportstheviewingfigureforanygameatthesetournamentsasapercentageofallthepeopleineachcountrywholiveinhouseholdswithTVsets.InmostEuropeannationsalmosteveryhouseholdhasownedasetsincethe1970s.However,thatisnottrueinlessdevelopednations.OnlyaboutaquarterofIndia’spopulationof1.2billion,forinstance,livedinhouseholdswithTVsin2008.

Alavy’scollection isa treasurechest: thousandsofTVratingscoveringhundredsofgamesbetweennationalteamsscreenedinfifty-fourcountriessince1998.Butthereisanobvious problem: Germans probably watch a lot of games involving Germany, andGermanyhasaprettygoodrecord;howtocomparetheviewingfiguresofthesuccessfulGermans with the not-quite-so-successful English? Indeed, how to compare GermanviewingofEuro2008,wheretheirteammadethefinal,toviewingbytheEnglish,whoseteamdidn’tevenqualify?Ortociteanothercomplication:acasualfanwhowatchesonlyhisownnationalteamissurelynottobecomparedtothefanaticwhogluesherselftothesofa for everymatchof the tournament.Goingone step further,viewers inMalaysiaorColombiawho follow theEuromust surely be considered to have reached the acmeofperfectioninfandom.

There are other problems. The World Cup in Japan and Korea had disastrous TVratings inEurope, becausemost gameswereplayed in theEuropean latemorningor atlunchtime.ThatiswhyFIFAwassoeagertokeeptheWorldCupof2010inSouthAfricadespitealltheproblemsthere:JohannesburgisusuallyonthesametimeascentralEurope,making it ideal for European viewers. It’s less convenient for Americans. In all theagonizingovertherefusalofAmericanstowatchsocceronTV(asopposedtoplayingit,whichAmericanchildrendoingreatnumbers),anobviousbutoverlookedexplanationis

that most of the best games are played in Europe at times when most Americans areworking. In2014, for the first time in twenty years,Americanswill have aWorldCupmore or less in their own time zones (but even then most kickoff times have beenscheduledtosuitEuropeans).

Wealsoneed tocontrol for the significanceofeachmatch.Obviously the finalwilldrawmoreviewersthanagroupmatch,buthowmanymore?

Inshort,notwoofourthousandsofratingsarestrictlycomparable.Happily,thereisawaytocontrolforthedifferences,andsotostripdowntotheessenceofTVfandom.Wecanexpectviewinglevels ineverycountry torisefor thefinalofa tournament.Wecanalso expect an uplift when the country’s own national team plays, or when a game isshown inprime time.Weneed towheelout the techniqueofmultiple regression.Quitesimply, multiple regression is a mathematical formula (first identified by themathematicianCarlFriedrichGaussin1801)forfindingthecloseststatisticalfitbetweenone thing (in this caseTVviewing figures) and any other collection of things (time ofmatch,whoisplaying,andsoforth).Theideaisbeautifullysimple.Theproblemusedtobe the endless amount of computation required to find the closest fit. Luckily,moderncomputershavereducedthisprocesstothepressofabutton(justlookup“regression”onyourspreadsheetpackage).

Whenyouhavemanyobservations—likethethousandswehavehere—theregressiontechnique is extremely powerful. Not only does it give you a precise figure for theinfluence of one factor on another, but it can also tell you how reliable that statisticalestimateis.Forexample,theregressioncanshowthatplayingagameinprimetimewilladd,say,4percenttothesizeoftheaudience,anditcanalsosaythattheprobabilitythatthisestimateismistakenislessthan1percent.

Runningaregressionwillallowustoisolateeachcontributoryfactor—suchaskickofftime—andmeasureitsimpactonattendance.Notonlywillthistellusagreatdealaboutwhatattractsviewers to televisedsoccer,but thefinal figureweare leftwithafter theseregressionsconsistsoftwoparts.Onepartiswhatiscalleda“randomerror”:thatwhichwecannotexplainbecauseweknowtoolittleaboutwhathappenedontheday.Theotherpart,though,isa“fixedeffect”:anestimateoftheviewingsharethatasoccermatchwillachieveinagivencountry,strippedofallothercharacteristicslikekickofftime,identityofteams,stageinthetournament,andsoon.Thefixedeffectiswhatweareafter.ThesizeofthefixedeffectineachcountrywilltellushoweagerthatcountryistowatchinternationalsocceronTV.

Themethodworks like this: ourdata show that the fixed effect for theUK is 6.98.Thismeansthatjustunder7percentofallBritishhouseholdswithTVsetswillwatchaWorld Cup or European championship game, regardless of its characteristics. SevenpercentistheproportionofBritsthatwecanexpecttohavewatched,say,TunisiaversusSaudiArabiaattheWorldCupof2006.However,ifthegameisplayedinthemiddleofprimetime(meaningakickoffbetween7and8:45P.M.),thetotalofBritishviewersrisesbyabout4.3percent.Ifthegameisasemifinal,viewinggoesupanadditional5.6percent.

SoourregressionswouldleadustoestimatetheBritishaudienceforeachWorldCup

semifinalin2006at16.9percent:thecoreaudienceof7percentwouldhaverisenby4.3percent because each game kicked off in prime time, and by an additional 5.6 percentbecause it was a semifinal. The actual viewing figures for each game were within 2percentagepointsofourestimates.

Bynomeansperfect,butoverthehundredsofgamesseeninfifty-fourcountries,theerrorsarerelativelysmall.Theaverageratingfigureforeachgametakenacrossallfifty-fourcountriesis8.6percent.Again:thatistheproportionofhouseholdswithTVsetsthatwatched thegame.Formore than three-quarters of our estimates, the errorwas smallerthanhalfthisnumber.Sowhilewecannotplacetoomuchweightonanysingleestimatefor a particularmatch seen in a specific country, overall the regression summarizes thedataprettywell.Theregressioncaptures justover two-thirdsof thevariationinviewingfigures.Theremainingthirdofthevariationisduetounexplainedrandomfactors.

Beforeweaskwhichcountriesarethebiggestsoccercouchpotatoes,let’spickaparttheother regressioneffects forwhat they tellusabout fandom.Wefound thatonly twotime-of-day effectsmattered: gamesplayedduring “sleep time” (midnight to5:40A.M.)reduced theaverageaudienceby3.6percentagepoints,whileprime timeaddedabout4percentagepointsdependingontheexacttime.

The significance of amatchwas crucial. In the group stages, if one or both teamsplayinginthethirdmatchwerealreadyknockedout,theTVratingfell.Ifbothteamswereout, thegame lost4.7percentagepointsof its rating—agiant loss, sincea ratingof4.7percentisusuallyenoughtokeepaseriesonTVinthefirstplace.

Yet when one or both teams in a third group game had nothing much to play forbecausetheyhadalreadyqualifiedforthenextround,viewingfiguresbarelyfell.Socceris soap opera. We watch it because of the story that unfolds after the game, not justbecauseofthegameitself.Aslongasateamisstillinthetournament,itsstorycontinues.

Viewingfiguresrisesteadilyforeachroundofatournament.TheWorldCup’sroundofsixteenadds1.4percenttotheaudience,whilequarterfinalsadd2.5percent,semifinals5.6percent,andthefinalitself10.1percent.Eventhematchforthirdplace,oftenmockedas meaningless, raises audiences by 4.9 percent—only slightly less than the semifinaleffect.UEFAdropped the third-placeplayoff from theEuropeanChampionship in1984becausethegamewasthoughttobeboring.PerhapsUEFAshouldreconsider.

Besides timeandsignificanceof thematch,a thirdeffectsometimesmatters:whoisplaying.Braziliseverybody’s“secondteam.”Despitegettingdullersince1970,theteamcontinued to command a viewing premiumof 2.2 percentwhenever it played.Weirdly,only oneother national teamconsistently enhancedviewing figures across all fifty-fournationsinAlavy’sdatabase:notItalyorHollandorArgentinabut,yes,England.ItsgamesboostedglobalTVratingsby1.4percent.

Tosumup,imagineaWorldCupfinalplayedinmid–primetimebetweenEnglandandBrazil. This would add 10.1 (the final effect) + 4 (prime-time effect) + 1.4 (Englandeffect)+2.2(Brazileffect)=17.7percenttoaverageviewershipexpectedinanycountry.

Thereisonelastfactortoconsider:nationalism.Itseffectisenormous.Foranygame,

foranycountry,broadcasting thenational teamaddedanaverageof17.9percent to theaudience. It appears that for the average person on earth, simply watching his ownnationalteaminahumdrumgroupmatchismoreattractivethanwatchingEnglandversusBrazil in the World Cup final. People who love soccer are vastly outnumbered bynationalistswhotuneinonlyfor“ourboys.”

If England did play Brazil in aWorld Cup final in prime time, howmany Britonswould watch? Our model would predict 7 percent (the core audience) + 17.9 (thenationalisteffect)+16.3(theprimetime,final,and“Brazil”effects)=41.2percent.Thatwouldequalabout25millionviewers. In fact, this isalmostcertainlyanunderestimate,partly because it wouldn’t count the people watching in pubs and other public places.Predictionsabouteventsthatarebothextremelyrareandimportantareinevitablysubjecttowidemarginsoferror.Thesameproblemafflicts forecasting in financialmarkets:nostatisticalmodelcanaccuratelypredictameltdownof thestockmarket liketheonethathappenedin2008.Wehaveagoodideaofhowregular“small”factorslikethetimeofdaywillaffectviewingfigures.Wearemuchlesspreciseabouttheeffectofbigone-shotdealslikethecountry’sownnationalteamplayingafinal.

FIGURE12.4.Thebiggestsoccercouchpotatoes

Now we can finally open the last door: After correcting for all incidental factors,whichcountryhasthehighestTVratingsforWorldCupsandEuropeanchampionships?

Andthewinneris:Croatia!AlavynotesthatCroatpassiongoesbeyondsoccer.“Theyalsohaveveryhighratings inothermajorsportingevents,”hesays.For instance,whenCroatiaandSpainmetintheworldhandballfinalin2005,averageratingsinCroatiawerenearly four timeshigher than inSpain.Thisenthusiasmmaystemfromhaving recentlyfought for independence inanationalistwar,or itmay justbebecauseCroatiahasverygoodsportsteams.

The other European countries that watch the most international soccer—theNorwegians, Dutch, Danes, and Serbs—also have relatively small populations andrelatively big soccer reputations. Quite likely, small nations score high in our rankingsbecausetheytendtobemoreinterestedinwhatisgoingonoutsidetheirbordersthanbignationslikeFranceorMexico.Alavynotes,“Tohavehighaverageratings,it’sallabouthavingahightendencytowatchwhenyourlocalheroesarenotplaying.”

Britain,forallitsclaimsofsoccerobsession,isstuckinwhatAlavycalls“akindofmidtable mediocrity,” sandwiched in eighteenth place between Romania and Lebanon.Germanyhas themost eager couchpotatoes amongEurope’sbig countries.Eleventh inthe table, the Germans would be even higher but for their new custom of “PublicViewing,”as theycall it in their impenetrable language.Since2006, theyhave taken towatching games in huge crowds on big screens outside.About 12millionGermans areestimatedtohavechosenthismethodtowatchtheirteamlosetoItalyinthatyear’sWorldCup semifinal. The figure was particularly impressive given that the 30 million otherGermans who watched at home were by themselves the country’s largest-ever TVaudienceuptothatpoint.DuringEuro2008,the“FanMile”bytheBrandenburgGatein

Berlinhadtobeclosednearlythreehoursbeforethefinalbecauseitwasalreadypackedwithnearlyhalfamillionsinginganddancing“publicviewers.”YetthesepeopledonotshowupinGermany’speople-meterdata.

Generally, European countries dominate at the top of Alavy’s table. Partly this isbecause mostWorld Cup games are played at times designed to suit them. There is avicious (or virtuous) cycle here: because Europe has high viewing figures for soccer,WorldCupsareoftenheld inEurope,andsoEuropean teamsdowell,andsoEuropeanviewing figures are high. Only as Asians become richer and more enthusiastic aboutsoccermightthischange.Chineseprimetimecouldbeaverylucrativemarketoneday.

FIGURE12.5.Least-enthusiasticnations

TheAsianfiguresinourtableneedapinchofsalt.TheKoreanfiguresarefor2002to2008, so they benefited from the “halo effect” created by South Korea’s run to thesemifinal in 2002.Moreover, inKorea and Indonesia theWorld Cup is hard to escapebecauseitisoftenshown“wall-to-wall”onseveralchannelssimultaneously.Bycontrast,SingaporescoreshighpartlybecauseonlythebestWorldCupmatchesareshownthere—andpartlybecauseSingaporeanslovebettingonsoccerthewayotherpeoplelovesoccer.

Figure12.5showsAlavy’sleastenthusiasticnations.

The Taiwanese must really not like soccer. Of course, even they cannot achieve anegative rating in practice, but our data combine the actual viewing figures with thespecificcharacteristicsofeachgame(timeofday,groupmatch,andsoforth)toproduceafinalfigure.InreallifetheTaiwanesenumbersdidnotcomeoutfarfromzero.NordidtheratingsfortheUSandIndia,thoughviewingrosesharplyinbothcountriesfortheWorldCupof2010.AnoddityoftheUSisthatitistheonlycountrywherethenominalnationalteamoftendoesnot draw thehighest ratings.At theWorldCupof 2006, viewers therepreferredwatchingBrazil,Italy,andMexico.FormanypeoplelivingintheUS,ofcourse,thesearetheirtrue“home”teams.

Americans, Indians, andTaiwaneseat leasthaveanexcuse fornotwatching soccer:theypreferothersports.Thenations that standoutamongAlavy’s leastenthusiasticareMexico and Ukraine, which both have respectable traditions in soccer. Indeed, severalothercountriesthatdon’tcaremuch—Spain,Portugal,andFrance—havesomeofthebestsoccer teamson earth.Alavynotes that Spanish audiences for international sports havetraditionallytendedtoberelativelylow,perhapsbecauseofthecountry’sregionaldivides.ManyBasques, for instance, did notwant to follow a Spanish “national” team.That isnow changing: Spanish viewing figures shot up during Euro 2008 even before Spainreachedthefinal,andthenagain,forobviousreasons,attheWorldCupof2010.

The problem, in terms of our quest for Europe’s most soccer-crazy nation, is thatAlavydidn’thaveTVviewingfiguresfortwoofourcontenders,IcelandandtheFaeroeIslands.Itmaybethattheentirepopulationofbothcountrieswatcheseverygameofeveryinternationalsoccertournament,eventhegoallesstiebetweenBoliviaandSouthKoreaintheWorldCupof1994,buthe justdoesn’tknow.Wecheckedwithsomehigh-poweredFaeroestelevisionexecutives(theplacehashadTVsincetheearly1980s),andeventhey

don’t have any viewing figures. “The islands prettymuch sit down forWorldCup andEuropeanfinals,”HvidbrooftheFaeroesFAassuredus.However,intheabsenceofhardnumberswehavetoruletheislandersoutofourquest.Theycancontentthemselveswithaveryhonorablemention.

Icelandisadifferentmatter.Itintroducedpeoplemetersonlyin2007,andanywayistoosmallamarketforFuturesSport+Entertainmenttohavebotheredtotrackitsviewinghabits.ButwewentandfoundsomeIcelandicfigures.FIFAproducedanunprecedentedlyrigorousreportonworldwideviewingofthe2010WorldCup.Thereport,writtenbytheresearch consultancy KantarSport, drew on well-sourced viewing figures from nationalTV stations around theworld.Again,we’ll just look at the European figures. The keynumber, for us, is the average TV ratings for livematches—i.e., the percentage of thepossibletotalaudiencethatwatchedtheaveragematch.TheleadingEuropeancountriesasrankedbyKantarSportandFIFAareshowninFigure12.6.

FIGURE12.6.ViewingofWorldCup2010(Europeancountriesonly)

Iceland’sfirstplaceisimpressivegiventhatthecountry’sTVbroadcast250hoursoflivematchesfromSouthAfrica,morethantwiceasmuchasNorwegianTV,and90hoursmore thanDutchTV. Icelandersdidparticularlywell tooutwatch theDutch, given thatthey themselvesdidn’thaveadog in the fightwhereasHollandwentall theway to thefinal.

THECOUNTRYTHATBOUGHTWESTHAM

Iceland, the land of fish, volcanoes, and endlesswinters, is officiallyEurope’s kookiestnationaboutsoccer.

Just to recap: here is how it won our award. In our first category, playing soccer,Germanyand theFaeroesscoredhighest inEurope,at leastaccording toFIFA.Austria,Norway,Slovakia,Sweden,Iceland,Holland,andIrelandfollowedatsomedistance.

Oftheseenthusiasticplayingcountries,themostenthusiasticaboutspectatingweretheFaeroes, with Iceland a distant second. Somewhat further behind, the Dutch andNorwegiansalsowenttolotsofgames,asdidtheScotsandCypriots.

So our third category, TV viewing, had to provide the decider between the front-runners: the Faeroes, Norway, the Netherlands, and Iceland. Norway and Hollandregistered among the Continent’s leading couch potatoes as compiled by Kevin Alavy,alongsideDenmarkandCroatia.(Inthepreviouseditionofthisbook,whenwedidn’tyethaveviewingfiguresforIceland,wenamedNorwayasthemostsoccer-lovingcountryinEurope.)

TherearenoTVdatafor theFaeroes.ButIceland’sviewingof the2010WorldCupblewawayeventheDutchandNorwegians.GiventhattheIcelandersalsoledthesetwonationsingoingtothestadium,theyclearlyhaveanunhealthyobsessionwithsoccer.

Insomeways,Iceland’sstoryisverylikeNorway’sortheFaeroes’.Icelandtooisasocial democracy,whose government does its best to give all inhabitants the chance toplay sport. It’s also a cold country, with long winters, which Icelanders tend to spend

hunkered down inside, either working hard or drinking hard while they wait for thesummerpartyingseason.What todowhilehibernating?VidarHalldórsson,anIcelandicsportssociologist, says:“WegrewupwatchingEnglishfootballonTV,fromthe1970s.The onlyTV station in Iceland showedEnglish games once aweek, onSaturdays (notlive,butaweeklater).Theyweretheonlyprofessionalsportswesawthen.”InasurveyofIcelandicmenin2003,Halldórssonfoundthat88percentcouldnameafavoriteEnglishsoccerteam.AronJóhansson(raisedinIcelandbutnowanAmericaninternational)recallsboys fighting in the streetsofReykjavikoverEnglish soccer results. “Thatpassionwasvery deep,” he says. It’s a passion that arguably reached its apogee in 2006 when thebillionaire Björgólfur Guðmundsson—then Iceland’s second-richest man after his son,Björgólfur Thor—boughtWestHamUnited.After the financial crisis struck Iceland in2008,ForbesmagazinerevaluedGuðmundsson’sestimatednetworthfrom$1.1billiontozero.In2009hewasdeclaredbankrupt.Still,nodoubtthepassionremained.

Bythen,also,Icelanderswerefinallyplayingsocceryear-round.Iceland’sleaguerunsfromMaytoSeptember—“theshortestfootballseasonintheworld,”thecountry’ssoccerfederationproudly calls it.But in the late 1990s, Icelandbeganbuilding an all-weathersoccer infrastructure thatmay be unparalleled on earth.Over 110 Icelandic schools gotartificialmini-fields, and there are now seven heated indoor halls with full-size soccergrounds.NowadaysIcelanderscanplayeveninwinter,whethertheybelongtoaclubornot.

Playing sport is a part of life in Iceland, especially in the villages. Gender barelymatters: nearly a quarter of the country’s registered soccer players are girls aged undereighteen.Even six-year-oldkids are trainedbyqualifiedpaid soccer coaches.And theyusuallyplayothersportsbesides.

SportinIcelandissomethingyoudoveryseriously,forfun,whilecontinuingreallifeontheside.Therecan’tbemanycountrieswherethenationalteam’sgoalkeeperisalsoaprofessional filmmaker. Hannes Thor Halldórsson actually shot the commercial forIcelandairthatfeaturedhisownteam.“Itwasweird,”hetoldSportsIllustrated.“Ihadtoact in thecommercialaswell, so Iwasdirecting thecommercial in thenationalkitandboots.” Meanwhile Iceland’s legendary handball captain, Olafur Stefansson, seemed toregardhimselfprimarilyasanexistentialistphilosopher.WhenweaskedhimduringtheLondonOlympicswhatahandballgoldwouldmeanforthelittlecountry,herepliedthathewasunabletoanswer:“Youhavesomanydifferentrealities.Thegameis—whatisit?asimulacrumoflifeitself,maybeinsimplifiedterms.”

In Beijing in 2008, Stefansson’s team had beaten Spain in the Olympic semifinal.During that game, “there was not a single transaction made on the Icelandic stockexchange,” says the sociologistHalldórsson.Stefansson’smenendedupwith silver.NocountrythatsmallhadeverwonanOlympicmedalinateamsport.

Icelanders excel in many different competitions—they have wonMissWorld threetimes—butsocceriswhatreallydoesitforthem.InNovember2013Icelandonlyhadtobeat Croatia in a playoff to become the smallest nation ever to reach theWorld Cup.Beforethehomematch,thesoccerfederationputthe9,800ticketsavailabletoIcelanders

upforsaleat4A.M.,worried that itswebsitewouldcrash if itopenedsales indaytime.Theticketsweregonebeforethesunrose(admittedlynotdifficultinanIcelandicwinter).Sadly,Icelandlost2–0overtwolegs.ButifthesepeopleevermakeittotheWorldCup,theymightreallystarttolikesoccer.

13ARESOCCERFANSPOLYGAMISTS?ACritiqueoftheNickHornbyModelofFandom

Justthisoneafternoonstartedthewholethingoff—therewasnoprolongedcourtship….Inadesperateandpercipient attempt to stop the inevitable, Dad quickly tookme to Spurs to see JimmyGreaves score fouragainstSunderlandina5–1win,butthedamagehadbeendone,andthesixgoalsandallthegreatplayersleftmecold:I’dalreadyfallenfortheteamthatbeatStoke1–0fromapenaltyrebound.

—NickHornbyinFeverPitch(1992),ontheoriginofhislifelongloveofArsenal

FeverPitchisawonderfulmemoir,themostinfluentialsoccerbookeverwritten,andanimportantsourceforourimageofthesoccerfan.The“Fan,”asmostBritonshavecometothinkofhim,isacreaturetiedforlifetotheclubhefirst“fellfor”asachild.HornbysayshisloveofArsenalhaslasted“longerthananyrelationshipIhavemadeofmyownfreewill.” But is Hornby’s “Fan” found much in real life? Or are most British soccersupportersmuchlessloyalthantheworldimaginesthemtobe?

Let’sstartwithHornby’sversion,becauseit is theacceptedstoryof theBritishFan.Asfaraslifeallows,theHornbyesqueFanseesallhisclub’shomegames.(It’sacceptedevenintherhetoricoffandomthattravelingtoawaygamesisbestlefttounmarriedmenundertheageoftwenty-five.)Nomatterhowbadhisteamgets,theFancannotabandonit. When Hornby watched the Arsenal of the late 1960s with his dad, the team’sincompetenceshamedhimbuthecouldnotleave:“IwaschainedtoArsenalandmydadwaschainedtome,andtherewasnowayoutforanyofus.”

“Chained”isaveryHornbyesquewordforaFan’sfeelingsforhisclub.OftentheFanuses metaphors from drugs (“hooked”) or romantic love (“relationship,” “fell for”).Indeed,someadultEnglishmenwhowouldhardlydaretelltheirwivesthattheylovethemwillhappilyappearinpublicsingingoftheir loveforaclub,orforaplayerwhowouldsnubtheminanightclubiftheyevermanagedtosneakpasthisentourage.

NowondertheFan’sloyaltytohisclubissometimesdescribedasabondstrongerthanmarriage.RickParry,aschiefexecutiveof thePremierLeague in the1990s, recited thethendominantclichéaboutfandom:“Youcanchangeyourjob,youcanchangeyourwife,butyoucan’tchangeyoursoccerteam….Youcanmovefromoneendofthecountrytoanother,butyounever,ever loseyourallegiancetoyourfirst team.That’swhatEnglishsoccer is all about. It’s about fierce loyalty, about dedication.” (TheArgentine variant:“Youcanchangeyourwife—butyourclubandyourmother,never.”)Recently, inmoremetrosexual times, soccerofficials trying toemphasize thestrengthofclubbrandshaveextended the cliché by one more attachment: you can even change your gender, theofficialssay,butnotyourclub.

Ideally, theHornbyesqueFansupportshis local team(even ifHornbydidnot).ThisgivestheFanroots,asenseofbelonging.Inawonderfulessayonfandominthehighbrowjournal Prospect, Gideon Rachman quotes an archetypal declaration of faith from a

CarlisleFannamedCharlesBurgess,whowroteinTheGuardian,“Thereneverwasanychoice. My dad… took me down to Brunton Park to watch the derby match againstWorkingtonTown justafterChristmas41yearsago—Iwashookedandhavebeeneversince….Mysupporthasbeenaboutwhoweareandwherewearefrom.”

InreallifeRachmanisacommentatoroninternationalpoliticsintheFinancialTimes,but his essay in Prospect is a key text in the British debate about fandom. It is theanti–Fever Pitch. In it, Rachman outs himself as a “fair-weather fan, an allegiance-switcher,”whoatdifferent times inhis lifehas supportedChelsea,QPR,andSpurs.Socasualarehisallegiances thathe registeredwithFIFAfor theWorldCupof2006asanIvoryCoastsupporter,figuringthathewouldn’tfaceasmuchcompetitionfortickets.Hegotintoeveryroundincludingthefinal.HewenttotheWorldCupinSouthAfricaasaregisteredParaguayfan.

Rachman treats the passions of Hornbyesque Fans as slightly bizarre. After all, inEnglandaFan’schoiceofteamislargelyrandom.Fewclubshaveparticularreligiousorclassaffiliations,andfewEnglishpeoplehaveanattachmentdatingbackgenerations toanyparticularlocation.Somechildrenbecomefansoftheirlocalteam,howeverterribleitmightbe,butifyouliveinaruralpartofEnglandlikeCornwallyoumayhavenolocalteam,whileifyouliveinLondonoraroundManchesteryouwillhavemany.AsRachmanasks,“WhydevoteahugeamountofemotiontofavoringonepartofwestLondonoveranother?”

Nonetheless, the Hornbyesque Fan is a widely admired figure in Britain, at leastamongmen.Whereasfanaticisusuallyapejorativeword,aFanissomeonewhohasrootssomewhere. As we will argue later, this respect is connected to the quirks of Britishhistory:inBritain,rootsofanykindareinshortsupply.

However, our first question is: How true is the Hornbymodel of fandom?Does itreallydescribethewaymostBritishfansfeelabouttheirclubs?

THECHINESESERIALFAN

Verylittleisknownaboutsportsfanswhoarenothooligans.TheacademicsD.L.WannandM.A.Hamletestimatedin1995thatonly4percentofresearchonsportsconcentratedonthespectator.

So we start our quest into the nature of fandom with only one or two fairly safepremises.One is that foreign fansofEnglishclubs, at least, arenot allmonogamous intheir devotion. Rowan Simons explains inBambooGoalposts, his book about Chinesesoccer,thatmanyChinesefanssupport“anumberofrivalteamsatthesametime”andarealwayschangingtheirfavoriteclub.Simonsadds,“SodominantistheserialsupporterinChinathatitisquiteraretofindafanwitharealunflinchingloyaltytooneteam.”

FIGURE13.1.FanestimatesforManchesterUnited

StephanusTekle,seniorconsultantatthemarketresearchersSport+Markt,haspollingdata tobackupSimons’sclaim.Teklesays thatsince the late1990shordesofnewfansaround the world—particularly women—have come to soccer without long-standingloyalties.Many of these people appear to be “serial supporters” who probably supportManchester United and Liverpool, or Real Madrid and Barcelona, simultaneously. Nowonder thatclubs likeUnitedorRealkeepchanging theirguessesas tohowmanyfansthey haveworldwide. Figure13.1 presents a few ofUnited’s estimates of the past fewyears.

Noneoftheseestimatesisnecessarilywrong.Theremaywellbe659millionpeopleon earth who have feelings for Manchester United. However, few of these “fans” arelikelytobelifelongHornbyesquedevotees.JoseAngelSanchez,nowdirectorgeneralofRealMadrid,aclubwithitsownshareofforeignserialsupporters,thoughtmanyoftheseserialfansmighteventuallyevolveintoHornbys.Hetoldusin2003,“Weusedtosaythatthechancesofchangingyour teamis less thanchangingyourpartnerorevenyoursex.ButthewaythatpeopleentersoccerinAsiaisdifferent:theyenterthroughthestars.Butthiswillnotstaythisway,inmyopinion.”Well,perhaps.

Still, surely British fans are a lot more loyal than those fickle Chinese, right?Unfortunately, polling suggests otherwise. In 2008Sport+Markt found thatChelseahad2.4million“fans”inBritain.AgainaccordingtoSport+Markt, thatrepresentedariseof523percentinthefiveyearssinceRomanAbramovichhadboughttheclub.Yeteventhatfigureof2.4millionrepresentedaswiftdecline:in2006,when,nodoubtcoincidentally,Chelsea had just won the league twice running, Sport+Markt credited the club with amammoth3.8millionBritishfans.

Again,wearenotsayingthatSport+Markt’sfigureswerewrong.Rather,itspremisewas.To serial supporters, thequestion“Which isyourpreferred soccer club?”doesnotmakesense.Itpresumesthateveryonewholikessoccerisaone-clubHornbyesqueFan.Instead,researchersshouldbeasking,“Whichareyourpreferredsoccerclubs?”Afterall,averylargeproportionofpeoplewholikesoccerarepolygamousconsumers.Oneoftheauthorsof thisbook,Stefan, asaSaturday-morningcoachofgrade-schoolchildren sawthecoloroftheshirtsswitchfromredtoblueandbackagaindependingonwholastwontheleague.NewlyrisingclubslikeChelseaareparticularlypronetoattractingshort-termfans,saysTekleofSport+Markt.ClubslikeLiverpoolorManchesterUnitedwithstrongerbrands tend to have more loyal long-term supporters, he adds. In fact, the likes ofManchesterUnitedarelikelytohavebothfarmoreHornbysandfarmorecasualfansthanotherclubs.ButdetractorsofUnitedtendtoseizeuponthehordesofcasualfansanddon’tmentiontheHornbys.

Hornbyhimselfrecognizedtheprevalenceofcasualfansinsoccer.Manyofthepeoplewhopopupbriefly in thepagesofFeverPitchenjoy thegamebutarenotwedded toaparticularclub.Hornbycallsthistypethe“sod-that-for-a-larkfloatingpunter,”andspeaksof itwithadmiration:“Iwouldliketobeoneof thosepeoplewhotreat their local teamliketheir localrestaurant,andthuswithdrawtheirpatronageif theyarebeingservedupnoxiousrubbish.”

SPECTATORS:THEHARDCORE

Weknowthereare,broadlyspeaking,twotypesofsoccerfan:theHornbysandthesod-that-for-a-lark floating punters.We know that the sod-that-for-a-lark people are heavilyrepresentedamongforeignfansofclubslikeUnited,andevenseemtobeprettycommonin Britain. By 2006, if we can believe Sport+Markt’s figures, about 90 percent ofChelsea’sBritishfanswerepeoplewhohadnotsupportedthemin2003.NodoubtaclublikeHartlepoolhasahigherpercentageofdevotedHornbysamongitsfans,butthenclubslikeHartlepooldon’thavemanyfansanyway.

Onemightcarpthatthesod-that-for-a-larklotaremostlyjustarmchairfans,andthat“real”fanstendtobeHornbys.However,itwouldbewrongtodismissarmchairfansasirrelevant.TheoverwhelmingmajorityofsoccerfansinBritainarearmchairfans,inthesense that they hardly ever go to games. In a survey by the pollstersMori in 2003, 45percent of British adults expressed an interest in soccer. But we’ve seen that the totalaverageweeklyattendancefiguresofallprofessionalclubsinEnglandandScotlandequalonlyabout3percentofthepopulation.Inotherwords,mostofthecountry’ssoccerfansrarelyorneverentersoccerstadiums.

Fletcher Research, in one of the first serious market analyses of English soccer in1997,foundthatonlyabout5percentofsupportersofPremierLeagueclubsattendevenonematchinanaverageseason.Ifonlyasmallminorityofsoccerfansgettothestadiumatall,evenfewerseeeverysinglehomegameforyearsonend,asHornbydid.

Mostsoccerfansarearmchairsupporters.IfwewanttounearththeHornbys,weneedtoconcentrateontheeliteoffanswhoactuallygotogames:thespectators.

WeknowthatinthePremierLeagueatleast,mostspectatorsnowwatcheveryhomegametheirclubplays.Oftentheyhaveto:atthemostsuccessfulclubs,onlyseason-ticketholderscangetseats.Manyoftheseregularspectatorsmaybesod-that-for-a-larkpuntersatheart,whohavebeenenticedbyticketingpoliciestoshowupeveryweek.However,it’samongthisgroupofweek-inandweek-outspectatorsthatwemustlookforthesmallhardcoreoflifelongHornbysinEnglishsoccer.Atmomentsofhighemotion,theTVcamerasliketozoominonspectatorsinthestands—headsinhands,orhuggingtheirfriends—asifthese people incarnated the feelings of the club’s millions of supporters. They don’t.Rather, they are the exceptions, the fanatical fewwho bother to go to games. Some ofthese spectators presumably support their club “through thick and thin,”watching themuntoeternitylikeHornbydoes.

Atleast,thatisthetheory.ButwestudiedattendancenumbersinEnglishsocceroverthe past sixty years and found that even among the actual spectators, a startlingly highproportionappearedtobesod-that-for-a-larktypes.

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NobodyseemstohavetriedbeforetocalculatehowmanyBritishfansareHornbys.Yetthe figures required to make some sort of estimate do exist. That marvelous website,European-football-statistics.co.uk, has statistics on attendance rates and leagueperformance for all clubs in the top four divisions ofEnglish soccer since 1947.Using

thesedatawecanfindout(a)theannualmortalityrateofsoccerspectators;thatis,howmany of the people who watched last season don’t come back the next? and (b) thesensitivityofnewspectatorstothesuccessofteams.DomostnewcomersflocktoChelseawhenChelseawinstheleague?

Ourmodelisbasedonsomefundamentaltruthsofsoccerfandom.Generallyspeaking,teamscannothaveveryloyalHornbyesqueFans(thatis,alowmortalityrate)andatthesame time be capable of attracting large numbers of new spectators when they aresuccessful.IfmostofthecrowdconsistedofHornbyswhonevergaveuptheirseats,thenwhena teamdidwell, therewouldbenoroomin thestadiumforall thenewfanswhowantedtowatchthem.Sofloatingsupporterscangetticketsonlyifthemortalityrateoftheexistingspectatorsishighenough.

Previous studies have shown that a club’s attendance tends to rise and fallwith itsleagueposition.(TherareexceptionsincludeNewcastle,Sunderland,andtheManchesterCity of the late 1990s,when bad results failed to deter spectators.) In our data for thesixty-one-yearperiod from1947 through2008, therewere4,454changes inclubs’ finalleague position. The average club moves six or seven league positions a year. In 64percentofthecaseswheretheclubroseintheleague,itshomecrowdincreased,too.In74percentofthe“down”years,homeattendancefell.Thismeansthat69percentofallcasesconfirmedthesimplehypothesisthatfansrespondtoperformance.Simplyput:thereisamarketinsoccerspectators.Thefewacademicswhostudyfandom—mostofthemintheUS—explainthefans’motivesthroughthepsychologicalphenomenonof“BIRGing,”or“baskinginreflectedglory.”

Toaccount for theebband flowofEnglishsoccer fans,wehaveconstructedaverysimplemodel.Itconsistsoftwoelementsthatarelogicallyconnectedtooneanother.First,therearethe“newfans”comingintothegame.Newfansareestimatedasthedifferencebetweenthetotalattendancefortheseasonandthenumberofloyalfansleftoverfromthepreviousseason.Wedividenewfansintotwogroups:theBIRGers,whocometowatchtheteamdependingonitssuccess,andthosewhocomeforreasonswecan’texplain.Wewill treat these reasons as random factors, although each person probably had a goodreason to come to the game at the time—a friend invited him, a girlfriend left him, orsomesuch.

Thesecondelementofourmodelisthe“loyalfans”:thosewhocamebackfromthepreviousseason.Loyal fansareestimatedas thedifferencebetween the totalattendancefortheseasonandthenewfansenteringthegame.Ofcourse,thedifferencebetweentheloyalfansplusthenewfansandlastseason’sattendanceisthe“lostfans.”Wecanthinkoftheselostfansasfallingintotwogroupsaswell:theBIRGerswhowerelosttotheclubbecause its performance declined, and those who were lost for other reasons that wecannotmeasure(gotbacktogetherwithgirlfriend,tookupDIY,orwhatever).

So,

Totalfans=loyalfansfromlastyear

+fanssensitivetowinning

+randomfans

In ourmodelwe estimate the shares of loyal fans and fans sensitive towinning byminimizingthenumberofrandomfans.Weminimizerandomfanspreciselybecausewethinkmost fans go for a reason: either loyalty orBIRGing.Randomness surelyplays arelativelysmallrole.

Now, we are not claiming that we can identify new fans, loyal fans, and lost fansindividually.However,wecan identify thesecategories ina statistical sense, as groups.Weknowhowmanypeopleareineachgroup,evenifwedonotknowtheirnames.

Ourmodel produces two results. First, it gives us an estimate of the BIRGers: thefractionofnewfansthatateamcanexpecttoattractasaresultofthepositionitachievesin the league. Looking at the annual changes in attendance figures, we found thatspectatorsareonlymildlysensitive toa team’sperformance.Ourestimates implied thatthe club that won the Premier League would attract 2.5 percent of all new spectatorsentering the league thenext season.However, a team that finishedat thebottomof thePremierLeague, or at the topof theChampionship (English soccer’s second tier), doesalmostaswell:itattracts2percentofalltheleague’snewspectators.Teamsinthemiddleofthefourdivisions(thatis,thoserankedaroundforty-sixthinEngland)wouldattract1percent of all new spectators, while teams at the very bottom of the fourth tier wouldattractalmostnobody.Inshort,whilenewspectatorsdolikesuccess,thevastmajorityofthemarenotsimpleBIRGers,gloryhunters.Judgingbytheebbandflowofcrowdsoverthesixty-oneyearsthrough2008,mostpeopleseemtogotoaplausibleclubplayingneartheirhome.

That is the profile of the newcomers. But howmany of last year’s crowd do theyreplace?Whatisthemortalityrateoftheexistingspectators?

Weknowhowmanyspectatorseachclub lostorgained,seasonbyseasonforsixty-oneyears.Wealsoknowhowmanyspectatorstheleagueasawholelostorgained.Thatmeansthatforeveryclubwecancalculatetheaveragepercentageofspectatorsatagivengame one season who would not attend that same fixture the next season. And thepercentage that fits the data best: 50. Yes: on average in the postwar era, half of allspectatorsinEnglishsoccerdidnottaketheirseatsagainfortheequivalentmatchthenextseason.

Let’s be clear about what exactly we are saying. Imagine that Bristol City playsWolvesoneseason, in frontof15,000spectators.Thenextseason, for thesamefixture,evenifthereareagain15,000spectators,halfofthemwouldtypicallybepeoplewhohadnot seen the previous year’s match. Seven thousand five hundred of last year’s crowdwouldbegone.Now,manyofthose7,500peoplemightwellseeothergamesinthenewseason.Manyofthe“newcomers”mightbepeoplewhohadseenBristolCity–Wolvestwoyears before, or tenyears before, but had thengonemissing at that fixture for awhile.However,thepointstillstands:atanygivenmatchinEngland,halfthespectatorswouldbenewcomparedwiththesamematchtheseasonbefore.

Here’s an example of how the model works (for the sake of simplicity, we have

roundedupallnumbers):

Bristol City finished the 2006–2007 season in second place in League One, theEnglish third tier. The team’s total attendance that season was 295,000. Note that thatdoesn’tmean 295,000 different people. Rather, 295,000 ticketswere sold for all City’smatchescombined.Mostfanswouldhaveattendedmultiplematches.Thetotalattendanceforallfourdivisionswas29.5million.

Thenextseason,

(a) Thetotalattendanceforallfourdivisionsroseby400,000,to29.9million

(b) Bristol City came in fourth in the championship—a rise of twenty-twoplaces

So to calculate Bristol City’s expected attendance in 2007–2008, we estimate itsnumberofloyal“returning”fansandofnewfans:

(c) Loyalfansare50percentofthepreviousseason’stotal:148,000

(d) NewfansarecalculatedbyestimatingBristolCity’sshare(basedonleagueperformance)ofnewfansoftheentireleague

(e) Wepredict15.1millionnewspectatorsforEnglishsoccerasawhole.Thatequals thisyear’s totalattendance(29.9million)minusloyalfansfromlastyear(50percentof29.5million=14.8million)=15.1million

(f) GiventhatBristolCityfinishedtwenty-fourthoutofninety-twoclubs,weestimateitsshareofallnewfansinthecountryat1.7percent.Itsnumberofnewfansshouldthereforeequal.017x15.1million=257,000

(g) SoBristolCity’sloyal+newspectators=148,000+257,000=405,000

(h) Bristol City’s actual number for 2007–2008 was 374,000, so our modeloverestimatedtheirsupportby31,000,or8percent

Obviously themodel does notwork perfectly for every club.At big clubs, such asArsenalorManchesterUnited, there is very little flux in the stands.Their stadiumsareprettymuch always full, and total attendance therefore always the same.Most of theirspectators are season ticketholderswho see everygame.Thesepeoplegenerally renewtheir season tickets each year, because they know that if they don’t their seats will besnappedupbyothersandtheymightnevergetbackintothestadiumagain.

However,takingallninety-twoclubstogether,theestimatethatfitsthedatabestisthat50percentofthefanswhosawagamelastseasondonotseeitagainthenextseason.ToquoteoneanalysisoftheEnglishgame,“OneThirdDivisionclubintheLondonarea,forexample, has an estimated ‘hard core’ support of about 10,000; this rises to 20,000accordingtotheteam’ssuccessandthestandingofthevisitingteam.”Thesewordswerewrittenin1951inaneconomicstudyofsoccerpublishedbytheLondon-basedPoliticalandEconomicPlanningthinktank.TheyremainagoodsummaryofEnglishfandomasawholesincethewar.

Thediscoverythathalfofallspectators—supposedlythehardestofhard-coreFans—arenottherewhenthesamefixturerollsaroundthenextseasonconflictswiththeHornbyversion of loyal one-club fandom.Yet it has to be true, to explain the churnwe see inattendancenumbers.Evenaclub likeLeeds,noted for itsdevoted fans—while stuck inLeagueOneitdrewsignificantlylargercrowdsthanJuventus—sawattendancefallfromapeakof755,000inthe2001–2002seasontoonly479,000in2006–2007.

Noristhishighmortalityrateanewphenomenon.Thesixty-oneyearsofattendancedata suggest that habits of English spectators have changed little over the years.WhiletherehasalwaysbeenahardcoreofHornbys, itseemsithasalsoalwaysbeenthecasethatthemajorityofpeoplewhogotoEnglishsoccermatchesgoonlyonceinawhile,andareoftenquitefluidaboutwhomtheychoosetowatch.Andgiventhatspectatorsarethefanswhocommit themost timeandmoneyto thegame, theirdevotion is inmostcasesreallyratherlimited.Thelong-termdevotedspectatorofthekindthatHornbydescribedinFeverPitch,farfrombeingtypical,isararespecies.Committedone-clublifelongfandomisabeautifultheory—orasGandhisupposedlysaidofWesterncivilization,“Itwouldbeagoodidea.”TherealityisthatinEnglishsoccer,theloyalHornbysareasmallshoalinanoceanofcasualRachmans.Englandmaybeanationoffans,butit’sscarcelyanationofHornbys.

CALLYOURSELVES“LOYALSUPPORTERS”

In1996AlanTapp,aprofessorofmarketingatBristolBusinessSchool,startedtodeveloparelationshipwithastrugglingclubin thePremierLeague.Over thenextfouryearshemettheclub’sexecutives,gottoseethedatatheyhadontheirsupporters,andassembledateam of researchers who conducted hundreds of interviews with the club’s fans. Tappeventuallypublishedtwopapersabouthisworkinacademicmarketingjournals.Togethertheyadduptoarare,marvelousstudyofhowthespectatorsofoneclubactuallybehave.Tapp titled his second paper, published in 2004, “The Loyalty of Soccer Fans—We’llSupportYouEvermore?”with a very pregnant questionmark.What he foundwas thatfanstalkloyalbutdon’talwaysactit.

TheclubTappandhiscolleagueJeffClowesstudied—basedinaMidlandstownthatisquiteeasy to identify—wasnotverygood. Itwasn’t thesortofoutfit toattractmanyBIRGinggloryhunters.Mostoftheclub’sspectatorslivedlocally.Inasurveyin1998,amassive87percentofthemagreedslightlyorstronglywiththephrase,“Iwoulddescribemyselfasaloyalsupporter.”

Well,theywouldsaythat,wouldn’tthey?Tappcautionsthatmanyofthose87percentmighthavebeenengagingin“sociallydesirableresponding.”Afterall,almostnobodyinEnglishsoccercallshimselfa“sod-that-for-a-larkfloatingpunter.”Thatwouldbesociallytaboo.Most fans told Tapp and Clowes that they regarded sod-that-for-a-lark types as“pariahs.”AsRickParrysaid,Englishfanspridethemselvesontheirloyalty.

Yet when Tapp studied how these spectators behaved, he found a peculiar lack ofloyalty.To startwith themostbasic fact: theclub’saveragecrowdduring the four-yearperiodofstudyslippedfromabout24,000tojust16,000.

Theaverageacrosstheperiodwasabout21,000,whichbrokedownasfollows:

• About8,000season-ticketholders

• Another 8,000 places typically filled from a group of 15,000 or so regularattendees

• 5,000 spectators who came from “a ‘revolving door’ of perhaps 20,000‘casualfans’”

Tapp came up with three labels for the different groups: “fanatics,” “committedcasuals,”and“carefreecasuals.”

The “fanatics,” or Hornbys, were mostly season-ticket holders. Tapp said some ofthesepeoplewereveritable“‘soccerextremists’whohadcommitmenttothesportandtheclubthatisarguablyunparalleledinotherbusinessorleisuresectors.”Therewasthemanwho,whenaskedbyTapp’s teamwhathewould save if therewerea fire inhishouse,replied, “Oh my [match] programs and tapes. No question. And my wife and kids ofcourse.”Manyofthefanaticscamefromthelocalareaandhadsupportedtheclubsincechildhood.

Butevensomeofthefanaticswerelessfanaticalthantheyclaimedtobe.Tappfoundthateachseason,onaverage,1,000ofthe8,000season-ticketholdersdidnotrenewtheirseatsandwerereplacedbynewpeople.“Evenat thefanaticend,theloyaltybuckethadsignificantleaks,”heremarked.

The team was playing badly. In one season, a mere 2 percent of fans proclaimedthemselves “very satisfied”withperformances.However, itwasnot thebad soccer thatwas driving them away. When Tapp’s team asked people why they were letting theirseason tickets lapse, the lapsersusually talkedabout their lives away from the stadium.Fansweremuchmorelikelytogiveuptheirseasonticketsiftheyhadchildrenunderagefive,oriftheydescribedtheirlivesas“complicated.”

Soitwasn’tthatthelapsersfeltlessloyaltotheteamthanthepeoplewhokeptgoingyearin,yearout.Theyweresimplyatdifferentstagesinlife.Someregularfansadmittedthatatonepoint in life“theyhadsimply lost interest,often in their late teensandearly20s.”Others had been “triggered” by a son or daughter to return to the stadium.Olderpeople, whose lives were presumablymore stable, were themost likely to renew theirseason tickets. Tapp surmises that they “have simply settled into some form of auto-repurchase.” In otherwords, showingup to the stadiumyear in, year out is not a goodmarkerofloyalty.Rather,itisagoodmarkerofage.

Atthefarendofthescalefromthe“fanatics”werethe“carefreecasuals.”Fewofthecarefree casuals claimed to be “loyal supporters.” Theywere “soccer fans” rather than“club fans,” theypreferred to seeagoodgame rather thanavictory for their team,andthey treated soccer as just one of several possible activities on a Saturday. Tapp noted,“Beingclubsupportersisnotpartoftheirself-image.”

Manyof the“carefreecasuals” sometimeswent towatchother teams.Tapp reckonsthatitisprobablethatsomeregularsatDerbyCounty,forinstance,alsooccasionallyshow

upatDerby’srivalNottinghamForest,evenifthisfliesinthefaceofeverythingwearealwaystoldaboutEnglishsoccerfans.

Tapp adds that these people are mostly not “brand switchers,” who switch fromsupportingoneclub tosupportinganother.Veryfewpeople loveDerbyoneyear,Forestthenext, andCarlisle theyear after.Rather, these adulterous spectators are engaging inwhat marketing experts call “repertoire buying”: they purchase different brands atdifferenttimes.Innormalconsumermarketsinalmosteverycountry,“repertoirebuyers”arethoughttooutnumberboth“brand-loyal”and“pricebuyers.”Insoccer,too,repertoirebuyersseemtobefairlycommon.Tappsays,“Repertoirefanstookalotofpleasurefromamultiplicityofaspectsofthegameitself,whilesingleclubfanaticswerelessinterestedinsoccer,moredevotedtotheclubasanentity.”

Tapp’smiddlegroupofspectatorsat theMidlandsclubwasmadeupof“committedcasuals.”Thesepeopledidn’tgotoeverymatch,buttheydidtendtodescribethemselvesas“loyalsupporters.”Theyrarelywatchedotherclubsandweremoreinterestedthanthe“carefreecasuals”inseeingtheirteamwin.However,theytootreatedsoccerasjustoneoptionfortheirSaturday.Tappsaidthey“perhapshavetheirsoccersupportinperspectivewiththerestoftheirlives.”

In short, through close-up study very rare inEnglish soccer, he had gotten past theclichéof“We’llsupportyouevermore.”Insteadhefoundthesamethingthatwedid:thereare some Hornbys in British soccer, but even among the self-proclaimed “loyalsupporters”ofaningloriousclubtheyareoutnumberedbycasualfanswhocantakeitorleaveit.TappendsbycautioningsportsmarketersthatforalltherhetoricofundyinglovepervadingEnglish soccer, fans’ “loyalty cannot be relied upon.”He urgesmarketers to“lookunderthesurfaceofsupporterloyalty,”wheretheywillfind“loyaltypatternsquitesimilarto,say,supermarketgoodssectors.”

HORNBYS,CLIENTS,SPECTATORS,ANDOTHERS

It turns out that few British soccer fans are either Hornbys or BIRGing glory hunters.Rather,mosthavea shifting relationshipwith theclubor clubs they support.Of the50percentofspectatorswhodonotshowupforthesamefixturefromoneseasontothenext,thelargestgroupmaywellcontinuetobemonogamousfansofthatclub.Theyjustdon’twatch everygame, or can’t afford to go anymore, or are busy raising children, or havemovedtoanotherpartofthecountry,orsimplycarelessthantheyusedto.Theobjectoftheir lovemightnothavechanged,but the intensityhas.Manyof themmayoncehavebeenHornbyswhofellforateamaseight-year-oldswhentheirfatherstookthemtotheirfirstgame.However,bythetimetheyaretwenty-eightoreighty-eighttheyarenolongerthesamefans.Formanypeople,fandomisnotastaticconditionbutaprocess.

Otherlapsedfanswillhavelostinterestaltogether.Othersstillmightbeshiftingtheirallegiances to another club or clubs, because they have either moved to a new town,startedtofollowtheteamtheirkidssupport,orsimplyfallenforbettersoccerelsewhere.Rachman,forexample,explainsinhisProspectessaythathestoppedsupportingChelsea“becausetheywereaterribleteam,followedbyviolentcretins.”

Instead he made a two-and-a-half-mile journey withinWest London and became aQPR fan. In the rhetoric of English soccer, the choice facing the supporter is oftenpresentedas stark:eitherhe stickswithhis local team,orhebecomesaBIRGinggloryhunter.However,realityismorenuanced.Englandissodenselystuffedwithprofessionalsoccer clubs—forty-three within ninety miles of Manchester, as we saw—that manypeoplecanfindanewlocalsidewithoutgoingtothetroubleofmovinghouse.

ThenthereisadirtysecretofEnglishsoccer:manyfanssupportmorethanoneteam.IfyouliveinPlymouth,say,youmightsupportPlymouthArgyle,Chelsea,andBarcelona,andhaveafondnessforahalf-dozenotherclubs,eventhoughifPlymouthevermakestheFA Cup final, you will travel to Wembley decked out as a “lifelong Plymouth fan.”Hornbyhimself, inFeverPitch, supportsCambridgeUnitedaswell asArsenal. In fact,whereastheusualanalogyforsoccerfandomisidealizedmonogamousmarriage,abetteronemightbemusicfandom.PeoplearefansoftheBeatles,ortheCure,orthePixies,buttheygenerally likemore thanonebandat thesame time,andarecapableofmovingonwhentheirheroesfade.

As so often, it was Arsène Wenger who put this best. In 2009 he gave Arsenal’swebsiteanuntraditionalaccountofhowhethoughtfandomworked:

Soccerhasdifferenttypesofpeoplecomingtothegame.Youhavetheclient,whoistheguywhopaysonetimetogotoabiggameandwantstobeentertained.Thenyouhavethespectator,whoistheguywhocomestowatchsoccer.Thesetwocategoriesarebetween40and60[yearsold].Thenyouhavetwoothercategories.Thefirst is thesupporterof theclub.Hesupportshisclubandgoestoasmanygamesashecan.Thenyouhavethefan.Thefanisaguybetween15and25yearsoldwhogivesallhismoneytohisclub.

ObviouslyWenger’s fourcategoriesarenotexact.Hereand there theyevenconflictwith thoseofTappandClowes,whofound thatmanyfans lose interestbetween fifteenand twenty-five. But Wenger agrees with the other observers that there are severaldifferent categories of spectator, of varying emotional intensity, and that people movebetweenthesecategoriesdependinglargelyontheirtimeinlife.

Ties in soccer fandom are much looser than the rhetoric of “We’ll support youevermore”suggests.Inthatregard,theyresembletiesofrealexistingmarriageinBritaintoday.People still getmarriedpromising“till deathdouspart,”but in2011 therewere117,558 divorces in England and Wales, nearly five times as many as in 1960, eventhough thenumberofmarriageshasplummeted.Overhalfof all adults inEnglandandWalesarenotpresentlymarried.Alifelongmonogamousmarriagehasbecomealmostasrareasalifelongmonogamousloveofasoccerclub.

THEINAUTHENTICNATION

Againstallevidence,thestereotypepersiststhatthetypicalBritishsoccerfanisafull-onHornby. No wonder it does, because the tiny percentage of fans who are Hornbysdominatethenationalconversationaboutfandom.Ofcoursetheydo:theyarethepeoplewhoaremostmotivatedtojointheconversation.Forthem,followingsoccerisnotjustahobbybutan identity.Also, theymakeupadisproportionately largeshareof thesoccereconomy—”the most valuable customers,” Tapp calls them—and so clubs and medialisten to them more than to the sod-that-for-a-lark punters. And the Hornbys have a

compellingstorytotell.Mostofthebeststoriesareaboutlove,andthesearepeoplewhoproclaimtheirloveinpubliceveryweek.

YetthereisadeeperreasontheHornbyaccountoffandomhasbeensoeasilyacceptedinBritain.Thatisbecauseittellsastoryofroots,ofbelonging—alifelongloveoftheclubyourfatherorgrandfathersupportedbeforeyou—inacountrythat isunusuallyrootless.IntransientBritain,thestoryoftherootedFanisespeciallyseductive.

Britainwasthefirstcountryonearthwherepeasantslefttheirnativevillagestogotowork in rootless industrial cities. It was among the first countries where the churchesbegan to empty; a tie that helps root people all over the world has long beenextraordinarilyweakamongnativeBritons.

EvenaftertheIndustrialRevolution,theBritishneversettleddownmuch.TheaverageBritonnowchangeshisresidenceaboutonceeverysevenyears,moreoftenthanallotherEuropeansexcepttheNordicsandtheDutch,accordingtoaEurobarometersurveyfortheEuropeanCommission in2005.ManyBritonsemigrate.About5.5millionof themnowlive outside Britain, as do an additional 50 million–odd people with British ancestry.Probablyonly India andChinahaveproduceddiasporas that are as largeandaswidelyspread,saystheBritishgovernment.

It ishard forpeople this transitory tobuildupdeep tiesofanykind,even tosoccerclubs.Admittedly,TappandClowesfoundthatmanyofthe“fanatical”supportersoftheclub they studiedhad spent their lives in the local town.But itwas the club’s “casual”fans, who “had often moved to the area as adults,” who were more typical of Britishmigratorypatterns.Forinstance,TappandClowesidentifiedonegroupwhomtheycalled“professionalwanderers”:“people(mainlymanagers/professionals)whohaveheldjobsinanumberofdifferentplaceswhotendedtostrikeup(weaklyheld)allegianceswithlocalteams, which they retain when they next move.” Like most Britons, the professionalwanderers were too rootless to become Hornbyesque Fans. None of the casual fansinterviewedbyTappandClowes“feltaclosepartofthelocalcommunity,incontrasttothefanatics.”

And Britons have suffered yet another uprooting: as well as leaving their place ofbirth,manyofthemhavelefttheirclassofbirth,too.Thisupheavalbeganonalargescalein the1960s.As the economygrew, andmoreBritons stayedon at school andwent touniversity,amostlyworking-classnationturnedintoamostlymiddle-classone.Formanypeoplethiswasatraumaticchange.Theirfathershadbeenfactoryworkers,andnowtheywere managers/professionals, with the different set of experiences and attitudes thatentails.They lost touchwith their roots.Naturally,manyof thembegan toworryabouttheirauthenticitydeficits.

In the 1990s, British soccerwent upscale. The price of tickets jumped. In the foodstandsoutside the stadiums, theproverbialmiddle-class quiches replaced theproverbialworking-class pies.All these changes prompted endless laments for a lost cloth-cappedproletarianculturefrompeoplewhothemselvessomewherealongthewayhadceasedtobecloth-cappedproletarians.Theyyearnedtobeauthentic.

All thismakes the true Fan a particularly appealing character to Britons. He is theBritishversionofablood-and-soilmyth.UnlikesomanyactualBritons,theFanhasroots.Generationsmaypass,andbluecollarsturntowhite,buthestillsupportshis“local”teamin what is supposed to be the “workingman’s game.” Lots of Britons who aren’tHornbyesqueFanswouldliketobe.TheFanismorethanjustacompellingcharacter.HeisaBritishnationalfantasy.

14AFAN’SSUICIDENOTES

DoPeopleJumpOffBuildingsWhenTheirTeamsLose?Itisoneoftheeternalstoriesthataretoldaboutsoccer:whenBrazilgetsknockedoutofaWorldCup,Braziliansjumpoffapartmentblocks.ItcanhappenevenwhenBrazilwins.Onewriterat theWorldCupinSwedenin1958claimstohaveseenaBrazilianfankillhimselfoutof“sheerjoy”afterhisteam’svictoryinthefinal.JanetLevertellsthatstoryinSoccerMadness,hereye-openingstudyofBraziliansoccerculturepublishedwaybackin1983,whennobody(andcertainlynotfemaleAmericansocialscientists)wrotebooksaboutsoccer.Levercontinues:

Ofcourse,Braziliansarenottheonlyfanstokillthemselvesfortheirteams.Inthe1966WorldCupaWestGermanfatallyshothimselfwhenhistelevisionsetbrokedownduringthefinalgamebetweenhiscountryandEngland.NorhaveAmericansescapedsomebizarreends.AnoftencitedcaseistheDenvermanwhowroteasuicide note—”I have been a Broncos fan since the Broncos were first organized and I can’t stand theirfumblinganymore”—andthenshothimself.

Evenworsewas the suicideofAmeliaBolaños. In June1969 shewas an eighteen-year-oldElSalvadoreanwatchingtheHonduras–ElSalvadorgameathomeonTV.WhenHonduras scored thewinner in the lastminute,wrote the great Polish reporterRyszardKapuscinski,Bolaños“gotupandrantothedeskwhichcontainedherfather’spistolinadrawer. She then shot herself in the heart.” Her funeral was televised. El Salvador’spresident and ministers, and the country’s soccer team walked behind the flag-drapedcoffin.Withinamonth,Bolaños’sdeathwouldhelppromptthe“SoccerWar”betweenElSalvadorandHonduras.

Then there was the Bangladeshi woman who reportedly hanged herself afterCameroonlosttoEnglandintheWorldCupof1990.“TheeliminationofCameroonalsomeanstheendofmylife,”saidhersuicidenote.Infact,ifTheHindunewspaperinIndiaisright,Bangladeshishaveaterribleproclivityforsoccersuicides.AfterDiegoMaradonawasthrownoutoftheWorldCupof1994forusingephedrine,“aboutahundredfansinBangladesh committed suicide,” said an article in The Hindu in 2006. (It would befascinatingtoknowthenewspaper’ssource.)

Bynowthenotionthatsoccerpromptssuicidehasbecomeatruism.Itisoftencitedtoshowthegripofthegameoveritsdevotees,andasonereason(alongwithheartattacksonsofasduringtelevisedmatches)theaverageWorldCupcausesmoredeathsthangoals.

We found that there is indeed an intimate connection between suicide and soccer.However, theconnectionistheoppositeofwhatiscommonlybelieved.It’snotthecasethatfansjumpoffbuildingswhentheirteamslose.WorkingwithacrackteamofGreekepidemiologists,wehavefoundevidencethatratherthanpromptingsuicide,soccerstopsthousandsofpeoplefromkillingthemselves.Thegameseemstobealifesaver.

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Measured suicide rates roseby60percent in the forty-fiveyears to2011, estimates theWorldHealthOrganization.Nearlyamillionpeopleayearnowkillthemselves,accordingto theWHO.That ismore than twiceasmanyasdied inwarworldwide in theaverageyearfrom1955through2002,andnearlytwicethenumberthatdieofbreastcancereachyear.TouseGermanyasanexample:in2005,10,260Germansofficiallydiedbysuicide,more than were killed by traffic accidents, illegal drugs, HIV, and murder and otherviolenceputtogether.ForGermansunderageforty,suicidewasthesecond–mostcommoncause of death. And the reported figures for suicides were understatements, said theUniversityHamburg-Eppendorf,whichrunsatherapycenterforpeopleatriskofsuicide:“Theremaybeasignificantshareofunrecognizedsuicidesamongthedeathtypeslabeled‘trafficaccidents,’‘drugs,’and‘causesofdeathunknown.’”

Thesuicideriskvariesdependingonwhointheworldyouare.Ifyouareanelderly,alcoholic,clinicallydepressed,divorcedLithuanianman,beveryafraid,butsuicideratesarerelativelylowinLatinAmerica,leavingasideforthemomenttheissueofWorldCups.Globally,womenattemptsuicidemoreoftenthanmendo,butmost“successful”suicidesare males. In the US, for instance, nearly 80 percent of the 38,364 people who werereported as having killed themselves in 2010weremale. For reasons that nobodyquiteunderstands, suicide peaks in spring when daylight hours are longest. In the NorthernHemisphere,thatmeansMayandJune.

The question of why people commit suicide has preoccupied sociologists sincesociology began. In 1897ÉmileDurkheim, descendant of a long line of French rabbis,publishedhisstudySuicide.Itwasn’tjustthefirstserioussociologicalstudyofsuicide.Itwasoneofthefirstserioussociologicalstudiesofalmostanything.Drawingoncopiousstatistics, Durkheim showed that when people lost their connection to wider societybecause of a sudden change—divorce, the death of a partner, a financial crisis—theysometimes killed themselves.He concluded that this particular form of suicide “resultsfromman’sactivitieslackingregulationandhisconsequentsufferings.”

A few decades later, sociologists began to wonder whether man’s sufferings mightpossiblyincludetheresultsofsportsmatches.Thenumbersofsuicidesthiscausedmightbesignificant: afterall,most suicidesaremen,andsportsgivemeaning tomanymen’slives.FrankTrovato, a sociologyprofessor at theUniversityofAlberta inCanada,wasamongthefirsttoinvestigatethesuicide-sportsnexus.HefoundthatwhentheMontrealCanadiensicehockeyteam—oncedescribedasthenationalteamofFrenchCanada—gotknockedoutoftheplayoffsearlybetween1951and1992,Quebecoismalesagedfifteentothirty-four becamemore likely to kill themselves.RobertFernquist, a sociologist at theUniversity of Central Missouri, went further. He studied thirty American metropolitanareaswithprofessional sports teams from1971 to1990andshowed that fewer suicidesoccurred in cities whose teams made the playoffs more often. Routinely reaching theplayoffscouldreducesuicidesbyabouttwentyeachyearinametropolitanareathesizeofBoston orAtlanta, said Fernquist. These saved liveswere the converse of themythicalBraziliansthrowingthemselvesoffapartmentblocks.

Later,Fernquistinvestigatedanotherlinkbetweensportsandsuicide:helookedatthe

suiciderateinAmericancitiesafteralocalsportsteammovedtoanothertown.Itturnedout that someof the fans abandonedby their teamkilled themselves.This happened inNewYorkin1957whentheBrooklynDodgersandNewYorkGiantsbaseballteamsleft,inCleveland in1995–1996when theBrowns football teammoved toBaltimore, and inHouston in1997–1998when theOilers football teamdeparted. Ineachcase thesuicideratewas10percent to14percenthigher in the twomonthsaround the team’sdeparturethan in the same months of the previous year. Each move probably helped prompt ahandful of suicides. Fernquist wrote, “The sudden change brought about due to thegeographicrelocationsofprosportsteamsdoesappearto,atleastforashorttime,makehighly identified fans drastically change the way they view the normative order insociety.”Clearlynoneofthesepeoplekilledthemselvesjustbecausetheylosttheirteam.Rather, theywere very troubled individuals forwhom this sportingdisappointmentwastoomuchtobear.

Perhaps themost famous recentcaseofamanwhofoundhecouldnot livewithoutsportswastheGonzoauthorHunterS.Thompson.HeshothimselfinFebruary2005,fourdaysafterwritinganoteinblackmarkerwiththetitle,“FootballSeasonIsOver”:

NoMoreGames.NoMoreBombs.NoMoreWalking.

NoMoreFun.NoMoreSwimming.67.Thatis17yearspast50.

17morethanIneededorwanted.Boring…

Thompson, an occasional sportswriter, loved football. One night during thepresidentialcampaignof1968,hetookalimousinejourneythroughNewHampshirewithhisleastfavoriteperson,theRepublicancandidateRichardNixon,andtheytalkedfootballnonstopinthebackseat.“Itwasaveryweirdtrip,”Thompsonwrotelater,“probablyoneof the weirdest things I’ve ever done, and especially weird because both Nixon and Ienjoyedit.”Thereminiscence, inFearandLoathingontheCampaignTrail‘72, seguesintoanominousmusingonsuicide,asaNixonaidesnatchesawaythecigaretteThompsonis smoking over the fuel tank of the candidate’s plane. Thompson tells the aide, “Youpeople are lucky I’m a sane, responsible journalist; otherwise I might have hurled myflamingZippointothefueltank.”

“Notyou,”theaidereplies.“Egomaniacsdon’tdothatkindofthing.Youwouldn’tdoanythingyoucouldn’tlivetowriteabout,wouldyou?”

“You’re probably right,” saysThompson.As it later turned out, hewaswrong.HisasheswerefiredfromacannoninAspen,Colorado.

So much for suicides and North American sports. We know much less about theconnection between suicides and European soccer. In one of the very few Europeanstudiesdonesofar,MarkSteels,apsychiatristattheUniversityHospitalinNottingham,askedwhetherNottinghamForest’sworstdefeatsprompted local suicides.He lookedatadmissions for deliberate self-poisoning to his hospital’s accident and emergencydepartment on two bad days for Forest: after the team’s defeats in the FACup final of1991andtheFACupquarterfinalof1992.Hefoundthatbothgameswerefollowedbyanincrease in self-poisonings. After the cup final, the rise was statistically significant,

meaningthatitwasunlikelytohavehappenedbychance.Steelsconcludedthat“asuddendisappointmentexperiencedthroughanentirecommunitymayproveonestresstoomanyforsomevulnerablemembersofthiscommunity.”

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All this isfascinatingbut inconclusive.Forstarters, thesamplesizesofall thesestudiesare pretty small. How many people are admitted to a Nottingham hospital for self-poisoningafterasoccermatch?(Answer:teninthetwelvehoursafterthe1991cupfinal,nineafter the1992quarterfinal.)Howmanypeoplekill themselves inCleveland inanygivenmonth? The other problem is that almost all these researchers pursuedwhat youmightcalltheBrazilianapartment-buildinghypothesis:thatwhenpeoplesufferasportingdisappointment, they kill themselves.Mostly these are studies of the dogs that barked:peoplewhodidcommitsuicide.

Butwhat if therelationshipbetweensuicideandsports isdeeper than that?Ifsportsgivemeaningtofans’lives,iftheymakethemfeelpartofalargerfamilyoffansoftheirteam, if fans reallydo eat and sleep soccer like in aCoca-Cola ad, thenperhaps sportsmight stop someof these fans fromkilling themselves.Wewanted to find outwhetherthereweredogs thatdidn’tbark:peoplewhodidn’tcommit suicidebecausesportskeptthemgoing.

Itsohappensthatwehaveacasestudy.FrederickExleywasafanoftheNewYorkGiantsfootballteam,whoselifealternatedbetweenincarcerationsinmentalhospitalsandequallyunhappyperiodsspentinthebosomofhisfamily.In1968Exleypublishedwhathecalled“a fictionalmemoir,”AFan’sNotes, oneof thebestbooks everwritten aboutsports.NickHornbygaveFeverPitch the subtitle “AFan’sLife” inpart as a tribute toExley.

TheExleydepictedinAFan’sNotesisaclassicsuiciderisk.Heisanalcoholiclonerseparatedfromhiswife.Hehasdisastrousrelationshipswithwomen,alienateshisfriends,andspendsmonthsatatimelyinginbedoronasofaathismother’soraunt’shouse.Forawhilehisonlyfriend ishisdog,Christie III,whomhedresses inaminibluesweatshirtlikehisownandteachestostanduplikeaman.“LikemostAmericans,”Exleywrites,“Ihad led a numbingly chaste and uncommitted existence in which one forms neithersympathiesnorantipathiesofanyenduringconsequence.”

Onlyonethinginlifeprovideshimwithanycommunity:theNewYorkGiants.WhilelivinginNewYorkCityhestandsontheterraceduringeveryhomegamewithagroupofBrooklynmen:“anItalianbread-truckdriver,anIrishpatrolman,afatgaragemechanic,twoor three burly longshoremen, and someotherswhose occupations I forget… .Andtheylikedme.”

WhentheGiantsarenotplaying,Exleyspendsmuchofhistimedrinkingalone.Butwhenagame ison,hewatches—dependingon thestageofhis life—withhisBrooklyngroup, or with other people in bars, or with his stepfather at home. Exley is thestepfather’seternalhouseguestfromhell,but“thingswereneverbetterbetweenusthanonautumnSundayafternoons”:“Afteratime,hardlynoticeableatfirst,hecaughtsomething

of my enthusiasm for the beauty and permanent character of staying with someonethroughvictory anddefeat and came round to theGiants.”Fittingly, the stepfather diesjustbeforeaGiantsgame:“Seatedontheedgeofthedavenportwatchingthestartingline-upsbeingintroduced,heclosedhiseyes,slidsilentlytothefloor,anddiedpainlesslyofacoronaryocclusion.”

Inevitably,atonepointinthememoir,Exleycontemplatessuicide.Hehasconvincedhimselfhehaslungcancer.Determinedtoavoidthesufferinghisfatherwentthrough,hedecides tokillhimself instead.Drinkingwithstrangers inbars,hegets into thehabitofworking“theconversationroundtosuicide”andsolicitingtheirviewsonhowbesttodoit.Thestrangersarehappy tooblige:“Suchwas theclinicalandspeculativeenthusiasmfor thesubject—‘Now, if Iwasgonnaknockmyselfoff…’—that Icame toseesuicideoccupying a greater piece of the American consciousness than I had theretoforeimagined.”

Onlyone thingkeepsExleygoing.TheGiantsare“a life-giving,anexaltingforce.”Heis“unabletoconceivewhat[his]lifewouldhavebeenwithoutfootballtocushiontheknocks.”Thereal-lifeFrederickExleylivedtotheageofsixty-three,dyingin1992aftersufferingastrokealoneinhisapartment.HemightneverhavegottenthatoldwithouttheGiants.

TheremaybeagreatmanyExleysaround.Theviewingfigureswesawearlierinthisbooksuggest thatsport is themost importantcommunalactivity inmanypeople’s lives.Nearly a third ofAmericanswatch theSuperBowl.However,European soccer is evenmorepopular.IntheNetherlands,possiblytheEuropeancountrythatfollowsitsnationalteammosteagerly,three-quartersofthepopulationwatchHolland’sbiggestsoccergames.InmanyEuropeancountries,WorldCupsmaynowbe thegreatestsharedeventsofanykind.Tocapitall,WorldCupsmostlytakeplaceinJune,thepeakmonthforsuicidesintheNorthernHemisphere.HowmanyExleyshavebeensavedfromjumpingoffapartmentbuildingsbyinternationalsoccertournaments,theworld’sbiggestsportingevents?

Thisisnotjustarhetoricalquestion.Astudyofsoccertournamentsandsuicidewouldbringtogetherbothanincomparablycompellingcommunaleventandasamplethesizeofseveralcountries.Sowesetaboutfindingthedata.

We needed suicide statistics per month over several years for as many Europeancountriesaspossible.These figuresdonotseemtobepublishedanywhere.Luckily,wefound out that the Greek epidemiologists Eleni Petridou and Fotis Papadopoulos hadlaboriously gotten ahold of these data by writing to the statistical offices of severalcountries.AstatisticianwhoworkswithPetridouandPapadopoulos,NickDessypris,wentthrough the numbers for us. He found that in almost every country for which he hadnumbers,fewerpeoplekillthemselveswhilethenationalteamisplayinginaWorldCuporaEuropeanChampionship.Dessyprissaidthedeclineswere“statisticallysignificant”—unlikelytobeduetochance.

Let’stakeGermany,thebiggestcountryinourstudyandonethatalwaysqualifiesforbig tournaments. Petridou and Papadopoulos had obtained monthly suicide data forGermany from 1991 through 1997. A horrifying total of 90,000 people in Germany

officially killed themselves in this period. The peak months for suicides were MarchthroughJune.

But when Germany was playing in a soccer tournament—as it did in the Junes of1992,1994,and1996—fewerpeopledied.IntheaverageJunewithsoccer,therewere787maleand329femalesuicidesinGermany.However,alotmorepeoplekilledthemselvesin the Junesof1991,1993,1995, and1997,whenGermanywasnotplaying soccer. Inthosesoccer-freeJunes,therewasanaverageof817maleand343femalesuicides,or30moredeadmenand14moredeadwomenthanintheaverageJunewithabigtournament.For bothGermanmen andwomen, the Junewith the fewest suicides in our seven-yearsamplewas1996,themonththatGermanywonEuro’96.

Wefoundthesametrendfortenofthetwelvecountrieswestudied.InJuneswhenthecountrywasplayinginasoccertournament,therewerefewersuicides.Thesedeclinesareparticularlyremarkablegivenhowmuchalcoholisconsumedduringsoccertournaments,because drinking would normally be expected to help prompt suicides. Only in theNetherlands and Switzerland did soccer tournaments not seem to save lives; these twocountries saw very slight increases in the suicide rate during tournaments. In the othercountries,thelifesavingeffectofsoccerwassometimesspectacular.OurdataforNorway,for instance, run from 1988 through 1995. The soccer-mad country played in only onetournamentinthatperiod,theWorldCupof1994.TheaverageforthesevenJuneswhenNorwaywas not playing soccerwas 55 suicides. But in June 1994 therewere only 36Norwegian suicides,by far the lowest figure for all eight Junes inourdata set.Or takeDenmark, forwhichwehavesuicide talliesfrom1973through1996, the longestperiodfor any country. In June1992 theDaneswon theEuropeanChampionship.Thatmonththerewere54malesuicides,thefewestforanyJunesince1978,and28femalesuicides,thejointlowest(with1991)sincethedatasetbegan.

FIGURE14.1.LivessavedfromsuicideduringWorldCuporEuropeanChampionshipcomparedtoaverageJune

We have tried to make some very rough estimates of how many lives thesetournamentssavedineachcountry.“Livessaved”representsthedeclineindeathsduringtheaverageJunewhenacountry’snationalteamisplayinginaWorldCuporEuropeanChampionship compared to the average Junewhen the team isn’t playing. Figure 14.1showsthetally.

The figures are negative for the Netherlands and Switzerland becausemore peoplekilledthemselveswhentheirteamswereplayingthanwhentherewasnosoccer.

Thenextquestioniswhathappensafterateamisknockedout.Doallthepeoplewhohad been saved from suicide by soccer then fall into a void and jump off apartmentbuildings?Ifso,youwouldexpectariseinsuicidesintheperiodafterthetournament.

FIGURE14.2.Livessavedbygenderin“soccer”years

However,wefoundthatintenofourtwelvecountries,suicidesdeclinedfortheentireyear when the national team played in a big tournament. Only in the Netherlands didsuicidesriseintheyearwhentheteamplayed;inSpainthedifferencewasnegligible.Butin theother tencountries, evenafter the teamgotknockedout and theeuphoria ended,therewasnocompensatingriseinsuicide.Tothecontrary:itseemsthattheunitingeffectofthetournamentlastedforawhileafterward,continuingtodepressthesuiciderate.Foreachofthesetencountries,morelivesweresavedonaverageovertheentireyearthaninJunealone.Figure14.2containsourveryroughestimatesforlivessavedovertheentireyearwhenthenationalteamplaysinatournament(“livessaved”representsthedeclineindeathsduringa“soccer”yearcomparedtotheaverageyear).

Veryroughly,thetypicalsoccertournamentinthisperiodappearstohavehelpedsaveseveralhundredEuropeansfromsuicide.

Wecouldn’tfindanymonthlysuicidedataforanyoftheBritishnations.However,theonly two previous studies on this topic that we know of in Britain suggest that thelifesavingeffectworksthere,too.

“Parasuicide”isasuicidalgestureinwhichtheaimisnotdeathbutratherself-harm,oracryforhelp.Oneexampleofparasuicideis takinganinsufficientoverdose.GeorgeMasterton,apsychiatrist inEdinburgh,andhisco-authorJ.A.StrachanstudiedScottishparasuicidesduringandimmediatelyaftertheWorldCupsof1974,1978,1982,and1986.Eachtime,Scotlandhadqualifiedforthetournament.Eachtime,MastertonandStrachanfoundafallinparasuicideforbothgendersduringthetournamentthat“hasbeensustainedforatleasteightweeksafterthelastgame.”TheScottishcaseisaprettystrongpieceofevidence against the apartment-building theory of soccer suicides, because if therewaseveranexcuseforsoccerfanstotrytokillthemselves,itwasScotland’sperformanceatthe World Cup of 1978. (The team’s fantasist manager, Ally McLeod, had boastedbeforehandthattheScotswouldleavewitha“medalofsomesort.”)

LaterMastertonandAnthonyJ.ManderstudiedthenumbersofpeoplewhocametotheRoyal EdinburghHospitalwith psychiatric emergencies during and after theWorldCupsof1978,1982,and1986.Theresearchersfound“reductionsinallillnesscategoriesduring and afterwards (with the exception of alcoholism during).” The decline inemergencies applied to both genders, andwasmoremarked after eachWorldCup thanduringit.Forinstance,therewasa56percentfallinadmissionsofmaleneuroticsintheweeksafteratournament.

Theauthorsthentriedtoexplainwhatwasgoingonhere:TherearefewoutletswhichpermitawideandacceptableexpressionofScottishnationhood—sportisperhapsthemostpowerful,and[soccer]isthenationalgame….Wewouldspeculatethatsuchacommoninterestandendeavour, fused with a surge of nationalism, might enhance social cohesion in the manner proposed byDurkheimtoexplainthedecreasedsuicideratesthataccompanytimesofwar.

Social cohesion is the key phrase here. This is the benefit that almost all fans—potentialsuicidesandtherestofus—getfromfandom.Winningorlosingisnotthepoint.Youcangetsocialcohesionevenfromlosing.Veryoften,anationwillbondoveradefeatin a big soccer game.People sob inpublic, performpostmortems in theoffice thenext

morning,huntforscapegoatstogether.ForItalians,forinstance,defeattoNorthKoreain1966wasasharednationalmomentalmostasmemorableasvictoryinBerlinin2006.Itisnot the case that losingmatchesmakes significant numbers of people so unhappy theyjumpoffapartmentbuildings. In theUS, fansof longtime losers like theChicagoCubsandtheBostonRedSoxbaseballteams(Bostononlybecamefrequentwinnersagainfrom2004)havenotkilledthemselvesmorethanotherpeople,saysThomasJoiner,authorofWhyPeopleDiebySuicide,whoseownfatherdiedbysuicide.

Joiner’sarticle“OnBuckeyes,Gators,SuperBowlSunday,and theMiracleon Ice”makesastrongcasethat it’snot thewinningthatcountsbut thetakingpart—thesharedexperience. It is true that he found fewer suicides inColumbus,Ohio, andGainesville,Florida,intheyearswhenthelocalcollegefootballteamsdidwell.ButJoinerarguesthatthisisbecausefansofwinningteams“pulltogether”more:theyweartheteamshirtmoreoften,watchgamestogetherinbars,talkabouttheteam,andsoon,muchashappensinaEuropean country while the national team is playing in a World Cup. The “pullingtogether” saves people from suicide, not thewinning.Proof of this is that Joiner foundfewersuicides in theUSonSuperBowlSundays thanonotherSundaysat that timeofyear, even though few of the Americans who watch the Super Bowl are passionatesupportersofeitherteam.Whattheygetfromtheday’spartiesisasenseofbelonging.

That is the lifesaver. In Europe today, there may be nothing that brings a societytogetherlikeaWorldCupwithyourteaminit.Foronce,almosteveryoneinthecountryiswatching the same TV programs and talking about them at work the next day, just asEuropeans used to do thirty years ago before they got cable TV. Part of the point ofwatchingaWorldCupisthatalmosteveryoneelseiswatching,too.Isolatedpeople—thetypesatmostriskofsuicide—aresuddenlywelcomedintothenationalconversation.Theyaregivensocialcohesion.AllthishelpsexplainwhybigsoccertournamentsseemtosavesomanyfemalelivesinEurope,eventhoughrelativelyfewwomeneithercommitsuicideor (beforeabout2000at least)watchsoccer.The“pulling together”duringabigsoccertournamentissouniversalthatitdragsmanywomenalonginawaythatclubsoccerdoesnot. Itmayalsobe that during tournaments, some troubledwomenbenefit fromabriefvacationfrommalepartnerswhoaredistractedbysoccer.

Otherthansports,onlywarandcatastrophecancreatethissortofnationalunity.Moststrikingly, in the week after John F. Kennedy’s murder in 1963—a time of Americansadnessbutalsoof“pullingtogether”—notonesuicidewasreportedintwenty-ninecitiesstudied.Likewise, in theUS in the days after theSeptember 11, 2001, attacks, anotherphaseofnational“pulling together,” thenumberofcalls to the1–800-SUICIDEhotlinehalved to about threehundredaday, “an all-time low,”writes Joiner.And inBritain in1997,suicidesdeclinedafterPrincessDianadied.

Joiner speculates that “pulling together” through sports may particularly suit“individualswhohavepoorinterpersonalskills(oftencharacteristicofseverelydepressedorsuicidalpersons).”Youdon’thavetobecharmingtobeafanamongfans.

In1956FrederickExleywasdrunk,unemployed,andlovelessinChicago.Hewrites,“ThoughIhadcompletelydisregardedfootballmyfirstyearinthathappycity,duringthe

autumnof1956, after losingmy job, I once again found that itwas theonly thing thatgavemecomfort.”Atsomepointorotherinlife,wehaveallknownhowthatfeels.

15HAPPINESS

WhyHostingaWorldCupIsGoodforYouYou don’t often see people consciously building a white elephant, but that’s what washappening in Brasilia in 2012. Smack in downtown, on the main avenue of Brazil’stropical capital, workers were finishing off a stadium for 70,000 people. The EstadioNacionalwasoneoftwelvestadiumsbuiltfortheWorldCupin2014.Anditwasdoomedto become redundant even before the tournament ended. Brasilia’s tinpot clubs seldomdraw1,000spectators.NorwilltheRollingStonesregularlybeflyingintothiscityinthemiddleofnowheretofilltheNacional.BrasiliamightaswellteardownthestadiumafterthelastWorldCupgame,andsaveitselfafortuneinmaintenancecosts.OtherhostcitieslikeManaus,Cuiabá,andNatalcoulddolikewise.

It’s this kind of waste that brought Brazilians onto the streets in June 2013,demonstratingagainsttheircountry’shostingoftheWorldCupandtheRioOlympicsof2016.“Wehaveworld-classstadiums—nowweneedacountrytogoaroundthem,”readoneprotestor’sbanner.“AteacherisworthmorethanNeymar,”saidanother.Worldwide,from Atlanta to the International Olympic Committee’s headquarters in Lausanne,Switzerland,peoplearereachingthesameconclusion:hostingsportseventsdoesn’tmakeyourich.

Whenever a country prepares to host a World Cup or an Olympics, its politiciansprophesy an “economic bonanza.” They invoke hordes of shopaholic visitors, the freeadvertisingofhostcitiestotheworld’sTVviewers,andthelong-termbenefitsofalltheroadsandstadiumsthatwillgetbuilt.Nowonderthatnowadaysalmosteverygovernmentseemstowanttohosttheseevents.ThebiddingtostagetheWorldCupsof2018and2022wasthemostcutthroatever.Ifonlythebiddingcountriescouldgrasptherealreasonforwantingtobeahost:hostingdoesn’tmakeyourich,butitdoesmakeyouhappier.Brazilwillbenefitfrom2014,butnotinmoney.

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The1989movieFieldofDreamsisasentimentalredemptionstorystarringKevinCostnerasanIowafarmer.Growingupthesonofabaseballnut,thefarmerhaddreamedofbeingabaseballstar.Asanadult,hehearsavoicetellinghimtobuildabaseballdiamondonhiscornfield. “If youbuild it, hewill come” is the film’s catchphrase.Themoral: buildingstadiumswheretheydonotcurrentlyexist isupliftingandgoodforyou.ThisoriginallyAmericanidealaterspreadtosocceraroundtheworld.

ThereisintheUSasmallindustryof“consultants”whoexisttoprovideaneconomicrationale for“Ifyoubuild it,hewillcome.” Inalmostanycity in theUSatalmostanytime,someoneisschemingtobuildaspankingnewsportsstadium.ThebigprizeformostAmericancitiesistohostamajorleagueteam,ideallyanNFLfranchise,butifthatcan’t

behad, thenbaseball,basketball,or, ifnothingelse isgoing,soccerorevenicehockey.Hosting anAmerican sports franchise has a lot in commonwith hosting aWorldCup.Both the franchise and the World Cup are mobile beasts. Their owners are generallywillingtomovetowhichevercityorcountryoffersthemthebestdeal.IntheUS,ownersofsportsteamsusuallydemandthatthehostcity’staxpayersponyupforastadium,withlucrativeparkinglotsthrownin.Allthisisthenhandedovertothefranchiseowner,whoalso gets to keep the money he makes from selling tickets. About seventy new majorleaguestadiumsandarenaswerebuilt intheUSinthetwentyyearsbeforethefinancialcrisisof2008.The totalcost:$20billion,abouthalfofwhichcamefromthepublic. InNewOrleans,forinstance,thetaxpayerpaidfortheSuperdomebutnotforbetterlevees.

Inonetypicalcasein1989,seventyinvestors,includingoneGeorgeW.Bush,sonofthe thenAmericanpresident,paid$83million for theTexasRangersbaseballclub.TheBushgroupwantedabiggerstadium.Strangelyforaphalanxofright-wingmillionaires,itdecided that local taxpayers should finance it. If that didn’t happen, the new ownersthreatenedtomovetheRangerselsewhere.ThepeopleofthelocaltownofArlingtondulyvotedtoincreasethelocalsalestaxbyhalfapercent,raisingthe$191millionneededfortheballpark.

The president’s sonGeorgeW. became theRangers’managing director.Mostly thisjustmeant being the official face of the club.Hewould sit in the stands during gameshandingoutbaseballcardswithpicturesofhimself.WhenheranforgovernorofTexasin1994,heconstantlycitedhisexperience inbaseball.Therewasn’tmuchelseonhisCV.Hewasdulyelected,anddecoratedhisAustinofficewith250signedbaseballs.

In1998theBushgroupsoldtheRangerstoTomHicks(themanwholaterbecameco-ownerofLiverpoolFC)for$250million.Mostof thevaluewas in thestadiumthat thetaxpayers had built.Bush personally netted $14.9million.He admitted, “When it is allsaid and done, I will have made more money than I ever dreamed I would make.”Meanwhile, hewas already beginning to parlay his governorship into a bigger politicalprize.

So the trick forAmerican club owners is to persuade the taxpayer to cough up forstadiums. This iswhere economists come in handy. Economists like to say that peoplerespondtoincentives.Well,economistscertainlyrespondtoincentives.AnyonehopingtopersuadetaxpayerstopayforastadiumintheUScommissionedaneconomisttowritean“economicimpact”study.Byastrangecoincidence,thesestudiesalwaysshowedthatthestadiumwouldmaketaxpayersrich.(OnebookdescribingthisracketisaptlycalledFieldofSchemes.)

Theargumenttypicallywentasfollows:Buildingthestadiumwouldcreatejobsfirstforconstructionworkers,andlaterforpeoplewhoworkedinit.Fanswouldflockinfromallaround(“Ifyoubuildit,hewillcome”),andtheywouldspendmoney.Newbusinesseswouldspringuptoservethem.Astheareaaroundthestadiumbecamepopulated,morepeoplewouldwant to live there, andevenmorebusinesses (and jobs)would springup.“The building of publicly funded stadiums has become a substitute for anythingresembling an urban policy,” notesDave Zirin in hisPeople’s History of Sports in the

UnitedStates.

The “economic impact” study then typically clothed this model with some bignumbers.Ifyouputyourmindtoit,youcouldthinkupatotalinbenefitsthatranintothebillions,whatevercurrencyyouhappenedtobeworkingin.Bestofall,noonewouldeverbeabletoprovethatnumberwrong.Supposeyoupromisethatastadiumwillbringacityeconomicbenefitsof$2billionovertenyears.Ifthecity’sincome(hardtomeasureinthefirst place) rises by only $1 billion over the decade, then, of course, it was somethingcompletelydifferent(theworldeconomy,say)thatrestrictedtheincome.Youcouldprovetheoriginalestimateswrongonlyifyoucouldestimatehowmucheconomicgrowththerewould have been had the stadium never been built—but this “counterfactual” figure isunknowable,preciselybecauseitisacounterfactual.ThesameeconomistssoonbranchedoutintowritingstudiesthatjustifiedevermoreextravagantspendingontheOlympics.

Itwouldhaveseemedrudetoderailthisindustrywithanythingsoinconvenientasthetruth.ButthenalongcameRobBaade.Thequiet,courteousacademicseemedanunlikelyfiguretobetakingonthestadiumlobby.Afterall,heisaformertop-classathletehimself:atcollege,BaadecaptainedtheWisconsinbasketballteam.Whenthewhitecoachseemedantagonistic to themajorityofblackplayers,Baade foundhimself championingplayersagainstcoachinwhathedescribesasoneofthemostdifficultyearsofhislife.

Afterwardhewanted to dograduatework in public finance, a branchof economicsthat usually involves many equations and few words. But he also wanted to coachbasketballandtoapplysomethingofwhathehadlearnedwhileontheWisconsinteam.Acolleaguetoldhimabouta jobatLakeForestCollege,anidyllic littleplacejustoutsideChicago. To the dismay of some of his purist professors, hewent to Lake Forest on atemporaryappointmentandendedupcoachingthereforeighteenyears,whilealsorisingtofullprofessorofeconomics.Hewasagoodcoach,too:theyearbeforehearrived,theteamhadnotwonasinglegame,butwithinfouryearstheywerewinning85percentoftheirgames.

When you start out as an academic you try to write papers that will grab yourcolleagues’ attention.Baadeusedhisownbackground to enter theeconomicsof sports,thenstillalmostvirginterrain.AtaseminarinNewYorkhepresentedapapertitled“TheSportsTax.”JournalistsfromtheNewYorkTimesandtheWallStreetJournalhappenedtobeintheaudience,andtheyzeroedinonwhathadbeenalmostathrowawaylineinhistalk: public investment in stadiums does not provide a good return for taxpayers.As acoachhimself,Baademighthavebeenexpectedtojointhestadiumboosters.Hadhedoneso, he could have earned himself good money in consulting. Instead he went intoopposition.

TheHeartlandInstitute,aconservativethinktank,askedhimtowriteuphisthoughts.TherearefewissuesinAmericanpoliticallifewheretheRightjoinswithanintellectualliberal like Baade, but the paper he published in 1987 laid out the problem clearly:“Contrary to the claims of city officials, this study has found that sports and stadiumsfrequently had no significant positive impact on a city’s economy and, in a regionalcontext,mayactuallycontributetoareductioninasports-mindedcity’sshareofregional

income.”

Baade had asked the awkward questions that stadium boosters always ignored. Forinstance, where would all the construction workers for the new stadium come from?Wouldn’ttheyhavejobsalready,andthereforewouldn’tashortagearisesomewhereelse?Worsestill,ascompetitionfortheirskillsintensified,wouldn’tcostsrise?

Once you start thinking of people as having alternatives rather than just standingaroundwaitingforthestadiumtoarrive,theeconomicsbegintolooklessappealing.Foreverydollargoingin,thereisprobablyadollargoingoutsomewhereelse.Inparticular,ifacityhastobalanceitsbudget,thenspendingmoreonstadiumsmustmeanspendinglessonhospitalsandschools.Theselostjobshavetobecountedagainstthestadium’sbenefits.Andifthecitydoesn’tbalanceitsbudget,isn’titstoringupfutureburdensfortaxpayers,whowillhavetoforgosomething,someday?

That is badenough,butwhat if the stadiumdoesn’t produce thepromisedbenefits?Afterall,moststadiumsareusedforonlyafewhoursaweek,andbarelyatallintheoff-season.Evenallowingfortheoccasionalrockconcert(andthereisa limit tohowmanytimesEltonJohncanplay inyour town),mostof the time theneighborhoodaround thestadiumwill bedeserted.Nobodywants to live in aplace like that.TheneighborhoodsaroundtheoldYankeeStadiumorSheaStadiumhardlybecamedesirable,forinstance.

NordidBaadebelievethatastadiumwoulddrawinmuchspendingfromoutsidethecity.Mostout-of-townfanswouldbuyahotdogandbeer,watchthegame,andleave—hardly an economic bonanza.Amall, or a cineplex, or even a hospitalwould generatemorelocalspending.

Around the end of the 1980s other economists, too, began asking these awkwardquestions.However,Baadewentonebetter.Toshowthattheboosters’numbersdidn’taddup, he generated some numbers of his own. Perhaps he couldn’t measure thecounterfactual, buthe couldget closebycomparingeconomicgrowth in cities thathadmajor league teams with those that didn’t. After all, he reasoned, if the boosters wereright,thenovertimecitieswithstadiumsmustdobetterthancitieswithoutstadiums.

Baadeexamineddatasuchasincomeperheadandthenumbersofnewbusinessesandjobscreatedinvariouscities.Themorehelooked, the lessdifferencehefoundbetweentheeconomicprofilesofcitieswithandwithoutstadiums.Allthisspendingwasevidentlyproducingnobenefit.

Graduallypeopletooknotice.OthereconomistsstartedtoreplicateBaade’sfindings,and found new ways to test the proposition that stadiums create wealth. “Antistadiummovements” began in many American cities. (In the TV comedy series Portlandia,hipstersinPortlandcampaignagainstthemeretheoreticalpossibilityoftheirtown’severtryingtobidfortheOlympics.)

In the mid-1990s Baade was asked to testify before Congress. On the day of histestimony,Congresswasalsoholdinghearingson theClintonWhitewater affair andonmilitaryinterventioninBosnia,butwhenthestadiumhearingsstarted,theotherchambersemptied. One of the people in the room was Paul Tagliabue, NFL commissioner and

someoneallthecongressmenwantedtobeseenwith.PowerfulpeoplelikeTagliabueweregettingquiteirritatedbyBaade’sawkwardfacts.

Academic freedom isacherishedvalueofAmericanuniversities,but,asBaadewasstartingtorealize,soismakingmoney.Herecallsanoldguycominguptohimafteronemeetingandsaying,“Youmightberight,professor,butifIwereyouIwouldwatchmyback. You’re getting in the way of a whole lotta commercial projects.” A universityseldomlikesseeingitsemployeesupsetlocalpoliticiansandbusinesspeople.LakeForestCollege always supported Baade, but at times it would have been convenient had hethoughtdifferently.

Hekeptontellingthetruthregardless.Amongeconomists,oftennot thesportiestoftypes, he developed a special credibility as a former athlete. This sometimes came inhandy,suchaswhenaquestionerinapublicdebateasked,“Nodisrespect,professor,butwhatdoesaneconomistlikeyouknowaboutathletics?”

Eventually Baade descended on soccer. He and a colleague, Victor Matheson,conductedastudyoftheimpactofhostingtheWorldCupof1994intheUS.Theylookedforevidenceoffastereconomicgrowthinthehostcities,andasusualtheyfoundnothing.Yet by now, the old bogusAmerican arguments for hosting sports had spread to othercountries.

TheraisinganddashingofhopesofaneconomicbonanzabecameasintegralapartofamodernsoccertournamentastheraisinganddashingofhopesthatEnglandwouldwinit.A fewmonthsafterEnglandhostedEuro ’96, for instance,a reportbyabodycalledTourismResearch&Marketing said that fewer than 100,000 overseas fans had visitedEnglandforthetournament,againstaforecast—admittedlypluckedoutofthinairbytheEnglish Football Association—of 250,000. Nor had the visitors spent much. Euro ’96generatedabout$155millionindirectincomeforBritain.Thiswaspeanutscomparedtothe$20billionspentbyalloverseasvisitorstothecountryin1996.Meanwhile,astudybyLiverpool University and the city council found that the 30,000 visitors to LiverpoolduringEuro’96spentonly$1.56millionbetweenthem.Howmanyjobshadthatcreated?Thirty,allofthemtemporary.

Afewyears laterJapaneseandKoreangovernmentofficialswerepredictingthat theWorldCupof2002couldboosttheireconomiesbyastaggering$26billionand$9billion,respectively.Ofcourse,aftertheeventtherewaslittlesignofanysuchboost,andindeedsome evidence that tourists had stayed away for fear of soccer hooligans. Big sportstournaments attract some visitors, and deter many others. Greek tourism officialsestimated in late 2004 that there’d been a 10 percent fall in tourist arrivals during thatyear’sAthensOlympics,asvacationerschoosingsummerdestinationssteeredclearofthefrenzy.Nordidthetwenty-twostadiumsbuiltfortheAthensGamesgenerateaneconomicbonanza. In 2010 an analysis by theWall Street Journal found that twenty-one wereunoccupied.

Finally,theweightofthisresearchwasstartingtostackup.Itwasbecomingobviousthat even if you build it, hewon’t necessarily come.The boosters’ claims of economicbenefitsweregrowingmuted.TheestimatesproducedfortheWorldCupinGermanyin

2006 were altogether more sober. Even a study sponsored by the German soccerfederationsuggestedamere$2billioninnewbenefits.(SimilarlyinLondon,estimatesofthelikelyeconomicbenefitsfromthe2012Olympicswerekeptstudiouslyvague.)

PerhapsthebestestimatewehaveofhowmuchvisitorstosoccertournamentsactuallyspendwasdoneattheGermanWorldCup.Thiswasthebiggestmediaeventinhistory,amonth-longparty(exceptfortheboringsoccer),yetevenherethehostsdidn’tmakemuchmoney.

Ateamofeconomists,ledbyHolgerPreussfromtheUniversityofMainz,decidedtowork out howmuch “new”money visitors to theWorldCup actually spent. In the olddays,whenboostersestimatedeconomicbonanzas,theysimplymultipliedthenumberofseats in stadiums by some imaginary spending number (counting meals, hotels, andtransportationaswellastickets)toproduceanenormoushypotheticalsum.

The problemwith thismethod, as serious economists pointed out, is that not everyvisitortoaneventreallyinjectsextraspendingintotheeconomy.Preuss’steamsurveyedalarge sample of visitors to the World Cup and found that only about one-fifth wereforeignerswho had traveled toGermany specifically for the soccer.More than half the“visitors”were in factGermans. For themost part theseGermanswould have been inGermanyanyway,andhad therebeennoWorldCuptheypresumablywouldhavespenttheirmoneyonotherformsofentertainment(suchasgoingtomoviesorrestaurants).Iftheyspentmoneyat theWorldCup, theyspent lesselsewhere in theGermaneconomy,whichlargelyoffsetanyeconomicbenefitfromthesoccer.Ofcourse,someGermanswhomightotherwisehavebeenspending theirmoneyonSpanishvacationsstayedhomeforthe soccer. However, their spending was probably offset by other Germans who wentabroadpreciselytoavoidthemadnessoftheWorldCup.

TheremainingforeignvisitorstotheWorldCup—aboutaquarterofallvisitors—wereeither “time switchers,”whowould have come toGermany anyway at some point andsimply timed theirvisit tocoincidewith theWorldCup,or foreigners,whowouldhavebeeninGermanyduringtheWorldCupanywayandjustdecidedtogoalongandseewhatallthefusswasabout.Preuss’steamcalledthislastcategory“casuals.”

“Time switchers” and “casuals” would have added little to spending, because evenwithout theWorld Cup theywould have spent theirmoney inGermany. Preuss’s teamaskedrespondentsdetailedquestionsabouttheirspendingplans.TheyconcludedthattheWorldCupgeneratedspendingbyvisitorsof€2.8billion.ThatwasnegligiblebesidetheParisHiltonesque€1 trillion–plus spentannuallybyconsumers inGermany. Itwasalsomuch less than theGermanstate spentpreparing for the tournament.Remarkably,morethanathirdofthatvisitorincomecamefrompeoplewhonevergotinsideastadiumbutmerelywatchedthegamesonbigscreensinpublicplaces.Inshort,eventheWorldCupwasbarelyahiccupintheGermaneconomy.

Almostallresearchshowsthesamething:hostingsportstournamentsdoesn’tincreasethenumberoftourists,oroffull-timejobs,ortotaleconomicgrowth.Addedtoallthisarethehost’scosts.If theeconomicbenefitsofputtingonthesetournamentsaremuted, theexpensesseldomare.EconomistsBradHumphreysandSzymonProkopowiczmadesome

roughestimatesofthecoststoPolandofhostingjusthalfofEuro2012.Polandneededtolayonalotmorethanjustnewstadiums,airports,andhotelsforfans.UEFArequires,foritsownofficialsandguests,theuseofoneentirefive-starhotelwithinaforty-five-minutedriveofeverystadium.The teamsneedanadditionalsixteenhotels,mostof themfive-star. The referees have to be in five-star hotels near the stadiums. The doctors whoperformthedopingcontrolsneedfive-stars“inthecountryside.”Muchofthecostofthesehotels came courtesy of the Polish government. Poland also had to put up surveillancecamerasalloveritsstadiumsandtowns.

Inall,HumphreysandProkopowiczestimated that thecountrywouldhave tospendabout$10billiononEuro2012.Withhindsight, this looks likea seriousunderestimate.True,someoftheinfrastructurethatPolandboughtstillhasitsusesafterthetournament.However,much of it doesn’t, because the things you need for a soccer tournament—amassivenewstadium,roadstothatstadium,anairportinasleepytown—areneverquitethesameasthethingsyouneedfordailylife.

Almost all the research points in one direction: hosting doesn’t create an economicbonanza.AndyetSouthAfricawentintoitsWorldCupin2010promisingitscitizensaneconomicbonanza.Inasense,thecountryhadto.Whenaboutathirdofyourpopulationlivesonlessthan$2aday,thegovernmentcanhardlysayit’sblowingbillionsonamonthoffun.Ithastoarguethatthesoccerwillbenefitthepoor.YouthenendupwithpeoplelikeIrvinKhoza,whochairedthetournament’slocalorganizingcommittee,sayingthingslike, “The2010WorldCupwill change the face of the country. Itmayprove a pivotalpointinourdevelopmentasayoungdemocracy.”

TheSouthAfricanrulingclassputthismessageacrosssoenergeticallythatwhenthecountry was named host in May 2004, crowds celebrating in the township of Sowetoshouted,“Themoney iscoming!”Half thepeopleyoumet inSouthAfrica in theyearsbefore the tournament had a scheme for 2010: buying apartments just to rent them outduring the tournament, selling sausage and maize pudding outside stadiums, corrallingpeasantwomentoweavebeadedflagsinthecolorsofalltheparticipatingteams.MuchofSouthAfricanconversationwasaboutsuchschemes,and innewspaperprofiles,whenacelebritydescribedwhathewasworkingon,hewouldoftenadd,“Thekeythingistobereadyfor2010.”Theyearhadbecomeamagicnumber.

As2010approached,thetournament’sexpectedcostsinevitablysoared.SouthAfricahad initially promised a cheapWorldCup.All the stadiumsput together, it had said in2004, would cost only about $170 million. But with FIFA demanding perfection, andevery local powerbroker in South Africa wanting his own A-1 stadium, the bill forstadiumsendedupabouttentimesthat.ThisembarrassingoverrunmaybewhycopiesofSouthAfrica’soriginalbidbookwere“disappeared.”

Some of the South African organizers ended their journey in 2010 feeling ratherchastened.Wewitnessedthisonechillywinter’sSaturdayduringtheWorldCup,inachicconvention center in Johannesburg’s business district of Sandton. A few dozen visitingBrazilianofficialshadtakentheirseatstolistentoSouthAfricanofficialsexplainwhatithadreallybeenliketostagethetournament—tohear,inthewordsofoneSouthAfrican

speaker,about“someofourcutsandbruises.”

The Brazilian guests were mostly cheery, as befits officials on a “study visit” to aWorldCup.But theyheardsomechillingthings.Perhaps themostchillingcamefromaladywewon’tname,tokeepheroutoftrouble.ShewasaseniorofficialforGauteng,theprovincethatincludesJohannesburg.

ShetoldtheBrazilianshowin2009,shehadreviewedtheprojectedeconomicboostthattheWorldCupwouldgiveSouthAfrica.Shelooked—andfoundalmostnothing.“Itwasn’tgoingtobegivingusthebenefitsthatwehadtoldthecountrytheWorldCupwasgoing togiveus,”shesaid.True, the tournamentwould improveJohannesburg’screakytransportlinksabit,but“itwasn’tasmuchaswehadthought.”

And so, over a year before kickoff, Gauteng quietly discarded hopes of economicboost. Instead it recast the World Cup as an exercise in branding—“almost a 30-dayadvertisementforGauteng.”That,theladyadmitted,wasallthetournamenthadproventobe. “Thereare a lotofmistakeswemade thatyouhopefullywon’tmake,” she told theBrazilians.

Afterhertalk,webuttonholedhertoaskwhythepromisedeconomicboosthadneverhappened. “If you look at all the research about mega-events,” she replied, “all thefindingsarethattheeconomicreturnsarehighlyinflatedbypeoplehopingtoprofitfromtheevents.”

That’sright.Forinstance,theexpectedhordesofforeignvisitorsneverreachedSouthAfrica. In 2009 themanagement consultancyGrantThornton—producer of a streamofupbeateconomicforecastsabouttheWorldCup—waspredicting483,000foreignvisitorsforthetournament.(Earlierforecastshadbeenevensunnier.)Aretrospectivestudybasedon official South African statistics, co-authored by Stefan with Thomas Peeters of theUniversityofAntwerpandVictorMathesonfromtheCollegeoftheHolyCross,estimatesthatthenumberofadditionalvisitorsinJuneandJuly2010wasonly220,000,lessthanhalf Grant Thornton’s prediction. Given that tourist arrivals from countries outside ofAfricaaverageabout2millionperyear,thisrepresentedaboosttotourism,butnotabigone.Nordidtheeconomyasawholeseemuchbenefit.JohnSaker,chiefoperatingofficerofKPMGAfrica,said:“Thebigboostdidn’thappen.”

Predictably,mostof thestadiumsthatSouthAfricabuilt for the tournamentarenowwhite elephants. The country never had any need for them. The larger hosting cities—CapeTown,Johannesburg,Durban,andPretoria—havefordecadespossessedlarge,verydecentrugbygroundsthatcanservethemodestneedsoflocalsoccer,too.JohannesburgalsohadtheoriginalSoccerCity,astadiumrightlytoutedasthebestinAfricawhenSouthAfricawasbiddingfortheWorldCup.

Very few domestic games outside the Johannesburg region draw more than about10,000 spectators. Provincial towns likeNelspruit, Polokwane, and Port Elizabeth nowhaveWorldCup stadiums, but they do not have clubs in the country’s Premier SoccerLeague.(IfyouarewonderinghowPortElizabethbecameahostcity,itjusthappenstobethehometownofDannyJordaan,theWorldCup’schiefexecutive.)InOctober2010the

French company SAIL Stadefrance said it was pulling out of its thirty-year lease tooperateCapeTown’sGreenPointStadium, evenbefore the lease came into effect.Thecompanyadmittedithadunderestimatedthecostofrunningthevenue.Quitelikely,inthenextfewyearsCapeTownwillfindbetterusesforthatprimepieceoflandoverlookingtheAtlanticOceanthanaredundantsoccerstadium.

BRAZIL2014:THEHYPENEVERCEASES

Youwould have thought that peoplewould learn from the shame of the SouthAfricanWorldCup;fromthewayFIFAforcedadevelopingcountrytobuildunnecessarystadiumsfancyenoughforsponsors,whileafewmilesawaypeoplelivedincorrugated-ironshacks.In2009aseniorEuropeansoccerofficialmusedtousaboutputtingpressureonFIFAtoletBrazilhostacheaperWorldCup. It couldbedone, thismansaid, if a fewpowerfulsoccer federations—Germany, France, the US, England, and some others—argued thatBrazilneedn’tbuildthemostexpensivestadiumsonearth,justsomegoodsolidonesthatwouldn’tturnintowhiteelephantsthedaythecircuslefttown.

Nosuchluck,however.OnemorninginJohannesburgduringtheWorldCupof2010,oneofus,Simon,hadbreakfastwiththeBraziliansportsminister,OrlandoSilvaJr.Theminister was a charming man, wearing the sort of casual clothes we wish our ownministers inBritainwould try.Andhewas really looking forward tohosting theWorldCup.“Iguessthatthecuphasservedasastimulusfordevelopmentandinfrastructureherein South Africa,” he said, “and we will follow the same path in Brazil.” He said hiscountry had deliberately chosen “less developed regions” to host matches, just to givethem the chance to develop. Brazil was building airports, ports and stadiums all over.There’dbejobsgalore.Inshort,theWorldCupwasjustwhatBrazil’seconomyneeded.

Regrettably Silva is no longer in office, having resigned in 2011 over a corruptionscandal.However,Brazil2014isalreadylookinglikearerunofSouthAfrica2010.Thereis the ever-rising cost of stadiums: froman initial estimateofunder$1billion,mostofwhichwouldbepaidbyprivatebusinesses,toover$3.5billion(almostentirelyfundedbythe Brazilian taxpayer) by late 2013. And let’s just say the estimated cost (or“investment,”asofficialsliketocallit)wasunlikelytofall.Theconstructioncompaniesknew the stadiumshad tobe readyby June2014.Thismeant theycouldchargealmostwhatevertheylikedtobuildthem;thegovernmentwouldjusthavetopay.

No wonder the construction of stadiums kept hitting delays. That allowed theconstruction companies to tell the government at the lastminute, “Oops, this is costingmorethanwethought.Giveusmorecashorwewon’tfinishontimeandyouwill lookstupidinfrontoftheworld.”

TheBrazilianWorldCup is awonderful thing if youhappen to own a constructionbusiness; not so wonderful if you pay taxes in Brazil, or if you were hoping thegovernmentwoulddosomethingaboutall the terribleBrazilian roads thatdon’t lead tosoccerstadiums.

We confidently predict that in July 2014, when the last of the party animals hastumbledoutofacupboardandflownhome,itwillturnoutthatnobodymademuchmore

fromthetournamentthantheywouldhaveintheregulartouristseason.

Havingsaidall that, theBrazilianWorldCupwillprobablyhaveamoreworthwhilelegacy than theSouthAfricanonedid.Fora start, ifBrazilhas itswitsabout it, itwillpiggyback the preparations for the World Cup with the Rio Olympics of 2016. SouthAfricabuiltinfrastructureforoneparty.Brazil,atleast,shouldbebuildingfortwo.

Moreimportant,BrazilhasagreaterneedthanSouthAfricadidforthemainlegacyofaWorldCup:soccerstadiums.Brazilhasnearly200millioninhabitants,almostfourtimesasmanyasSouthAfrica.Ithasamuchlargersoccer-goingpublic:noclubinSouthAfricahasanaverageattendanceofover20,000,whereasseveralinBrazildo.

AndBrazil lacksdecentstadiums.Whenitwasnamedhost in2007, itdidn’thaveasingleonegoodenoughforaWorldCup.Itssoccerfanswerewatching—ornotwatching—inthetumbledownstadiumsofapoorerera.

A wealthier Brazil can afford better grounds. During the recent boom years, thisbecamemoreofamiddle-classcountry.Itnowhasmoreinhabitantsabletopaytowatchsoccer in comfort. TheWorldCupwillmake that happen. The government’s aim, saidSilvaatourbreakfast,“istoraisethecomfortlevelofourstadiumswithoutexcludingtheworkers.” Once the comfort level rises in the shiny new stadiums, more middle-classBraziliansandtheirfamiliesshouldstartcomingtoleaguematches.ThisiswhathappenedinEnglandafter thecountry raised thecomfort levelof its stadiums in theearly1990s.True,England thenwas amuch richer country thanBrazil is today.ButBrazil today isricherthanitscurrent,run-downstadiums.Admittedlysixofthehostcitiesfor2014don’teven have teams in the national championship, but at least the other six stadiums(includingamarvelousnewMaracanãinRio)shouldcomeinhandyafter2014.That’sabetterratiothanSouthAfricamanaged.

Ifwell-offBrazilians startbuyingexpensive tickets togamesafter2014, thatwouldmakeBrazilianclubsricher.AnofficialatChelseatoldushesawBrazilinthefutureas“amarketplace of threat for the talent that you have here [in England].” Already, as thecountrygetsricher,Brazilianclubscanaffordtokeepmoreoftheirbetterplayersathome.Brazil has ceded its traditional position of soccer’s biggest exporter of players toneighboringArgentina. Post-2014,Brazil could have a very good league.After all, theBrazilianeconomyisbiggerthanEngland’s,andthecountryproducessomedecentsoccerplayers.

IfourrosypredictionsforBraziliansoccercometrue,thenthatwon’tmakeBrazilasawholericher.Rather, theBrazilianWorldCupisbestunderstoodasaseriesof financialtransfers:fromwomentomen(whowillhavemorefun),fromBraziliantaxpayerstoFIFAandtheworld’ssoccerfans,andfromtaxpayerstoBraziliansoccerclubsandconstructioncompanies.PossiblyBraziliansocietydesiresthesetransfers.Still,wehavetobeclearthatthis iswhat’s going on: a transfer ofwealth fromBrazil as awhole to various interestgroups inside and outside the country. This is not an economic bonanza. Brazil issacrificingalittlebitofitsfuturetohosttheWorldCup.

Ah, say the boosters, but the biggest economic benefits from these events are

intangible.ThinkofallthebillionsofpeopleseeingthehostcountryonTVeverynight.SakerofKPMGAfricapromised thatSouthAfricawouldbenefit from“wordofmouthandgoodwillforyearstocome”after2010.Similarly,Silvatoldusthatthe2014WorldCupwouldpromoteBrazil’simageintheworld.Well,maybe.Firstofall,astheAmericansports economist Andrew Zimbalist says, “Brazil is hardly a secret as an internationaltouristdestination.”Rio is already themostvisitedcity in theSouthernHemisphere,henotes.Furthermore,there’stheriskthattheWorldCupcoulddamageBrazil’sbrand.ThathashappenedtoseveralOlympichosts:Munichin1972,Montrealin1976,andAtlantain1996. The 2014 World Cup might persuade people that Brazil is not a crime-riddencountrywithterrible traffic;alternatively, itmightpersuadethemthatBrazil ispreciselythat.

It’s rarefora truth longknowntoeconomists tosink inwith thegeneralpublic,butthat is happening on this issue. People everywhere are cottoning onto the truth thatbuildingstadiumsdoesn’tbringwealth.InreferendumsinEuropein2013,thecitizensofMunichvotedagainstbiddingforawinterOlympics,andtheVienneseagainstbiddingfora summerGames. In theUS, the economic crisis seems to havemade taxpayersmoreskepticalofstadiumboondoggles.In2013theAtlantaBravesandMinnesotaVikings,incahootswith local politicians, avoided letting locals vote on funding their planned newstadiums—becausetheysuspectedpeoplewouldvoteagainst.WhenInsiderAdvantage–Fox 5 polled 1,698 registered voters in Cobb County, Georgia, in November 2013, 56percentopposed spending local taxdollarson theBraves stadium.Yet later thatmonth,CobbCountycommissionersvotedforit.

Otherinternationalsportingbodiesdon’twanttoangertaxpayersthewayFIFAhasinBrazil.That’spartlywhytheIOCgavethe2020OlympicstoTokyo:themegacitycouldbetter afford to stage the Games than its poorer rivals Istanbul andMadrid. In soccer,UEFAwent one step further: it didn’t choose a host at all for Euro 2020. The burdenwould have been too great, explained UEFA’s general secretary Gianni Infantino,especiallyinhardeconomictimes.Insteadthirteencountrieswillsharethehosting.

FIFA,too,musthavelearnedfromitsBrazilianexperience.Itnowknowsthattoaskademocraticcountrytofundwhiteelephantsistoaskforprotests.MucheasiertogivetheWorld Cup to dictatorships like Russia or Qatar, where protestors are discouraged.Alternatively, you could choose a host country that doesn’t need to build world-classstadiumsbecauseitalreadyhasdozens.StepforwardtheUSAfor2026.

HAPPINESSISAWORLDCUP

MostpeoplenowagreewithRobBaade:hostingasportstournamentdoesn’tmakeaplacerich.The question then iswhy countries still bother.Why did somany countries go tosuch embarrassing lengths to stage theWorldCupsof 2018 and2022?The answerhasnothing to dowith desire for profit. To the contrary:Qatar,whichwon the bidding for2022, has so much money that it can afford to waste pots of it on a month of fun.However, the frantic bidding by respectable democracies, such as Australia, the US,England, and Spain, does reveal something about the new politics of happiness slowlyemergingintherichworld.

Inrecentyears,socialscientistshavelearnedalotabouthappiness.Theirbestsourcein Europe is the Eurobarometer research program, which is funded by the EuropeanCommission. Each year it asks about 1,000 citizens from each European country howhappytheyare.Toquotetheexactquestion:“Onthewhole,areyouverysatisfied,fairlysatisfied,notverysatisfied,ornotatallsatisfiedwiththelifeyoulead?”

The survey has been conducted for over forty years. By now some insights haveaccumulated.Perhapsthemostinterestingisthathavingmoneyinitselfdoesn’tmakeyouhappy.“Thereisaparadoxattheheartofourlives”ishowRichardLayardopenshisbookHappiness:Lessons fromaNewScience,oneofa floodof recentworkson thesubject.“Mostpeoplewantmoreincomeandstriveforit.YetasWesternsocietieshavegotricher,their people have become no happier.” Layard says that in theUS, Britain, and Japan,peoplehavegottennohappierinthepastfiftyyearsevenasaverageincomeshavemorethandoubled.

It seems that we humans adapt quickly to our environment. The things we oncethoughtofasluxuriessoonbecomenecessities(although,bythesametoken,oursenseofwell-beingwouldquicklyadapttolosinghalfourincome).Whatwecareaboutisnotourabsolute wealth but our rung on the ladder. Ruut Veenhoven, a leading researcher ofhappiness,says,“WhenwehaveovertakentheJoneses,ourreferencedriftsupwardtotheSmiths,andwefeelunhappyagain.”

Onlyincountrieswhereincomepercapitaisbelowabout$15,000—countriessuchasBrazil,thePhilippines,andIndia—hasincreasedwealthbroughtsomehappiness.Layardwrites, “The reason is clear—extra income is really valuablewhen it lifts people awayfromsheerphysicalpoverty.”ButthatveryrarelyhappensinEuropeanymore.

Some other truths emerge from the European data. Scandinavians are very happy;easternEuropeansarenot.The Irishbothnorthandsouthof theborderare surprisinglyhappy. Age, sex, and social status matter, too. In western Europe at least, the averageperson’shappinesstendstodeclinewithageuntilheorsheistwenty-six,andthenstartstoriseagain.Womenseemtobehappierthanmen,whichmighthelpaccountfortheirmuchlowerratesofsuicide.Themoreeducatedpeopleare,thehappiertheytendtobe.Marriedpeople are generally happier thanunmarriedones.What happens aroundyou in societyalso matters: when unemployment or inflation rises, people tend to grow unhappier.Spendingtimewithfriendsandfamilymakespeoplehappy.

And,wediscovered,sodoeshostingsoccertournaments.StagingaWorldCupwon’tmakeyourich,butitdoestendtocheeryouup.

Thedaybefore theWorldCup final of2006,oneof the authors,Simon,visited thestreetwhereheusedtoliveinBerlin.Fifteenyearsbefore,theHohenfriedbergstrassehadbeen a dull-brown placewith toilets on the stairwells and potentially fatal ancient coalovensineveryapartment.Nobodyeverspoketoanyoneelse.Thistimehehadtocheckthestreetsigntomakesureitwasthesameplace.Flagswereflyingfromeveryhouse—German flagsmade inChina, but also flags ofmany other nations—and childrenwereplaying everywhere even though they had supposedly gone extinct in Germany. TheWorldCupseemedtohavemadeausuallygloomynationhappy.

This is typical. Georgios Kavetsos and Stefan Szymanski (with a lot of help fromRobert McCulloch, guru of happiness research) took the European Commission’shappiness data for twelvewestern European countries from 1974 to 2004 and checkedwhether it correlated at all with sports tournaments. The obvious first question waswhetherpeoplebecamehappierwhentheirnationalteamdidwell.Itturnedoutthattheydidn’t: therewasnovisiblecorrelation.ThenKavetsosandStefanlookedathostingandhappiness, and here they found a link. After a country hosts a soccer tournament, itsinhabitantsreportincreasedhappiness.

WhatKavetsosandStefandidwastoreplicateexistingstudiesofhappinessusingallthemeasures researchers usually consider (income, age,marital status, and so on), andthen see whether living in a host country made a difference as well. Their data onhappiness covered eight separate hosts of tournaments: Italy and France for theWorldCupsof1990and1998andfortheEuropeanchampionshipsItaly(1980),France(1984),WestGermany (1988),England (1996), andBelgiumand theNetherlands (2000). Inallbut one of these eight host countries, there was a significant uptick in self-reportedhappinessjustafterthetournament.TheonlyexceptionwastheUK,wherehappinessfellslightlyjustafterEuro‘96,butthenweallknowthattheUKisnotEngland.

TheLondonOlympicsdo seem tohaveboostedBritishhappiness.TheUK’sOfficeforNationalStatisticsregisteredasmallriseinself-reported“lifesatisfaction”from2011–2012to2012–2013,despitetheeconomiccrisis.Ofthe165,000Britishadultspolled,77percent rated their life satisfaction at seven ormore out of ten—up a touch from 75.9percentin2011–2012.TheONScommentedthattheOlympicsandtheQueen’sDiamondJubileemayhave“influencedpeople’sassessmentoftheir…well-being.”

The mass of evidence is persuasive. However, given that so many other factorsinfluencehappiness,wewanted to testwhether thiseffectcouldbemeasuredevenafterallowing for the other factors. To do this, several large databases had to be weldedtogether,andintheprocessthedatafromsomeyearswerelost.Forinstance,itturnsoutthat the incomeof respondentswasnot surveyed in every singleyear.That leftuswithdataforfivehosts:Italia’90,andtheEurosof1984,1988,and2000,thelastofwhichhadtwohosts.Admittedly,thisisasmallsample,butinallfivehostcountries,happinessroseafterthetournament,evenallowingforalltheothereffectsthatinfluencehappiness.Theinhabitants reported a higher level of happiness the year after the tournament than theyhadtheyearbefore,andtheyreportedmorehappinessintheautumnsurveys(thatis,heldafter the tournament) than in the spring surveys (held before the tournament).Interestingly,thisisjustwhatthelateBritishsoccerwriterArthurHopcraftobservedwhenEnglandhostedtheWorldCupin1966.Hewrotetwoyearslater:

ThecompetitionreleasedinourcountryacommunalexuberancewhichIthinkastonishedourselvesmorethanourvisitors.Itgaveusachancetospruceupa lot, to lightentheleadencharacterof thegroundswhere thematcheswereplayed,tothrowoffmuchofourinhibitionofbehavior,particularlyintheprovinces,sothatwebecameagay,almostrecklesspeopleinourownstreets,whichiscommonlyonlyhowweconductourselveswhenweputonourraffiahatsinothercountries’holidayresorts.Exceptinthecelebrationsthatgreetedtheend of the SecondWorldWar, I have never seen England look as unashamedly delighted by life as it didduringtheWorldCup.

Wefoundmuchthesamethinginthenationswestudied.Thejumpinhappinesswas

quite large.Citizens ofwealthy countries like theNetherlands orFrancewouldneed tomakehundredsofeurosmoreamonthtoexperienceasimilar leap.Onewaytoexpressthis is that the average person gains twice as much happiness from hosting a soccertournament as from having higher education. The effect can also be likened to anunexpected increase in income that takes someone from the bottom half of the incomedistribution to the middle of the top half. It’s not quite winning the lottery, but verysatisfyingnonetheless.Ifyoucalculatethisforanentirenation,thentheleapinhappinessfromhostingcaneasilybeworthafewbillioneuros.

In general in the host countries, older men gained the most extra happiness,presumablybecausemanyofthemweresittinginfrontoftheirtelevisionsetswithlittleelse todo.Lesser-educatedpeoplegainedmorehappiness thanbetter-educatedones.Ofallthesubgroupswestudied,onlyone(asignificantone)didnotgetanyhappier:women.

Thegaininhappinesslastsatleastacoupleofmonths,giventhatthetournamentsareplayed inmidsummerand the survey iscarriedout in theautumn.ForWorldCups, thegainwasquitepersistent:even twoandfouryearsafter the tournament,everysubgroupwe looked at was still happier than before the tournament. European championships,though,liftedhappinessonlybriefly.WefoundnoimpactonhappinessinthehostcountryayearaftertheEuro.

But if people gain a lot of happiness after hosting a tournament, they lose a littlehappiness before it. The ritual fuss over whether the stadiums will be ready, whetherhooligansor terroristswill invade theircountry,andwhether their teamwillbemade tolook ridiculous appears to cause stress. Six years and four years before hosting atournament,manyofthesubgroupswestudiedshowedadeclineinhappiness.

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Itturnsoutthathostingdoesn’tmakeyourich,butitdoesmakeyouhappy.Thisbegsaquestion.Ifcountrieswanttohostsoccertournaments(andAmericancitieswanttohostmajorleagueteams)aspartoftheirpursuitofhappiness,whydon’ttheyjustsayso?Whybotherclothingtheirargumentsinboguseconomics?

Theansweris thatpoliticianshavestillbarelydiscoveredthelanguageofhappiness.They talk mostly about money. Anything that serves only to make people happy getsderidedwith the contemptuousphrase “feel-good factor,” as if politics shouldbe abovesuch trivialities. Most politicians have simply assumed that the real business ofgovernment is to make people richer. For one thing, measuring income is easier thanmeasuring happiness. And so, when politicians argue for hosting tournaments, theytypicallyusethelanguageofmoney.Itisalmosttheonlyvocabularytheyhave.JohnKay,writingintheFinancialTimesin2013aboutthecostsoftheLondonOlympics,remarked:“Acuriouspuritanism requirespoliticians topretendactivities intended tomakeus feelgoodaboutourselvesare justifiedbytheircontributionto‘theeconomy.’TheOlympiadwasagoodparty,whichcosttheBritishpopulationabout£200perhead.”

But it is becoming clear that in rich countries, more money doesn’t make peoplehappier. Robert F.Kennedywas one of the first to see this, remarking inMarch 1968,

three months before he was murdered, that the gross domestic product “measureseverything … except that which makes life worthwhile.” For a few years before theeconomiccrisishitin2008,Europeanpoliticiansdidbegintalkinglessaboutmoneyandmore about happiness. In Britain in 2006, for instance, the Conservative leader DavidCameron tried to introduce theacronym“GWB”—“generalwell-being”—tocounter thedecades-old“GDP”for“grossdomesticproduct.”Hesaid,“Improvingoursociety’ssenseof well-being is, I believe, the central political challenge of our times… . Politics inBritain has too often sounded as though it was just about economic growth.” InsteadCameronwantedpolitics“torecognizethevalueofrelationshipswithfamily,friendsandtheworldaroundus.”

Itseemsthatsoccertournamentscreatethoserelationships:peoplegatheredtogetherinpubsandlivingrooms,awholecountrysuddenlycaringabout thesameevent.AWorldCupisthesortofcommonprojectthatotherwisebarelyexistsinmodernsocieties.We’veseen that themere factof followinga team in theWorldCupdeters somevery isolatedpeople from committing suicide. If playing in a tournament creates social cohesion,hostingonecreatesevenmore.Theinhabitantsofthehostcountry—andcertainlythemen—come to feel more connected to everyone else around them. Moreover, hosting canboostthenation’sself-esteem,andsomakespeoplefeelbetteraboutthemselves.

Intheend,thebestreasonforhostingaWorldCupisthatit’sfun.Brazil’sPresidentDilmaRousseffoughttohavebeenhonestandsaid,“It’llcostusmoney,we’llhavelessleftoverforschoolsandroadsandpoorpeople,butwealllovesocceranditshouldbeafunmonth, so it’sworth it.”ThenBrazilianscouldhaveaclearheadeddebateabout thetrueprosandconsofhosting.It’sreasonableenoughtowanttothrowtheworld’sbiggestparty.Butyoudon’tthrowapartytomakemoney.Youdoitbecauseitmakesyouhappy.

Hostingmakesevenpoliticianshappy.Mostoftheirworkisfrustrating.Youtrytogetmoneytobuild,say,roads,butotherpoliticiansstopyou.Evenwhenyougetthemoney,it’shardtobuildtheroads,becausepeoplepopuptoobject.It’sthesamewithhousingorforeignpolicy or recycling: being a politician is an endless, tedious strugglewith yourenemies.

But it isn’twhen youwant to host a sports tournament. Suddenly everyone gets onboard.WhileLondonwasbiddingfortheOlympics,therowerSteveRedgravepulledanOlympicgoldmedaloutofhispocketduringameetingat theHouseofCommons,andMPsofallpartiesbegandroolingoverhim.Evengoingtowardoesn’tcreatethatsortofunanimoussentimentanymore.

The end of ideology—the disappearance of nationalism, socialism, religion,communism, and fascism from western Europe—means that in good times manypoliticianshavelittlebettertodothantoplugsportseventsusingspeciousarguments.KenLivingstone wrote when he was mayor of London, “Crucially, the Olympics will alsobringmuch-needednewfacilities:anOlympic-sizeswimmingpoolinacitythathasjusttwo Olympic pools to Berlin’s 19, and a warm-up track that would be turned over tocommunityuse.”

Plainly, arguments like these are just excuses. If you want to regenerate a poor

neighborhood, regenerate it.Buildnicehousesanda train line. IfyouwantanOlympicpoolandawarm-uptrack,buildthem.YoucouldbuildpoolsandtracksallacrossLondon,anditwouldstillbecheaperthanhostingtheOlympics.TheonlygoodreasontohostanOlympicsisthatitmakespeoplehappy.ThepoliticiansbehindLondon’sbiddidnotsayso,but theydidsense that thevoterswouldreward themforwinning theGames.The8millionLondoners,inparticular,havethehighestincomesintheEuropeanUnion,andsowouldneed to receivea fortune in tax rebates tobuy thehappiness theGames seem tohavebroughtthem.

PuritansmightrightlyarguethatevenarichcountrylikeBritainhasbetterthingsonwhich to spendmoney.However, the likely gain in happiness from theOlympics doesmeanthepoliticiansarecannytogivethepeoplebreadandcircuses.InwealthycountrieslikeBritain,themathofhostingandhappinessprobablystacksup.

But it’s much less likely that Brazil will get its money’s worth in happiness fromhostingtheWorldCup.Thisisstillverymuchasub-$15,000country,whereputtingmoremoneyinpeople’spocketswouldmakethemhappier.AndlikeSouthAfrica,it’samongthemosteconomicallyunequalcountriesonearth.Bothcountrieshaveafirst-worldsectorof theeconomywith themoneyandskills tohostaWorldCup—butalsoa third-worldsectorthatdesperatelyneedsthefruitsofthemoneyandskills.MillionsofBraziliansarestillstuckinlife-diminishingpoverty.SomeofthemhavebeenpushedoutoftheirslumstomakewayfortheWorldCup.LikeSouthAfricans,theyshouldaskhowmanyhomeswithrunningwatercouldhavebeenbuiltforthecostoftheirnewstadiums.

WealreadyknowtheWorldCupwon’tmakeBraziliansricher.It’salsoprobablynotthemostefficientwaytomakethemhappier.

PARTIII

CountriesRichandPoor,TomThumb,GuusGhiddink,England,Spain,Saddam,andtheChampionsoftheFuture

16WHYENGLANDLOSESANDOTHERSWIN

BEATENBYADISHWASHER

HereiswhatwewroteinthefirsteditionofSoccernomics,whichappearedninemonthsbeforetheWorldCupof2010kickedoff:

WhentheEnglandteamfliestoSouthAfricafortheWorldCup,anancientritualwillstarttounfold.PerfectedoverEngland’sfourteenpreviousfailurestowinthecompetitionawayfromhome,itfollowsthispattern:

PHASE1:PRETOURNAMENT—CERTAINTYTHATENGLANDWILLWINTHEWORLDCUP

AlfRamsey, theonlyEnglishmanager towin the trophy,predicted thevictoryof1966.However, his prescience becomes less impressive when you realize that almost everyEnglandmanagerthinkshewillwinthetrophy,includingRamseyinthetwocampaignshedidn’t.Whenhis teamwasknockedout in1970hewasstunnedandsaid,“WemustnowlookaheadtothenextWorldCupinMunichwhereourchancesofwinningIwouldsayareverygoodindeed.”Englanddidn’tqualifyforthatone.

Glenn Hoddle, England’s manager in 1998, revealed only after his team had beenknockedout“myinnermostthought,whichwasthatEnglandwouldwintheWorldCup.”Anothermanagerwhowenthomeearly,RonGreenwood,confessed,“IhonestlythoughtwecouldhavewontheWorldCupin1982.”AmonthbeforetheWorldCupof2006,SvenGoranErikssonsaid,“Ithinkwewillwinit.”

Thedeludedmanagerisneveralone.AstheEnglandplayerJohnnyHaynesremarkedaftereliminationin1958,“EveryoneinEnglandthinkswehaveaGod-givenrighttowintheWorld Cup.” This belief in the face of all evidence was a hangover from empire:Englandissoccer’smothercountryandshouldthereforebethebesttoday.ThesociologistStephenWaggnotes,“Inreality,EnglandisacountrylikemanyothersandtheEnglandsoccerteamisasoccerteamlikemanyothers.”Thistruthisonlyslowlysinkingin.

PHASE2:DURINGTHETOURNAMENT—ENGLANDMEETSAFORMERWARTIMEENEMY

In five of its last sevenWorld Cups, England was knocked out by either Germany orArgentina.ThematchesfitseamlesslyintotheBritishtabloidviewofhistory,exceptforthe outcome.AsAlanBall summed up themood in England’s dressing room after thedefeattoWestGermanyin1970,“Itwasdisbelief.”

EvenJoeGaetjens,whoscoredthewinninggoalfortheUSagainstEnglandin1950,turnsout tohavebeenofGerman-Haitianorigin,notBelgian-Haitianas is always said.Andinanycase,theUSisanotherformerwartimeenemy.

PHASE3:THEENGLISHCONCLUDETHATTHEGAMETURNEDONONE

FREAKISHPIECEOFBADLUCKTHATCOULDHAPPENONLYTOTHEM

Gaetjens, the accounting student and dishwasher in aManhattan restaurant who didn’tevenhaveanAmericanpassport,scoredhisgoalbyaccident.“Gaetjenswentfortheball,butatthelastmoment,decidedtoduck,”England’scaptainBillyWrightwrotelater.“TheballbouncedonthetopofhisheadandslippedpastthebewilderedWilliams.”

In 1970 England’s goalkeeper Gordon Banks got an upset stomach before thequarterfinal againstWestGermany.Hewas okay on themorning of the game andwaspickedtoplay,butalittlelaterwasdiscoveredonthetoiletwitheverything“comingoutbothends.”Hisunderstudy,PeterBonetti,letinthreesoftGermangoals.

Therewasmorebadluckin1973,whenEnglandfailedtoqualifyforthenextyear’sWorldCupbecausePoland’s“clown”ofagoalkeeper, JanTomaszewski,unaccountablyhadabrilliantnightatWembley.“ThesimpletruthisthatonanormaldaywewouldhavebeatenPoland6–0,”England’smidfielderMartinPeterssaysinNiallEdworthy’sbookonEnglandmanagers,The SecondMost Important Job in theCountry. Polandwent on toreachthesemifinalsofthe’74WorldCup.

In1990and1998England lost inwhateveryoneknows is the lotteryof thepenaltyshoot-out. In 2002 everyone knew that the obscure, buck-toothed Brazilian kidRonaldinhomusthaveluckedoutwiththefreekickthatsailedintoEngland’snet,becausehecouldn’thavebeengoodenoughtoplaceitdeliberately.In2006WayneRooneywouldneverhavebeensentoffforstompingonRicardoCarvalho’sgenitalsifCristianoRonaldohadn’ttattledonhim.Thesethingsjustdon’thappentoothercountries.

PHASE4:MOREOVER,EVERYONEELSECHEATED

TheBrazilian crowd in 1950 and theMexican crowd in 1970 deliberatelywasted timewhileEnglandwaslosingbykeepingtheballinthestands.TheCIA(somesay)druggedBanks. Diego Maradona’s “hand of God” single-handedly defeated England in 1986.DiegoSimeoneplayactedin1998togetDavidBeckhamsentoff,andCristianoRonaldodidthesameforRooneyin2006.

Every referee opposes England. Those of his decisions that support this thesis areanalyzeddarkly.Typically, the referee’snationality ismentioned toblackenhimfurther.BillyWright,England’scaptain in1950, laterrecalled“MrDattiloofItaly,whoseemeddetermined to letnothingsonegligibleas the lawsof thegamecomebetweenAmericaand victory.” The refereewho didn’t give England a penalty againstWestGermany in1970was, inevitably,anArgentine.TheTunisianrefereeof1986who, likemostpeoplewatchingthegame,failedtospotthe“handofGod”hasbecomelegendary.

PHASE5:ENGLANDISKNOCKEDOUTWITHOUTGETTINGANYWHERENEARLIFTINGTHECUP

Theonlyexceptionwas1990,whentheteamreachedthesemifinal.Otherwise,Englandhas always been eliminated when still needing to defeat at least three excellent teams.Since1970,Bulgaria,Sweden,andPolandhavegottenasclosetowinningaWorldCupasEnglandhas.

Perhaps England should be relieved that it doesn’t finish second.As Jerry Seinfeldoncesaid,whowantstobethegreatestloser?ThesciencewriterStefanKleinpointsoutthatwinningbronzeattheOlympicsisnotsobad,becausethatisagreatachievementbyanystandards,butwinningsilverisawful,asyouwillalwaysbetorturedbythethoughtofwhatmighthavebeen.

Englandhasneverbeenatmuchriskofthat.TheteamwononlyfiveofitseighteenmatchesatWorldCupsabroad from1950 through1970,anddidn’tqualify for thenexttwo tournaments in1974and1978,soat least ithasbeen improvingsince.Thegeneralbeliefindeclinefromagoldenageismistaken.

PHASE6:THEDAYAFTERELIMINATION,NORMALLIFERESUMES

The one exception is 1970, when England’s elimination may have caused the LabourParty’s surprise defeat in theBritish general election four days later. But otherwise theelimination does not bring on a nationwide hangover. To the contrary, England’seliminationsarecelebrated,turnedintonationalmyths,orsongs,orcommercialsforpizzachains.

PHASE7:ASCAPEGOATISFOUND

Thescapegoatisneveranoutfieldplayerwhohas“battled”allmatch.Evenifhedirectlycausedtheeliminationbymissingapenalty,heisa“hero.”

Beckhamwasscapegoated for thedefeatagainstArgentina in1998onlybecausehegotaredcardafterforty-sixminutes.WriterDaveHillexplainedthatthepresswassimplypulling out its “two traditional responses to England’s sporting failure: heralding agloriousdefeatandmercilesslypunishingthoseresponsibleforit,inthiscasePoshSpice’sunfortunatefiancé.”

Beckham wrote in one of his autobiographies that the abuse continued for years:“EverytimeIthinkithasdisappeared,IknowIwillmeetsomeidiotwhowillhaveagoatme.Sometimesitisatmatches,sometimesjustdrivingdowntheroad.”Headdedthathekept“alittlebookinwhichI’vewrittendownthenamesofthosepeoplewhoupsetmethemost.Idon’twanttonamethembecauseIwantittobeasurprisewhenIgetthemback.”Onedaytheywillallgetupsetstomachs.

Oftenthescapegoatisamanagementfigure:Wrightascaptainin1950,JoeMearsaschiefselectorin1958,andmanymanagerssince.Sometimesitisakeeper,whobyvirtueofhispositionjuststoodaroundingoalratherthanbattlinglikeahero.Bonettispenttherestofhiscareerenduringchantsof“YoulosttheWorldCup.”Afterretiringfromsoccer,hewentintoquasiexileasamailmanonaremoteScottishisland.

In2006CristianoRonaldowasanointedscapegoat.OnlyafteradefeattoBrazilisnoscapegoatsought,becausedefeatstoBrazilareconsideredacceptable.

PHASE8:ENGLANDENTERSTHENEXTWORLDCUPTHINKINGITWILLWINIT

That’swhatwewrotein2009.Wearenotusuallythisprescient.IfwepredictedEngland’sexperienceinSouthAfricain2010precisely,it’sonlybecauseoverthedecadestheroute

mapofEngland’seliminationshadbecomeperfectlyclear.

In phase one of our sequence, England flew to South Africa expecting to win theWorld Cup. That expectation wasn’t particularly ludicrous: Fabio Capello’s team hadqualifiedwithmoredashthaneverbefore,winningnineoutoftenqualifyinggames.

Phase twowas,“During theTournamentEnglandMeetsaFormerWartimeEnemy.”Following the4–1 thumpingby theGermans inBloemfontein,Englandhas nowexitedagainstGermanyorArgentinainsixofitslasteightWorldCups.

Wecalledphasethree“TheEnglishConcludeThattheGameTurnedonOneFreakishPieceofBadLuckThatCouldHappenOnlytoThem.”In2010thiswasofcourseFrankLampard’s shot that bounced inside the German goal without the referee noticing. AsLampardhimselfhadlamentedafterEngland’spreviouselimination,in2006,“ItseemstobetheEnglishwaytoloseinbizarrecircumstancesbutitwearsyoudown.ItgetstothepointwhereyouwanttotellLadyLucktof***offandtakeherbadsisterwithher.”

Phasefouris“Morever,EveryoneElseCheated.”FIFAshouldhavebeenusinggoal-linetechnology,andtheGermankeepershouldhavefessedupthatLampardhadscored.

Inphasefive,“EnglandIsKnockedOutWithoutGettingAnywhereNearLiftingtheCup.”HadtheEnglishsomehowbeatenGermany, insteadof losingby threegoals, theywouldhavethenneededtobeatArgentina,Spain,andHolland.

Inphasesix,normalliferesumedthedayafterelimination.RiotsbrokeoutinEnglishcitiesinthesummerof2011,notthesummerof2010.

Inphaseseven,themanagerCapellowaschosenasthenation’sscapegoat.TheItalianhad raised English hopes bymaking his players look likeworld-beaters for two years,before finally pulling off themask in South Africa to reveal them as the usual losers.Furthermore,asaforeignerhemadeaperfectscapegoat.

TheWorldCupasritualhasameaningbeyondsoccer.Theeliminationisusuallythemost-watchedBritishtelevisionprogramoftheyear.It thereforeeducatestheEnglishintwocontradictorynarrativesabouttheircountry:one,thatEnglandhasamanifestdestinyto triumph,and, two, that itneverdoes.Thegeniusof the song“ThreeLions,”Englishsoccer’s unofficial anthem, is that it combines both narratives: “Thirty years of hurt /Neverstoppedmedreaming.”

There is an alternative universe in which Beckham didn’t get sent off, Banks’sstomachheldup,Lampard’sgoalcounted,andsoon. In thatuniverseEnglandhaswonaboutsevenWorldCups.ManyEnglishpeoplethinktheywouldhavepreferredthat.Butitwould have deprived the nation of a ritual thatmarks the passing of timemuch likeChristmas or New Year’s and celebrates a certain idea of England: a land of unluckyheroesthatnolongerrulestheworld,althoughitshould.

Yetwiththatfailurein2010,somethingchanged.ToadaptT.S.Eliot,humankindcanonly take so much reality. England’s umpteenth disappointment seems to have finallyconvincedthenation’sfansandmediatoshedthefantasyofmanifestdestiny.Whentheunderstated Roy Hodgson replaced Capello as manager in 2012, he seemed intent on

reducing expectations from low to zero. “It’s difficult to say what would constitute‘success’atEuro2012,”hemusedathisfirstpressconference.“I’dlikepeopletocutusabitofslack.”Peopledid.WhenhisteamlosttheEuropeanquarterfinalonpenaltiestoaformerwartimeenemy,Italy,nobodywasverysurprised.

Finally, the English have become realistic. Perhaps helped by a general decline innational status, they are beginning to realize they are just another country,without anymanifestdestinytotriumph.

APERFECTLYDECENTTEAM

Anymathematicianwouldsayit’sabsurdtoexpectEnglandtowintheWorldCup.

Englandwins just over two-thirdsof itsmatches.Tobeprecise, from1990 to2010(countingfromtheendofthe1990WorldCuptotheendofthe2010WorldCup)Englandplayed224,won122,tied57,andlost45.Ifwetreatatieashalfawin,thistranslatesintoawinningpercentageof67.2percent.Ifwethenbreakthisdownintofivefour-yearWorldCupcyclesEngland’swinningpercentagehasrangedbetween65and76,exceptfor the1998–2002cycle,whenitslumpedto60percent.Inotherwords,itsperformanceformostofrecenthistoryhasbeenveryconstant.

Yes, these statistics conceal some ghastly mishaps as well as some highs, but thestatistics tell us that the difference between anguish and euphoria is a few percentagepoints.

Onthefaceofit,winningtwo-thirdsofthetime—meaningbookies’oddsof1–2on—isnottooshabbyinatwo-horserace.Ofcourse,somecountriesdoevenbetter.Brazil’swinningpercentageisnearly75percent.Butagainstmostteams,Englandisthedeservedfavorite.Inthe1990–2010period,England’swinpercentagewasninthbestintheworld.

The problem comes when we try to translate this achievement into winningtournaments.England’sfailuretowinanythingsincetheholyyearof1966isacauseofmuchembarrassmentforBritishexpatriatesinbarsontheSpanishcoast.

It is tricky tocalculate theexactprobabilityofEnglandqualifyingfora tournament,becauseitrequiresananalysisofmanypermutationsofevents.However,wecanreduceittoasimpleproblemofmultiplicativeprobabilityifweadoptthe“must-win”concept.Forexample,EnglandfailedtoqualifyforEuro2008bycominginthirdinitsgroupbehindCroatiaandRussia. Indoingso itwonsevenmatches, lost three,and tied twice (foranaveragewinningpercentageofexactly66.66percent).ItwasnarrowlybeatenbyRussia,whichwonseven,losttwo,andtiedthreetimes(awinningpercentageof70.83percent).

Supposethattoguaranteequalificationyouhavetowineightgamesoutright.Thentheproblem becomes onewhen you have towin eight out of twelve, where yourwinningprobability in each game is 66 percent. Calculating this probability is a bit morecomplicated,sinceitinvolvescombinatorics.

Theanswer is aprobabilityofqualificationof63percent.Thatmeans thatEnglandshouldqualifyfor fewer than two-thirdsof the tournaments itenters. Infact, from1970through2014Englandqualified justover70percentof the time:foreightoutofeleven

World Cups and seven out of ten European championships. Given that the number ofqualifyingmatcheshas risenover time,England’sperformance is somewhatbetter thanyoumightexpect.

ThesadfactisthatEnglandisagoodteamthatdoesbetterthanmost.Thismeansitisnotlikelytowinmanytournaments,anditdoesn’t.Whenwefirstpublishedthisbook,wecalled theBritish editionWhyEngland Lose. Going into the 2010WorldCup, Englishpeopleoftenaskedus:“Aren’tyouworriedaboutyourtitle?WhatifEnglandwin?”Weweren’t very worried. Later we changed the title anyway, because it turned out(amazingly)thatfewEnglishpeoplewantedtobuyabookcalledWhyEnglandLose.

Until2010,theEnglishtendedtothinkthatEnglandshoulddobetter.Theteam’susualstatusaroundthebottomoftheworld’stoptenwasnotgoodenough.Thenationalmedia,in particular, felt almost perpetually let down by the team. England was “known asperennialunderachieversontheworldstage,”accordingtothetabloidTheSun;itshistory“hasbeenalandscapesculptedfromvalleysofunderachievement,”saidTheIndependentnewspaper;theformerEnglandcaptainTerryButchergrumbledintheSundayMirror in2006 that “historical underachievement has somehow conspired to make England feelevenmoreimportant.”

“WhydoesEnglandlose?”isperhapsthegreatestquestioninEnglishsports.Intryingtoanswerit,wehearstrangeechoesfromthefieldofdevelopmenteconomics.Thecentralquestioninthatfieldis,“Whyaresomecountrieslessproductivethanothers?”Thetwomain reasons England loses would sound familiar to any development economist. SowouldthemostcommonreasonfalselycitedforwhyEnglandloses.HerearethosethreereasonsforEngland’seliminations—firstthefalseone,thenthecorrectones.

BRITISHJOBSFORBRITISHWORKERS?WHYTHEREARETOOMANYENGLISHMENINTHEPREMIERLEAGUE

WhenpunditsgathertoexplainwhyEnglandloses,theirfavoritescapegoatofthelastfewyears is imports: the hundreds of foreigners who play in the Premier League. Here isEngland’smidfielderStevenGerrardspeakingbeforeEnglandlostathometoCroatiaandfailedtoqualifyforEuro2008:“Ithinkthereisariskoftoomanyforeignplayerscomingover,whichwouldaffectournationalteameventuallyifit’snotalready.Itisimportantwekeepproducingplayers.”

Afterall, ifourboyscanbarelyevengetagame in theirown league,howcan theyhope tomature into internationals?After England’s defeat toCroatia, FIFA’s president,SeppBlatter,ManchesterUnited’smanager,AlexFerguson,andUEFA’spresident,MichelPlatini,allmadeversionsofGerrard’sargument.In2013GregDyke,thenewchairmanofEngland’sFootballAssociation,warned:“Inthefutureit’squitepossiblewewon’thaveenoughplayersqualifiedtoplayforEnglandwhoareplayingregularlyatthehighestlevelinthiscountryorelsewhereintheworld.Asaresult,itcouldwellmeanEngland’steamsareunabletocompeteseriouslyontheworldstage.”

These men are effectively blaming imports for the English lack of skills. Thereasoningisthatourownworkersdon’tgetachancebecausetheyarebeingdisplacedby

foreign workers. Exactly the same argument is oftenmade in development economics.Whyaresomecountriesnotveryproductive?Partlybecausetheirinhabitantsdon’thaveenoughskills.Thebestplacetolearnskills—suchasmakingtoothpaste,orteachingmath,orplayingsoccer—isonthe job.Tolearnhowtomaketoothpaste,youhavetoactuallymake it, not just take a class to learn how tomake it.But if you are always importingtoothpaste,youwillneverlearn.

Thatiswhy,formorethanhalfacentury,manydevelopmenteconomistshavecalledfor“importsubstitution.”Banortaxcertainimportssothatthecountrycanlearntomakethestuffitself.Importsubstitutionhasworkedforafewcountries.Japanafterthewar,forinstance,managedtoteachitselffromscratchhowtomakeallsortsofhigh-qualitycarsandelectricalgadgets.

The idea of import substitution in the Premier League has an emotional appeal tomanyEnglishfans.Britonsoftencomplainaboutfeelingoverrunbyimmigrants,andfewspots in the country aremore foreign than aPremierLeague fieldonmatchday.Someclubs have wisely dispensed with Englishmen almost altogether. All told, Englishmenaccountedforonly37percentoftheminutesplayedbyindividualplayersinthePremierLeague in the2007–2008 seasonbeforeCroatia’snight atWembley.By the2012–2013season,only32percentof starters in the leaguewereEnglish.Tosomedegree,Englishsoccernolongerexists.

“Itismyphilosophytoprotecttheidentityoftheclubsandcountry,”Platinihassaid.“Manchester United against Liverpool should be with players from Manchester andLiverpool,fromthatregion.RobbieFowlerwasfromLiverpool.Hegrewupinthatcity,itwasnice,butnowyoudon’thavetheEnglishplayers.”

Imagine for amoment thatPlatini somehowmanaged to suspendEU lawand forceEnglish soccer clubs to discriminate against players from other EU countries. If thathappened, Platini andGerrardwould probably end up disappointed. If inferior EnglishplayerswerehandedplacesinPremierLeagueteams,theywouldhavelittleincentivetoimprove. This is a classic problem with import substitution: it protects bad producers.Whatthentendstohappenisthatshort-termprotectionbecomeslong-termprotection.

But,infact,Platini’sentirepremiseiswrong.Ifpeopleinsoccerunderstoodnumbersbetter,theywouldgraspthattheproblemoftheEnglandteamisnotthattherearetoofewEnglishmenplayinginthePremierLeague.Tothecontrary:therearetoomany.Englandwoulddobetterifthecountry’sbestclubsfieldedevenfewerEnglishplayers.

YoucouldarguethatEnglishplayersaccountfor“only”32percentofstartingplayersinthePremierLeague.Oryoucouldarguethattheyaccountforamassive32percentofstarting players, more than any other nationality in what is now the world’s toughestleague. TheDutch, Portuguese andUruguayans dream of accounting for 32 percent ofstartersinthePremierLeague,orindeedinanybigleague.TheEnglishhaveaboutsixty-five to seventyplayers starting regularly in theworld’s toughest league.That shouldbeenoughtomakeupadecentsquadoftwenty-two.

Inotherwords,Englishplayersgetalotofregularexperienceintop-levelclubsoccer.

Evenifwelumptogethertheworld’sthreetoughestleagues—thePremierLeague,Spain’sPrimera División, and Germany’s Bundesliga—then only Germans and Spaniards playmoretoughclubsoccer.ButcertainlyEnglishplayersgetfarmoreexperienceintop-levelsoccerthan,say,CroatiansorRussiansdo.

TheexperienceofcompetingagainstthebestforeignplayerseveryweekhasprobablyhelpedEnglishinternationalstoimprove.Englishmenhavehadtogetbetterjusttostayintheirclubteams.Theynowlearnaboutinternationalsoccereveryweek.

Indeed, since the Premier League has become more international, England’sperformanceshaveimproved.TheswitchfromamostlyBritishleaguetoamostlyforeignonecanbedatedto1995,theyearofthe“Bosmanruling”thatallowedEuropeanplayerstoplayanywhereinEurope.Let’scompareEngland’sperformancesintheeraofaBritishleague, from1968 through1992, to its performances since1998. (Wehave consciouslyexcludedtheWorldCupof1966,whichwasananomalouseventgiventhatEnglandwereplayingathome.)Inthatfirst“British”periodthrough1992,EnglandreachedoneWorldCupsemifinal,in1990.However,thatwasanexception.Inthoseyears,Englandreachedthequarterfinalsofmajortournamentsonlyfourtimesinthirteenattempts.Bycontrast,inthe “international” period since 1998, it has reached four quarterfinals in just eightattempts.Moreover, itswinpercentageatmajor tournaments jumpedfrom52percent in1968–1992to62percentinthe“international”period(countingatieasworthhalfawin).The figures suggest that if anything, the international league has been good for theEnglandteam.

In fact, youcould argue that in recentyears, as thePremierLeaguehasgotten everstronger, England’s players have been playing toomuch rather than too little top-classinternationalclubsoccer.ThePremierLeagueisbecomingsoccer’sNBA,thefirstgloballeagueinthissport’shistory.Sotheplayersearnmillionsofdollars.Sotheleagueisall-consuming,particularlyifyouplayforoneofthebigclubs,asalmostallregularEnglishinternationals do.The players have to give almost all their energy and concentration ineverymatch. It’s a little easier even in the German or Spanish leagues, where smallerteamslikeMainzorOsasunacannotaffordtobuybrilliantforeigners.

Clearlyanathletecan’tpeakineverymatch.IfyouarerunningintheOlympics,youplanyourseasonsothatyouwillpeakonlyattheOlympics,andnotbefore.Ifyouplaysoccer for, say, Croatia and for a club in a smaller league (even in Serie A), you canhusbandyourenergysoastopeakinbiginternationalmatches—forinstance,whenyouareplayingEnglandatWembley.

Bycontrast,Englishplayershavetotrytopeakeveryweekfortheirclubs.Innoothercountry do players face as many demanding games a season. No clubs in any othercountryplayasmanyEuropeangamesas theEnglishdo.DanieleTognaccini, longtimechiefathleticscoachatACMilan’s“MilanLab,”probablythemostsophisticatedmedicaloutfit in soccer, explainswhat happenswhen a player has to play sixty tough games ayear:“Theperformanceisnotoptimal.Theriskofinjuryisveryhigh.Wecansaytheriskofinjuryduringonegame,afteroneweek’straining,is10percent.Ifyouplayaftertwodays, the risk rises by 30 or 40 percent. If you are playing four or five games

consecutivelywithouttherightrecovery,theriskofinjuryisincredible.Theprobabilityofhavingonelesserperformanceisveryhigh.”

SowhenEnglishplayersplayinternationally,theystarttired,hurt,andwithoutenoughfocus.Oftentheycannotraisetheirgame.HarryRedknappsaidwhenhewasmanagerofPortsmouth, “I thinkEnglandgamesget in thewayof club soccer for theplayers now.Clubsoccerissoimportant,theChampionsLeagueandeverythingwithit,thatEnglandgamesbecomeadistractiontothem.”Moreover,playersintheintensePremierLeaguearealwaysgettinginjured,andtheirclubsdon’tgivethemtimetorecover.ThatmaybewhyhalfofEngland’sregularscouldn’tplayagainstCroatia,andwhyWayneRooneyplayedtwo successiveWorldCupswhile half-fit. For some of the same reasons, theUS oftendisappointsinbasketballworldchampionships.

In short, if England wanted to do better in international matches, it should exportEnglish players to more relaxed leagues, like, for example, Croatia’s. Indeed, if moreyoung English players spent some learning years abroad, they would probably absorbmoreinternationalknowledge.

England’s formermanager Eriksson understood the problem of English exhaustion.WhenoneoftheauthorsofthisbookaskedhimwhyEnglandlostinthequarterfinalsinthe World Cup of 2002 and in Euro 2004, he said his players were tired after toughseasons.Wasthatreallytheonlyreason?“Iwouldsayso,”Erikssonreplied.“Ifyou’renotfitenough…InJapan,weneverscoredonegoalthesecondhalf.”

AshleyCole,reflectingontheWorldCupof2006,noticesthesamephenomenonbutcannot explain it: “We had to be honest… and recognize somethingwas amiss in thesecondhalves.Wejustdidn’tknowwhat.”However,someofhissmarterteammatesdidseemtoknow.HereisLampardlookingbackon2006:

Throughoutthetournamentwehadsufferedintheheat.Oursecond-halfperformanceswereinvariablybelowthestandardofthefirstperiodandatitsworst—againstParaguayinFrankfurt—mostofuscouldbarelywalk,nevermindrun,inthelatterstagesofthematch.

This echoes Gerrard’s account of the previous tournament: “The truth was thatEnglandwere knackered at Euro 2004… .A long, hard season took a terrible toll.” In2010inSouthAfrica,too,Englandneverscoredinthesecondhalf.CapellolatertoldtheFIFAwebsitewhyhethoughtEnglanddidn’twinsummertournaments:“They’retheleastfreshofanyof thecompetingnational sides,because their leaguedoesn’thaveabreak.It’slikewhenyou’redrivingacar:ifyoustophalfwaytoputfuelinthenyou’lldefinitelygetwhereyouwanttogo,butifyoudon’tthere’salwaysthechanceyou’llberunningonemptybeforeyoureachyourgoal.InmyopinionthesoccerplayedinthefirsthalfoftheEnglishseasonismuchbetterthaninthesecondhalf.”

Itispossibletodismissalltheseclaimsoftirednessasself-serving.ButiftherehastobeasingleculpritforEngland’ssummerfailures,wesuspectit’smorelikelytobefatiguethantheforeigninflux.

In any case,English fanswant to see teams full of foreignplayers. PlatiniwonderswhetherLiverpudlians can identifywith aLiverpool team full of foreigners.Well, theyseem to manage. Judging by the Premiership’s record crowds despite its record ticket

prices,fansstillidentifyenough.Englandcanhaveanexcellentleague,oritcanhaveanEnglishleague,butitcan’thaveboth.Giventhechoice,fansseemtopreferexcellence.Inthat sense, they are typical consumers. If you try to substitute imports, then, at least atfirst,consumershavetoputupwithworseproducts.Theygenerallydon’tlikethat.

THEPROBLEMOFEXCLUSION:HOWENGLISHSOCCERDRIVESOUTTHEMIDDLECLASSES

TheRomansbuilttheirempirewithanarmydrawnfromeverypartofsociety.Onlywhenthemilitiabecameaneliteprofessionopenjusttoparticularfamiliesdidtheempirestartto decline.When you limit your talent pool, you limit the development of skills. Thebiggerthegroupofpeopleyoudrawfrom,themorenewideasthatarelikelytobubbleup.That’swhylargenetworksliketheCityofLondonandSiliconValley,whichdrawtalentfromaroundtheworld,aresocreative.SoisthePremierLeague.

TheproblemofEnglishsocceriswhathappensbeforethebestEnglishplayersreachthePremierLeague.TheEnglishmenwhomakeittothetoparedrawnverylargelyfromonesingleandshrinkingsocialgroup:thetraditionalworkingclass.Thecountry’smiddleclassesaremostlybarredfromprofessionalsoccer.Thatholdsbackthenationalteam.

Therearemanyways toclassifywhichsocialclass someonewasborn into,butonegood indicator is theprofessionof thatperson’s father. JoeBoyle,withsomehelp fromDanKuper,researchedforusthejobsofthefathersofEnglandplayersattheWorldCupsof 1998, 2002, and 2006.Boyle ignored jobs the fathersmight have been handed aftertheirsons’risetostardom.Asmuchaspossible,hetriedtoestablishwhatthefatherdidwhilethesonwasgrowingup.Usingplayers’autobiographiesandnewspaperprofiles,hecame upwith the list below. It doesn’t include every player (asked, for instance, whatWayneBridge’sdaddidforaliving,wethrowupourhandsindespair),butmostarehere.Anothercaveat:someofthedadsonthelistwereabsentwhiletheirboysweregrowingup.Thatsaid,theirprofessionsareshowninFigure16.1onthefollowingpage.

Manyof these jobdescriptionsare imprecise.WhatexactlydidRobLee’sdaddoattheshippingcompany,forinstance?Still,it’spossibletobreakdownthelistofthirty-fourplayersintoafewcategories.Eighteenplayers,ormorethanhalfthetotal,weresonsofskilled or unskilledmanual laborers:Vassell, Terry, Shearer, Seaman, Scholes, Rooney,Merson,McManaman,Ince,Heskey,Gerrard,Fowler,Adams,Batty,Beckham,Campbell,Ferdinand, andDowning.AshleyColewith his “working-class upbringing” by a singlemother is probably best assigned to this category, too. Four players (Jenas, Lampard,Mills,andOwen)hadfatherswhoworkedinsoccer.LeSauxandJoeColewerebothsonsof fruit and vegetable traders. Anderton’s dad ran amoving company, which seems tohave failed, before becoming a cab driver. Sheringham’s father was a policeman.Carragher’s andDyer’sdads ranapubanda social club, respectively.That leavesonlyfive players out of thirty-four—Crouch, James, Lee, Southgate, and Walcott—whosefathersseemtohaveworkedinprofessions thatrequiredthemtohavehadaneducationbeyond the age of sixteen. If we define class by education, then only 15 percent ofEnglandplayersofrecentyearshad“middle-class”origins.

Themalepopulationasawholewasmuchbettereducated.OfBritishmenbetween

agesthirty-fiveandfifty-fourin1996—thegenerationofmostoftheseplayers’fathers—alittlemorethanhalfhadqualificationsabovethemostbasiclevel,accordingtotheBritishHouseholdPanelStudy.

FIGURE16.1.EmploymentofWorldCupfathers

English soccer’s reliance on an overwhelminglyworking-class talent poolwas onlymoderatelydamaging in thepast,whenmostEnglishpeoplewereworkingclass. In thelate1980s,70percentofBritonsstill left schoolat theageof sixteen,often formanualjobs.Butbythenthegrowthofthemiddleclasshadalreadybegun.Infact,middle-classvalues began to permeate the country, a process that sociologists call“embourgeoisement.”Ithappenedonwhatusedtobethesoccerterraces,whichbecauseofhighticketpricesarenowslightlymoremiddleclassthaneventhecountryatlarge.

Nowadays,more than 70 percent of Britons stay in school past the age of sixteen.More than 40 percent enter higher education.More andmore,Britain is amiddle-classnation. Yet because soccer still recruits overwhelmingly from the traditional workingclasses,itexcludesanever-growingswathofthepopulation.ThatmustbeabrakeontheEnglandteam.

The shrinking of the talent pool is only part of the problem. Until at least the late1990s British soccer was suffused, without quite knowing it, by British working-classhabits.Someoftheseweredamaging,suchasthesausages-and-chipsdiet,ortheideathatbingedrinkingisahobby.“Maybeinearliergenerationsthedrinkingculturecarriedoverfrom the working-class origins of the players,” wrote Alex Ferguson in his 1999autobiography.“Mostofthemcamefromfamilieswheremanyofthementooktheviewthatiftheyputinahardshiftinafactoryoracoalminetheywereentitledtorelaxwithafewpints.Somefootballersseemdeterminedtoclingtothatshift-worker’smentality….Also prevalent is the notion that Saturday night is the end of the working week andthereforeagoodtimetogetwrecked.”Ofcourse,“problemdrinking”existsintheBritishmiddle classes, too. Equally of course, most working-class people have no issues withalcohol.However,Fergusonisexplicitlydescribingatraditionalworking-classattitude.

Another problem was that the British working classes tended to regard soccer assomethingyoulearnedonthejob,ratherthanfromeducationalistswithdiplomas.Itwasthe attitude you would expect of an industry in which few people had much formaleducation.ThelateErnieWalker,longtimesecretaryoftheScottishFootballAssociation,who worked for decades to introduce coaching courses in Scotland, told us that clubsmockedhisattemptsas“somenewfangledthinggotupbycollegeboys—asiftherewasshame inbeingeducated.”He recalls thatcoachingand tactics became“shamewords.”“Peoplewould say, ‘The troublewith soccer today is that there is toomuch coaching.’That’slikesaying,‘Thetroublewithschoolisthatthere’stoomucheducation.’”

Itwouldbecrazytogeneralizetoomuchabouttheworkingclasses.Thereisastrongworking-class traditionof self-education.LargenumbersofpostwarBritonsbecame thefirst people in their families to go to college.Nonetheless, the anti-intellectual attitudesthatWalkerencountereddoseemtobewidespreadintheBritishgame.

TheseattitudesmayhelpexplainwhyEnglishmanagersandEnglishplayersarenotknown for thinking about soccer.When theDutchman JohanCruijff said, “Soccer is agameyouplaywithyourhead,”hewasn’ttalkingaboutheaders.

Overthepastfifteenyearsthesetraditionalworking-classattitudeshavebeguntofade

inBritishsoccer.Foreignmanagersandplayershavearrived,importingtherevolutionarynotionsthatprofessionalathletesshouldthinkabouttheirgameandlookaftertheirbodies.AndyCarroll’sdrinkingnowmarkshimoutasanexceptioninthehigherreachesoftheEnglish game. But one working-class custom still bars middle-class Britons fromprofessionalsoccer:whatyoumightcallthe“antieducationalrequirement.”

MostBritishsoccerplayersstill leaveschoolatsixteen.Thebeliefpersists thatonlythuscantheyconcentratefullyonthegame.Theargumentthatmanygreatforeignplayers—Ruud Gullit, Dennis Bergkamp, Tostao, Socrates, Osvaldo Ardiles, Jorge Valdano,Slaven Bilic, Josep Guardiola, Andres Iniesta, Fernando Redondo, Kaká, and others—stayed in school after sixteen, or even attended college, is ignored. This is probablybecausemanyBritishcoachesandplayersaresuspiciousofeducatedpeople.

Itistruethattheclubs’newacademiesaremeanttohelpplayerskeepstudying,butinpracticethisrarelyhappens.AfewyearsagooneofusvisitedtheacademyofanEnglishclub. It’s an academy of some note: two of its recent graduates first played for theircountrieswhile still teenagers.But all theboyswemet there,brightorotherwise,weresent to do the same single lowly vocational course in leisure and tourism to fulfill theacademy’sminimumeducational requirements.Together the boys caused such havoc inclassthatalltheotherstudentshaddroppedoutofthecourse.It’snotthatsoccerplayersaretoobusytostudy;theyrarelytrainmorethanacoupleofhoursaday.Rather,it’sthatbeingstudiousisfrownedupon.

English soccer consequently remains unwelcoming to middle-class teenagers. Forinstance,StuartFord,whoatseventeenplayedforEnglandSchools,gaveuponbecomingaprofessionalbecausehegot tiredof listening torantsfromuneducatedcoaches.Beingmiddleclass,healwaysfelt likeanoutsider.Herecalled,“Iwasoftengoadedaboutmyposh school or my gross misunderstanding of street fashion. That was just from themanagement.” InsteadhebecameaHollywood lawyer.Later, as a senior executiveat aHollywoodstudio,hewasoneofthepeoplebehindanunsuccessfulbidtobuyLiverpoolFC.

OrtherewastheyouthtraineeatOldhamAthletic,whoseteammateshoundedhimasan intellectual snob after he walked into the club one day carrying a copy of themidmarketnewspaper theDailyMail.He told us years later, “Aside from the clubwidepiss-taking,IhadDeepHeatrubbedintotheliningofmyslips.Itooksomuchverbal(andphysical)abusethatmonththatIoftenwonderwhatwouldhavehappenedhaditbeentheFinancial Times.” This man, incidentally, studied for that same vocational course inleisureandtourismwithseveralfuturePremierLeagueplayers.

Oneofthefewremotelymiddle-classEnglishmentohavemadethenationalteaminrecent decades is Graeme Le Saux. He has a middle-class accent, reads the upmarketGuardiannewspaper,andwhenhejoinedChelsea,lookedforwardtoexploringLondon’sgalleriesandmuseums.Naturally,throughouthiscareerinsoccerLeSauxwasabusedbyhisfellowprofessionals.Sofar,sotypical.What’scuriousistheparticularslanttheabusetook. The heterosexual Le Saux was branded “gay.” Liverpool’s Robbie Fowler oncepretendedtoofferhimhisbottomonthefieldduringagame.LeSauxhassaidthatduring

anothermatch, the great metrosexual David Beckham called him a “poof” (derogatoryBritish slang for gay), though a spokesman for Beckham denied the allegation. Non-Britonsmay struggle to interpret these subtle culturalmarkers, but thepoint tograsp isthat in thecomplicatedBritishclassdebate,“gay”canbeasynonymfor“middleclass”(andnotinagoodway).

Some of themore educated foreign players in the PremierLeaguemust view thesegoings-onwithdismay.Astheyhavenoassignedplace in theBritishclasssystem, theyhave a touch more freedom to be intellectual. However, Erik Thorstvedt, Tottenham’sNorwegian goalkeeper of the 1990s, does recall bread rolls being chucked at his headwhenheopenedabroadsheetnewspaperontheteambus.

IftheBritishworkingclassesgetlittleeducation,thatismainlythefaultofthemiddle-class people who oversee the UK’s school system. Nonetheless, the educational dividemeansthatanymiddle-classpersonenteringBritishsoccerfeelsinstantlyoutofplace.

Manymiddle-class athletesdrift to cricketor rugby instead.Often, this represents adirectlosstosoccer.Formostpeople,sportingtalentisfairlytransferableuntiltheyreachtheir late teens.ManyEnglishsoccerplayers, likeGaryNevilleandGaryLineker,weregiftedcricketers, too.Somewell-knownrugbyplayers tookup rugbyonlyas teenagers,when they realized they weren’t going to make it in soccer. And in the past, severalparagons represented England inmore than one sport. Only a few sports demand veryspecificqualitiesthatcan’tbetransferred:it’shardtogofrombeingajockeytobeingabasketball player, for instance. But English soccer competes with other ball games fortalent,anditscaresawaytheeducatedmiddleclasses.

This is particularly sad because there is growing evidence that sporting talent andacademic talent are linked. The best athletes have fast mental reactions, and thosereactions,ifproperlytrained,wouldmakeforhigh-caliberintellects.

Interestingly, some people inside English soccer have become aware of the game’sclassdiscrimination.DanielHargreaves,whoworksforEverton’sacademywiththeremittomakesureitsdecisionsareevidence-based(thesortofjobthatdidn’texistinEnglishsoccerafewyearsago),hasspottedtheclub’stendencytoscoutmainlyinworking-classneighborhoods. “Traditionallywe have core areaswherewe thinkwe find players,” hesays.“Butthere’sagrowingmiddle-class,therearemoregreenspacesinthemiddle-classareas.”HasEverton operated an unintentional bias against themiddle classes? “I thinkevidencewouldsuggestthat’sthecase.”

Butfornow,thisclassbiashelpsexplainwhyeventhoughtheacademiesofEnglishclubs are the richest in the world, England doesn’t produce better players than poornations.InsteadoftryingtoexcludeforeignersfromEnglishsoccer,itwouldbesmartertoinclude more middle-class English people. Only when there are England players witheducated accents—as happens in Holland, Argentina, and even Brazil (Leonardo,Socrates,andKaká,forinstance)—mightthenationalteammaximizeitspotential.

CLOSEDTOINNOVATIONS:ENGLISHSOCCER’SSMALLNETWORK

WhentheInternetarrived,manypunditspredictedthedeclineofthecity.Afterall,why

live in a small apartment inEastLondonwhen you could set up your laptop in an oldfarmhouseoverlookingasheepmeadow?

Thepredictionturnedouttobewrong.Citieshavecontinuedtheirgrowthofthepasttwo hundred years, which is why apartments in Brooklyn became so expensive.Meanwhile, the countryside has turned into something of a desert, inhabited by a fewfarmersandoldpeopleandusedbytherestofusmostlyforhiking.Itturnsoutthatpeoplestillwant to live indirty,overcrowded,overpricedcities.And the reason theydo is thesocialnetworks.Toberuralistobeisolated.Networksgiveyoucontacts.

Someoneyoumeetatapartyoratyourkids’playgroundcangiveyouajoboranidea.Just as thebrainworksbybuildingnewconnectionsbetweenhugebundlesofneurons,witheachconnectionproducinganewthought,soweasindividualsneedtofindourselvesinthecenterofthebundletomakemoreconnections.

Networksarekeytothelatestthinkingabouteconomicdevelopment.Betternetworksare one reason that some countries are richer than others.As it happens, networks alsohelp explain why some countries have done better at soccer than England. Englishsoccer’sbiggestproblemuntilveryrecentlywasprobablygeography.ThecountrywastoofarfromthenetworksofcontinentalwesternEurope,wherethebestsoccerwasplayed.

Onceuponatime,Englandwasatthecenterofsoccer’sknowledgenetwork.Fromthefirstofficialsoccer international in1872,untilat least theFirstWorldWar,andperhapseven until England’s first home defeat against Hungary in 1953, you could argue thatEnglandwas thedominantsoccernation. Itwas thecountry thatexportedsoccerknow-howtotheworldintheformofmanagers.TheEnglishexpatriatemanagerbecamesuchalegendaryfigurethattothisdayinSpainandItalyaheadcoachisknownasa“mister.”

Many English people clung to the belief in England’s supremacy long after it hadceasedtobetrue.TheastonishmenteachtimeEnglanddidn’twintheWorldCupendedonlywiththeteam’sabjectfailuresinthe1970s.

ThegradualBritishdeclineinsoccerechoesthedeclineinBritain’seconomicstatus.ThecountrywentfromsupremeeconomicpowerunderQueenVictoriatohavingitshandheld by the InternationalMonetary Fund in the late 1970s.Admittedly, in soccer as ineconomics,mostobserversexaggeratedBritain’sslide.Thecountry’sposition in the toptenlargesteconomieswasnevermuchindoubt.Butinsocceritbecameclearby1970atthe latest thatdominancehad shiftedacross theChannel to thecoreofwesternEurope.For thenext fortyyears, thatpartof theContinentwouldbe themost fertilenetwork insoccer.AndBritainwasjustoutsideit.

WesternEurope’sgriponglobalsoccerprobablypeakedattheGermanWorldCupof2006. The region has only about 400 million inhabitants, or 6 percent of the world’spopulation,yetonlyonceinthatentiretournamentdidawesternEuropeanteamlosetoateam from another region: Switzerland’s insanely dull defeat on penalties toUkraine, amatchthatwasthenadirof10,000yearsofhumancivilization.

In 2006 evenBrazil couldn’tmatchwesternEurope.Argentina continued its run offailingtobeatawesternEuropeanteaminopenplayataWorldCupsincethefinalagainst

WestGermanyin1986(thoughitdidwintwooftheeightsubsequentencountersagainstEuropeansonpenalties).Bigcountriesoutsidetheregion,likeMexico,Japan,theUS,andPoland, could not match little western European countries like Portugal, Holland, orSweden.IfyouunderstoodthegeographicalruleofthatWorldCup,youcouldsit inthestandsforalmosteverymatchbeforethequarterfinalsconfidentofknowingtheoutcome.

Aswe’lldiscussinourfinalchapter,by2010thedominanceofwesternEuropewaswaningslightly.InSouthAfrica,westernEuropeancountrieslostsixoftheirtwenty-ninegames against teams from other regions. In part, this must have been because thetournamentwasheldoutsidewesternEurope. Inpart, itwasbecauseother regionshavebeguntocopywesternEuropeanmethods.Yetevenin2010,first,second,andthirdplaceallwenttowesternEuropeans.

WesternEuropeexcelsatsoccerforthesamefundamentalreasonithadthescientificrevolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries andwas for centuries theworld’srichest region. The region’s secret iswhat the historianNormanDavies calls its “user-friendlyclimate.”WesternEurope ismildand rainy.Becauseof that, the land is fertile.Thisallowshundredsofmillionsofpeopletoinhabitasmallspaceofland.Moreover,asMaliseRuthven,thescholarofIslam,haspointedout,Europehas“ahigherratioofcoasttolandmassthananyothercontinentorsubcontinent,andacoastlinesome23,000mileslong—equivalenttothecircumferenceoftheglobe.”NowonderEuropeanswerethefirstpeopletosailtheworld.Geographyhasalwayshelpedthemexchangeideas,insidetheircontinentandbeyond.Inshort,theyarenetworked.

FromtheWorldCupinGermany,youcouldhaveflownintwoandahalfhourstoanyoneofabouttwentycountriescontainingroughly300millionpeopleintotal.Thatisthedensestnetworkonearth.TherewasnothinglikethatinJapanattheWorldCupof2002:theonlyforeigncapitalyoucanreachfromTokyowithinthattimeisSeoul.SouthAfrica,hostin2010,wasevenmoreisolated.AndtheonlyforeigncapitalwithintwohoursflightofBrazil’sbiggestcity,SaoPaulo,isAsuncióninParaguay.

For centuries now, the interconnected peoples of western Europe have exchangedideasfast.ThescientificrevolutioncouldhappeninwesternEuropebecauseitsscientistswere near one another, networking, holding a dialogue in their shared language: Latin.Copernicus,PolishsonofaGermanmerchant,wrotethattheearthcircledthesun.Galileoin Florence read Copernicus and confirmed his findings through a telescope. TheEnglishmanFrancisBacondescribedtheir“scientificmethod”:deductionsbasedondata.EnglandatthetimewasverymuchapartoftheEuropeannetwork.

Atypicalproductof thatnetworkwasthelensgrinder,acrucialnewmachineinthedevelopmentof themicroscope in theearly1660s.RobertHooke inLondon inventedanewgrinder,whichmadelensessoaccuratethatHookecouldpublishadetailedengravingofalouseattachedtoahumanhair.ButmeanwhileSirRobertMoray,aScotinLondonwhoknewwhatHookewasupto,wassendinglettersinFrenchaboutthenewgrindertotheDutchscientistChristiaanHuygens.ThankstoMoray,HuygenshadpreviouslygottenaholdofdetailsofHooke’sbalance-springwatch.

MorayandHuygens“sometimeswrotetoeachotherseveraltimesaweek,”writesthe

historianLisa Jardine.Their letters crossed theChannel in days, or about as quickly asmail does now.Meanwhile, the French astronomerAdrienAuzout in Pariswas gettingcopies of some of their letters. So Hooke’s breakthroughs were being spread to hisEuropeancompetitorsalmostinstantly.

AllthisirritatedHooke.ButtheproximityofmanythinkersinwesternEuropecreatedanintellectualferment.Thatiswhysomanyofthegreatscientificdiscoveriesweremadethere.Thesediscoveriesthenhelpedmaketheregionrich.

Centuries later, soccer spread the same way. In the nineteenth century the gameinfectedwesternEurope first,because there ithad the shortestdistances to travel.Latertheproximityofsomanypeoplesbroughttheregiontwoworldwars.After1945,westernEuropeans decided they could live crammed together only under a sort of singlegovernment: the European Union. Borders opened, and the region became the mostintegratedinthehistoryoftheworld.

Againthebestideasspreadfastestthere,justastheyhadinthescientificrevolution.Theregion’ssoccerbenefited.Oneof themenwhocarried tactical ideasaroundEuropewasArrigoSacchi.HisfatherwasashoemanufacturerinRavenna,Italy,andtheyoungSacchi used to accompany him on business trips. He saw a lot of games in Germany,Switzerland,France,andtheNetherlands.“Itopenedmymind,”helatersaid.AsmanagerofACMilaninthe1980s,heimportedaversionofDutchsoccerthatrevolutionizedtheItaliangame.

AnothergreatEuropeannetworkerwasArsèneWenger.Whilegrowingupinavillagein theFrenchAlsace, near theGermanborder, he used towatch the legendaryGermansoccer programDie Sportschau on Saturday afternoons. He became a fan of BorussiaMönchengladbach, andgenerally absorbedGerman soccer.LaterWenger took aFrenchcoachingcourseandcametoadmireDutch“totalfootball.”Thepointisthathewastakingininfluencesfromallthecountriesaroundhim.Itwaseasybecausetheyweresoclose.

Ideas spread evenmore quickly inEuropean soccer than in other economic sectors,because soccer is the most integrated part of the Continent’s economy. Only about 2percentofallwesternEuropeansliveinadifferentEuropeanUnioncountry,becausefewcompaniesbotherhiringbusdriversorofficeadministratorsfromneighboringcountries.In some professions, language barriers stop workers from moving abroad. But manysoccer players do findwork abroad, largelybecause television advertises theirwares toemployers across Europe. And so most of the EU’s best players have gathered in theEnglish and Spanish leagues or at BayernMunich, and meet one another on weekdaynightsintheChampionsLeague.ThiscompetitionistheEuropeansinglemarketcometolife,adensenetworkof talent.There’salwaysmuchdebateabout thesuperiorityofonesoccermodeloveranother—theBundesligaversusthePremierLeagueversustheSpanishleagueandItaly’sSerieA—buttherealpointistheintensityofcompetitioninsideEurope,on the field and in the boardroom. That forces the big clubs constantly to strive forimprovements.

The teams in the Champions League can draw talent from anywhere in the world.Nonetheless,anoverwhelmingmajorityoftheirplayersarewesternEuropeans.Withthe

world’s best players and coaches packed together, theworld’s best soccer is constantlybeingrefinedthere.

The best soccer today isChampionsLeague soccer,westernEuropean soccer. It’s arapidpassinggameplayedbyathletes.Rarelydoesanyonedribble,orkeeptheballforasecond.Youpassinstantly.It’snotthebeautifulgame—dribblesareprettier—butitworksbest. All good teams everywhere in theworld now play this way. Chris Anderson andDavid Sally showed in their book The Numbers Game how statistically alike the topEuropeanleaguesare.WhetherintheEnglishPremierLeague,SerieA,theBundesligaorSpain’spremierdivision,theaverageteamcompletedsimilarnumbersofpassespergame,ofsimilarlengths,andhadcomparablenumbersofshotsandcorners.Inallfourleagues,theaveragegameproducessomewherebetween2.5and3goals.Thedifferencesbetweenthesenations“arecosmetic,shallow,” theauthorsconclude.“If itwasnot for theshirts,you would not be able to tell them apart.” All four leagues are producing westernEuropeansoccer.EventheBraziliansadoptedtheChampionsLeaguestyleinthe1990s.TheystillhavemoreskillthantheEuropeans,buttheynowtry(andoftenfail)toplayataEuropeanpace.Brazilhasbeenlosingdominanceinsoccerevenasitgetsricher,becauseit isexcludedfromtheknowledgenetworksofwesternEurope.Ithasstruggledtoworkoutthatslowdribblingrarelybeatsfastpassing.

WesternEuropehasdiscovered thesecretofsoccer.Moreprecisely,acoregroupofwesternEuropeancountrieshas,namely,fiveofthesixnationsthatin1957foundedtheEuropean EconomicCommunity, ancestor of the EuropeanUnion. (We’ll leave out thesixth founding nation, the hopeless minnow Luxembourg.) Germany, France, Italy,Holland,andevenBelgiumdon’tallplayinexactlythesamestyle.HollandandItaly,say,areratherdifferent.But theyalladhere to thebasic tenetsofrapidcollectivizedwesternEuropeansoccer.Herearesomeresultsfromtheperiod1968–2006:

• ThecorefivecountrieswontwelveEuropeanchampionshipsandWorldCupsbetweenthem.

• Thecountriesat thecornersofEurope—theBrits, theIberians, theBalkans,theformerSovietbloc,andScandinaviannationsnorthoftheBalticSea—betweenthemwonone:Greece’sEuropeanChampionshipof2004,deliveredbyaGermancoach.

• Europe’s only other trophies in this period went to Denmark andCzechoslovakia. Denmark enjoys an utterly permeable border with the five corecountries.Czechoslovakiawastheexception,theonlyeasternEuropeancountrytowinanythinginthisperiod.

CountriesseparatedfromthecoreoftheEU—eitherbygreatdistance,bypoverty,orbyclosedbordersunderdictatorships—oftenunderperforminsoccer.InthevastlandmassrunningfromPortugalinthesouthwesttoGermanyinthenortheast,andincludingCroatiaandBosniajusteastofItaly,everycountryofmorethan2millioninhabitantsqualifiedfortheWorldCup2014.Thenationsthatdidn’tmakeitwereonEurope’smargins:theScots,Irish,andWelsh,alltheScandinavians,theTurks,andmostofEurope’seasternedge.Thecountriesatgreatdistance—anditcanbeadistanceofthemindratherthangeographical

distance—are often out of touch with core European soccer. Many countries on themarginshavetraditionallyhaddysfunctionalindigenousstylesofsoccer.TheGreeks,forinstance,dribbledtoomuch.TheBritsplayedmindlesskick-and-rush.

Again,thisisexplainedbytheoriesofnetworks.Ifyouareontheperiphery,liketheBritishwere until recently in soccer, it’s harder tomake new connections, because youhave to travel farther.Worse, those not on the periphery see you as only a second-bestconnection. You are the end of the line, not the gateway to a new set of connections.That’swhyforeigncountriesstoppedhiringEnglishcoachesorevenEnglishplayers.Asaresult, the people on the periphery become more and more isolated and insular. TheUkrainianmanagerValeri Lobanovskywas a soccer genius, but during the days of theSovietUnionhewassoisolatedthatwhenaDutchjournalistcametointerviewhiminthemid-1980s,Lobanovskypumpedhim for information aboutHolland’s players.Aswe’lldiscusslaterinthebook,SpainhadthesameproblemunderGeneralFranco’sdictatorship.“EuropeendsatthePyrenees”wasthesayinginthosedays.

Graduallyisolationbecomesyourmind-set:afterawhileyoudon’tevenwanttoadoptforeignideasanymore.AnyonewhohasspenttimeinEngland—particularlybefore1992—has witnessed this attitude. Isolation can lead you into your own blind alleys thatnobodyelseappreciates.Forinstance,thelongrefusalofEnglishplayerstodivemayhavebeenanadmirableculturalnorm,buttheymighthavewonmoregamesiftheyhadlearnedfromcontinentalEuropeanshowtobuytheoddpenalty.

Happily, the era of British isolationism is now over. This era began on Sunday,September 3, 1939, when the country’s borders closed on the outbreak of the SecondWorld War. In soccer, that isolation deepened when English clubs were banned fromEuropeancompetitionsaftertheHeyseldisasterof1985.Theylostwhatmodestnetworktheyhad.

But between 1990 and 1994, British isolation began to break down: English clubswerereadmittedtoEuropeancompetitions,newlawsenforcedfreemovementoflaborandcapital within the EU, and Eurostar trains and budget airlines connected Britain to theContinent. London turned into a global city. English became the global language.Nowadays southern England, at least, belongs to core Europe, just as it did during thescientificrevolution.

The end of isolationism meant, for a while, the end of English soccer managersmanaging England or the best English clubs. You wouldn’t appoint a Frenchman tomanage your baseball team, because the French don’t have a history of thinking hardabout baseball.And youwouldn’t appoint anEnglishman tomanage your soccer team,because the English don’t have a history of thinking hard about soccer. After repeatedfailureswiththetraditionalBritishstyleofkick-and-rush,theEnglishembracedEuropeansoccer. England hired a Swedishmanager with long experience in Italian soccer, SvenGoranEriksson.

At this, the conservativeDailyMail newspaper lamented, “The mother country ofsoccer,birthplaceofthegreatestgame,hasfinallygonefromthecradletotheshame.”Itwas a wonderful statement of “English exceptionalism”: the belief that England is an

exceptionalsoccercountrythatshouldruletheworldplayingtheEnglishway.However,theobviousstatisticaltruthisthatEnglandisnotexceptional.Itistypicalofthesecond-tiersoccercountriesoutsidethecoreofwesternEurope.

The numbers strongly suggest that England needed foreign knowledge. From 1990through2011EnglandhadtwoforeignmanagersandsevenEnglishmanagers,includingtwo caretakers (HowardWilkinson and Peter Taylor). On everymeasure the foreignerswonhandsdown:

Eriksson should be remembered as the great qualifier: for the first time since the1960s,heensuredthatEnglandconsistentlymadeittothemajortournaments.Butforeignmanagers have also performed slightly better at the final tournaments themselves:ErikssonandCapello’sEngland teamsnever lost at thegroup stages, and reached threequarterfinals and one round of sixteen. By contrast, the Englishmanaged one semi (athomeatEuro‘96),oneappearanceinthelastsixteen,andtwoexitsinthefirstround.

Quiteclearly, foreignmanagershaveoverachievedwithEngland.This isnotmerelybecauseErikssonandCapellohada“goldengeneration”ofplayerstoworkwith.Manyofthe samemenwho playedwell for the Swede and the Italian performed abysmally forSteveMcClarenandKevinKeegan.It’spainfultoimaginehowwellEnglandmighthavedoneiftheFAhadstoppeddiscriminatingagainstforeignersdecadesearlier.Inthesameway, British cycling and cricket have recently become world-class by stealing foreignideas. In tennisAndyMurray in 2013 became the firstmaleBriton towinWimbledonsince 1936 largely because as a teenager he had taken himself off to an academy inBarcelona.(IfonlysomeEnglishsoccerplayershadmadethesamemove.)

WhenitcomestoEngland’ssoccercoaches,itmaysoundoddthataforeignpassportcanmakesuchadifference.Afterall,youmightthinkthatEngland’splayersthesedayshave enough foreign experience of their own. They play with and for and againstforeignersattheirclubseveryweek.MichaelOwen,thefirstEnglandinternationaltoplayhisentireprofessionalcareeraftertheborder-openingBosmanrulingof1995,toldusthathehadgrownupa“European”ratherthanapurelyEnglishfootballer.Surelyplayerslikehimnolongerneedforeignmanagers?

WhytheydowasbestdemonstratedthatmiserablenightatWembleyagainstCroatiain 2007. A team of Englishmenmanaged by an Englishman played like caricatures ofEnglishmen.Gerrardinparticularwasaremarkablesight,chargingaroundintherainattoppace,hittingimpossiblyambitiouspasses,constantlylosingtheball.Heplayedlikeaheadlesschicken,orlikeanEnglishfootballercirca1988.

ForLiverpool,GerrardusuallyplayslikeaEuropeansophisticate.Hehasmasteredthe

international,globalizedstyleof top-classmodernfootball.TheproblemagainstCroatiawas that therewasn’t a foreigner on the field or the bench to check him.When thingsbegangoingbadly,heshedthatcosmopolitanskin,returnedtochildhood,andplayedlikeanEnglishmanofold.HeandalltheotherEnglandplayershadgrownupuntilabouttheageoftwentyplayinganonlyslightlydilutedversionofEnglishfootball.Becauseofthatupbringing,nationalfootballculturescontinuetoexist.That’swhyEnglandstillneedsaforeignmanagertocorrectitsplayers’flaws.

OtherperipheralcountriesfromGreecetotheUShavefollowedtheEnglishexample,andhiredforeigncoachesfromthecoreofEurope.Importingknow-howturnedouttobeanexcellentremedyfortheproblemofisolation,whichmakesitevenodderthatin2006Englanddidanabout-faceandappointedtheEnglishmanMcClaren,whohadneverevenworked abroad. The English Football Association didn’t realize that England, as arecovering isolationist, stillneededforeignhelp.Rooney, forone, seems tohaveknownbetter.Hereheisinhisautobiography,damningthenewlyappointedMcClarenwithfaintpraise:“Buthe’sagoodcoach,alwayssmiling.I’mgladhe’sgotthejob.IthinkhewasthebestEnglishmanavailable.”

ByhiringFabioCapellotosucceedMcClarenin2007,Englandacceptedtheneedforcontinental European know-how. Capello was like one of the overpaid consultants socommonindevelopmenteconomics,flyinginonbusinessclasstotellthenativeswhattodo.HisjobwastoteachtheEnglishsomeofthevirtuesofwesternEuropeansoccer.

To cite just one of those virtues: a game lasts ninety minutes. Habitually, Englishplayers charge out of the gate, run around like lunatics, and exhaust themselves wellbeforethematchisover,eveniftheyaren’thungover.

YouseethisinEngland’speculiarscoringrecordinbigtournaments.IneveryWorldCupeverplayed,mostgoalswerescoredinthesecondhalvesofmatches.Thatisnatural:in thesecondhalfplayers tire, teamsstartchasinggoals,andgapsopenupon thefield.But England, in its last seven big tournaments since 1998, scored twenty-seven of itsforty-threegoalsinthefirsthalvesofmatches.Theteam’srecordincrucialgamesisevenstarker:inthematchesinwhichitwaseliminatedfromtournaments,itscoredeightofitsninegoalsbeforehalftime.Inotherwords,Englandperformslikeacheapbattery.Thisispartlybecauseitplaysinsuchanexhaustingleague,butalsobecauseitdoesn’tseemtohavethoughtaboutpacingitself.

Italiansknowexactlyhowtomeasureouttheninetyminutes.Theytakequietperiods,when they sit back and make sure nothing happens, because they know that the bestchanceofscoring is in theclosingminutes,whenexhaustedopponentswill leaveholes.That’swhenyouneedtobesharpest.IntheWorldCupof2006,typically,ItalyknockedoutAustraliaandGermanywithgoalsinthefinalthreeminutes.

England has already bought Italian know-how. In Hodgson, it deliberately chose acoachwhohadspentmostofhiscareerabroad.

Now all it needs to do is include its own middle classes and stop worrying aboutforeigners in thePremierLeague,anditwill finallystopunderachievingandperformas

wellasitshould.Buthangonamoment:WhosaysEnglandunderachieves?

SHOULDDOBETTER:ISENGLANDWORSETHANITOUGHTTOBE?

ThatEnglandunderachievesisusuallytakenforgrantedintheBritishmedia.Afterall,theteam hasn’t won anything since 1966, and sometimes doesn’t even qualify fortournaments.Clearlythatisnotgoodenoughfor“themothercountryofsoccer,birthplaceofthegreatestgame.”

ButdoesEnglandreallyunderachieve?OrisitjustthattheEnglishexpecttoomuchoftheirteam?Toanswerthis,wefirstneedtoworkouthowwellEnglandshoulddo,givenitsresources.

Beforeweareaccusedoflookingforexcuses,let’sconsiderwhatisandisn’tpossible.A five-year-old can’t win the hundred-meter finals at the Olympics, and neither can aseventy-year-old.Youaren’tgoingtohaveacareerintheNBAifyouareonlyfivefeettall,andyou’llneverridethewinnerintheKentuckyDerbyifyouaresixfooteight.Itisveryunlikelythatyouwillhaveacareer inshowjumpingifyourparentsearnless than$40,000peryear,youprobablywon’twinaboxingmatchifyou’veneverhadanytrainingas a boxer, and youwon’t have a shot at beingworld chess champion unless you canpersuadeateamofgrandmasterstoactasyourseconds.Geneticsarebeyondourcontrol;trainingdepends partly on our own effort, but partly on the resources that other peoplegiveus.

Whatistruefortheindividualisalsotrueforthenation.DuringhistenureanEnglandsoccermanagercannoteasily (a) increase thesizeof thepopulation fromwhichhewillhave to draw the talent, (b) increase the national income so as to ensure a significantincrease in the financial resources devoted to developing soccer, or (c) increase theaccumulatedexperienceofthenationalteambyverymuch.(Englandplayednearlyeighthundredgames from1872 through2000,andcurrentlyplaysaroundadozengamesperyear,soeachextragamedoesn’taddmuchtothehistory.)

Yetinanyinternationalmatch,thesethreefactors—thesizeofthenation’spopulation,the size of the national income, and the country’s experience in international soccer—hugelyaffecttheoutcome.It’sunfairtoexpectJamaica,say,toperformaswellasmuchlarger,moreexperienced,andricherGermany.Itisfairertoassesshowwelleachcountryshould perform given its experience, income, and population and then measure thatexpected performance against reality.Countries like Jamaica orLuxembourgwill neverwinaWorldCup.Theonlymeasureofperformancethatmakesanysenseforthemisonebasedonhoweffectivelytheyusetheirlimitedresources.ThesameexercisemakessenseforEngland,too,ifonlyasacheckontabloidhysteria:DoesEnglandreallyunderperformgivenwhatithastoworkwith?

InabsolutetermsEnglandisabouttenthintheworld.Butwewanttoknowhowwellit does in relative terms—not relative to the expectations of the media but relative toEnglish resources. Might it be that England in fact overachieves, given the country’sexperience,population,andincome?

Toworkthisout,weneedtoknowthesoccerresultsforallthenationalteamsinthe

world.Luckily,wehavethem.Thereareanumberofdatabasesofinternationalmatches,butoneof thebestwasassembledbyRussellGerrard, amathematicsprofessoratCassBusinessSchoolinLondon.BydayGerrardworriesaboutmathematicalwaystorepresentthe management problems of pension funds. For example, one of his recent papers issnappily titled “Mean-VarianceOptimizationProblems for theAccumulationPhase in aDefinedBenefitPlan.”Itconcerns,amongotherthings,Lévydiffusionfinancialmarkets,the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and the Feynman-Kac representation. As youmightexpect,Gerrardhasbeenmeticulous inaccumulating the soccerdata,which tookhim seven years of his life. His database runs from 1872 through 2001 and includes22,130games.Wehavenowupdatedittocoverallinternationalgamesupto2012.

RUSSELLGERRARD’SBRILLIANTSOCCERDATABASE

Later in the book, we will crunch Gerrard’s data to discover which is the best soccercountryonearth,andwhichpunchesmostaboveitsweight.Buthere,let’slimitourselvestoasneakpreviewofwhereEnglandstands.

Thedistantpastisoflimitedrelevance.Let’sthereforeconcentrateonrecenthistory,thefiveWorldCupcyclesfrom1990through2010.ThiswasbynomeansagoldenageforEngland.Thecountrydidn’tevenqualifyfortheEuropeanChampionshipof2008ortheWorldCupin1994,anditsbestmomentinthesetwodecadeswasthelostsemifinalatEuro ’96.Aswe’vealreadyseen,Englandplayed224matches in these twentyyears. Itwon 54 percent of them and tied 25 percent, for a “win percentage” of 67 percent(rememberthatforthesepurposeswetreatatieashalfawin).Thatisnearthemiddleofthecountry’shistoricalrange.

Wewanttoseehowmuchofateam’ssuccess,matchbymatch,canbeexplainedbypopulation,wealth,andexperience.However,winpercentage isnot thebestmeasureofsuccess,becauseanytwowinsarenotthesame.Weallknowthata1–5awaywinagainsta certain someone is not the same as a tame 1–0. Put another way, if England playsLuxembourgandwinsonly1–0,it’smorelikelythattheLuxembourgianpresswillbeinecstasythantheBritishtabloids.

Insteadwechosegoaldifferenceasourmeasure,sinceforanymatchweexpectthatthegreaterthedifferencebetweenthetwoteams’populations,wealth,andexperience,thegreaterwillbe thedisparity inscores. (Ofcourse,apositivegoaldifference tends tobehighlycorrelatedwithwinning.)

We then analyzed Russell’s database of matches using the technique of multipleregression.A reminder:multiple regression is themathematical formula for finding thecloseststatisticalfitbetweenonething(inthiscasesuccessofthenationalteam)andanyother collection of things (here experience, population, and incomeper head). For eachinternational match you simply input the population, income per head, and teamexperienceof the twonationsat thatdate, and in secondsyouget a readout tellingyouhowsensitive(onaverage)theteam’sperformanceistoeachfactor.Wewillalsotakeintoaccounthomeadvantageforeachmatch.

Collecting the data is usually the toughest part.We have assembled figures for the

population,soccerexperience,andincomepercapitaof163countries.Wewillunveilourfindingsabouttheother162countriesinthenextfewchapters.Here,wewillfocusjustonEnglandanditssupposedunderperformance.

Weranour regressionand immediatelymadeseveraldiscoveriesabout internationalsoccer. First, home-field advantage alone isworth a lead of about two-thirds of a goal.Obviouslythatisnonsenseifappliedtoasinglegame,butthinkofitthisway:playingathomeis likehavingagoal’sheadstart in twooutofeverythreegames.Second,havingtwiceasmuchinternationalexperienceasyourrivalisworthjustoverhalfagoalagame.Infact,experienceturnsouttomattermuchmorethanthesizeofyourpopulation,whichiswhytheSwedesandCroatsdobetterinsoccerthanverylargebutinexperiencedChinaand India.Having twice your opponent’s population isworth only about one-tenth of agoal.Havingtwicethegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)perheadisworthaboutaslittle.Inother words, although being large and rich helps a country win soccer matches, beingexperiencedhelpsalotmore.ThatisnotgoodnewsfortheUS.

It shouldbeadded thatourestimatesarestatisticallyvery reliable.Notonly is therenotmuch doubt that these factorsmatter, but there is little doubt about the size of theeffects.ItistheseeffectsthatmakethefirstroundsofWorldCupsfairlypredictable.

However, much still remains unexplained. Experience, population, and income percapitacombinedexplainonlyjustoveraquarterofthevariationingoaldifference.Thatisgoodnews:ifwecouldpredictoutcomesperfectlybyjustthesethreefactors,therewouldnotbemuchpoint inwatchingWorldCupsat all.Nonetheless, the fact that these threefactorsexplainsomuchtellsusthat,uptoapoint,soccerisrationalandpredictable.

For now,we are interested only inEngland.Are its resources so outstanding that itshoulddobetterthanmerelyrankingaroundtenthintheworld?

First let’s look at experience. England is one of the most experienced countries insoccer. It played 885 internationals between 1872 and the end of the 2010WorldCup.According to our data, only Sweden played more (923). However, England’s muchvauntedhistoryisnotworthmuchagainsttheotherleadingsoccernations,becausemostofthemhavenowaccumulatedsimilaramountsofexperience.Brazil,Argentina,andevenHungary had all played more than 800 internationals by 2010. When it comes to oursecondvariable,nationalincome,Englandscoreshigh,too.Itisusuallyoneoftherichestoftheserioussoccercountries.WhereEnglandfallsshortisinsize.WhatoftenseemstogounnoticedisthatEngland’spopulationof53millionputsitatamajordisadvantagetothecountriesitlikestomeasureitselfagainstinsoccer.NotonlyisGermanymuchbigger,withover80millioninhabitants,butFrancehas66millionandItaly60million.AmongtheleadingEuropeannations,EnglandisaheadonlyofSpain(47million).Soinsoccerterms,Englandisanexperienced,rich,butmedium-sizedcompetitor.

Thenweranthenumbers.WecalculatedthatEngland,givenitspopulation, income,andexperience,“should”scoreonaverage0.19goalspergamemorethanitsopponents.To get a feel for how thisworks, considerEngland’s performance at theWorldCup of1998.EnglandplayedTunisia,Romania,Colombia,andArgentina,allonneutralground,so there was no home-field effect. Facing Tunisia in its opening game, England had a

population five times larger, a GDP per head four times larger, and two times moreinternational experience than its opponent. That combination gave an expected goaldifferenceofonegoalinEngland’sfavor.Intheevent,Englandwon2–0andsodidbetterthanexpected.

AgainstRomania,Englandhadtheadvantageof twice thepopulation, five times theincomeperhead,andabitmoreexperience(othercountrieshavebeenplayingsoccerforlonger than the English sometimes like to think). All this gave England an expectedadvantageofabouthalfagoal.England’s2–1defeatmeantthatitunderperformedbyoneandahalfgoals.

NextEnglandplayedColombia,withaslightadvantageinpopulation,fourtimestheincome per head, and double the experience. The package was worth an advantage ofalmost an entire goal (you start to see how the Tom Thumb World Cup might beorganized),butagainEnglandoverperformed,winning2–0.

ThencameArgentina: as everyone inEnglandknows, theEnglish lostonpenalties.Should England have done better? Well, it had a slight advantage in population overArgentina,double the incomeperhead,butbarelyanymoreexperience.Puttingall thattogether, a fair scorewould have been a tie,which is exactlywhat happened after 120minutes.Pityaboutthepenalties,though.

Ourmodelallowsustoreexamineeverygameeverplayed.Thegloriousuncertaintyofsoccermeansthattherearemanydeviationsfromexpectations.However,ifweaveragethe difference between expectations and results for each country, we get a picture ofwhether any national team systematically outperforms or underperforms relative to itsresources.Ourfinding:Englandinthe1990–2010periodoutscoreditsopponentsby0.87goals per game. That was 0.68 more than we had predicted based on the country’sresources.Inshort,Englandwasnotunderperformingatall.Contrarytopopularopinion,itwasoverperformingbytwo-thirdsofagoalpergame.ItmightbearguedthatEnglandisn’twinningtheall-importantgames(perhapsbecauseoftirednessinthefinalstagesofmajor tournaments), but the fact is that losses are rare events. And as we’ll show,England’soverperformancehasbeengettingevenbetterinrecentyears.

Asanexampleofthisoverachievement,let’stakeEngland’sencounterswithPoland.EnglandplayedthePolestentimesbetween1990and2010,winningsevenandtyingthreetimes,with a goal difference of plus twelve.Over the periodEngland’s populationwasabout 25 percent larger than Poland’s, its income per head about two and a half timesgreater, and its international experience about 20 percent more. These should havecontributedtoapositivegoaldifferenceofaboutonehalf,one,andonehalf,respectively,oratotalofplustwooverthetengames.SoEngland’sgoaldifferenceofplustwelvewastengoalsbetterthanwemighthaveexpected.Thatisnottooshabby.

Laterinthebookwewillrevealourglobaltableforrelativeperformancefrom1990through2010:arankingoftheteamsthatdidbestrelativetotheircountries’experience,income,andpopulations.Fornow,we’lljustsaythatEnglandcameinseventeenthoutof163countries.Thisinitselfisalargeleapforwardinrecentyears.Whenwedidthesamecalculation in earlier editions of this book, covering the period from 1980 to 2001,

Englandcame inonlysixty-seventhoutof189countries. Ithas risen in the last decadefrom a group ofmoderate overachievers, including countries such asRussia,Morocco,IvoryCoastandMozambique,toalevelofoverachievementcomparablewiththelikesofHonduras,Croatia,SouthKorea,andItaly.LikeEngland,alltheseteamsscoredabout0.6to0.8goalspergamemorethanthey“should”have,giventheirpopulations,income,andexperience.

However,Englanddoesn’tbenchmark itselfagainstHondurasorMorocco. It’smoreinteresting to see whether England overperforms “more” than the teams it sees as itsrivals:thebestcountriesintheworld.Here’sarankingofthegame’sgiants,plusEngland,based on howmany goals per game each scored above expectations in the 1990–2010period:

It turnsout thatEngland’soverachievement—though largecomparedwithalmostallother countries on earth—isn’t verygoodwhenyou class thembeside thegiants of thegame.Still,EnglandoverachievedmorethanItaly,eventhoughtheItalianswonaWorldCupinthisperiodandEnglanddidn’t.

Our conclusion: England does just fine. The team actually performs better thanexpected,givenwhatithastostartwith.Allitneedstobringhomesometrophiesisbettertiming—itmustwinfewerfriendliesandmoreWorldCupsemis—andafewmillionmoreinhabitants. Consider the England-Germany semifinal at Euro ’96. Both countries hadsimilar levels of experience, and by 1996 Germany’s lead over Britain in income percapitahadslippedtoonlyabout10percent.However,accordingtoouranalysis,England’shomeadvantage(worthjustunderhalfagoalinagamebetweenEuropeans)waslargelywipedoutbyGermany’smuchlargerpopulation.Thatmadetheexpectedgoaldifferenceonly0.49infavoroftheEnglishhometeam,notfarshortof thetie thatmaterializedinopenplay. In theendGarethSouthgatemissedhispenalty in theshootout,andEnglandlost.

Overallinthe1990–2010period,EnglandplayedGermanyninetimes.Englandwon

three,andlostsix(onceonpenalties).Itsgoaldifferenceovertheninegameswasminusone.GivenGermany’sslightleadinGDPperheadintheseyears,butparticularlygivenEngland’s shortage of people, that is almost exactly the goal differencewewould havepredicted.The“thirtyyearsofhurt” shouldn’tbeamystery.Englandsimplyshouldnotexpecttobeworld-beaters.Assooften,JamieCarragherinhisautobiographygetsitright:

The psychology of our international game iswrong. England ought to be embracing the idea of being theunderdogontheworldstage….WeshouldberevelingintheimageofthepluckyoutsidertryingtounbalancethesuperpowersofArgentinaandBrazil,whilematchingtheFrench,GermansandItalians.

Still,itistruethatoveritshistory,Englandcouldhavegottenluckier.Abetterpenaltyhere,astrongergoalkeeper’sstomachthere,DarrenAnderton’sshotrollinghomeinextratimeagainstGermanyatEuro’96 insteadofhitting thepost,and itallcouldhavebeendifferent.Whatweseehereispartlytheenormousroleofluckinhistory.Wetendtothinkwithhindsightthatateamthatdidwellinaparticulartournamentwassomehowalwaysgoingtodowellandateamthatlostwasdoomedtodoso.Thewinner’svictorycomestoseeminevitable.Thisisacommonflawinthewritingofanykindofhistory.

Infact,though,inevitablevictorieshardlyeverhappeninsoccertournaments.PerhapstheonlyrecentcasewasBrazilattheWorldCupof2002.Justhowdominantthecountrywas dawned on a leading European club manager a few months after the final. Thismanagerwas trying to signBrazil’s goalkeeper,Marcos.After all,Marcoswas aworldchampion.Marcosvisitedtheclubanddidsomephysicaltests,inwhichhedidn’tperformparticularlywell.Nevermind, thought themanager, theguywon theWorldCup.SoheofferedMarcosacontract.Attwoo’clockthenextmorning,themanagerwasawakenedathomebyaphonecall.ItwasMarcos’sagent.

Theagentsaid,“I’msorry,butMarcoswon’tsignforyou.”

Thesleepymanagersaid,“Allright,butwhynot?”

Thentheagentconfessed.AcoupleofyearsbeforetheWorldCup,Marcoshadbrokenhis wrist. It had never healed properly. But his old clubmanager, Luiz Felipe Scolari,becamemanagerofBrazilandputMarcosontheteam.SuddenlyMarcoswasgoingtoaWorldCup.Every day at the tournament, the agent explained,Marcoswas in pain.Hecouldbarelyeven train. Inmatcheshecouldbarelycatchaball.EverydayMarcos toldhimself,“IreallymusttellScolariaboutmywrist.”Buthecouldneverquitebringhimselfto.Sohewenton,dayafterday,untilhefoundthathehadwontheWorldCup.BrazilwassosuperiorthatitwontheWorldCupwithacrockedgoalkeeper.

However,suchdominanceisveryrare.Normally,thedifferencesbetweenteamsinthefinal stages of a World Cup are tiny. The difference between an England team beingconsideredlegendaryorafailureistwotothreegames,eachgenerallydecidedbyasinglegoal,overtwoyears.Afterall,thedifferencebetweenmakingaWorldCupandspendingthesummeronthebeachcanbejustapoint.Sometimesit’sapointthatyoulostbyhittingthepost.Sometimesit’sapointgarneredbyarivalinamatchyoudidn’tevenplayin.

Onceyou’reat theWorldCup, thedifferencebetweengoinghomeignominiously inthefirstroundandmakingthesemifinalsisoftenamatterofafewincheshereorthereonacoupleofshots.Thegreatestprizeinthesporthingesonaveryfewmoments.Jonathan

WilsonputsitwellinhisAnatomyofEngland:“Onemomentcanshapeagame,andonegame can shape a tournament, and one tournament can shape a career. Football is notalwaysfair.”Wilsonpointsout“oneofthemajorproblemsofinternationalfootball:thatthere is so little of it huge conclusions are drawn from individual games.” As ArsèneWengerhasnoted,Europeanchampionshipsareover in threeweeks,andany team inaleaguecanbetopofthetableafterthreeweeks.

In those short tournaments, England have probably been unluckier thanmost.OverlunchinLondoninOctober2013,theFA’schairmanGregDyke,whohasspentalotoftimeaskingpeopleinthegamewhyEnglandlose,toldus:“There’sanotherargument.TheguywhoownsBrentford[thesmallLondonclubthatDykesupports]isMatthewBenham,right?He’s very rich.He’smade all hismoney gambling on football.He employs top-qualitygraduates,mathsgraduates.Alltheydoisstudyfootballaroundtheworld.Hedoeseverythingonstatistics.Everythingisonprobabilities.Hesays, thesinglebiggestfactorwhyEnglandhaven’tdonewellisbecausethey’vebeenunlucky.”

LuckisparticularlyimportantinWorldCups,weinterjected.

“Andalso,”saidDyke,“thenumberoftimesyou’reknockedoutonpenalties.”

OfthetentournamentsforwhichEnglandhavequalifiedsince1990,theyhaveexitedsixonpenalties.

Dykecontinued:“He[Benham]saysyoucanalterthechancesofwinningorlosingonpenalties,butnotbyalot.Soiftheluckhadgonetheotherway,hisargumentisthatwe’dhavewononeortwoofthoseandwewouldn’tbesittingherehavingthisconversation.”

Yettherewewere,havingthisconversation.

ThereisasimilarissuewithluckinMajorLeagueBaseball,notesMichaelLewisinMoneyball: “The season ends in a giant crapshoot. The playoffs frustrate rationalmanagement because, unlike the long regular season, they suffer from the sample sizeproblem.”Lewismeansthatbecausetherearesofewgamesintheplayoffs—becausethe“samplesize”issosmall—randomfactorsplayanoutsizeroleindeterminingthewinner.

Mostsoccerfansunderstandthatluckmatters,eveniftheyconstructapost-factstoryabout the tournament thatmakeseithervictoryorhumiliationseemfatedfromthestart.But our data point to an even scarier truth than the existence of fluke: namely, there isbarely any difference between “brilliant” and “terrible” England teams. It lookssuspiciouslyasifEnglandformostofitsmodernhistory—atleastbeforeCapelloarrived—hasbeenmoreorlessequallygood.

Thismaysoundhardtobelieve.Fansfeelstronglyaboutthequalitiesofmanagersandplayers.Thereareperiodsofnationaloptimismandnationalpessimism,associatedwiththeviewthattheEnglandteamiseitherstrongordisgraceful.

Butinfact,watchingEnglandplayresembleswatchingacoin-tossingcompetition.Ifwefocusonoutrightvictories, thenEnglandonaveragewins justover50percentof itsgames;therestiteithertiesorloses.Sojustasacoinhashalfachanceoflandingheadsupandhalftailsup,Englandintheaveragegamehasabouthalfachanceofwinningand

halfofnotwinning.

We assigned a “1” for each win and a “0” for a loss or a tie, and examined thesequenceofEngland’s fourhundredgames from1972 through2007.Beforewediscussthis sequence, let’s look at coin tossing. If you tossed a coin four hundred times, youwouldexpectonaveragetogettwohundredheadsandtwohundredtails.However,thereis no reason to think that the outcomes would alternate (heads, tails, heads, tails…).Sometimes you will get sequences of a few heads, sometimes a few tails. Crucially,though,therewouldbenorelationshipatallbetweenthecurrentcointossandthelastone.Ifyoutossafaircointhereisalwaysafifty-fiftychanceofheads,whateversequencehasoccurreduptothispoint.Thereisnostatisticalcorrelationbetweencurrentcointossesandpastcointosses,eveniftheaverageofanysequenceisalwaysaround50percent.

Here is our finding: England’s win sequence over the four hundred games isindistinguishablefromarandomseriesofcointosses.ThereisnopredictivevalueintheoutcomeofEngland’slastgame,orindeedinanycombinationofEngland’srecentgames.Whateverhappenedinonematchappearstohavenobearingonwhatwillhappeninthenextone.Theonlythingyoucanpredict is thatover themediumtolongterm,Englandwillwinabouthalfitsgamesoutright.Wehaveseenthattheoutcomeofmatchescanbelargely predicted by a country’s population, income, and experience. However, thisexplainsonly theaverage outcome. Inotherwords, ifEnglandwere smaller, poorer, orlessexperienced,itwouldhavealowerpercentageofwins,butthesequenceofthosewinswouldstillbeunpredictable.

Tomakesurethatourfindingwasright,weconstructedafewrandomsequencesof1sand 0s to see if they looked like England’s results. Often we found more apparentcorrelationinourrandomsequencesthaninEngland’sresults.

FIGURE16.2.Englandwinpercentage

Contrarytoallpopularopinion,itmaybethatformostofmodernsoccerhistorythestrength of the England team has barely ever changed (which would make the entireapparatusofpunditryattachedtotheteaminstantlyredundant).Figure16.2showsthewinpercentageof theEngland teamfrom1950 to2013 (againcounting tiesasworthhalfawin).Apartfromafewmomentsinthe1950sithasnotrisenabove70percent,andithasneverfallenbelow67.5percent.Theoverallpictureisoneofsteadybutextremelyslowdecline,punctuatedbytwoerasofexceptionalperformance.Oneofthoseeraswasthelate1960s,whenEnglandwasworldchampion.Theotherperiodofclearimprovementbeganintheearly2000sandcontinuestoday.

On thewhole, though, very little has changed over sixty years.A star playermightfadeorretire,butinacountryofabout50millionpeople,thereisalwayssomeonecomingupwho is near enoughhis level tomake almost nodifference.Over the long term, thethree key factors that determine a country’s performance are very stable. The Britisheconomyboomedinthe1990sandisnowdroppingdowntheglobalwealthrankings,butmeasuredover thepastcenturyBritainhasalwaysbeenoneof thewealthiestnations intheworld.Equally,itsshareofthesoccerpopulationchangesonlyglacially.Andwhilethe

Englandteamgainsexperience,sodoitsmainrivals.Theonlykeyfactorthatchangesishomeadvantage.Given thatplayingathomeiswortha leadof two-thirdsofagoalpergame inglobalsoccer, it’s littlewonder thatEnglandwon theWorldCup inEngland in1966.

Otherwise,England’sperformancesingoodorbadtimesaremuchthesame.It’sjustthat fansand themedia seek to seepatternswherenoneexist.NickTaleb, the financialinvestor who wrote The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, famouslyexplained that we are constantly fooled by randomness. In neuroscientific terms, ourrationalbrainsareeggedonbyouremotionalbrainstofindpatternsevenif therearen’tany.Intheend,thebestexplanationfortheshort-termupsanddownsoftheEnglandteamisrandomness.

THECAPELLOEFFECT

At least, that was true before Capello arrived. It appears that the Italian changedsomething.Despite the ritualEnglishdisappointment inSouthAfrica, it does seem thattakinghisreignasawhole,Englandunderhimwasbetterthaniteverhadbeen.Thatisexactlywhatyouwouldexpect,ifheimportedthelatestcontinentalknow-how.

Aswe’veseen,CapellowasthenominatedscapegoatfortheWorldCupof2010.Butitisunfairtojudgehimonjustfourmatches,playedatatimewhenEnglandwassufferingitsritualend-of-seasonfatigue.(Capello’sstar,theailingRooney,hadbeensqueezedlikea lemonbyManchesterUnited that spring.)TakingCapello’sEnglishyears as awhole,from2008untilhisresignationinFebruary2012,hisresultsstandout.

Mostobviously,hiswinningpercentageof75(countingtiesashalfawin)washigherthan anyone else’s (and 14 percentage points above his immediate predecessor,McClaren).Aswe’venotedearlier,innootherfour-yearperiodfrom1978through2007did England’s winning percentage rise above 68 percent. Capello also won a higherproportionofgamesoutrightthananyofhispredecessors.True,hehadthegoodluckofcoachingintheaftermathofthebreakupsoftheSovietUnionandYugoslavia.Therearenow far more weak little countries in European soccer, the likes of Slovenia andKazakhstan, which England generally beats. But the previous five regular Englandmanagersenjoyedthesameadvantage,andnoneofthemhasstatstomatchCapello’s.

What’salsonoticeableishowfreelyhisteamsscored.Theybeattheiropponentsbyanaverageof1.48goalsagame,abouthalfagoalbetter than the typicalmodernEnglandmanager. Scoring was easier for prewar England sides and for Walter Winterbottom’steams in the immediate postwar period, becausemany international sides in those dayswere rubbish: in May 1947, for instance, Winterbottom’s England won 0–10 away toPortugal,notaresultthatEnglandhasthreatenedtomatchsince.

CapellowassucceededbyHodgson,whostartedevenbetter thantheItaliandid.BythetimehisEnglandhadbeatenPoland2–0atWembleyinOctober2013toqualifyfortheBrazilianWorldCup,Hodgson’swinpercentageaftertwenty-twogameswas77percent—fractionallyaboveCapello’s,andthehighestinEnglishhistory.

Admittedlyhisteamthenlosttwostraightexhibitiongamestodilutehisnumbers.We

arestillfairlyconfidentthatHodgson’sboyswillflyhomefromBrazilintears.Ultimatefailure is only to be expected, despite England’s improvement in recent years. ThedifferencewithpastWorldCupsisthatEnglishfansnowexpectfailuretoo.Ithastakennearlyfiftyyearsofhurt,butthefantasyofmanifestdestinyhasfinallybeendiscarded.

17THECURSEOFPOVERTYWhyPoorCountriesArePooratSports

WhenDidierDrogbawasfive,hisparentsputhimonaplaneintheIvoryCoastandsenthimtolivewithanuncleinFrance.Thesix-hourflight,alonewithhisfavoritetoy,passedinabluroftearsandtissues.

About a decade laterDrogba’s father lost his job at a bank in IvoryCoast, and thefamilymovedtoasuburbofParis,wheretheywerereunitedwiththeirexiledson.EightDrogbasendeduplivinginanapartmentofabout110squarefeet.“Averylargewardrobe,really,”Drogbarecalledinhisautobiography.“Hard.Veryhard.Evenenoughtodriveyoucrazy.” The apartment was cold, and his little brothers were so noisy he couldn’tconcentrateonhisschoolwork.“Luckily,myfatherhadallowedmetostartplayingsocceragain.”

Thereisamyththatpoorpeoplearesomehowbestequippedtomakeitassportsmen.Aclichéoftenusedaboutthemisthatsportistheir“onlyescaperoutefrompoverty.”Thepooraresupposedlyfiguratively“hungrier”thantherich.Iftheyareblack,likeDrogba,they are sometimes thought to have greater genetic gifts than white people. And theevidencethatpoorpeopleexcelatsportsseemstobeinfrontofoureyes.Englandisnottheonlynationalsoccerteamdominatedbyplayersfromlowlybackgrounds.Francesincethe 1990s has generally fielded a majority of nonwhite players, and few Brazilianinternationalsaresonsofcorporatelawyers,either.Mostoftheworld’sbestsoccerplayersstartedlifepoor:SouthAmericanslikeDiegoMaradona,whoasatoddleralmostdrownedinalocalcesspit,AfricanslikeSamuelEto’owhoappeartosupporthundredsofpeopleback home, or European immigrants like Zlatan Ibrahimovic or Zinedine Zidane, whogrewupinsomeofthetoughestneighborhoodsontheContinent.Drogba’schildhoodwasonlyslightlymoreDickensianthanmost.TheoriginsofAmericanbasketballplayersandfootballplayersaremostlylowly,too.Thebestpreparationforsportinggreatnessseemstobeapoorchildhood.

Yetitisnot.Thefactsshowthattheworld’spoorpeopleandpoorcountriesareworseatsports thanrichones.It is true thatpoorer immigrants inrichcountriesoftenexcelatsports,butthereasonsforthathavenothingtodowithskincoloror“hunger.”

Let’slookatpoorcountriesfirst.ThevastmajorityofcountriesonearthareevenmorefirmlyexcludedfromsportingsuccessthanEnglandis,simplybecausetheyarepoor.Thisbecomes apparent in a simple exercise to discoverwhich country is theworld’s best atsportsandwhichcountryisbestforitssize.

To find the best countries, we combined the historical results from many majorinternational sporting events: theSummer andWinterOlympics,WorldCups in severalsports,andthemostpopularindividualsports.Forsomesportsthedatagobackmorethan

acentury,forothers,onlyacoupleofdecades.Forallsports,wetookNovember2013astheendpoint.

Our methodology is not perfect. We started with the men’s world cups in biggishsports thathaveseldomorneverbeenfeaturedat theOlympics.Weranked the top fivecountriesinthesesports,basedfirstonthenumberofworldtitlestheyhavewon,andincase of ties, on finishes in the final four.We gave the best country in each sport fivepoints,thesecondfour,thethirdthree,thefourthtwo,andthefifthone.Thereisnoneedtoreadtherankingsforeverysport,butfollowingarethedetailedpointstalliesforthosewhoareinterested:

RugbyUnion

NewZealand 5

Australia 4

SouthAfrica 3

England 2

France 1

Cricket

Australia 5

India 4

WestIndies 3

Pakistan 2

SriLanka 1

Baseball was trickier. Historically the US dominates the sport. However, ittraditionallysendsamateursorminorleaguerstotheworldcup.TheUSranksonlythirdall-timeinthetournament.Butweusedourjudgmenttorankitastheworld’sbestcountryinbaseball,producingthisranking:

US 5

Cuba 4

Venezuela 3

Colombia 2

SouthKorea 1

Basketball is anOlympic event.However, as theworld’s secondmostpopular teamgame it deserves additional input in this quest. We therefore added the results of thebasketballworld cup.Again theUS rarely fields its best players, and historically rankssecond behind Yugoslavia. But using common sense we placed the US first here, too,producingthisranking:

US 5

Yugoslavia/Serbia&Montenegro 4

USSR/Russia 3

Brazil 2

Argentina 1

FavoringtheUSinbaseballandbasketballdidnotaffecttheoutcomeofourquest.

Theonlywomen’sworldcupwecountedwassoccer.Women’ssoccerisanOlympicevent, too, but farmorepopular thanmostotherwomen’s teamgames, and therefore itseemedtomeritmoreinput.Therankingsforwomen’ssoccer:

US 5

Germany 4

Norway 3

Japan 2

Sweden 1

Wealsoassessedpopularindividualsportsthathaveseldomorneverbeenrepresentedin the Olympics. We rewarded countries for triumphs by their citizens. In tennis wecountedmen’sandwomen’sGrandSlamtournaments—tennisbeingararesportinthatitisplayedwidelybywomen.Weusedonlyresultsfromthe“Openera”startingin1968,whentennisbecameverycompetitive.

Men’sTennis

US 5

Sweden 4

Australia 3

Spain 2

Switzerland 1

Women’sTennis

US 5

Germany/WestGermany 4

Australia 3

Belgium 2

Yugoslavia/Serbia 1

Ingolfweusedtheresultsofthemen’smajors:

US 5

Britain(includingallfourhomecountries) 4

SouthAfrica 3

Australia 2

Spain 1

Incyclingwecountedvictoriesbycitizensofeachcountry in theTourdeFrance,amoreprestigiouseventthantheworldchampionship.Wedidn’tcountdopedwinnerslikeLanceArmstrongwhowerelaterstrippedoftheirtitles:

France 5

Belgium 4

Spain 3

Italy 2

Luxembourg 1

In auto racing we chose the most prestigious competition, Formula I, thusdiscriminating against the US, which prefers its own races. Again, we counted worldchampionshipsbycitizenship.Therankings:

Britain 5

Germany 4

Brazil 3

Argentina 2

Finland,Australia,Austria,France 1each

Wedidnot include theworld cupsofpopular sports likevolleyball and icehockey,because these areOlympic sports, and sowewill assess them through their role in theOlympics’all-timemedalstable.Boxingwastoohardtoassess,astherearevariousrival“worldchampionships.”Wealsoexcludedtheathleticsworldcup.AthleticsiscopiouslyrepresentedattheOlympics,andformostofthehistoryofitsworldcup,theentrantshavebeenentirecontinentsratherthansinglecountries.

ClearlytheSummerandWinterGamesdeservetocarrymoreweightinourquestthananysingleworldcup.IntheSummerOlympicsof2012,medalswereawardedintwenty-six sports.Manyof these, suchas archeryorkayaking, areplayedbyvery fewpeople.Still, because of the event’s profusion of sports and its prestige, we gave the SummerGamestentimestheweightingofworldcupsinsinglesports.Sowegavethetopcountryintheall-timemedalstable50pointsratherthan5pointsforasingleworldcup.Becausethe whole planet competes in the Olympics—unlike, say, in baseball or cricket—werewardedthetoptenratherthanfivecountriesintheall-timemedalstable.Theranking:

US 50points

USSR/Russia 40

Germany 30

Italy 20

Britain 10

France 8

EastGermany(GDR) 6

Sweden 4

China 2

Norway 1

WegavetheWinterOlympicsthreetimestheweightingofaworldcup.Becausefew

countriesplaywintersports,werewardedonlythetopfiveintheall-timemedalstable:

USSR/Russia 15points

Norway 12

US 9

Germany(includingWestGermany) 6

Austria 3

Finally, the soccerworldcup.Soccer is anOlympic sport, but it is also theplanet’smostpopulargame.Wegaveitsworldcupsixtimestheweightingofworldcupsinothersports,andrewardedthetoptencountriesintheall-timepointstable.Theranking:

Brazil 30points

Germany 24

Italy 18

Argentina 12

England 6

Spain 5

France 4

Netherlands 3

Uruguay 2

Sweden 1

Wethentotaledupallthepoints.Hereareourtoptwenty-threesportingcountriesonearth:

US 89

Germany(includingWestGermany) 72

USSR/Russia 58

Italy 40

Brazil 35

Britain 27

France 19

Australia 18

Norway 16

Argentina 15

Spain 11

Sweden 10

EastGermany,Belgium,SouthAfrica 6

Yugoslavia/Serbia&Montenegro,NewZealand 5

Austria,India,Cuba 4

Netherlands,WestIndies,Venezuela 3

Thewinner,theUS,deservesparticularpraisegiventhatweomittedtwoofitsfavoritesports, football and NASCAR, because nobody else plays them. Germany, in secondplace,wouldhavegottenclosertotheAmericantotalifwehadcreditedtheunitedcountrywithEastGermany’sOlympicmedals (and forgottenall themalegrowthhormones thatwentintowinningthem).TheUSSR/Russiainthirdplacecanbeslightlylesspleasedwithitself,becauseitwonmostof itspointswhenitwasstillamultinationalempire.Britainwas fourthwhenwe first calculated this table in 2006, but has since dropped to sixth,despitetheLondonOlympics.

Australia ineighthplacedidbrilliantlygiven thatwe ignored itsprowessat itsveryownversionoffootball,“AussieRules.”Brazilwasthebestdevelopingcountrybyaverylongway,andnotjustthankstosoccer.IthasalsodiversifiedsuccessfullyintobasketballandFormulaIautoracing.India(1.2billioninhabitants,5pointsforcricket)andChina(1.3 billion, 2 points for the summerOlympics)were the biggest flops per capita. TheArabworldcombinedgotzeropoints.

Butwhich country isworld champion per capita? To find out,weworked out howmanypointseachcountryscoredpermillioninhabitants(usingtheirpopulationfiguresfor2013).Thatproducedthistoptenofoverachievers:

Norway 3.19

Luxembourg 1.88

NewZealand 1.14

Sweden 1.05

UnitedGermany(excludingtheGDR’sOlympicMedals) 0.88

Australia 0.79

Italy 0.66

Uruguay 0.59

WestIndies(orthenationsthattogethersupplyalmostallWestIndiancricketers,namely,Jamaica,TrinidadandTobago,Guyana,Barbados,andAntigua) 0.58

Belgium 0.54

HeiaNorge. The country that we very nearly crowned as the most soccer mad inEuropenowturnsout tobethebestpercapitaatsport.Norway’sleadissolargethat itwouldmost probably havewon our sporting TomThumb trophy evenwith a differentscoringsystem—even,say,ifwehadhalveditspointsforbeingthebestWinterOlympicsnation.ThisisacountrywhereatastatekindergarteninsuburbanOsloinmidafternoon,among the throng of mothers picking up their toddlers, someone pointed out to us ananonymousmomwhohappenedtobeanOlympicgoldmedalistincross-countryskiing.Norway won more points in our competition than all of Africa or Asia (excludingOceania) put together. We could even have omitted the Winter Olympics—almost aNorwegian fiefdom—and the country still would have finished sixth in our efficiencytable.

Butthemainthingthetopofourrankingsdemonstratesistheimportanceofwealth.Ourefficiencytableforsportsbearsacuriousresemblancetoanotherglobalranking:the

United Nations’ human development index. This measures life expectancy, literacy,education,andlivingstandardstorankthecountriesoftheworldaccordingtotheirwell-being.Wefoundthatanation’swell-beingishighlycorrelatedwithitssuccessinsports.NoprizesforguessingwhichcountrytoppedtheUN’srankingsforhumandevelopmentin2012:HeiaNorge,again.

NewZealandandAustralia, thirdandsixth inour sporting rankings,were sixthandsecondforhumandevelopmentin2012.Sweden,fourthintheworldforsports,wasjointseventhforhumandevelopment.Germanywasfifthinsport,fifthinhumandevelopment.TheonlypoorernationsthatsneakedintooursportingtoptenwereUruguayandtheWestIndiannations.However,eventhesepoorcousinswereallclassifiedbytheUNas“veryhighly” or “highly” developed countries except Guyana, whose development was“medium.”Generallythemostdevelopedcountriesalsotendtobebestatsports.

ThecaseofNorwayshowswhy.It’sNorwegiangovernmentpolicythateveryfarmer,everyfisherman,nomatterwherehelivesinthecountry,hastherighttoplaysports.AndNorwaywill spendwhat it takes toachieve that. Just as supermarketshavesproutedallover Britain, there are all-weather sports grounds everywhere in Norway. Even in theunlikeliestcornersofthecountrythere’sgenerallyonearoundthecornerfromyourhouse.Usuallythelockerroomsarewarm,andthecoacheshaveacquiredsomesortofdiploma.Akidcanplayandtrainonaproperteamforunder$150ayear,reallynotmuchformostNorwegians.Almosteveryoneinthecountryplayssomething.KnutHelland,aprofessoratBergenUniversitywhohaswrittenabookonNorwegiansportsandmedia,notesthatNorwayhasthebiggestskiraceintheworldwithabout13,000participants.“I’mtakingpartinitmyself,”headds.WhentheEuropeanCommissionstudiedtimeuseinEuropeancountries in 2004, it found that theNorwegians spent themost time playing sports: onaverage,awhoppingthirteenminutesaday.Peopleallovertheworldmightwanttoplaysports,buttomakethatpossiblerequiresmoneyandorganizationthatpoorcountriesdon’thave.Moneybuyssportingtrophies.

AfterwepublishedthefirsteditionofSoccernomics,ChristopherAnderson,apoliticalscientistatCornellUniversity,andlaterco-authorofTheNumbersGame,ripostedthatweplaced undueweight onwealth. In his paper “DoDemocraciesWinMore?”AndersonanalyzedallsoccerWorldCupsfrom1950through2006.Thekeytowinningwasn’tsomuchwealth,heargued,asdemocracy.

Thatmaywellbe true.Wealthanddemocracytendtocorrelateveryclosely.Almostallrichcountries(leavingasideafewoilstatesintheMiddleEast)aredemocracies.Thatmakesittrickytoseparatetheeffectsofwealthfromtheeffectsofdemocracy.Andersonmightwellberightthatdemocracycontributesmoretowinningsoccergames(notealsothatinmakingourcase,wewerelookingatmanysportsratherthanjustsoccer).Perhapstheaveragequalityofschoolingindifferentcountries—ifyoucouldmeasureitperfectly—wouldbeanevenbetterpredictorofsuccess insoccer.Afterall,schoolingisaprettygoodgaugeofhowwellacountrychannelsresourcestoallitspeople.Ifyou’regoodatprovidingschoolsforeveryone,asmostdemocraciesare,thenyouareprobablyalsogoodatprovidinggoodsoccerfieldsandcoachesforeveryone.It’simpossibletosaywhether

Norway is good at sports because it’s rich, or because it’s a democracy, or because it’shighlyeducated.Rather,beingrichanddemocraticandwell-educatedandgoodatsportsareallpartofthesamething.

However you measure it, poor countries are generally poorer at sports. It’s nocoincidence that China won nothing at sports before its economy took off and that ittoppedthemedalstableattheBeijingOlympicsafterward.MostAfricancountriesbarelyeventrytocompeteinanysportsotherthansoccerandafewrunningevents.Andthebestplace to find outwhy theworld’s poor doworse than theworld’s rich is SouthAfrica,wheresomeverypoorandveryrichneighborhoodsarealmostsidebyside,separatedonlybyahighwayoragolfcourse.

SouthAfricaistheoneAfricancountrytoscoreanypointsatallinoursportingtable.Yetitowesalmostallthosepointstoanethnicgroupthatmakesuplessthan10percentofthecountry’sinhabitants:whitepeople.

Onlyabout4.6millionofthe51millionSouthAfricansarewhite.Nonetheless,whitesaccounted for fourteen of the fifteen players in theSpringbok rugby team thatwon theworldcup in1995, thirteenof the fifteenwhowon it in2007,aswell asall fiveSouthAfrican golferswho havewonmajors, andmost of the country’s best cricketers. IfwetreatedwhiteSouthAfricaasaseparatecountry, thenitssixsportingpointswouldhaveput it in third place in the world in our sporting efficiency table. That is entirelypredictable. South African whites were nurtured under apartheid on almost all theresourcesofthecountry.

The national teams of South African whites remain world-class in their respectivesports.NonwhiteSouthAfrica’snational teamdoes lesswell.At the timeofwriting, inJanuary2014,theBafanaBafanasoccerteam,sometimesknownathomeasthe“BananaBanana,” is sixty-second in FIFA’s rankings, far behind Panama and the Cape VerdeIslands. Even that represents quite a big rise in recent years. The Bafana just missedqualifyingfortheAfricanNationsCupof2012,havingfailedtofigureoutthattheteamneededtobeatratherthantieSierraLeoneinthelastqualifyinggame.(ThescenesoftheBafanawasting time in the finalminutes to preserve the tiewould have been hilariousweretheynotaterriblereflectiononthestateofmathteachinginSouthAfrica.)

HerearefivevignettestoexplainwhyblackSouthAfricaandotherpoornationsfailatsport:

YOUAREWHATYOUEAT:JOHANNESBURG

StevenPienaar,Everton’sSouthAfricanmidfielder,hastheframeofaprepubescentboy.There’shardlyaEuropeansoccerplayerasreedyasheis.ButinSouthAfricansoccerhisbodytypeiscommon.FrankEulberg,aGermanwhospentaboutfiveminutesasassistantcoachoftheKaizerChiefs,SouthAfrica’sbestteam,saysthatwhenhearrivedattheclub,sixteen of the players were shorter than five foot nine. “I sometimes thought, ‘Frank,you’reinthelandofthedwarves.’”

Most likely, Pienaar is reedy because he grew up malnourished and without muchaccess to doctors. He was born in a poor Coloured township in 1982, the height of

apartheid,whenalmostallmoneyandhealthcarewenttowhites.Growingtallisnotjustamatterofwhatyoueat.Whenchildrenbecomeill,theirgrowthisinterrupted,andbecausepoorchildrentendtogetillmoreoftenthanrichones,theyusuallyendupshorter.

Most of the players who represented South Africa in 2010 were born in nonwhitetownships in the 1980s.And so the ghost of apartheid bugged theBafana at their ownWorldCup.OnereasonSouthAfricansaresobadatsocceristhatmostofthemdidn’tgetenough good food. There are big strong black South Africans like Lucas Radebe andAaronMokoena,butnotverymanyofthem.

Apartheid, based on the bogus ideology that races are different, ended up creatingwhite, black, “Coloured,” and Indian South Africans who really were like separatepeoples.Thewhitesonaveragetowerovertheblacks.Nowonderthecricketandrugbyteams are so much better than the Bafana. “Well, they have their moments,” laughsDemitriConstantinou.

This descendant of Greek immigrants, an exercise scientist at Wits University inJohannesburg,directsFIFA’sfirstmedicalcenterofexcellence inAfrica.Whenwemet,he was running a project with the South African Football Association to help developyoungsoccerplayers.Constantinou’steamtestedthehealthofalltheplayersselectedforSAFA’s program. In a Woolworths tearoom in one of Johannesburg’s posh northernsuburbs, among white ladies having afternoon tea, he says, “The biggest issue wasnutrition.” Ismalnutrition one reasonAfrican teams perform poorly atWorldCups? “Ithinkyes.AndIthinkithasbeenoverlookedasapossiblecause.”

Hardly any players in the latter stages of theWorldCup of 2006were shorter thanabout five foot eight, Constantinou notes. “There is a minimum height.” If a largeproportionofyourmalepopulationwasbelow thatheight,youwerepickingyour teamfrom a reduced pool. Conversely, though he didn’t say it, one reason thatNorway andSweden(twoof the three tallestcountries in theworld)excelatsports is thatalmostalltheirmaleinhabitantsaretallenough.Theyarepickingtheirteamsfromafullpool.

ABEASTINTOATOOTHPICK:CAPETOWN

GeorgeDearnaleyisabig,ruddywhitemanwholookslikearugbyplayer,butinfacthewas once the Bafana’s promising young center forward. Dearnaley never got beyondpromising, because when he was in his early twenties his knee went. He didn’t mindmuch. He spoke a bit of Zulu and had studied literature and journalism at college inToledo,Ohio,andsohejoinedthesoccermagazineKickOff.Hebecameitspublisheraswellastheauthorofanexcellentcolumn.

Over an English breakfast in a Cape Town greasy spoon near theKickOff offices,DearnaleyreflectedontheAmazuluteaminDurbanwherehiscareerpeaked.SevenofhisteammatesfromtheAmazulusideof1992werenowdead,outofasquadofabouttwenty-four.Dearnaleysaid,“Oneguydiedwhenhishouseexploded,sothatwasprobablyataxiwaror something.But the restmusthavebeenAIDS.Oneplayer, aDurbannewspapersaidhewasbewitched.Asix-foot-fourbeastofaman,whowassuddenlywhittleddowntoatoothpick.”

Constantinou says it’s quite possible that a fifth of the Bafana’s potential pool ofplayers for 2010 carried the HIV virus. Not many people now remember Emmanuel“Scara”Ngobese,onceagreatSouthAfrican“dribblingwizard,”whodiedatagetwenty-eightinaJohannesburghospitalonMay11,2010,amonthbeforetheWorldCupkickedoff.Hiscauseofdeathwasgivenas“tuberculosis.”ScarawontheleaguewiththeKaizerChiefs in 2005, and played once for theBafana.HowmanySouthAfricanswho couldhaveplayedin2010weredeadinstead?

THEDARKSIDEOFTHEMOON:SANDTON,JUSTOUTSIDEJOHANNESBURG

It was quite a step for Danny Jordaan to organize aWorld Cup, because until he wasthirty-eight hehadnever even seenone.The chief executiveofficer of theFIFAWorldCup2010grewup amillionmiles from theworld’s best soccer.Being inSouthAfricaunderapartheidwasnotquitelikebeingonthemoon,orbeinginNorthKorea,butitwasalmost as isolated. SouthAfricawas the last industrialized country to get television, in1976,becausethewhitegovernmentwasafraidofthedevice.EvenafterthathardlyanyblackshadTVsets,andFIFAdidnotallowitsWorldCuptobebroadcastintheapartheidstate.SothefirsttimeJordaansawaWorldCupontelevisionwasin1990.

Thecountry’sisolationcontinuedevenafterthat.AsfarasmostSouthAfricanswereconcerned,internationalsoccermightstillaswellhavebeenhappeningonMars.Jordaantoldus,“SouthAfricansplayedontheirown.Wethoughtweweresosmart.That’swhywhenwe played our first competitivematch against Zimbabwe [in 1992], every SouthAfricanknewweweregoingtohammerZimbabwe.ButZimbabwehadthislittleplayercalledPeterNdlovu.NobodyknewPeterNdlovu.Byhalftimeitwas3–0forthem.Thatwasthefirstentryintointernationalsoccer.Thatreallyshookthiscountry.”

As late as1998,whenSouthAfricaentered its firstWorldCup, large swathsof thepopulation assumed that the Bafana would win it. After all, everyone knew that theirnativestyleof“pianoandshoeshine”—essentially,doingtricksontheballwhilestandingaround—wasjustlikeBraziliansoccerbutbetter.TheBafanadidnotwintheWorldCup.

Black South Africa was isolated twice over: first by sanctions, then by poverty.However,isolation—adistancefromthenetworksoftheworld’sbestsoccer—isthefateofmostpoorcountries.Theircitizenscan’teasilytraveltoItalyorGermanyandseehowsoccer is played there, let alone talk to the best coaches. Some can’t even see foreignsoccerontelevision,becausetheydon’thaveatelevision.Andonlyacoupleoftheverybestplayersinthesecountriesevermakeittothebestleaguesintheworld.

Onereasonpoorcountriesdobadlyinsports—andonereasontheyarepoor—isthatthey tend tobe less“networked,” lessconnected toothercountries, than richones. It ishardforthemjusttofindoutthelatestbestpracticeonhowtoplayasport.

Playing for national teams in Africa hardly lifts the isolation. Most poor, isolatedAfrican countries compete only against other poor, isolated African countries. At best,theymightencountertheworld’sbestonceeveryfouryearsataWorldCup.Nowondertheyhavelittleideaofwhattop-classsoccerislike.

“THEORGANIZERS.IT’STHEBIGGESTPROBLEM”:LONDON

Formysteriousreasons,in2006someonedecidedthattheBafanashouldplaytheirannualcharitymatch, theNelsonMandela Challenge, not in themagnificent 78,000-seat FNBStadiumjustoutsideJohannesburg,butmorethan5,000milesawayatBrentford’sGriffinParkinWestLondon.

OnagrayNovemberLondonafternoonthedaybeforethegame,theBafanawereintheirgray-coloredthree-starhotelontheoutskirtsofHeathrowAirport.Inthelobbywereflightcrews, travelingsalesmen,andcheerymeningreen-and-yellowtracksuitshangingwiththeirentourage: theBafanaBafana.Theiropponents, theEgyptians,whowerealsostayinginthehotel,hadcongregatedinthebar.ApparentlyEgyptwasfurious.Ithadbeenpromisedafive-starhotel,andamatchfeethathadyettomaterialize.

PitsoMosimane, theBafana’s caretakermanager—abig, bald, bullet-headedman—wasalsohangingaroundthelobby.MosimanecomplainedthatAfricancoachesnevergotjobs inEurope.Hegesturedtowardthebar:“ThecoachofEgypt,whowontheAfricanCup of Nations. Don’t you think he could at least coach a team in the English firstdivision?”ThenMosimanewentoffforaprematchpracticeatGriffinPark.

Minuteslaterhewasbackatthetable.“Thatwasquick,”someoneremarked.“No,wedidn’t train!”Mosimane said. Nobody had bothered telling Brentford the Bafana werecoming,andsothefieldwasn’treadyforthem.NowtheywouldhavetoplaytheAfricanchampionswithouthaving trainedon the field. “And I’mcarryingplayerswhoplay forBlackburn Rovers and Borussia Dortmund, and you know? We’re laughing about it.”Mosimane jerked a thumb toward four men in suits drinking at the next table: “Theorganizers.Itisthebiggestproblem.Thiswouldn’thappenwithanyothernationalteam.”

Hewaswrong.Organizationalmishapsarealwayshappeningtonationalteamsfrompoorcountries.Onmostsub-SaharanAfricannationalteamsthatmakeittoaWorldCup,playersandofficialshavearitualdisputeoverpayaboutaweekbeforethetournament.In2002 Cameroon’s dispute got out of hand, whereupon the squadmade a brief airplaneodyssey throughEthiopia, India, andThailandbefore finally landing in Japan fourdayslate.Jet-laggedandconfused,theIndomitableLionswereknockedoutinthefirstround.In 2006,Togo’s players spentmuch of their brief stay at the country’s firstWorldCupthreatening to go on strike because of their pay dispute. They worried that after thetournament was over, Togo’s federation might never get around to paying them.EventuallyFIFA sidestepped the federation, paid the players’ bonuses directly, and toldthemtoplayorelse,butitislittlewonderthattheteamlostthreematchesoutofthree.

Towin at sports, you need to find, develop, and nurture talent.Doing that requiresmoney,know-how,andsomekindofadministrativeinfrastructure.FewAfricancountrieshaveenoughofany.

“COLOURED”BEATS“BLACK”:THECAPEFLATS

IfyoustandonTableMountainatnightandlookdownatCapeTown,youwillseeacityof lights.Next to the lightsare the railway tracks.Andon the far sideof the tracksare“black spots”:Coloured townshipswithout lights. These are the rainy,murderousCape

FlatswheremostofSouthAfrica’sbestsoccerplayersgrewup.

BenniMcCarthy—SouthAfrica’srecordgoalscorer—comesfromtheCapeFlats.Sodoes theman justbehindhim in thescoringcharts,ShaunBartlett.SodoesBenni’soldfriendQuintonFortune,foryearsaloyalreserveatManchesterUnited.

The key point is that according to the racial classifications of apartheid, still tacitlyusedbymostSouthAfricanstoday,noneoftheseplayersis“black.”Theyare“Coloured”:agroupofgenerallylighter-skinnedpeople,mostlyderivedfromthelighterAfricantribesoftheCape,thoughsomedescendfromAsianslavesandmixedwhite-blackliaisons.Lessthan 10 percent of South Africans are Coloured, while about three-quarters are black.However, Coloureds often make up as much as half of the Bafana team. Pienaar, forinstance, is from a Coloured township outside Johannesburg. This density of Colouredtalentisalegacyofapartheid.

Underapartheid,theColouredswereslightlybetteroffthantheblacks.Theyhadmoreto eat and more opportunities to organize themselves. In the Coloured Cape Flats, forinstance, there were amateur soccer clubs with proper coaches like you might find inEurope.Notsoinblacktownships,whereaboys’teamwouldtypicallyberunbyalocalgangsterortheshebeenowner,whoseldombotheredmuchwithtraining.

To the irritation of many South African blacks, the Bafana have been a largelyColoured team formuchof their history since1992.Theblacks are simply toopoor tocompetewithintheirowncountry, letalonewithEuropeans.Eveninthesimplestgame,thepoorareexcludedbymalnutrition,disease,anddisorganization.Poorpeople inpoorcountriesdoworseatsports.

Thatleavesonethingunexplained:WhyisitthatsomanyofthebestEuropeansoccerplayers—Zidane, Drogba (officially an Ivorian but raised in France), Ibrahimovic,Rooney,CristianoRonaldo—comefromthepoorestneighborhoodsinEurope?

Itcannotbethatboysfromtheghettohaveanunquenchablehungertosucceed.Ifthatwere so, they would do better at school and in jobs outside soccer. There must besomethingabouttheirchildhoodsthatmakesthemparticularlywellsuitedtosoccer.Thatreasonispractice.

Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Outliers: The Story of Success, popularized the“10,000-hourrule.”Thisisanotionfrompsychology,whichsaysthattoachieveexpertiseinanyfieldyouneedatleast10,000hoursofpractice.“Instudyafterstudy,ofcomposers,basketball players, fiction writers, ice-skaters, concert pianists, chess players, mastercriminals,”saysneurologistDanielLevitininOutliers,“thisnumbercomesupagainandagain.Tenthousandhoursisequivalenttoroughlythreehoursaday,or20hoursaweek,of practice over 10 years… . No one has yet found a case in which true world-classexpertisewasaccomplishedinlesstime.”

The10,000-hourrulehassincebeenquestionedbyacademicsinvariousfields.Itmayindeednotapply inveryphysicalsports likerunningor jumping,wheresomebodywiththe perfect genes can becomeworld-classwithoutmuch training.However, in a highlyskill-basedsportlikesoccer,Gladwell’sessentialpointiscorrect:practicemakesperfect.

Insoccer,itisthepoorestEuropeanboyswhoaremostlikelytogetthemostpractice.Theytend to live insmallapartments,whichforces themtospend timeoutdoors.Theretheymeeta readysupplyof localboysequallyeager togetoutof their apartmentsandplaysoccer.Theirparentsarelesslikelythanmiddle-classparentstoforcethemtowasteprecious timedoinghomework.And theyhave lessmoney forother leisurepursuits.Aconstantinsoccerplayers’ghostedautobiographiesisthemonomaniacalchildhoodspentplayingnonstopsoccerand,inaclassicstory,sleepingwithaball.Here,forinstance,isNourdin Boukhari, a Dutch-Moroccan soccer player who grew up in an immigrantneighborhoodofRotterdam,recallinghischildhoodforaDutchmagazine:

Igrewupinafamilyofeightchildren….Therewasnochanceofpocketmoney….Ilivedmoreonthestreetthanathome….AndlookatRobinvanPersie,MounirElHamdaouiandSaidBoutahar.AndI’mforgettingYoussefEl-Akchaoui.[LiketheotherplayersBoukharimentions,El-Akchaouibecameaprofessionalsoccerplayer.]ThoseboysandIplayedonthestreetinRotterdamtogether.Weneverforgetwherewecamefromandthatweusedtohavenothingexceptforonething:theball….

Whatwehave incommonis thatwewereonthestreeteveryminuteplayingsoccer,dayandnight.Wewere alwaysbusy, games, juggling, shooting at the crossbar.Theballwas everything forme, for us.We’dmeetonsquares.

Bythetimetheseboyswerefifteen,theyweremuchbetterplayersthansuburbankids.The importance of practice also explains why blacks raised in American ghettos areoverrepresentedinbasketballandfootball.

ButitwouldbemisleadingtosaytheseEuropeansoccerplayersgrewup“poor.”Byglobal standards, they were rich. Even in Cristiano Ronaldo’s Madeira, Rooney’sCroxteth, or Zidane’s La Castellane, children generally got enough to eat and decentmedicalcare.ItistruethatCristianoRonaldogrewupinahousesosmallthattheykeptthewashingmachineontheroof,butinblackSouthAfrica,thatwashingmachinewouldhavemarked the family as rich.Besides the10,000-hour rule, there is another rule thatexplains sporting success: the $15,000 rule. That’s the minimum average income perpersonthatacountryneedstowinanything.Thereisonlyonewayaroundthis:beBrazil.

18TOMTHUMB

TheBestLittleSoccerCountryonEarthIn1970,whenBrazilwonitsthirdWorldCup,itgottokeeptheJulesRimettrophy.ThelittlestatuetteofNike,thenstillknownchieflyastheGreekgoddessofvictory,endedupinaglasscaseintheBrazilianfederation’sofficesinRiodeJaneiro.Onenightin1983thetrophywasstolen.Ithasneverbeenseensince.

However, thepoint is thateveryoneagrees thatBrazildeserves theJulesRimet.Thefivefoldworldchampionisundoubtedlythebestcountryinsoccerhistory.Ourquestionhere is a different one:Which country is best after taking into account its population,experience,andincomepercapita?IfBrazil is theabsoluteworldchampion,whois therelative one, the biggest overperformer? That overachieving country deserves its ownversionof theJulesRimet trophy—call it theTomThumb.Andwhichcountriesare theworstunderachieversrelativetotheirresources?Alongthewaywewillhavetoconsiderseveralimpressivecandidatesandmakesomejudgmentcallsbeforecomingupwithourwinnerandloser.

Firstofall,ifwearedealingwithstatistics,wehavetoconstructourargumentsonthebasis of large numbers of games played. There have only been nineteen World Cupsthrough2010,andmostoftheseinvolvedhardlyanycountriesfromoutsideEuropeandLatin America. So crunching the numbers from World Cups might at best tell ussomethingabout thepeckingorderamong the long-established largesoccernations.Butwhen the difference between, say, Argentina’s two victories and England’s one comesdowntoaslittleasMaradona’s“handofGod”goal,orthedifferencebetweenItaly’sfourandFrance’sone toa commentbyMarcoMaterazzi aboutZidane’sparentage, then thestatisticianneedstolookelsewhere.Happily,sincenationalteamsplayalotofgames,wehave plenty of data. As in Chapter 16, we will rely on Russell Gerrard’s remarkabledatabaseofgames,whichwehaveupdatedto2012.

Thenumberofinternationalmatcheshassoaredovertime.BetweenthefoundationofFIFAin1904andtheFirstWorldWarthenumberrosequicklyto50peryear.After1918growth resumed. By the eve of the Second World War, there were more than 100internationalmatchesayear.Butthiswasstillaworlddominatedbycolonialpowers,andonly with the independence movement after the war did international competitionmushroom. In 1947 therewere 107 internationalmatches; by 1957 therewere 203; by1967,308.Fewnewcountrieswerefoundedinthenexttwodecades,butthenumberofinternationalmatchescontinuedtorisethankstothejetplane,whichmadetravellessofapainandmore financiallyworthwhile. In1977 therewere368 internationalmatches; in1987therewere393.Atthatpointtheworldseemedtohavereachedsomesortofstableequilibrium.

But then the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen separate states, and Yugoslavia

collapsed. The new countries flocked into FIFA. At the same time the commercialdevelopment of soccermeant that cash-hungry national associationswere eager to playlucrative friendlies. In 1997 there were 850 international games, more than double thefigure of a decade before. Since then growth has slowed but not stopped altogether,reachingafigureof923in2007.

Ifweconcentrateonjustthetwenty-yearcyclefromtheendofthe1990WorldCuptothe end of the 2010World Cup—the post–cold war era—a list of the most successfulteams features the usual suspects. Let’s rank the top ten countries by the percentage ofgameswon,or,giventhataroundone-thirdofmatchesareties,bythe“winpercentage”statisticcalculatedbyvaluingatieasworthhalfawin.

Thetopfewteamsaremuchasyouwouldexpect.Spain—aswe’lldiscussinthenextchapter—has been the world’s leading soccer nation for a surprisingly long time. Andeveninatwenty-yearperiodwhenBraziltriedtoreinventitsnationalstyleofsoccer,itswin percentagewas almost 75 percent.That equates to bookmakers’ odds of 3 to 1, oraboutascloseasyoucangettoasurethinginatwo-horserace.

FIGURE18.1.Thetoptennationalteamsbywinpercentage,1990–2010

IfwelookatBrazil’sperformanceovertime,someinterestinginsightsemerge.Herearetheteam’sresultsbydecade:

FIGURE18.2.Brazil:Thedisasterof1950asthestartofsomethingbeautiful

Viewedinthelightofhistory,it’slittlewonderthatBrazillostathometoUruguayintheWorldCupfinalof1950.TheBrazilianssimplyweren’tthatgoodthen.Theirhubrisatthat tournament had no historical basis. It’s only in the 1950s that Brazil turned intosoccer’ssuperpower.Indeed,inthefiftyyearssincethentheteam’sperformancehasbeenstrikingly consistent: Brazil’s winning percentage (counting ties as worth half a win)hoveredbetween73percentand78percentineachofthepastsixdecades.Ifyouhadtopickaparticulargoldenage,itwouldprobablybe1964to1985,butourmainfindingisgreat stability of performance, even in the supposedly fallow twenty years after 1970.WorldCups,aswehaveseen,usuallyturnonacoupleofcrucialmatches,whichinturnareusuallydecidedbyonegoaleach.Thepunditstheninvestigatethesecrucialmatchesformeaning,when in fact thebestexplanationof theoutcomeofsucha tinysampleofgamesmightbechance.Thebroader storyofBrazil in thepast fiftyyears is consistentexcellence.Still,ifBrazilisgoingtoremainatthetop,itwillprobablyneedtoplugintothewesternEuropeanknowledgenetworks. In recentWorldCupsBrazilhas sometimeslookedponderousagainstthebestEuropeanteams.ItoughttoconsidertherevolutionarystepofhiringawesternEuropeanmanager.IfBrazilcancombinetheworld’sbestplayerswiththeworld’smostadvancedtactics,theresultcouldbescary.

There’s justoneother findingofnote.Brazilperformsbetter inWorldCupyears. Itwins about 5 percent more often in years with a World Cup, and the difference isstatisticallysignificant.Thatsoundscounterintuitive:afterall,theteamwouldtendtofacetougher competition in those years.However, the sordid truth is thatmost of the time,Brazilian internationals coast a little. They don’t raise their game for qualifiers against

BoliviaorNike-inspiredfriendliesagainstAsiancountries.Intheseoffyears,wearystarssometimes cry off claiming injury, and agents sometimes finagle places in the team forplayerswhoneedaforeigntransfer.ButinaWorldCupyear,wheneveryoneisplayingforhisplace,Brazilisatitsbest.

Youmight thinkthat1990to2010wasa timeofdeclineforArgentina.Afterall, intheseyearsitneverevenreachedtheWorldCupsemifinals,whereasin1986and1990ithadwonaWorldCupfinalandthenlostanotheronlyonadubiouspenalty.Yetinfactthe1980s—the decade of Diego Maradona’s greatness—was match for match the worstdecade in Argentina’s soccer history. The country’s winning percentage slumped to amiserable53percent.

FIGURE18.3Argentina’sresults:WhereistheMaradonaeffect?

Butforhis“handofGod”in1986,Maradonamighthavegonedowninhistoryasabrilliant underperformer, much like his contemporary Zico. Argentina’s unevenperformancesduringMaradona’sera,aswellashisrathersporadicclubcareer,underlineadifference between him and his little successor: Maradona never provided weeklybrilliancethewayLionelMessihas.Ontheotherhand,geniusmayinpartbetheabilitytoperformwhenitmattersmost.

Inanycase,Argentina’srelativefailure inhiseraprobablywasn’tMaradona’sfault.The team’s results seem to track the country’s economic fortunes: in the 1980s, bothdeclined.

UntilwellaftertheSecondWorldWar,Argentinawasoneoftherichestcountriesonearth.Indeed,inthe1940sitexportedbeeftoastarvingEurope.Nowonderthatdecadewasalsoitsbestinsoccer.ButlaterArgentinabecame,inthewordsofMaradona’sformerteammate Jorge “El Filósofo” Valdano, “the world’s first undeveloping country.” The1980swere the “lost decade”: average income shrank from$7,500per head in 1980 to$5,700in1990.

The past twenty years have been a roller coaster for the Argentine economy, butultimately a great success in that incomeperheadhas risen tonearly$16,000 in2010.That represents almost a trebling of real income since 1990. Admittedly there was aterrible recession around 2001, when the banking system collapsed, and Argentinadevalued its peso and defaulted on its debts. Yet for much of the time since then, theeconomyhasgrownatcloseto10percentayear.SomeeconomistsarepredictinganewArmageddon,butithasn’tcomeyet.

It’s notable that as the economy has bounced back, so has the soccer team (thoughadmittedlynotintheknockoutstagesofWorldCups).Argentina’swinningpercentagehasshot back up to 70 percent in the twenty years since 1990, a level it had previouslyreachedonlyinthegoodold1950s.Returningtothatstandardwasquiteanachievement.Since the1950ssoccerhasbecomeaglobalsport,andmanynewcountrieshave joinedthe race for supremacy. The international game today is more competitive than ever.Argentina’scomebackdeservesacompliment.

TheCzechRepublicandPortugalalsowarrantparticularpraiseformakingourtopten

ofmostsuccessfulsoccerteams.Eachcountryhasonly10millioninhabitants,comparedtothe47million–82millionofthelargeEuropeannationsandBrazil’s178million.Somereaders may also be surprised to find England in the top ten, given England’s falsereputationas“notoriousunderachievers.”

Pace Brazil and Argentina, one thing our top ten tells us is that Europeans havedominatedinternationalsoccer.Thecontinentprovideseightofthetenbestcountries.Wehave seen that this is partly thanks toEurope’s unmatched knowledge networks. Thosenetworks rest on tradition: European nations are generally older, and have playedinternational soccer longer, than the rest of the world. It may also help that until veryrecently,controlofglobalsoccerlargelyremainedinEurope.FIFAmakestherulesofthegamefromaposhsuburbofZurich,andalthoughwesternEuropehasonly6percentoftheworld’s population, it has hosted ten out of nineteenWorldCups. (Amark of howpoweringlobalsoccerisshiftingisthattheregionmightnowhavetowaitdecadesbeforehostinganother.)

But tradition does not in itself secure dominance. If it did, then British companieswouldstilldominateindustriesliketextiles,shipbuilding,andcarmaking.Dominanceistransitoryunlessproducershavetheresourcestostayaheadofthecompetition.Thekeyresource in soccer is talent. Generally speaking, themore populous countries aremorelikelytohavethelargestsupplyoftalentedpeople.Wehavealsoseenthatrichcountriesare best at finding, training, and developing talent. In short, it takes experience,population,andwealthtomakeasuccessfulsoccernation.

Theeasybitisrecognizingthis.Thehardworkisassemblingthedatatoanswerourquestion:Which countries do best relative to their resources of experience, population,andwealth?

Thankfully,Russell’sdatacanhelpuswith the issueofexperience.Hehasrecordedeverysingle internationalgame inhistory.Withhis list,wecanmeasure thecumulativenumberofgamesacountryhadplayeduptoanygivendate.Wehaveseenthatthemostexperiencedsoccercountrieshadplayedmore thansevenhundred internationalmatchesthrough2000.Pedantsmightdisputesomeoftheexactnumbers—identifyinginternationalgames isoftena judgmentcall ifwegobackmore than fiftyyears,whenarrangementscould be quite informal—but even if our figures were off by 5 percent, it wouldn’tsignificantlyaffectthestatisticalanalysis.

We also have data on each country’s income. The measure typically used is grossdomesticproduct.GDPisthetotalvalueofallgoodsandservicesboughtandsoldwithinan economy. (It includes imports and exports but excludes income from assets ownedoverseasandprofitsrepatriatedtoforeigncountries.)ThebestsourcesforGDPfiguresarethe Penn World Tables, produced by the Center for International Comparisons at theUniversityofPennsylvania.ThecenterhasestimatesofGDPfor167countriesbetween1950and2011.Tomeasure the economic resources available to eachperson, it dividesGDPbypopulation.Admittedly, thereareall sortsof finicky issues involved inmakingcomparisonsacrosscountriesandacrosstime,nottomentionworriesaboutmeasurementerrorandstatisticalreliability.Nonetheless,thesedataarethebestwe’vegot.

NowwerunthemultipleregressionswedescribedinChapter16.Ouraimis to findtheconnectionbetweengoaldifferencepergameandour threekey inputs—population,wealth,andexperience—whilealsoallowingforhomeadvantage.

After all these pyrotechnics, we can make another ranking. But this time we cancompensate all the world’s national teams for that trio of factors beyond their control:experience,population,andincomeperhead.

FIGURE18.4.Thetoptenoverachievingnationalteamsintheworld,allowingforpopulation,wealth,andexperience,allgames,1990–2010

Thefinalcolumnofthetableistheonetonotice.Itshowswhatyoumightcalleachcountry’s “outperformance,” the gap between the goal difference it “should” haveachieved against opponents given its national resources and experience and what itactually did achieve (listed in the penultimate column). Brazil, themost overachievingcountryinsocceraccordingtothistable,scoresnearly1.5goalspergamemorethanyouwouldexpectjudgingbyitsresources.Allourtoptenscoredonaverageaboutagoalpergamemorethantheirresourceswouldpredict.Ofouroriginal“absolute”topten,Brazil,Spain,Germany,Argentina,theCzechs,theDutch,andthePortugueseallsurviveinthis“relative” top ten. It turns out that these countries aren’tmerely very good in absoluteterms.Theyarealsooverachievingrelativetotheirresources.AsforMexico,wesuspectitspresenceinthetoptenisonlybecauseitspendssomuchofitstimeplayingCaribbeanislands,tinycentralAmericancountries,andCanada.ViewedfromMexicoCity,eventheUSisasoccersuperpower.TheMexicanswouldwinalotfewergames(andwouldsinkinourrankings)iftheyweremovedintotheSouthAmericanconfederation.

Thereareonlytwobigsurprisesinourtoptenofrelativeoverachievers:IranandIraq.(IfGeorgeW.Bushisreadingthis:atleastbethankfulthatNorthKoreaisn’tthere.)Forastart: kudos to the Iranians. The international sanctions don’t seem to have had muchimpactontheirsoccer.TheyqualifiedfortheWorldCupof2014,andiftheynowstarttoopentotheworld,theycouldgetevenbetter.

But the stunner, for us, is Iraq. The years from 1990 to 2010—two Gulf Wars,massacres, sanctions, Saddam, near–civil war—were not happy ones for Iraqis.Nonetheless,overtwentyyearsitscorednearlyagoalagamemorethanyouwouldexpectgivenitsresources.

Itdid soevenwhileunder the thumbofSaddam’s family,which loved sports.EachApril Baghdad celebrated Saddam’s birthday by hosting the “Saddam Olympics.” Youmaynothavecaught theseonESPN,butas lateas2002,withBaghdad’sRussian-IraqiFriendshipSocietyassponsor,Iraqattractedathletesfromseventy-twocountries.Andnotmany people know that Baghdad was also bidding to host the real Olympics in 2012beforeeventsintervened.

SaddamleftcontrolofthesoccerteamtohisbestialsonUday.Aplayboyandpervert,whowalkedwith a limp after an assassination attempt,Udaymotivated his players bythreatening to amputate their legs if they lost. One former international reported beingbeatenonthesolesofhisfeet,draggedonhisbarebackthroughgravel,andthendippedin

rawsewagesothathiswoundswouldbeinfected.SomeplayersspenttimeinAbuGhraibprison.AfterKuwaitcametoBaghdadin1981andwon,oneoftherulingfamily’shelpersbeatupthereferee,whowas then“drivenhurriedly to theairportandputbleedingonaplaneoutofthecountry,”writesDeclanHillinhisbookonglobalmatchfixing,TheFix.

StorieslikethesefromIraqidefectorspromptedFIFAtosendacommitteetoIraqtoinvestigate.TheIraqisproducedplayersandcoacheswhosworeblindthatitwasalllies.FIFAbelievedthem,andsotheLionsofMesopotamiawereallowedtokeeponcollectingprizes.

OnlywhenAmericantroopsenteredBaghdadin2003didtheyfindtheprisonUdaymaintained in the basement of Iraq’s Olympic headquarters. It featured “a rack and amedieval torture device used to rip open aman’s anus,”writes JamesMontague in hisWhenFridayComes:FootballintheWarZone.

Butdespiteeverything,underSaddam theLionsofMesopotamiawere the strongestteamintheworld’slargestcontinent.ThoughtheyhadtoplayonneutralgroundformuchofSaddam’sreignduetothewarwithIran,theyqualifiedfortheWorldCupof1986andfor threeOlympics.AsIraqisupportersusedtochant(oftenwhilefiringbullets into theair), “Here we are Sunni—yah! Here we are Shiite—yah! Bring us happiness, sons ofIraq!”EvenKurdssupportedtheLions.Montaguecallstheteam“arguablythelastsymbolof national unity left in Iraq.”Only from the 1990s, as Saddam’s regime became evenmoreisolatedandbrutal,didIraqisoccerdecline.Itswinpercentagefrom1980to2001wasstillamagnificent67percent;intheturmoilfrom2002through2012,itdippedtoamerelyimpressive55percent.

Allthismaybeacaseofpeopleimmersingthemselvesinsoccerbecauseitwastheironlyformofpublicexpression.HuthyfaZahra,anIraqiartistwhonowproducessoccer-themed“popart”fromthesafetyofnearbyAbuDhabi,says,“Evenduringthewars,inthenineties, there were bombs above us, and we were playing in the streets. Because wedidn’thaveanythingtodo.”

WhyweretheLionssogoodunderSaddam?Zahraissurprisedtohearthattheywere.“Wearemuchbetternow,”hereplies,“becausetheplayersplaywithoutfearnow.Ifyoudon’t feelcomfortable,youcan’tplay.”Hepointsout that since the fallofSaddamandUday,Iraq’sLionshavefinishedfourthintheAthensOlympicsandwontheAsianCupof2007. Iraqismay now finally be getting the chance to devotemost of their energies tosoccer.TheAmericanwriterNirRosenreportedin2010:

OnmytripstoIraqinyearspast,ImadeahabitofscanningthewallsofBaghdadneighbourhoodsforbitsofsectariangraffiti,spray-paintedslogansthatwerepro-MahdiArmy,pro-Saddam,anti-Shiiteorpro-insurgency.This time, however, there were almost none to be found; the exhortations to sectarian struggle had beenreplacedwiththeenthusiasmsofyouthfulfootballfans:nowthewallssay“LongLiveBarcelona.”

Still, thepresenceofboth Iran and Iraq in the top fiveofour “overachievers” tabledoes illustrate the problem of comparing national teams from different continents. It ishardtoimaginethateithercountrywouldhavedoneallthatwellagainsttheotherteamsin the top ten. In fact, theyhavehardlyeverplayedagainst theglobalbigboys (neitherSaddam’snorMahmoudAhmadinejad’sboysgotmanyinvitationstoexhibitiongamesat

Wembley).Mostly,IranandIraqbeatMiddleEasternandAsiancountries.FIGURE18.5.ToptenEuropeanteamsbywinpercentage,gamesbetweenEuropeancountries,1990–2010

Furthermore,GDPstatisticsforpoorercountriesoutsideEurope(especiallycountriesin the midst of war or sanctions) are notoriously unreliable. In general, there is more“noise”inallthedataforcountriesoutsideEurope,meaningthatwestruggletopickupthe influence of the factorswe are interested in. It’s like listening to a radiowith poorreception:themeaningofthewordsishardtomakeout.

It therefore makes more sense to focus on Europe alone. Europe is a morehomogeneous place than the world as a whole, meaning that differences, especially inincomeandexperience, tend tobe smaller.Second, thedata arebetter:Europeanshavebeen collecting them for longer, and they have a relatively long history of transparentrecordkeeping(thoughtherearesomeverysuspiciousEuropeanstatistics).Last,mostoftheworld’sdominantteamsaregroupedtogetherinEurope,playingagainstprettymuchthe same set of opponents. It all adds up to a fairly accurate picture of howwell eachEuropeanteamperforms.

Let’sfirstrankthebestEuropeanteamsontheirabsoluteperformance,withouttakinginto account their population, experience, or GDP. Taking only those games playedbetweenEuropeanteams(thatis,eliminatinggameswhereatleastoneteamcomesfromoutsideEurope),Figure18.5presentsthe“absolute”toptenrankedbywinpercentage.

BunchedatthetoparethefourEuropeansuperpowersofmoderntimes:Spain,France,Italy,andGermany.Veryimpressively,theCroatsareonlythetiniestnotchbehindthem.Forthemostpart,aknowledgeablefanwouldhavebeenabletopredicttheEuropeantopten(withthepossibleexceptionofRomania).

However,thingsbecomemoreinterestingafterwecorrectforpopulation,experience,and GDP. Now a new picture emerges.We find that in Europe, home-field advantageboostsateambyalittleunderhalfagoalpergame,comparedwithtwo-thirdsofagoalinglobal soccer. Experience also counts for less in Europe than in the world in general,though it remains the most important of our key variables in winning soccer matches.Havingtwicetheexperienceofyouropponentgivesyouanadvantageofabout30percentofagoalpergame.Bycontrast,populationandGDPcountformoreinEuropeansoccerthan theydo inglobal soccer.Having twice thepopulationas theother team isworthaquarterofagoalpergameinEurope.Havingtwice theopponent’s incomepercapita isworth about one goal every six games. So the factors in order of importance are (1)playingathome,(2)experience,(3)population,and(4)GDP.

Figure18.6, theEuropean efficiency table (the first of its kind, as far asweknow),maybethemosttellingwehave,sowerankeveryteamforwhichwehavedata.

Again,themostimportantnumberisinthelastcolumn:eachcountry’s“relativegoaldifference.” It turnsout thatall the leadingEuropeannations—Spain,France,Germany,Italy,andEngland—overachieverelativetotheiralreadyconsiderableresources.Thesearelarge,well-connectedcountries,allofthemricherthantheEuropeanaverage.Theyshoulddowell,buttheyaredoingevenbetterthanexpected.AgainstEuropeanopponents,each

scoresatleasthalfagoalpergamemorethanitsresourceswouldpredict.

IneasternEurope,Croatia,Romania,andSerbia/Montenegroareoverachievers.It’snocoincidence that theseareamong thebest-connectedeasternEuropeancountries.Praguebefore communism was an unmistakably central European city, with many ties toGermany and Italy. Very soon after the fall of communism the Czechs had reforgednetworkswiththeirwesternneighbors.CroatiaandSerbiaspentthecommunisterainthemostopencommunist country,Yugoslavia,whichamongother things sentmanysoccerplayerstowesternclubs.AndRumaniawasanoutlierintheSovietbloc,alwaysresistantto theUSSR’scontrol.After the fallof theCeaucescucommunist regime, thecountry’sLatin-derivedlanguagehelpeditnetworkwithItaly,Spain,andFrance.

FIGURE18.6.Overachievers:RankingofEuropeannationalteams,correctingforpopulation,wealth,andexperience,allgamesbetweentwoEuropeanopponents,1990–2010

Now that we’ve reviewed all the evidence, who gets the Tom Thumb trophy—thepoor, small, inexperienced man’s Jules Rimet—for the relatively best team on earth?Whichcountrydoesbestallowingforexperience,population,andincome?Well,onedaywe’dliketoseethisplayedoutongrass.Let’shaveaWorldCupinwhichteamsstartwithahandicap,settledbyapanelofeconometricianschairedbyProfessorGerrard.Butuntilthatgreatdaycomes,allwehaveisourmodel.ClearlytheCroats,Czechs,Iranians,andPortuguese have donewonders with theirmodest resources. However, the country thatstandsoutmostgivenwhatithastoworkwithisIraq,eventakingintoaccountitseasyAsianschedule.Ifthecountryeverachievesnormality,thenwatchout,world.

Onlyonegreatquestionremains:whichistherelativelyworstteamonearth?Figure18.7 shows the worst underperformers relative to their population, income, and soccerexperience.

FIGURE18.7.Worstunderperformers,1990–2010,entireworld(of116teamswithmorethan100gamesplayed)

Luxembourgistheshocker.Thecountryofjustoverhalfamillionpeopleoughttobebadatsoccer,butinfactit’smuch,muchworsethanitshouldbe.Thatseemssurprising.It’ssandwichedamidsomeofthebestsoccernationsonearth.Ifyoujudgebythemap,Luxembourg is smack in themiddle of thewestern European knowledge network. Butnetworks are never simply geographical. Nobody in soccer wanted to network withLuxembourgbecausethecountrywastoosmalltosupportadecentleagueortoproducemany good players. Top-class foreign coaches and players were never spotted at theJeunesseEschstadiumpassingon theirknow-how.Admittedly, thenation’sdryspelloffifteen yearswithout awin endedwith PaulKoch’s legendary last-minute penalty saveagainstMalta in1995,butevenafter that theLuxembourgeoishardlyhit theheights. In2001 Joel Wolff, secretary-general of the country’s FA, confessed to us in a worldexclusive interview, “Let’s say that we have arrived at a relative nadir.” Whenevermanagers recited the verity, “There are nomoreminnows in international soccer,” theywereforgettingLuxembourg.

Happily,thecountryhasimprovedatouchinrecentyears.Therewasthelegendary2–1triumphovermightyAlbaniaathomein2011,andthe3–2slayingofNorthernIrelandin 2013. Still, looking at our period of study, we give Luxembourg the Soccernomicsawardfortherelativelyworstsoccerteamonearth.

19MADEINAMSTERDAM

TheRiseofSpainandtheTriumphofEuropeanKnowledgeNetworks

On the chilly Johannesburg evening of July 11, 2010, we proponents of Soccernomicsgenuinely thoughtwemightbewithin fiveminutesofdeciding theWorldCup final. Inextra time at Soccer City, Holland and Spain were still tied 0–0. Simon, sitting in themedia stand, was barely watching the game anymore. Instead he was rereading on hislaptopthePDFfilethatwehadsenttheDutchcampthatmorning.Thefile’sauthorwasIgnacio Palacios-Huerta, the economics professor featured earlier in this book, who in2008 had given Chelsea an analysis of Manchester United’s penalty-takers for theChampionsLeaguefinal.

This timeIgnacio,workingdayandnight,hadprovidedHollandwithananalysisoftheSpanishpenalty-takers.(True,IgnaciohasaSpanishpassport,butasaBasquehewasperfectlyhappytoseeSpainlose.)Withapenaltyshoot-outloominginJohannesburg,thePDFsuddenlymadecompellingreading.Forinstance,IgnaciohadpredictedthatXaviandAndresIniesta,asright-footedplayerswhodidn’tusuallytakepenalties,wouldprobablyhit their kicks to the right of the Dutch keeper Maarten Stekelenburg. And FernandoTorres almost always kicked low.Against him,Stekelenburgwould need to dive to thegroundfast.“It’sareportwecanuseperfectly,”theDutchgoalkeepingcoachRuudHesphade-mailedus thatmorning.Nowit lookedas ifwemightbeabout tohelp theDutchwin theWorldCup.Alternatively, if our advicewaswrong,wemight be about to helpthemloseit.

Just then, down on the field, Cesc Fabregas found Iniesta unmarked as if in somechildhoodtrainingsessiononthesunnyfieldsofBarcelona’sacademy,theMasía.Iniestafiredhome.SimonclosedthePDFandbeganwritinghismatchreport.

Forallourbestefforts,Spain’swinwasaboutasinevitableasvictoriesinWorldCupsget.Thecountryoncederidedaseternallosershadnotmerelybecomeworldchampion;itwasalsothebestteamintheworld.(Manyworldchampionsarenot.)Infact,Spainhadprobably been best in the world for nearly a decade before 2010. Then, in 2012, itcompletedanunprecedentedtripleofEuropeantitle,worldtitle,Europeantitle.ThisSpainwasarguablythebestnationalteamever.Crucially,thecountryoweditstriumphsinlargepart to its location in interconnected western Europe. The rise of Spain is the perfectexampleofournetworktheory:whythecountriesofwesternEuropestillrulesoccer.

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Spain hadn’t always been so connected.General FranciscoFranco, Spain’s fascist rulerfrom1936untilhisdeathin1975,hadisolatedthecountryfromtherestofEurope.JimmyBurns, theAnglo-Spanishwriter born inMadrid in 1953, recalls in hisWhen Beckham

WenttoSpain:Spainwasvirtuallyaclosedeconomy.IspentpartofmychildhoodbetweenEnglandandSpain,smugglingthings from London to Madrid, never the other way round—clothes, gramophone records, books andmagazines.WhileEnglandseemedtobeverymuchpartoftheworld,Spaineventomyyoungeyesstruckmeassomethingofaworldofitsown,wherekidsofmyageallseemedtobetaughtbyeitherpriestsornuns.

ThecosmopolitanRealMadridofBurns’schildhood,studdedwithimportedstarssuchasAlfredo di Stefano (fromArgentina), Ferenc Puskás (Hungary), andRaymondKopa(France),wasverymuchtheexceptioninFranco’sSpain.Fewforeignerswantedtojoinlesser clubs in this poor country, and thosewho tried to comewere often blocked. Formostof the1960sSpainofficiallylet inonlyforeignplayersofSpanishdescent.Infactmany Latin American players invented Spanish ancestors to get in—one Argentineclaimedhisfatherhadcomefrom“Celta,”whichisn’ta townatallbut thenameof theclub in Vigo—but even these imports didn’t transform Spanish soccer. There weren’tmanyofthem,andtheymostlyweren’tverygood.NordidSpanishplayersoftheFrancoeragoabroadtolearnnewtricks.

Spain’s isolation in those yearswas usually reflected in the national team’s results.Though the country won the European Championship at home in 1964, in the periodbeforewesternEuropemadeitsgreatleapinsoccerknow-how,forthenextfortyyearstheSpaniardsdidalmostnothingininternationaltournaments.

What saved Spain’s soccer was the country’s opening to Europe and the world.SpanishisolationbegantobreakdowninthelastyearsofFranco’slife.In1973,justafterSpain reopened its borders to foreign soccer players, FC Barcelona imported the greatDutchman JohanCruijff. It is possible todrawadirect linebetweenCruijff’s arrival inBarcelonaandSpain’svictoryinJohannesburgthirty-sevenyearslater.

Signing Cruijff had not been easy. Franco’s regime often obstructed Spanishcompaniesfrommakingforeignpayments,andBarcelonaendeduphavingtoregistertheplayerasapieceofagriculturalmachinery.Inanothermarkoftheisolationistclimateofthetime,anelderlyBarçadirectorlamentedtotheclub’ssecretaryArmandCarabén,“ADutchmanintheNouCamp!What’stheworldcomingto?Thisispuremadness.Amanfromthelandofbuttercomestothelandofoliveoil.Doesnobodyunderstandthatevenifheplaysnicely,hisstomachwillbeamesswithinfourdays?”

ButCruijffwasmorethanjuststomachandlegs.Possiblymorethananyothergreatplayer,hewasbrain, too.Hewasaphilosopherofsoccer,and themost important thingaboutsoccer,forCruijff,wasthepass.Hecould(andoftendid)spendhourstalkingaboutthepass.Youneverpassedintoateammate’sfeet,helectured,butalwaysameterinfrontofhim,tokeepthepaceinthegame.Whilethefirstmanwaspassingtothesecondman,thethirdmanalreadyhadtobeinmotionreadytoreceivethesecondman’spass.Cruijfftalkedpeoplesillyaboutthepass.

In the early 1970s he and Barcelona’s Dutch manager, Rinus Michels, introducedSpaniards toa formofDutch“total football.”The twomenhadarrivedat just therighttime.Besidesopeningtotheworld,Spainwasthenbeginningitslongeconomicrise.

Cruijff playedhis last game forBarcelona in1978,butSpainwouldhear fromhim

again.Much later, he would bring his ideas on soccer back to Catalonia. They wouldprovide the underpinnings first of the great Barça sides, and eventually of the Spanishworldchampionsof2010.

CruijffhadplannedtoretireasaplayerafterleavingBarcelona.However,helosthismoneyinaseriesofill-advisedventures,mostnotablyapigfarm,andhadtostartplayingagain.AfteraspellintheNorthAmericanSoccerLeaguewiththeWashingtonDiplomatsand the Los Angeles Aztecs, he finished playing at Ajax in 1984. He stayed inAmsterdam,andayearlaterbecamemanageroftheclubthathehadfirstenteredintheearly 1950s as a toddler from down the road.Asmanager hewent to the fieldswhereAjax’s boys’ teams played, fields that had practically been his backyard, and said thateverything had to change. Years before Cruijff transformed Barcelona’s academy, hetransformedAjax’s.

Everythinghedidtherewasthesumofalifetime’sthinkingaboutsoccer.Cruijffoncesaidthatbeforehewasthirty,hehaddoneeverythingoninstinct;butafterthirty,hebegantounderstandwhyhedidit.NolongerwouldAjax’syouthteamsaimtowinmatches,theclub’snewmanagertoldasurprisedsetofvolunteers.Fromnowon,theonlypurposeofthe youth teamswould be to turn talented boys into adult stars. Thatmeant, above all,creatingtwo-footedplayerswhoweremastersofpositionalplayandthepass.TheboysinAjax’s academy would spend much of their time playing passing games, especiallyCruijff’sfavorite,sixagainstthree.Cruijff’slongtimeassistantTonnyBruinsSlotrecalledin the Dutch magazine Voetbal International in 2011, “Making triangles, getting anumericaladvantageinmidfield,speedofactioninasmallspace,puttingpressureonanopponent:everythingwasinthere.”

ForAjax’sboys’teams,evenmatchesbecamepracticalclasses.Sometimeskidswereputinolderagegroups,wheretheycouldnolongergetbyonnaturalbrillianceorspeedandhadtodevelopguile,too.Oftenthecoachesdeliberatelyplayedboysoutofposition.“Thatbeganwith [Dennis]Bergkamp,” saidBruinsSlot. “Hewas awonderful attackeranywayandtheright-backintheunder-18sjustwasn’tgoodenough.SoweputDennisinthat position for a while. He managed it with his fingers in his nose [a Dutch phrasemeaning“withoutanytrouble”].Also,Denniscouldnowputhimselfinsidethemindofadefender,whichwouldbeusefultohimasastriker.Thatwasasuccess,sowebegantodoitmoreoften.”

Cruijff was always looking for lessons from other disciplines. An opera singer, LoBello,wasbroughtintoteachAjax’splayershowtobreathe.Inwinter,whenpitcheswerefrozen, theboysattended lectures: agreat femalePing-Pongplayer taught themhow todeal with stress; a groundsman told them how to look after their gear; and a onetimepromisingyoungsterwhohadnevermadeitexplainedwherehehadgonewrong.

Cruijffranaredthreadthroughtheentireclub,fromtheyoungestboys’eleventothefirst team.EveryAjaxteamineveryagegroupplayedthesame4–3–3formationasthegreatHollandandAjaxteamsofthe1970s.(Cruijffsaidthatonlywith4–3–3couldeveryzone on the field be occupied.) When the opposition’s left-back had the ball, Ajax’splayersfromtheunder-eightstothefirst teamknewexactlywhichpositionstheyhadto

occupy to press him. When the outside-right from the under-eighteens made hisprofessionaldebut,hefeltentirelyathome.That’sonereasonCruijffhappilythrewkidsintobigEuropeangames:theseventeen-year-oldBergkampturnedaSwedishfullbackandpart-timepoliceman insideoutonenight,andreturned toschool inAmsterdamthenextday.

And partly, it was simply that Cruijff was a born teacher. One of us, Simon,experiencedithimself.WhenSimoninterviewedthegreatmaninhisBarcelonamansionin2000,Cruijffrosefromhissofaandtaughthimhowtokickwithhisleftfoot.“Look”—he demonstrated—”whether you kick with your right or left, the point is that you arestandingononeleg.Andifyoustandononeleg,youfallover.Soyouneedtoadjustyourbalance, and the onlyway to do that iswith your hand, your arm.”And he kicked animaginary ballwith his left foot, flinging out his right arm.Simon’s left foot improvedinstantly.

CruijffleftAjaxin1988afteryetanotherargument,andstayedawayuntil2011,whenhe returned to the club as a director and spiritual godfather. However, Ajax’s youthacademyhasalwaysstucktotheCruijffianmodel.Itworks.Overthepasttwentyyears,homegrownAjax players (including foreigners who joined the club as teenagers) haveincluded Bergkamp, Edwin van der Sar, Frank and Ronald de Boer, Edgar Davids,ClarenceSeedorf,PatrickKluivert,NwankwoKanu,ZlatanIbrahimovic,Maxwell,StevenPienaar, Cristian Chivu, Rafael van der Vaart, Wesley Sneijder, Nigel de Jong, JanVertonghen,andmostrecentlytheDaneChristianEriksen,whojoinedTottenhamin2013.

In1995alargelyhomegrownAjaxteamhadbeatenMilanintheChampionsLeaguefinal, with eighteen-year-old Kluivert scoring the winner. A few months later SimonvisitedAmsterdamtofindouthowtheworldcouldcopyAjax’smodel.Afterall,soccerprogresses largely through international copying.CoAdriaanse, then theheadofAjax’syouthacademy,satinthemetalcontainerthatwashisofficeandscoffed,“It’snotarecipeforpancakes!Otherclubsdon’thaveaclubstyle.Theydon’tstartwithkidsateightyearsold.Theydon’thavethequality.Andthere’snocontinuity.”

Indeed, not evenArsèneWenger atArsenal hasmanaged to replicateAjax’s recipe.Something is lacking. InWenger’s years in London since 1996,Arsenal’s youth teamshaveproducedvery few future stars:AshleyCole (alreadynearly sixteenwhenWengerinherited the club), Fabregas (sixteenwhenWenger nabbed him fromBarcelona),GaëlClichy (nearlyeighteenwhenhecame toLondon fromFrance), andmost recently JackWilshere.

Only one club has learned Ajax’s recipe: Barcelona. No wonder, because Cruijffcarriedtherecipeacrossinperson.It’stheperfectcasestudyofintra-Europeanknowledgetransfer.WhentheDutchmanmovedfromAmsterdamtotheNouCampasheadcoachin1988,hedidsomethingthatfewBarçacoacheshadeverdonebefore:hewenttothefieldswhere Barcelona’s youth teams played. There he saw a skinny kid in central midfieldhittingperfectpasses. “Take thatboyoff athalftime,”he told theboy’s coach. “Why?”askedthecoach.“BecauseI’mputtinghiminthefirstteam,”saidCruijff.Theskinnykid,whose name was Pep Guardiola, spent a decade in Barcelona’s first team. From 2008

through2012,GuardiolamanagedtheSpanish,European,andworldchampions.Heoncesaid,“JohanCruijfftaughtmethemost.Iworkedsixyearswithhimandlearnedaterrificamount.” Guardiola was only the latest in a line of Cruijffians in the Nou Camp.Guardiola’s predecessor, Frank Rijkaard, was an Amsterdammer and an Ajax man.Rijkaard got the Barcelona job on Cruijff’s recommendation despite having just beenrelegated from the Dutch Premier division with Sparta Rotterdam. Louis van Gaal,Barcelona’scoach from1997 through2000,wasalsoanAmsterdammerandAjaxman,though he absolutely did not get the job on Cruijff’s recommendation. Van Gaal hadplayedforAjaxintheearlyseventies,atthesametimeasCruijff,butonlyinthesecondteam. VanGaal appears to have harbored a jealousy of Cruijff ever since. Though thepersonalfeudbetweenthetwomenhasamusedDutchfansforyears,bothofthemthinkalmost exactly the same way about soccer. When Van Gaal came to Barcelona, hecementedtheclub’svenerationofthepass.HeadvancedthecareersofgreatpassingkidslikeXaviandIniesta.VanGaalandlaterRijkaarddidn’talwayswinonthefield,buttheycontinuedthetransferofDutchknow-howtoCataloniathatCruijffhadbegunin1973.

WhenGuardiolabecameBarcelona’sheadcoach,herestoredandupdatedCruijffism.How this works was explained to us in 2009 by Albert Capellas, then coordinator ofBarça’s youth academy.Wemet Capellas over beers in a Swiss hotel bar.A couple ofweekslater,hewasgivingusatouroftheMasía,orfarmhouse,theunlikelyheadquartersofBarça’sacademyuntilthelittlebrickbuildingwiththesundialonthefrontwasfinallyclosedin2011.

The day we visited theMasía, in October 2009, you could simply walk in off thestreet.Therewerenoguards.Insideyougotacoffeeandafriendlywelcomeatthebar.Itfelt like thehouseof a largeCatholic family.Adeliveryman stoppedbyandcarried anenormoushamintothekitchen.Therewasaroomwithfoosballandbilliardstables,butwhenwevisitedtheywerecovered,becausetheboysintheMasíahadtostudyforschool.Thedoorstothegardenwereopen,toletthesunfloodin.Inthegardenstoodasculptureofafemalebody,whichmusthaveprovokedtheoddstraythoughtamongtheMasía’sall-maleresidents.

FromtheupstairswindowsoftheMasía,youcouldlookoutontotheNouCamp.Youcouldalmosttouchithere.TheboysoftheMasíaactuallysleptinthestadium;thelittlefarmhousehadgottentoosmalltohousethem.

Butthatmorning,ninemonthsbeforetheWorldCupinSouthAfricakickedoff, theMasía still felt ascozyas thecanteenat theold,nowdestroyed littleAjax stadium,DeMeer.Bothplacesresembledneighborhoodcafés,wheremengatheredforfellowshipandcoffee.PartofAjaxandBarcelona’ssecretisthattheyarelocalclubs,runbylargelythesamebunchof localmenfordecades.These localsare interested in the talentedkidsoftoday,becauseintenyears’time,whenthekidsareinthefirstteam,thelocalsexpectstilltobearound.

When the staff sat down to explain how theMasíaworked, you felt as if youwerebeing transportedback toAmsterdam in1985.For a start, saidCapellas,Barça’s youthteamsallplayedthesame4–3–3asthefirstteam.Whentheopposition’sleft-backhadthe

ball,Barça’splayers,fromtheunder-eightstothefirstteam,knewexactlywhichpositionstheyhadtooccupytopresshim.Whentheoutside-rightfromtheunder-eighteensmadehisprofessionaldebut, he felt entirely at home.Thatwasone reasonBarcelonahappilythrew kids into big games: Iniesta, Xavi, and Messi were all playing regularly in theworld’sbiggeststadiumwhilestillintheirteens.

Therewerea lotof things theMasíadidn’tworryabout.Untilplayers reached theirmid-teens, said Capellas, “we don’t think about competition, or not so much.” Boys’matchesweretreatedaspracticalclasses.TheMasíadidn’tcareaboutsize,either.NobodymindedthatMessiandIniestawereshort.Capellassaid,“Ifhe’ssmallorifhe’stall,forusthatisnotimportant.Wedon’ttestforphysicalcapacities.Wearealwaysthinkingaboutthe technical and tactical capacities of eachplayer.”Theplayers barely ever did fitnesstrainingwithouttheball.Evenspeedwasoflimitedrelevance.Guardiola,aslowrunner,hadmovedtheballfastest.

Nor did the boys train much. Ninety minutes a day was enough, Capellas told us.Schoolwork took upmuchmore of their time, because likeAjax, Barcelona knew thatmostof itsplayerswouldnever turnpro.Thiswasnota ruthlesscorporation.“Wetreatourfiftyboyslikeourfamily,”saidPepBoade,Barça’sgrizzledoldchiefscout,andthisdidn’t appear to be cant. Many youth academies are ruled by militaristic brutes, butBarça’scoachessoundedliketraditionalCatholicmothers.WhenaboywascutfromtheMasía, sometimes his rival would cry from guilt at having been better. Capellas said,“MessiandIniestadon’tlivehereanymore,butthisistheirhome,theycomebytoeat,iftheyhaveaproblemtheycometotalktous,astheywouldtoamotherorfather.Forustheyarenotstars.It’sLeo,it’sBojan,it’sAndres.Andresishumble.Wesay,‘Youareagoodman,youareanincredibleperson,don’tloseyourvalues.’”

Inoneregard,though,theMasíawashyperprofessional.WhatmatteredtoBarça,astoAjax, was passing. Both academies fetishized the pass. Soccer, to Cruijff, was aboutmakingpassing“triangles”onthefield.Ifaplayercoulddothat,Cruijffpickedhim.Thatremains Barça’s principle. Capellas recited the mantra, “Always the players must findtriangles.”Training,then,isadeepstudyofpassing.

Topass,ortostoptheotherteamfrompassing,youalsoneedtoknowexactlywhereto be. The average player has the ball for only 53.4 seconds every game (according toChrisCarling,theEnglishperformanceanalystatLilleinFrance)soanyplayer’smainjobis to occupy the right positions for the other eighty-nineminutes and 6.6 seconds. Theboysin theMasíaspenda lotof timeplayingfouragainstfour,withtwotouchesof theball allowed,andwith three“joker”playerswho joinwhichever teamhas theball.Youwinthisgamebybeingintherightposition:soccerasasortofchess,ratherthansoccerasphysicalcombat. In thesunof theMasía, justasatAjax’syouthcomplexDeToekomst(“TheFuture”),wherethechillwindsweepsinoffthehighway,somegreatfutureplayersspentthemorningsoftheiryouthmakingCruijffiantriangles.

Our tour of theMasía ended in the dining room,where in latemorning you couldalreadysmellatastylunch.“Homecooking,”Capellasnoted.OntheplainwhitewashedwallswerepicturesofMasíateamspast.CapellasandBoadefoundthepicturefrom1988,

withanabsurdlyskinnyyoungGuardiola.TwootherboysinthephotolaterbecamehisassistantcoachesatBarça.Oneofthem,TitoVilanova,wouldsucceedhimasheadcoachin2012beforeresigningayearlaterbecauseofthroatcancer.

GuardiolawasanotherpartoftheMasía’ssecret.Theacademyproducedtheboys;hesentthemoninthestadiumnextdoor.Capellassaid,“WhenweplayRealMadrid’syouthteams,weareequal.Don’tthinkRealdoesn’thavegoodyouthplayers.”YetReal’sboysrarelymakethefirstteam,becauseMadridkeepsbuyingstars.Bycontrast,Guardiola,likeCruijff,wasamanoftheclubwhoknewexactlywhatwascookingintheMasía,eveninthesecond-stringyouthteams.

“Youhavetohavesomeoneuptherewhosays,‘Goin,’”saidCapellas.Thatwaseasywhen the kidwas as good asMessi or Iniesta. ButGuardiola had done the samewithPedro,notanobviousstar,andhehadstuckinthefirstteam.InthesunoutsidetheMasía,Capellasusedhisfoottodrawacircleontheground:GuardiolawentfromtheMasíatothe first team and then recruited from the Masía again. The circle was round, saidCapellas.

Barça has been lucky, the club’s then chief executive JoanOliver admitted to us in2009:“Yeah,goodfortuneexistsalways in theworld, ineverykindof industry. It’snotpossiblealways toguarantee thatwewillhaveaMessioranIniestaoraXavifromtheacademy.Perhapsyoucouldnotgetthebestplayeroftheworldfromyouracademy,butwegetsix,sevenfirst-teamplayers.”That isnot tomentionMasíaexportssuchasJoseReina(Napoli)andMikelArteta(Arsenal).

FROMTHEMASÍATOJOHANNESBURG

Inshort,onceSpain’sisolationhadbeenliftedinthelastyearsofFranco,BarcelonabeganbuildingastylebasedonknowledgetransferfromAmsterdam.EventuallySpainadoptedthismade-in-Amsterdamgame.AtEuro2008,theWorldCupinSouthAfricaandagainatEuro 2012, the Spaniards often looked as if they were still making their triangles atmorningpracticeattheMasía.Theypassedtheballupanddownlikelittlemenfillinginacrosswordpuzzleat topspeed.Whenever theywent1–0up, theysimplymadesure theopponentnevergottheballagain.TheWorldCupfinalwastheforty-fourthstraightgameinwhichSpainhadwonafter scoring first.Everyoneknewexactlyhow themen in redplayed,yetitwasimpossibletobeatthembecausetheyhadbecomeCruijffianmastersofthepass.

SpainbecameagreatsoccernationbecauseitjoinedEuropeanknowledgenetworks.Thismightsoundliketooneatatheory—thesortofthingyougetwhenyouletacademicslooseonsomethingasmysteriousandintuitiveassoccer.Luckily,though,thefactsseemtomatchourtheory.Let’slookatSpain’sresults,decadebydecade:

We’lltakethe1920sasanillustrationofwhatFigure19.1shows.Spainwontwenty-threeofitsthirty-twomatchesinthedecade,or72percent.Italsotiedfourgames.Ifwecountatieasworthhalfawin,thenSpain’stotalwinningpercentageforthedecadewas78 percent. The figure in the last column for each decade is the most telling one. ItprovidesthebestmeasureofSpain’ssuccessdecadebydecade.

FIGURE19.1.TheriseofSpain

The table demonstrates how closely Spain’s soccer success tracks the country’sintegrationwithEurope.Inthe1920s,beforethecivilwarofthe1930s,Spainperformedverywell.ButthenisolationdescendedunderFranco.Fromthe1930sthroughthe1980s,Spain’s winning percentage hovered around a disappointing 60 percent. The team waswinningabouthalfitsgames,anddrawinganotherquarter.ThatEuropeanChampionshipof1964wasananomaly.Thebroaderstorywasthatapoor,shut-offSpainwasstrugglingto access the world’s best soccer know-how. In these sorry decades Di Stefano, theArgentinian–turnedColombian–turnedSpanish international, summedupSpain’s soccerhistoryinaphrase:“Weplayedlikeneverbefore,andlostlikealways.”

Butin1986SpainjoinedtheEuropeanUnion—asortofformalentryintoEuropeannetworks.Soonafterward,theSpanishnationalteamimprovedsharply.Wehaveseenthata country’s success at soccer correlateswith itswealth.AndSpain from the1980swasgrowingricherfast.Inthe1960sand1970sitsincomepercapitahadbeenstuckatabout60percentoftheaverageofthecorefifteenmembernationsoftheEU.Inthe1980sand1990sSpainbegantocatchup.TheBarcelonaOlympicsof1992nicelycapturedtherise:theGamesshowcaseda“newSpain,”andayoungSpanishsoccerteamguidedbytwenty-one-year-oldPepGuardiolawongold.

YetduringthisperiodtheSpaniardscontinuedtobemockedininternationalsocceras“notoriousunderperformers.”LikeEngland,theyjustcouldn’tmatchthebignationsinbigtournaments.However,thecriticismwaswrong.Eveninthese“bad”decades,Spainwasalreadyoverachievinggivenitsmodestresourcesofpeopleandwealth.Itwassimplynotbigorrichorconnectedenoughtoexpecttomatchtheleadingnationsinsoccer.

Let’s take the relatively recent period 1980 to 2001. For Spain this was a fallowperiod: failure in a World Cup hosted at home, and no performance of note save anappearance in the finalofEuro1984,which is rememberedchiefly forgoalkeeperLuisArconada’sfumblingofMichelPlatini’sfreekick.

InabsolutetermsSpain’swinningpercentage(countingtiesashalfawin)ofabout66percentinthatperiodrankeditsomewherenearthebottomoftheglobaltopten,aroundthesamelevelasEngland.ButwewanttomeasureSpain’srelativeperformance:howitachievedrelativetoitsresources.

First let’s look at experience. By 2001 Spain had played 461 internationals in itshistory.Thatitselfisamarkerofisolation.We’veseenthataccordingtoRussellGerrard’sdata,Swedenby2001wasthemostexperiencedcountryininternationalsoccer,with802internationals.England,Argentina,Hungary,Brazil,andGermany(includingWestbutnotEastGermany)hadallplayedover700each.Spain—cutoffforsomanyyears—lagged.

When it comes to our second variable, wealth, Spain still fell short of most of itsrivals.Inthe1980sand1990sitwassignificantlybehindGermany,France,England,andevenItaly.

And Spainwas small.When people complain that the country underperforms, theyusuallymeanitdoesworsethanthegiantsofinternationalsoccer.Well,nowonder,given

thatSpainismuchsmallerthantheyare.NotonlydidBrazilin1990dwarfSpain’sthenpopulationof39millionpeople, but sodidGermany,France, Italy, and even that other“notoriousunderachiever,”England.

Wecalculated thatSpain,given itspopulation, income,andexperience in the1980–2001period,“should”havescoredonaverage0.3goalspergamemorethanitsopponents.ButSpaindidmuchbetterthanthat:itoutscoredopponentsbynearly0.9goals,averagingnearly0.6goalsmorethanexpected.Oftheteamsthatplayedatleastonehundredgamesinthisperiod,Spainwastheeighth-bestoverperformerintheworld.Thecountrywasanoverachieverlongbeforeitbeganwinningprizes.Untilveryrecently,itjustwasn’tquitebigorrichorexperiencedorluckyenoughtowinanything.

Consider,forinstance,itsrecordagainstItalyinthoseyears.OverthatperiodSpain’spopulation, income per head, and international experience was on average about 30percentinferiortoItaly’s.Giventhat,wewouldhaveexpectedSpain’sgoaldifferencetobe about minus two over its four games against Italy. Instead Spain overachieved,notchingawin,twoties,andadefeatwithagoaldifferenceofzero.

Inshort:Spain’sbadtimeswerenotbadatall.Italwayswasoverachieving.Butinthepast twenty years or so, even taking into account the recent economic crisis, Spain’sresourceshave improved.SinceSpain joined theEU, the country’s average incomehasrisen to about three-quarters of the core EU’s average. Its population has grown to 47million. Spain has also become fully networked inEurope. Its best soccer players nowexperience the Champions League every season. A richer, more populous, moreexperienced, and more networked Spain became first a serious contender, and finally(thankstoitscontinuedoverachievement)thebestteamonearth.

Wealth, size, and integration have translated into goals. In the 1990s Spain’s winpercentage(stilltreatingtiesasworthhalfawin)shotuptoover70percent.Inthe2000sitwasover80percent,withSpainlosingjust12percentofitsgames.From2000through2009thecountrywon71percentofitsmatchesoutright,along-termperformanceaboutas good as any other national team’s since international soccer took off in the 1930s.Brazilnevermanagedit.Eventheall-conqueringItalyofthe1930swonjust70percentofitsgames thatdecade.Spainhadbecomeagreat team longbefore itwon titles.Here isWayneRooneyinhisautobiographydescribingaSpain-Englandexhibitiongamein2004,atimewhentheSpaniardswerestillconsideredeternallosers:

Spainhadbeentakingthemickey,passingtheballbackandforth,andshowboatingwhichupsetme.Whenthathappens,youhavetotryandbreakupyouropponents’passinggamebygettingstuckintothem,tacklinghardandquickly.PerhapsIoverdiditbecauseIwassofrustrated,butwecouldn’tgetakickoftheball.Notnice.

Of course the emergence from isolation cannot by itself explain Spain’s success.Intangiblesmatter too—thesuddenemergenceofseveralgreat individuals,suchasXaviand David Villa. Spain was the only team at the 2010 World Cup with as strong apersonnel as the best club teams. No other country in the tournament fielded elevenplayerswhowerestartersatbigclubs.Spainwasmassivelyoverperformingitssizeandwealth,butthatoverperformancewaspossibleonlybecauseoftheendofisolation.Nor,clearly,hasthefinancialcrashof2008hurtSpain’snationalteam.Despitetherecession,

thecollapseofpropertyvalues,andunemploymentofover20percent,SpainhasremainednetworkedwiththerestofEurope.

ItwaswonderfullyappropriatethattheSpaniardssealedtheirriseinaWorldCupfinalagainst theirmentor country.Thiswas theCruijff versusCruijff final. Probably for thefirst time,bothteamsinsoccer’sbiggestgamewere, intheirorigins, theproductofoneman.Itwasatriumphofintra-Europeanknowledgetransfer.ThatnightinJohannesburg,theoldAmsterdammerlivinginBarcelonamusthavefeltliketheproudfatheroftwins—albeitthattheDutchtwinbehavedlikeafratricidaldelinquent.

Seven of the fourteen Spaniards who played in the match had spent time in theCruijffian Masía; seven of the fourteen Dutchmen had come from Ajax’s Cruijffianacademy.OneofthosesevenDutchmen,EljeroElia,hadneverevenmadeitintoAjax’sfirst team.KhalidBoulahrouzandAndréOoijer,whosatontheDutchbenchthatnight,werealsorejectsoftheAjaxacademy.Whenevenyourdropoutsarestaffingthesecond-best national squad on earth, you are doing pretty well. Not as well as the Spaniards,though.HadSpainbeenabletofieldjustoneotherproductoftheMasía—andwhentheArgentineMessiwasaboytheSpaniardshadbeggedhimtoplayfortheirnationalyouthteams—FIFA could have dispensed with the 2010 World Cup altogether and simplyhandedSpainthetrophyataquickceremonyinZurich.

The Holland-Spain final was best understood as “Jungian mirroring,” summed upDavid Winner, author of Brilliant Orange: The Neurotic Genius of Dutch Soccer:“Holland’spathtotheworldtitleisblockedbythemoreauthenticversionoftheirbetterselves.ItisnowSpainwhoplayDutchsoccer.”ThatishowCruijffsawit,too.“Ithoughtmycountrywouldneverdare toplay like thisandwouldnevergiveup itsownwayofplaying,”hesaidafterthegame.Hecontinued:

Evenwithoutgreatplayerslikeinthepast,ateamhasitsownstyle.Ihadthewrongendofthestick….Theydidn’twanttheball.Andunfortunately,andit’shardtosayso,theyplayeddirty.Sobadthattheyreallyshouldquicklyhavebeendowntoninemen.ThentheymadetwosuchmeantacklesthatIfeltthepainmyself.Thisnasty,vulgar,hard,closedgame thatwasn’twatchableandwasbarelysocceranymore—yes,with that theycouldtroubleSpain.Theyplayedanti-soccer.

But perhapsHolland had to, because the Spaniardswere now better at soccer. TheDutchhad taught theSpaniardshowtoplay, justas in theDutch-SpanishEightyYears’War(1568to1648)theDutchhadsoldtheSpaniardsarms.InJohannesburg,Hollandpaidforit.

20CORETOPERIPHERYTheFutureMapofGlobalSoccer

OnasnowynightinAmsterdam,adozenorsoDutchsoccerwritersandex-playershavegathered in an apartment in the dinky city center. Guus Hiddink walks in and grabssomeone’sshouldersfrombehindbywayofgreeting.Growingupwithfivebrothersgavehim a knack for male bonding. (Hiddink appears to find women more exotic, and hiscohabitationwithhisthenmistressinSeoulshockedKoreans.)

Theeveningstartswithasoccerquiz,atwhichthefuturemanagerofChelsea,Russia,and Turkey performs indifferently. Then there is food and soccer talk until the earlymorning.ThoughHiddinkistheseniorfigureatthetable,henevertriestodominate.Helikes telling stories—about his former playerRomario, or his old roommate at the SanJoseEarthquakes,GeorgeBest—butwhenothersinterruptheisjustashappytoleanbackinhischairandlisten.Heisasolid,soothing,jowlypresence.“Youcanfeelhe’satease,”BoudewijnZenden,oneofhisformerplayers,toldus,“soifhe’satease,theothersareatease.Hecreatesthisenvironmentwhereyoufeelsafe.”

Hiddink—agreatsuccessasacoachuntil2008,lesssoinhisdecliningyears—hasaspecialplaceinthelateststageofsoccer’shistory.Inthetwenty-firstcentury,hebecameone of the world’s main exporters of soccer know-how from western Europe to themarginsoftheearth.WesawinChapter16thatfromabout1970to2000,thesixfoundingmembers of the European Economic Community dominated soccer thinking and wonalmostallthegame’sprizes.ThesecountriesperfectedwhatyoumightcallthecontinentalEuropeanstyle:afast,physical,collectivistsoccer.

But then these countries began exporting their expertise. Hiddink and other Dutch,German, French, and Italian expat managers established themselves in Hiltons andwesterners’compoundsaroundtheplanet.Inthepastfewyearstheyhavehelpedseveralnewsoccercountries—Russia,Australia,andSouthKorea,tonameafew—catchupwiththemanagers’ownnativecountries.It’sbecauseofmenlikethesethatEnglandwillnotbethe best soccer country of the future. Hiddink’s native Holland appears even morethoroughlydoomed.Onthenewmapofsoccer,whichHiddinkhelpedtodraw,hisowncountrywillshrinktoadot.Soccerknow-howisbeingglobalizedfast.

FROMTHEBACKCORNERTOTHEWORLD

Bornin1946,Hiddinkgrewupclosetowhatwasjustbecomingtheepicenterofglobalsoccer knowledge.He is the son of a village schoolteacher andResistance hero fromasmall town in the Achterhoek, or “Back Corner,” about five miles from the Germanborder. The Back Corner is wooded and quiet, one of the few empty bits of theNetherlands,andonvisitshomefromstintsinSeoulorMoscow,Hiddinkenjoystoolingalong its back roads on his Harley-Davidson Fat Boy. “Pom-pom-pom-pom-pom.” He

puffsouthischeekstomimicthemotor’sroar.

Hegrewupmilkingcows,plowingbehind twohorses,anddreamingofbecomingafarmer. But Dutch farms were already shedding labor, and he became a soccer coachinstead.Atnineteenhetookanassistant’sjobattheBackCorner’ssemiprofessionalclub,DeGraafschap,wherehisfatherhadplayedbeforehim.Hethenmadeanunusualcareermove:fromcoachtoplayer.Theheadcoach,seeingthathisyoungassistantcouldkickaball,stuckhimintheteam,andthusbeganasixteen-yearplayingcareer.

The handsome, round-faced, wavy-haired playmakerwas too lazy and slow for thetop, yet he was present at a golden age. The Dutch 1970s shaped Hiddink. Holland,playing what foreigners called “total football,” a new kind of game in which playersconstantlyswappedpositionsandthoughtforthemselves,reachedtwoWorldCupfinals.DutchclubswonfourEuropeanCups.Offthefield,DutchplayersofHiddink’sgenerationansweredforeignjournalists’questionswithsophisticateddiscoursesinseverallanguages.ForakeenobserverlikeHiddink,theplayers’constantsquabblesprovidedobjectlessonsinhowtokeepstarsjustaboutfunctioningwithinacollective.

Dutchsoccer’srenownatthetimehelpedevenasecond-rateplayerlikeHiddinkfindworkabroad,withtheWashingtonDiplomatsandtheSanJoseEarthquakes.“IwasBest’sroommate,” saysHiddink, enjoying the quirkyAmericanword, and hemimics himselffieldingthephonecallsfromBest’sgroupies:“Georgeisnothere.Georgeissleeping.”

ItwasthestartofaworldtourwhoserecentdestinationshaveincludedSouthKorea,Australia,asuiteinafive-starhotelinMoscow(where,accordingtothepresidentoftheRussianFA, he spent a fortune ordering cappuccinos from room service), and Istanbul.HiddinkgottheKoreansplayingthebestsoccerintheirhistoryattheWorldCupof2002,theAustraliansplayingtheirbesteverin2006,andtheRussiansatEuro2008.

True,hethenfailedtotaketheRussianstotheWorldCupof2010,andtheTurkstoEuro2012.Therearesigns thatafterpassingsixtyhe lost someofhisdrive.Moreover,once almost all countries began trying to acquirewestern European know-how, he lostsome of his first-mover advantage. Nonetheless, Hiddink and other expat westernEuropeancoacheslikehimarehelpingtoshiftpowerinsoccerfromtheirownregiontotherestoftheworld.It’snocoincidencethatthisishappeningjustaseconomicpowerisshiftinginthesamedirection.

1889–2002:OFFTHEPLANEWITHALEATHERSOCCERBALL

Soccerseemstohaveaqualitythatenablesiteventuallytoconquereveryknownsociety.ThefirstexportersofthegamewereVictorianBritishsailors,businessmen,missionaries,and colonial officers. In 1889, to cite a typical story, twenty-one-year-old EnglishmanFrederickReadisembarkedontheislandofSouthUistoff thewestcoastofScotlandtoworkasaheadmaster.Acoupleofyears later twoofhisbrothersvisited,carryingwiththem a leather soccer ball. Within two decades the game had conquered South Uist.Shinty, a stick sport that had been played there for 1,400 years, “waswiped like chalkfromthefaceoftheisland,”wroteRogerHutchinsonintheBritishsoccerjournalPerfectPitch in1998,“supplanted, likea thousandof itsdistant relatives fromBuenosAires to

Smolensk, by a game almost as young and innocent as Frederick Rea himself.” TodaysocceristhedominantsportonSouthUist.Itconqueredbecauseofitsmagic.

VictorianBritonsspread thegame tocontinentalEurope,LatinAmerica,andbitsofAfrica. However, for a century Asia and North America remained almost immune.Contrarytomyth,soccertookalongtimetobecomeaglobalgame.Whatpeoplecalledthe “World Cup” should until the 1980s have been called “the Euro–Latin AmericanDuopoly.” Though most people on the planet lived in Asia, the continent’s onlyrepresentativeattheWorldCupof1978wasIran.Evenin1990theBritishIsleshadmoreteamsat theWorldCup (three) than all ofAsia combined (two).ManyAsian countriesstillbarelyknewaboutsoccer.Whenthatyear’sWorldCupfinalwasshownonJapanesetelevision,therewasasurprisingstudioguest:baseballplayerSadaharuOh.“Mr.Oh,”hewas asked during thematch, “what is the difference between sliding in baseball and insoccer?” InAustralia, too, soccer thenwas stillmarginal. JohnnyWarren, anAustralianinternationaland laterTVcommentatoron thegame,calledhismemoirsSheilas,Wogs,andPoofters, because according toAustralianmyth in the years beforeHiddink landedthere,women,immigrants,andhomosexualswerethethreecoreelementsofthenationalsoccerpublic.

Butby1990theso-calledthirdwaveofglobalizationwasunderway.Increasedworldtrade,cabletelevision,andfinallytheInternetbroughtsoccertonewterritories.RobertoFontanarrosa, the lateArgentine cartoonist, novelist, and soccer nut, said, “If TVwereonlyaninventiontobroadcastsoccer,itwouldbejustified.”

SuddenlytheChinese,Japanese,Americans,andevenmanyurbanIndianscouldseesoccer’s magic. They saw it even more clearly than the people of Uist had a centurybefore.Soccerbynowhadtheprestigeofbeingtheworld’sbiggestsport,andeveryonewantedapieceofitsfans’passion.Soccerisoftenmockedforitslowscores,butpreciselybecausegoals are so scarce, the releaseof joy isgreater than inother sports.When theformer goalkeeperOsama bin Laden visited London in 1994, hewatched fourArsenalmatches,boughtsouvenirsforhissonsintheclubshop,andremarkedthathehadneverseenasmuchpassionasamongsoccersupporters.

Justthensoccerwascapturingthelastholdouts.OnMay15,1993,Japan’sJ-Leaguekickedoff.ThenextyearChinaacquiredanationalprofessionalleague,andin1996theUSandIndiafollowed.AtherapistwemetinSanFrancisconicelydescribedthegame’simpact on new converts.When she’d first seen aWorldCup on TV, her reactionwas:“Whydidn’tanybodyevertellmeaboutthis?”Shehadn’tstoppedwatchingsoccersince.ShestandsformillionsofAmericans(andIndians,Chinese,inhabitantsofSouthUist,andsoon).

Fromthe1990sthenewmarginalcountriesbegantohireEuropeancoacheswhocouldquickly teach them the latest in soccer.By the turn of themillennium,Hiddinkwas anobviouscandidate forexport.Hehadwon theEuropeanCupwithPSVEindhoven,hadmanagedclubsinTurkeyandSpain,andhadtakenHollandtotheWorldCupsemifinalin1998.Afterhepassedfifty,hefelthisambitionbegintowane.Neveraworkaholictostartwith,theboyfromtheBackCornerhadbynowprovenhimself.Hehadmetwithtriumph

anddisasterandtreatedthosetwoimpostorsjustthesame.Hehadgonefromvillagertocosmopolitan.Hehadfalleninlovewithgolf.Soccerwasbecomingjustahobby.

Hetookabreakandin2001poppedupinhisfirstmissionaryposting,asmanagerofSouthKorea.As part of the globalization of soccer, the countrywas due to cohost the2002WorldCupwith Japan.SouthKoreahadplayed in severalWorldCupsbeforebuthadneverwonasinglematch,andin1998hadlost5–0toHiddink’sHolland.

WhenHiddinklandedinSeoul,historywasbeginningtoworkinhisfavor.Likemanyemergingnations,theSouthKoreansweregettingbigger.Thankstoincreasedwealth,theaverageheightofaSouthKoreanmanhadrisenfromfivefootfourinthe1930stoaboutfivefooteightby2002.Thatmeantabiggerpoolofmenwith thephysiquerequired toplay international soccer. In an interview during a Korean training camp in the BackCorner, a year before theWorldCup,Hiddink told us he’d caughtKoreans using theirsmallnessasanexcuseinsoccer.Headded,“ButIwon’tallowthat.Iwon’tletthemsaybeforehand, ‘They’re a bit bigger and broader; we’re small and sad.’ And gradually Inoticethatsomeofourplayersarebig,too,andknowhowtolookafterthemselves.”The“heighteffect”wasalsoquietlyliftingmanyotheremergingsoccercountries,fromChinatoTurkey.

But the Koreans had other problems. The Dutch psychological quirk had beensquabbling.TheKorean disease, asHiddink soon discovered,was hierarchy. InKoreansoccer, the older the player, the higher his status. A thirty-one-year-old veteraninternationalwassorespectedhecouldcoast.Atmeals,thegroupofolderplayerswouldsitdownatthetablefirst,andtheyoungestlast.

WhereasDutchplayerstalkedtoomuch,Koreanswerepracticallymute.“Slavishnessis abigword,”Hiddink said thatday in theBackCorner, “but theydohave somethinglike: if thecommandersays it,we’ll followitblindly.Theyareused to thinking, ‘I’masoldier.I’lldowhat’saskedofme.’Andyouhavetogoastepfurtherifyouwanttomakea team reallymature.Youneedpeoplewhocanandwill take the team in theirhands.”Hiddinkwanted autonomous, thinking “Dutch,” players: a center half who at a certainpointinthegameseesheshouldpushintomidfield,astrikerwhodropsbackafewyards.HewasteachingtheKoreanstheDutchvariantofthecontinentalEuropeanstyle.

Hiddinksaidofhisplayers,“Commitmentisnottheirproblem.Almosttoomuch.Butifyourcommitmentistoohigh,youoftenlosethestrategicoverview.”

Hiddinkhadstartedout inKoreabykickingacoupleof theolderplayersoutofhissquad.Hemadeayoungmancaptain.Heaskedhisplayerstomaketheirowndecisionsonthefield.“Thatmakesthemabitfreer,easier,”hesaid.ShortlybeforetheWorldCup,hebroughtbackthejiltedolderplayers,whobythenwereprettymotivated.

However,theeducationalprocessinKoreawasalwaystwo-way.Duringhiseighteenmonthsinthecountry,Hiddinklearnedafewthingshimself.AlreadyduringhisstintsinTurkeyandSpainhehadbegunfreeinghimselffromthenationalsuperioritycomplexthatpervadesDutchsoccer:thebeliefthattheDutchwayistheonlyway.InHolland,soccerisathinkingperson’sgame.WhentheDutchtalkaboutit,theconceptstowhichtheyalways

return are techniek and tactiek. Passie, or passion, was a quality they associated withsoccerplayersfromunsophisticatedcountries,suchasEngland.InKorea,Hiddinklearnedthatitwasactuallyprettyimportant.EvenwhenspeakingDutchhetendstodescribethisqualitywith theEnglishword commitment, perhaps because there is no obviousDutchequivalent.

Hehadalsolearnedwhateverysuccessfulmissionaryknows:respectthenativewayof life, or at least pretend to, because otherwise the natives won’t listen to you. ThatafternoonintheBackCornerhesaid,“Idon’tgotoworkonthecultureofthecountry.Ijust leave it; I respect it. I only do something about the conditions that they need toperform on the pitch. And of course there are a couple of things off the field that doinfluencethat.”

Atthe2002WorldCuptheKoreansplayedwithafervorrarelyseeninsoccer.Helpedbybizarrerefereeingdecisions,thecountryfromsoccer’speripheryreachedthesemifinal.

Koreahadcravedglobalrecognition,andHiddinkachievedit.Koreancitiesplannedstatues inhishonor, andacaricatureofhis faceappearedonKorean stamps.Hiddink’sautobiographyappearedinaKoreanprintrunofahalfmillion,despitehavingtocompetewith an estimated sixteenHiddink biographies. In the Back Corner, Korean tour busesmade pilgrimages to the Hiddink ancestral home. Soon after theWorld Cup, the manhimselfdroppedby tovisithisoctogenarianparents.“Well, itwasn’tbad,”admittedhisfather.“Coffee?”

2002–2004:THEPERIPHERYTAKESOVERINTERNATIONALSOCCER

During thatWorld Cup of 2002, other peripheral soccer countries were emerging, too.Japanreachedthesecondround,theUSgottothequarters,andKoreawasconqueredinthematchforthirdplacebyTurkey,whichhadn’tevenplayedinaWorldCupsince1954.

WesaidinChapter16thatacountry’ssuccessinsoccercorrelatesstronglywiththreevariables:itspopulation,itsincomepercapita,anditsexperienceinsoccer.ForTurkeyasformanyotheremergingcountries,allthreevariableswereimprovingfast.

From1980through2001,Turkeywas thesecond-worstunderperformer inEuropeansoccer.Itscoredafullgoalpergamefewerthanitshouldhavegivenitsvastpopulation,decentexperienceininternationalsoccer,andadmittedlylowincomes.

Butjustasthatperiodwasending,theTurkswereimproving.ItisnocoincidencethatthecountrywentfrombeingapatheticsoccerteamtoanoccasionalcontenderinEuropeatthesametimeasitgrewfromamidsizeEuropeanstateintothecontinent’sthird–mostpopulousnation.Turkeyhad19millioninhabitantsin1945,doublethatby1973,andover80million by 2013. In Europe, only Russia and Germany havemore.While Turkey’spopulationgrows,mostEuropeancountriesarelosingpeople.AddseveralmillionTurksinthediaspora,andtherelativeyouthofmostTurks,andthecountrystartstorivalevenGermany in its soccer potential. And Turkey is just one ofmany developing countrieswhosepopulationisfastoutstrippingthatofrichcountries.

Atthesametime,Turkey’seconomywasbooming,anditwasusingsomeofthenew

money to importsoccerknowledge. InChapter16,wehadmeasuredacountry’ssoccerexperience by how many matches its national team had played. However, there is ashortcut to gaining experience: import it. This process began for Turkey in June 1984,when West Germany got knocked out of the European championship. The Germanssackedtheircoach,JuppDerwall.ThatyearhejoinedGalatasarayandbegantoimportthecontinentalEuropeanstyleofsoccerintoTurkey.

Derwall and other German coaches (as well as the Englishman Gordon Milne atBesiktas) got Turkish players actuallyworking. They also introduced the novel idea oftraining on grass. Turkish television began showing foreignmatches, which introducedsomeTurkishviewerstotheconceptofthepass.

BeforeDerwall’sarrival, theaverageTurkishplayerhadbeenatiny,selfishdribbler.Derwall shipped German-born Turks into Galatasaray. The German Turks were biggerthan Turkish Turks thanks to a better diet, and they trained like Germans. Admittedly,soonafterarrivalinIstanbultheywereexposedtothesultanesqueharemlifestyleofmanyTurkishplayers and their gamedeteriorated, but itwas a start.DiasporaTurks—mostlyfromGermany—havecontinuedtogiveTurkeyafasttracktoEuropeansoccerknow-how.No other national team in Europe includes as many players who grew up in otherEuropeancountries.

In1996Turkeyqualified for its firstmajor tournament since1954.Though itdidn’tscoreagoalorregisterapointatEuro’96,itwasjudgedtohavedonequitewell.Ithassincereachedtwosemisandaquarterfinalatmajortournaments.

Despiteafallowperiodafter2008,globalizationhasimprovedTurkishsoccer.Turkscametotherealizationthateverymarginalcountryneeds: thereisonlyonewaytoplaygoodsoccer—combineItaliandefendingwithGermanworkethicandDutchpassingintothe European style. (“Industrial soccer,” some Turks sulkily call it.) In soccer, nationalstyles don’t work. You have to have all the different elements. You cannot wininternational matches playing traditional Turkish soccer. You need to play continentalEuropeansoccer.

Both Hiddink’s and Turkey’s experiences point to an important truth: in soccer,“culture”doesn’tmattermuch.Perhaps,astheformerFrenchpresidentGiscardd’Estaingsaidwhen he drafted theEuropeanUnion’s failed constitution, Turkey had “a differentculture,adifferentapproach,adifferentwayoflife,”butitdidn’tstoptheTurksgettingbetteratsoccer.Culturesarenoteternalandunalterable.Whentheyhaveanincentivetochange—like the prospect ofwinningmore soccermatches, or perhaps the prospect ofgettingricher—theycanchange.

Turkeywasonlyoneofmanycountriesbraveenoughtojettisonitstraditionalsoccerculture.Most countries on the fringes of Europe had dysfunctional indigenous playingstyles. The ones on the southern fringe—Greece, Turkey, Portugal—favored pointlessdribbling,whiletheBritishandScandinaviansplayedkick-and-rush.Graduallytheycametoacceptthatthesestylesdidn’twork.

Nobody did better out of abandoning their roots and adopting continental European

soccer thanTurkey’s friendsacross thewater, theGreeks.TheGreeknational teamhadtraditionallyplayedterriblesoccerinfrontofacouplethousandspectators.Duringforeigntrips,itscampfollowers—friends,journalists,andmiscellaneous—wouldhangaroundtheteam hotel drinking espressos with players until the early morning. When Greecesomehow made it to theWorld Cup of 1994, it ended up regretting it. At the team’straining sessions outside Boston, an outfield player would stand in the goal while theothersblastedshotsintothebushes.TheyspentmostofthetournamenttravelingtheEastCoast of the US to receptions with GreekAmericans, though they did find time to bethrashedinthreematches.In2002,GreecegaveupontheGreekstyleandimportedavastchunkofexperienceinthepersonofanagingGermanmanager,OttoRehhagel.

The Rhinelander was the prototypical postwar West German collectivist. He hadgrown up a healthy drive across the border from Hiddink, amid the ruins of postwarwestern Germany. An apprentice housepainter and bone-hard defender, Rehhagel wasbroughtuponthe“Germanvirtues”ofhardworkanddiscipline.AsacoachinGermanyfordecades,heaimed to signonlycollectivistEuropean-typeplayerswhosepersonalityhadbeenvettedbyhiswife over dinner in theRehhagel home.Everywhere he tried tobuild an organization. Sacked as manager of Arminia Bielefeld, he sighed, “At leastthankstomethereisnowatoiletatthetrainingground.”OnlatervisitstoBielefeldwithotherclubs,healwaysinquiredabouthistoilet.

Rehhagel quickly rooted out Greece’s cult of the soloist, introduced core Europeansoccer,andtooktheteamtoEuro2004inPortugal.Therehewentaroundsayingthingslike,“NowthatIamcoachingGreece,Iwanttomakeonephilosophicalstatement.Pleasewriteitdown:manneedsnothingmorethanotherpeople.”Banalasthissounded,itmusthaveresonatedinpostwarWestGermany.CertainlytheGreekplayers,whopre-Rehhagelneverseemedtohaveheardofcollectivespirit,hadbegunpreachingthenotioninmanylanguages.“Wewasverygoodorganized,”saidZisisVryzasafterGreecebeatFranceinthequarterfinals.AngelosCharisteas, thereserveatWerderBremenwhowouldbecomethehighestscorerofEuro2004,eulogized,“WehaveaGermancoach,hehasaGermanmentality,andweplaylikeaGermanteam.”Infact,GreecehadmadethesamejourneyasTurkey:frommidgetdribblerstoboringEuropeansoccerthankstoGermancoaching.

Rehhagel himself called it “learning from European soccer.” At the time becoming“European”—code for becoming organized—was the aspiration of many marginalEuropean countries, in soccer and outside. Just as these countries were joining theEuropean Union, they were absorbing European soccer. The final of Euro 2004 pittedGreece against another recentlymarginal country. TheGreeks beat the Portuguese 1–0thankstoanotherheaderfromCharisteas,whosoonafterwardwouldbeareserveagainatAjax. It turned out that with merely half-decent players, a good continental Europeancoach,andtimetoprepare,almostanymarginalcountrycoulddowell.

2005–2006:EVENAUSTRALIA

Inthisnewclimate,thebestcontinentalEuropeancoachescouldpicktheirposts.Hiddinkreceived many offers to take teams to theWorld Cup of 2006, but he chose the mostmarginalcountryofall:Australia.

In1974,whileHiddinkwasstillabsorbingtotalsoccerintheBackCorner,AustraliahadqualifiedforitsfirstWorldCupasAsia’ssolerepresentatives.TheSocceroosofthedaywerepart-timers,andsomehadtogiveuptheirjobstogotoGermany.TheGermanpresswasparticularlyinterestedinthemilkman-cum-defenderManfredSchaefer,whohadbeenborninHitler’sReichin1943andcametoAustraliaasachildrefugeeafterthewar.AtonepointinthetournamentWestGermany’sstrikerGerdMülleraskedhimifhereallywasanamateur.Well,Schaeferproudly replied,hehadearned$4,600byqualifying fortheWorldCup.“That’swhatIearnaweek,”saidMüller.

The Australians achieved one tie in three matches at the World Cup. “However,”writesMatthewHallinhisexcellentbookaboutAustraliansoccer,TheAwayGame,“theirthongs,super-tightAussieRules–styleshortsandmarsupialmascotsendearedthemtotheGermanpublic.”

In the next thirty years, soccer sank so low in Australia that the country’s soccerfederation was sometimes reduced to filming its ownmatches and giving them to TVchannels for free. Australian club soccer was punctuated by weird vendettas betweenBalkan ethnic groups. Only in 1997, during the new wave of globalization, were theSocceroosof1974publiclyhonoredintheirowncountry.

Then, in 2005, Hiddink landed with a mission to teach European soccer. First hegathered the Australian team in a training camp in his native Back Corner. His firstimpression:“Whatabunchofvagabonds.Everyonecameinwearingacap,orflip-flops.Onehadon long trousers, another shorts, and anotherBermuda shorts. I said, ‘What isthis?’‘Well,that’showwelive.’‘Hello,butyouprobablyplaylikethat,too.’”

HiddinkspentAustralia’s first trainingsession in theBackCornerwatchinghisnewchargesflyintoeachotherlikekamikazepilots.“Youdon’thavetochasetheseguysup,”heremarked.Afterahalfhourhestoppedthegame.Whentheplayers’criesof“Comeon,Emmo!”“Hold theball, Johnno!” “Let’sgo!” and the streamsof “Fucking”had finallyfaded,Hiddink asked them to shout onlywhen a teammatewas in trouble and neededcoaching.Thatwould improveeveryone’svisionofplay,hesaid.Thegameresumed innearsilence.ItwasAustralia’sfirstbabysteptowardcontinentalEuropeansoccer.

Just as he had with the Koreans, Hiddink was turning the Australians into Dutchsoccer players.Thatmeant giving them the intellectual discipline needed for theWorldCup.TheAustralianwaywastotrainhard,playhard,butthenrelaxwithlate-nightbeersin the hotel bar. Hiddink wanted the players thinking on their own about their jobs.Working hard wasn’t enough. Since the Australians already had “commitment” andpassie,HiddinkwasteachingthemtothinklikeDutchmen.TheSocceroostendedtoruntowherevertheballwas.Hiddinkforbadethemfromenteringcertainzones.InEuropeansoccer,doingtherightthingsisalwaysbetterthandoingalotofthings.

Hehadnoticed thatat theConfederationsCupof2005,shortlybeforehe tookover,where the Socceroos had lost all their three games and conceded ten goals, all fourAustraliandefenderswouldoftenstaybacktomarkasingleforward.Thatleftthemshortelsewhereonthefield.NosemiprofessionalDutchteamwouldbesonaive.

Hiddink was surprised that the Australians were so willing to listen to him. Theyunderstood that they had a chance to learn the European style from the man himself.Hiddinkhadalwaysexcelledindealingwithdifficultcharacters:Romario,EdgarDavids,ortheKoreanAhnJung-Hwan.Heknewjusthowtotouchthem.ButtheAustralians,headmitted,were“zerodifficult.”

Except perhaps Mark Viduka, Australia’s best but not its most committed player.Hiddinkrecalledlater,“Hecameinwith,‘Oh,I’dliketogotoaWorldCup,butit’sgoingto be difficult. We’ve never made it, and I’m not fit.’” Hiddink sent the Socceroos’physiotherapist toworkwithVidukaathisclub,Middlesbrough.Thisdidn’tmerelygettheplayer fit. Itmadehimfeelwanted.HiddinkalsomadeVidukahiscaptain, tomakesurehewouldbeinsidethetentpissingoutratherthanoutsidepissingin.

It was striking how quickly the Socceroos learned European soccer. Once again,“culture” seemed to be no obstacle. InNovember 2005, only a couple ofmonths afterHiddinkhadstartedpart-timeworkwiththem(hewasalsocoachingPSVattheotherendoftheglobe),theybeatUruguayinaplayofftoqualifyfortheWorldCup.SuddenlytheMelbourne Herald Sun found itself wondering whether the sport of “Aussie Rules”football could remain dominant inAustralia’s southern states.AlreadymoreAustralianchildrenplayedsoccerthanAussieRulesandbothrugbycodescombined.

Thenewspaper’sworriesappeared justifiedwhenafewmonths later, justbefore theWorld Cup of 2006, an Australia-Greece soccer friendly drew 95,000 people to theMelbourneCricketGround.InnocityinEuropeorLatinAmericacouldsuchagamehavedrawn such a crowd.Australia had also just become approximately the last country onearthtoacquireanationalprofessionalsoccerleague.

AndthenHiddinkledtheSocceroos to thesecondroundof theWorldCupof2006.GreatcrowdsofAustralianssettheiralarmclockstowatchatunearthlyhours.SoonaftertheSocceroosgotbackfromGermany,Australialauncheditsown(disastrous)bidtostageaWorldCup.WhathadhappenedonUistmorethanacenturybeforeisnowthreateningtohappeninOz.Acenturyfromnow,AussieRulesmightexistonlyatsubsidizedfolklorefestivals.

2006–2009:HIDDINKTOGHIDDINKINAMOSCOWHOTELSUITE

AfterAustralia,Hiddinkcouldhavehadalmostany job insoccer. Inan idealworld,hewould have liked to manage England. Of all the world’s marginal soccer countries,England had the most potential because it was rich and fairly large and had recentlyrejoinedthenetworkofcorecountries.

Hiddink also relished the specific challenges of managing England. He had thepsychologicalexpertisetoinspiretiredmultimillionaires.Heloveddealingwithdifficultcharacters;WayneRooneywouldbeacinch forhim.Andhewouldhave improved thethinkingofa team thathadeverythingbut intellect.Asa loverof thebohemian life,hewouldhavebeenhappyinLondon,andhisgirlfriendwouldhavebeenanhourfromherbelovedAmsterdam.ButHiddinkcouldn’tbear the thoughtofBritish tabloidscrawlingoverhisfamily,andsohedecidedtospreadhiscontinentalEuropeanknow-howtoRussia

instead.

Like England, Russia had always been removed from the best western Europeansoccerknow-how.Thecountrydidn’thavemuchofatradition.TheexcellentSovietsideofthe1980shadbeenlargelyUkrainian.Butnow,aftercommunism,Russia’sdoortotheWesthadopenedslightly.Therewaspotentialhere.

Admittedly, thecountry’spopulationwascollapsing rather thangrowing,asRussianmen drank themselves to death. However, when Hiddink took the job, the Russianeconomywasmovingtherightway.Inthedecadefrom1998,Russianincomepercapitanearlydoubled.Thecountry’snewoilmoneyboughtHiddink’sbrain.(Oilingeneralhasbecomeoneofthedominantfinancialforcesinmodernsoccer.)

AsinKorea,Hiddink’sjobwastoforcehisplayerstobefree.Traditionally,Russiansoccerplayershadthe“Ionlyworkhere”demeanorofHomosovieticus.Theyfearedtheircoaches as much as they feared the mafiosi who stole their jeeps. They shoved safesidewayspassesintoeachother’sfeet,becausethatwaynobodycouldevershoutatthem.Therewaszaorganizovannost,overorganization.

Ghiddink, as the Russians call him, joked with his players, relaxed them. As a“punishment”intraining,aplayermighthaveaballkickedathisbackside,whiletherestofthesquadstoodaroundlaughing.Thetimeshelped:thisgenerationofRussianplayerscould barely remember the USSR. Armed with iPhones and SUVs, they had left theperipheryandjoinedtheglobalmainstream.

AshehadinKorea,Hiddinkpracticallyorderedhisplayerstothinkforthemselves,togiveriskierpasses,tomoveintonewpositionswithouthistellingthemto.MarcBennetts,author ofSoccerDynamo:ModernRussia and thePeople’sGame, said, “It’s as if he’sbeaten the Marxism-Leninism out of them.” At Euro 2008, Russia’s hammering ofGhiddink’snativeHollandwastheultimatetriumphofamarginalcountryoveracoreone.It also provided the almost unprecedented sight of Russian soccer players having fun.They swapped positions and dribbled, knowing that if they lost the ball no onewouldscreamat them.After thegame, theirbestplayer,AndreiArshavin,mutteredsomethingabout“awiseDutchcoach”andcried.

Russialost inthesemisofEuro2008toanotherformermarginalcountry,Spain.Bythen,aftertwenty-twoyearsintheEuropeanUnion,Spainwassonetworkedthatitdidn’tevenneedaforeigncoachtowintheEuro.

Spain,Russia,andTurkey,anothersemifinalistatEuro2008,wereallbeneficiariesofthespreadofsoccerknow-howtomarginalcountries.Whenallcountrieshaveaboutthesamesoccerinformation,andconvergingincomes,thecountrieswiththemostinhabitantsusuallywin.ThreeofthefoursemifinalistsatEuro2008(Russia,Germany,andTurkey)hadthelargestpopulationsinEurope.

Theriseoftheperipheryisnowupsettingsoccer’straditionalorder.We’venotedthatwesternEuropeanteamslostsixmatchestonationsfromotherregionsinSouthAfricain2010,comparedwithonlyone(onpenalties)inGermanyin2006.Theoldrulingcountriesnowhavetokeeplearningtacticallytostayontop.TheEnglishhaven’t.TheSpaniards,

Germans,andDutchhave.Theyconstantlyexchangeknowledgewitheachother.

Butinthelongterm,eventhatmightnotbeenoughtosavesmallcorecountrieslikeHolland,Denmark,or theCzechRepublic.Theirpopulations andeconomies are almoststatic,andtheyhaveexportedtheirsoccerknowledge.Whatmadethemuniquebetween1970and2000wastheirnetworks.Nowthatthenetworkshaveexpandedtoincludemuchoftheworld,theyareprobablydoomed.

2014-?:THEPERIPHERYWINSTHEWORLDCUP

Untilthelate1990stheclichéinsoccerwasthatanAfricancountrywould“soon”wintheWorld Cup. Everyone said it, from Pelé to the 1950s England manager WalterWinterbottom. But it turned out not to be true, mostly because although Africanpopulationsweregrowing, their incomes remained too low to importmuchgoodsoccerexperience. A better tip for future World Cups might be Iraq. If the country remainshalfwaystable,it’slikelytodoevenbetterthanitdidinitsyearsofmadness.However,the best bets for the future are probably Japan, the US, or China: the three largesteconomies on earth, which can afford good European coaches, where potential soccerplayershaveenoughtoeatanddon’tgetterriblediseases.

FIGURE20.1.USteam’sresultsbydecade,1947–2010

JustlookathowfartheUShascomeinthelastsixtyyears.Theteam’sresults,decadebydecade,areshowninFigure20.1.

Thenadirfor“TeamUSA”wasthepostwarperiodupto1960.ThiscoincidedwiththepeakofAmericandominanceasa superpowerand theAmericandream. Itmight soundoddthattheworld’smightiestcountrywassuchamouseatsoccer,butinfactformostoftheseyearstheUSfeltlittleneedtomeasureitselfagainstothercountries.Ithaditsowngames.Prewar,anAmericanteamstaffedlargelywithrecentimmigrantshadplayedfairlyoften against Europeans and South Americans. After the war the number of gamesslumped.

Butwecanseethatfromthe1970s,theUSgrewmoreinterestedinsoccer.TheNorthAmericanSoccerLeaguetookoff,thenationalteambeganplayingmoreoften,especiallyagainst Europeans, and results improved. Things continued to get better in the 1980s(whentheUSstartedplayingmoreagainstSouthAmericans)andthenagaininthe1990swhenthecountryreturnedtoWorldCups.It’snotthattheUSstartedscoringmoregoals;rather, it gradually learned to concede fewer. Defense is alwaysmoremechanical thanoffense,soitappearsthatinthesedecadestheUSwaslearningfromtherestoftheworld,andfromforeigncoacheslikeBoraMilutinovic.Thecountry’ssoccerwasemergingfromisolation.Yetwhenwecalculatedtheworld’sworstunderachievingnationsfortheperiod1980–2001, the US still made our bottom ten on earth. Given the country’s fabulouswealthandenormouspopulation, it“should”havescorednearly three-quartersofagoalmorepergame than itdid. Itswinpercentage in those21years (counting tiesashalf awin)wasjust52percent.

Inthetwenty-firstcentury,though,theUS’swinpercentagehasjumpedto65percent,doublewhat itwasbefore1960.Admittedly that statistic flatters thecountry.Lately the

Americans have been playing fewer internationals against teams from the strongestcontinents,EuropeandSouthAmerica.Inthedecadethrough2010,forthefirsttimesincethe1970s, theUSplayed themajorityof itsgamesagainstNorthandCentralAmericanteams. That is not the way to learn best practice. The US has been slowly erasing itshistoricalunderperformance,buttokeepimprovingitneedstokeepmeetingtheworld’sleadingcountriesinsteadofJamaica.

We think theAmericans,Chinese, and Japanesewill keep improving.Already thereareomensofsuccess.BoththeUSandJapanreachedthelastsixteenoftheSouthAfricanWorldCupandwereunluckynottogofurther.TheUShasthemostyoungsoccerplayersofanycountry,andMajorLeagueSoccerisexpandingfast;JapanplanstohosttheWorldCupagainby2050 andwin it;China topped themedals table at theBeijingOlympics.Thesecountriesarestartingtodominatefemalesoccer:inthewomen’sWorldCupfinalof2011, Japanbeat theUS. In theOlympic final the next year, theUSbeat Japan. In thewomen’sgame,wherenocountryhasmuchexperience,big,richnationswin.

Inmen’s soccer too, theUS, Japan, andChina are fast closing the experience gap.TheyhaveovertakentheAfricansenroutetothetop.Inthenewworld,distancenolongerseparatesacountryfromthebestsoccer.Onlypovertydoes.

AFTERWORDTheBestofTimes

“Absolutelycrazy,”commentedJürgenKlinsmann,coachof theUSnational team,afterRealMadridpaidSpurs$132millionforGarethBalein2013.“Ithinkthatallthosehugetransfers—Idon’tknowifyoucanjustifythatstuffanymore.It’skindofoutofcontrol,”KlinsmanntoldtheBBC.

Hewas expressing a broadly felt disquiet: that soccer’s transfer fees, debts,wages,ticketprices,spoiledplayers,andgeneralhypehavegottenoutofhand.Manypeoplehavearguedthatthe“soccerbubble”isboundtoburst,justastheAmericanhousingbubbledidafter2006.JimSpence,writingaboutEnglishsoccer’sticketpricesontheBBCwebsitein2011, contributed some other metaphors: “If football’s elastic snaps, the game will becaughtwithitstrousersdownverysoon,chargingthesekindsofprices….Footballhastobecarefulnot tocut itsown throat and see that lifeblooddrainaway to leavea lifelesscorpse.”

Wedisagree.Wedon’tthinkthereisasoccerbubble.Wedothinkthegamehasneverhad it so good, butwe also think itwill have it evenbetter in years to come as soccercontinues to conquer the world. Like it or not, expect leading players to become evenmore“overpaid”andthegameevenmoreoverhypedinthefuture.

Not long ago, there was very little money in soccer. By the 1970s, most westernEuropeans had acquired TV sets (except in Spain, where in 1970 only 28 percent ofhouseholds had one). However, they hardly ever used those TVs for watching soccer.Europe’s state broadcasters of the day barely screened the game. In most countries itwasn’tpossible towatchregular leaguecompetition,week in,weekout, in thewaythatAmericanviewerscouldwatchbaseballorgridiron football.Europeansponsorsweren’tveryinterestedinsoccer,andsoalmosttheonlypeopleputtingmoneyintothesportweretheonesshowingupattheweekendattheirlocalclub’srun-downstadium.In1974,thetotalincomeofallofEuropeanprofessionalsoccerwasprobablyabitover$200million.That made it a slightly bigger business than American Major League Baseball ($153million) or the National Football League ($172 million), but it was a little amoebacompared toHollywood. In1974, totalbox-office receipts for themovie industry in theUSalonewere$1.9billion.

But then something changed.Over the last thirtyyears, sports havebeen the fastestgrowingsegmentof theentertainmentbusiness,andsoccerhasbeenthefastestgrowingsport.

This ismostly thanks toTV.When rights to livebroadcastsof theEnglishFootballLeague were first sold, in 1983, they fetched just £2.5 million a year (then about $4million).However, in theearly1990sthemulti-channelerareachedEurope.TVmogulslikeRupertMurdochandSilvioBerlusconiusedsomeofthenewchannelstoshowsoccer.It rapidlybecameclear thateven themostpopular soapoperas—which fordecadeshadgluedentirenationstothesofa—couldn’tgetafractionoftheaudiencecommandeeredby

thebiggestsoccergames.Moreover,thesoaps’scriptwriterscouldn’twritefastenoughtogenerateenoughmaterialtofilltheschedules.

SoccerclubsbecamedefactoproducersofTVcontent.Thatchangedthegame.Whenyou’reontelevisioneveryweek,youhavetosmartenyourselfup.Run-downstadiumsfullofmisbehavingfansnolongercutit.It’snocoincidencethattherefurbishingofEnglishstadiumsandthefirstsaleoftherightstosatelliteTVhappenedalmostsimultaneouslyinthe early 1990s. In the new TV era, with smarter stadiums, soccer hooliganism hasdeclinedacrossmostofwesternEurope.Since2002,thebuilduptotheWorldCuphasnolongerbeenovershadowedbyangstaboutthugs.

On the field, too, the violence has been takenout of the game. In the past, being acreativeplayerwasahardlife.ThetacklesthatGeorgeBesthadtoendureonManchesterUnited’s right wing in the 1960s almost resembled the sackings of quarterbacks in theNFL.In1966PelélimpedoutoftheWorldCup;in1983DiegoMaradonahadhistimeatBarcelonaruinedbyanassaultbyAndoniGoikoetxea(“TheButcherofBilbao”);andin1992MarcovanBasten’scareerwaseffectivelyendedby injuriesat theageof twenty-eight. But in the TV era, the authorities began to crack down on thuggish defending.BeforetheWorldCupof1998,FIFAactuallymadethetacklefrombehindasending-offoffense. These curbs have freed creative players. In our day, Lionel Messi, CristianoRonaldo,andZlatanIbrahimovichavebeenabletothrillfansweekin,weekoutforyears,almostunsulliedbyinjuriesorfear.

Withabetterspectacleonoffer,andstadiumsmorecomfortable,nowonderclubsinthe best leagues began charging more for tickets. No wonder, too, that in the 2000sviewers beyondEuropebegan switchingontoEuropeangames.A club likeManchesterUnitedstartedlifeasaclubinManchester.ItsoonbecameaclubinEngland,lateraclubinEurope,andtodayitisaglobalclub.

Soccerisnow,byalargeandconstantlygrowingmargin,theplanet’sfavoritegame.Therewasa landmarkmoment in2009,whentheChampionsLeaguefinalovertooktheSuperBowlastheworld’smostwatchedsportingevent:109millionviewersversus106million,accordingtotheFuturesSport+Entertainmentconsultancy.EvenintheCanadianprairie townofEdmonton,crowds tookoverdowntown tocelebrateBarcelona’svictoryoverManchesterUnited.Perhapsevenmoresignificantly,in2013thesoccervideogameFIFA12 sold 13.5million copiesworldwide;MaddenNFL 13, themost popular videogameforgridiron,soldamere5.6million.Themarketforthesegamesiskids,andtoday’skids vote with their Playstations. Soccer—notably European soccer—is inheriting theglobe.That’swhymoviestarsnowadayswanttohangoutwithsoccerplayers,ratherthanviceversa.

Noteventheeconomiccrisishasstuntedthegame’srise.Evenafter2008,Europeanclubs kept growing their revenues by 5 percent a year, against the tide of almost everyotherbusiness.By2012,EuropeansoccerhadbecomeamuchbiggerindustrythananyofitsAmericancompetitors:

Sector Annualrevenuesinbillionsofdollars

Europeansoccer 24.6

USmovietheaters 10.8

NationalFootballLeague 8.8

USMajorLeagueBaseball 7.5

It’s in the context of soccer’s current revenues thatwemust see its current debt. In2013 European clubs owed a cumulative €7.7 billion (about $10 billion), according toUEFA.That’s a lotmore than theyowed a decade ago—but now theyhave a lotmoremoneytopayitwith.

Thesoccereconomyisnotabubble,becauseitshigherspendingisfundedbyhigherrevenues.Madridcouldafford topayaworld-record fee forBalebecause from1997 to2013itsrevenueshadjumpedsixfoldto$792million.Withallthatmoneyinthegame,ofcourse players are earning enormous salaries and becoming spoiled. These are theproblemsofsuccess.

It’sperfectlyreasonabletomakeamoralcritiqueof thenewsoccer.Youcansay:“Irememberthetimewhenmylocalteamconsistedoflocalboysearningthesamesortofwagesasmostpeopleinourtown.Idon’tlikethemoneyedsocceroftoday.”That’sfairenough.You can still find theold local soccer if youdropdownadivisionor two, butperhapsyoustillwanttogotoArsenalorManchesterUnitedandfindeverythingmoreorlessas itwas in1974,andyoucan’t. It’sreasonable toresent that.Afterall,mostofuslike soccer because it connects uswith our childhood.But it’s illogical to jump fromamoralpreference(“Idislikethenewsoccer”)toaneconomicprediction(“Thisisabubblethat’s going to burst”). You might loathe today’s big soccer, but the fact is that it’sprobablyonlygoingtogetbigger.

Backinthe1960s,theEnglishsocceragentKenStanleytoldhisclientGeorgeBest:“Thinkaboutwhatfootballwillbelikewhenit’strulyaworldgame.ThinkofthesizeofAmerica.Thinkofeveryboy inAfricahavinga teamshirtandaballathis feet.ThinkaboutChinaandJapanandtherestoftheFarEast.Therearebillionsofpeopleoutthere,George.Thegameisstillgrowing.They’llbewatchingyouontelevisioninPekingandCalcuttabeforelong.”

Foralltheglobalgrowthwe’veseeninthelastdecade,Stanley’sprophesyisonlyjuststartingtocometrue.TheEnglishPremierLeague,inparticular,isworkingveryhardattapping new markets. Kevin Alavy, the managing director of the Futures Sport +Entertainmentconsultancywhomwemetearlierinthebook,saysthatoftenthePremierLeague enters a new territory by offering itself on free-to-air TV.That’swhat it did ineasternEurope,across theformerSovietUnion,andmorerecently inIndonesia.Untilafew years ago, hardly any of the 247 million Indonesians knew soccer. But given thechancetowatchtop-classEnglishgamesonTVforfree,manybeganwatching.Inrecentyears,saysAlavy,“typicallyIndonesiahasbeenthenumberonemarketbyTVaudiencesforthePremierLeague.”OnceIndonesianswerehooked,thePremierLeaguegavethemanewTVrightsdealthatofferedthemfarlessfreesoccer.

Using these methods, says Alavy, “Football now touches all countries withoutexception.Thatisdifferenttotwentyyearsago.”However,headds,soccerstillhasgreat

scopeforglobalgrowth.Thegamehasonlyjustbeguntopenetratetheworld’sfourmostpopulouscountries,China,India,theUS,andIndonesia,whichbetweenthemaccountforabout45percentofhumanity.

InChinaandIndia,saysAlavy,fewerthan10percentofthepopulation“really,reallycaresaboutfootball.”ThePremierLeaguecurrentlyearnsonlyabout3centsinTVrightsperChineseperson,comparedwithabout$56perSingaporean,accordingtothebusinesswebsite Sportingintelligence.com. That’s room for growth. Then there are the largeeconomies of Japan, Canada, and Australia, where soccer is also growing fast. Onemeasureof theunrealizedpotential is that thePremierLeaguestillearnsmorefromTVrightsinsideEngland(about$4.8billiontotalfrom2013through2016)thanintherestoftheworldputtogether(about$4billion).

Thoseproportionswon’tstaythatwayforlong.AndallofEuropeansoccerwillkeeptappingawayat thosenewoverseasmarkets.Oneprediction: in thenext fewyears, theChampions League will grow its global TV audiences by admitting the champions ofcountriessuchastheUS,China,andJapan.TheseteamswillreplacethePolishorDutchchampions,or theItaliannumberthree.Theproblemoftravelwillbesolvedbymakingthenon-European teamsplay their threeEuropeangamesback toback.And theirhomeaudienceswillswitchoninthemillions.

Pessimistswarnthatpeoplemightwellwatchmoresoccer,butstoppayingforit.Afterall,consumersnowillegallydownloadmuchoftheirmusicforfree,sowhynotArsenal-Chelsea?Already,with a bit of Internet savvy, you canwatch plenty of games online.However, the consultancy PwC, in its report “Outlook for theGlobal SportsMarket to2014,”isreassuring.Itsays:“Researchandindeedtheexperienceofpay-TVbroadcasterswith exclusive sports content confirm that people are prepared to pay for additionalvalue.”

Better, for the first time ever, viewers no longer need a TV to watch soccer.Increasingly, they can choose their platform: cell phones, tablets, Xboxes. That meansthey can watch on the subway, in Starbucks, or during the lunch break at the office.Already,most youngviewerswatchgameswith a “second screen”up, so that they canchat with fellow fans on Twitter or Facebook.Within a couple of decades, technologyshouldmaketheviewingexperienceevenmorefun:ifyouwant,youwillhavehologramsofplayersrunningaroundyourlivingroom.

Inthirtyyears’time,whenEuropeanstadiumsarepackedwithAsianfanspaying$500fortheirtickets,wemaywelllookbackandsay,“Canyouimaginethatin2013youcouldgetintoaPremierLeaguegamefor$100andhavemoneyleftoverforapie?”OrperhapsbytheneveryonewillbewatchingMajorLeagueSoccerinstead.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSDozensofpeoplehelpedmakethisbookpossible.WewouldliketothankPeterAllden,DaveBerri,VictorBichara,IssaMartinez,JoeBoyle,EdwardChisholm,DennisCoates,BastienDrut,RodFort,BerndFrick,JulienBraccoGartner,BrianGoff,SunilGulati,JahnHakes,PaulineHarris,BradHumphreys,PaulHusbands,Kristján Jónsson,KaiKonrad,DanKuper,MarkusKurscheidt,MikeLeeds,BenLyttleton,WolfgangMaennig,RogerNoll, Andrew Oswald, Holger Preuss, Skip Sauer, Philip Soar, Henk Spaan, and LiaNa’amatenBrink.

WegotideasandinformationfromKevinAlavy,RobBaade,RobBateman,Vendelinevon Bredow, Carl Bromley, Tunde Buraimo, Pamela Druckerman, Gavin Fleig, MikeForde, Rod Fort, Russell Gerrard, Matti Goksoyr, Norbert Hofmann, Adam Kuper,Hannah Kuper, Kaz Mochlinski, Jean-Pierre Meersseman, James Nicholson, IgnacioPalacios-Huerta, Ian Preston, Antoinette Renouf, Placido Rodriguez,Mark Rosentraub,AndreasSelliaas,SimonWilson,AxelTorresXirauandPaul in‘tHout;fromBenjaminCohen, Jonathan Hill, Mark O’Keefe, and Alex Phillips at UEFA; and from DavidO’ConnorandAndrewWalshatSport+Markt.

The following were fantastic collaborators: Kevin Alavy, Wladimir Andreff, GilesAtkinson, Tunde Buraimo, Luigi Buzzacchi, Filippo dell’Osso, David Forrest, PedroGarcia-del-Barrio, Steve Hall, David Harbord, Takeo Hirata, Tom Hoehn, GeorgiosKavetsos,StefanKésenne,TimKuypers,UmbertoLago,StephanieLeach,NeilLongley,Susana Mourato, Susanne Parlasca, Thomas Peeters, Ian Preston, Steve Ross, RobSimmons,RonSmith,TommasoValletti,JasonWinfree,andAndyZimbalist.

Gordon Wise and Kate Cooper were hardworking and imaginative agents, CarlBromleythoughtfromthestartthatthisbookshouldappearintheUnitedStates,andhe,SandraBeris,Antoinette Smith, andAnnetteWenda helpedmake theAmerican editionmuchbetterthanitcouldhavebeenwithoutthem.

Wealsowanttothankalltheintervieweesquotedinthetext.

NOTEFROMTHEAUTHORSCHAPTER2

1.OurviewoftransferswasrecentlychallengedinthebookPayasYouPlay,writtenby threeLiverpool fans,PaulTomkins,GraemeRiley, andGaryFulcher.Thebook is atreasure trove of interesting financial facts, with the added benefit that the authors aredonatingalltheirroyaltiestothechildren’scharityPostpals.

Pay as You Play uses data on transfer fees put together by Riley, by day a senioraccountant atAdecco, by night an accomplished soccer statto.He collected figures fortransfer fees paid by Premier League clubs since 1992–1993 from newspapers and anyothersourceshecouldfind.It’satruelaboroflove.

Theauthors’approachtotransfersisveryreasonable.Astheypointout,addingupthetotaltransferfeespaidforalltheplayersinasquadovermanyyearsismisleadingbecauseof inflation in transfer fees—the average spend per player has roughly doubled in adecade. The authors therefore convert past transfer fees into the “current transfer feepurchase price” (CTPP), using average transfer fees as an index. For example, ThierryHenry cost Arsenal an estimated £10.5 million in 1999, which converts to a CTPP of£24.6 million. By giving every transferred player a value, they can compare a team’sspendingontransferstoperformanceintheleague.

WhenTomkins thenpublishedablogbyZachSlatonheadlined“SoccernomicsWasWrong:TransferExpendituresMatter,”naturallywesatupandtooknotice.

Slatonarguedthattransferfeeswerejustasgoodapredictorofleaguepositionasiswagespending.Oneofus(Stefan)contactedSlatonandtheauthorstofindoutabitmoreaboutwhatwasgoingon.Rileykindly showedus thedatahehadused tocalculatehisindex.

Itthenbecameclearwherethedifferenceslay.ThePayasYouPlayindexrefersonlyto transfer feespaid.Butwhenwesaid thatspendingon transfersbears little relation towhereaclubfinishes,wewerereferringtonettransferspending—transferfeespaidminustransferfeesreceived.(Wehaveclarifiedthatpointinthisedition.)Thenetfigureisthecrucialone,becausehardlyanyclubscan justkeepbuyingplayerswithoutoccasionallyselling some to stop their spending from going too far out of whack. The only free-spendingexceptionsinEnglishsoccerareManchesterCitysince2008,andChelseasince2003.Onceyoulookatnetspending,it’sclearthatveryfewclubsrunsuccessfultransferpolicies: their net spendingbarelypredictswhere they finish in the league. Ifmanagersand clubswere valuing players accurately, you’d expect to see a significant correlationbetweennetspendingandperformance,atleastovertime.

Thereliabilityof thePayasYouPlaydata isalsodoubtful.Dataonwages isprettyaccurate: it’s drawn from each club’s audited financial accounts, which are publiclyavailableinEngland.Buttransferfeesquotedinthemediaarelesstrustworthy.Takethefollowing comparison of transfer fees paid formembers ofArsenal’s 2008–2009 squadfromPayasYouPlaydataandfromanotherreputablesource,transfermarkt.co.uk:

There are clearly somebig differences here.Nowonder, as transfer fees are almostnever officially disclosed, only leaked to the media by the club or the player’s agent,generallywith a spin.Nonetheless, andgiven these caveats, thePayasYouPlay indexdoesquitewellatexplainingthevariationinteamperformanceinthePremierLeaguefortheyearscovered.

That’s hardly surprising.A club that spends a big transfer fee buying a playerwillalmostalwaysalsospendabigsumonhiswages.Sointhissense,intheveryshortterm,gross transferfeescanbealmostasgoodanexplanationofsuccessaswages.However,realsuccessinthetransfermarketmeansbuyingcheapandsellingdear.Forthatyouneedtoknowaclub’snetspending,whichshowsverylittlecorrelationwithteamperformance.Thetransfermarketremainsfarfromefficient.

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MAGAZINES

HardGras(Netherlands)

Johan(Netherlands,nowdefunct)

SoFoot(France)

VoetbalInternational(Netherlands)

INDEXA.T.Kearney,42,63,66

Abidal,Eric,44,106

Abraham,Mike,198

Abramovich(MidgleyandHutchins),84

Abramovich,Roman,84–85,100,122,175–176,245

ACMilan,7–8,13,31,180,213,310,323

AccringtonStanley,73,78

Adams,Tony,30,59–60

Addicted(Adams),60

ADODenHaag,174–175

Adu,Freddy,42

AfricanNationsCup,353

Age

inbaseballscouting,42–43

ofplayers,transfermarketinfluencedby,28–29,42

Agnellifamily,182

Agüero,Sergio,37,89,149,162

Aitken,Peter,76

AjaxAmsterdam,36,379–380

Alavy,Kevin,229–230,240,413

AldershotFC,78

AllPlayedOut:TheFullStoryofItalia’90(Davies,P.),6

Allison,Malcolm,114

Alonso,AngelBarajas,69

Alves,Dani,47

Amokachi,Daniel,105

AnatomyofEngland(Wilson),337

Ancelotti,Carlo,58

Anderson,Chris,125,170,324,352

Anderson,Sonny,44

Anderson,Viv,98

Andreff,Wladimir,83

Anelka,Nicolas,32–33,110,132

Anguilla,221

Anti-stadiummovements,278

Apartheid,354,358–360

Arabplayers,107–110

Arconada,Luis,387

Ardiles,Osvaldo,316

Arena,Bruce,212

Argentina,364–366,365(fig.)

Arsenal,18,87,94,104,118–119,159,192

Arshavin,Andrei,405

Arteta,Mikel,29

Aruba,220

AshtonGate,75

Asia,237,395–397

AsianCup,370

Assou-Ekotto,Benoit,108

AstonVilla,136,166

Atkinson,Ron,104

AtlantaBraves,287

AthleticBilbao,68

AtleticoMadrid,63–64,68–70

Aulas,Jean-Michel,38–45,179

Australia,401–403

AustralianRulesfootball,200

Austria,221

Auzout,Adrien,322

Baade,Rob,276–279

Bacon,Francis,322

BafanaBafana,353,357–359

Bale,Gareth,14,158,168,409

Ball,Alan,300

Ballack,Michael,143

BambooGoalposts(Simons),244

Banks,Gordon,52,300–301

Barbados,220

Barcelona,46–47,50,180–181,213,245,378,381

Masíaand,382–385

Barnes,John,13,98,112

Barnet,227

Barrio,PedroGarciadel,67

Bartlett,Shaun,358

Barwick,Brian,56

Baseball

ageorplayersin,42–43

globalparticipationin,345

historicaldiscriminationin,106–107

luckasfactorin,338

NegroLeagues,106

salarycapsin,87–88

statisticsand,4

SeealsoMoneyball;Moneyball(film)

BaseballAbstracts(James),4

Basketball,345

Bassett,Dave,152

Bateman,Rob,158

Bates,Ken,84

Batistuta,Gabriel,186

Batty,David313–314

Batty,Michael,189

BayernMunich,80,87,148,180,213,323

BCFC.SeeBristolCityFootballCity

Beane,Billy,4,19,42–43,45,58,164

interestinsoccer,156–157

SeealsoMoneyball;Moneyball(film)

Beaud,Stéphane,109

Beck,John,122

Beckenbauer,Franz,172

Beckham,David,119,201,301,317–318

scapegoatingof,302–303

Belanov,Igor,140

Belgianplayers,23–24

Belletti,Juliano,143

Bello,Lo,380

Bellos,Alex,5,23

BenArfa,Hatem,109

Benayoun,Yossi,29

Benfica,140

Benford’sLaw,223

Benham,Matthew,338

Benitez,Rafael,16–17,166

Bennetts,Marc,404

Benzema,Karim,109

Berbatov,Dimitar,158

Bergkamp,Dennis,155,316,380

Berlin,Germany,137–139

Berlusconi,Silvio,187,410

Bermuda,221

Best,George,29–30,31–32,391,411–412

Bielefeld,Arminia,400

Biermann,Christoph,23,160

Bilic,Slaven,316

binLaden,Osama,395

BIRGing,forfans,248–250

BirminghamCity,26

Birtles,Gary,26

Blackmanagers,112

Blackplayers

incities,192

discriminationagainst,inEngland,3,95–106

inFrance,107–110,343

asgoalkeepers,103–104

inNegroLeagues,106

inSouthAfrica,358–360

SeealsoDiscrimination

TheBlackSwan:TheImpactoftheHighlyImprobable(Taleb),341

BlackburnRovers,100,117,357

Blair,Tony,127

Blanc,Laurent“LePrésident,”107–108,110

Blatter,Sepp,307

lesBleus,108–109

Blissett,Luther,13,31,112

Boade,Pep,383

Boateng,Kevin-Prince,149

Bocuse,Paul,38

Bohinen,Lars,153

Bolaños,Amelia,260–261

Bolton,159

Bonetti,Peter,301

Bonhof,Rainer,184

BorussiaDortmund,181,357

BorussiaMönchengladbach,184,323

Bose,Mihir,52

Bosmanruling,185,309

BostonRedSox,4

Boukhari,Nourdin,359–360

Boulahrouz,Khalid,389

Boyle,Joe,313

BradfordParkAvenue,73,77

Brady,Chris,59

Brandswitchers,255

Brazil

hostingofWorldCup,273,284–288,294

asoverachievingnation,368

overvaluationofplayers,23–24

playersintransfermarkets,35

soccerculturein,260–261

asuniversal“secondteam,”234

winningpercentagesof,362–364,363(fig.)

Breakevenrule,87–88

Brentford,338

Bridgewater,Sue,58–59,128

BrilliantOrange:TheNeuroticGeniusofDutchSoccer(Winner),390

BristolCityFootballCity(BCFC),74–78,250

BristolRovers,77

BritishInsolvencyAct,78

Brown,Steve,168

Bucharest,Steaua,173

Buffett,Warren,21

Buffon,Gianluigi,142

Bundesliga,175,213,309,324

Bungs,25

Buraimo,Tunde,133–134

Burgess,Charles,243

Burnham,Andy,203–204

Burns,Jimmy,174,377

Burns,Kenny,26,28

Bush,GeorgeW.,275

Busquets,Sergio,46

Butcher,Terry,307

Butragueño,Emilio,203

Butt,Nicky,119

Buyingclubs,14,15(fig.)

SeealsoSalaries

Caesar,Gus,96

Cambiasso,Esteban,141

CambridgeUnited,153,256

Cameron,David,293

Cameroon,357

Campbell,Alastair,127

Canio,Paolodi,20

Cantona,Eric,26

Capellas,Albert,382

Capello,Fabio,124,148,303,327–328

Capelloeffect,341–342

Capitalcities,174–176,179

Carabén,Armand,378

Carefreecasualfans,254–255

Carling,Chris,384

Carra(Carragher),16

Carragher,Jamie,16,123–124,336

Carroll,Andy,165,316

Carsley,Lee,169

Carter,Jimmy,198

Carvalho,Ricardo,301

Cassidy,David,184

Castiella,FernandoMaría,174

Cathedralcities,186–188

Ceauşescu,Nicolae,173,223

Cech,Petr,143,149

Celtic,225

Chamakh,Marouane,108

ChampionsLeague,323–324,413–414

fairnessof,213

insmalltowns,188

ChampionsLeaguefinal(2005),18

ChampionsLeaguefinal(2008),3,72,131,141

ChampionsLeaguefinal(2013),81

Championshiptier,14

ChannelFour,UK,200,208,228

Charisteas,Angelos,400

CharltonAthletic(soccerclub),77

Charlton,Bobby,52

Chelsea,18,47,59,87,100,122,192

CheltenhamTown,182

Chiappori,P.-A.,137

Chineseserialfans,244–246

Chivu,Cristian,381

Christie,Agatha,199

CIESFootballObservatory,166

Cissé,Djibril,17

Cities

blackplayersin,192

capital,174–176,179

cathedral,186–188

industrial,176–183

lawofproportionategrowthand,190

provincial,183

smalltownsand,183–186,184(fig.)

Clark,Frank,60

Clarke,Steve,126

Clough,Brian,19,25,54,115,172,214,223

Clowes,Jeff,253

Coachingandcoaches.SeeManagementandmanagers

ColdWar,137

Cole,Ashley,143,311,313

Cole,Joe,313

Coller,Deryn,75

Colombia,333–334

Committedcasualfans,255

CommonwealthGames,229

Comolli,Damien,157,165–171

scapegoatingof,167

ConfederationsCup,402

Connolly,Fergus,157–158

Constantinou,Demitri,354

CookIslands,221

Cooney,Aidan,155

LaCoruña,69

Costner,Kevin,274

Coulson,John,2

Cragnotti,Sergio,63–64

Crick,Michael,102

Cricket,318,345

Cristelli,Matthieu,189

Croatia,236,327–328

Crooks,Garth,96

Cruijff,Johan,316,378–390

inSouthAfrica,385–390

Cruijff,Jordi,21

CrystalPalace,95,153

Curtis,George,57

Cutiño,FranciscoPérez,66

CzechRepublic,366

DailyMail,317,326

Dalglish,Kenny,56–57

TheDamnedUnited(film),25–26

TheDamnedUnited(Peace),25–26

Dataanalysis,5–9

eraofbigdata,5–6

MarchoftheGeeks,7–8

inpolitics,6–7

SeealsoMatchAnalysis;Opta;Prozone;Statistics

DavidversusGoliathmatches,211–212

Davids,Edgar,381,402

Davies,Norman,321

Davies,Pete,6

deBoer,Frank,381

deBoer,Ronald,381

deJong,Nigel,381

Dearnaley,George,354–355

Dein,David,175

Deisler,Sebastian,185

Derby,77

DerbyCounty,206

Derwall,Jupp,398

Desailly,Marcel,104

Dessypris,Nick,267

diStefano,Alfredo,377

Diamonds,227

Diao,Salif,16

Diarra,Mahamadou,44

Dicks,Alan,74–75

Diouf,El-Hadji,16–17

Discrimination

againstArabplayers,107–110

inbaseball,106–107

basedonappearance,102

againstblackmanagers,112

againstblackplayers,3,95–106

cycleof,101

inFrance,107–110

job,100

legalityof,97–98

inPremierLeague,99

wage,100

againstwomen,56–59

Dobson,Stephen,209

Domenech,Raymond,39,109

Dorling,Daniel,191

Downing,Stewart,166

Draper,Peter,198

Drogba,Didier,34,121,343

Duncan,John,57

Dundee,Sean,16

Dupont,Jean-Louis,88

DurhamCity,73

Durkheim,Émile,262

Dyke,Greg,54,307,338

DynamoBerlin,174

DynamoKiev,20

EasternEurope,winpercentagesin,372

EbbsfleetUnited,129

Econometrics,99

Edwards,Martin,56

Edworthy,Niall,301

Eggers,Dave,201–202

EightyYears’War,390

ElfSchweine.SeeDynamoBerlin

Elia,Eljero,389

Eliot,T.S.,305

Engels,Friedrich,176

England

badluckfor,300–301

blackplayersin,3,95–106

bungsin,25

Capelloeffectin,341–342

certaintyofwin,forWorldCup,299–300

cheatingallegations,301

culturaldevelopmentof,198–199

earlysalariesforplayers,53

eliminationof,fromWorldCupfinals,302

endofisolationistpolicies,325–326

fandomin,257–259

footballontelevisionin,200

hopefulnessof,forfuturewins,303–305

immigrationto,97–99

merchandisingin,forsoccerclubs,53

middle-classin,312–319

renovationofstadiumsin,54–55

rivalsto,300,336

scapegoatingin,302–303

soccernetworkin,319–329

spendingratesforclubs,14

statisticaldataanalysisfor,161,331–341

duringThatcherrecession,74

asunderachieving,307,329–331

winningpercentageof,305–308,340(fig.)

duringWorldWarI,197

SeealsoLondon,England;PremierLeague;Soccerclubs

EnglishFootballAssociation,54,56,60,71,152,279,307,328

EnglishFootballLeague,49,73,99,177,410

Epstein,Theo,4

EqualityandHumanRightsCommission,UK,111

Eriksen,Christian,381

Eriksson,SvenGoran,63–64,300,311,326

Essien,Michael,44–45

EstadioNacional,273

d’Estaing,Giscard,399

Estonia,223

Ethiopia,357

Eto’o,Samuel,344

Eulberg,Frank,353

Euro(1980),290

Euro(1984),290–291,387

Euro(1988),290–291

Euro(1996),279,290,335,399

Euro(2000),290–291

Euro(2004),401

Euro(2008),236,306,385,405

Euro(2012),281,305,385,393

Europe

attendancedata,223–224

disappearanceofclubs,79

Eastern,winpercentagesin,372

insolvencyofsoccerclubs,79,86

match-fixingin,80

over-achievingteams,byrank,373(fig.)

preferredclubsin,178(fig.)

soccer-friendlyclimatein,321

winpercentages,fortoptenteams,371–372,371(fig.)

EuropeanCup,183(fig.),213

EuropeanEconomicCommunity,324,392

EuropeanUnion,324–325,386

Everton,95,165–171

Exley,Frederick,265–266,272

FACup(1991),264

Fabregas,Cesc,42–43,151,377

Fandom

clichésabout,243

inEngland,257–259

Hornbymodel,242–244,246,253–254

IndustrialRevolutionasinfluenceon,177,258

asprocess,256

shiftingsupportfor,255–257

Fans

BIRGing,248–250

brandswitchers,255

carefreecasual,254–255

Chineseserial,244–246

committedcasuals,255

asconsumers,222–223

aseconomicmarket,215

hardcore,246–252

inindustrialcities,178–179

forisland-basedsoccerclubs,219–228

lost,249

asloyalsupporters,252–255

managementinfluencedby,62

forManchesterUnited,245–246,245(fig.)

mortalityratesfor,250,252

forPremierLeague,247,249–250

professionalwanderers,258–259

suicideand,260–272

AFan’sNotes(Exley),265

FaroeIslands,220,226–227,239–240

FaroeIslandsFootballAssociation,226

Fascistgovernments,soccerunder,173

FearandLoathingontheCampaignTrail(Thompson),264

Fellaini,Marouane,169

Fenerbahce,2

Ferdinand,Rio,84,142

Ferguson,Alex,18,56,144,155,307,315

Fernandes,Tony,3,20–21,62,124,193

Fernquist,Robert,262–263

FeverPitch(Hornby),96,242,246,252,265

Feynman-Kacrepresentation,330

FFP.SeeFinancialfairplay

FieldofDreams,274

FIFA,219–221,229,286–288,355,411

expansionof,362

foundationof,362

transfermarketsand,28

Financialfairplay(FFP),9,84–94

forbigsoccerclubs,93–94

breakevenrulein,87–88

playerwages,89

relevantincomeand,87–88

FinancialTimes,84,243,292,317

FinchFarm,167–168

Finkielkraut,Alain,108–109

Fiorentina,186–187

TheFix(Hill,Declan),369

Fixedeffect,fortelevisionviewing,232–233

Flamini,Mathieu,160

Fleig,Gavin,37,150–151

FletcherResearch,247

Flynn,Alex,50

Fofi,Goffredo,180

Fontanarrosa,Roberto,394

Football(American)

attendanceratesfor,203

developmentof,199

globalparticipants,201

nameof,195–196

salarycapsin,87–88

soccercomparedto,202–211

statisticsin,156

FootballAssociation,98

FootballDynamo:ModernRussiaandthePeople’sGame(Bennetts),404

TheFootballMan(Hopcraft),64

FootballManagement(Bridgewater),58

FootballMoneyLeague,50

Ford,Stuart,317

Forde,Mike,151,159

Forest,25–27

Forlán,Diego,145

Forrest,David,207

Fortune,Quinton,358

Fowler,Robbie,308,317

France,37–47

Arabplayersin,107–110

blackplayersin,107–110,343

discriminationinsoccer,107–110

Paris,174–176

FranceFootball,32,40

Francis,Gerry,60

Francis,Trevor,27,185

Franco,Francisco,173–174,377

Freakonomics(Levitt),137

Friar,Ken,74

Fulham,59,193

Furphy,Ken,57

DieFussball-Matrix(Biermann),23,160

Futebol:TheBrazilianWayofLife(Bellos),5,23

FutureSport+Entertainmentconsultancy,229–230,411,413

Gabaix,Xavier,190

Gaetjens,Joe,300

Gametheory,137–139

Garland,Chris,76

Gauss,CarlFriedrich,232

Gazidis,Ivan,90

GDP.SeeGrossdomesticproduct

Gemmill,Archie,26–27

George,Ricky,52

Germany

Berlin,137–139

enthusiasmforsoccerin,221

historicalrivalsto,300,336

statisticaldatain,161

suicidesin,267

televisionviewingdatain,228–229

WorldCupin,280–281

Gerrard,Russell,330–341,362,387

Gerrard,Steven,17,151,159,165,307

Giggs,Ryan,102,119

GilyGil,Jesús,68

Gillett,George,71

Ginsborg,Paul,180

Gladwell,Malcolm,359

Glazerfamily,92–93,210

Goalkeepers,103–104,147,162

Goddard,John,209

Goikoetxea,Andoni,411

Gomes,Heurelho,163

Gopnik,Adam,132

Gordon,Craig,162–163

Gori,VittorioCecchi,186–187

Gourcuff,Yoann,19

Graham,George,20,22–23,117

Grant,Avram,126,141–142

Gray,John,199

GreatManTheoryofHistory,127

Greece,399–401

Green,Robert,163

GreenPointStadium,284

Greenwood,Ron,300

Gregg,Harry,114

Groseclose,T.,137

Grossdomesticproduct(GDP),367,370–371

Guardian,195

Guardiola,Josep,46,316,381–384,387

Gudmundsson,Björgólfur,240

Guerrero,PlácidoRodriguez,69

Gullit,Ruud,32,59,112,316

TheHague,174–175

HalifaxTown,73

Hall,John(Sir),54,182

Hall,Matthew,401

Halldórsson,HannesThor,241

Halldórsson,Vidar,240

Hamilton,Duncan,32

Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmanequation,330

Hamlet,M.A.,244

“HandofGod,”301,362,365

Hannah,Les,81

Hannover96,56

Happiness:LessonsfromaNewScience(Layard),288–289

Hardcorefans,246–252

Hargreaves,Daniel,168,318

Harris,C.(Reverend),194

Haynes,Johnny,300

Helder,Glenn,106

Helland,Knut,351

Hembert,Emmanuel,42,61

Henderson,Jordan,166

Henry,John,18,164,210

Henry,Thierry,29,84,121,162,192

Hereford,52,77

Here’sLookingatEuclid(Bellos),5

Herrera,Helenio,127

HerthaBerlin,175

Hesp,Ruud,376

Hicks,Tom,71,275

Hiddink,Guus,124,391–393,395–397

inAustralia,401–403

inMoscow,403–405

Higuain,Gonzalo,148–149

Hill,Dave,95,105,302–303

Hill,Declan,369

Hirshleifer,Jack,212

Hoddle,Glenn,20,60,299

Hodgson,Roy,59,305

Holland.SeetheNetherlands

Hooke,Robert,322

Hooper,Tom,25

Hopcraft,Arthur,64,291

Hornby,Nick,6,96,227,242,252,265

modeloffandom,242–244,246,253–254

Hosting,ofWorldCups

bidsfor,274

branddamagefrom,287

inBrazil,273,284–288,295

economicbonanzafrom,282–284

fundingfor,287–288

inGermany,280–281

happinessfrom,288–295

infrastructurefor,285–286

stadiumsand,275–279

Houllier,Gérard,16–17,41,166

Hughes,Charles,152

Hughes,Emlyn,95

Hughes,Mark,21,128

Hughton,Chris,112

Hull,77

Humphreys,Brad,281

Hussein,Saddam,369

Hussein,Uday,369

Hutchins,Chris,84

Hutchinson,Roger,394

Hutton,AlexanderWatson,197

Huygens,Christiaan,322

Hvidbro,Virgar,226

Hyppiä,Sami,17

Ibrahimovic,Zlatan,47,89,344,381,411

Iceland,221,225–226,238–241

Immigration,toEngland,97–98

Immortal(Hamilton),32

In‘tHout,Paul,223

Ince,Paul,59,112

Incomes

FFPand,87–88

frommerchandising,53

fromsoccer,51

fromstadiumnamingrights,89

SeealsoSalaries

Independent,195

India,357

Industrialcities,176–183

fansin,178–179

IndustrialRevolution,177,258

Infantino,Gianni,288

Iniesta,Andres,316,376,382–383

Inswinger,1

Inter,213

InternationalMonetaryFund,320

InvertingthePyramid(Wilson),151–152

Inzaghi,Filippo,8

Iran,368–370

Iraq,368–370

Istanbul,Turkey,181–182

Italia‘90,291

Italy,161

SeealsoMilan,Italy

ITV,228

James,Bill,3–4,29,42

James,David,149,163

Japan,231,395,407

Jensen,John,22,27

Jobdiscrimination,100

Jóhansson,Aron,240

Johansson,Bjørn,55–56

Johnson,Adam,151

Joiner,Thomas,271

Jones,Dan,210

Jordaan,Danny,284,355

Jung-Hwan,Ahn,402

Juventus,180,213

Kaenzig,Ilja,56

Kahn,Lawrence,106

Kahneman,Daniel,170

KaizerChiefs,353,355

Kaká,22,316

Kalou,Salomon,143

Kanu,Nwankwo,381

Kapuscinski,Ryszard,260

al-Kathiri,Mohammed,42

Kavetsos,Georgios,290

Kay,John,292

Keane,Robbie,17

Keane,Roy,26,58,59

Keegan,Kevin,208,327

Keller,Kasey,23

Kennedy,JohnF.,271–272

Kennedy,RobertF.,293

Kenyon,Peter,52

Khan,Ilyas,78

Khan,Shahid,193

Khoza,Irvin,282

KickOffmagazine,355

Kingsley,George,188–190

Kirkland,Chris,163

Kirkwood,Alistair,200

Klein,Stefan,302

Klinsmann,Jürgen,409

Klose,Miroslav,149

Kluivert,Patrick,381

KMPGAfrica,287

Koch,Paul,375

Kopa,Raymond,377

Köpke,Andreas,140

Korea,231

Koreandisease,396

Kornai,János,82

Kroenke,Stan,94,210

Krugman,Paul,189

Kuper,Dan,313

Kuper,Simon,2–3,352

Lacombe,Bernard,40

LakeForestCollege,276–277,279

Lampard,Frank,125,143,149,159,304

Lamprecht&StammSFBAG,220

Lamptey,Nii,42

Landscrona,107

Lanham,Neil,152–153

Laporta,Joan,46

Lawofproportionategrowth,190

Layard,Richard,288–289

LazioRoma155

LeGuen,Paul,41

LeSaux,Graeme,317

LeagueManagersAssociation,128

Lee,Rob,313

LeedsUnited,81,120

Lehmann,Jens,140,145

Lever,Janet,260

Levitin,Daniel,359

Levitt,Steve,137

Lewis,Michael,4,6,19–20,22,42–43,58,156–157,338

SeealsoMoneyball

LeytonOrient,227

Licensing,51,93

Liébana,JoséMariaGayde,69

Lineker,Gary,318

LiverpoolFC,36,55,59,95,117–118,245–246

statisticalanalysisfor,164–171

transferpolicyof,16–19

Livingstone,Ken,294

Lobanovsky,Valeri,153,325

London,England,174–176,188–193

transformationof,191–192

Zipfand,188–190

LongEaton,26

LongWalktoFreedom(Mandela),194

“TheLongestPenaltyEver”(Soriano),138

LosAngelesAztecs,379

LosAngelesGalaxy,201,212

Lowe,Rupert,123

Loyalsupporterfans,252–255

Luck,Andrew,206

Luxembourg,374–375

Lyttleton,Ben,8

MacArthur,Douglas,199

Macmillan,Harold,128

MaidstoneUnited,78

MajorLeagueSoccer(MLS),201,212

Makelele,Claude,160–161

Maldini,Paolo,8,161

Mali,221

Malouda,Florent,44

Managementandmanagers

availabilityof,60

averagetenurefor,125

discriminationin,112

fans’influenceon,62

firingof,asritual,127–1218

GreatManTheoryofHistoryand,127

hiringspeedof,55–56

interviewprocessfor,56–59

LeagueManagersAssociation,128

asomnipotent,127

overachieving,115,116(fig.),117,118–119

onpenaltykicks,133

penaltykicksand,coachingstrategiesfor,144–148

performancecriteriafor,126

preferencefor,111–113

publicrelationskillsof,60,126–127

qualificationsof,59–60

rankof,116–117

special,117(fig.)

spendingby,20–21

staffingand,125–126

statisticsand,assupplementaryinformation,158

wagespendingby,117–119

womenand,56–59

Manchester,England,176–178

ManchesterCity,35–37,88,91,120,122,150

ManchesterUnited,3,15,19,47,54,62,66,87–89,92,102,118–119,376,411

fanestimatesfor,245–246,245(fig.)

globalpopularityof,177–178

statisticalanalysisfor,164

winningrecordfor,209

ManchesterUnited:TheBiography(White),176

Mancini,Roberto,1–2,128–129

Mandela,Nelson,194

Mander,Anthony,270

Mann,Jimmy,76

Manning,Peyton,206

Mansour,Sheikh,89,91,128

Maradona,Diego,42,58–59,261,301,344,411

“HandofGod”and,301,362,365

MarchoftheGeeks,7–8

Marcos,336–337

Marcotti,Gabriele,89

Marini,Valeria,186

Markovits,Andrei,202

Marshall,Julian,76

Marx,Karl,176

Masía(headquartersofBarcelonaacademy),382–385

Masterson,George,269

MatchAnalysis,2

Matchdata.SeeStatistics

Match-fixing,80

Materazzi,Marco,362

Matheson,Victor,279

Matthäus,Lothar,185

Maxwell,381

McCarthy,Benni,358

McClaren,Steve,55,327

McGregor,William,49

McLeod,Ally,270

McMordie,Eric,31–32

Mears,Joe,303

Mears,Tyrone,33

Meersseman,Jean-Pierre,7

Mehlman,Ken,6

MelbourneHeraldSun,403

Merchandising,asrevenuestream,53

Merrick,Geoff,76

Merson,Paul,30

MerthyrTown,73

Messi,Lionel,42,383,411

Meulensteen,Rene,59

Mexico,238

Michels,Rinus,379

Middle-class,Englishplayersand,312–319,314(fig.)

Middlesbrough,60

Midgley,Dominic,84

Mielke,Erich,174

Milan,Italy,180

Miller,Charles,196–197

Milutinovic,Bora,407

MinnesotaVikings,287

Mittal,Lakshmi,193

MLS.SeeMajorLeagueSoccer

Modric,Luka,158

Monaco,153

Moneyball(film),4

Moneyball(Lewis),4,6,19–20,22,42–43,58

incompetenceofstaff,62

luckasfactorin,338

statisticsin,156–157

Montague,James,369

Moore,Bobby,52,57

Moore,Ronnie,122

Moray,Robert,322

Morientes,Fernando,17

Moscow,Russia,137–139,175,188–193,403–405

Mosimane,Pitso,357

Möttölä,Matias,50

Mourinho,José,58–59,113,122

Moyes,David,168–170

Mulier,Pim,197–198

MulierInstituut,221

Müller,Gerd,401

Mullery,Alan,114

Murdoch,Rupert,53–54,200,410

Murray,Andy,327

MyStorySoFar(Rooney),34

Nasri,Samir,109

NationalFootballLeague(NFL)

onEnglishtelevision,200

popularityoutsideU.S.,195

PremierLeaguecomparedto,204–206

RooneyRulein,112–113

associalistleague,203

SuperBowls,200,230

ontelevision,200

totalincomeof,410

Nationalities,overvaluationofplayersby,23–24

Ndlovu,Peter,356

NegroLeagues,106

Nelson(soccerclub),73

NelsonMandelaChallenge,356

theNetherlands,239,379–381

attendanceaveragesin,225

enthusiasmforsoccerin,221

suicidesin,269

“totalfootball,”392–393

Netzer,Gunter,184

Neuer,Manuel,149

Neville,Gary,34,318

NewBrighton,73

NewYorkGiants,265–266

NewYorkTimes,6–7,277

NewYorker,68,132

Newcastle,54,64,117

NewportCounty,73,78

NewtonHeath.SeeManchesterUnited

NFL.SeeNationalFootballLeague

Ngobese,Emmanuel“Scara,”355

Nike,361

Nixon,Richard,263–264

Noades,Ron,95–96,103

Nolan,Kevin,151

NorthAmericanSoccerLeague,379,406–407

Norway,240

attendanceaveragesfor,225

assportingcountry,350–351

suicidein,267–268

NorwichCity,15

NottinghamForest,19,115,214

TheNumbersGame(Anderson,C.andSally),125,170,324,352

Obama,Barack,231

OldTrafford,119,121

OldhamAthletic,317

Oliver,Joan,46–47

Oliviera,Williamde,42

Olmert,Ehud,92

Olsen,Egil,153–154

Olympics

economicbonanzafrom,273

happinessasresultof,290

sportsin,344–348

Olympics(Summer)1972,287

Olympics(Winter)1976,287

Olympics(Summer)1992,387

Olympics(Summer)1996,287

Olympics(Summer)2012,290,292,347–348

Olympics(Summer)2016,273,285

OlympiqueLyon,19,37–45

transfermarketfor,40

OlympiqueMarseille,33–34,40,175

Ooijer,André,389

OptaConsulting,2,6,154–155

OptaIndex,154

Orakwue,Stella,112

Osundo,Philip,42

Outliers:TheStoryofSuccess(Gladwell),359

OutsideView,170

Outswingers,1

Overmars,Marc,29

Overvaluation,ofplayers,21–24

bynationality,23–24

Owen,Michael,17,327

OxfordUnited,182

Özil,Mesut,23

Paisley,Bob,28,57

Palacios-Huerta,Ignacio,141–142,146–149,376

Panathinaikos,173

Papadopoulos,Fotis,267

Paradoxofpower,212–213

Parasuicide,269–270

Paris,France,174–176

ParisSaint-Germain,175–176

Parkin,Steve,122

Parma,187

Parry,Rick,243,253

Passcompletionrates,2

Peace,David,25–26

Peeters,Thomas,88,283

Pelé,42,405,411

LePen,Jean-Marie,108

Penaltykicks

forawayteams,134

fairnessof,132–137

forfavoriteteams,136

gametheoryand,137–139

goalkeeperstrategies,147

forhometeams,134–135,134(fig.)

impactonsoccer,132–133,135(fig.)

managersand,133

mixedstrategiesfor,146

patternsfor,139–144

inPremierLeague,averagesof,134

randomizationof,ascoachingstrategy,144–148

People’sHistoryofSportsintheUnitedStates(Zirin),276

Pérez,Florentino,22,68,160

Perrin,Alain,41

Perry,William“theRefrigerator,”200

Peters,Martin,301

Petit,Emmanuel,29

Petridou,Eleni,267

PFA.SeeProfessionalFootballAssociation

Phillips,Trevor,111

Phoenixing,77

Pienaar,Steven,36,353,381

Pietronero,Luciano,189

Piqué,Gerard,46

PitchInvaders(Orakwue),112

Pitt,Brad,4

Platini,Michel,72,90,172,307–309,387

PlayingforProfits,63

Plenderleith,Ian,212

Poborský,Karel,21

Poland,301,334

Porto,175

PortsmouthFC,79

Portugal,366

Poverty,343–360

soccerexpertiseand,359–360

inSouthAfrica,352–356

Poyet,Gus,20

PremierLeague,14,92,307–319,413

attendanceaveragesfor,67,222

blackmanagersin,112

broadcastincomefor,94

championshipteams(2003–2012),14(fig.)

completionratesfor,151

discriminationin,99

fansfor,247,249–250

foreignmanagersin,316

inequalitywithin,206–210

internationalizationof,309

NFLcomparedto,204–206

penaltykicksin,averagesof,134

playersfrommiddle-classbackgrounds,312–319

profit/lossesfor,65,65(fig.)

relocationconsultantsfor,36–37

revenuesfor,50–51

statisticalanalysisfor,162

televisionincomefor,210–211

Preuss,Holger,280

PrimeraDivisión,Spain,309

ProLicensecourse,England,59

ProfessionalFootballAssociation(PFA),England,76

Prokopowicz,Szymon,281

Prospect,243

Provincialcities,183

Prozone,6

Puskás,Ferenc,377

QueensParkRangers,3,20–21,37

Rachman,Gideon,243–244

Racism.SeeDiscrimination

Ramsey,Alf,299

Rangers,225

Ranieri,Claudio,122

Rausch,Friedel,184

Rea,Frederick,393

RealBetis,69

RealMadrid,14,19,22–23,32–33,50,67,160,173–174,213,245,377

RealMurcia,69

RealZaragoza,69

Rebrov,Sergei,20

RedStarBelgrade,173

Redgrave,Steve,294

Redknapp,Harry,21

Redondo,Fernando,316

Reep,Charles,151–153

Rehhagel,Otto,400

Reina,Jose,163

Reker,Jan,140

Relocation,ofplayers,30–37

consultantsfor,33–35

culturaladjustmentsin,30

inPremierLeague,36–37

Renouf,Antoinette,195

Ribéry,Franck,148

Rickey,Branch,106

Rijkaard,Frank,382

Robinho,35–36

Robinson,Jackie,106,112

Robson,Bobby,118

Robson,Bryan,60,126

Rodgers,Brendan,59,126

Rodgers,David,76

Rodríguez,Maxi,140

Romario,402

Ronaldinho,301

Ronaldo,Cristiano,22,121,142–143,167,179,301,359–360,411

scapegoatingof,303

Rooney,Wayne,15,34,42,125,301,311,388,404

RooneyRule,112–113

Rosen,Nir,370

Rosen,Sherwin,206

Rousseff,Dilma,293

Rugby,318,344–345

Rush,Ian,32

Rushden,227

Ruthven,Malise,321

Sacchi,Arrigo,58,322–323

Saint-Étienne,38

Saker,John,284

Salamanca,79–80

Salaries

caps,inbaseball,87–88

early,forEnglishplayers,53

endofyearrankingsinfluencedby,15,15(fig.)

Sally,David,125,170,324,352

SanJoseEarthquakes,226,391,393

Sanchez,JoseAngel,245

Sanderson,Allen,206

Santini,Jacques,41,192

Santos,Andre,29

Sarkozy,Nicolas,110

Scapegoating

ofBeckham,302–303

ofComolli,167

inEngland,302–303

ofRonaldo,303

Schaefer,Manfred,401

Schmid,Sigi,2

Scholes,Paul,119

Scolari,LuizFelipe,337

ScottishFootballAssociation,316

SeattleSounders,2

TheSecondMostImportantJobintheCountry(Edworthy),301

Seedorf,Clarence,381

Seinfeld,Jerry,302

Selliaas,Andreas,227

Sellingclubs,14

SerieAleague,222

Shankly,Bill,57,214

Shearer,Alan,64

Shearman,Montague,177

SheffieldUnited,153

Sheilas,Wogs,andPoofters(Warren),394

Shilton,Peter,27

TheSignalandtheNoise(Silver),155

Silva,David,151,163

Silva,Orlando,Jr.,285

Silver,Nate,7,155

Simmons,Robert,207

Simone,Diego,301

Simons,Rowan,244

Simonsen,Alan,184

SkyTelevision,200,208

Slot,TonnyBruins,379

Smalltowns,183–186

ChampionsLeaguein,188

teambankruptciesin,187

winningrecordsfor,184(fig.)

Smith,David,102

Smith,James,168

Smith,Ron,99

Sneijder,Wesley,381

Soar,Phil,27

Soccer

Americanfootballcomparedto,202–211

inAsia,395–397

attendanceratesfor,203,211

asbadbusiness,52–55

asbigbusiness,49–51

bubble,409

incapitalcities,174–176,179

incathedralcities,186–188

ascultureofBrazil,260–261

datarevolutionfor,156–158

debtforclubs,70–71

economicsof,99–100

favoriteteamsbycountry,179(fig.)

globalparticipants,201,219–220,220(fig.)

historicaldevelopmentof,196–199,393–397

incomegenerationfrom,51

incompetentstaffingand,61–64

lackofobsolescencefor,82

aslessviolent,411

MajorLeague,201

merchandisingof,asrevenuestream,53

networks,inEngland,319–329

nomenclaturefor,195–196

overachievingnationalteams,368(fig.)

penaltykicksin,132–133,135(fig.)

forperipheralnations,397–401

profitsfrom,65–66

onsatellitetelevision,53–54

insmalltowns,183–186,184(fig.)

statisticalanalysisfor,164–171

suicideand,260–261

undertotalitarianregimes,173–174

asunbusinesslike,64–71

underperformingnations,375(fig.)

inU.S.,200–202

winpercentages,bynation,363(fig.),371–372,371(fig.)

forwomen,346

SeealsoManagementandmanagers

Soccerclubs

attendanceaverages,224–225,225(fig.)

bankruptcyfor,77–78

buyingclubs,14–15

debtfor,70–71

inEurope,79,178(fig.)

FFPfor,93–94

financialaccounts,ofEnglishclubs,113–114

duringGreatDepression,73

insolvencyof,inEurope,79,86

largeversussmall,211–212

merchandisingby,53

phoenixingand,77

sellingclubs,14

spendingratesfor,14

ontelevision,410–411

duringThatcherrecession,74

SoccerJournal,152

SoccerMadness(Lever),260

SoccerWars,261

Soccernomics(Kuper/Szymanski),2,352

Socceroos,401–403

Socrates,316

Soriano,Osvaldo,138

SouthAfrica

apartheidin,354,358–360

HIVin,355

isolationof,355–356

racialclassificationsin,358–360

assportingcountry,352–353

stadiumsin,284

SouthAfricanFootballAssociation,354

SouthKorea,237,396–397

SouthShields,73

Southgate,Gareth,144,336

Spain,376–390

attendancedeclines,224

inEuropeanUnion,386

foreignplayersin,378

underFranco,173–174

isolationistpolicyof,377

inknowledgenetworks,385

PrimeraDivisión,309

statisticaldatain,161

underperformanceof,387–388

winningpercentagesfor,386(fig.),388

SpartaRotterdam,382

Speed,Gary,159–160

Spence,Jim,409

TheSpiritoftheGame(Bose),52

Sport+Market,178–181,245–247

Sports

sportingcountries,byrank,349–350

suicideand,263–265

SeealsoBaseball;Football;Soccer

SportsBusinessGroup,210

Stadiums

anti-stadiummovements,278

costsof,285

economicbenefitsfrom,276

forhostingofWorldCups,275–279

namingrightsfor,89

renovationof,inEngland,54–55

inSouthAfrica,284

inU.S.,275–276

Staffing,61–64,125–126

Stam,Jaap,155

Stanley,Ken,412

Stark,Steven,198

Statistics

inAmericanfootball,156

baseballand,4

asdatarevolution,156–158

forEnglishsoccer,161,331–341

eraofbigdata,5–6

forEverton,165–171

forGermansoccerclubs,161

Gerrard,R.,and,330–341

forgoalkeepers,162

high-intensityoutput,forplayers,162

historicaldevelopmentof,151–152

forLiverpoolFC,164–171

management,rankof,116–117

forManchesterUnited,164

MarchoftheGeeks,7–8

inMoneyball,156–157

inpolitics,6–7

forPremierLeague,151,162

forsoccer,165–171

assupplementaryinformation,formanagers,158

withTopScore,153

SeealsoOpta;Prozone;Silver,Nate

Stekelenburg,Maarten,376

Stern,David,199

StillnessandSpeed(Bergkamp),155

Storm,Rasmus,83

Strachan,J.A.,269

Sturrock,Paul,122–123

Suarez,Luis,165,171

Sugar,Alan,20,25,64–65

Suicide

fansand,260–272

inGermany,267

intheNetherlands,269

inNorway,267–268

parasuicide,269–270

soccercultureand,260–261

sportsand,263–265

bywomen,262,269(fig.)

duringWorldCups,266,268,268(fig.)

Suicide(Durkheim),262

SundayTimes,17

Sunderland,20,54

SuperBowlXLIV(2010),200

SuperBowls,200,230

Sweden,221

Sweeney,Gerry,76

Symes,Rob,170

Szymanski,Stefan,2–3,57,97–99,290,352

Tagliabue,Paul,214–215,278

Tainton,Trevor,76

Taleb,Nick,341

TampaBayBuccaneers,156

Tapie,Bernard,182

Tapp,Alan,252–253

Taylor,Graham,136,152

Taylor,Peter,19,25–28,40–41,326

Taylor,Rogan,83

TaylorReport,54

Tekle,Stephanus,245

Television

ChannelFour,200,208

EnglishFootballLeagueon,410

fixedeffectfor,232–233

footballon,200

haloeffect,237

nationalismasinfluenceviewership,234–235

PremierLeagueand,incomefrom,210–211

satellite,53–54

SkyTelevision,200,208

soccerclubson,410–411

viewingdatafor,228–239,235(fig.),237(fig.)

ofWorldCup,239(fig.)

“10,000-hourrule,”359

Tennis,346–347

Ternent,Stan,127

Terry,John,131,143

Tevez,Carlos,142,151

Thailand,357

Thompson,Hunter,263–264

Thor,Björgólfur,240

Thornton,Grant,283

Thorstvedt,Erik,318

Thuram,Lilian,105–107

Tigana,Jean,112

TillDeathDoUsPart,98

Tobin,Andrew,226

Tognaccini,Daniele,162,310

Togo,357–358

Tolkien,J.R.R.,199

Toobin,Jeffrey,68

TopScore,153

Torres,Fernando,165,376

Tostao,316

“Totalfootball,”392–393

TottenhamHotspur,14,17,20,64–65,168

TourdeFrance,347

Touré,Kolo,150

Touré,Yaya,151,160–161

TourismResearch&Marketing,279

TraitresàlaNation?(Beaud),109

TranmereRovers,113,122

Transferfees,13–14,16–17

Transfermarket

ageofplayersand,28–29,42

forblondplayers,24

Brazilianplayersin,35

buyingclubs,14

buying/sellingstrategiesfor,28

FIFAand,28

inefficiencyof,16

Liverpooland,16–19

forOlympiqueLyon,40

overvaluationofnationalities,23–24

rejectionof,46–47

relocationofplayersand,30–37

replacementstrategiesfor,44–45

sellingclubs,14

strategiesfor,48

timingoftrades,21–23

transferfees,13–14,16–17

Traore,Djimi,16

Trapattoni,Giovanni,186

Trovato,Frank,262

Turk,Michael,6

Turkey,398–399

UEFA(Europeansoccerassociation),72,89–90,219–220

FFPrules,9,85

licensingunder,51,93

Ukraine,238

UnitedStates(U.S.)

NorthAmericanSoccerLeague,379,406–407

soccerexpansionin,200–202

stadiumsin,275–276

teamresults,406(fig.)

SeealsoBaseball;Football;NationalFootballLeague

Valdano,Jorge,316,365

Valencia,69–70

VanBasten,Marco,59,411

VanBreukelen,Hans,140

VanBronckhorst,Giovanni,23

VanderSar,Edwin,3,131–132,143–144,381

VanderVaart,Rafael,381

VanGaal,Louis,382

Vanuatu,221

Veenhoven,Ruut,289

Venables,Terry,25

Vertonghen,Jan,381

Vialli,Gianluca,122

Viduka,Mark,402–403

Vieira,Patrick,29,108,121,160

Vieri,Christian,63–64

Villa,David,47,389

Villas-Boas,André,126

Vogts,Berti,184

VonNeumann,John,137

Vryzas,Zisis,400

Wagediscrimination,100,107,117–119

Walker,Ernie,316

Walker,Jack,90,100

WallStreetJournal,89,277,280

Wann,D.L.,244

Warren,Johnny,394

WashingtonDiplomats,379,393

Watford,136

Weir,David,168

Weisweiler,Hennes,185

Wenger,Arsène,18,21,56,85,120,133,148,153,257,323,337,381

WerderBremen,400

WestBromwichAlbion,104

WestHamUnited,20,239–241

WesternEurope,winpercentagesin,371–372,371(fig.)

Westerveld,Sander,16

Wharton,Arthur,97

WhenBeckhamWenttoSpain(Burns),174,377

WhenFridayComes:FootballintheWarZone(Montague),369

WhenSaturdayComes,105,211–212

White,Jim,176

WHO.SeeWorldHealthOrganization

WhyEnglandLose,306

WhyPeopleDiebySuicide(Joiner),271

WiganBorough,73

Wilkinson,Howard,326

Will,James,42

WillemII,17

Wilpon,Fred,68

Wilson,Jonathan,151–152,337

Wimmer,Hacki,185

Winner,David,390

Winterbottom,Walter,405

WithCloughbyTaylor(Taylor,P.),26–28

Wolff,Joel,375

Wolves,77,152,250

Women

insoccermanagement,56–59

assoccerplayers,346

suicidesby,262,269(fig.)

WorldCup(1950),197

WorldCup(1958),260

WorldCup(1966),229,291,341

WorldCup(1974),270

WorldCup(1978),270,394

WorldCup(1982),270

WorldCup(1986),270,369

WorldCup(1990),290

WorldCup(1994),136,152–153,238,261,279,399

WorldCup(1996),52

WorldCup(1998),105–107,132,290,333

WorldCup(2002),279,311,321,336,393,397

WorldCup(2006),35,171,229,233,237,244,280,289,311,320,329,354,401,403

WorldCup(2010),7,109–110,148–149,201,231,239(fig.),282,284,355,393

WorldCup(2014),273

WorldCup(2018),274,288

WorldCup(2022),274,288

WorldHealthOrganization(WHO),261

WorldWarI,197,320,362

WorldWarII,106,326,362

Wortmann,Sönke,141

Wright,Billy,300–301

Wright,Ian,106

Xavi,376,382–383,389

Zabaleta,Pablo,37

Zahra,Huthyfa,370

Zaidi,Farhan,171

Zeeuw,Demyde,51

Zelentsov,Anatoly,153

Zenden,Boudewijn,31,391

ZenitSt.Petersburg,107

Zidane,Zinedine,344

Ziege,Christian,16

Zimbalist,Andrew,287

Zipf,George,188–190

Zipf’slaw,188–190

Zirin,Dave,276

ABOUTTHEAUTHORS

VINCENTLIGNIER

SimonKuperistheaward-winningauthorofSoccerAgainsttheEnemy;Ajax,theDutch,theWar: The Strange Tale of Soccer During Europe’s Darkest Hour, and, with StefanSzymanski,thenationalbest-sellerSoccernomics.HewritesaweeklysportscolumnintheFinancial Times, and has previously written soccer columns for the Times and theObserver. InDecember 2007, hewon the annualManuelVazquezMontalban prize forsportswriting, awarded by theColegio de Periodistas deCatalunya and FCBarcelona’sfoundation.HelivesinParis,France.

CASSBUSINESSSCHOOL

StefanSzymanskiistheStephenJ.GalettiCollegiateProfessorofSportManagementattheUniversityofMichigan’sSchoolofKinesiology.TimHarfordhascalledhim“oneoftheworld’sleadingsportseconomists.”WithSimonKuper,hehasbeenco-authoronallpreviouseditionsofSoccernomics.HelivesinAnnArbor,Michigan.

Founded in 2000, Nation Books has become a leading voice in American independentpublishing. The inspiration for the imprint came from theNation magazine, the oldestindependent and continuously publishedweeklymagazine of politics and culture in theUnitedStates.

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