Social networksIndividual behaviorstrategic interactionstructure

ExamplePolitical Action

Social Networks

Why was there a revolution in Eastern Germany in 1989?

Summer 1989 The East German government praised (on t.v.) the decision to use

violence against the Tiananmen Square protesters.

September 4, 1989 Demonstrations began at St. Nicholas church in Leipzig.

October 2, 1989 Eric Honecker issued a shoot to kill order; huge police militia,

Stasi, and work-combat troop presence.

October 9, 1989 Biggest peaceful demonstration. Military surrounded the

demonstration but did not take action.

October 18, 1989 Honecker had to resign

November 19, 1989 Fall of the Berlin wall.

October 3, 1990 German reunification

Participation in Monday Demonstration

0125,000250,000375,000500,000

Sept25 Oct2 Oct9 Oct16 Oct23 Oct30 Nov6

Participants

DATE NUMBER PARTICIPAN

TS09-25-89 6,50010-02-89 20,00010-09-89 70,00010-16-89 110,00010-23-89 225,00010-30-89 350,00011-06-89 450,000

Source: Table 1 from Braun, Norman. 1995. Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion. Rationality and Society 7:167-182.

Why did people do this? To explain the revolution, many (sub)questions need to be answered.

1 Why did officials eventually not order to shoot to the protestors?

2 Why did Honecker decide to resign?

Why didn’t the soviet army intervene? (it had happened before)

3

Why did so many people participate in the protest in Leipzig?

4

Why did people do this?

1 Why did officials eventually not order to shoot to the protestors?

2 Why did Honecker decide to resign?

Why didn’t the soviet army intervene? (it had happened before)

3

Why did so many people participate in the protest in Leipzig?4

To explain the revolution, many (sub)questions need to be answered.

Dissident groups, personal networks and spontaneous cooperation: The eastern German revolution of 1989

Karl-Dieter Opp & Christiane Gern (Am. Sociol. Rev. 58, 659-680)

On the roles of groups and personal networks in demonstrations in the repressive setting of East Germany between May and October 1989.

Focus

Observe: a social problem

Observe: a social problem

Assumptions:

Societies are like Western Democracies

Ample opportunities exist for forming groupsmobilizing new members

personal networks

cooperation with other groups

Critical communication about the government or political system can be exchanged without fear of severe repression

1

2

These conditions are not met in authoritarian societies

Mobilization is difficult under threat of strong repression

The emergence of protest is unlikely

BUT...

The nonviolent 1989 rebellion in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Although opposition forces were suppressed by state repression

Protests erupted!!!

3

Observe: a social problem

But: Coordination?

Demonstrations in Leipzig and other parts of GDR were not organized (in contrast to most demonstrations in Western democracies)

Spontaneous emergence

what happened then?

rational actor model - RCT

Four types of incentives: Public goods motivationMoral incentives

Social incentives

Repression

Speculate: use a theory of action

Complete explanation: not only macro

What we will call the micro-macro link

Incentives to participate

political discontent

Promotes political action in large groups if actors believe their participation will make a difference

Dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods

Assumption: Political discontent & perceived political influence of protest (PG motivation) had a positive effect on participation

Moral incentives

Discontent with the political and economic situations was high

Moral obligation to protest may have been particularly salient

Prediction: Moral incentives had positive effect on participation

social incentives

Encouragement by important others to participate

Prediction: Social incentives were salient on participation

Incentives to participate

spontaneous cooperation

If demonstrators were not organized, how did individuals coordinated their actions to produce the demonstrations?

(+) Strong desires to engage in action against the government

(-) Costs of protesting were high

Citizens faced a dilemma:

When and where will sufficient people gather?

coordination problem

Coordinating mechanism

Repression has no significant effects

friendship networks are very important

Members of opposing groups were regarded as unrealistic

Protests were not a result of the mobilization of opposing groups

Friends more than work colleagues were of influence

In authoritarian regimes trust is mainly placed on friends

Criticism of the regime, only among friends

Workplace helps mobilization if colleagues are also friends

No repression - Yes networks

Cost of participating must be low

Joining a demonstration on Monday prayers had less cost that other actions (i.e., joining an opposition group)

Strong Situational incentives to participate

67% reported they joined when others first participated in a demonstration

Facing severe repression

Higher in more individualized protest actions

Few Incentives needed

High public good motivation (feeling that what we do will have an effect) & having friends critical of the regime were the main factors inducing participation in demonstrations

Thus

Noticemicro-macro link

To explain social phenomena we need to address issues also at the individual level (i.e., incentives, preferences, etc.)

Individual behavior

Using a theory of individual behavior (i.e., Rational Choice Theory) will allow us to make predictions about their choices and the way they interact

networks

Individuals hardly ever stand in isolation. Their social networks are essential for the transmission of information and the spread of behaviors.

The course

AIMSof this course

How networks affect our behavior & how our individual characteristics affect the networks we are part of.

+ Social phenomena emerges from an integration between the micro level (individuals) and the macro level (social structure)

+ Social networks are key to understand the way individuals and their social environment interact

We will cover theoretical, experimental and empirical discussions about social problems & networks

Goalof this course

Presume no prior knowledge

You don’t need to know anything specific to take this course

More breadth than depth

Introduce you to a variety of approaches to understanding social phenomena

Methodologyof this course

Lectures

Feel free to interrupt, ask, comment or discuss along the lectures

We will play different experimental gamesYou will earn points in each

There is a winner: One student is randomly chosen from those students who have points above the average of the class

The winner will receive an Amazon gift card between 50 & 75 euros

Practical

Schedule19:30 - 21:15

Wednesday. August - 21

Thursday. August - 22

9:30 - 12:15

14:30 - 18:15

Friday. August - 23

9:30 - 12:15

Saturday. August - 24

9:30 - 12:15

14:30 - 18:15

Sunday. August - 25

9:30 - 12:15

(1)

(2)(3)

(2)

(2)(3)

(1)

design

From the individual perspective sometimes is not straightforward to observe the aggregate outcomes

The visible and the invisible

From the aggregate outcomes we can’t always see the individual motives that brought them about

Deductive approach

Like in any social explanation we deduce behavior from general theories

The course is designed such that we go from general to particular to general again (macro-micro-macro)

BLock 1:social phenomena

How common sense can be detrimental to our understanding of the social world

Why social problems are not as intuitive as we might think they are

What is a good approach to understanding & explaining social problems

BLock 2:Individual behavior

The theory of Rational Choice (RCT)

How it has been tested & improved via experimental studies

What are the main findings on individual behavior & social preferences

BLock 3:strategic interaction

The essentials of rational strategic thinking

Basic concepts and notation of Game Theory

BLock 4:social networks

How do networks emerge (form)?

How do networks influence behavior?

Questions?