smolensk crash status report 111111 3

8/3/2019 Smolensk Crash Status Report 111111 3

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CrashofthePolishGovernmentalPlanePFL101inSmolensk1

April

10,

2010

StatusReportDatedNovember10,20112

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 2

IACInvestigationConductedinViolationofInternationalAgreements....................................................... 3

IACFinalReportDoesnotComplywithAnnex13........................................................................................ 5

ViolationbytheRussianFederationofRulesandProceduresoftheChicagoConvention,itsAnnexesand

ICAORegulations.......................................................................................................................................... 7

FlightManagementGroup........................................................................................................................ 7

AThirdPersonintheFlightControlTower............................................................................................... 7

RescueOperations.................................................................................................................................... 8

ContradictionsintheIACFinalReport.......................................................................................................... 9

TamperingwithEvidence............................................................................................................................ 13

ManipulationofData.................................................................................................................................. 14

"Goaround"............................................................................................................................................ 14"Hewillgocrazy".................................................................................................................................... 14

TopographyofTerrain............................................................................................................................ 15

TAWSandFMS........................................................................................................................................ 16

BadFaith..................................................................................................................................................... 16

CredibilityofIAC......................................................................................................................................... 17

FindingsofthePolishParliamentaryCommitteefortheSmolenskCrashInvestigation........................... 19

Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 20

Appendix1:DestructionofEvidence.......................................................................................................... 21

1Accordingtothe"Head"InstructionthatgovernsthetransportationoftheofficialsofthePolish

RepublicsuchasthePresident,PrimeMinister,ChairpersonoftheLowerHouseoftheParliamentand

theSenate,thedesignation"PFL101"meanthatthePresidentisonboard.2ThisStatusReportwaspreparedbyamultidisciplinaryteamofexpertsthatsupportsthefamiliesof

theSmolenskvictims.


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SmolenskStatusReportNovember2011

Page2of21

Introduction

TheRepublicofPoland,actingastheStateoftheOperatorandtheStateofRegistrypursuant

toArticle6.3ofAnnex13tothe1944ConventiononInternationalCivilAviation("Chicago

Convention"),onDecember19,2010submitteditscommentstothedraftFinalReport

preparedbytheRussianFederationthatactedastheStateofOccurrence,theStateofDesign,andStateofManufacturerandconductedtheinvestigationintothecrashoftheTu154M

aircrafttailnumber101datedApril10,2010("SmolenskCrash").TheTu154Maircraft,flight

101fromWarsaw,PolandtoSmolensk,Russia,carriedthePresidentofPolandand95Polish

citizenstravelingforthecommemorationofthe70thiethanniversaryoftheKatynCrime.

TheRemarksoftheRepublicofPolandtothedraftFinalReportoftheRussianFederationdated

December19,2010("PolishResponse")weresubmittedtotheRussianFederationinPolishand

RussianlanguagesbutwerenotofficiallytranslatedintoEnglish.3Therefore,thefamiliesofthe

SmolenskvictimshiredthemostrenownedinternationalfirmTransperfectTranslationstoperformthetranslationofthePolishResponsetothedraftFinalReportoftheRussian

FederationontheSmolenskCrashintoEnglish.4TheRussianFederation,actingthroughthe

InterstateAviationCommittee(IAC)astheinvestigatorincharge,disregardedthePolish

Response,inparticularthePolishobjectionastothecausesofthecrash,andannouncedits

FinalReportwithitsownconclusionsastothecausesofthiscrashatapressconferencein

MoscowonJanuary13,2011("IACFinalReport").

InitsinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrash,theRussianFederationrequestedtheassistanceof

theUnitedStateswithrespecttorecoveringtheTAFSandFSMreadingsbytheUS

manufacturerofthesesystems UniversalAvionicsSystemsCorporationfromRedmond,

Washington. TheUnitedStatesactingthroughtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

providedtherequestedassistance,howeverdidnotreceivethestatusoftheaccreditedrepresentativetoparticipateintheinvestigationtotheSmolenskCrashasallowedbyarticle

5.23oftheChicagoConvention.AtleastonecitizenoftheUnitedStateslosthislifeinthe

SmolenskCrash.

TheobjectionstotheinvestigationoftheRussianFederationintotheSmolenskCrashare

multifoldandoffundamentalnature. TheyrangefromchallengingthecredibilityoftheIACby

virtueofitsmembersactingindirectconflictwiththeirofficialpositionswiththedesigner,

manufactureandservicerofTu154MaircrafttochallengingtheIACinvestigationandthe

conclusionsoftheIACFinalReportinitsentirety,aspresentedbytheRepublicofPolandinthe

3NoattemptsbythePolishGovernmenthavebeenmadetotranslatethePolishResponsetotheRussianinvestigationintoEnglish.Itisentirelyuptonongovernmentalorganizationsandprivate

personsthattheWesternreadercanlearnofthisofficialPolishResponseandconfrontthescopeof

irregularitiesoftheRussianinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrash.4SponsorsoftheEnglishtranslationofthePolishResponse("PolishResponseinEnglish")are:TheKatyn

2010FamilyAssociation,Ul.Chemzyska98C,04247Warszawa,Poland,Mobile(Poland):+48784756

531Mobile(UK):+447935557562;+447969362341email:[email protected].


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Page3of21

PolishResponse.ThePolishobjectionstotheRussianinvestigationprocessrangefromdenying

theRepublicofPolandaccesstotheinvestigationbypreventingthePolishAccredited

RepresentativefromparticipatingintheIACmeetings,denyingPolishrequestsforinformation

andassistance,todestroying,falsifyingandmanipulatingtheevidence,providinginadequate

rescueandmedicalassistancetothevictimsofthecrash,conductingtheinvestigationin

violationofICAOstandards,anddraftingtheIACFinalReportinviolationofAnnex13tothe

ChicagoConvention. ThisStatusReportdoesnotintendtoaddressallissuesarisingin

connectionwiththeRussianinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrashbutratherhighlightsthe

mostimportantproblemsandthemostrepresentativeviolations.

IACInvestigationConductedinViolationofInternationalAgreements

ThreedaysaftertheSmolenskCrash,theRepublicofPolandandtheRussianFederation

enteredintoanagreementtoproceedwiththeinvestigationoftheSmolenskCrashin

accordancewiththeChicagoConvention. Thepartiesagreedtoproceedinaccordancewith

Annex13totheChicagoConventionthatgovernsaircraftaccidentandincidentinvestigation

("Annex13).Accordingly,theRussianFederationastheStateofOccurrencewasinchargeofconductingtheinvestigationwhiletheRepublicofPolanddesignateditsAccredited

RepresentativetoparticipateintheinvestigationinaccordancewithArticle5.18oftheChicago

Convention.

Inthecourseoftheinvestigation,thePolishGovernmentactingthroughitsAccredited

Representativefilednumerousmotionsandrequestswithrespecttotheinvestigationin

accordancewithArticle5.25ofAnnex13. Specifically,thePolishsidesubmitted222inquiries

forinformationtotheRussianFederation.Only34inquirieswereanswered.TheRussian

Federationignoredorrefusedtoacknowledge169inquiries,andpartiallyanswered19

inquires.AsaresultofthislackofcooperationfromtheRussianside,thePolishAccredited

RepresentativeandhisadviserswereunabletofulfiltheirresponsibilitiesunderAnnex13.

Amongthemotionsignoredorrefusedwasarequestforinformationregardingtheassessment

oftheminimumairdromeconditionsattheSmolenskairport,arequestforvideorecordingsof

radardisplayreadingsbytheChiefAirTrafficControlleronApril10,2010withrespectto

landingapproachofthefollowingflights:Il76,Yak40,Tu154M,arequestforphotographic

documentationfromthecrashscene,arequestfordataoftheflyaroundperformedsoonafter

thecrash,andrequestsforinspectionofcommunicationandnavigationaids.ThePolishside

didnotreceiveanytechnicalexpertiseofthewreckagedebrisoranydataoftwofailed

attemptsofIl76landingspriortothecrashofPFL101.AmotiontoauthorizethePolish

AccreditedRepresentativeandtwospecialiststotakepartintheflyaroundprocedurewasdenied.Aprotestagainstthisrefusalwasignoredaswellastheprotestagainsttherefusalof

theinspectionoftheRSP6M2radarsysteminSmolensk.

TheRepublicofPolandastheStatehavingsufferedfatalitiesofitsPresident,FirstLady,nine

generalsandthetopleadership,wasdeniedaccesstotherelevantfactualinformationwith

respecttorescue,firstaid,survivaldataandautopsyexaminationindirectviolationofArticle


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Page4of21

5.27ofAnnex13. Asaresult,thePolishsidewasunabletoprovideitsresponsetovitally

importantpartsoftheIACFinalReport,includingsections1.13MedicalTracingExamination,

1.14DataontheSurvivalofPassengers,CrewMembersandOthersoftheAircraftIncident,and

3.1.Findings.Inparticular,theRussiansidefailedtoprovidetothePolishsidethefollowing

information:

1) documentationofforensicexaminationofthecrewoftheaircraft,togetherwiththe

resultsoftoxicologicalandidentificationexamination;2) reportoftheinspectionofthesite;thePolishsidehasnoknowledgeastowherethe

specificinspectionareaswerelocatedandhowtheyweremarked.5

TheIACFinalReportprovidesnoinformationabouttherescueactionstakenatthesceneofthe

accident.ThePolishsidehasnotreceivedanytranscriptsofcommunicationorsituationalplans,

reportsofparticipantsoftherescueandfirefightingteams,photographicdocumentation,

includingfilmfootage,whichisessentialforproperassessmentofthesecuritylevelof

SmolenskSevernyairfieldregardingfirefightingservices,rescueoperationsandmedical

security. ThePolishsidewasnotgivenaccesstotheprotocolofsurveillanceofthelocationof

theoccurrencethuswasnotabletoreplytoFinding3.1.67.

Similarly,thePolishsidewasnotinthepositiontorespondtoFinding3.1.68oftheIACFinal

ReportthattheCommanderinChiefofthePolishAirForcesGeneralAndrzejBlasikwaspresent

inthecockpitatthetimeoftheimpactwiththeground.Furthermore,thePolishSidewasnot

inthepositiontorespondtothestatementthatthecoronaryexaminationrevealed0.6of

ethanolinthebloodoftheCommanderinChiefofthePolishAirForces.Resultsoftestingthe

concentrationofalcoholinthebloodofthePolishAirForceCommanderBlasikcannotbe

independentlyverifiedbecauseoftheunavailabilityofthesourcedocumentation.No

authorizedtoxicologicaldataandinformationastowhenandhowthematerialwassecuredfor

analysiswasprovidedtothePolishside.6

AllrequestsofthePolishsideregardingtheinformationwithrespecttosmokepresentinthe

vicinityoftheairportonthedayofthecrashweredenied. Regularcitationsmadebythe

meteorologistfrom4.00a.m.UTCindicatedthepresenceofsmoke.ThePolishinquiryastothe

sourceoffiresandsmokeintheareasurroundingtheairportatthetimeofthecrashandits

adverseeffectonatmosphericconditionswasignoredaswell.Noinformationabouttherescue

andextinguishingoffireswasprovided. Noreportsregardingtestingfortracesofexplosive

materialswereprovided.Testingfornonconventionalexplosionswerenotmade.

5ThePolishResponseinEnglish,p.60.6ThePolishResponseinEnglish,p.143.InJanuary2011IACpublishedonitswebsiteadocumentnr.37

datedApril11,2010thatpurportedlyrepresentstestingofGen.Basik'sblood.Medicalexpertspoint

outthatanaturalalcoholisproducedinthebodywithin24hoursfromdeathandcanreacheven1

percent. Thereforeothertestsarerequiredtoverifysuchfindings.HowevertheRussiansidedidnot

produceanyothertestsanddidnotpresentsupportingdocuments.Seealso:

www.rp.pl/artykul/593062_EkspertBlasikniekonieczniepil.htmland

www.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?dat=20110131&typ=po&id=po51.txt

http://www.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?dat=20110115&typ=po&id=po02.txt


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Page5of21

Only19fullpostmortemreportswereprovided;theremaining77areeithergrosslyinaccurate

ornotprovided.Medicalandpathologicalreportsforsomevictimscontaindescriptionsof

organsthathadbeensurgicallyremovedfromthevictimslongbeforethecrash.7

Thelistof169PolishrequestsunansweredbytheIACasofDecember19,2010remained

unchangedaftertheofficialpresentationoftheIACFinalReportonJanuary13,2010. InAugust

2011,thePolishsideofficiallyconfirmedthatnoadditionalinformationregardingthe

outstanding169PolishinquireshasbeenreceivedfromtheRussianFederation.8

IACFinalReportDoesnotComplywithAnnex13

ThePolishResponsetotheIACFinalReporttheRepublicofPolandpointsoutthattheIACFinal

ReportviolatesthestandardsofAnnexandhasbeenpreparedinviolationoftheguidelines

containedintheICAODocumentNumber9756entitled'ManualofAircraftAccidentand

IncidentInvestigation,'("ICAOInvestigationManual").AccordingtoAnnex13,thefirstchapter

ofthefinalreport,entitled"FactualInformation,"shouldcontainonlyfacts;whiletheanalysis

shouldbeincludedinthesecondchapterentitled"Analysis." Thus,theRepublicofPolandobjectstotheinclusionofthesocalledpsychologicalanalysisas"FactualInformation."The

psychologicalanalysispresentedinthischapterisnotbasedonfactsandisnotsupportedby

evidence.Tothecontrary,itisbasedonassumptionsofhighlyspeculativenatureandstandsin

contradictiontotheCockpitVoiceRecorder("CVR")readingsobtainedbythePolishside.9

Furthermore,contrarytoICAOInvestigationManual,theanalysispresentedinthesecond

chapteroftheIACFinalReportisbasedonassumptionsandhypothesesratherthanfactsand

relevantevidencepresentedunder"FactualInformation." Hypothesesnotsupportedbyfacts

shouldhavebeenabandoned.Unfortunately,thehypothesesbasedonassumptionswerenot

abandoned,butinsteadwerepresentedwithoutconditionalclausesasexplainedinthePolish

Responsebelow:

TheanalysisshouldexaminetheevidencealreadypresentedinChapter1.FactualInformation,anddevelopcircumstancesandsituationsthatmightoccur.Thisshouldleadtotheformulationofpossiblehypothesesthatshouldbediscussedinthecontextoftheevidencegathered.Hypothesesunsupportedbyevidenceshouldberejected.Hypothesesmaynotbetreatedascertainties,andtheirproofmaynotrelyonhypotheticalevidence.Thelisteditemsarepresentedasstatementsintheformofaxioms;andconditionalexpressions,suchaslikely,possible,etc.,werenotusedevenonce.TheanalysiscontainsmanyrepetitionsaswellasreferencestomanyfactsthatwerenotincludedintheFactualInformation.Itdoesnotfocusonthedescriptionofpossiblevariantsofthecourseofactionandtheassessmentofthecourseofindividual

7Seealso:

http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/10,114927,10009206,_Rosja_nie_przekazala_pelnej_dokume

ntacji_dot__sekcji.html

http://www.rmf24.pl/raportlechkaczynskiniezyje2/fakty/newsparulskikompletnematerialyz

sekcjitylko18ofiar,nId,3190188OfficialStatementofthePolishMinistryofInternalAffairsfromAugust2011.

9Seefurtherdiscussionunder'ContradictionsintheIACFinalReport.'


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Page6of21

flightsequences.TheactivitiesoftheFlightsManagementGroupwerenotevaluatedneithertheimpactofdecisionstakenoutsidetheFlightsManagementGroupontheseactivities.Itmainlyfocusedonprovingthattheactivitiesofthecontrollersatthetrafficcontrolwerecorrect.10

WhiletheanalysisofthepsychologicalpressurepresumablyexertedonthePolishpilotsby

thirdpersonswasbasedonspeculationsnotsupportedbyanyevidencecontainedinthe

FactualInformationoftheIACFinalReport,theanalysisofpsychologicalpressureexertedon

theRussianairtrafficcontrollersonthegroundwasentirelydisregarded.Theoutside

psychologicalpressureontheRussianChiefAirTrafficController("CATC")whowastheonly

personsuggestingthattheTu154Maircraftshouldbesenttoanalternateaerodromebutwas

overruledbyathirdpersonpresentintheFlightControlTower("FCT")wasnoteven

mentioned.TheIACmerelystatedthattheactivitiesoftheFCTcontrollerswerecorrect.

ThepsychologicalpressureexertedbypersonspresentintheFCTbutnotbelongingtothe

FlightsManagementGrouponthedecisionmakingprocessoftheSmolensk'Severny'

controllerswasnotevaluatedbytheRussiansideatall. Aftertheofficialpresentationofthe

IACFinalReport,theIAC,underpressurefromthePolishside,publishedadditionaltranscriptsfromtherecordingthatconfirmedthePolishallegationsthatathirdpersonnotbelongingto

theFlightsManagementGroupwaspresentintheFCTattheSmolensk'Severny'airfieldon

April10,2010.11ThepresenceofathirdpersonintheFCTrepresentsanimportantpieceof

factualinformationthatshallbeincludedinanyaccidentinvestigationreport.Afullanalysisof

thesituationattheSmolensk'Severny'FCTshouldbecarriedoutaspartoftheofficialIAC

investigationinaccordancewithAnnex13.Theanalysisshouldevaluatetheinfluenceofthat

thirdpersonpresentintheFCToverthedecisionmakingprocessoftheCATC.

Furthermore,theanalysispresentedintheIACFinalReportdoesnotincludeanyanalysisof

possiblealternativecoursesofactionanddoesnotpresentanyassessmentastothecourseofindividualflightsequences. Suchexaminationofalternativescenariosisindispensablein

arrivingatthefinalconclusionwithrespecttothecausesofanycrash.

ThefirstchapteroftheIACFinalReportemphasizes"psychologicalanalysis"butdoesnot

addressthehistoryoftheflight.AccordingtoAnnex13andtheICAOInvestigationManual,the

historyoftheflightshouldcontainreconstructionofthesignificantportionoftheflightpath

andlocation.

Inviolationofarticle2.25(h)ofAnnex13,theAccreditedRepresentativeoftheRepublicof

Polandwasnotallowedtoinspecttheexpertreportontheactivitiesofthegroupdirecting

flightson10April2010.

10ThePolishResponseinEnglish,page101.

11ThefourthmicrophonetrackrepresentsrecordingsfromtheopenmicrophoneattheNearControl

PlaceoftheFlightControlTower.


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Page7of21

ViolationbytheRussianFederationofRulesandProceduresoftheChicago

Convention,itsAnnexesandICAORegulations

FlightManagementGroup

IntheIACFinalReporttheRussianFederationstatesthattheChiefAirTrafficControllerPavel

PliusninandLandingZoneControllerViktorRyzenko12underwentmedicalexaminationsand

wereauthorizedtoperformairtrafficcontrolfunctionsbyadoctorondutyatthemedicalpointJW06755.AccordingtothestatementgiventothepublicprosecutorsoftheRussian

Federationon10April2010,themedicalpointwasclosedatthattime.Bothcontrollers

decidedthemselvesthattherewerenoobstaclestofulfiltheirdutiesjudgedontheir

wellbeing.InhisstatementsmadebeforethepublicprosecutoronApril10,2010between2

and4PM,theLandingZoneControllerstatedthatthemedicalunitwasclosedatthetime.

Thestatementalsocontainsthefollowingtext:

Ifeltgoodon10April2010.Aroundseveno'clockthatday,PliusninandIunderwentamedicalexaminationattheMilitaryHealthFacilityunit06755:[Translator'sNote:beforethewordunderwenttheworddidnotisadded/asaresultofwhichitwasconcludedthatIwasingoodhealth/Translator'sNote:thedeletedwordsaredeletedintheoriginalprotocol],sincetherewasnobodyatthemedicalunit,butasIalreadystated,Ifeltgoodandnothinghappenedthatwouldaffectmyabilitytocarryoutmyofficialduties.13

ThePolishsidepointedoutthatabovestatementisinconsistentwithPar.1.5.3oftheIACFinal

Reportentitled"Detailsofthegroundcrew."InthetableregardingCATCunder"Medical

examinationbeforeshift"thefollowingtextappears:At05:15,authorisedforairtrafficcontrolbythedoctorondutyofMilitaryUnit06755,whileinthetableregardingLandingZoneControllerunder"Medicalexaminationbeforeshift"thefollowingtextappears:At06:50,authorisedforairtrafficcontrolbythedoctorondutyofMilitaryUnit06755.

14

TheIACdisregardedthevitalinformationastotheeligibilityoftheCATCtoperformhisduties

attheairportthatday.ThereisnorecordthattheAirTrafficControllerwasauthorizedtowork

indifficultmeteorologicalconditions.DuringquestioningbytheIACon18April2010,theAir

TrafficControlleradmitteditwasonlyhissecondtimeinthisroleeverattheSmolenskairport.

HisfirstevershifttookplaceonApril7.Withinthe12monthpriortothisaccident,hehad

undertakenthisroleonlyninetimesaltogether.Again,thereisnodocumentationprovidedas

towhethertheLandingZoneControllerhadeverbeentrainedorauthorizedtooperateand

supervisethePrecisionApproachRadarRSP6M2SysteminSmolensk.

AThird

Person

in

the

Flight

Control

Tower

TheassessmentoftheroleofColonelKrasnokutskyattheFlightControlStationinSmolensk

duringthelandingoftheTu154MPFL101presentedintheIACFinalReportcontradictsthe

evidenceandthereforeisdisingenuousandwrong.AccordingtotheIACFinalReport,Deputy

12CATCAssistantW.W.Lubancevwasalsoondutythatday.

13PolishResponseinEnglishp.33

14Ibid.


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Page8of21

ChiefofMilitaryUnit21350ColonelKrasnokutskywasdelegatedtotheMilitaryUnit06755"for

thepurposesoforganizationalcontrolandassistancetotheheadofthisUnit(whowasnotan

aviationspecialist)witharrivingVIPflightsonApril7and10.ActuallythispersonfromApril2to

April10wasdelegatedthefunctionsofcoordinationandcontrolofallaerodromeservices

involvedinacceptingthearrivingflights."15TheRussiansidefurtherclaimsthat:

Duringtheflightsof10.04.2010,accordingtotheATCrecorderandhis[Krasnokutsky]

ownexplanations,thispersonwasattheBSHP[ACTNearControlPlace]fromtimeto

time(includingthetimeoftheaccident)providinggeneralcoordinationofvarious

services,informing(byphone)ofdifferentofficialsontheactualsituationsconcerning

theacceptedflightsandweatherconditionsaswellascoordinationofalternate

aerodromes.Hewasnotdirectlyinvolvedintheairtrafficcontrol.16

ThePolishsiderespondedtotheabovestatementasfollows:

Accordingtotherecordings(reel9channel4)he[ColonelKrasnokutsky]tookanactive

partinconductingradiocommunications,despiteseveralsuggestionsfromtheCATCto

discontinuethe

approach

of

the

Tu

154M

aircraft

by

aclear

command

Allowingthem

till100monly,100mnoquestionsandcutsoffanyfurtherattemptsofCATCtosendtheaircrafttoareserveaerodrome.

Clearly,ColonelKrasnokutskywasthemostactivememberofthegroundcrewwhotalked

directlytothePolishpilotandnotonlygavehimdetailedreportsabouttheaircraftposition

andthesituationattheairportbutalsomadethecriticalfinaldecisiontobringtheairplane

downto100meters.AccordingtothePolishside,theactiveroleofColonelKrasnokutskyin

directingtheflightthatinterferedwiththedecisionofCATCrequiresapsychologicalevaluation

ofthesituationattheFCT.TheroleofColonelKrasnokutskyinthedecisionmakingprocessnot

tosendtheTu154Maircrafttoanalternativeairportshouldbecloselyscrutinized. Numerous

requestsofthePolishsideforinformationontheauthorizationofCol.Krasnokutskytodirect

theflightsattheFCTNearControlPlaceinSmolenskonApril10,2010wereignoredbythe

Russianside.17 Furthermore,theRussiansiderefusedtoprovideanyinformationaboutanother

personwithwhomColonelKrasnokutskyhadspokenviacellphoneduringthelandingofthe

Tu154Maircraft.

RescueOperations

TheTu154Mplanecrashedat6:41:05UTC,400hundredmetersfromtherunwaybeam.As

detailedintheIACFinalReport,thePCz3rescueserviceunitwasondutyattheaerodromeall

dayonApril10,2010.Theunitwasnotsummoneduntil6.50UTC.Theinformationeventually

reachedtheunit,butaccordingtowitnesstestimony,theunitinitiallyheadedintheoppositedirectionandhadtodoaUturn,andtheyarrivedatthescene14minutesaftertheaccident

tookplace.TheCATCalsocalledunitsstationedfurtherawayinthetown.Theyarrivedatthe

15IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.128

16Ibid.

17ThePolishResponseinEnglish,pp.111,113,114.


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Page9of21

scene44minuteslater.TheRussianshavenotsuppliedanydetailsoftherescueandmedical

operationsoractionstakentoextinguishfiresattheaccidentscene.

IntheIACFinalReportthereisnoinformationabouttheMedicalRescueTeampresentonthe

runway.Itappearstherewasnosuchteamatall.ThePolishsidepointsoutthatthefirst

medicalrescueunitarrivedatthesceneat6.58UTC,thatis17minutesafterthecrash.

Additionalsevenmedicalunitsappeared46/43minutesafterthecrash,despitethefactthat

theairportissituatedwithinthecityboundaries.18

IntheopinionofthePolishside,searchandrescueoperationsweregrosslydeficient.Victims

werenotprovidedwithfirstaidonatimelybasis.Initialreportsfromthecrashsceneindicated

that6peopleonthecrashsceneshowedsignsoflife. Howevernofirstaidwasforthcomingin

thefirsthourafterthecrash.Asaresult,noonesurvivedthecrash.19Bodieswerenothandled

withdignityeitheratthecrashsceneorsubsequentlyduringthemedicalexaminationin

Moscow.ThebodiesarrivedinPolandforburialinlockedcoffinsandthefamiliesweredenied

therighttoopenthecoffinsbeforethefunerals.Theyweredeniedtherighttoperformtheir

ownautopsies. Permissionwasgiventoonefamilytoexhumethebodyofavictimoverone

yearafterthecrash;theautopsyperformedontheexhumedbodyconfirmedtheRussianautopsyreportonlyin10percent.

20

ContradictionsintheIACFinalReport

AccordingtotheIACFinalReport,"On15April2010,uponrequestoftheinvestigationteam

theAn26t/n147ofMilitaryUnit21350aircraftlaboratorymadeatestflyaroundofthe

aerodromenavigationaidsandlightingequipment.Accordingtotheresultsofthestandard

checklistforflyaroundthementionednavigationaidsandlightingequipmentwereoperative

whichwasconfirmedbytherelativetasksheets."Unfortunately,thePolishAccredited

Representativeandhisadvisorswerenotallowedtoparticipateinanyflyaroundtests.The

analysisfromtheabovementionedtestflightwasnotmadeavailabletothePolishsideeither,

despitemanyrequestsmadepursuanttoArticle5.25ofAnnex13.21

AccordingtotheIACFinalReport,theairportlightingsystemwasworkingproperlyatthe

Smolensk'Severny'airfieldatthetimeoftheaccident. Thisconclusionstandsindirect

contradictiontostatementscontainedintheIACFinalReportindicatingthatfouroutofeight

rowsoflightswereturnedoff.22ThisinformationwasrevealedbytheRussiansideonlyaftera

18Ibid.,pp.6064.

19See:InterviewwithMagorzataWassermann;See:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7O1rbeQ8S420AutopsyofZbigniewWassermann.

21PolishResponseinEnglish,pp.6869.

22IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.55.Thelightingequipmentcheckalsorevealedthatdepending

ontheaircraftpositionandflightaltitudethe lightsatadistanceof400,700and800mfromRWY26

canbeshadedbythesurroundingtreesandbushes. Itrevealedthatthelightsofthesecondandthird

group (800and700m fromRWY26threshold)weremissing,therewerefragmentsof lights,andthe

powercablewastornoff.Thelightfiltersonthefirstsgrouplights(900m)werebroken,andonlyoneof

thethreelightswasoperative.


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Page10of21

journalistfromBelorussiamadepublicphotosshowingRussiansoldiersreplacingbulbsand

fixingpowersupplycablesonlyafewhoursafterthecrash.23

AccordingtotheIAC,recordsfromtheradarvideotaperelatedtothelandingofTu154M

Flight101weremissing."DuringthepreflightpreparationonApril10onlytheoperabilityof

therecorderwascheckedwithnoassessmentoftherecordquality.Theanalysisrevealedthat

therecordwasnotmadeduetotwisting(bridging)ofwiresbetweenthevideocameraandthe

videorecorder.Afterthewireswereinsulatedthevideorecordingwasresumed."24

WhilereviewingtheIACFinalReport,thePolishsidenoticedtheinformationonthelocationof

theblipsoftheaircraftontheglidepaththatmusthavecomefromtheradarvideorecording

andinquired:"Inlightoftheinformationaboutthemissingvideorecordingoftheprocessof

approachtolandingonthePRLindicator,thequotationofdatarelatedtothelocationofthe

blipsoftheaircraftontheglidepathonthePRLindicatorraisesseriousdoubts."25Accordingly,

thePolishsiderequestedanexplanationastowhyanumberofstatementsweremadebythe

Russiansidebasedonthereadingfromtheradarvideorecordingif,allegedly,suchrecording

wasnotmadeduetomalfunctioning.ThefollowingstatementsmadeintheICAFinalReport

illustratethisissue:At6kmtheaircraftwasactuallyhigherthantheglidepath(consideringtheindicationinaccuracytheaircraftblipwasonthetopboundaryoftheglidepathtolerance

areaforglidepathangleof~310)."26

Anotherstatementalsoreferstothereadingfromtheradarrecording:At10:40:39thelanding

zonecontrollerinformedthecrew:'2,oncourse,onglidepath'.Atthattimetheaircraftwasat

aheightofabout115mwithreferencetoRWY26threshold,whichwasalmostcorresponding

tothemissedapproachheight.Consideringtheindicationinaccuraciestheaircraftbliponthe

radarwasalmostatthelowestboundaryoftheglidepathtolerancearea.27

Thelastsentencefromthequoteaboveisfalseinseveralimportantrespects.First,itdescribes

theaircraftblipfromtheradartapethatallegedlywasnotmade.Second,theconclusionthat

theblipwasalmostatthelowestboundaryoftheglidepathtoleranceisgrosslyinaccurate

consideringthatthemarginoferrorinthisinstanceisintherangeof600percentbecausethe

tolerancelevel28atthedistanceof2000metersis7meterswhilethevarianceinthiscaseis42

metersbelowtheglidingpath,whichamountsto600%error.29 ThereforetheRussian

conclusionthattheaircraftblipontheradarwasalmostatthelowestboundaryoftheglide

pathtoleranceareainthesituationwherethemarginoferrorrepresents600%isgrossly

23PolishResponseinEnglish,p.7073.

24IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.73.

25PolishResponseinEnglish,pp.5760.26IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.58.Similarstatementsthatrefertodetailedinformationabout

thelocationofanaircraftontheradarscreenweremadeonpages5760ofthereport.27Ibid.

28ThetolerancelevelsoftheRussianFederationasprovidedbytheFederalAviationProvisions

regardingStateAviationFlights("FAPPPGosA")arepresentedonpage108ofthePolishResponse.29AccordingtoK.Matyszczak,attheglidepathangleof240theerroris600%. IftheRussiansinsiston

usingtheglidepathangleof310inthisscenariothemarginoferrorwouldamountto1,000%.(2000

distance+6mtolerancelevel,60mbelowtheglidepath: 60/6x100).


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unreasonableandwrong. Similarmisleadingstatementsaremadewithrespecttotheentire

descriptionoftheglidingpath.30

Asimilarcontradictionoffundamentalsignificancetothisinvestigationcanbefoundwith

respecttotheevaluationofFlightControlGroupsactionsandthesubsequentimpactofthese

actionsontheoccurrenceoftheaviationevent.IntheIACFinalReport,theRussianside

concludesthattheFCTgroupactionsduringtheapproachdidnotcontributetotheaccident.31

ThePolishsidechallengesthisconclusionbypointingoutthattheaircraftcrewwasincorrectly

informedthattheywereonthecorrectcourseandpathposition,wheninfacttheplanewas

abovethepath,andfrom2.5kmtoDS26wasbelowthepathby240'.32

TheRussiansidefurtherconcludesthatthelevelofprofessionalismoftheFCTgroupatthe

SmolenskSevernyAirdromecompliedwiththerequirements. ThePolishsideobjectstothis

conclusionbystatingthattheLandingZoneControllerhadlittleexperienceworkinginthis

capacity."Heservedinthisfunctionseventimesinthelast12monthspriortothedayofthe

disaster,ofwhichonlyonceinadverseatmosphericconditions. Inhislogbook,thereisno

properentryofbeingauthorizedtoperformKSLdutiesattheSmolensk'Severny'Airfield,

whichisinconsistentwithFAPPPGosA[RegulationsoftheRussianFederation]."33

AnothersignificantcontradictionpresentedintheIACFinalReportrelatestotheanalysisofthe

landingcharts. AnICAOtestflightwasperformedattheSmolensk'Severny'airportonMarch

15,2010withtheglidepathangleof240'. Thisglidepathanglewasusedontheapproach

cardsofTu154MthatweremadeavailabletothePolishside.Afterthecrash,onApril15,

2010,theRussiansideperformedasecondflyaroundtestattheSmolensk'Severny'airfield

withtheglidepathangleof312.3.Thissecondglidepathanglewasthenselectedforfurther

calculationsbytheIAC. InitscommentsthePolishsidepointsoutthat"therehasbeenno

analysisregardingthepathof240'(30)validfortheapproachcards.Theexplanationfor

changesinthepathof240'to312.3'maybeanattempttoexplainthelackofresponsefrom

KSL[LandingZoneController]tothedeviationofpositionofTu154Maircraftfromthevalid

glidepathoutsidethepermissibletolerance."34

ThelackofresponseoftheLandingZoneControllertothewrongpositionwithrespecttothe

glidepathisfurtherjustifiedbytheRussianreportasfollows:"Thus,intheaccidentflightthe

landingzonecontrollersawtheaircraftblipontheradarasbeingreferencedtoglidepathof

~310.Theinaccuracywasabout0.5,whichisequaltothetolerancearearange.35

30IACFinalReport,EnglishTranslation,pp.153,154,162,163,164

31IACFinalReport,EnglishTranslation,pp.131132

32PolishResponseinEnglish,p.78. Inrelationtothe310pathcitedbytheRussianside,theaircraftintersectedthepathdownward3.3kmfromtheDS26threshold.DS26meansthelandingrunwayat

theSmolensk'Severny'airportinthedirection259degreefromeasttowestEW.33Ibid.


35IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.123. Evenataglidepathangleof312andtakinginto

accountallowabledeviationsfromthebeamrunwaycentre,theaircraftwouldstillhaveremained

undertheglidepath,dangerouslyclosetotheground,evenifstartingfromadistanceof3000meters

fromtherunwaybeam.


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AccordingtothePolishside,theanalysesoftheglidepathof310'donotcorrespondwiththe

validandthepublishedpathof240'.Furthermore,theinformationpresentedbyIACindicates

that"theaircraftblipwasoutsideofthepermissibleerrorareaofthelineardeviation,even

forthepathof310,whichisnotcommentedbytheauthorsoftheIACFinalReport."36

CalculationscarriedoutbythePolishsidethattakeintoaccountthepositionoftheaircraftin

relationtotheglidepathof310showthat"atadistanceof3.3kmtotheDS26the

permissibleerroroflineardeviationis28m,i.e.withatoleranceof1/3ofthevaluethatis

below 9.33m,KSLshouldhaveinformedthecrewofitswrongpositiononthepath.The

conclusionisthatevenbeforereaching3km,KSLcontinuedtoinformthecrewoftheircorrect

position'onthecourseandpath',wheninfacttheflightoftheaircraftwaslowering,increasing

itsverticaldistancefromthepath."37

TheIACFinalReportalsoincludesthefollowingstatement:"At10:39:10thecontroller

informedthecrewthattheywere10kmfromtherunwaythresholdandhadreachedtheglide

pathentrancepoint."AccordingtothePolishside"Informingthecrewthatatadistanceof10

kmtheaircrafthadreachedtheglidepathentrancepoint[means]thatKSLguidedtheaircraft

accordingtotheapproachglidepathangle240'thatwasinforceoncards."38

Inanalyzingthelastphaseoftheflight,theIACdecidedtochangetheglidepathangle39from

240'to312.Infact,threedifferentglidepathangles,thatis240',310'and312,3angles,

areusedbyIACthroughoutthereport.AccordingtothePolishside,intheIACFinalReport

"variousanglesofthedescentpatharereferredtodependingontheneedforconductingthe

analysis,whichgivestheimpressionthatthechoiceofpathwasdictatedbytheneedtoprove

thatontheradarscreentheblipoftheaircraftwasalwaysoncourse.Inadditiontothe

doubtsabouttheangleofthepathoftheradarlandingsystemandtheconsistencyofthe

analysis[...],thereisastatementsayingthatinfacttheflightcrewperformedtheflightwith

anangleof5."

Therefore,thePolishsidewasforcedtoask:whatangleofthepathshouldbeusedhereifeventhepathof5didnotcausedistressandreactionofradarguidance

controllers.40

AccordingtothePolishside,whenusingtheglidingangleof240'theairplanewasongliding

pathonlyatadistanceof10kmandonemoretimeatadistanceof2.78kmwhilecrossingthe

glidingpath. Atallothertimesinadistancefrom9kmto2.78kmfromthelandingbeamthe

marginoferrorwasintherangefrom200%to600%.Atadistancefrom2.78kmto1.48kmthe

airplanewasbelowtheglidingpathwiththeerrorrangingfrom300to600%.

36PolishResponseinEnglish,p.69andpp.107108.

37PolishResponseinEnglish,p.121


39AsrequiredbyArticle115oftheRussianFAPPPGosA,"thelocationoftheblipontheindicator

correspondstotheposition'ontheglidepath'whenthepermissibleerroroflineardeviationdoesnot

exceed1/3ofthelineardimensionsofthezoneoftolerance.40PolishResponseinEnglish,p.123.


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Evenassumingtheincorrectlyappliedglidingpathangleof310'usedbytheIAC,theairplane

wouldhaveremained75%ofthetimeoutsidetheglidingpath. Atadistanceof3kmfromthe

airportbeamitwasdangerouslybelowtheglidingpath,exceedingtheacceptedmarginof

error41by10%andby1000%at2.5kmto1.95km. TheFCTreactedonlyat1.45kmfromthe

airportbeamwheretheacceptederrorexceeded1600%.42

Whenthecrewcrossed'level101'theFCTdidnotalertthepilotsabouttheproblembut

insteadreassuredthecrewtheywereoncourseandonthecorrectpath,misleadingthecrew

abouttheactualdistancefromtherunwaybeam.TheFCThasnotcorrectedthismisleading

informationforatleast30seconds.

Althoughtheaircraftwasfor29secondsoutsidethezonebelowtheglidingpath43the

LandingZoneControllerdidnotgivethecrewinformationaboutitsincorrectpositionrelative

tothepath,stillincorrectlyinformingthemofthecorrectposition'oncourseandonpath.'44

ThecommandLevel101(10:40:53.4)wasgivenabout14secondsafterinformingthecrew

thattheyweretwooncourseontheglidingpath(10:40:39,9),45ThecommandLevel101

wasissuedbytheLandingZoneControllertoolate,whentheaircraft'smarkeralready

disappearedfromtheindicator(accordingtotestimony).

IntheIACFinalReport,theIACstatesthatthePolishsidedidnotsubmitrequired

documentationregardingtheApril8,2010incidentwhentheTu154Maircraftenteredin

contactwithabird.However,infactthePolishsidehadsubmittedtotheIACallrequired

documentsregardingthisincident,andtheIAChadinfactreceivedfulldocumentationofthe

event.46

TamperingwithEvidence

OnSeptember8,2011,Prof.KazimierzNowaczyktestifiedbeforethePolishParliamentary

CommitteefortheInvestigationoftheSmolenskCrash("PolishParliamentaryCommittee")that

satellitepicturesoftheaccidentsitetakenbyGeoEyesSatelliteshowthatthegroundposition

oftheplane'slefthorizontalstabilizerwaschangedbetweenApril11andApril12,2010.47The

41AccordingtotheregulationsoftheRussianFederation.


43Ibid. InaccordancewithArticle115ofFAPPPGosA,thepermissibleerroroflineardeviationdoesnot

exceed1/3ofthelineardimensionsofthezoneoftolerance.44Inaddition,FTCcommunicationswiththecrewfromtheverybeginningprovideddistanceinformationwith600700metererror.Thusthecrewthoughttheywereclosertotheairportthaninfacttheywere.45PolishResponseinEnglish,p.121. Infacttheplanewasalreadyontheglidepathatanaltitudeof17

minrelationtothethresholdofDS26.46PolishResponseinEnglish,pp.4850.ThePolishsideprovidesadetailedlistofallthedocumentation

submittedinconnectionwiththebirdincident.47KazimierzNowaczyk,"AreMAKandKBWLLPreportstrustworthy?"asretrievedonlineonNovember

7,2011athttp://mdabrowski.salon24.pl/340718,prezentacjaekspertowprzedzespolem

parlamentarnym08092011.


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horizontalstabilizerwasmovedabout20metersclosertothemainpartofthewreckage

betweenApril11andApril12.TheIACFinalReportinitsanalysisincludesanewpositionfrom

April12astheoriginalpositioninwhichthehorizontalstabilizerpurportedlywasfound.48

InOctober2010thePolishpresspublishedphotosshowingtheprocessofdemolitionofthe

wreckageoftheTu154MairplaneattheSmolensk'Severny"Airport.Someofthesephotos

areshownin Attachment1herein.AvideofootageoftheRussianworkersdestroyingthe

wreckageoftheTu154Mairplaneimmediatelyafterthecrash,i.e.onApril11,2010,isshowninadocumentary"Akcjaspecjalna"byAnitaGargas.

49

ManipulationofData

"Goaround"

TheRussianconclusionthatthepilotwasunderpressureto"tocontinuedescentinthe

conditionsofunjustifiedriskwithadominatingaimoflandingatanymeans"50issupportedby

thefollowingstatement: "Atadistanceof1200600mfromthepointoffirstimpactduring

theactualdescentwiththeverticalspeedofabout8m/sec,theCVRrecordedthreereportswithin8secondsabouttheheightof100m,equaltotheestablishedminimumdescent

altitude.[...]ThePICs[PilotinCommand]decisiontogoarounddidnotfollow."51

However,thePolishreadingoftheCVRrevealedthatuponpassinganaltitudeof100meters

thePICorderedthe'goaround.'Thecopilotconfirmedthiscommand.52Thus,contrarytothe

Russianstatementsandconclusions,thedecisionto'goaround'wasmadeattherighttime

becausethePilotinCommandorderedabortingthelandingatanaltitudeof100meters,as

requiredbystandardairportlandingminimum.53

"Hewillgocrazy"

The'psychologicalanalysis'presentedintheIACFinalReportisbasedonthetranscriptsfromtheCockpitVoiceRecorder("CVR")allegedlycontainingstatementsmadebythecrew

membersduringthelast30minutesbeforethecrash.Thesetranscripts,preparedbytheIACin

MayandJune2010,containlineswhichdonotappearontheCVRcopyinthepossessionofthe

Polishside.

48IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.8749See:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oeel3QTC8AcBreakingwindowsisofaddedsignificance

becauseinsearchingforevidenceofexplosiontheglassisthebestmaterialfortesting.50IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.183.

51IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,Article3.1.59

52ThePolishResponseinEnglish,p.142.Thetranscriptofthecockpitrecordingwiththecommand'go

around'waspublishedinAugust2011.Seehttp://mswia.datacenter

poland.pl/protokol/Zalacznik_nr_8__Odpis_korespondencji_pokladowej.pdf53PolishResponseinEnglish,p.139.


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IntheIACFinalReport,theRussiansidetwiceincludedthefollowingstatementallegedly

utteredbyamemberofthePolishcrew:Hewillgocrazy.54Thisstatementhasbeenusedtoprovethattherewaspressuretolandcomingfromathirdparty,specificallyfromtheMain

Passenger.ThisthirdpartypressureonthePICtolandispresentedintheconclusionsoftheIAC

FinalReportasoneofthemaincausesoftheSmolenskCrash.

AccordingtothePolishside,thewords'hewillgocrazy...'wereneverutteredbythecrewof

Tu154M.IntheopinionofthePolishside,theCVRtapewasalteredtoimplysuchastatement.

BoththePolishInvestigationCommitteeandthePolishProsecutor'sOfficepublicallyconcluded

thatnosuchstatementwaseverutteredbyanymemberofthePolishcrew. ThePolishside

unequivocallyrejectedanysuggestionsthatthecrewmighthaveundergoneanypsychological

pressurefromathirdpartytocontinuedescent. AccordingtothePolishResponse,"therecord

oftheonboardvoicerecorderlocatedinthecabinoftheaircraftTu154M(CVR)didnotreveal

anypassageconfirmingtheattempttoinfluencetheactionsofthecrewbythirdpersons,

includingtheMainPassenger."55.Thispositionwasonceagainconfirmedbythespokesmanof

thePolishMainMilitaryProsecutor'sOfficeonApril19,2011asfollows:"Inthedocuments

gatheredthusfarthereisnoevidencewhatsoeverindicatingthatthecrashofTU154was

causedbyunduepressureexertedonthecrewofTU154.56InthetranscriptfromtheCVRpublishedbythePolishsideinAugust2010atthepoint10:38:00

(06:38:00UTC)whereaccordingtotheRussiansthestatement"Hewillgocrazy..."wasuttered,

nosuchstatementislisted.Between10:37:22and10:38:30thetranscriptliststhecountingby

thenavigatorofadistancetotheairportbeamandthefollowingstatementnotincludedinthe

Russiantranscript:"Tellthatonemoremiletothecenterremains."57

TheRussiansideignoredtheabovePolishobjectionsandusedtheunduepsychological

pressurehypothesissupportedbyfalseevidenceasthebasisforitsconclusion.

Topographyof

Terrain

TheIACFinalReportignorestheevidencefromtheCVRwhichprovesthattheTu154Mcrew

knewthetopographyoftheterraininthevicinityoftheSmolensk'Severny"airportverywell.

TheIACcompletelydisregardedclearstatementsmadebythePolishpilotsregardingthe

loweringoftheterrainbeforetheairportbeamthatappearintheCVRtranscript. Accordingto

54IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.103:AnumberofphrasesrecordedbytheCVR(at10:30:33

PanDirector:SofarnoPresidentsdecisionwhattodonextandat10:38:00unidentifiedvoice23:Hellgocrazyif)showthatthePICwasinpsychologicallydifficultposition.ItwasobviousthatincaseofmissedapproachandproceedingtothealternateairdromethePICcouldhavetofacenegativereactionoftheMainPassenger.AsthephraseHellgocrazyifwassaidduringthefinalturnthePICcouldhavechangedhispreviousdecisionanddecidedtotaketheriskofdescendinglowerthanthedecisionaltitudehopingtofinallyestablishvisualcontactwiththerunwayandland.See:http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/files/tu154m_101/finalreport_eng.pdf55ThePolishResponseinEnglish,p.66.

56See:http://www.tvn24.pl/1,1699665,0,1,matprokuraturaniemazadnegodowoduna

naciski,wiadomosc.html57OdpisKorespondencjiPokadowej,Zacznik8,p.118,aspostedonNovember7,2011at

http://mswia.datacenterpoland.pl/protokol/Zalacznik_nr_8__Odpis_korespondencji_pokladowej.pdf


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thetranscript,oneminutebeforethecrashand5kmbeforetheairportbeam(thatis3km

fromtheloweringoftheterrain),theCopilotremindedthePICabouttheloweringofthe

terraintowhichthePICresponded: "Iknow."58 Indirectcontradictiontothisevidence,the

IACconcludedthatthepilotslackedtheknowledgeoftheterraintopography.Suchconclusion

alsodisregardstheinformationthatthePIClandedattheSmolensk'Severny'airportascopilot

threedaysbeforethecrash.

TAWSandFMSTheTerrainAwarenessandWarningSystem("TAWS")thatwasonboardofTu154Mwasto

prevent"ControlledFlightIntoTerrain"accidents.TheTu154Mwasalsoequippedwiththe

FlightManagementSystem("FMS").Boththeseinstrumentsweremanufacturedbythe

UniversalAvionicsSystemCorporationbasedintheUSA. ThereadingofTAWSandFMS

recordingswasperformedbythemanufacturerwiththeparticipationoftheNTSBandFAA.59

IntheIACFinalReportonlythetimeinformationfromreadingtheTAWSandFSMrecordings

wasprovided.ThisinformationwasreferencedinFootnote26asfollows:"Consideringthe

differenceintimezonesthreeextrasecondswereaddedtoTAWStimetobesynchronizedwith

theFDR."60TAWSandFMSreadingswerenotpartoftheanalysispresentedintheIACFinal

ReportexceptforthereadingofthelastFMSshowingthepositionoftheairplane,itsaltitude

andspeed.TheoriginalTAWSandFMSreadingsmadebytheAmericanmanufacturerwere

disclosedbythePolishsideonJuly29,2011,morethansixmonthsafterthepublicationofthe

ICAFinalReport.61 Acarefulanalysisofthisdatashowsthattheentirecomputersystemofthe

Tu154Mwasshotdownatanaltitudeof15metersfromthegroundandatadistanceof50

metersfromfirstsignsofthecontactwiththeground.Thisissuewasnotdiscussedatallinthe

IACFinalReport.Furthermore,aspointedoutbyDr.K.Nowaczyk,TAWSNo38wasnotlistedin

theIACFinalReportatall.ThisTAWSindicatesadifferentdirectionoftheplaneinthelast

fragmentsoftheflightthanassumedbytheIAC.

BadFaith

TheRussiansaccusethePolishsideofnotconductingairportinspectionsbeforetheApril10,

2010,whereastheRussianFederationrefusedthePolishsideaccesstotheairportfor

inspectionpurposes.AsaresultoftheRussianrefusal,therewerenoPolishinspectionsheldat

theSmolensk'Severny'airportbeforeApril10,2010.

58Ibid.CVRtranscript:SDrugipilot,APierwszypilot:6:40:09.0 S (Tamjestobnienie?).6:40:12.0 S

(Tamjest 6:40:12.5 obnienie?),Arek. 6:40:13.0 A (Wiem, )6:40:13.5 zaraz,6:40:14.0 bdzie.

6:40:14.5 6:40:15.0 Tam,tojesttaki...?) Therewerefiveloweringsoftheterrainonthepath.See:

http://m.naszdziennik.pl/zasoby/smolensk/ZalacznikiDoRaportuKoncowego.pdf59TAWSserialnumber237andFMSserialnumbers291,1577.

60IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,pp.105107.

61FinalReportofthePolishCommissionfortheInvestigationoftheState AirplaneAccidentNumber

192/2010/11oftheairplane154Mnr101onApril10,2010.See:

http://m.naszdziennik.pl/zasoby/smolensk/RaportKoncowyTu154M.pdf. Accordingtothisdata

submittedbytheNTSBtherecordingtookplaceat6:41:02withthespeedof270km/hatthepoint

N5449.483E03203.161atthecorrectedaltitudeofabout15meters.


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TheRussiansideaccusestheCommanderinChiefofthePolishAirForceofbeingpresentinthe

cockpitatthetimeofthecrashandhavingalcoholinhisblood.Thecommentsaboutthe

alcoholinthebloodofthetopgeneraloftheRepublicofPolandthatarenotsupportedby

adequateevidence(see:Footnote6)areofdisparagingcharacter,especiallywhendisclosedby

theIAC forthefirsttimeasthekeyevidenceofthePolishguiltatthepressconference

announcingtheresultsoftheIACinvestigation.

R.R.YesayanasamemberofthetechnicalteamfortheinvestigationoftheSmolenskCrash

statedpublicallythattheTu154Mairplanewasequippedforidiots.62

CredibilityofIAC

OnthebasisofthePresidentialOrderoftheRussianFederationdatedApril10,201063aState

InvestigationCommissionwasappointedtoinvestigatethecausesoftheTu154Maircraft

crash.TheInvestigatorinChargefortheStateInvestigationCommissionwasthePrimeMinisteroftheRussianFederationVladimirPutin.FromApril10toApril13,2010,the

investigationatthecrashsitewassupervisedbyVladimirPutinandledonthegroundbythe

HeadoftheFlightSafetyAgencyoftheRussianArmedForces.Duringthisthreedayperiod,the

followingindividualsplayedthekeyroleintheinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrash:Jurij

CzajkaProsecutorGeneral,GeneralRaszydNurgalijev,Gen.SergeiIvanovandGen.Sergei

Shoigu.64

AlltheseofficialsarecloselyconnectedwiththeRussiansecurityforces,theultimatesuccessors

totheexecutionersoftheKatynvictims.GeneralShoiguiswellknownforhiscommentsonthe

KatyncrimeandthehistoriographyofWorldWarII. InMarch2009,Shoigupublicallystated:

"OurparliamentshouldpassalawthatwouldenvisageliabilityforthedenialoftheSoviet

victoryintheGreatpatrioticWar."GeneralShoigufurtherstatedthatthelegislationwouldalso

seektopunisheasternEuropeanorformerSovietstatesthatdenytheywereliberatedbythe

RedArmy."TheleadersofthosecountriescouldbebannedfromRussiansoil.Thenthe

presidentsofcertaincountriesdenyingthiswouldnotbeabletovisitourcountryandremain

unpunished,"65Shoigusaid.

OnApril13,2010,thegeneralsupervisionofthetechnicalinvestigationandcoordinationwith

theinterestedRussianandforeignpartieswasdelegatedtoA.N.Morozov,theIACChairperson

whoalsoactedasDeputyoftheStateInvestigationCommission.

62Scion,"ZbrodniaSmolenska,"p.73.

63OrderoftheHeadoftheStateCommission 225.

64AlexanderScios,'ZbrodniaSmolenska;AnatomiaDesinformacji."WydawnictwoAntyk,Warszawa

2011,p.70.

65See:AdrianBlomfiled,"RussiantooutlawCriticismofWWIItactics."TheTelegraph,March5,2009,

asretrievedonlineonNovember7,2011at

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/4943814/Russiatooutlawcriticismof

WWIItactics.html.


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OnApril13,2010,Morozovissuedanorderconcerningthetechnicalinvestigationin

cooperationwiththeRussianMinistryofDefense.66Bythisorderthefollowinginvestigation

teamwasappointed:InvestigatorinChargeA.N.Morozov,ViceChairmanofIACChairmanof

theAAIC;DeputyInvestigatorinCharge:V.V.Sorochenko,DeputyHeadoftheFlightSafety

Agency,RussianArmedForces,DeputyInvestigatorinCharge:G.A.Yachmenev,ViceChairman

oftheAAIC,IAC;Members:1)A.V.Alekseyev,DeputyoftheChiefEngineer,AviakorLtd.

AviationPlant,2)R.T.Yesayan,DeputyGeneralDirectorHeadofflightresearchcenter,State

ResearchInstituteforCivilAviation;3)N.M.Kozhevnikova,Consultant,AAIC,IAC;4)M.S.Kulikov,ChiefATCinstructor,AirNavigationInstitute;5) V.G.Nekrasov,ViceChairmanof

AirdromeandEquipmentCertificationCommission.IAC;6)A.V.Roldugin,ViceChairmanofthe

AAISTSC,IAC;7)A.A.Talalakin,DeputyoftheChiefConstructor,TupolevDesignBureau.

Severalmembersoftheabovelistedtechnicalinvestigationteamactedindirectconflictof

interestwithrespecttotheinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrash. Themostalarmingisthe

presenceontheinvestigationteamofarepresentativefromtheAviacorAviationPlantin

Samara("Aviacor").InhiscapacityasDeputyChiefEngineeroftheAviacor,Alekseyevwas

directlyresponsibleforthetechnicalreliabilityoftheairplaneunderinvestigationbecauseat

thetimeofthecrashtheTu154MairplaneoperatedundervalidwarrantyfromAviacor. Just2.5monthsbeforethecrash,AviacorperformedmajorwarrantyworkonthisparticularTu

154M. Similarly,thepresenceofTalalakin,arepresentativeofthedesigner/manufacturerof

theairplaneunderinvestigation,raisesseriousdoubtsastohisimpartiality. Anothermember

oftheinvestigativeteamnamedNiekrasovservesasDeputyoftheAirportCertification

CommitteeoftheIAC.Inthiscapacity,NiekrasovissuedIACcertificatesformanyairports

includingthecertificationfortheairportinSochiwhereonMay3,2006,anArmenianplane

crashlandedinbadweather.AccordingtotheIAC,thepilotwasatfault.Armeniaprotested

thisfinding,pointingoutthatthepilotdidnotreceiveappropriatesupportfromtheFCT.67

AnothermemberoftheinvestigativeteamR.T.Yesayanpubliclydeclaringthat"theywere

seekingthegroundandtherewasplentyofbodies."WithrespecttotheassessmentoftheworkoftheSmolenskFCT,Yesayandidnotobjecttoastatementbyoneofhisexpertsthat

even"achimpanzeecouldbeseatingandmumblingintheFlightControlTower."68 Another

memberoftheinvestigativeteamM.S.KulikovasanexpertonCivilAirTrafficManagement

hadnoappropriatequalificationswithrespecttoairtrafficmanagementatthemilitaryairport

likethe'Severny'AirfieldinSmolensk.

TheInterstateAviationCommitteethatconductedtheinvestigationintotheSmolenskCrash

actedfromthepositionofconflictofinterestinmanyimportantrespects.TheIAC,asthestate

regulator,certifiedthedesignerofthisplane,itsmanufacturer,itsservicer,themanufacturerof

theengines,andtheserviceroftheengines.Theaveragefeeforthecertificationisintherange

ofthreetofivemilliondollars.69Accordingly,theIACastheagencyresponsibleforquality

66Order8498/

67Scios,ZbrodniaSmolenska,p.72.

68Ibid.p.73.

69PerestimatesofMichailMarkov,theIACreceivedfromAviacorcloseto$25millionfromcertification

fees.ThecredibilityoftheIACisalsochallengedinconnectionwithamajormalfunctionoftheTU154M


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controloftheairplane,aircraftmanufacturer,andthesafetyproceduresattheairportacted

indirectconflictofinterestintheinvestigationintothecrashoftheTu154Mairplanein

Smolensk.

TheTu154MthatcrashedinSmolenskhadexperiencedamajortechnicalproblemonlanding

inHaitiinJanuary2010. TheIAC,astheagencyoverseeingAviacor,tooknoactionwithrespect

tothisincident.70

FindingsofthePolishParliamentaryCommitteefortheSmolenskCrash

Investigation

AccordingtotheIACFinalReport,"theaircraftcollidedwiththebirchwithatrunkdiameterof

3040cm,whichledtotheleftouterwingportionofabout6.5mrippedoffandintensiveleft

bank.In56moreseconds,inverted,theaircraftcollidedwiththegroundandwas

destroyed."71 Accordingly,theencounterwiththebirchthatresultedinthelossofapartofthe

wingcausedtheplanetoinvertandcrash.Thisscenariowasillustratedbyananimation

demonstratingIAC'sinterpretationofthelastmomentsoftheairplanebeforethecrash.This

animationwasnotsupportedbyanyscientificorforensicanalysisofthecrashscene,butrather

representedaworkofartcontrarytobasiclawofphysics.

OnSeptember8,2011,Dr.WieslawBinienda,anexpertonhighenergyimpactsonmaterials

andstructurestestifyingbeforethePolishParliamentaryCommittee,provedbeyonda

reasonabledoubtthatthecollisionwiththebirchcouldnothaverippedtheouterportionof

thewingfromtheaircraft.WhileapplyingallparameterspresentedintheIACFinalReportina

rigorousfiniteelementanalysis,hedemonstratedthroughavirtualexperimentthatthehigh

energyimpactcausesthewingtoactlikeanax,cuttingthebirchwithonlyasmallamountof

damagetotheedgeofthewingbutwithoutanydamagetotheliftingareaofthewing.72These

findingsdirectlychallengedthescenariopresentedbytheIAC.

However,evenifthescenariopresentedbytheIACisassumedwherebythebirchripsoff1/3of

thelengthofthewingattheheightof6.5metersfromtheground,therippedoffportionof

thewingcouldnothavefallenasfaras111metersfromthebirchwhereitwasfound.The

aerodynamicsimulationshowsthattherippedoffpartwouldcrashtothegroundnofurther

than12metersfromthebirchatvelocityof100km/h. Theinspectionofthecrashscene

showedthattherippedoffportionoftheleftwingwasfoundleaningagainstthetrees111

metersfromthebirchandontherightsideofthepathoftheairplane. Theobserveddamage

tothetreesandtotherippedoffsegmentofthewingexcludesthepossibilityofavelocityof

100km/hatthepointofimpact.

airplanethattookplaceinJanuaryof2010inHaiti. TheIACastheagencyoverseeingAviacortookno

actionwithrespecttothisincident.70Scios,"ZbrodniaSmolenska"p.75

71FindingsNo.3.1.69and3.1.70,IACFinalReport,Englishtranslation,p.180

72WieslawBinienda,"CzybrzozawSmolenskumoglazlamacskrzydloTu154M10kwietnia2010roku?,"

aspostedonNovembr7,2011athttp://mdabrowski.salon24.pl/340718,prezentacjaekspertowprzed

zespolemparlamentarnym08092011


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Inordertoexplainthefinallocationoftherippedoffsegmentofthewing,theaerodynamic

analysisoffreeflowofthesegmentwasconducted,requiringthatthelandingspotofthe

segmentcorrespondswiththelocationatwhichitwasfound.73Theresultsobtainedindicated

thattheseparationfromthewingatvelocityof80m/shappenedatadistanceof70meters

fromthebirchand26metersfromtheground.Thus,theaerodynamicanalysisdemonstrates

thattheIAC'sassumedpathof6.5metersabovethegroundwas20meterstoolowandthe

locationoftheseparationofthewingwasoffby70meters.

Furthermore,theIAC'sconclusionthattheairplanetravelingattheheightof6.5metersfrom

thegroundcouldoverturnisalsoimpossiblebecausethespanofthewingis19meters.After

presumablylosing6.5metersonthebirch,theremaining12.5metersofthewingwasstill

longerthanthedistancetothegroundof6.5meters.Thus,theIACconclusionthat"after

intensiveleftbank"theairplane"inverted"isobviouslyimpossibleanderroneous.

So,possiblyinanticipationofthisproblem,theIACversionofthecrashassumesthatthe

airplaneafterlosing1/3ofthewingisgainingheight. Thisscenarioalsoposesafundamental

problembecauseafterlosingasignificantpartofthewing,theairplanewouldbeunableto

gainanyheight. AccordinglythescenariopresentedbytheIACisincorrectinallfundamentalaspectsandthusimpossible.

Conclusion

TheRussianFederationviolatedArticle5.1oftheChicagoConventionthatprovides:'Stateof

Occurrenceshalluseeverymeanstofacilitatetheinvestigation'andArticle5.2thatestablishes

theresponsibilityofthestateconductingtheinvestigation. Furthermore,theRussian

FederationviolatedtherightsoftheAccreditedRepresentativeofPolandpursuanttoArticles

5.24and5.25,therightsofPolandasthestatehavingsufferedfatalitiesorseriousinjuriestoits

citizenspursuanttoArticle5.27,andtheresponsibilityofthestateconductingtheinvestigation

inpreparationofthefinalreportunderArticle6.1.Inconductingtheinvestigation,theRussian

FederationviolatedtherulesandproceduresofAnnex13totheChicagoConventionandthe

ICAOInvestigationManual.ThePolishProsecutorGeneralwasnotgrantedaccesstoevidence

inviolationofArticle5.2oftheChicagoConvention.

Exceptforminorcorrections,theRussianFederationignoredthePolishResponsetothedraft

IACFinalReport.ThewreckageofthePolishGovernmentalAirplaneTu154Mandtheblack

boxesremaininthepossessionoftheRussianFederation. Inlightofalltheabove,itis

imperativethattheinternationalcommunitymusterthewilltoformanimpartialinternational

commissionfortheinvestigationoftheSmolenskCrash.

73Theanalysiswasbasedonsolidfluidinteractionandhighvelocityaerodynamicdraglawsofphysics


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SmolenskStatusReportNovember2011Appendix1:DestructionofEvidence

PhotosTakenattheSceneoftheSmolenskCrashonApril11,201074

74Photosfrom"MisjaSpecjalna"byAnitaGargas.

smolensk crash status report 111111 3

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