smithq&oaklander_dialogue5

7/27/2019 SmithQ&Oaklander_Dialogue5

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Dialogue 5The problem of change

A college campus in New England.PHIL: I find philosophy fascinating, but terribly puzzling, for it raises

perplexing questions about what initially seem to be the mostobvious features of our experience. I am reminded of the Irishphilosopher Bishop Berkeley who claimed that philosophersraise the dust and then complain they cannot see.

ALICE: What features of our experience do you have in mind?PHIL: There are two issues that are especially fundamental and give

rise to numerous questions; time and change. Let us discusschange first. You and I know, or think we know, that thingschange. For example, I change, my friends change, my plantschange, and so does just about everything that exists. For

example, my tomato is now red, but it first was green.However, when I reflect upon the fact of change, I see a problem.

ALICE: Really, what is it?PHIL: On the one hand, whenever there is change there is identity. It is

one and the same tomato that is green and then red. In order forsomething to change, the thing must remain what it is,otherwise it would not be that thing that undergoes change.Take another example: I just painted the walls in my study.Before the change the walls were light blue, and after the changethey were white. Still, it is the same wall that persisted throughthe alteration, that is, through the gain and loss of properties.On the other hand, whenever there is change, there is diversity:the thing must not remain what it is, but become different.Maybe I am just confused, but I seem to see a problem here.Change seems to require that the thing that changes be onething or identical to itself, and two things or different fromitself, and that strikes me as totally impossible. So, although Iseem to perceive change, upon reflection I have my doubtsconcerning its reality.



ALICE: But how could you possibly doubt change? It is obvious thatchange occurs!

PHIL: I am not denying that change obviously seems to occur. I amjust raising the question of whether what normally seems to us

to be change may turn out not to be change at all, once wecorrectly analyze what is going on. Certainly reality seems to bechanging, but isn’t it a possibility that this appearance isdeceptive and that reality is in some sense changeless?

ALICE: It is hard to take that possibility seriously. But I am interested inyour idea. You said there was a problem about a thing beingboth the same and different if it changes. But I am not sure thatI see any problem here. After all, isn’t the tomato that is greenthe same as the tomato that is red?

PHIL: Yes.

ALICE: And isn’t the property of green different from the property of red?

PHIL: Yes.ALICE: Well then, we should say the tomato is the same as itself both

before and after the change, and the properties that the tomatohas are different before and after the change. It soundsparadoxical when you say “Change involves the tomato beingwhat it is and being what it is not,” but the air of paradoxdisappears once we distinguish the thing or substance, thetomato, from its properties. If a thing changes, then obviously it

is not qualitatively identical with what it was because it hasdifferent properties or qualities from those it previously had.But even though it is qualitatively different it may still benumerically the same thing that undergoes the change.

PHIL: That seems simple enough. Change occurs when one and thesame thing lacks a property that it formerly had.

ALICE: That’s right.PHIL: Wait a minute. I still see a problem since I don’t think that you

can have one and the same thing at two different times if thealleged single thing has different qualities or properties at thosetimes.

ALICE: Really, why not?PHIL: Let me pick up this old tomato here and put it between us. We

are now both looking at it from different perspectives. I see theback side and you see the front. Each of us may perceive thetomato to have some properties that the other does notperceive, for example, it may be partially rotten in the back, butnot in the front. However, given we are looking at the sametomato, the tomato I perceive will have all the properties that

52 TIME AND IDENTITY



you perceive it to have, and vice versa. Let me give anotherexample before I draw the consequence and make my point.

If the chair I am looking at is the same as the one you aresitting on, then every property possessed by the chair I am

looking at will also be possessed by the one you are sitting on.The general point is that if what appears to be two things arereally identical (are really one thing), then every property of what appears to be the one thing will also be a property of what appears to be the other. Alternatively, we could say thatif “two” things are really identical, then everything true of theone will also be true of the other.

ALICE: I accept that principle, but why does that cause you to doubt thereality of change?

PHIL: It seems to me that we are caught on the horns of a dilemma. Let’s

go back to the tomato. We are agreed that if the tomatochanges, then the tomato which is green is identical with thetomato which is red. But we have just agreed that if the greentomato is identical with the red tomato then every property thatthe green tomato has will also be a property of the red tomatoand vice versa.

ALICE: Yes, but what is the dilemma?PHIL: Just this. If the green tomato has the same properties as the red

tomato and vice versa, then the green tomato must be red, andthe red tomato must be green, and that, if not an outright

contradiction, is certainly impossible in some sense. On theother hand, if you deny that the green tomato has all theproperties of the red tomato, then you have two differenttomatoes and not one. In either case, change appears to beimpossible.

ALICE: You must be making a mistake somewhere. Can’t you see howexcited I have become; can’t you simply see I have changed?

PHIL: I see what you see, or rather I can see you are getting veryagitated over this issue, which is good, but my reason tells meyou have not really changed. I told you philosophy is puzzling.Maybe there really is change, but for the life of me I cannot seehow it is possible. Can you see any mistake in my reasoning?

ALICE: As a matter of fact I can. You say, for example, I cannot changefrom being calm to being agitated and keep my identity becauseif I did I would have to possess incompatible properties, andthat is contradictory or in some other way impossible.

PHIL: Yes, that’s my point.ALICE: But you have overlooked the obvious.PHIL: Really, what obvious fact or truth have I overlooked?

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE 53



ALICE: You have failed to distinguish between the essential propertiesof a thing and its accidental properties. An essential property of me is one that I cannot lose and still be the individual who I am.Thus, my being a human being is an essential property of me. I

could not change that property and take on the property of being an insect ( pace Kafka’s Metamorphosis) and still retainmy personal identity. Accidental properties, on the other hand,are those I can shed without ceasing to be who I am. Thus, myweighing 150 pounds is an accidental property of me since Imay gain or lose a couple of pounds without losing my personalidentity or ceasing to exist.

PHIL: Yes, there is such a distinction, but how does it help avoid theproblem I am raising?

ALICE: What explains the identity of the tomato with incompatible

properties is that the tomato which is green has the sameessential quality of being a tomato as the tomato which is red.Similarly, I can change from being agitated to being calm andkeep my identity since my essential qualities are the samewhether I am calm or agitated even though my accidentalqualities are different. It has different and incompatibleproperties, but it is one tomato that exists both before and afterthe change because it has the same essential form, namely, beinga tomato.

PHIL: I don’t think that solution works. The essence of this particular

tomato is the same as the essence of that tomato over there. So,if the essence of the tomato is the basis for its identity then thistomato would be identical to the tomato over there, and wewould still be stuck with a contradiction since this tomato isgreen and that one is red.

The problem with your way out can be viewed differently. Itis agreed that if an object A persists through a change, then itmust be identical to itself (=B) both before and after thechange. You say that an object can be identical to itself—that Acan be identical to B—so long as they have the same essentialqualities, but I do not see why you limit the concept of identityto essential qualities. Admittedly, if A and B do not have thesame essential qualities they are not the same object, but if Aand B do not have the same accidental qualities they are not thesame object either. Our concept of identity requires that if we arereally dealing with one and the same object, so that A and Bare really two names for the one object, then everything true of A will also be true of B.

ALICE: Could you explain that one more time?




PHIL: Yes. I agree that as we ordinarily think about things, an objectcan persist through an alteration of some of its properties,namely, those which are accidental, but cannot persist through achange in others, namely, those which are essential. But what I

am saying is that we also ordinarily think that if what appearsto be two objects is really one object, then every property thatthe one object has the other must have too. In this principle wedo not distinguish between accidental and essential qualities. If the “two” objects are one then they must have the sameaccidental and the same essential qualities.

Go back to an example we considered a moment ago. Thischair is what it is, and not a different object. Thus, any objectthat differs in any of its properties from this chair is not thischair. This chair is brown. Could a chair which is not brown be

this chair? Could this chair be both brown and not brown? Ithink not. This principle, which is known as Leibniz’s law, orthe indiscernibility of identicals, is just as certain as theintuitive belief that objects persist through an alteration of accidental qualities. The philosophical problem of changearises, in part, because of the conflict between our intuitionsconcerning identity and change.

ALICE: OK, but now I see what is wrong with your argument: youfailed to include time in your description of a thing’s changing. Iam calm and agitated at different times, the tomato is green and

red at different times, and so on. The contradiction vanisheswith the introduction of time.

PHIL: Maybe so, but I don’t see exactly how the introduction of timehelps. After all, how can a thing that changes its properties fromone time to the next have all the same properties both beforeand after the change? I agree that change, if it is possible,involves time, but I don’t see how the mere appeal to timemakes change possible.

ALICE: As I said before, and this is obvious to me, when I change frombeing calm to being excited, I have the one property at one timeand the other at another time. Now, and this is the key, theintroduction of time enables me to have the same propertieswhen I am calm as I do when I am agitated. For suppose that Iam agitated at… Hmm, do you know what time it is?

PHIL: No, I don’t wear a watch.ALICE: It doesn’t matter. Let’s say that “I was calm at t1” and “I am

agitated now at t2.” It turns out that at t1 and at t2 I had thesame properties. For at t1 I possessed the properties of being calm at t 1 and of being agitated at t 2 , and at t2 I have exactly the




same properties. Thus, even though I changed my psychologicalstate from one time to the other, it is also the case that everyproperty that I possessed at one time is also a property that Ipossessed at another. Thus, the introduction of time renders

intelligible the idea of one thing changing its properties.PHIL: I must be dense, but I just don’t get it. Let me go back to thebeginning and quickly retrace our steps. Sometimes that helpswhen doing philosophy. Change requires an alteration in theproperties of one thing. But if a thing’s properties alter theneither we have a contradiction, e.g., the tomato is green (allover) and red (all over); you are both calm and agitated, etc., orthere is not one thing that has the incompatible properties. Ineither case we do not have change. That’s my argument. Yousay that the introduction of time avoids the contradiction and

preserves change since there is no incompatibility between yourbeing calm at t1, and being agitated at t2. There is no threat toidentity since all the properties of you at t1 are also propertiesof you at t2. Your solution reminds me of a remark of Kierkegaard when he spoke of the doctor who cured the diseaseby killing the patient. In your case you remove the problems bydoing away with change.

ALICE: What do you mean?PHIL: If at t1 you have the properties of being calm at t 1 and being

agitated at t 2 , and you have the very same properties at t2, then

how can you say that you have changed? On your view,individuals always have all the properties they ever willhave. Thus, once you introduce time, any paradox involved inthe concept of change is avoided all right, but the cost is high;you do away with change altogether!

ALICE: I can tell that I am really getting in over my head, but let metake one more stab at it.

PHIL: OK, but before you do let me get out a book by a rurn-of-the-century British philosopher by the name of John EllisMcTaggart. He is famous for his alleged proof of the unreality of time, and I bring him up because my argument is based onsomething I read by him. He is considering Bertrand Russell’saccount of change according to which a poker changes becausethere is a time when it is hot and a time when it is not hot. Tothis McTaggart replies:

But this makes no change in the qualities of the poker. It isalways a quality of that poker that it is one which is hot onthat particular Monday. And it is always a quality of thatpoker that it is one which is not hot at any other time. Both




these qualities are true of it at any time—the time when it ishot and the time when it is cold. And therefore it seems to beerroneous to say that there is any change in the poker.1

That sums up my argument, but you were saying that you

had another way of understanding change. I am all ears. Afterall, I don’t want to be a sceptic about change.ALICE: Maybe time figures into the account of change in a different

way. As time passes things change. So perhaps it is the passageof time that constitutes the crucial ingredient in change. Rightnow my talking belongs to reality and your talking does not.Your talking and my listening are events that have ceased toexist. But one moment from now, my talking will not belong toreality. Reality will consist of something different. Reality onlyconsists of the present and the present is always changing.

Granting the thesis that only what is present exists, perhaps wecan understand change in terms of the coming into existence andceasing to exist of the successive stages or events in the history of a thing.

PHIL: Hmm. “The coming into existence and ceasing to exist of thesuccessive stages or events in the history of a thing”!? Now it’syou who are moving too fast, but before we go any further intothis labyrinth of time and change I have an idea. There arealways some philosophy professors in thePhilosophy Department coffee room, so maybe we could drop

by and see what they have to say about these issues.

NOTE

1 John McTaggart (1927) “Time,” in The Nature of Existence, vol. II,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accidental property A property is said to be accidental to a thing whenthat thing can exist without it.Essential property A property is said to be essential to a thing when that

thing cannot exist without it.Indiscernibility of identicals The principle states that if “two” things are

identical, then every property that is possessed by one is alsopossessed by the other, and everything true of the one is true of theother.




STUDY QUESTIONS

1 What is the problem of change?2 Does the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity

solve the problem of change?3 Does the distinction between accidental and essential properties solvethe problem of change?

4 Do you think that the introduction of time avoids the problem of change? Why or why not?

5 What is Alice’s final account of change? What questions does it giverise to?

FURTHER READING

Broad, C.D. (1923) ‘The General Problem of Time and Change,' in ScientificThought, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, reprinted Patterson, NJ:Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1959.

Argues that the problem of change requires the coming into existence of hithertonon-existent future events.

Haslinger, Sally (1989) “Persistence, Change, and Explanation,” Philosophical Studies 56:1–28.

A very clear exposition of how a conflict of intuitions gives rise to the problem of change.

Heller, Mark (1992) “Things Change,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3:695–704.

States and defends a popular theory of changing things against objections.*Hirsch, Eli (1982) The Concept of Identity, New York: Oxford University Press.Concerned with identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then

underlying matter and eventually persons.*le Poidevin, Robin (1991) Change, Cause, and Contradiction: A Defence of the

Tenseless Theory of Time, New York: St Martin’s Press.Argues that the problem of change can only be avoided if we adopt a particular

(tenseless) theory of time (to be discussed in Dialogue 6).*McTaggart, John (1927) “Time,” in The Nature of Existence, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, vol. II, bk V, ch. 33.

In this famous chapter, McTaggart argues that time and change are unreal.*Merricks, Trenton (1994) “Endurance and Indiscernibility,” Journal of Philosophy 91:165–84.

Merricks gives a careful account of the apparent conflict between change,indiscernibility and endurance, and then offers his own solution.

Oaklander, L. Nathan (1987–8) “Persons and Responsibility: A Critique of DelmasLewis,” Philosophy Research Archives 13:181–7.

Discusses some of the relations among time, change and identity.Smith, Quentin (1993) “Change,” in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (eds) A

Companion to Metaphysics, Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.


Smith summarizes the standard definitions of change that are discussed in the

philosophical literature.



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