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The Regulatory Assistance Project 50 State Street, Suite 3Montpelier, VT 05602
Phone: 802-223-8199www.raponline.org
Smart Rate Designfor a Smart Future
Olympia, Washington
December 11, 2015
Presented by Jim Lazar
Overview
About RAP
Regulatory History
WUTC Decisions in PURPA Era
Residential Rate Design
Distributed Generation and Net Metering
Adapting to Variable Resources
Smart Grid
2
Brief History of Regulation
3
Medieval England Accommodations
• Business “affected with the public interest.”
• Prices regulated due to monopoly stature
4
New Inn, Gloucester, 1454
US Origin: Munn v. Illinois (1877)
• Grain elevators charging monopoly prices to farmers.
• Supreme Court ruled “affected with the public interest” and subject to price regulation.
5
Bluefield Water Works (1935)
• Prudent investment rule.
• Utility entitled to a return comparable to companies with similar risks.
6
Hope Natural Gas (1944)
• “Just and reasonable” standard upheld.
• End result, not the method employed.
• Intervenors have limited rights.
7
The Roaring ’60s and the Scary ’70s
• Load Growth
• + Inflation
8
Result: Big Rate Increases
9
Centralia 1972
Trojan 1975
WPPSS 1979
Colstrip 3&4: 1983/85
Centralia (1972):
$200/kW
Colstrip 1&2
(1975):
$300/kW
Trojan (1975):
$700/kW
Colstrip 3&4
(1983/85)
$1,300/kW
WPPSS #2 (1985)
$3,000/kW
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: 1978
• Avoided Cost for Independent Power
• Right of Intervention
• PURPA Ratemaking Standards
10
Rate Design Standards
Cost of ServiceTime of DaySeasonalInterruptibleDeclining BlockLifeline
Utility Service Standards
Master MeteringFuel Adjustment ClausesInformation to ConsumersTermination of ServiceAdvertising
The PURPA Right of Intervention
• Any subject utility: 750 million kWh/year
• Any consumer may intervene
– Right to present evidence
– Right to reasonable rules of discovery
– Right to intervenor compensation if no consumer advocate is funded.
11
12
Overcapacity and Abandoned Plant
• Sharp rate increases led to low growth
• Abandoned projects in the PNW include:
– Nuclear:
• Skagit 1 & 2 (Puget)
• Pebble Springs 1&2 (Portland GE)
• WPPSS 1, 3, 4, 5 (Public Power)
– Coal
• Creston (Avista)
• Pioneer (Idaho Power)
13
Regulatory Treatment of Excess Capacity and Abandoned Plant
• High rates drove down loads
• High rates drove out aluminum industry
• Efficiency further reduced load growth
• Hotly contested in 1985 – 1995
– Abandoned Plant: ~65% recovery
– Excess Capacity: ~90% recovery
14
Integrated Resource Planning: Examples
• 1975: Seattle City Light Energy 1990
• 1977: NRDC Alternative Scenario
• 1980: NW Power Act
• 1981: Initiative 394
• 1982: “Model Plan”
• 1983: First Power Plan
15
Washington Rate Design History
16
Issues Addressed in the PURPA Docketand the Early 1980s
• Embedded vs. marginal cost of service
Baseload generation vs. peaking
Transmission allocation
Distribution cost allocation
• Lifeline rates vs. baseline rates
Cost basis for inclining block rates
17
Embedded vs. Marginal Cost
• Staff position: Marginal cost
California, Oregon, Montana, Pacific Power, Puget
• Avista, industrials: Embedded cost
• Consumer intervenors: Incremental cost (Seattle method)
• Decision: “Forward-looking embedded cost”
18
Embedded Cost of Service
• Functionalization
• Classification
• Allocation
19
Pro Forma Results of Operations by Customer Group
ELECTRIC COST OF SERVICE STUDY FLOWCHART
TransmissionProductionCommon
Energy /
Commodity
Related
Customer
Related
Demand /
Capacity Related
Residential Small General Large General Extra Large
General
Pumping Street & Area
Lights
Allocation
Pro Forma
Results of
Operations
Functionalization
Distribution and
Customer
Relations
Classification
Direct Assignment
Number of Customers
Weighted Number of
Customers
Direct Assignment
Coincident Peak
Non-Coincident Peak
Direct Assignment
Generation Level mWh's
Customer Level mWh's
Different Approaches to Embedded Cost Allocation
• Production
• Transmission
• Distribution
20
Production Cost
• Peak responsibility (industrial customers)
100% of all investment-related costs and maintenance costs classified as demand
Allocated based on 1 to 12 hours of demand.
• Average and excess demand (Avista)
• Peak credit (PSE, Pacific, intervenors, staff)
• Decision: Peak credit
21
Commission Decisions: Production Cost
• Mr. Schoenbeck's [industrial customers] proposed allocation on a fixed/variable approach is rejected because it fails to recognize whether generation is constructed for baseload or peaking.
- Cause U-82-12, Fourth Supp. Order, P. 34 (Pacific)
22
Production Cost: Now
• Baseload Thermal
• Baseload Renewable
• Peaking Thermal
• Variable Renewable
• Demand Response
• Central Batteries
• Distributed Batteries
23
Production Cost: Now
• Hourly energy (Texas)
• Hourly energy with separate short-duration capacity market (New England)
• Base-intermediate-peak methods
• “Capacity” and “demand-related” are obsolete concepts
24
Discussion: Production Cost
25
Transmission Cost
• Demand-related: Industrials
• Baseload vs. network: PSE, Avista
• As production: Staff, intervenors, Pacific
26
Commission Decisionson Transmission
• The Company is ordered in its next rate case to present a cost of service study that complies literally with the Commission's directive related to the allocation of transmission costs. The Commission does not intend that remote transmission costs should be allocated differently than total transmission costs. - Cause U-82-38, Third Supp. Order, P. 31 (Puget)
27
Commission Decision on Transmission
• Commission Staff's position conforms with our continuing belief that "distribution-related" transmission lines are constructed to deliver energy as well as to meet peak demand. Thus, we reaffirm that transmission network costs should be classified as partly driven by demand and partly by energy, using the approved Peak
Credit ratio.
- Docket No. UE-920499, Ninth Supplemental Order on Rate Design, P. 10 (Puget)
28
Transmission Cost: Now
We now know that peaking resources and demand response are built “in the load center” and should probably bear no high-voltage transmission cost at all.
BUT: Wind and central solar may not meet peak demand, but do need transmission.
29
Distribution Cost
• Most contested issue nationally
• “Minimum system” method: ~50% of distribution infrastructure treated as “per-customer” cost
• “Basic customer” method: Only customer-specific costs treated per-customer
• Now some utilities are pursuing the “straight fixed/variable method: 100% of system per-customer
30
Straight Fixed/
Variable:
100% ofDistribution
System Classified as Customer-
Related
31
Minimum System
Method:
~50% ofDistribution
System Classified as Customer-
Related
32
Basic Customer Method:
ONLY Customer-
Specific Facilities
Classified as Customer-
Related
33
Commission Decisions on Distribution Cost
The Commission rejects the company's use of the zero-intercept method. The minimum system method, of which the zero-intercept method is a variant, is also rejected. Both methods are likely to lead to the double allocation of costs to residential customers and over allocation of costs to low use customers.
- Cause U-83-26, Fifth Supp. Order, P. 33 (Avista)
34
Commission Decisions on Distribution Cost
Costs such as meter reading, billing, the cost of meters and service drops, are properly attributable to the marginal cost of serving a single customer. The cost of a minimum sized system is not. The parties should not use the minimum system approach in future studies.
- Cause U-89-2688-T, Third Supp. Order, P. 71 (Puget)
35
Commission Decisions on Distribution Cost
We agree with Commission Staff that proponents of the Minimum System approach have once again failed to answer criticisms that have led us to reject this approach in the past. We direct the parties not to propose the Minimum System approach in the future unless technological changes in the utility industry emerge, justifying revised proposals.
- Docket No. UE-920499, Ninth Supp. Order (Puget)
36
Lifeline/Baseline Rates
• Commission defined “lifeline” rate to be income-driven.
• “Baseline” rate was defined as a lower cost for initial block for all customers to reflect hydro costs.
• Adopted “baseline” rates.
37
Discussion: Distribution Costs
38
Break
39
Residential Rate Design
• Customer charges
• Inclining block rates
• TOU rates
• Seasonal rates
• Demand charges
• Critical peak pricing
• Net metering / PV customers
40
Customer Charges
• Cost allocation
• Minimum system
• Basic customer
• BUT: Cost allocation is not rate design
• “Forward-looking embedded cost”
41
The Line Extension Policy
Part of the tariff – Avista/Idaho:
42
Comparing Methods
43
Cost Category
Straight
Fixed /
Variable
Minimum
System
Method
Basic
Customer
Method
Poles $10 $5 -$
Wires $20 $10 -$
Transformers $14 $7 -$
Services $1 $1 $1
Meters $1 $1 $1
Billing $3 $3 $3
Customer Service $3 $3 $3
Total $52 $30 $8
$/month/customer
Distribution Cost: Today
• Why are distribution systems built?
• Single-family vs. multi-family
• Urban vs. suburban vs. rural
• Overhead vs. underground
• Role of demand response is avoiding distribution capacity upgrades
• Smart grid investments provide upstream benefits
44
“Subsidies”
Utilities argue that net-billing is a “subsidy” or that “large users are subsidizing small users.”
Rate design is full of subsidies:
• Apartments vs. single-family
• Urban vs. rural
• Overhead service vs. underground
45
Single-Family Sprawl Zone:
4 customers per circuit-mile
46
Studio Apartments:
4,000 customers per circuit-mile
Billing and Collection Costs
WUTC rule: “Not less than bimonthly.”
Why do we bill customers monthly?
47
What About Other Industries?
48
We Pay For Other “Grids”In Volumetric Prices
49
The Most Common Residential Rate Design: Inclining Block
• Goals include:
• Allocation of low-cost resources
• Recognition of load
• Encouragement of conservation
• Essential needs at affordable cost
• Low-income benefits
50
Residential Inclining Block Rate
51
City of Palo Alto (California)
Customer Charge None
First 300 kWh $0.096/kWh
Next 300 kWh $0.130/kWh
Over 600 kWh $0.174/kWh
52
How an Inclining Block RateAffects Most Consumption
Usage
Block
% of
Customers
Whose
Usage Ends
In This Block
% of kWh Sales
To Customers
Whose Usage
Ends in This
Block
% of kWh Sales
to Customers
Whose Usage
Exceeds This
Block
0 - 250 29% 8% 92%
251 - 500 33% 23% 69%
501 - 750 17% 20% 51%
751 - 1,000 9% 15% 34%
>1,000 12% 34%
Average Monthly kWh Usage: 526
Seasonal + Inclining Block
53
Arizona Public Service Company (Arizona) Optional TOU Available
Winter Summer
0 – 400 kWh $0.0942 $0.0969
401 – 800 kWh $0.0942 $0.1382
801 – 3,000 kWh $0.0942 $0.1617
Over 3,000 kWh $0.0942 $0.1726
An Inclining Block Rate CAN BE a Seasonal Rate
54
Cost Basis for Inclining Block Rates
• Load factor
• Resource allocation (baseline rates)
• Conservation policy
• Marginal cost
55
Inclining Block Rate Based on Load Factor
• Start with a typical commercial rate:
–$10/kW/month + $.08/kWh
• Determine load factor of each usage Block
• Compute block rates
56
Primary Usage kWh
Load
Factor Demand Energy Total
Lights/Appliances 400 70% 0.020$ 0.08$ 0.100$
Water Heat 401- 800 40% 0.035$ 0.08$ 0.115$
Space Conditioning >800 20% 0.069$ 0.08$ 0.149$
Baseline Block RatesBased on Resource Types
• Start with typical cost of resources;
• Determine how much of each the utility has available for the class;
• Set blocks to recover costs.
57
Block kWh Energy Delivery Total
Hydro 250 0.02$ 0.06$ 0.08$
Coal 251 - 750 0.04$ 0.06$ 0.10$
New Supply >750 0.10$ 0.06$ 0.16$
Residential Demand Charges
• Newest rate due to fixed charge backlash.
• Common in commercial rates.
• Terrible idea.
58
Problems with Demand Charges
1) Normally measure non-coincident peak, which is irrelevant to anything but the final line transformer.
2) Reward customers that contribute to the peak every day, vs. those whose use varies.
3) Lack of customer understanding.
59
Individual Load Shapes Vary
60
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Customer 3: 38% Load Factor
Customer 3
All the Utility Sees Is The Combined Loadof Multiple Customers With Different Shapes
61
Lots of Diversity at the Transformer:26-Unit Apartment Complex, L.A. Area
62
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Individual Demand Total Grouped Demand Total
Service Size Rate:Burbank
63
Rate Element Amount
Customer Charge $/month $7.11
Service Size Charge $/month
Small Most multifamily $1.40
Medium Most single family $2.80
Large 400 Amp Panel + $8.40
First 300 kWh $/kWh $.1153
Over 300 kWh $/kWh $.1672
Service Size Charge:Électricité de France (EdF) Base Rate
Typical
Dwelling Units
Contract
power-rating
(kVA)
Subscription
Including Tax
$/month
Price per
kWh incl. tax
$/kWh
Incre-
mental
$/kW /
Month
Apartments 3 $ 4.76 $ 0.154
6 $ 7.73 $ 0.154 0.99$
Small SF Home 9 $ 10.24 $ 0.154 0.84$
12 $ 15.75 $ 0.154 1.84$
15 $ 18.07 $ 0.154 0.77$
Large SF Home 18 $ 20.78 $ 0.154 0.90$
24 $ 44.24 $ 0.154 3.91$
30 $ 54.67 $ 0.154 1.74$
36 $ 63.32 $ 0.154 1.44$
64
Time-of-Use (TOU) Rates
• PURPA decision
• History: PSE Pilot, 1999 – 2002
• Recent California decision
65
PSE Pilot
• 300,000 customers
• Default – opt-out available
• Additional cost implemented in 2002
• ~90% of customers losers
• Suddenly terminated
• Evaluation
66
California PUC Decision
• Three-year process
• No customer charge
• Inclining blocks: 2 blocks 25% differential
• 3-period TOU default by ~2019
67
68
Rates That Require AMI
• Peak-Time Rebate (PTR): A customer gets a credit if they reduce their usage during peak events. No penalty if they do not.
• Critical Peak Price (CPP): A high price defined in advance that takes effect on a day-ahead notice basis.
• Variable Peak Price (VPP): A price that is set one day ahead that takes effect when noticed by the utility.
• Real-Time Price (RTP): A price that is set by the market, and may change with one-hour notice.
69
Peak-Time Rebate
• Risk-free: Customer can win, but cannot lose
• Events are noticed, generally day-ahead
• San Diego Gas and Electric “Reduce Your Use” Rate
– A “use less than” amount is set at program signup
– Email or text notification when events occur
– 11 AM to 6 PM time period
– $.75/kWh for manual reduction
– $1.25/kWh for technology-enabled reduction
– No minimum or maximum periods per year
• “Training wheels” for critical peak pricing
70
Critical Peak PricingEskom (South Africa) RuralFlex
• 17 days per year maximum; day-ahead notice
71
Critical Peak Pricing: Électricité de France Tempo
• Tempo unit shows what price in effect
• All days have on-peak and off-peak
• Inclining customer charge tied to kVa
• Maximum 22 “red” days per year
EdF Tempo
Rate
72
Enabling Technology For CPP and RTP
• Installation of energy management devices that automatically adjust energy use when a price signal is received.
– Air conditioning
– Process and water heat
– Cold storage refrigeration
– Eventually, minor loads like refrigerators, freezers, and laundry equipment
73
Enabling Technology Improves Price Response
74
Peak Load ReductionVaries by Pricing Approach
75
Peak Reduction vs.Energy Reduction
• Inclining block rates produce the most overall reduction in energy usage. This occurs because incremental usage is most discretionary.
• Time-varying prices produce peak load reduction, but may or may not reduce total energy use
– Pre-cooling of buildings may increase total kWh usage
– Curtailment of A/C may lead customers to “not be home” at all, reducing other energy usage
• More complex rates work best with technology enablement.
76
Inclining Block Rates Save Energy;Complex Rates Save Peak
USEPA, Customer Incentives for Energy Efficiency Through Electric and Natural Gas Rate Design, September, 2009
Principles for Modern Rate Design
Universal Service: A customer should be able to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connecting to the grid.
Time-Varying: Customers should pay for grid services and power supply in proportion to how much they use and when they use it.
Fair Compensation: Customers supplying power to the grid should be compensated fairly for the value of the power they supply.
77
Principle #1
A customer should be allowed to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connecting to the grid.
78
Principle #2
Customers should pay for the grid in proportion to how much they use the grid, and when they use the grid.
79
Principle #2
Customers should pay for the grid in proportion to how much they use the grid, and when they use the grid.
80
Principle #3
Customers delivering power to the grid should receive full and fair value – no more and no less.
81
A Simple Cost-Based Rate Design
82
Transformer: $/kVA/Mo 1.00$
Off-Peak $/kWh 0.08$
Mid-Peak $/kWh 0.12$
On-Peak $/kWh 0.18$
Critical Peak $/kWh 0.75$
Bi-Directional Energy Charges
Customer-Specific Charges
Customer Charge $/Month 3.00$
Bill Simplification
83
Which Pricing Approach Is More Useful to You as a Consumer?
Crude Oil 2.237$
Tanker to Refinery 0.114$
Refinery Capital 0.213$
Refinery Operating 0.235$
Product Pipeline 0.113$
Terminal Rack 0.023$
Truck to MiniMart 0.114$
Mini-Mart Profit 0.217$
State Taxes 0.349$
Federal Taxes 0.184$
So Why Confuse Consumers?
85
Your Usage: 1,266 kWh
Base Rate Rate Usage Amount
First 500 kWh 0.04000$ 500 20.00$
Next 500 kWh 0.06000$ 500 30.00$
Over 1,000 kwh 0.08000$ 266 21.28$
Fuel Adjustment Charge 0.03456$ 1,266 43.75$
Infrastructure Tracker 0.00789$ 1,266 9.99$
Decoupling Adjustment (0.00057)$ 1,266 (0.72)$
Conservation Program Charge 0.00123$ 1,266 1.56$
Nuclear Decommissioning 0.00037$ 1,266 0.47$
Subtotal: 126.33$
State Tax 5% 6.32$
City Tax 6% 7.96$
Total Due 140.60$
When This is What It Really Means
If you want customersto respond to the rate,
simplify the bill
86
EFFECTIVE RATE INCLUDING ALL ADJUSTMENTS
First 500 kWh 0.09291$ 500 46.46$
Next 500 kWh 0.11517$ 500 57.59$
Over 1,000 kwh 0.13743$ 266 36.56$
Total Due: 140.60$
Discussion: Rate Design
87
Break
88
89
Distributed Generation and Net Metering
Two Views of Cost Recovery
Traditional Utility View• DG customer “uses” the grid
and should pay for it
Solar Advocate View• Value of distributed resource is
greater than the retail rate
90
RMI Survey Of Multiple StudiesAverage: $.1672/kWh
91
92
$0.090
$0.138 $0.135
$0.107$0.115
$0.00
$0.04
$0.08
$0.12
$0.16
MaineShort-Run
MaineLong-Run
Minnesota Austin Averageper-kWh
Rate
Value of Solar Studies: Utility Economic Values Only
Comparison of Washington Ratesto California Residential Rates
• CA first block > Washington tail block
• Average rates in Washington < LRIC
93
Monthly Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Average
Puget 7.87$ 0.094$ 0.110$ 0.104$
Pacific 6.00$ 0.059$ 0.094$ 0.079$
Avista 8.00$ 0.071$ 0.083$ 0.097$ 0.086$
PG&E -$ 0.132$ 0.159$ 0.319$ 0.359$ 0.153$
Strategy for Washington
• Focus on increasing tail blocks to reflect full long-run marginal costs of $.13-$.20
• Reduce customer charges and initial block rates to achieve higher tail blocks.
• If and when tail blocks fall below long-run marginal costs, then raise initial blocks, and only then consider distribution fees for DG customers.
• Address short-run revenue issues with decoupling or other revenue stabilization options.
94
95
A Home-Grown Tomato is a “Better” Tomato
96
Lots of People Grow Their Own Tomatoes
97
What If You Don’t Have Enough?
98
What If You Have Too Many?
99
All Tomatoes Are Not Equal
Local Organic
Tomatoes $3.00/lb.
California Tomatoes
$2.00lb.
100
We Buy Local Organic Tomatoes: $2.00lb.
Utility average cost
of service Retail rates
Traditional Ratemaking
101
Lost revenues from
net metering
Short-run fuel and purchased power
costs avoided by net metering
Critical View of Net Metering
102
Solar Advocate View of Net Metering
Lost revenues from net metering
Long-run avoided cost for generation, transmission, distribution+ Reduced emissions+ Avoided fuel cost and supply risks+ Local economic development+ Future carbon costs+ Shading benefits on AC load+ Much, much more
103
Utility average cost of service
Long-run avoided cost for generation, transmission, distribution+ Avoided emission cost+ Avoided RPS Obligation+ Avoided fuel cost risk+ Avoided fuel supply risk
Balanced Net Metering View
104
Discussion: DG and Net Metering
105
Break Before Adapting to Variable Resources
106
The California ISO “Duck Curve”:Increasing solar means steep afternoon ramping
107
Teaching The Duck to FlyTen Strategies To Align Loads to Resources
(and Resources to Loads) 1. Targeted energy
efficiency
2. Orient solar panels
3. Use solar thermal
with storage
4. Manage electric
water heat
5. Require new large
air conditioners to
include storage
6. Retire older inflexible power
plants
7. Concentrate rates into
“ramping” hours
8. Deploy electricity storage in
targeted locations
9. Implement aggressive demand
response programs
10.Use inter-regional exchanges
of power
108
Not every strategy will be applicable to every utility.
Teaching the Duck to Fly
Requesting Permission for Take-Off
Ten Strategies To Align Loads to Resources(and Resources to Loads)
with Illustrative Values for Each1. Targeted energy
efficiency
2. Orient solar panels
3. Use solar thermal
with storage
4. Manage electric
water heat
5. Require new large
air conditioners to
include storage
6. Retire older inflexible power
plants
7. Concentrate rates into
“ramping” hours
8. Deploy electricity storage in
targeted locations
9. Implement aggressive demand
response programs
10.Use inter-regional exchanges
of power
110
Not every strategy will be applicable to every utility.
Water Heat Is a BIG Load for the Electric System
111
Washington Has 1.7 MillionElectric Water Heaters
112
Electric Customers 2,852,760
Gas Customers 1,088,762
Likely Electric
Water Heaters 1,763,998
kWh/Year (average) 4,000
Annual Use MWh 7,055,992
Total State Residential MWh 35,082,958
% Electric Water Heat 20.1%
Strategy 4:Grid-Interactive Water Heating
• GIWH acts as a low-cost “battery”
• Stores a full day’s supply
• Provides ancillary services to the grid
• NOT: Simple on/off control or timers
113
Electric Water Heater Basics• Two 4.4 kW heating
elements
• Water self-stratifies: hot water rises
• Thermostat on each; top has priority
• When top of tank is cold, top element comes on;
• When top is hot, bottom element comes on until full
114
It’s Easy To Spot a Water Heater
115
Water Heat Is a Peak-Oriented Use
116
Source: Steffes Corp.
Add Heat When Power Is Cheap;Draw Hot Water As Needed
117
Grid-Integrated Water Heating:Low-Cost Battery
• Supercharge to 140F – 170F during low-cost hours
• Coast through other hours
118
• 15 – 25 kWh per water heater
Grid-Integrated Water Heating Also Provides Ancillary Services
119
Ancillary Service Value May Exceed Water Heating Energy Cost
120
Break Before Smart Grid
121
Smart Grid
• Benefits of smart grid
• Costs of smart grid
• Allocation of smart grid costs
122
Benefits of Smart Grid
• Ability to measure interval data
• Automated meter reading
• Remote connect/disconnect
• Line loss reduction
• Peak load management
• Capital cost avoidance
• Reliability
123
Burbank: Smartsaver
124
Burbank Smartsaver
125
Glendale:Conservation Voltage Regulation
• Measure voltage in real-time at every customer
• Dial down voltage to meet minimums
• 2-4% energy savings
• 8-year payback for entire AMI system
126
Empowering Smart Technology
New technologies can minimize total system costs and increase system reliability
127
Electric Vehicles
• Source of on-peak power (V2G)
• Market for off-peak power
• Provide multiple ancillary services
128
Path to Smart Electric Future
1. Cost-effective deployment of smart meters/smart grid
2. Development of smart rate designs
3. Adoption of enabling technology to facilitate transition
4. Incorporation of smart design in new construction codes
5. Consumer education
129
Cost Allocation of Smart Grid Costs:Smart Grid Benefits
Reliability improvement: Distribution automation
Peak load reduction through time of use and critical peak pricing
Loss reduction: Voltage control, power factor correction, phase balancing
Remote shut-off and turn-on
Reduced O&M expense for meter reading
130
Cost Allocation of Smart Grid Costs
131
Smart Grid Element
Pre-Smart Grid
Element
"Traditional"
FERC
Account
Traditional
Classification
Smart Grid
Classification
Smart Meters Meters 370 Customer
Demand /
Energy /
Customer
Distribution Control Devices Station Equipment 362 DemandDemand /
Energy
Data Collection System Meter Readers 902 Customer
Demand /
Energy /
Customer
Meter Data Management System General Plant 391 - 397 Subtotal PTDC
Demand /
Energy /
Customer
Smart Grid ManagersCustomer Accounts
Supervision901 Customer
Demand /
Energy
Energy Storage Devices
(Batteries; Ice Bear)
Installations on
Customer Premises 371 Customer
Demand /
Energy
Discussion: Smart Grid
132
Wrap-Up
Other topics?
How can RAP help?
133
134
RAP Publications on Rate Design
• Smart Rate Design for a Smart Future (2015)
• Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well (2014)
• Rate Design Where AMI Has Not Been Fully Deployed (2014)
• Time-Varying and Dynamic Rate Design (2013)
• Pricing Do’s and Don’ts (2011)
About RAP
The Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) is a global, non-profit team of experts that focuses on the long-term economic and environmental sustainability of the power and natural gas sectors. RAP has deep expertise in regulatory and market policies that:
Promote economic efficiency Protect the environment Ensure system reliability Allocate system benefits fairly among all consumers
Learn more about RAP at www.raponline.org