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epartment of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy

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SMALL VESSEL

SECURITY STRATEGYAPRIL 2008

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY


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Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy

FOREWORD

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,maritime security efforts have focused primarily

on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew.Efforts to address the small vessel1 environment

have largely been limited to traditional safety andbasic law enforcement concerns. Small vesselsare, however, readily vulnerable to potentialexploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons ofmass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, andother contraband, and other criminals. Smallvessels have also been successfully employedoverseas by terrorists to deliver WaterborneImprovised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs).

Law enforcement agencies face the challenge ofdistinguishing between the vast number oflegitimate vessel operators and the relatively fewindividuals engaged in illicit activities. Thechallenge is immense, as it involves nearly 13million registered U.S. recreational vessels,2

82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 othercommercial small vessels. On any given day, aconsiderable number of these boats sharewaterways with commercial and military traffic,operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and in theimmediate vicinity of critical maritimeinfrastructure, including bridges and waterfrontfacilities such as petrochemical plants. Moreinformation concerning small vessels is needed toimprove the proper assessment of the risk posedby these vessels. The challenge is to balance thecollection of requisite information necessary forproper assessment of risk posed by these vessels,with the freedom of the seas expected by the smallboating community.

1Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft regardless of method of

propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small vessels can include commercialfishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected

passenger vessels, or any other commercial vessels involved in foreign orU.S. voyages.

2CG 2006 boater statistics compiled from state boater registration reports

(does not include unregistered watercraft, which, when combined withregistered boats, is estimated at 17 million total U.S. watercraft).

Additionally, a significant number of these craftoperate internationally, especially in regions suchas the Great Lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, and theCaribbean Sea. During Fiscal Year 2006, only70,000 boater foreign arrivals were recorded in theU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)Pleasure Boat Reporting System (PBRS), based onboater self-reporting. Conservative estimatessuggest that these reporting figures represent onlya fraction of the actual international boater traffic,especially given the ease with which boatersoperate in these waters.

Currently, the U.S. Government has an incompleteknowledge of the international recreationalboating public, their travel patterns, and thefacilities they use. Couple this with the limitedinformation available regarding fishing fleets andthe multitude of small commercial vesselsoperating in or near U.S. waters and thecomplexity of the issue becomes obvious.

Hence, there is a clear need to close security gaps

and enhance the small vessel securityenvironment. The Small Vessel Security Strategy(SVSS) addresses these concerns and provides acoherent framework to improve maritime securityand safety. It envisions a coordinated effort ofFederal, state, local, and Tribal authorities,together with international partners, privateindustry, and recreational users of the waterways.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD................................................................................................................................................................................. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................................................iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................................................ 1

PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGY................................................................................................................................ 1

SCOPE............................................................................................................................................................................ 1

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STRATEGIES AND PLANS................................................................................... 1

METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................................ 2

KEY DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................................................................... 2

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................................................................. 4

IMPORTANCE OF THE MARITIME DOMAIN ..................................................................................................... 4

MARITIME GOVERNANCE...................................................................................................................................... 5

SMALL VESSEL COMMUNITY................................................................................................................................ 5

SMALL VESSEL RISK ................................................................................................................................................ 6

STRATEGIC VISION............................................................................................................................................................... 15

GUIDING PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................................................ 15

OVERARCHING VISION AND MAJOR GOALS ................................................................................................. 16

RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................................................................. 22

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COORDINATION............................................................... 24

THE WAY AHEAD ................................................................................................................................................................... 29

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................................................... 31

APPENDIX AUNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES...............................................A-1

APPENDIX BRELEVANT AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................... B-1

APPENDIX CEXISTING INTERAGENCY INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................C-1

APPENDIX DACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................D-1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists

within the framework of other security strategies.It does not replace any of the current strategies orrelevant documents. Rather, this strategyharmonizes directions from related strategies intoa multi-layered, unified approach for thecomponent agencies within the DHS, and to laythe groundwork for DHS participation incoordination across all levels of government, aswell as other public, private and internationalstakeholders in the maritime domain. Thisstrategys purpose is to address the risk that

small vessels1

might be used to smuggleterrorists or WMD into the United States ormight be used as either a stand-off weaponplatform or as a means of a direct attack with aWBIED. The resulting risks are difficult tomanage because small vessels are not centrallyregistered, operators have not alwaysdemonstrated proficiency in small vesseloperations, and the ability to screen or detectvessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. Thereis, moreover, a tradition and expectation among

the large population of small vessel operators oflargely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways.

This strategy also describes the small vesselcommunity and the environment in which itoperates. It discusses and identifies the threats,vulnerabilities, and consequences resulting fromfour key risk scenarios. Understanding therelationship of the threat, risk, vulnerability, andconsequence of a small vessel terrorist attack onthe United States will help to reduce the risk of

such an attack. The guiding principles andoverall goals of this strategy complementexisting solutions for large vessels. These have

1Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft regardless of method

of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Although there is no exactcorrelation between a vessels length and its gross tonnage, a vessel of300 GT is approximately 100 ft in length.

been effective in controlling risk in the operationof larger vessels that fall under the traditionaloversight and regulations of commercialoperations in international trade. These solutionsprovide direction, but each solution needs to becreatively adapted to suit the circumstances ofsmall vessels, due to their difference in size,operation, and use compared to largercommercially operated vessels.

This strategy identifies specific goals whereefforts can achieve the greatest risk reductionacross the breadth of the maritime domain. Itsguiding principles are that: solutions shall berisk-based; education and training are the keytools for enhancing security and safety; andeconomic and national security needs will not becompromised.

The overarching goals of the Small VesselSecurity Strategy are to: enhance maritime

security and safety based on a coherentframework with a layered, innovative approach;develop and leverage a strong partnership withthe small vessel community and public andprivate sectors in order to enhance maritimedomain awareness; leverage technology toenhance the ability to detect, infer intent, andwhen necessary, interdict small vessels that pose

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a maritime security threat; and enhancecooperation among international, Federal, state,local, and Tribal partners and the private sector(e.g., marinas, shipyards, small vessel andfacility operators), and, in coordination with the

Department of State and other relevant federaldepartments and agencies, international partners.This strategy lays out the appropriate wayforward in managing and controlling risks posedby the potential threat and possibly direconsequences of small vessel exploitation.

The private sector performs a central role inHomeland Security and can assist authorities inreducing each of the components of risk (threat,vulnerability, and consequence).

Small vessel operators can be effective partnersin detecting threats in our ports and on ourwaterways. The large number of small vesseloperators and their familiarity with the local areaand patterns of waterway use make it possiblethat small vessel operators will be the first torecognize suspicious behavior. DHS mustpromote and strengthen their effectivenessthrough public dialogue regarding their role inhomeland security and specialized programssuch as Americas Waterway Watch. Non

governmental organizations are key partners inkeeping this dialogue going.

The private sector, through its efforts at securingprivate facilities from unauthorized entry andother intrusions, plays a key role in reducing ourvulnerability to terrorist exploitation of smallvessels. Small vessel operators can reducevulnerability by ensuring their vessels are secureand protected against unauthorized use.

The private sector is the Nations primaryprovider of goods and services and the ownerand operator of approximately 85 percent of ourcritical infrastructure. It is an essential partner inensuring structural and operational resilience thatprotects the American people, establishingsecurity around critical infrastructure and keyresources, and reporting suspicious activities at

work sites that could uncover and ultimately helpdisrupt terrorist activity.

The private sector is also a critical partner inrebuilding critical infrastructure and keyresources affected by a catastrophic incident aswell as in fielding scientific and technologicaladvancements that can help secure the UnitedStates. Due to the multiple and essential roles theprivate sector plays across all areas of homelandsecurity, continued collaboration andengagement with the private sector to strengthensmall vessel security is imperative.

It is understood that the vast size of the smallvessel community makes the efforts to manageand reduce the overall risk in the maritimedomain difficult. Yet, it is clear that an effectivepartnership through the layers of stakeholdersand government authorities involved in securityoperations, and commercial and recreationalpursuits, comprises one of the nations greatestassets for reduction of small vessel related risks.

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGY

The intent of the Small Vessel Security Strategy(SVSS) is to reduce potential security and safetyrisks from small vessels1 through the adoptionand implementation of a coherent system ofregimes, awareness, and security operations thatstrike the proper balance between fundamentalfreedoms, adequate security, and continuedeconomic stability. Additionally, the strategy isintended to muster the help of the small vesselcommunity in reducing risks in the maritime

domain.

SCOPE

The SVSS is designed to guide efforts tomitigate the potential security risks arising fromsmall vessels operating in the maritime domain.While guiding DHS efforts, this strategyacknowledges that to effectively reduce risk, allmaritime security partnersFederal, state, local,and Tribal partners and the private sector as well

as international partnersmust work together todevelop, implement, and undertake cooperativeactions to reduce both security and safety risksfrom misuse of small vessels.

Much of the recent U.S. maritime security effortshave focused on regulating cargo containers andlarge vessels at official Ports of Entry (POE).Examples of such regulations include the 96hourAdvance Notice of Arrival, cargo manifest/crewlist transmittal within 24 hours of departure, and

the carriage requirement for the AutomaticIdentification System (AIS). This strategybroadens the focus of federal interest, taking into

1Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft regardless of method

of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Although there is no exactcorrelation between a vessels length and its gross tonnage, a vessel of300 GT is approximately 100 ft in length.

consideration small vessels regardless of type.The small vessel community includes a wide-range of vessels, from small commercial vessels,such as uninspected towing vessels andpassenger vessels, to commercial fishing vesselsand recreational boats, whether personalwatercraft or large power and sail boats.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHERSTRATEGIES AND PLANS

The SVSS complements and is consistent withall applicable portions of the followinglegislations and strategies:

2002 Homeland Security Act

2002 Maritime Transportation SecurityAct

2004 Department of Homeland Security

Strategic Plan 2005 National Defense Strategy

2005 National Intelligence Strategy

2005 National Strategy for MaritimeSecurity

2006 National Security Strategy

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Maritime Domainis all areas and things of, on,under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on asea, ocean, or other navigable waterway,including all maritime related activities,infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other

conveyances.

Risk is typically defined as a function offrequency and consequence of an undesirableevent. When assessing the risk of terrorism, thefrequency factor of risk is often broken downinto the elements of threat and vulnerability.When assessing operational risk, frequency oftenincludes the elements of probability (likelihoodthat an event will occur) and exposure (amountof time, people, or equipment involved).

Risk Management is a continuous process ofassessing risks and implementing mitigatingactions, with its primary goal being to reduce thepotential that an adverse event will occur. Riskmanagement addresses initial risk of anidentified threat, and manages the residual riskafter countermeasures are implemented. It hasbeen used in the private sector (insurance,engineering, and banking and finance) and publicsector (Food and Drug Administration,Environmental Protection Agency, and

Department of Defense) for decades, but itsapplication for Homeland Security andcombating terrorism is relatively new without aprecedent framework.

Threat is an indication of the likelihood that aspecific type of attack will be initiated against aspecific target or class of targets.3It is based onan understanding of an adversarys intentions,motivation, history of attacks, and capability tocarry out an attack.

Vulnerabilityof an asset is an indication of thelikelihood that a particular attempted attack will

3 Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, at p.111.

succeed against a particular target or class oftargets.

4

Consequence of an attack is the magnitude ofthe adverse impact of a successful attack. Theoutcome of an attack may include many forms,such as the loss of life, economic costs, and anyadverse impacts on U.S. national security.

State government, for the purposes of thisstrategy, means any state of the United States,the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories ofPuerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,American Samoa, the Commonwealth of theNorthern Mariana Islands, or the Trust Territoryof the Pacific Islands.

Local government means any county, city,village, town, district, or other politicalsubdivision of any state, and includes any ruralcommunity or unincorporated town or village orany other public entity for which an applicationfor assistance is made by a state or politicalsubdivision thereof.5

4 Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, at p.112.5 Definitions of state and local governments from the

National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007)p. 4.

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STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

IMPORTANCE OF THE MARITIME

DOMAIN

The United States is the worlds leadingmaritime trading nation, accounting for nearly20% of the annual world ocean-borne overseastrade. The global Maritime TransportationSystem (MTS)a complex and interconnectedsystem of waterways, ports, terminals, inter-modal connections, vessels, people, supportservice industries, and users spanning thedomestic and international public and private

sectorsis the economic lifeblood of the globaleconomy and is critical to U.S. national securityand interests.

The maritime domain serves as a criticalhighway for the global economy, but alsopresents unique security challenges,encompassing vast stretches of oceans,waterways and countless potential points ofentry. The United States has over 95,000 milesof coastline, 361 ports (including eight of the

worlds 50 highest-volume ports), and 10,000miles of navigable waterways. It enjoys theworlds largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),spanning 3.4 million square miles of waters andcontaining some of the most valuable andproductive natural resources on Earth. In 2005,offshore activities contributed over $120 billionand two million jobs to American economicprosperity. Approximately 30% of U.S. oilsupplies and 25% of its natural gas supplies areproduced in offshore areas.

Nearly 700 ships arrive in U.S. ports daily, and8,000 foreign-flag ships, manned by 200,000foreign mariners, enter U.S. ports every year.Annually, the nations ports handle more than$700 billion in merchandise, while the cruise

industry and its passengers account for $35.7billion in direct and indirect economic output.9

All told, the U.S. MTS supports a global chain ofeconomic activity that contributes more than$700 billion to Americas economy each year.

In addition to the global maritime tradecontributions, the economic role of oceanindustries provides tremendous value to thedomestic economy. The MTS supports the

commercial fishing industry and its 110,000fishing vessels. In 2006, it contributedapproximately $35.1 billion

10 to the U.S.

economy, while the recreational saltwater fishingindustry was valued at $30.5 billion.11

The millions of recreational boaters, who use theMTS every year, also contribute considerably tothe economy. Nationwide, retail expenditures on

9 The Contribution of the North American Cruise Industry

to the U.S. Economy in 2006 (August 2007), prepared forCruise Lines International Association by BusinessResearch & Economic Advisors, p. 35.

10 Fisheries of the United States 2006, National MarineFisheries Service, p. v.

11 A Vision for Marine Recreational Fisheries, NOAA

Recreational Fisheries Strategic Plan FY2005-2010, p 2.

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recreational boating exceeded $3recreational boating exceeded $33 billion in3 billion in2004. Moreover, hundreds of m2004. Moreover, hundreds of millioillions of visitorsns of visitorsspend billiospend billions of dollars annually to enjoy thens of dollars annually to enjoy thenations ocean, lakes, and river beaches.nations ocean, lakes, and river beaches.

ARITIARITIMEME OVERNANCEOVERNANCEMM GG

Maritime security and safety initiatives are bestunderstood when viewed or discussed in thecontext of Figure 1. Governance of security andsafety issues are accomplished using regimes,awareness, and operations through a unifiedeffort involving international organizations,government, and private stake holders across theglobal maritime domain. Effective maritimegovernance requires:

(1) Appropriate regimes, or rule sets, to describethe desired state of the domain;

(2) Awareness to inform decision makers as tothe actual state of the domain; and

(3) Operations and operationalcapability/capacity to help shape the domainfrom its current state toward the state describedby the regimes.

This strategy embodies and fosters the

development of capabilities across all three areasof regimes, awareness, and operations andemploys unity of effort.

SMALL VESSEL COMMUNITY

The small vessel community is not monolithic. Itis a large and diverse group of operators withdifferent backgrounds, professional and casualtraining, and operating characteristics. Each

geographic area has its own unique operatingpatterns and mix of small vessels. There arethousands of professional mariners who maketheir living on the waters every dayaconsiderable number of whom do so operatingsmall vessels. These professional mariners rangefrom charter vessel operators to small ferry orfreight vessel operations, and include the

Figure 1, Mar1, Mariitime Govertime Governnanceance

majority of the domestic commercial fishing andtowing vessel industries. In addition to theseprofessional mariners, as many as 80 millionpeople participate in recreational boating in agiven year. The level of experience within thesmall vessel community varies from expertsdown to occasional renters of a recreational boatwho have little or no training and widely varying

experience.

Additionally, there are generally low barriers toentry into the small vessel community. Smallvessels are affordable to a broad range ofboaters. Extensive skills and experience are oftennot necessary to minimally operate small vessels,and limited regulations in effect are primarilyfocused on safety. Another difference from largevessel operators is that the small vesselstakeholders generally have little directinvolvement or face-to-face interaction with theinternational, Federal, state, local, and Tribalpartners that govern the use of the waterways.This can lead to unnecessary misunderstandingsand confusion. Finally, governance of the smallvessel community is spread across multipleentities, with 18 Federal agencies and numerousstate, local, Tribal, and port authorities, havingroles ranging from vessel registration to


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management.13 This effort requires identifyinghigh-risk small vessels in priority and developinga layered system of regimes, awareness, andoperational response capabilities to reduce risks.

In general terms, risk is defined as the product ofthe frequency (or likelihood) of an undesirableevent and its consequence (or magnitude of theoutcome) to persons, places, or property.

Risk =Frequencyx Consequence

Frequency can further be broken down intoseparate components of threat (to address thelikelihood of adverse actions based onanticipated capabilities and intent) andvulnerability (to address the potential strengths

or weaknesses of facilities or assets that aretargeted).

Risk = (Threat x Vulnerability)x Consequence

Relative to other fields such as insurance orfinance, terrorism is a relatively new applicationfor risk assessment. Unlike those fields whichhave extensive historical data that are used toassess risks, DHS lacks such data on terrorismagainst the U.S. homeland, thus limiting anydetailed analysis in assessing risks. As a result,

the threat, vulnerability, and consequence factorsof a terrorist act are poorly understood anddifficult to predict, requiring greater reliance onjudgments from intelligence analysts, terroristaction modeling experts, and subject matterexperts.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and otherguidance such as Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) advocate theuse of risk management to protect the nations

CIKR. HSPD-7, in particular, directed DHS toestablish uniform policies, approaches,guidelines, and methodologies integratingFederal infrastructure protection and risk

13 Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and

Protection (Homeland Security Presidential Directive7).

management activities. The GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) developed anoverall risk management framework using avariety of industry, government, and academicsources of information. That framework outlines

an iterative process that focuses on identifyingthe objective, assessing risk, identifying optionsfor mitigating actions, selecting and managingthe best options, and implementing those actionsand monitoring the overall process. Figure 2displays the framework graphically.

Small Vessel Risk Components

Threat

As defined, threat is an indication of thelikelihood that a specific type of attack will beinitiated against a particular target or class oftargets. It may include any indication,circumstance, or event with the potential to causethe loss of or damage to an asset. Generally, thethreat component of risk is determined bycapability (resource implications), and intent(political or other motives). Intent is the mostdifficult variable to determine, the one mostamenable to change, and the quickest way to

increase threat and modify the risk assessment.Analysis of threat-related data is a critical part ofrisk assessment. Information for characterizingthreat can be gained from a variety of sources,such as the intelligence and law enforcementcommunities, as well as from past activities ofvarious enemy groups and entities.Understanding an underlying pattern of attackson target types is useful in predicting futureadverse events and planning mitigationstrategies. However, threats not supported by

historical data must also be considered.Ultimately, one purpose of assessing threats is toassign relative probabilities to various types ofattacks.14

14Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, p. 25.

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Overall Vulnerability

As stated, the vulnerability of an asset is anindication of the likelihood that a particularattempted attack will succeed against a particular

target or class of targets. It is usually measuredagainst some set of standards, such asavailability/predictability, accessibility, andavailable countermeasures. Each of theseelements can be evaluated based on a numericalassignment corresponding to the conditionalprobability of a successful attack. Theprobability that a particular vulnerability couldbe successfully exploited is, in part, afunction ofthe effectiveness of countermeasures.

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The vast majority of small vessel operators arelegitimate, law-abiding individuals. However,the large numbers of small vessels and the dearthof information regarding the user, owner, oroperating patterns of those vessels make itextremely difficult to precisely identify thepopulation and distinguish legitimate users fromthose with the intent to do harm. Whenevaluating and addressing the risks, lawenforcement agencies are faced with sortingthrough thousands of small vessels, which can beclosely intermingled with large commercialcargo vessels, cruise vessels, military warships,and critical infrastructure, at or near hundreds ofseaports, along thousands of miles of U.S.coastline and navigable waterways, ororiginating from foreign waters.

15Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, p. 25.

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Figure 2, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Risk Management Framework

Small vessels possess complex characteristics,which also present unique challenges in

assessing risks related to their presence in themaritime domain. The most obvious is simplythe sheer number nationwide. There are 13million registered recreational vessels throughoutthe country and perhaps an additional fourmillion unregistered recreational boats. Further,there are 110,000 commercial fishing vessels aswell as thousands of towing vessels and

uninspected passenger vessels operating withinthe maritime domain. Each of these disparate

types of small vessels have different operatingpatterns, economic factors, and interestedstakeholder groups.

Many sites of CIKR in the maritime domain arevulnerable to small vessel attacks. Additionally,small vessels routinely operate within closeproximity of high-profile targets such as


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passenger craft, large commercial or cargovessels, military warships, major bridges, criticalwaterfront industries, and other maritimeinfrastructure. The exact number of all smallvessels operating in proximity of maritime

infrastructure at any given time is also a keyfactor in CIKR vulnerability.

In 2007, the USCG Research and DevelopmentCenter sponsored a study of nine U.S. ports anddetermined that there were approximately 3,000small commercial vessels, 3,000 fishing vessels,and 400,000 recreational vessels that either mustor are likely to operate in the vicinity ofimportant maritime infrastructure within thoseports.16

Overall Consequence

As defined earlier, consequence of a terroristattack is the magnitude of the adverse impact ofa successful attack. Depending on its magnitude,consequence can easily be a dominant driver inthe overall risk calculation for many threats.

The primary consequence of a terrorist incident(as well as other Transportation Security Incident

(TSI)

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) arising from the use of a small vesselwith conventional weapons could be devastatingfor the U.S. economy if it damaged CIKR orresulted in closure of the port. A 10-day labordispute closed West Coast seaports in 2002. Oneestimate18 placed the cost to the national

16An Assessment of Small Vessel Populations in U.S.

Waters, prepared for the U.S. Coast Guard Research andDevelopment Center by Potomac Management Group,

Inc., June 2007.17 Section 70101(6) of Maritime Transportation SecurityAct of 2002

18Zeigert, Amy, et. al. Port Security: Improving

Emergency Response Capabilities at the Ports of LosAngeles and Long Beach. California Policy Options2005. University of California Los Angeles, School ofPublic Affairs (Los Angeles, Calif. 2005).

economy for the first five days of this closure at$4.7 billion and increased exponentially afterthat. The consequences of a WMD release viasmall vessel would be worse.

Coastal waters and adjacent lands are some ofthe most productive and active areas of theUnited States. U.S. coastal communities aremajor population and economic centers, whichgenerate over 60 millions jobs and about half ofU.S. GDPapproximately $4.5 trillion.According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 53% ofAmericans live in coastal watershed counties.Additionally, 85% of Americans live within 100miles of the nations coasts. In 2004, close to 75million Americans were directly involved in onthe-water activities and 90 percent ofinternational trade by weight was carried by sea.Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure and keyresources is located near the maritime domain.The great diversity and redundancy of thenations CIKR provide for significant physicaland economic resilience in the face of terroristattacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies,and contribute to the strength of the nationseconomy. However, this vast and diverseaggregation of highly interconnected assets,systems, and networks present an attractive arrayof targets to terrorists.

Any large-scale incident would also create otherlong-term, cascading, adverse effects. By way ofexample, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,large segments of the population moved awayfrom the Gulf Coast particularly in NewOrleans thereby causing a secondaryconsequence. The loss of population furtherharmed the Gulf Coasts economy as a tertiaryconsequence. The direct loss of power also

disabled pumps in the petroleum pipelines acrossthe southern United States. This negativelyimpacted gasoline stocks throughout the nation.One can imagine the multifold consequences of aterrorist attack using a weapon of mass

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assembled weapon. The parts and technology,required for assembling an IND could be wellhidden on a small vessel. Additionally, the smallvessel itself could readily serve as a platformfrom which to detonate a nuclear weapon, IND,

or radioactive dispersal device (RDD)commonly referred to as a Dirty Bomb.

Fissile material is the most difficult componentof a nuclear weapon to obtain. Because thematerial is better secured in U.S. facilities, itmore probably would be acquired by a terroristorganization overseas where some of the largerand less well secured potential sources fornuclear weapons and materials exist. Theseweapons or materials would be more likely to betransported via maritime modes. Small vesselsprovide a clear opportunity for terrorists to retaincontrol of the WMD and activate it at theoptimum times.

The consequences of a WMD attack anywhere inthe United States could be catastrophic, andpotentially include millions of people killed andinjured, billions of dollars in direct and indirecteconomic losses, and adverse environmentaleffects including the contamination of the impactarea with subsequent loss of its use for

decades.21While an RDD would likely result infar less casualties than a nuclear weapon/IND, itcould also easily cause economic disruption inthe billions of dollars coupled with a devastatingpsychological effect on the nation.

c. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into

the United States

In September 2007, 10 people dressed in blackarrived in San Diego, California aboard a 20-foot

skipjack, which they abandoned at WipeoutBeach. The boat was registered to a San Diego

21Abt, Clark C. The Economic Impact of NuclearTerrorist Attacks on Freight Systems in an Age of SeaportVulnerability, (Cambridge, MA, 2003), pp. 3-4.

resident who sold it in 2002 and had not beenregistered since.

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Undocumented maritime migration andsmuggling threatens the United States from allsides. Illegal landings have occurred along theentire Eastern and Western seaboards, as well asfrom every U.S. territory. Since 1980, theUSCG, working with other Federal, state, andlocal law enforcement authorities, has interdictedover 320,000 illegal maritime migrants from 47different countries. In 2004, there wereapproximately 5,000 successful arrivals of illegalmaritime migrants.

23 These numbers are

primarily from small vessel arrivals as opposedto absconders from large commercial vessels.Any one of these arrivals could potentially be aterrorist.

The number of people entering the countryillegally between ports of entry, and theconcomitant proliferation of human and drugsmuggling networks, present clear risks to U.S.national security due to the ever-present threat ofterrorism. Terrorists and terrorist organizationscould leverage these illicit networks to smuggleoperatives into the United States, while the largenumber of aliens attempting to enter the country

illegally could potentially provide cover for theterrorists. A particular concern has been thatterrorists may take advantage of numerouscriminal networks and exploit small vessels aslow-profile modes of transportation to smuggledangerous people and materials into the UnitedStates, thereby circumventing more-stringentland border security measures. Additionally, theproceeds from these smuggling networks couldpotentially be used to finance terrorist activities.

22 Baker, Debbi Farr. The San Diego Union Tribune,September 5, 2007.http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/200709050841-bn05boat.html

23GAO-05-364T Coast Guard Budget Priorities, p. 31.

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d. Waterborne platform for conducting a

stand-off attack (e.g., Man-Portable Air-

Defense Systems (MANPADS) attacks).

The use of a small vessel as a platform for

conducting a stand-off attack is viable. InNovember 2005, a cruise ship 100 miles off thecoast of Somalia was attacked by two 25-footrigid hull inflatable boats. The pirates usedrocket-propelled grenades and automaticweapons at a distance of no more that 25 yardsfrom the SEABOURNE SPIRIT. The pirateswere ultimately repelled by the ships crew usinga device that generated disabling sonic blasts.

It is technically feasible to launch a ballistic

missile from a ship as small as 200 tons againstthe United States. A substantial, cooperativeeffort between the ship's crew and missile launchpersonnel would be required to achieve asuccessful launch.24

The exploitation of a small vessel to provide astand-off attack platform provides numerousbenefits for terrorists. The use of a small vesselas a stand-off weapon platform provides greateroperational security, improved access to targets(bypassing shore-side security measures), and aready means of escape. It also increasesdifficulty for protecting assets due to the relativequickness and maneuverability of many smallvessels in evasive situations.

The result of a successful stand-off attack coulddisrupt the nations transportation system andeconomy. In several locations across the UnitedStates, citizens rely on ferry service for dailycommuting, as well as for travel and recreation.The ferries that transport passengers and vehicles

across bays and channels provide critical linkswithin the marine transportation system, servingas an essential means of transportation for more

24 Defense Intelligence Agency/Missile & SpaceIntelligence Center response to PR R205-08-0005-S dated31 January 2008.

than 64 million individuals annually. Cargo isalso continuously transported on water bythousands of ships, vessels, and barges via theinland and coastal waterway systems and oceans.Key energy resources, such as coal for electrical

power plants, petroleum products, and grain forexport to global trading partners, move on theU.S. waterway system daily. We could seesignificant impacts on cargo and generaltransportation insurance rates, even after a minorbut successful attack.

These four scenarios illustrate some terroristgroups prior history of using small vessels insuicide operations overseas, a history which,combined with some groups stated objective toattack the United States, supports adetermination of significant potential risks to theUnited States. This strategy addresses thoserisks.

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STRATEGIC VISION

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

In pursuing the strategic goals, DHS is guided bythe following principles. These are underlyingconcepts that will inform and frame developmentand implementation across all goals, priorities,objectives, and action plans.

Risk based decision making will benecessary to best channel actions andfinite resources.

Efforts to enhance security may improve

small vessel safety and operatoreducation, thus the security strategybuilds on existing safety frameworks

Risk mitigation efforts must be designedso as to strike the delicate balance andtradeoffs between personal freedom,national security, and commerce.

o Small vessel risk reduction effortsshould not impede the lawful use ofthe maritime domain or the free flow

of legitimate commerce.o Small vessel risk reduction efforts

will include ongoing engagementwith the small vessel community, aswell as other key stakeholders inorder to ensure that potentialsolutions reflect their interests and tobenefit from the collected wisdom ofthe small vessel community incrafting solutions.

o Successful small vessel risk reductionwill require close coordination andcooperation between Federalagencies, state, local, and Tribalgovernments, as well as private andinternational partners.

A one-size-fits-all approach cannotadequately ensure U.S. maritime security

and safety due to the diversity of themaritime domain and the heterogeneity ofthe small vessel community. Thesecomplexities require the implementationof a national framework, within the scopeof international standards, which can beproperly tailored to local situations.

Maritime security and safety dependsupon the successful implementation of an

interlocking system of governancecomprised of maritime regimes, domainawareness, and operational capabilities.

Authorities at every level will be able toidentify shore vulnerabilities andpotential targets, and work with privateentities to establish appropriate protectionplans to ensure shore security.

Technology will serve as an important,complementary component to enhance

subsequent plans, initiatives, and actions(such as increasing MDA), but it is notthe sole answer to ensure small vesselsecurity. Additionally, leveragingtechnology will mitigate risks but shouldalso minimize impacts to small vesseloperators.

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OVERARCHING VISION AND MAJORGOALS

Overarching Vision

The SVSS aims at ensuring the maritime domainremains a secure environment, where smallvessel operators are able to safely earn a living,travel, and recreate freely, without undulyburdensome government regulations and withthe freedom to sail upon the navigable waters ofthe United States.

The institution of a system of effective regimes,awareness, and operational capabilities allowsgovernment agencies at the Federal, state, local,

and Tribal levels to determine which of themillions of small vessels plying U.S. waterspresent an undue risk to homeland security.

Ultimately, we want to be able to easily identifythe few threatening vessels from among themillions that legitimately use U.S. waterways.All government agencies, along withinternational partners, must work in a concertedeffort to manage and reduce risks, and havesufficient awareness to clearly distinguish

between legitimate and illegitimate uses.

Major Goals

A. Develop and leverage a strongpartnership with the small vesselcommunity and public and privatesectors in order to enhance maritimedomain awareness.

It is imperative that efforts focus on building

partnerships and trust with recreational boatersand professional mariners who operate smallvessels.

Again, the vast majority of professional andrecreational operators are law-abiding and safeusers of the maritime domain. It is imperative toenlist their aid as close allies in identifying

threats and reporting suspicious activitiesemanating within the small vessel community.Hence, special care must be directed at providingopportunities and venues for a continuousdialogue the small vessel community to

encourage the free and regular flow ofinformation and ideas between the private sectorand Federal, state, local and Tribal authoritiesand non-governmental organizations.

The small vessel community is the single largestasset in the efforts to mitigate small vessel-related security risks. As many as 80 millionindividuals participate in recreational boatingactivities each year. By formally educating smallvessel operators with respect to the risks facedand suggesting methods to address those risks(reporting, security measure protocols, etc.),small vessel users become an effective agent forreducing risk and increasing security.

Two effective means for the public to reportsuspected terrorist activity are to telephoneAmericas Waterway Watch (AWW) or theNational Response Center (NRC).

A prime example of the value of AWW occurredin 2003 when a tour boat operator in Florida

reported suspicious activity by one of thepassengers. The call led to the investigation ofthe suspect and his apprehension in Brooklyn,New York.25Between 2002 and 2006, the NRCreceived 646 reports of suspected terroristactivity.

25During a series of several meetings with an undercoveragent, the suspect attempted to buy five bulletproof vests,night vision goggles, a camera for the front of his car, 50sleeping pills, 100 Valium pills and a half-case of C-4 for$10,000.N.Y. Man Arrested for Allegedly Trying to Buy

Explosives, CNN.com, May 22, 2003 accessed athttp://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/22/explosives.arrest/index.htmlon September 26, 2007.

16
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/22/explosives.arrest/index.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/22/explosives.arrest/index.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/22/explosives.arrest/index.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/05/22/explosives.arrest/index.html


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of trends and fusing of potential intelligencerelated to the small vessel operator populationand related security risks. Improving informationanalysis and sharingespecially between thelaw enforcement and intelligence communities

and, in coordination with the Department ofState, with foreign governmentswill enableauthorities to specifically target threats related toWMDs or WBIEDs. Overall, this will improvecapabilities at the operational and tactical levelsand allow better allocation of resources,particularly in emergency situations.

Additionally, improving reporting procedures isessential to increasing reporting compliance andgathering data for risk-based efforts. As such,obtaining advance data for international traffic,such as the 96-hour Notice of Arrival rule, willallow the USCG and CBP to conduct thenecessary risk-based analysis, gain situationalawareness of small vessels, and improve theoverall MDA. The submission of basicbutessentialinformation on recreational vesseloperators in advance of U.S. arrival and

departure will enable consistent enforcementprioritizations and responses. These simplereporting requirements will also improve theeffectiveness of risk assessment efforts.

A layered innovative approach does notnecessarily mean all risk-mitigation actions willbe technologically based. Many times, the simpleexpedient of installing effective barriers aroundcritical infrastructure and key resources willeliminate most vulnerability to terrorist use ofsmall vessels as a WBIED. In order to developand maintain effective layered security, Federal,state, local, and Tribal officials must work inconjunction with their international counterpartsand private sector representatives to provideadequate security for CIKR.

Goal BSpecific Objectives

Enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a layered, innovative approach.

i. Improve detection and tracking capabilities to better identify small vessels operating in ornear U.S. waters.

ii. Develop a robust layered defense by expanding and enhancing maritime radiological/nucleardetection capabilities to international, Federal, state, local, Tribal, and private stakeholders.

iii. Implement basic procedures on advanced data submission and increase reporting complianceto improve situational and maritime domain awareness.

iv. Improve efforts to gather and share data on small vessels and their operators.

v. Improve data analysis capabilities to target high-risk small vessels.

vi.

Assess, develop, and improve layered security for critical infrastructure and key resources.

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C. Leverage technology to enhance theability to detect, determine intent, andwhen necessary, interdict smallvessels.

Surveillance of the entire maritime domain andthe tracking of all small vessels are notcontemplated by this strategy. Consistent withapplicable privacy laws, increased surveillanceand tracking may be appropriate, though, alongthe maritime border and in high risk, high trafficareas. Technology improvements will be centralto those efforts. Security technology iscontinuously evolving in terms of compatibility,standardization, and integration with informationsystems. Yet, technology is not the single

solution that can realize complete security for thesmall vessel environment. Instead, it is part of alarger layered security approach that can mitigatesmall vessel risks. Technology applications mayimprove the ability to identify threats earlythrough proper identification protocolsandmay improve the effectiveness of responseoperations.

As technology matures, new tools will beconstantly evaluated in order to adapt new

systems to small vesselstaking into accountsecurity requirements and operator preferences.Hence, efforts should be directed to theimplementation of effective security solutionsthat increase MDA, clearly identify dangeroussmall vessels, and ensure an appropriate level ofprivacy for law-abiding operators.

New detection capability will need to bedeveloped to address the vulnerabilities and risksdue to the exploitation of small vessel

characteristics, such as advanced human portableradiation detection systems and mobile standoffradiation detectors. The existing and newdetection capability should be deployed toFederal, state, local, and Tribal agenciesoperating on or near the water to improve thenations layered defense against terroristsexploiting small vessels.

Research and development play an importantrole in fulfilling this objective, since applicabletechnologies must operate within critical areas ofthe maritime domain. To be useful, informationobtained must be processed efficiently and

rapidly, and incorporated into the normalscreening procedures and daily operations oflocal authorities and law enforcement agencies.Ultimately, preventive measures, such asproviding the necessary, timely, and criticalinformation to key decision makers, will reducethe security risks of small vessels operating inthe maritime domain.

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Goal CSpecific Objectives

Leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent, and when necessary interdictsmall vessels.

i.

Expand research into and invest in prototyping low-cost, non-intrusive, small vesselidentification systems, such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, adaptableminiature transponders, portable Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, or cell-phonebased recognition systems.

ii. Expand research into and invest in anomaly detection instruments and other decision aids suchas automated scene understanding tools.

iii. Expand research into methods of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources, especiallyat shorelines, through means such as small boat barriers, unambiguous warning devices, andnon-lethal deterrents such as sonic canons.

iv.

Improve maritime domain awareness capabilities to adequately distinguish between andrespond to intentional and innocent intrusions into security and safety zones.

v. Expand research into and invest in advanced maritime radiation/nuclear detection technologyfor human portable radiation detection equipment, mobile standoff radiation detectors, andfixed detectors that could be deployed on or near the waters in the vicinity of small vessels.

(MOTR) Plan in accordance with currentD. Enhance coordination, cooperation, directives to optimize employment of all

and communications between appropriate resources in order to interdict threatsFederal, state, local, and Tribal as far from U.S. shores as practicable. The

partners and the private sector as well MOTR Plan sets forth lead and supportingas international partners. Federal agency roles and responsibilities for

MOTR based on a number of criteria including:The size and the scope of the maritime domain,

existing law; desired U.S. Government outcome;and the number of small vessels actively engaged

greatest potential magnitude of the threat; thein its use, make it virtually impossible for any

response capabilities required; asset availability;single government entity at any level to have

and authority to act. The MOTR plan directssufficient information, resources, expertise, or

clear coordination relationships and operationalstatutory authority to address the spectrum of

coordination requirements among the lead andpotential risks related to small vessels. Only

supporting MOTR agencies, enabling the U.S.through concerted coordination, continuous

Government to act quickly and decisively tocooperation, and diligent communications

counter maritime threats. The plan also sets forthbetween Federal, state, local, and Tribal agenciesprotocols for interagency coordination,

can the potential risks from small vessels beconsultation, and assessment throughout MOTR

adequately addressed without adverselyexecution.

impacting the legitimate use of the maritimedomain. Non-governmental organizations (recreational

boating, maritime exchanges, manufacturingFederal Agencies, where appropriate, will use

associations, pilot associations, and commercialthe Maritime Operational Threat Response

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operator associations, etc.) as well as privateentities share many of the same concerns andresponsibility for protecting CIKR and the MTS.These private actors have intimate knowledge oftheir own facilities and sphere of influence.

Working with the various non-governmentalorganizations is more effective than trying towork with individual small vessel communitymembers. The various non-governmentalorganizations provide a centralized point ofcontact on behalf of their members and have theability to efficiently communicate with them.

DHS agencies will work with Canadian,Mexican, Caribbean, and other foreigncounterparts to develop coordinated enforcementoperations targeting high-risk small vessels. Thiswill ensure maritime assets and responsecapabilities are properly distributed to provideappropriate coverage of the maritime border,consistent with current intelligence and themaritime threat. DHS agencies should cross-train, conduct personnel exchange programs, anddevelop clear standards of performance to bestcoordinate information sharing and appropriateenforcement actions.

In addition, DHS will continue to work with ourforeign counterparts to coordinate enforcementoperations, and will continue to work withinternational maritime organizations such as theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and

World Customs Organization (WCO) to developinternational standards applicable to smallvessels.

Goal DSpecific Objectives

Enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between Federal, state, local, Tribal, andterritorial agencies, the private sector, and non governmental organizations as well as internationalpartners.

i. Improve coordinated small vessel interdiction capabilities and operations.

ii. Leverage the capabilities of domestic partners and foreign governments through sharing ofinformation.

iii. Where appropriate, establish programs where law enforcement authorities from differentnations combine efforts in cooperative patrol and enforcement.

iv.

Make it a priority, consistent with available funding and in accordance with agencyresourcing plans, to integrate officers and intelligence analysts from the USCG, CBP, andImmigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) into participating state, local, and regionalfusion centers located in jurisdictions along maritime borders of the U.S.

v. Update Area Maritime Security (AMS) processes to insure that small vessels are addressedwhen conducting AMS assessments and developing AMS Plans (AMSPs).

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RISK MANAGEMENT

Given the size and complexity of the maritimedomain, risk-based decision making is the only

feasible approach to prevention, protection,response and recovery related to small vesselthreats. This risk-based SVSS will be appliedacross the maritime domain, the high seas, andforeign ports. The success of this strategy willhinge upon the informed and effectiveemployment of risk management, which willalso inform decisions about resources andinvestments in risk-mitigation actions.

Maritime security partners will mitigate a risk

posed by terrorist use of small vessels byconforming to the following five phases of theGAO risk management framework:

1. Strategic Objectives and Constraints

o Ensure all actions are firmly alignedwith articulated goals and objectives,keeping a clear focus on the desiredend state.

o Identify high-risk scenarios and/orlocations.

2.

Risk Assessmento Assess current and forecast threats,

vulnerabilities, and consequences.

3. Alternative Evaluation

o Develop various risk mitigationactions, coordinating efforts, whereprudent.

o Develop quantifiable performanceobjectives for each risk-mitigationaction under consideration.

4.

Management Selection

o Select appropriate risk mitigationactions and coordinate funding.

5. Implementation and Monitoring

o

Implement risk mitigation actions.

o Assess attainment of eachperformance objective.

o Make adjustments in DHS resourcesand investments to better attainperformance objectives.

o

Consider new risk mitigation actions.

Within this construct, maritime security partnersshould continue to undertake activities andinitiatives aimed at mitigating risks associatedwith small vessels. Coordinating and achievingsynergy among these efforts will reap benefitsand should include:

Maritime Regimes

Update Area Maritime Security Plans(AMSP), and Vessel and FacilitySecurity Plans as required by theMaritime Transportation Security Act of2002 (MTSA) to reflect small vesselsecurity issues.

Assess the benefits and costs oflegislative and regulatory optionspertaining to enhanced registration andreporting of small vessels.

Tailor domestic and international

outreach programs to small vesselsecurity.

Identify and evaluate alternative lawenforcement and defenseoperations/legislative initiatives.

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Maritime Domain Awareness

Review MDA initiatives and programsand, when appropriate, expand to includesmall vessels.

Support the AWW program to provideenhanced public outreach and educationprograms and evaluate potentialexpansion.

Review and where possible improve theDomestic Nuclear Detection Office(DNDO)Maritime Program Strategytosupport initiatives that will reduce therisk of small vessels smuggling illicitnuclear and radiological weapons andmaterial into the United States.

Maritime Operational Capabilities

Coordinate operational security activitiesclosely through interagency operationscenters.

Use DHS adaptable capabilities packagesto augment the security of the maritimedomain. Adaptable capability packagesdo not replace statutory missions,

existing contingency plans, or otherestablished processes, but they facilitateDHS-wide planning, support, prevention,detection, disruption and mitigationactivities associated with threats againstand incidents affecting security intereststhrough the integration of internal agencyoperational assets.

Employ law enforcement resources asappropriate to augment response andprevention activities within the maritimedomain of the United States.

Employ Research and Development(R&D) capabilities undertaken withinDHS Science and Technology (S&T)Directorate to support expanded smallvessel security.

Maritime security partners and the Americanpublic are encouraged to recommend additionalapproaches to further mitigate small vessel risksthrough Area Maritime Security Committees(AMSC) and other public forums. Such

improvements and recommendations will bepromptly evaluated by the appropriate entitiesand implemented where prudent.

Relative Risk Reduction from

Various Activity Groups

The risk reduction analyses conducted as part of theUSCGs Combating Maritime Terrorism (CMT)Campaign Plan have identified key groups of activitiesthat contribute to risk reduction. The activity groupsthat resulted in the greatest reduction in evaluated riskareas were:

Maritime Regimes

Control Port Access

Vessel and Facility Security Compliance

Maritime Domain Awareness

Surveillance of high risk areas and activities

Information collection and sharing

Maritime Operations

Boarding of Suspect Vessels

Use of Specialized Forces

(Adapted from CMT Campaign Plan Table 4:Activity and Relative Risk Reduction)

Figure 3, Key Activity Groups

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STATE, LOCAL,AND TRIBALGOVERNMENTS

To enhance deterrence and improvepreparedness, state, local, and Tribal

governments must address prevention, responseand recovery. Under the National IncidentManagement System (NIMS), thesegovernmental entities have responsibility forincident management response and recoveryefforts immediately after an incident. In dealingwith the vulnerability and threat aspects of smallvessel security risk, any planning initiativesshould align with AMSPs through participationin AMSCs.

As responsibilities, capabilities, andorganizational structures vary from agency toagency, specific functional responsibilities arenot delineated in this strategy. State, local, andTribal governments may each provide someassistance in the development of regimes,awareness and operational capability. However,to coordinate the Federal, state, local, and Tribalgovernment relationships, the following genericlist of functional responsibilities that state, local,and Tribal governmental agencies may perform

was developed.

State Governments

Coordinate state resources.

Make, amend, and rescind orders and

regulations under certain threatconditions in support of detection andprevention efforts as appropriate.

Communicate to the public aspects of an

emergency within state jurisdiction. Assist people, businesses, and

organizations of the state or territory tocope with the consequences of terroristactivity.

Encourage participation in mutual aid andimplement authorities for the state or

territory to enter into mutual aidagreements with other states, tribes, andterritories to facilitate resource-sharing.

Coordinate requests for Federalassistance when it becomes clear that

state capabilities will be insufficient orhave been exceeded or exhausted.

Exchange information with other Federal,state, local, and Tribal governmentagencies.

Participate in various advisorycommittees and task forces regardingmaritime security.

State boating law administrators develop,

implement, and enforce safe boatingstandards and operator qualifications.

Assist in the assessment of the economicimpact caused by a TSI.

Assist in the identification of responseand prevention resources and assets.

Provide resources as requested and asappropriate.

Assist in assessment, implementation andimprovement of security for criticalinfrastructure and key resources.

Local Governments

Craft, manage, and maintain small vesselrisk and threat mitigation and preventionplans.

Perform emergency first-responderactivities as appropriate.

Coordinate local resources.

Communicate to the public any type of

local threat or declared emergency withinthe local jurisdiction.

Assist people, businesses, andorganizations in the local area with theprevention and possible consequences ofany type of local threat or declared

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To assist the private sector in preparing for thisrole, DHS advocates, in accordance with theMaritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan thefollowing:

Private sector owners and operators ofvessels and facilities subject to UnitedStates Government regulation areencouraged to expand their businesscontinuity plans to include securityincident prevention, detection andrecovery operations as part of requiredplanning pursuant to Federal regulations.

Owners and operators of vessels and

facilities not subject to United StatesGovernment regulation are encouraged to

establish security incident prevention,detection and recovery operations andbusiness continuity plans, in coordinationwith appropriate trade partners.

All private sector security incidentprevention, detection and recoveryoperation plans should includenotification of appropriate local, state,and Federal government agencies. Plansshould be industry specific and include:(1) a plan for reducing vulnerability to

attacks; (2) a plan for evacuation orremaining, (3) adequate communicationscapabilities, and (4) a plan for businesscontinuity, and any other area or industryspecific concerns.

It is anticipated that the private sector willimplement business continuity plans/operationsplans on their own accord, based on informationprovided by the Federal Government.Information that may influence the decision to

implement contingency plans and divert orredirect cargo and/or the conveyances include:national priorities; military requirements; MTSrestrictions; and the expected duration of thoserestrictions.

To facilitate continued flow of commerce, thefollowing list of functional responsibilities that

the private sector may perform was developed aspart of the Maritime Infrastructure RecoveryPlan, and is applicable within the framework ofthis strategy:

Participate in various maritime industrystakeholder professional organizationsand advisory committees such as theAMSCs.

Engage in exchange of information aboutrecovery operations plans with otherpotentially affected private sector entitiesand the Federal Government to mitigatepotential congestion at non-incident siteports following the diversion of vesseltraffic.

Assist in the assessment of economicimpact.

Assist in the identification of preventionand recovery resources and assets.

Provide resources to assist in security andsafety activities, as appropriate.

Participate in pilot programs to test theeffectiveness of the Federal Governmentto communicate security activities to the

private sector. Using existing information-sharing

mechanisms such as the NationalInfrastructure Coordinating Center(NICC), AMSCs, Transportation SectorCoordinating Councils and InformationSharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC),communicate situational and operationalinformation as well as physical assetcapabilities for mitigation management.

In conjunction with Federal, state, localand Tribal authorities, assist in providingsecurity for critical infrastructure and keyresources.

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INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

Securing the maritime domain from the threatsposed by small vessels is a global issue and willinvolve partnering with Canada, Mexico,

Caribbean states, as well as other foreigngovernments. Additionally, combating terroristexploitation of small vessels will requireassistance from and close collaboration with allU.S. international partners.

International standards and cooperation can bedeveloped in traditional international maritimeorganizations such as the IMO and WCO.Geographic proximity in areas such as the GreatLakes region and Caribbean will call for a strong

regional approach. The easy transit of smallvessels between the United States and variousregional ports in the Western Hemisphererequires robust multinational agreements andsupport.

In addition to international organizations andregional compacts, bilateral cooperation withcountries, which share our borders both ininformation sharing and joint-operations willallow us to expand our reach and provide a moreeffective deterrent.

AUTHORITIES

The maritime domain, given its complex set ofinterlocking jurisdictions and authorities, issubject to a vast collection of laws andregulations at the Federal, state, local, and Triballevels. Appendix B contains some of the primarylaws which provide the Federal government andits agencies with authority to act in the maritime

domain.

EXISTING INTERAGENCYINSTITUTIONS

Interagency cooperation has long been acornerstone of effective governance. Multiple

interagency groups provide for effectivecommunications and cooperation. Interagencyinstitutions provide a means for all levels ofgovernment to combine their existing authoritiesand operational capabilities ensuring unity of

effort and building the relationships necessary tofoster cooperation and commitment to commongoals. A number of interagency efforts alreadyexist. Rather than creating new entities, existingframeworks will be utilized as mechanisms tocoordinate efforts to reduce small vessel risks.Appendix C lists several interagency efforts thatmay be leveraged in the effort to reduce risks.

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THE WAY AHEAD

Numerous prevention and response solutionshave been developed in building a layered

security system that is currently operating in themaritime domain. Many of these prior initiativeshave focused on larger commercial vessels.Maritime security initiatives appropriate forlarger vessels do not systematically transfer wellto small vessels because of differences betweenthe two communities.

In addition to the obvious difference of vesselsize, two important characteristics of the smallvessel community are the number and diversity

of stakeholders involved. Thus, there is nounique representation of small vessel stakeholderissues that would address the disparateviewpoints in the community. Another differenceis the little direct involvement or face-to-faceinteraction between small vessel stakeholdersand international, Federal, state, local, and Tribalauthorities, or commercial industry managers,that govern the use of the waterways in themaritime domain.

Challenges

The way ahead includes substantial challenges.The diversity and size of the small vesselcommunity impedes efforts to develop unity ofeffort as the various stakeholders have diversegoals, experience levels, capabilities, resources,and expectations concerning use of U.S.waterways. Many stakeholders are inexperiencedwith respect to risk management and may havenever interacted with the various layers of

government. The lack of a common viewpointleads to misunderstandings and confusion on allsides of the risk management effort.

In addition to cultural challenges, there aretechnical challenges to overcome. Thedevelopment of reliable and cost-effectivetechnology to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist

use of small vessels faces several hurdles. Anytechnology must be effective and complementaryin a wide-range of applications, in a largegeographic area, and be able to address a broadset of requirements. The expanded use oftechnology will require the integration of adiverse set of currently stove-piped capabilities.

Next Steps

The foundation of small vessel security efforts isa continued dialog with involved stakeholders. Itis vital that we continue the discussion begun atthe June 2007 DHS National Small VesselSecurity Summit held in Arlington, Virginia. Thesummit was a solid starting point to hear fromstakeholders and collect their input. It was thefirst national step, but there has to be an ongoinglocal interaction and discussion to ensure thatlocal ideas, strategies, and concerns areaddressed as implementation of the nationalstrategy occurs in the local ports, coastal andinland waterways.

DHS officials must continue to reach out tocounterparts in state, local, and Tribalgovernments. In coordination with theDepartment of State, DHS will communicatewith international partners, as well as privatesector entities. DHS will also continue to build

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partnerships and cooperation across the entiresmall vessel community so that a coordinatedsystem of regimes, awareness, and operationscan effectively reduce risk in the maritimedomain.

DHS will develop an implementation plan toprovide detailed direction to DHS agencies onhow to achieve the major goals outlined in thisstrategy. The implementation plan will includespecific actions in support of each objective inthis strategy and identify lead agencies and targetcompletion dates. The implementation plan willmake provisions for support of ongoing effortswith international partners, as well as linkages toall domestic stakeholders.

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CONCLUSION

I will guarantee you one thingthe enemy is not wasting time. Remind yourself about The

Sullivans. Remind yourself about the Cole. Remind yourself about that French tanker, the Limburg.

This attack technique is one they have used before. It is one that they will likely use again. Let us

work together to make our protections against this as robust as they can be in a way that preserves

the traditional freedom of the seas, our economic mobility and our continued pleasure and boating

on our oceans and in our waterways.

DHS Secretary Michael ChertoffNational Small Vessel Security Summit

June 19, 2007

This strategy is the initial step in identifyingoverriding goals and objectives in order toimplement a coordinated and unified strategy forsecuring the small vessel environment. An in-depth, risk-based security program must becoordinated in a multi-layered system thatincludes international, national, state, local,Tribal, and industry partners.

Yet, no single strategy can possibly address allareas of a topic as complex as small vesselrelated risk. This strategy and its implementationplan constitute the basis of the ongoing effort toreduce risk from illicit use of small vessels.While this strategy identifies four key riskscenarios, it is important to not let solutions beso focused on these four situations that they arenot flexible enough to prevent other threats.National plans and strategies must be asadaptable as those who aspire to do harm.

First and foremost solutions need to be risk-based, logical, and forward-looking, with a focus

on the education, communication, andcoordination of all stakeholders within themaritime domain.

Reducing risk from small vessels is atremendous challenge because of the sheernumber of boats, the variety of uses and types,their geographic range and frequent proximity to

large vessels and critical infrastructure/key

resources. This diversity precludes a single, onesize-fits-all solution, but requires a range ofactions that can be undertaken to minimize risk.Separate stand-alone solutions may not make asignificant contribution to risk reduction, butwhen taken together, will result in a greateroverall reduction in small vessel risk.

Fortunately, the great size of the small vesselcommunity also constitutes one of the greatestassets for risk reduction efforts. Everyday,

millions of recreational boaters and thousands ofprofessional mariners traverse our waters andstand ready, willing, and able to reportsuspicious activities. It is imperative thatFederal, state, local, and Tribal governmentswork together, to develop, and nurture theserelationships to address small vessel risk.

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APPENDIX AUNITED STATES FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

This appendix summarizes, at a very highlevel, some of the relevant Federalgovernment responsibilities in the maritimedomain. It does not purport to conferadditional responsibilities on these agencies,but is merely a concise summary of thoseresponsibilities and authorities that alreadyexist.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

DHS is a Cabinet level department of the United States Federal Government with theresponsibility of protecting the territory or homeland of the United States from terrorist attacksand responding to natural disasters. The Department works to protect the United States within,

at, and outside its borders. Its goal is to prepare for, prevent and respond to domesticemergencies, particularly terrorism.

DHS Office of Policy

DHS Policy is the primary policy formulation and coordination component for DHS. It providesa centralized, coordinated focus to the development of DHS-wide, long-range planning to protectthe United States.

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

I&A is the office in DHS which identifies and assesses a broad range of intelligence informationconcerning current and future threats against the United States. The office is responsible forissuing timely warnings and advisories for the full spectrum of terrorist threats against thehomeland, including physical and cyber events. In responding to disruption within the maritimedomain, I&A reviews threats to the Marine Transportation System and marine CIKR, andprovides intelligence to key decision makers within the Department.

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o Controls access to the operations of facilities under, in, or adjacent to waters subjectto the jurisdiction of the United States.

Facilitates efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness

o Tracks Notice of Arrival (NOA) information from ships entering U.S. waters and

ensures changes to NOAs are provided to the appropriate USCG and CBP officials atalternate ports of entry.o As part of AMSCs, and in coordination with appropriate stakeholders and other

government agencies, monitors all vessels and other inter-modal operations within therespective area of responsibility.

o Collects, integrates, and analyzes maritime intelligence concerning threats to vessels,ports and maritime infrastructure.

o Coordinates post-incident assessments and the reporting of maritime CIKR status andintermodal linkages.

Provides operational capabilities to deter, respond to, and mitigate small vessel relatedattacks.

o

Actively manages risks to ports by directing the movement of vessels, as necessary.o Furnishes available personnel, equipment or other resource support as requested,

consistent with overriding mission responsibilities and within the capabilities ofassigned resources.

o Provides port security measures to reduce potential threats and to ensure integrity ofthe existing infrastructure system, including boarding of certain high-risk vesselsprior to port entry.

o Ensures the safety of navigation and security of an Area of Responsibility (AOR).

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

U.S. Customs and Border Protections top priority is to keep terrorists and their weapons fromentering the United States. While welcoming all legitimate travelers and trade, CBP officers andagents enforce all applicable U.S. laws. CBP employs over 33,000 sworn law enforcementofficers, agents and agricultural specialists stationed at over 326 official ports of entry, at 142Border Patrol stations and 35 checkpoints along 7,000 miles of land border with Canada andMexico and along 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline, at 58 foreign seaports as part of the ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI), and at U.S. embassies around the world.

CBP is the only agency authorized to make final admissibility determinations regarding cargoand persons arriving from a foreign port or place. With regard to small vessel operations, CBPenforces applicable requirements for commercial vessel operations without regard to the size of

the vessel. Therefore, commercial vessel operators must comply with CBP requirements toprovide inbound and outbound cargo declarations and passenger manifests, and provide entryand clearance notifications.

Pursuant to 19 CFR 4.2, operators of small pleasure vessels, arriving in the United States from aforeign port or place to include any vessel which has visited a hovering vessel or receivedmerchandise outside the territorial sea, are required to report their arrival to CBP immediately

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upon arrival. CBP also requires a face-to-face inspection unless the operator and passengersqualify for one of four alternate inspection systems.

In addition to enforcing reporting requirements, CBP searches for narcotics and othercontraband, and undocumented migrants. CBP enforcement of small vessel requirementsincludes officers assigned to stationary designated inspection sites and agents on patrol using anarray of over 260 fixed, rotary wing and unmanned aircraft, and nearly 200 marine enforcementvessels of all types.

CBP:

Employs all available resources to identify and interdict terrorists and terrorists weapons(WMD) as far from the U.S. shores as possible

Coordinates with Federal, state, local, Tribal and international law enforcement partnersto stop illegal migrants, drugs, and other criminals from entering the U.S. via themaritime domain

Employs the widest possible information sharing practices with other law enforcementagencies and other partners

Employs risk management practices when analyzing information and targeting possiblehigh-risk persons, vessels, and cargo for enforcement actions

Continues to leverage the latest state-of-the-art technology solutions for situational

awareness and non-intrusive screening and inspection, whenever possible

Ensures enforcement actions do not unnecessarily impede the legitimate flow ofcommercial maritime trade and the freedom of recreational boaters operating in themaritime domain

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)

The DNDO is a jointly-staffed, national office established to improve the Nations capability todetect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear orradiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.

DNDO:

Develops the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture;

Develops, acquires, and supports the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system;

Fully characterizes nuclea

small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf

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