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Question (R4.8): Are there impediments to cooperation amongst GCC nations that reduce theireffectivenesstowardsundesirableoradverseregionalissues?Ifso,howcouldimpedimentsbeovercome?Contributors:WilliamCabán(CenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearning,MarineCorpsUniversity),Gerald Feierstein (Middle East Institute), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Abdulaziz Sager (GulfResearchInstitute),DanielSerwer(MiddleEastInstitute),KristianCoatesUlrichsen(RiceUniversity)ExecutiveSummaryWestonAviles,NSIIntroduction Atthetimeofthewritingofthisexecutivesummary,theGCC(GulfCooperationCouncil)hasexperiencedadiplomaticcrisiswiththreeGCCmemberstates(SaudiArabia,theUAE,andBahrain)cuttingdiplomatictieswithQatar (anotherGCCmember state)and remainingGCCmembers (Kuwait andOman)attempting tomediate.Thiseventbegsthediscussionof factorsanddynamicsthatobstructorcripplecohesionamongGCCnationsandpossiblesolutionstoovercomesuchobstacles.Athoroughunderstandingofthethreatsfacing the GCC andmore specifically, their limitations in responding to them, are crucial to attaining avigorousandholisticcomprehensionoftheGulfregion.No SMA contributor contests that there are significant impediments to GCC cooperation. Furthermore,therearenosignificantdisagreementsamongtheauthors;rather,eachauthoremphasizesdifferentpointsof contention and solution. Caban, Feierstein, Ulrichsen, and Sager all agree that the GCC is not amonolithic enterprise; instead, each nation is subject to varied and often competing interests (e.g.,economic resources, international political capital, territory etc.). Serwer then further elaborates, “[GCCstates]needtoallhangtogetherorthey’llallhangseparately,”andallauthorsagree,oratleasthint,thateffectivecooperationamongGCCmemberswouldbenefiteachnationdomesticallyand/orinternationally.DisagreementsandconflictswithintheGCCgobackdecades,andUlrichsencontendsthattheformationofthe GCC as an institution was completed in such a poor and hasty manner that internal friction wasinevitablefromthestart.ThePiXTeamprovidesanoverviewofthestructureoftheGCCandexplainsthepurposeand functionsof theGCCthatspan froma forumfor joint infrastructureprojects toahigh levelpoliticalassembly.Iran,ForeignPolicy,andPoliticalIslamContinuingthecriticismofthedesignoftheGCC,Ulrichsenpointsoutthat“theGCChasnoexplicittreaty-basedforeignpolicy-makingpowerasitsfoundingchartercalledonlyforacoordinationofforeignpolicy,”and the rest of the authors all agree that disagreements over foreign policy are a significant source ofdivisionwithintheGCC.EvidenceofthisdivisionisexemplifiedbyallauthorsagreeingthatIranissourceofattenuation of unity among the GCC (e.g., through proxy conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, as well asencroaching on territory in the Gulf). Feierstein and Sager posit that GCC members cannot come to aunifiedresponsetoIranianantagonismforavarietyofreasons,rangingfromvariouseconomicinterestin

SMAReach-back 7June2017

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Qatar, to Shia extremism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Feierstein provides a usefulmodel of a spectrumwithSaudi Arabia on the extreme anti-Iranian side and Oman on the more Iranian friendly side, with theremainingGCC states in between. This spectrum is evident in the currentQatari diplomatic crisiswhereFeiersteinhascontendedpriortotheriftthatIranisexploitinganopportunityinfriendlierKuwait,Oman,andQatartosowdiscordwithintheGCCand“isolatetheSaudis.”Iran manifests roadblocks to GCC cooperation through the sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and mostprominently,Yemen;however,theseflashpointsofconflictcanalsobeviewedthroughthemechanismofradical/political Islam, through which Iran manipulates them. In this context, the variance among GCCnations in geographical location, socio-economic factors, religious populations and others, present thecracks in GCC cooperation that Iran is able to exacerbate—all to the detriment of the GCC's ability toproduceandimplementacoherentandunifiedforeignpolicy.TheroleoftheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgyptandYemenisasourceofstrifeamongGCCstateswheretheSaudisandEmiratisboth“opposedtheriseofthe EgyptianMuslimBrotherhood” in opposition toQatar (Feierstein). And yet in Yemen, theUAE is farmore opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood presence than Saudi Arabia (Ulrichsen). Political Islam isparticularlyconcerningtoGCCnationsthatmustbalancereligiousextremismwiththe legitimacygrantedby religious institutions to the monarchies. Serwer and Caban recognize the divergence of domesticpressures of GCC nations that in turn deviate the interests of GCC nations from one another; differentproblemsnecessitatedifferentsolutionsthatmakeforweakandcompromisedpoliciesontheinternationallevel.MilitaryInstitutionsandSecurityStructuresGCCnations face adiverse set of geopolitical and socio-economic challenges; foremost among themareconcerns about security. Given the internal turmoil of sectarianism and external threat of Iran, coupledwith the threat of terrorism that plagues GCC nations on all levels, the need for a cogent and reactivesecurityforceisparamountforGulfregimes.CabanarguesthatGCCnationsare“deficientofprofessionalmilitaryforces[which]indicatesaninabilitytoperformjointoperations;because[they]havelimitedandadhoc professional military forces, they have insufficient capacity to work together effectively to thwartundesirableoradverseregionalissues.”CabangoesontodescribethatmanyGCCnationshaveahighratioof migrant workers to “natural-born citizens vested in the sovereignty of the homeland,” which makerecruitmentdifficultandoutsourcingsecurityforcesnecessary.EffortsbyGCCnationstohavetheirofficerstrained and educated outside the Gulf are being explored by the UAE, aswell as hiring foreignmilitaryprofessionals,butthereareadversepoliticalandlogisticalconsequencesstillunfoldingasaresultofthesemeasures(Caban).FeiersteinagreeswithCabanthataninabilitytoperformjointoperationsisamonumentalissuefacingGCCnations,but insteademphasizestherootof theprobleminthepoliticalstructuresofcooperationamongmember states. Feierstein notes that the disagreements of member states over the brevity of variousthreats canbeexplained throughapoliticalperspective. Feiersteinargues, “GCCcooperationworksbestwhentheissuesareapoliticalandtechnocraticinnature,andcanbeframedinawaythatbenefitsratherthan challenges the power and authority of individual states,” and cites historical examples of suchcooperation.

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Solutions/OvercomingChallengesEach author has proposed solutions to the challenges they each respectively highlighted in theircontribution,again,withahighdegreeofconcurrence.SagerassertsthatatenaciousandunambiguousUSpolicyintheregioniscriticaltoGCCsuccess.FeiersteinconcurswithSager’spointoftheneedforclearUSpolicyintheregion,butexplicitlystressesIranianissuesasanareaoffocus.FeiersteinalsosuggeststhatUSmust not try to force policy onto the GCC, but rather to cultivate it fromwithin, so as to not feed thepropaganda of Gulf regime submission to Western governments. Ulrichsen maintains that political andstructuralreformoftheGCCwouldbehelpful,andtheGCCasanorganizationshouldfocusonameliorating“administrativemechanismsandlessonbig-ticketitemsthatareperceivedtoimpingeonsovereignty.”InregardstotheproblemsfacingGCCsecurityforcesthatCabandescribes indetail,“DevelopingaprogramformilitaryofficersatthewarcollegesandaseriesofannualmilitaryexerciseswouldbringtogetherGCC-onlyarmedforcestopromotegreaterfamiliarityandthedevelopmentofcommondoctrine”(Feierstein).

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SubjectMatterExpertContributionsWilliamCabán,CenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearning,MarineCorpsUniversityImpedimentstocooperationamongstGCCnationsareendemicandstemfromamyriadofsocio-culturalissues. These issues include and are not limited to: lack of professional military institutions staffed bynatural-borncitizensvested in the sovereigntyof thehomeland, cultural implications shapedby religion,andmostimportantlythedesiretomaintaincontrolinthehandsoftheregions’ultrarichmonarchs.Theseissues are not independent, they affect each other continuously, with the undercurrent being religiousideology.Consideringthe issueofreligioncanbediscussedendlessly, theprimaryeffortofthisdiscoursewillbetoaddresssecuritycooperation,andGCCnationshiringforeignmilitaryveteranswithoperationalexperiencetostaffdomesticanddeployedmilitaryforces. GCCnations’needforprofessionalmilitaryforcesisexacerbatedbyinternalandexternalimplicationsandthreats. Internal unrest is being caused by disgruntled foreign and natural-born citizens (mostly Sunni)seeking increased political rights (migrants and Arab Spring). External pressures include Iran (Shia)encroaching on island territories in the Gulf (Iran took control of a few disputed islands), and ViolentExtremist Organizations (VEOs) some openly backed by Iran (e.g. Houthi rebels in Yemen). The IslamicMilitaryAllianceagreementattemptstopooltogetherregionalresourcestoaddressknownthreats.Beingdevoidofprofessionalmilitaryforcesindicatesaninabilitytoperformjointoperations;becauseGCCnationshave limited and ad hoc professional military forces, they have insufficient capacity to work togethereffectivelytothwartundesirableoradverseregionalissues. SecurityCooperation,OccupationalTraining,ProfessionalMilitaryEducationAttemptsatcorrectingtheGCCnations’militarydeficienciesareinmotioninavarietyofways.SecurityCooperation(SC)withpartnernationssuchastheU.S.andtheU.K.arecommon.SCwithforeignmilitaries typically calls for the U.S. and U.K. to deploy troops to the region to perform SubjectMatterExpert (SME)exchanges,giveclassesonmilitarytopics,andholdtacticalskill-setcourses (marksmanship,landnavigation,tacticalemploymentofgear,etc.).DiscussionswithU.S.personnelwhohaveconductedSCmissionsintheregionindicatethatlocalborntroopsareofnominalphysicalfitness(nowherenearMarineCorpsstandardswithfewexceptions),andgenerallylackthedrivetobecomeskilledmilitarypractitioners.Effort and interest in subject matter is difficult to draw, but the credibility these personnel gain fromworkingwithforeignmilitaries(suchastheU.S)isadesirednotchintheirbelt.Thereisanunspokenideathat if you train with combat experienced American troops, you have achieved a higher level ofprofessionalism,andthatassociatingyourselfwiththemincreasesyourexpertiseandknowledge.Thisideacanbeseen inU.S.militariesaswell.Whengeneralpurposetroopscollaboratewithsomesortofspecialoperationsoutfitthroughouttheircareer(e.g.MARSOC,NavySEALS,Rangers,GreenBerets,etc.),servicemembers tout that particular tour of duty as something that provides them increased credibility, eventhoughtheexperiencemighthavebeenextremelylimitedinscope;“WhenIwaswithMARSOC,”“DuringmytimewiththeSEALS”,etc.GCC military officers attend professional military education in the U.S. and abroad. U.S. studentobservations and reporting indicates that while these officers are in training they are not inclined toperform competitively (to U.S. standards), and have failed courses in the past. AMiddle Eastern officerfailed a course not too long ago and was executed upon returning to his home country, so U.S. policytowards failing foreign students has been modified. As such, foreign students (known as InternationalMilitary Officers or IMOs) usually receive a certificate of participation or attendance, not necessarily a

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certificateofcompletion.ThisisbecausemanyIMOssimplygothroughthemotionsinclass,participateifnecessary, and collect salaries laced with benefits like per diem and cost of living allowances thatsometimes dwarf their normal salary. Attending U.S. officer professionalmilitary education courses is asought-after career step for IMOs. Certificates, patches, badges, or pins earned (or purchased) while attheseinstitutionsareprominentlydisplayedonuniformsandinofficeswhentheyreturntoinformothersthe individualattendeda foreignmilitaryschool.Note that the individualshandselectedtoattendthesecoursesareusuallygroomedbasedonlineage,notnecessarilyprofessionalcapacity.Enlistedmembers of foreignmilitaries do not attendU.S. schools,more specifically, they do not attendprofessional learning centers for rank required leadership training (e.g. Corporal’s course, Sergeant’scourse,etc.)Theydo,onoccasion,attendmilitaryoccupationalschools.Issuesarisewhentrainedmilitarymembersgobacktotheircountriesanddon’thavetheassetsreadilyavailabletothemthattheydidataU.S.schoolbecauseeitherthecountrydoesn’thavethem,ortheirdoctrine(iftheyhavedoctrine)doesn’tworkinacongruentmanner.Thisisimportanttounderstandasofficerswhoaretrainedatpartnernationleadership schoolsarenowchallengedwith trying to fit the training they justacquiredontoa force thatisn’t prepared to receive the information and insight. It has also been the experience of U.S. ForeignSecurityForceadvisors,thatenlistedmembersofforeignmilitariesarefarlesseducatedinbasictacticsandmilitary skillswhich adds a layer of complexity to advisormissions. This is becausemanymilitaries haverequirements for officers such as attending a branch specific military academy before applying for acommission. OutsourcingMilitaryProfessionalsGCCnationshavehadtoaddress the issuesofsecuritysincetheir independence (until this time,colonialpowers provided regional security), and have done so through the outsourcing ofmilitary professionals.Hiringofretired,orpriorserviceforeignmilitaryprofessionalstoserveasprivatesecurity(mercenaries)isadecadesoldpractice intheregion.AcontributingfactorcontributingtoGCCnationsdiminishedabilitytoeffectivelyrespondtothreatsisthatcountriesintheregionlackapopulacewillingtojointheirprofessionalmilitaries. The relatively low native population is an indicator of this as a largemajority of the region’sinhabitants are workers from foreign countries including Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and thePhilippines.More recently, the U.A.E. has taken to hiring Latin American military professionals from countries likeColombia,Peru,Chile,andElSalvador.TheU.S.hasinvestedmillionsintrainingColombianstofightleftistinsurgencies and Transnational Criminal Organizations (the FARC and cartels) in what was dubbed bystrategists as “Plan Colombia”. Peru and Chile are long known to have professional maritime forces(includingnaval infantry/MarineCorps’),oncehaving foughteachother inanavalbattleover territorialclaims that are still in dispute. El Salvador has received training from the U.S. and is the only CentralAmerican country to participate in operations in theMiddle East,where theyprovidedon-base facilitiessecurityasmostsmallercoalitionpartnershave(asopposedtoperformingcombatoperations).ElSalvadoralsoemploystheirmilitaryasaninternalsecurityforcetocombatviolentgangs(likeMS-13),grantingthemexperienceinfightingatypeofcounterinsurgencyforthelastfewyearsthemselves.Latin American soldiers are prime candidates to pull from because they have military experience, andtrainingfromsometheworld’spremiermilitaryforces.Colombiansoldiers’experiencein5decadesoflow-intensitycounter insurgencybattle,at leastonpaper,providesa levelofappealfortheU.A.E.consumer.Thesewould-berecruitsalsocomeatasignificantlylowerpremiumthan,say,formerBritishorU.S.militaryprofessionalswould.Thecostdifferentialisroughly80%lessforwhatappearstobeacompetent,reliablesourcingpool,thoughprobablynotasextensivelytrainedasthemoreexpensivevariety.Therecruitment

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ofactivedutyColombianmilitarypersonnelbecameanissueforthemilitaryastheystartedexperiencingabrawn-drainof their competent and seasoned leaders. Somuch so,ColombianofficialsmetwithEmiratiofficialstotryandstemtheflowoftroops.HundredsoftrainedandexperiencedColombiansoldiershaveleft since 2010,when the first contracts for a privatemilitary in theU.A.E. began. Nothing came of thismeeting.From entry level soldiers to retired commander’s the contracts offer lucrative starting salaries toColombians, roughly 125-150 USD a day, or about 3300 USD monthly; a small fortune by Colombianstandardsconsideringmonthlysalariesintheircapitalregioncomeinatjustunder700USDpermonthforthe average professional. Loyal to their paychecks, this private stock of soldiers is also cheaper thanmaintaining a conventional force offering a “Fed-Ex” type of alternative to security, as opposed togovernmentalforcesbeinglikenedto“USPS”.Colombianrecruitsdon’talwayspossessthedesiredtacticalskill-setproficiency,andassuchtakelongertotrainandemploy.Thiswasanticipatedandwrittenintothecontract, though the level is sometimes lower than expected. Basic training includes physical fitness,marksmanship, checkpoint security, patrolling, communications, crowd control, crisis and disasterresponse.AllthistrainingtakesplaceonacompoundinZayedCity,intheU.A.E.TheU.A.E.beganfosteringtheColombianmercenaryconceptin2010,creatingasort-ofpraetorianguardforceforthemonarchies.ThiscameatatimewhenGCCnationsdidn’tknowiftheycouldcountonalliestosupport them. The toppling ofMubarak in 2011, the crisis in Crimea in 2014, and complete lack ofU.S.interventionduringbothwere indicators that securityneeded tobe taken in to theirownhands.Couplethis with the increasing encroachment of Iran, who seized an uninhabited island off their coast. Asinstability in theregionsteadily increased, theneedforsolutionsthatwouldsatisfynationalsecurityandcommercialconcernswasevident.Hiredgunswouldprovideprotectionforfacilitiesandhigh-risebuildings,toensurethestabilityofthecountry,andmaintaina“businessasusual”environment.In2015,whenthethreat of instability advanced through Yemen, the U.A.E. stepped up its efforts by providing forces toconfrontIranbackedHouthirebels.WiththeSaudisexecutingairstrikesinYemen(usingU.S.targetingandlogistical support), the U.A.E. tried to send Colombians abroad to supplement their already deployednational army. This, at first, didn’t sit well with the contractors. They pointed to the blatant breach ofcontractanddeniedorders. Increasingly lucrativeoffersweremadetoenticetheColombiansto fight fortheU.A.E.inYemen,andmercenarieswhoagreedwerewokenupinthemiddleofthenightandshippedofftobattleinOctober2015. ImplicationsReligionofforeignfightersReporting indicates that recruiters for theU.A.E.mercenaryArmywere specifically instructed to look forcandidates that were “not Muslim” because “Muslim soldiers could not be counted on to kill fellowMuslims”. This quote comes from private military industrial complex mogul Erik Prince (former CEO ofBlackwater)whowasbroughtontooverseetherecruitmenteffortsforthisproject.Thisconcepthasbeenexemplified inotherareaswhere Islamicmilitaries trainedandequippedby theU.S.andothers failed toexecutemissionswithoutadvisororlogisticalsupport(mostnotablythefallofIraqisoldierswheninitiallychallengedbyISIS).InthecaseoftheU.A.E.weseeanationusinga“lessonslearned”approachtocreatingandstaffingasecurityforce,beingjudicialintheirplanningprocess,andseeminglyrealisticinhowtheyareselectingtheirapplicants.It’simportanttonotetheU.A.E.isagroupofmonarchiesprotectingtheirassets.In theirview (and theviewof someoutsidecritics), thepeopleof theU.A.E.are less inclined to join themilitaryforanynumberofreasons.Alotofthepopulationdrawsfamilylinestotheleadership,sotheyfeelentitledtonotpartakeinhardlabor(evidencedbythehighnumberofimportedserviceindustryworkers),toincludemilitaryservice.Thepopulationisalmost4:1migrantworkertonaturalbornSunnicitizen.Also

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consider,thosenotnecessarilyrelatedtotheleadershiphavearelativelyeasylifepurposefullyfundedbythemonarchs to tacitly appeasepeople. Thehappier apopulace, the lower the likelihood for revolt andcalls for change to the status quo. Every now and then there is a protest calling for increased politicalparticipation,butareusuallymetwithcounterprotestssayingeverything is fine,andthecountercurrentprotestors are jailed (e.g. the U.A.E.-5 and U.A.E.-7, protestors jailed for voicing concern over lack ofpoliticaldiscourse).ProvocativeStaffingEffortsPreliminaryreportingstatedacompanyownedbyErikPrincewasfulfillingtheU.A.E.Colombianmercenarycontract. However, his lawyer released a statement affirming that Prince’s only involvement was inconsulting for recruitment of personnel for the project. Prince’s involvement is provocative due to theinfamous congressional hearings that tookplace after civilianswere killed in a 2007 firefight inBaghdadwhich caused Erik Prince’s company (then named Blackwater) to be investigated. The situation forced achange inU.S. policy, directedby conservative leaders,which states thatprivatemilitary contractors fallundertheUniformCodeofMilitaryJustice(UCMJ).Thiswasnotthecasebeforehand,therulesetswereunclear,andDoDcontractorswererarelychargedforcrimescommittedwhendeployedtocombatzones.Prince liquidated his holdings in Blackwater andmoved to Abu Dhabi in 2010 for its “friendly businessatmosphere.”ItishereweseetherelationshipbetweenErikPrinceandthecrownprinceblossom.Initialestimatesposedthat theprivate forceprocuredthroughtherecruitmenteffortsofErikPrincewasformedtoprotectfromuprisingsasseenthroughouttheregionrelatedtotheArabSpring.Inactuality,thisstring of deals began before the Arab Spring kicked off, though the timingwas convenient. Erik Prince,seizingopportunitytoexpandhisfootprint,hasmadethemilitaryindustrialcomplexmoreopenlyvisibletotheworldabroad.StillbeinganAmericancitizen,thequestionhasbeenposed,didPrinceviolateU.S.StateDepartment lawsbynotobtaininga license tosellmilitaryservicesoverseas?Asofyet,nochargeshavebeenbroughtupregardingthisissue.TheUSGisawareofthesituationandhasissuedstatementsassertingthat itwould benefitGCC countries like theU.A.E. to invest in privatemilitaries so theymight be takenmoreseriouslybynation-statesandnon-governmentalactors.

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GeraldFeierstein,MiddleEastInstituteA commonmisconception about the GCC is that it ismonolithic and that the individualmember statessharecommonviewsaboutregionalchallengesorstresstheimportanceofintegratedpolicies.Inneithercase isthatperceptioncorrect. Tobegin,therearebroaddisagreements,thinlypapered-over,aboutthenatureofregionalchallenges.IranTheoutliersonIranareSaudiArabiaandOman.SaudiArabiaandIranhavealonghistoryofconflictandcompetitionthatpre-datesthe1979Iranianrevolution,whichexacerbatedtheconflict.Itisonlypartiallyrelated to sectarian Shi’a-Sunni disagreements. It involves, aswell, the perception that each has of theotherasthemainchallengertoitsownaspirationsforregionaldominance.Asaresult,theSaudispressforpolicieswithintheGCCthattakethehardestlineonIran.OftheGCCstates,theSaudiswere:

• mostunhappywiththeJCPOA;• most skeptical of Obama Administration efforts to bring Iran into closer engagement with the

internationalcommunity;and• mostsupportiveofpoliciesthatwouldconfrontIranoritsproxiesmilitarilyandretainpoliticaland

economicsanctionsonIranforitsbadbehaviorregionally.Oman,bycontrast,perceivesIraningenerallypositivetermsreflectingboththehistoryofIraniansupport,especially in the early days of Sultan Qaboos’ rule when Iran helped defeat the Dhofar rebellion, andOman’ssectarian identityas theonlynon-Sunnimajoritystate in theGCC. TheOmanismaintainnormaldiplomatictieswithIran.Historically,theyweresympathetictoIranianeffortstoneutralizenuclear-relatedsanctionsandcurrentlylooktheotherwayatIranianinterventioninYemen.TheOmanisareproudoftherole they played in facilitating U.S.-Iranian discussions that helped pave the way to agreement on theJCPOA. For their part, the Iranians look to Oman as an ally in their outreach to the internationalcommunity. As a result of its generally positive outlook on Iran, the Omani leadership is viewed withsuspicionbytheotherGCCleaders.TheotherGCCstates’positionson Iran fallwithin thespectrumdefinedbySaudiandOmaniviews. TheBahrainis, who see Iran as the major actor stirring Shi’a dissent within Bahrain, share Saudi Arabia’shardline positionon Iran. While theUAE is also concerned about Iranian actions in the region, andhasjoined Saudi Arabia as the most aggressive member of the Saudi-led Coalition challenging IranianinterventioninYemen,theEmiratishavelonghadmajortradeandeconomicinterestswithIranandalargeIranianpopulationresidinginDubaithathelpsmoderatetheirviewsonIran.Similarly,Qatar’spositiononIran reflects its economic interests in themassive North Field gas project that it shareswith IranwhileKuwait, which has faced challenges in the past from Iranian-inspired Shi’a extremists, has also tried tomoderateIranian-GCCconflict.The Iranians recognizedifferencesof viewwithin theGCC. Over thepast sixmonths, theKuwaitis havemaderepresentationstoIranaboutthepossibilityofopeninganewdialoguebetweentheGCCstatesandIran. PresidentRouhanihasvisitedKuwaitandOmanandForeignMinisterZarifhascalledontheQatarileadershipinDoha.Clearly,theIraniansseeanopportunitytodividetheGulfstatesfromSaudiArabiaandisolatetheSaudis.

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Differences in perception about Iran have greatly complicated efforts to derive a common GCC policy.Nowhereare thosedifferencesmorepronouncedthanontheconflict inYemen. TheSaudi-ledCoalitionsees the Houthi insurgency as a reflection of Iranian efforts to establish a presence on the ArabianPeninsula threatening to Gulf Arab security and stability. The Saudis, at great military, financial, andreputationalcost,havepursuedadeterminedpolicyofdrivingIranianinfluenceoutofYemenandensuringthat the Houthis are denied an opportunity to dominate the government in Sana’a. The Omanis haveexpressedsympathyfortheHouthipositionandfacilitatedIraniansupportfortheHouthis.SultanQabooshas also expressed ambiguous views about the importance of retaining Yemeni unity at odds with theofficialSaudiandEmiratisupportforYemen’scontinuationasaunifiedstate.PoliticalIslamSimilarly,theGCCstatesaredividedintheirviewsaboutIslamicextremismandpoliticalIslaminwaysthatcomplicatetheirabilitytodefinecommonpositionsonissuesrelatedtocounter-terrorism,Syria,Egypt,orLibya.Inparticular:In Yemen, the Emiratis view counter-AQAP operations to be as significant to their interests as the anti-HouthicampaignandhavepartneredwiththeU.S.inclearingMukallahofAQpresencewhilereducingAQfreedom of movement in Hadramawt and Mahra governorates. The Emiratis are also opposed to theinvolvementoftheYemeniMuslimBrotherhoodaffiliate,Islah,intheCoalitioncampaign.TheSaudishavebeen less concerned about AQAP involvement in the campaign and have allowed Salafist elements tooperateintheSaudi-Yemeniborderarea.TheymaintainclosetieswithGeneralAliMohsin,whoiscloselyassociatedwithIslahandtheSalafists.TheSaudisandEmiratisopposed the riseof theEgyptianMuslimBrotherhood,encouraged theEgyptianmilitary to move against the government of Mohammed Morsi, and subsequently provided billions ofdollarsinassistancetoshoreuptheSisigovernmenteconomically. TheQataris,alignedwithTurkey,hadprovidedsubstantialsupporttotheMorsigovernmentandwereangeredbytheSisicoupd’etat.Qatar’s support for political Islamist groups and individuals, especially offering asylumand a platform toEgyptian fundamentalist preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi, nearly ruptured the GCC and brought Qatar intodirectconfrontationwiththeSaudisandtheUAE. AlthoughSheikhTamimhasworkedtoreduceQatar’sisolationwithintheGCCandeliminateitsoutlierrole,inparticularworkingtoimproverelationswithSaudiArabia,tensionspersist.Althoughlesssignificant,differencesoverpoliticalIslamhavealsocoloredtheindividualpoliciesoftheGCCstates regarding Libya. TheUAE has beenmost aggressive in teamingwith Egypt in support of GeneralHaftarandhisresistancenotonlytoviolentextremistgroupsintheeastbutalsotowardtheUN-supportedcoalitiongovernmentinTripoli.TheSaudiandQataripositionhasbeenmoreneutralandmoresupportiveoftheUNeffort.OvercomingImpediments The differences among the GCC members that impede closer strategic coordination and cooperationrepresentdeeplyingrainedpolitical,security,andsocialperspectivesofeachofthememberstatesthatareunlikely to be resolved without fundamental changes in the individual members’ basic world view. Asnotedabove,thememberstateshavebeenreasonablysuccessful inpaperingoverdifferences,butoften

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thishasmeant lowestcommondenominatorpositionswithintheorganizationwitheachofthemembersleft to pursue its ownpolicies outsideof theGCC framework. While a complete integrationofmemberstate policies is probably unachievable, U.S. leadership can help improve GCC cohesion through severalsteps:Lead the development of a common position on Iran: In his meetings with his GCC counterparts, thePresidentshouldproposethatwedevelopanintegratedU.S.-GCCpolicytowardsIranratherthancontinuethepracticeofdevelopingaU.S.policyand thenpressing for it tobeadopted in theGCC. Preparinganintegrated strategy with roles and responsibilities for each party will strengthen GCC buy-in and couldaccommodateoutlierpoliciesbybuildingthemintoalarger,mutually-agreedstrategicframework.ContinuetopressforthedevelopmentofagreaterIntegratedGCCSecurityStrategy:Effortstocoordinatememberstates’defenseandsecuritypolicies, to include jointdecisionsonweaponssystemsacquisitionsand deployment, have a long and largely unsuccessful history in the GCC. The Obama Administrationrevived the effort, with an emphasis on developing an integrated ballistic missile defense program.Continuationofthateffort,withafocusonbuildingdefensecohesion,canhelpbuildcommonperspectivesonregionalthreatsandappropriateresponses.ProposeGCC-onlymilitary trainingandexerciseprograms:Developaprogram formilitaryofficers at thewar colleges and also propose that we develop a series of annual military exercises that would bringtogetherGCC-onlyarmedforcestopromotegreaterfamiliarityandthedevelopmentofcommondoctrine.

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PiXTeam,TeslaGovernmentServicesPiX is a USG-sponsored secure information sharing community, approved for up to FOUO and SBUinformation, thatprovides tailored content assistance,RFI support, andGIS services. PiX's teamof SMEsprovidedbackgroundinformationontopicsrelevanttotheSMA.ToviewmoreinformationortosetupaPiXaccount,emailhelp@pixtoday.net.ClickthelinksbelowtoviewPiXinformationonSMAQuestR4.8:https://www.pixtoday.net/ap/index.php/Article:Gulf_Cooperation_Council

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AbdulazizSager,GulfResearchCenterTheself/nationalinterestsofeachGulfstatesalwaysinfluencedecisionsandattitudes,andthefactorofleadership'scompetitionsometimeinfluencepolicies.HavingsaidthatintherecentyearstheGCCstateshasdevelopedacommonandsharedsenseofthreat.We can see an agreement about the source of threat (Terrorism / ISL , Iran , Iraq, Yemen, …). Thedifferencesmostlyrelatedtothetacticsonwhotodealwiththisthreats.TheUSpolicytowardtheGulfregionisimportantinhelpingtoremoveimpedimentsandunifystrategies.Aclear,determine,andimplementableUSpolicycouldremoveanydoubtsandhesitation.Thus,ontheotherhand,aweak,unclearUSpolicywillopenthedoorsfordifferencesandconflictamongsttheGCCstates.

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DanielSerwer,MiddleEastInstituteYes,youneedonlytalkwitharandomGulfietoheartheircomplaintsabouteachother.TheexceptionsareSaudiArabiaandtheUAE,whichdespitetheirdomesticdifferencesseemlargelyinagreementonYemen,Syria,andotherissues.ButingeneraltheGulfstatesseemunabletorealizethat,asBenFranklinsaid,theyneedtoallhang togetheror they’llallhangseparately.TheGulfCooperationCouncilhasnotsolved thisproblem,whichlimitsGulfdiplomatic,political,militaryandeconomicinfluenceandeffectiveness.

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KristianCoatesUlrichsen,Ph.D,RiceUniversity ThroughoutthehistoryoftheGCCtheblochasstruggledtoreachagreementonissuesthatimpingeuponareasofnationalsovereignty;conversely,mostcooperationhasbeenreachedontechnocraticareaswhichtendtobeapolitical innature.At itsheart,theGCCisacollectionofsixrulingfamilies inwhichpower isclusteredaroundtheindividualrulers,whoareunwillingtodistributepowerwithintheirownsocieties,stillless with each other. This has resulted in a series of grandstandingmeasures, often at the annual GCCSummits,thatoftenhaveservedtohighlightthetensionsthatcontinuetosimmerbetweenmemberstatesandthatoccasionallycannotbekeptbelowthesurface.BahrainandQatar,forexample,didnotestablishfulldiplomaticrelationsuntil1997,26yearsafterindependenceand16yearsafterthecreationoftheGCC.Morerecently,theQatari-UAEdisputeescalatedsignificantly in2014whenEmiratiauthoritiesdiscoveredthatQatarhadnotonlygivenrefugetoEmiratiIslamistswhohadescapedarrestintheUAEbutthatseveralofthemhadsecuredpublicsectorjobsinDoha.KuwaitandSaudiArabiaalsohavehadatenserelationshiprecently,overdisagreementsconcerningdevelopmentswithintheirsharedNeutralZone,whichresultedinthe shutting of onshore and offshore oilfields in 2014-15. Further, while Saudi Arabia and the UAEconstitute the two leading partners in the GCC-led coalition in Yemen, they back different groups ofYemenis in-country, and differ greatly in their approaches toward the YemeniMuslim Brotherhood. Thedilemma for the GCC-led coalition (and international partners) is that these differences will becomeincreasinglyhardtocontainthecloserYemenevergetstoapoliticalsettlement.In addition, theGCC lacks the integrative structures that are embeddedwithin the EuropeanUnion (forexample)– there isnoGCCequivalentof theEuropeanCommissionor theEuropeanParliament,andnosupra-nationalmechanismtomanagethepoolingofsovereignty.ThisreflectsthefactthattheGCCcametogetherwithextraordinaryspeedinthespringof1981–afteryearsoffalsestarts(which illustratedthelackofconsensusovertheprecisenatureofabloc,thebalanceoffocusonpolitical,economic,orsecurityissues, orwhether Iraq should be a part of it) theGCCwas put together in just threemonths betweenFebruaryandMay1981.AspartoftherushtostrengthenGulfStates’defensivepostureatatimeofsuchregionalandexternalstress,thestructureoftheGCCemergedoutofaseriesofadhocdecisionsthatwerenotnecessarilytakenwithlonger-terminstitutionallegaciesinmind.Further, theGCC has no explicit treaty-based foreign policy-making power as its founding charter calledonlyforacoordinationofforeignpolicy. Itsmembergovernmentshaveretainedresponsibilityforalmostall aspectsofpolitical andeconomicpolicy and resistedany limitationson their sovereignty.As a result,theseinternalweaknessesmakeitharderfortheGCCtoleverageinfluenceasablocandcontributetothepreference of individual states to pursue bilateral economic and commercial relations.Moreover, SaudiArabia apart, the other fivemembers were still young nations in the process of state and bureaucraticconsolidation,andtheywerealsowaryofthepotentialforSaudidominanceorhegemonywithintheneworganization. The smaller states’ fearswere exacerbated by the fact that in terms of population, size ofarmedforces,intra-regionaltradeflows,andgeostrategicimportance,therewassuchaclearimbalanceinfavor of Saudi Arabia. In part to obviate this imbalance of power, the GCC presented itself from thebeginningasacautiousstatusquoentitythatintendedtoshielditsmemberstatesandsocietiesfromthetrans-nationalspill-overofinstabilityfromIranandIraq.The trajectory of security cooperation illustrates both the challenges and the opportunities of enhancedGCCcooperation.APeninsulaShieldForcewasestablishedinthe1980s,attheurgingofOman,butitnevergained traction, largely because Qatar and the UAE suspected it would increase still further Saudi

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dominanceofthebloc.AftertheGulfWarof1991,attemptstobuildanArabsecuritystructureintheGulf,basedontheGCCplusEgyptandSyria,similarlyfailedtoovercomesimmeringrivalriesandtensionsamongtheGCC6plus2.AninitialattempttoreachaninternalsecurityagreementandshareinformationamongGCCmemberstateswasblockedbytheKuwaitiparliament in1994.Since2011,OmanhasblockedSaudiefforts to transform theGCC froma cooperativebloc into amore formalunion,but it is noticeable thatmostGCC leaders (with the exceptionof the King of Bahrain) stayed away from the special consultativesummitheldinRiyadhinMay2012toconsidertheissue.Moreover,whilethePeninsulaShieldForcewasresurrected in 2011 to assist the Bahraini government in restoring order following the uprising there, aKuwaitidetachmentofmedicswasturnedbackattheSaudi-BahrainicausewayandnotpermittedtoenterBahrain.Thepassageof theGCC InternalSecurityAgreementshowshowgreaterprogresscanbemadeon issueswhere they are concernedmorewith the betterworking of administrativemechanisms and less on big-ticketitemsthatareperceivedtoimpingeonsovereignty.Tobesure,eachofthesixGCCstateshad,after2011,avestedinterestinmoresubstantivecooperationonsecurityissues,buttheabovementionedSaudicallforaGulfunionwenttoofarforeverystatebarBahrain.Instead,cooperationcametorevolvearoundaninternalsecuritypactagreedbyGCCInteriorMinistersattheirannualministerialmeetinginNovember2012 and endorsedbyGCCHeads of State at theGCC’s annual Summit in Bahrain the followingmonth.Qatar,asnotedabove,wasthefirststatetoactuallyratifytheagreementandputitintoforce,andeachoftheotherstates,withtheexceptionofKuwait,hassincefollowedsuit(Kuwait’sparliamentarycommitteeon foreign relations has refused to recommend ratification until the government provides a copy of theagreementtheyarebeingaskedtoratify).EvenintheabsenceofKuwaitiratification,however,aspateofarrestsofKuwaitinationalsforcriticismsmadeofotherGCCleadersandtheconductoftheSaudi-ledwarin Yemen, aswell as anecdotal evidence suggesting that anumberofpeoplehavebeendeniedentry toKuwait because they appear on security blacklists in otherGCC states, indicates that Kuwait has alreadysigneduptothespirit(ifnottheletter)oftheagreement.Thus, the experience of GCC cooperation is that it works best when the issues are apolitical andtechnocratic in nature, and can be framed in away that benefits rather than challenges the power andauthorityof individual states.Considerableprogress, forexample,hasbeenmade inGCCcommitteesonharmonization and standardization even as the plannedmonetary unionproject fell apart after theUAEpulledoutofthesinglecurrencyinprotestatthelocationoftheplannedGCCcentralbankbeingawardedto Riyadh rather than Abu Dhabi. Taking the politics out of issues is critical to successfully overcomingimpediments to cooperation, but even then the one-upmanship that characterizes so many regionalprojectsissometimeshardtoovercome–e.g.thefactthattheGulfhasthreeglobalairlines,threemajorinternationalairporthubs, fourcompeting regional financial centers,andothercompeting infrastructuralprojects,ports,etc.Thatsaid,thereductioninworldoilpricesandtheincreasingfiscalpressuresonGulfeconomieshasstartedtoresultincross-borderinvestmentsandmergersthathavethepotentialtocreatedurablenewcooperativemechanismsbased,again,onpragmaticcommoninterest.

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Biographies WilliamCabánWilliamCabán is a regional analyst for theCenter forAdvancedOperationalCulture Learning (CAOCL), asubset of Marine Corps University. Mr. Cabán is also an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve with abackgroundinintelligence,andextensiveexperienceinSecurityCooperationandForeignInternalDefense.His studies include a Bachelor’s degree in geography, and a Post-Baccalaureatecertificate in GeographicInformation Science (GISc.) fromCityUniversity ofNewYork, LehmanCollege,wherehe graduatedwithhonors. GeraldFeiersteinJerryFeierstein retired fromtheU.S. ForeignService inMay2016aftera41-yearcareer.At the timeofhis retirement,Feiersteinheld thepersonal rankofCareerMinister. Over the course of his career, he served in nine overseas postings,including three tours of duty in Pakistan, aswell as tours in SaudiArabia,Oman,Lebanon, Jerusalem, andTunisia. In 2010, PresidentObamaappointed FeiersteinU.S. Ambassador to Yemen, where he served until 2013. From 2013 until hisretirement, Feierstein was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NearEastAffairs.Inadditiontohiscareer-longfocusontheNearEastandSouthAsia,Feiersteinalsoplayed a prominent role in developing and implementing State Department policies and programs tocounter violent extremism. As Deputy Coordinator and Principal Deputy Coordinator in the StateDepartment’s Counter-Terrorism bureau, Feierstein led the development of initiatives to build regionalnetworks to confront extremist groups as well as to counter terrorist financing and promote counter-terrorismmessaging.HecontinuedtofocusondefeatingterroristgroupsthroughhissubsequenttoursasDeputyChiefofMissioninPakistanandasAmbassadortoYemen. PiXTeam,TeslaGovernmentServices

PiX is aUSG-sponsored secure information sharing community, approvedfor up to FOUO and SBU information, that provides tailored contentassistance, RFI support, and GIS services. PiX's team of SMEs providedbackground information on topics relevant to the SMA. To view moreinformationortosetupaPiXaccount,emailhelp@pixtoday.net.

AbdulazizSagerBorn inMakkah, Saudi Arabia in 1959, Dr. Abdulaziz Sager is chairman andfounder of the Gulf Research Center. He is also President of Sager GroupHolding in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is active in the fields ofinformationtechnology,aviationservicesandinvestments.InadditiontotheworkoftheGulfResearchCenter,Dr.Sagerholdsnumerousother appointments. In November 2003, Dr. Sager was appointed as amemberoftheMakkahProvinceCouncil.Healsoservesasamemberontheadvisoryboardof theArabThought Foundation; theGenevaCentre for the

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DemocraticControlofArmedForces(DCAF);theFacultyofEconomicsandAdministrationofKingAbdulazizUniversity;theMinistryofHigherEducation,SaudiArabia;theGenevaCentreforSecurityPolicy(GCSP);theGermanOrientFoundation;andsitsontheadvisorygroupforthe4thArabHumanDevelopmentReportfortheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP).HeisfurtherpartoftheThinkTankLeadersForumoftheWorldEconomicForumandtheCouncilofCouncilsoftheCouncilonForeignRelations. InMay2011,Dr.SagerwasawardedanhonoraryfellowshipfromtheUniversitàCa’FoscariinVenice,Italy.Dr. Sager has special research interest in Gulf strategic issues and is a frequent contributor andcommentator to international and regionalmedia.He regularly participates in regional and internationalforumsandconferencesheldonissuesrelevanttotheGulfregion.He is the author of numerous publications includingCombating Violence& Terrorism in the Kingdom ofSaudiArabia (GulfResearchCenter,May2004);GCCPolitical&EconomicStrategytowardsPost-WarIraq(GRC, April 2004); Reforms in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Feasible Solutions (GRC, September 2003);“Political Reform Measures from a Domestic GCC Perspective,” in Constitutional Reform and PoliticalParticipationintheGulf,AbdulhadiKhalafandGiacomoLuciani,eds.(Dubai:GulfResearchCenter,2006);“Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia” in Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, ForeignAffairs,PaulAartsandGerdNonneman,eds. (London:Hurst&Company,2005);EnergyShapesnewGulfSecurityArchitecture,JournalofMiddleEasternGeopolitics(2006);and“Whyforallitsproblems,theEUisstillamodelfortheArabworld,”Europe’sWorld,no.14,Spring2010.HehasalsobeenthechiefeditorfortheGulfYearbook(2003to2009editions).Dr.SagerholdsaPh.D inPoliticsand InternationalRelations fromLancasterUniversityandanM.A. fromthe University of Kent, United Kingdom and a Bachelor Degree from the Faculty of Economics andAdministrationofKingAbdulazizUniversity. DanielSerwer

DanielSerwerisaProfessorofthePracticeofConflictManagement,directoroftheConflictManagementProgramandaSeniorFellowattheCenterforTransatlantic Relations, at the Johns Hopkins School of AdvancedInternational Studies. Also a scholar at the Middle East Institute, DanielSerwer is the author of Righting the Balance (Potomac Books, November2013), editor (with David Smock) of Facilitating Dialogue (USIP, 2012) andsupervised preparation of Guiding Principles for Stabilization andReconstruction (USIP, 2009). Righting the Balance focuses on how tostrengthen thecivilian instrumentsofAmerican foreignpolicy tomatch itsstrong military arm. Facilitating Dialogue analyzes specific cases and best

practices in getting people to talk to each other in conflict zones. Guiding Principles is the leadingcompilationofbestpracticesforciviliansandmilitaryinpost-warstate-building.As vice president of theCenters of Innovation at theUnited States Institute of Peace (USIP), Serwer ledteams working on rule of law, peacebuilding, religion, economics, media, technology, security sectorgovernanceandgender.HewasalsovicepresidentforpeaceandstabilityoperationsatUSIP,overseeingitspeacebuildingworkinAfghanistan,theBalkans,IraqandSudanandservingasexecutivedirectoroftheHamilton/BakerIraqStudyGroup.Asaminister-counselorattheU.S.DepartmentofState,SerwerdirectedtheEuropeanofficeof intelligenceandresearchandservedasU.S.specialenvoyandcoordinatorfortheBosnianFederation,mediatingbetweenCroatsandMuslimsandnegotiatingthefirstagreementreachedat

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theDaytonPeaceTalks;from1990to1993,hewasdeputychiefofmissionandchargéd'affaires attheU.S.Embassy inRome, leadingamajordiplomaticmissionthroughtheendoftheColdWarandthefirstGulfWar.Serwer isagraduateofHaverfordCollegeandearnedMastersdegreesat theUniversityofChicagoandPrinceton,wherehealsodidhisPhDinhistory. KristianCoatesUlrichsen

KristianCoatesUlrichsen, Ph.D., is a Fellow for theMiddle East atRiceUniversity’sBaker Institute forPublicPolicyandtheauthorof fourbooksontheGulf, includingInsecure Gulf: the End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (2011),QatarandtheArabSpring(2014),TheGulfStatesinInternationalPoliticalEconomy(2015),andTheUnitedArabEmirates:Power,Politics,andPolicymaking(2016).

WestonAvilesWeston Avilesis an analyst at NSI, Inc. He studied criminology and politicalscience at Arizona State University (BS) withminors inMiddle Eastern historyandeconomics,andcertificatesinpoliticalthoughtandleadership,internationalstudies and religion and conflict. Weston then studiedGovernment at theInterDiscplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israelgraduate school with a focus incounter-terrorism and security studies (MA). Hisgraduate studies focused onArab Spring dynamics, international security in the MENA region and radicalIslam. Weston is an alumni of the University of Virginia's Semester at Seaprogram and has participated in several academic programs in Israel to studyterrorism and counter-terrorism.Weston is now an analyst for NSI and continues a research focus onMiddleEasternpoliticsandconflictstudies.