sivmarina-karlsen
TRANSCRIPT
The Pace of Internationalization of SMEs – Born
Global vs. Gradual Global
Work in Progress
Siv Marina KarlsenPhD-candidate
Department of MarketingNorwegian School of Management BI
Elias Smiths vei 15, Box 580N-1302 SANDVIKA, NORWAY
Phone + 47 67 55 73 43Fax + 47 67 55 76 76
E-mail: [email protected]
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AbstractThe objective of this study was to describe the process of
internationalization of SMEs and to explore/explain why some become
more gradual global and some are born global. This is due to the fact
that increasing evidence shows that in spite of small size and
inexperience in international transactions, high value-adding
manufacturing firms are capable of outperforming their larger, more
resourceful counterparts in foreign markets. The aim was to get more
knowledge about this new type of firm – what characterizes Born Globals
and the internationalization process?
Introduction
BackgroundThe objective of this study is to describe the process of
internationalization of SMEs and to explore/explain why some become
more gradual global and some are born global. Empirical evidence from
many countries support the notion that firms often internationalize like
“rings in the water”; their market knowledge increases gradually and
hence uncertainty as well as risk is reduced over time for each country
market. However, in 1988 Johanson & Mattson pointed out that some
firms follow other internationalization patterns. They argued that the
degree of internationalization of markets (i.e. the frequency, intensity,
and integration of relationships across borders in the particular industry
market) has an impact on the internationalization process of the
individual firm. In highly internationalized markets, firms may leapfrog
some of the stages or rings in the water. More recently many authors,
(f.ex. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen et al,
1999), have found empirical evidence of yet another type of exporters
often labeled “born globals” (BGs), which aim at the international
markets or even the global market right from their birth and do not
seem to follow any kind of stages e.g. they go beyond leapfrogging.
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Knight & Cavusgil (1996) believe that the slowness of the process
described in traditional internationalization literature, may be an
indication of management’s aversion to risk-taking and their inability to
acquire relevant knowledge and information. The fact that the process
seems to be speeded up now, may partly be explained by the so called
born globals’ management being less risk-averse and/or they having
easier access to relevant information. The environment has changed a
lot since the “traditional internationalization theories” were developed
f.i. the increased level of globalization in many industries, may make out
part of an explanation for the observed increase in pace of
internationalization of firms. This increased globalization, which is
believed to lead people to perceive the world as smaller, may thus also
make the manager perceive the risk of entering foreign markets, as
smaller. One driver of globalization is believed to be the development of
advanced communication technology i.e. an industry described as
having high degree of globalization will by definition be characterized by
having information transferred easily and faster than in industries less
globalized. This increased access to information may decrease the
psychic distance between countries, which have previously been seen as
a major obstacle for international expansion of firms (e.g. Johanson &
Vahlne, 1977).
Oviatt & McDougall (1994) state that recent technological innovation
and the presence of increasing numbers of people with international
business experience have established new foundations for MNEs.
Traditionally these were developed from large, mature, domestic firms,
but the facile use of low-cost communication technology and
transportation means that the ability to discover and take advantage of
business opportunities in multiple countries is not the preserve of large,
mature corporations anymore. Crick & Jones (2000) for instance, found
that several firms were set up by managers with experience, operating
in international markets from previous firms in which they were
employed. Thus, they have got experience in dealing with the
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complexities of international operations, they have acquired an
appreciation of the risks and resource implications, and last but not
least, they have developed a network of customers and contacts on
which they can build on after setting up their own firms. Whatever
reason, increasing evidence shows that in spite of small size and
inexperience in international transactions, high value-adding
manufacturing firms are capable of outperforming their larger, more
resourceful counterparts in foreign markets.
According to Bradley (1995), there are basically two dimensions, which
represent the key strategic decisions in connection with a firm’s
internationalization, (1) international market selection, and (2) choice of
entry mode. With regard to the market selection dimension, BGs often
start activities in many markets fast (simultaneously) and not always in
close markets first. The product is often developed for a
global-/international market (Madsen et al, 1999). Bell (1995) explains
this in the following way: “..psychic distance has become much less
relevant as global communication and transportation infrastructures
improve and as markets become increasingly homogeneous”, (p.62).
Hedlund & Kverneland (1985) also provide evidence of a speeding up of
the internationalization process and posit that: “the establishment and
growth strategies on foreign markets are changing towards more direct
and rapid entry modes than those implied by theories of gradual and
slow internationalization processes”. In other words, it seems the
internationalization process of firms is currently proceeding faster on
both dimensions (market selection and entry mode) than traditional
theory predicts. Traditional theory is here seen as the Process model or
Uppsala perspective (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977/1990). Traditional
internationalization theories describe a process in which the firm
gradually becomes involved in international business and enters foreign
markets and this view seems to enjoy general acceptance among most
international business scholars.
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According to the studies I have found (Knight, 1997; Knight & Cavusgil,
1996; Harveston, 2000, Madsen, Servais & Rasmussen, 1999; Junkkari,
2000), BGs are defined as SMEs with an export rate of more than 25%
within three years of founding. I see this as too broad a definition, for
instance, if a Norwegian SME export 30% of its products to Sweden and
Denmark (within three years) one can hardly call the firm global. In
other words, we need to incorporate what type of market (and how
many) an SME should be present in to be termed a BG in addition, most
very international SMEs usually have a far higher percentage of foreign
sales than 25% (e.g. Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2001). I therefore
choose to define a born global as an SME that export a minimum of 50%
within 3 years of founding. But, in addition, to be defined a “true Born
Global” (TBG), the SME has to be present in more than one continent
simultaneously, e.g. for a Norwegian SME to export 80% to European
countries do not qualify to be termed a TBG. For a firm to be labeled
BG, Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2001) also emphasized the presence
on several continents. They made a distinction between
internationalization degree of a firm (Finnish BGs had more than 80%
sales outside home) and globalization degree (Finnish BGs were found to
have more than 30% sales outside home continent), it might be worth
noticing that they used a time frame of 10-15 years.
Conceptual FrameworkThe existing literature has not reached an agreement as to which
conceptual framework and constructs should be used to explain a firm’s
foreign market entry mode (Andersen, 1997). The present framework
will be based on my perception of the most important contributions to
explain the pace of internationalization of SMEs. Bloodgood, Sapienza &
Almeida (1996), argue that new ventures will seek an international
presence for two reasons: industry conditions (e.g. increased
globalization) may require an international presence for the company to
be competitive and secondly, a venture may seek a global presence to
capitalize on its unique set of resources (e.g. management team’s
experience in global markets, new technologies or innovations, etc.).
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According to them, such conditions must be present for rapid
internationalization to be viable.
Type of product may also have an influence on the strategies chosen for
going international/global. Increasing global competition, together with
increasing speed in the development of new technologies, have led to
shorter product life cycles and higher innovation intensity. The shorter
product life cycles have led to more emphasis on R&D, and on
recognizing new opportunities and exploiting them quickly with
successful timing (ex. PCs and cellular phones). Product characteristics,
thus, are another aspect to be considered. The shorter the PLC, the
shorter the time in which returns on investment in product development
can be earned. Thus, especially companies with small domestic markets
need global volumes over which these costs can be divided.
Experience/background of founders and their relationships make out
important resources of a firm and are important drivers or facilitators of
internationalization. International experience is defined as the
understanding and realistic perceptions of foreign operations, risks and
returns in foreign markets (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997). The reasoning
here, which is based on the organizational capability of the firm, is that
firms are initially risk-averse when entering new markets, and therefore
not willing to invest substantial resources in unfamiliar terrain. As firm
management gets a better feel for the foreign markets, it has better
perceptions of the risks and returns, and therefore becomes more
confident and aggressive, but also more realistic. This may be
manifested in a willingness to commit more resources and also enable
them to make better investment decisions. International experience has
traditionally been measured at firm level as for instance, geographic
scope of a firm’s experience (number of different countries a firm is
active in) and length of experience (number of years a firm has been
active on the international arena) Erramilli (1991). In the present study
the variable will be analyzed at the individual level, that is, information
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of the founder(s)’ and/or other key employees’ international experience
will be collected. It seems most appropriate since a BG is by definition
not experienced if analyzed at firm level, but several studies (Oviatt &
McDougall, 1994; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Ellis, 2000), show that key
employees in socalled BGs very often have extensive experience from
previous employment.
Reuber & Fischer (1997) argue that decision-makers with more
international experience, are more likely to have in place a foreign
business network and are more likely to have developed the skills
needed to identify and negotiate with firms in a different culture. Oviatt
& McDougall (1994) further argue that partnerships provide concrete
critical resources such as specific skills and financial resources, as well
as more abstract resources such as legitimacy and market power.
These resources are seen as particularly important when a new and
young firm with poverty of resources is attempting to increase foreign
sales. The relationships may thus, enable the firms to enter new
markets at a faster rate than otherwise possible (e.g. by providing firm
with complementary resources and by opening up markets). This view
is supported by Ellis’ (2000) findings, which support the notion that
awareness of foreign market opportunities (which has been identified as
a critical antecedent of foreign market entry) is commonly acquired via
existing social ties. McGaughey, Welch & Welch (1997), also emphasize
the important role of personal networks in triggering initial export
inquiries or orders. They found that the networks key individuals
brought to bear on the case company’s international activities, were
critical in both the content and direction of the company’s
internationalization; “…much of the ability of the company to initiate
and carry through international operations resided in the decision-
makers’ personal networks” (p. 179).
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Contingency variables
- Product/Industry
- Network
- Skills/Background of entrepreneur
Performance variables
- Financial performance
(mis)fit - Survival
- De-internat./Divestment
- TBG
- BGE
- BGM
- GG
Response variables
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
One reason for the difference observed in the speed by which traditional
MNEs and BGs become international/global, may be due to different
environmental conditions. “…the slowness of the whole process is a
consequence of incremental adaptations to changing firm and
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environmental conditions rather than the result of a deliberate strategy”
(Knight & Cavusgil, 1996:13). In other words when the environmental
conditions change fast, as in increased globalization, the process of
internationalization is likely speed up as well. In a closed, domestic
industry, a company accustomed to weak competitors and undemanding
customers has little to fear – there is no source of new competitors that
might grow strong in more demanding competitive arenas. In an open,
globalized industry, such newly strong competitors abound (Yip, 1992).
That is why it is important to understand how the industry globalization
drivers affect the competitive environment of SMEs.
Boundaries between domestic and international markets are becoming
less relevant as businesses increase their activities abroad. A global
industry is, in this thesis, conceptualized in a manner consistent with
others: “an industry in which a firm’s competitive position in one
country is significantly affected by its position in other countries or vice
versa” (Makhija, Kim & Williamson,1997: 680). In this regard, the global
industry “is not merely a collection of domestic industries, but a series of
linked domestic industries in which rivals compete against each other on
a truly worldwide basis”, (Porter, 1986:18).
In order to find an explanation to why some SMEs still follow a more
step-by-step approach while other choose the faster and more erratic
approach of jumping stages, Madsen, Servais & Rasmussen (1999)
argue that the development (globalization) may enable firms to more
freely choose their own model of becoming international. International
sales both become easier and more difficult in that international markets
have become more accessible for most firms – while on the other hand
the degree of competition and demands for international competence
has increased. In other words there is both a “positive” pressure from
increased level of globalization – increased accessability to markets, and
a “negative” pressure – tougher competition, it is a necessity for a new
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company to be present in many markets. The result on the pace of
internationalization is the same for both “pressures” - it increases.
The pressures may work differently according to size of home market.
According to Bloodgood, Sapienza & Almeida (1996), new European
firms are more likely to consider internationalizing some of their
activities at the outset than are new US firms. One reason is the fact
that whereas a new US firm operating in 500-mile radius around its base
may do so without crossing borders, a European firm with the same
geographic scope may have to deal with five or six other countries.
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson (2001) state that globals of large countries
globalize because of the demand-based pull forces in global markets,
but BGs of small and open economies globalize due to the push and
pressure forces based mainly on the smallness of domestic markets and
on the fear of expected future competition coming from BGs located in
large nations. According to Hamel & Prahalad (1985), companies that
nestle safely in their home beds will be at an increasing resource
disadvantage. “They will be unable to marshal forces required for a
defense of the home market” (p. 146).
Research Design and Data Collection
Research Design
I want to know more about this new type of firm – what characterizes
born globals and their internationalization process? Quantitative
research looks at a large group of cases, people or units and measures a
limited number of features. A case study is more distinct. It usually
involves qualitative methods and focuses on one or a few cases during a
limited time period. Since few studies have investigated these issues in-
depth, it seems most appropriate to start with an exploratory, in depth
study to get a better understanding of the topic at hand.
Case studies are very demanding to carry out, and for this reason only
relatively few cases are chosen. In this study twelve case firms have
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been studied – one firm representing one case. The advantages of
carrying out more in-depth case studies are that it allows the researcher
to study complex issues in their real-life context and to collect and
analyze multiple types of data (Yin, 1994). It is worth noting that
qualitative and case study research is not identical, but “almost all
qualitative research seeks to construct representations based on in-
depth, detailed knowledge of cases” (Ragin, 1994:92). I started by
contacting the founder/CEO or another key employee (which has been in
the company from the start) of the firms I have found fulfill my criteria,
with a request that they participate in the study. The potential case
companies were selected using theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss,
1967; Yin, 1994). Thus, the logic of sampling was not random selection
for statistical purposes but rather purposive sampling based on
theoretical considerations. Because statistical sampling logic was not
used in this study, the typical criteria regarding the actual sampling size
were also relatively unimportant. What is important is the potential of
each case to aid in developing theoretical insights into the dynamics of
the internationalization being studied. During the first meeting with a
representative of the firm concerned, I presented the aim of the study
and the data gathering process. The case companies have been
selected from a pool of respondents to a survey that was carried out in
the Autumn 2001. The population of that survey was defined to be
SMEs in Norway, founded after 1990 (registered in the Kompass
database), an SME being defined as firms with less than one hundred
employees. The reason why relatively recently established firms are
chosen, are to ensure that the details surrounding the founding of the
firm are not lost to history. The definition of an SME is based on the fact
that several studies have found that most of the fast internationalizing
firms have far less than 100 employees. Knight, Madsen & Servais
(2002) found in their study of Danish and US BGs that the average
number of employees in the Danish sample was 60. From this I draw
the conclusion that to study Norwegian BGs it is sufficient to draw a
sample from a population of firms with less than 100 employees. This
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view is supported by Solberg’s (1988) findings that successful exporters
were significantly smaller than unsuccessful exporters. This finding lead
him to suggest that smaller units are better able to create the right
atmosphere for successful exporting, necessitating a closeness to the
market and an open minded organization not always present in large
corporations with rigid bureaucratic decision procedures. The SMEs also
had to be exporting (obviously). In addition I aimed to select firms that
were a stand-alone entity. The reason for this, is that it is expected that
sub-units of larger firms have greater access to resources such as
capital, human resources and information (Harveston, 2000). Despite
this, I ended up having three cases that were not independent, partly
because to draw a line between dependent/independent is not always
that simple and because it has been suggested that it might be useful to
have some cases that are not independent for reasons of comparison. A
relatively wide population was chosen at the outset in order to enable
me to draw a continuum where more gradual internationals are at one
extreme and true born globals at the other. The main cut-off point for
the different types of “globals” were made according to the market
selection dimension and export rate (after three years). For instance an
SME exporting only to Scandinavian countries may be termed gradual
global – if the export rate within three years are less than 50%. An SME
exporting to both Scandinavia and Western-Europe is slightly more
global and so on. The world is divided in seven parts with increasing
psychic distance from home market (in this case Norway); Scandinavia,
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North-America and Australia, rest of
Americas, Asia and the remaining parts of the world (Africa and Arab
countries). This division is more or less in accordance with Junkkari
(2000:160), who classifies areas from hot (close in terms of business
distance) to cold (far away).
Operationalization
While measures of imprecise concepts are never completely valid or
reliable, researchers strive to maximize these qualities (Knight, 1997).
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Pace of internationalization
The pace of internationalization was measured as how many markets
(regions) an SME is entering in a certain time period and also to which
type of regions the firm is entering and in what order (close or far away
from home market in terms of psychic distance). In addition I measured
how fast, after founding, the SME reached an export rate of say 25%,
50%, 75% and 100%.
Degree of Globalization
Globalization may be conceptualized in terms of a continuum from low
to high, along which different industries fall (Porter, 1986). An industry
at the very low end of globalization is highly independent of industries in
other countries. An industry at the very high end is significantly linked
to similar industries in multiple countries in which its various value-
added activities are located. The extent to which an industry is
characterized by international linkages is seen as an important
indication of its level of globalization (Makhija, Kim & Williamson, 1997).
It is rather difficult to find good measures of an industry’s globality, but
to adequately examine global strategies it is, according to Porter (1986)
and Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989), required to establish the extent to which
an industry is global. Each industry’s unique blend of competitive
pressures is likely to result in varying levels of globalization, which in
turn are reflected in the strategies the firm utilize in these industries
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Yip, 1992). One way of measuring this is using
the ranking of different industries in Yip (1992:34) or use subjective
measures asking the managers in the SMEs how they perceive their
industry according to certain set dimensions of globality (Solberg,
1997:5). These determinants may be useful even if they are based on a
more traditional view on globalization, but it is probably useful in this
study also to add some questions on what type of markets they are
aiming for (niche versus large markets), and degree of specialization of
products (Madsen & Servais, 1997).
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Top management experience/background
This construct is defined as the amount of experience that a manager
has accumulated in an international context. Harveston, Kedia & Davies
(2000), state that most studies using this construct have used amount of
time spent in the form of foreign assignments, education, or vacations
as a proxy to international experience. This covers one dimension of the
construct, length. From which continent(s) the key employees have
experience and whether the key employees have mainly worked abroad
or at home, covers the second dimension, scope.
Other proxies to foreign experience are; to which extent has the
manager engaged in foreign travel? How many languages does the
manager speak and how fluent is he in the different languages? Was
the top decision maker born abroad? Has he/she lived abroad
(Meisenbock, 1988; Reid, 1981)? What was the mindset of founder at
start-up (Harveston, Kedia & Davis, 20002)?
Personal NetworkAccording to Solberg (1997:16) the more global the industry structure –
the more important becomes the presence of an active and widespread
network. Motives for entering a new market were queried and the
characteristics of prior relationships and the role they have played have
been sought. Personal relationships to be studied in this thesis thus,
were relationships that key employees define as having an impact on
their road to internationalization. That may be relationships in their
home country or relationships in the target country, from working
abroad previously or from studying abroad or just a network they have
developed through their previous work assignments in their home
country. I wanted to establish what type of relation exists between the
key employees and their stated important network – how close are they?
This can be measured as frequency of contact (daily, weekly, monthly)
and type of contact (face to face, telephone, mail). We may assume
that the more frequent their contact and the closer type of contact used
(e.g. face-to-face), the more trust exists among the parties. Whether
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the contact is formal or informal may also be of some importance
assuming the more informal the contact the closer the relation and the
more bindings between the parties exist in terms of trust.
Product characteristics
I asked questions about how unique the product is considered to be,
compared to competitive products, is it “one of a kind”? Is it meant for
the consumer market or the industrial market. It is also considered
important whether the product is sensitive to changes in trends, price
and/or quality and whether they consider the product life cycle to be
long or short.
Performance
I did not intend to measure performance at this stage – I assumed that
firms internationalize in order to capture potential profit opportunities
outside the home market or to withstand competitive pressure, i.e.
factors that influence the firm to internationalize also contribute to its
increased profitability. It was in other words assumed that the more
international/global a firm is, the better it is performing. This may be a
bit off the mark, but since these are still very young firms I believe a
follow-up study will be in place in a few years to find f.i. survival rates
and how outspread deinternationalization is among the sample.
It is seen as difficult to measure whether an exporter is successful or not
(most measure success as the proportion of export sales to the firm’s
total sales – over a certain period of time (Ford & Leonidou, 1991:13). I
decided to measure performance after all and used Moen’s (2000)
performance measure, a four-item subjective scale including perceived
profitability, growth as compared to competitors, satisfaction with
market share and the overall rating of export performance (items taken
from Knight’s, 1997 study) in addition to getting financial data from the
interviewees and from a national data base (Brønnøysundregisteret).
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Selection of Cases (sampling)
In case studies you usually select cases based on theory (theoretical
sampling). When using several cases, they should be selected so as to
a) predict same results, or b) give opposite results, but for predictable
reasons (Yin, 1994). When using several cases, it can be useful to use
an explicit framework to choose from. This frame should be guided by
the research question and the conceptual framework. The framework
developed consists of a 2x2 matrix (see Fig. 2). The horizontal line
stating volume of export reached within three years of founding and the
vertical line stating number of market areas the firm is present in, i.e. it
includes my two main dimensions measuring a firm’s degree of
internationalization/globality.
several
No. of BGM TBG
continents
one GG BGE
< 50% <
Export within 3 years
Figure 2: Classification of global SMEs
TBG = True Born Global
BGM = Born Global on Market dimension
BGE = Born Global on Export dimension
GG = Gradual Global
Short description of the cases
I had to select firms that satisfied the framework conditions.
No. of areas
Several
Fras Colormatic
Kay Lindegaard IRTech
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Opera
Optoflow
ICAS Dolphin
Incatel Nor-Reg
Norsk Display
Superject
One < 50% <
Export within 3 years
Figure 3. The case companies
Gradual Global (GG)
ICAS AS was established in 1989 and started exporting in 1992. Current
export rate is 45% - after three years it was 30%. They are present in
Europe and sporadically in South-Africa (2001) and Australia (2000).
Incatel AS was established in 1993/94 and started exporting 1996.
Current export rate is 80% - after three years it was 50%. They are
present in Europe.
Born Global on Market dimension (BGM)
Fras AS was established in 1996 and started exporting in 1998 (90).
Current export rate is 80% - after three years it was 20%. They are
present on ships all over the world.
Kay Lindegaard Incinerators was established in 1999 and started
exporting the same year. Export rate after three years was 50%, same
as today. They are present all over the world.
Born Global on Export dimension (BGE)
Dolphin Interconnect Solutions AS was established in1991 and started
exporting in 1992. Export rate after three years was 90% the same as
today. They are present in North-America, South-America, and Europe.
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Nor-Reg AS was established in 2000 and started exporting in 2001.
Export rate after three years was 75%, same as today. They are present
in Western Europe and Japan.
Norsk Display AS was established in 1993/1994 and started exporting in
1994. Current export rate is 60% - after three years it was 65%. They
are present in Western Europe and North America.
Superject AS was established in 1990/1991 and started exporting in
1991. Current export rate is 80% after three years it was 70%. They
are present in Europe (mainly Western part).
True Born Global
Colormatic AS was established in 1997 and started exporting in 2000.
Export rate after three years was 90% - today it is 95%. They are
present in Scandinavia, Western-Europe, North America, Australia and
Asia.
IRTech AS was established in 1995 and started exporting the same year.
Export rate after three years was 100% - the same as today. They are
present in Europe, North America, Australia, and Asia.
Opera Software ASA was established in 1995 and started exporting the
same year. Export rate after three years was 99%, same as today.
They are present all over the world.
Optoflow AS was established in 1993 and started exporting in 1997.
Current export rate is 90% and after three years it was 85%. They are
present in Scandinavia, Western Europe, North America/Australia, Asia
and Africa/Arabia.
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Case descriptionsThe analysis in this section is based on twelve cases and seeks to
generate propositions that can be tested with large scale data sets
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Analysis and proposition development will be
segmented into four topics: (1) experience/background of founders, (2)
personal networks, (3) product characteristics, (4) industry globality. In
the interviews, I focused on understanding the drivers for the
international character of the SMEs in greater detail.
I use within-case analysis as well ass cross-pattern search (Eisenhardt,
1989) to analyze the data. Data and interview notes were coded by the
author using the software “HyperResearch”. This was done for each
firm along a number of dimensions.
Background of each caseSince data displays help the researcher see patterns (Miles & Huberman,
1994:433) I have decided to draw up critical events of each case’s
history (see below):
Colormatic – inkdoser (Background Tronrud Engineering – purely marketing & sales)
Product development
1983 1990s 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001Thronrud Thronrud 1st ed. Start-up Prototype *Schaefer USA Sell to 22 USAEng. Established approached ready Trade fair employed Germ. countries Japan
by 2 printers (no success) in Birming-England, France direct export & ham (Ipex) Belgium, distributors
Denmark, Australia & New Zealand**
Direct export
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*Schaefer was employed to strengthen the marketing and sales efforts. ColorMatic is purely a marketing and sales organization w/ some product development – Tronrud Engineering does the production and the main part of the product development part.**They had all seen it and become interested at the trade fair in Birmingham the year before. Only have 1 employee abroad – sales office in England to get more control.
Dolphin – Hardware (Background Norsk Data)
1991/19921992 1994 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002Start-upDir.Export Move ownersh. Buy-up Agent Agent Agent USA & China
USA to US co. in US France England Germany Sales subs. USA
FRAS – Fluid sampler (Background – Norske Veritas – Mission critical)
1975 1986 1990 1991 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003Parker Heglunds France Veritas Start-up Lloyds Licens China LookingHaneyfin follow Product Germany(Statoil) for investors
customers (Norske Skog)
All production at Brødrene Jonsen in Ski – they are a development company. They do not aim at country markets, but productmarkets; offshore, ship,
processindustry and energyproduction follow large customers out (e.g. Norske Skog, Shell, Statoil, Esso, Hydro, Lloyds)
ICAS – Smoke detector
1989 1990/91 1993 1997 2000 2001 2003 Start-up New law Finland Sweden (40%) Australia S-Africa England Germany
*Production Agent Germany Subsidiary England the Czech
Republic
Produced in Norway in 1990, but found it too expensive so started production in the Czech Republic from 1991 all production take place there - only marketing and sales in Norway
20
IRTech – system for detection of cracks in steel(Background – Elkem - just support and upgrading today – mission critical)
Hovland In Elkem (-81)
1980s 1982/83 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995 1999 2001 Elkem 1st systemCzechFranceFrance Engl. Taiwan Engl. GermanyUSAElkem Start-up Up- Use develop Germany USA Germany Korea TaiwanEngl Austr.wantedItaly grade Elkem’s system Direct Korea Japan Sweden out Engl. agents
export Turkey
Today have 1 plant in Czechoslovakia, 1 in Turkey, 1 in Korea, 1 in Japan, 1 in Italy?, 2 in France, 2 In USA, 3 in Germany and 3 in England .
During last two years 1 plant has been closed down in Australia, 1 in Sweden, 1 in Korea and 1 in Taiwan.
Incatel – Software(Background IBM – mission critical)
Vedeld Vedeld (-92) IBM Amis picked coworker
now leader Incatel
1959 1961 early 80s 1987 1989 1991 1992 1993/94 1997 1999 2001 2002 FranceVedeld 1st Pilot Sysscan Amis Vedeld Start-up Tele Chech Belgia Telia Telekomcomputer Tele- INKA bank- in Tele- Incatel Danm.Telekom Telekom Britishprogram verket rupt verket (KPN) Telekom
CimageCorenaCorena (IBM) dissolved
(1994)
Kay Lindegaard Incinerators (Background - Kay Lindegaard)
1932 1960 1970 1979 1990s 1999 2001 2002Start-up Start-up Ovens Hendriksen ProductionStart-up Agents all RussiaKay L Kay L for ship Croatia KLI over the world S-Korea
ovens Poland 1st
followed customers
NOR-REG Maskin – Packaging machines (Background – Nor-Reg)
21
1967 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002Parentco. Agents Sales subs Start-up co. Merged Aim to use only own subsidiariesestablishedDenmarkSweden, Establish w/mother due to bad experience w/ agents &
Japan Germany, production again distributors UK in Germany Snacksmarket
USA
Are present in 7 countries – Sweden, Germany, UK, Denmark, Japan, Spain & Ireland.
Norsk Display - Electronic Signs
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002EstablishStart-up/Denmark Internet USA Belgium Direct export US &contact export Finland Homepage UK to approx. 8 Germanyimport. Netherlands Germany countries (Netherl.relation (dir.export) US, Finl, Sweden,
Germ, Belgia, UK, Denmark)
Opera Software (Background Telenor)
1991 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 20022003 Cofounder Telenor Start- 1stOpera EmbraceUS Free ad- Symbian**
Cellularphones Tezchner project up browser emerging sponsored Holland Digital-TV Telenor Export released market of versions released internet internet Commercial
devices breakthrough *Opera team up w/key players in Internet device mrkt Acquired Hern Lab (Sweden) R&D Repr. Office (US) S&M UK web developer
* Ericsson, Nokia, Sony, IBM, Psion.
22
* * Symbian = Strategic alliance of leading handset and mobile computing manufacturers (Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Panasonic and Psion).
Optoflow AS – cytometer
1993 1994 1995 1996/97 1997 2001Start- Reodor Product UK Employed BioDetect KoreaUp prize 1st sale N OEM 3 people Japan
distributor
2 agents in USA, 1 in France, 1 in Italy 1 distributor in Japan, 1 in England and 1 in Germany
Superject – seals
1990 1992 1993 1994/95 2000 2001 2002Start-upSweden Nearly Denmark Germany France Take-over
Direct bankrupt bidexport Stokkan(then Finlandagent) Distributor (Swe)
Meet importantrelation (distributor/Swedish)
Today distributors in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany and France. Direct export to USA, Italy, Poland + + Most important product market: pulp & paper (30%) and country market: Sweden (25%)
Summary
No of Founded Internat.sales Sales 2001 Profit 2001Product
employees (export) 2001(after3yrs) NOK NOK ColorMatic 3 1997(00) 95% (90%) 11 mill 0.53 mill Inkdoser
Dolphin 10 1991(92) 90% (90%) 46 mill - 21 mill Hardware
Fras 4 1996(98) 80% (20%) 7 mill 0.35 mill Fluidsampler
ICAS 65 1989(92) 45% (30%) 27 mill 2.05 mill Smokedetector
Incatel 65 1993/4(96) 80% (50%) 25 mill - 43 millSoftware
IRTech 2.5 1995(95) 100% (100%) 4.6 mill 1.24 millCrack
detectionKay L 2 1999(99) 50% (50%) 3.1 mill - 0.15 mill
Combustion
23
ovenNOR-REG 20 2000(01) 75% (75%) 17 mill 0.3 mill
Packagingmachines
NDisplay 3 1993/4(94) 60% (65%) 3 mill 0.03 mill Electronicdisplay Opera
110 1995(95) 99% (99%) 28 mill - 21 millSoftware
Optoflow 10 1993(97) 85% (90%) 3.6 mill -5.53 mill Cytometer
Superject 4 1990(91) 70% (70%) 3.2 mill 0.29 mill Seals
* I verified all the numbers from the interviewees with transcripts from the “Brønnøysund register” except for Nor-Reg Machine AS where I only managed to find the financial statements of the parent company.
Figure 4 The case companies degree of globalization
Fras has today moved from being a born global on the market dimension
3 years after start-up to becoming a true born global. Dolphin, IRTech,
KLI, Nor-Reg, and Opera have remained at the same level of
No.ofareas
One
7
6
5
4
3
2
25% 50% 75% 100%
Export within 3 years
GG BGE
BGM TBG
* ICAS *Incatel
* Fras * KLI
* Dolphin
* Nor-Reg* Superject
* Norsk Display
* IRTech
* Optoflow
* ColorMatic
* Opera* Fras today
*Incatel today
24
internationalization while Norsk Display has reverted a bit without
changing category. The two gradual globals, have both become more
global, ICAS has increased its export rate slightly and thus moved to the
right while Incatel has both entered more markets and increased their
export rate significantly and thus is today a born global on the export
dimension. ColorMatic, Superject and Optoflow have become slightly
more global. I have just drawn in the most extreme changes e.g. Fras
and Incatel.
Discussion
Five out of the twelve cases had negative results in 2001, but two of the
firms with the largest negative results, Opera and Incatel, with -21 mill
and – 43 mill respectively, are both positive of the future, Opera expects
to have a positive result of about 10-20 mill this year (2003) and Incatel
has forecasted to have a positive result of about 10 mill by 2002
following from the contract with Telia. Incatel in the “Information
Memorandum” describes themselves as having “stable growth and
healthy economics” (p.20) – they achieved revenue growth of 35% from
1994 (9 mill) to 2000 (54 mill) and they have been around break even or
profitable every year except for year 2001. The reason for the fall in
revenue growth in year 2000, and the weak revenue and profit figures in
year 2001 was due to a significant investment in product development,
and that they increased sales and marketing efforts to strengthen their
Nordic position and also the fact that the times were difficult in the
telecom markets in 2001. The efforts in product development and sales
and marketing seems to have paid off for 2002 and the years to follow,
they have forecasted revenues of 80 mill for year 2002. These two
firms, Incatel and Opera, was rated as 2 out of 26 hottest firms in
Norway and were chosen to take part in the “Norwegian Tech Tour”
where they are to make themselves attractive for representatives of the
25
world’s largest venture-moneybags. The criteria to be selected were
that the firms had to be in ICT (Information Communication Technology),
energy or biomarin business, they should be in a phase of expansion,
have unique technology and be international on a large scale. The
administrator of Norwegian Tech Tour Mr. Vaksvik, believes they have
selected the 26 firms, out of 115 applicants with the greatest
international potential (Nettavisen, 28.08.2002).
Dolphin also with the next largest negative result (-21 mill), explains this
by the fact of the USD falling in March 2001, the result in 2000 was 79
mill and turnover was 63 mill in year 2000, the sales and the profits
accordingly thus seems to fluctuate quite a bit.
ICAS is the case with the best result out of these twelve cases, this may
be explained partly with the firm being cautious in their expansion
strategy, ref. their slow internationalization – they still only have an
export rate of about 45% 13 years after start-up and they are present in
about 6 countries mainly in Europe, with Sweden being their most
important market accounting for 40% of their total sales. Another
explanation for the good results may be that the product ICAS sells is a
rather simple product made for a mass market and thus not demanding
large investments in product development. Last, but not least, ICAS is
the “oldest” firm of the sample (established in 1989) and it follows then
that it has had the time to get established in the market and to pay off
debt. We saw above that both Opera (established in 1995) and Incatel
(established in 1993/94) with relatively large negative results expect
this to change in the very near future, the picture might thus look a bit
different in a couple of years.
ICAS is the least global case and Opera the most global why is that so –
what is the big difference between these two firms that can explain their
different paces of internationalization? Let us look at the facts, both
ICAS and Opera produce consumer goods, but Opera also has large
26
industrial firms as customers. It is a fact that Norway is traditionally not
that strong on massproduction of consumergoods. Opera also has a
large and powerful supporter in Telenor, where the founder worked
previously, they supplied them with consultancy and also locations at
the time of start-up. ICAS has no such “sugardaddy” in the back. The
products of these two firms are also very different, while Opera’s
software has very unique features and is very specialized differentiating
it from other similar products and a very short product life cycle
demanding constant updates, are ICAS’ smoke detectors neither unique
nor specialized and they have a long product life cycle. Opera’s product
is also very special in that it can be distributed over the internet, it
makes thus no difference where the customers are located as long as
they have access to the internet, this obviously simplifies the process of
internationalization. Last but not least, the founder of ICAS describes
the industry’s level of globality as low in that there are different
standards from country to country, while in Opera’s case, level of
globalization is described as very high with no barriers whatsoever and
the demand pattern is also described as global. Both founders describe
competition as very strong, but while Opera describe their competition
coming from a few, very large, American companies such as Microsoft,
describes ICAS’ founder the competition as coming from many both
small and large companies, especially from China. Another factor that
might have influenced these two “extreme” firms’ pace of
internationalization, might be the characteristics of the founders.
Opera’s founder is currently 35 years old and he has extensive
experience from abroad while ICAS’ founder is 57 years old and he has
never lived nor worked abroad, although he has some experience from
international firms.
I will now go on to discuss the case firms and how they may have been
influenced by each of the different dimensions in some more detail, but
first a summary (see figure below).
27
Firm Relational Globality Product Experience ColorMatic Not relational Low Industrial Technical
“one-shot” Specialized Bit businessHe has relations Long PLC studies (US)will not emphasize Unique Worked
abroadNot price sensitive
Sweden/Holland Inkdoser Engl/Swed/Germ Dolphin Not relational Very High Industrial Physics
Contract important SpecializedData/electronics
Important research Medium PLC Lived in Sweden
relations Unique Travelled extensively
Not price sensitive Worked only in N co’s Hardware Engl/Germ/French Fras Very relational Very high Industrial Technical (eng/bus)
“My friends” Specialized Established 2 firms
Very small industry Long PLC Always worked Unique internationallyNot price sensitive “see no
barriers” Fluid sampler Engl/Germ/Swe/Da ICAS Very relational Low Consumer Technical (eng/mrktg)
Will not emphasize Not specialized Worked in int’l org.
personal network Long PLC Never lived abroad“experience from Unique production English &
Frenchworklife important” Not price sensitive
Smoke detectors Incatel Very relational Low Industrial 30 years in IBM
“friends” from Very specialized Stats & Business
time in IBM & Long PLC Made computer progr.
Telenor Unique Lived in Sweden &
Not price sensitive US Software Eng/Germ/French
28
IRTech Very relational Very high Industrial Technical (engineer)
“personal friends” Specialized Worked in Geneve
Important network Long PLC for 8 years, 1 in US
from time in Very unique Studied 3 years in Swe
Elkem Not price sensitiveEngl/Germ/French
System detect cracks KLI Varies Medium Industrial Technical (engineer)
No own network Specialized Travelled extensively
(agents) Long PLC never lived abroadPrice sensitive
Engl/Germ/French Incinerator NorReg Mach Not relational Medium Industrial
(technical)“too technical” Specialized Bachelor
mrkt/financeHave some network Long PLC Lived 4 years
in USUnique Worked in Swe
4 yearsPackaging machines and Germany
1 year Engl/Germ/Fren/Span Norsk Display Relational High? Industrial Technical (engineer)
(attitude) Simple Little foreignwish it to be Long PLC experiencecloser Unique
Engl/Germ/French 1 v.imp.relation Electronic scales Opera Very relational Very high Consumer (Technical)
R&D cooperation Specialized Business educationw/customers Very short PLC Lived abroad
most ofCFO has netw. Unique grown
life (UK/Swe)imp.for finance Price sensitive English &
French Software Optoflow Not relational High Industrial Technical (electronics)
29
“one-shot” Very specalized Only worked in N coWill not emphasize Very long PLC Travelled
extensivelyimp.of network Very unique in Europe and
US1 v.imp. Swiss Not price sensitive
Ebgl/Germ/French “experience fr. worklife” Cytometer Superject Varies Very high Industrial Technical (engineer)
1 very important Very standardized Worked abroad on
relation since 1993 Very long PLC N projectsin Swedish trading house Very unique
Travelled extensivelyNot price sensitive English
Seals to rotating shafts
Figure 5 Summary dimensionsOne surprising finding is that even though the founders state that they
have a network of importance and find it rewarding to cultivate these
relations, they might not have a very relational attitude towards other
actors in the market f.i. customers. Mr. Løchsen in Dolphin f.i describes
the general business climate as “largely of technical nature” (Løchsen,
2002), at the personal level on the other hand, he has a network of
importance – the relations he has through a European Research
Cooperation is emphasized. The founder of Optoflow describes their
sales as “one-shot” and there is thus no ground for building relations
with the customers. Mr. Gjelsnes in Optoflow states that “work
methodology” is the most important he has got from life, not
relationships – experience from previous work-life and finding which
methods that work, is seen as most important for the success of the
firm. This is said despite the fact that a very important Swiss connection
aided him at start-up. Mr. Gjelsnes admits that this man was very
important at the time, but he has no contact with him presently, “I don’t
know if he’s still alive” (Gjelsnes, 2002). In addition he has important
relations with various research organizations such as Sintef,
Radiumhospitalet and Veterinærhøyskolen, that aid him on subjects
where he has insufficient knowledge and they cooperate on R&D. This
30
finding is supported by Uzzi (1997),who states that assumptions about
individuals being either innately self-interested or cooperative are too
simplistic, he found that individuals simultaneously acted “selfishly” and
cooperatively with different actors in their network.
I have found that the three “subsidiaries” KLI, Nor-Reg Machine and
ColorMatic is not very relational – is it because small companies need it
more? In addition I found that the founders of Fras, Incatel and IRTech
all refer to their business relations as “personal friends” – these
companies are also the ones that sell products that are supporting
needs at the customers that are referred to as “mission critical” – is
there a connection? The customers with processes of the type, mission
critical, are obviously very dependent on reliable suppliers.
Even if there are only three “subsidiaries” out of the twelve cases, eight
of the cases have large, well-known companies in the back and of the
last four cases, three have strong relations to at least one important
actor to, as the founder of Superject put it; “get associated with
something bigger” (Stokkan, 2002). ColorMatic is the “subsidiary” of
Tronrud Engineering, KLI of Kay Lindegaard and Nor-Reg Machine of Nor-
Reg. The large company in the back of Dolphin is Norsk Data, of Fras is
Veritas, of Incatel is IBM and Telenor, of IRTech is Elkem and of Opera is
Telenor. ICAS closely cooperate with insurance companies, Optoflow
has very close relations to different research institutions and Superject
has a very strong and long-lasting relationship with a large distributor,
Elof Hanson in Sweden. The last firm, Norsk Display does not have a
large firm in the back, but the founder expresses a wish to have closer
relationships with the customers, he does not feel they have succeeded
in that. This supports the findings of Crick and Jones (2002) who found
that several firms were set up by managers with experience from
international markets and most importantly they have developed
networks and made contacts on which they could build on after setting
up their own firms.
31
When it comes to the background of the founder, the most striking is the
fact that most of the founders have technical background. In addition, it
seems that the founders of the two gradual global firms have quite
extensive international experience and it is thus slightly puzzling why
they have not moved faster on the internationalization process (might
find answer to that in type of product and globalization of industry which
is low for both firms).
Almost all of the cases’ products have a long or very long product life
cycle no matter which category they belong to, this is quite opposite of
what I was expecting. Not so surprising is the fact that all but two cases
produce and sell industrial products, only Opera (software) and ICAS
(fire alarms) sell consumer goods, Norway has no tradition of mass
production at least not for a foreign market.
ConclusionsWe can assume that globalization will continue to escalate, bringing
about fundamental changes in the traditional boundaries of nations,
industries and market. This increased globalization creates great
opportunities, but also poses significant challenges for managers and
founders of new international ventures, opportunities and challenges
that is important to understand to operate successfully in the new world
market.
32
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