sitrep - the canada first defence strategy

7/30/2019 SITREP - The Canada First Defence Strategy

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The Canada First Defence Strategy:

Expeditionary Capabilities under the Conservative Government

By David S. McDonough

An earlier version of this paper appeared in The Canada First Defence Strategy: ExpeditionaryCapabilities under a Conservative Government, SITREP, 67, 1 (January/February 2007).


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Introduction

The Canadian Forces (CF) remains fixated with an ambitious transformation agenda

that seeks, in the short-term, to streamline its command structure by creating various operational

commands. This endeavour was largely completed in early 2006, when four new commands

were assigned operational command responsibilities. The redesign of the command structure is

meant to expand the flexibility and efficiency of CF operations in both North America and

abroad, and perhaps more implicitly eliminate some of the bureaucratic impediments to this

model of transformation at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). The initial component of

the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hilliers vision would be afait accompli for the

newly elected Conservative minority government that took power in February 6, 2006.

Yet these changes are only the first tentative steps to a larger redesign of the CF. The

strategic goal of the current CDS vision remains the gradual development and prioritization of

expeditionary capabilities, including strategic and tactical lift and other intervention-enablers,

that could be used for forward defence operations on the scale of the current Afghan mission.

This vision has largely transcended two minority governments, with even the current

Conservative government embracing expeditionary forces within its Canada First Defence

Strategy (CFDS). It is, however, more uncertain whether this expeditionary Afghanistan

model of transformation will be compromised by the Conservative promise of sovereignty

protection and homeland defence, alongside the immediate short-term requirements for the

mission in Afghanistan. Even more importantly, one should also understand that the current

emphasis on expeditionary forces could come at the expense of Canadas traditional capabilities,

much of which has been deteriorating as a result of the rust-out platform crisis.1 Current efforts

1 For more on this issue, see Brian S. MacDonald, The Capital and Future Force Crisis, in Douglas Bland, ed.,Canada without Armed Forces? Claxton Papers IV(Kingston: Queens University Press, 2003).


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at transformation might entail a more specialized and robust CF, but it could also lead to a more

limited niche role than was initially intended.

The Strategic Vision of the DPS

The 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) is the most recent document to offer strategic

guidance to the CF. Despite being written by a short-lived Liberal minority government, this

strategic blueprint for the reinvigoration of Canadas military assets remains one of the few

components of the International Policy Statement (IPS) that has been effectively maintained by

the current government as much a result of the Conservative agreement with the main thrust of

the DPS recommendations as with the continuity provided by the current CDS. The Conservative

government may have introduced a sovereignty-oriented Canada First approach to defence

strategy, which will likely be reflected in the upcoming Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP). But

this will likely represent an important corollary or addendum to the DPS, rather than a

fundamental reassessment of the document itself.

The DPS acknowledges the problems with the countrys long-standing capability-

commitment gap. Indeed, the document goes on to advocate a significant reinvestment in CF

capabilities that, while still limited in allocated resources, would be redesigned for an important

expeditionary role in future coalition operations. The first step towards this CF transformation

was the redesign of the military command structure, which would lead to operationally-focused

commands that are more conducive to joint missions. This was perhaps the most easily

accomplished task advocated by the CDS. Structural changes were largely an internal military

matter that did not entail a significant infusion of resources, while executive authority to create

operational commands was already invested with the Minister of National Defence (MND) and


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did not require Cabinet approval.2 Moreover, the close relationship between then MND Bill

Graham and the CDS General Hillier would make this change relatively free of controversy.

Four operational commands stood-up on February 6, 2006, and replaced the previously

structure where operational command was assigned on an ad hoc basis to the Deputy Chief of

Defence Staff (DCDS). Canada Command (CANCOM) is a single national command structure,

subdivided into more manageable Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs) that would be able to

rapidly respond to domestic contingencies, though CANCOMs area of responsibility would in

fact extend to the North American continent. While this represents Canadas belated response to

the US decision to stand-up Northern Command (NORTHCOM), it still has an ambiguous

relationship not only to the other operational commands, some of which have domestic and

international responsibilities, but also to the long-standing bi-national North American

Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) structure. Canada Special Operations Command

(CANSOFCOM) has operational command over CF special forces, either directly in the event of

a special operations mission abroad, or in a support role in the event that special forces are used

domestically (under CANCOM) or as part of a larger conventional mission. Canada

Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) is an operationally focused command and was

created to integrate global CF operations and achieve a strategic, focused, decisive effect.3 The

fourth command is represented by Canada Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM),

which plays a direct supporting role (e.g. logistics, food, equipment maintenance) for the other

three operational commands.

2 Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the FundamentalDifferences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and Its Present Transformation, Canadian MilitaryJournal, 6, 4 (Winter 2005-2006), 11.3 Chris MacLean, Expeditionary Force Command an overview,Frontline Magazine (March/April 2006), 23.


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The DPS also advocates the creation of joint military formations, which requires not only

some organizational changes but also more controversial capability and procurement

modifications. The Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) constitutes the new military formation

designed for unconventional missions in Canada and abroad, including counter-terrorism and

rapid evacuation operations as well as combat and intelligence support for more conventional

operations. The SOTF will be the primary formation under CANSOFCOM, and consists of an

expanded Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) contingent and Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

Defence Company. A critical component of the SOTF is the newly created second-tier Canadian

Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), which will be a 750-strong regiment that is modelled on

the US Army Rangers and fully capable of using helicopter assets for tactical deployment in

order to secure an area and enable JTF-2 units to conduct more surgical operations.4

The SOTF is expected to be joined by a Standing Contingency Force (SCF) consisting of

designated land, air, maritime and special operations forces, and capable of amphibious land and

sea operations within the littoral regions of any given military theatre. According to the CDS

Action Report 3 (CAT 3), the SCF is envisioned to be up to a 2,800-strong force, with a land

force component of approximately 500-600, that can be pre-positioned in various locations and

held at 10 days readiness for urgent deployments.5 The critical capability for the SCF is

envisioned to be provided by the colloquially termed big honking ship (BHS) an amphibious

strategic sealift platform that would be capable of carrying the land-force component of the SCF,

alongside equipment and other supplies. The exact BHS has yet to be determined, and planning

for its procurement will likely only proceed once the SCF concept has been fully examined. Yet

4 See Adam Day, Canadas New Special Ops,Legion Magazine: Defence Today (November/December 2006).5 The Chief of Defence Staff established 4 CDS Action Teams (CATs) in 2005 to examine various aspects oftransformation within the DPS framework. CAT 3 examined the emerging operational capabilities, such as the SCF,that would be required. See Executive Summary, CDS Action Team 3 Report, available at:http://www.cds.forces.ca/cft-tfc/pubs/cat_e.asp.


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the realization of the SCF will likely have a strong impact on Navy transformation, as various

other naval platforms from the current Victoria-class submarines andKingston-class frigates to

the planned acquisition of Joint Supply Ships (JSS) would likely be geared towards providing

key support and force protection roles during these amphibious littoral operations.

The DPS strategic vision reflects a strong emphasis on long-range, rapid reaction

expeditionary forces. The SOTF will be designed for high-intensity intervention operations,

while the SCF is intended for more flexible full spectrum operations that range from stability

activities to limited war-fighting.6 The development of strategic lift capability by the Air Force

and Navy would enable the projection of ground forces into various theatres an Army-centred

vision of power projection that seeks to obtain influence with boots on the ground rather than

the relatively safe deployment of interoperable naval or air force platforms. The CF would be

redesigned to primarily undertake robust stability operations in partnership with the interoperable

military forces of Canadas allies. As Canadas recent combat experience in Afghanistan has

shown, stability campaigns require robust combat capabilities that would be useful though

perhaps not sufficient in and of itself for high-intensity war-fighting operations against

conventional adversaries. This model of transformation appears to be a strategically savvy

measure to prevent the further erosion of our expeditionary capability at a time of limited

strategic resources. By doing so, Canada would maintain sufficiently robust and self-contained

forces to play leadership roles in coalition operations like Afghanistan, and thereby reinforce

Canadas already limited political capital among the power brokers in Washington.

The Canada First Corollary to the DPS

6 R. D. Bradford, An Amphibious Task Group for the SCTF, Canadian Naval Review, 2, 2 (Summer 2006), 16.


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The current Conservative minority government, while not entirely dismissive of the DPS

proposal to reinvigorate the CF, was keen to put its own stamp on the issue of defence. The

Canada First Defence Strategy was introduced as a means to strengthen Canadas national

sovereignty at home and abroad, and it certainly expands upon the DPSs prioritization of the

domestic defence role for the CF. Not surprisingly, there is a renewed attention on the protection

of this countrys territorial sovereignty, especially in the vast northern reaches of Canadas

Arctic region. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that expeditionary capabilities a

critical component of the DPS vision are no longer a priority in the CFDS. The Conservative

government has taken a more holistic definition, which entails not only territorial independence

(sovereignty at home) but also the capability to undertake independent action (sovereignty

abroad). In this formulation, the need to rely on allies for critical operational capabilities, such

as tactical and strategic lift, is considered an infringement in sovereign independence that should

be rectified.

It is perhaps telling that the major platform acquisitions that the Conservatives have

promised in 2006 are primarily expeditionary-oriented. Specifically, the government has

announced the planned procurement of a strategic and tactical airlift fleet, likely in the forms of 4

C-17 aircraft and 17 C-130J Hercules aircraft, which will cost an estimated total of $11.5-billion;

an in-theatre troop transport capability to be provided by 14 medium-to-heavy lift helicopters,

likely the CH-47 Chinook, that will cost an estimated $4.7-billion; 2,000 medium transport

trucks at the cost of $1.2-billion; and the $2.9-billion JSS project to provide three multi-role

ships capable of at-sea support and modest sealift operations. With the exception of the JSS and

the C-17s, much of these platforms are designed to fulfill immediate operational needs in the


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Afghanistan theatre though the slow acquisition process will likely mean that these capability

platforms will only be available long after the end of the Afghan deployments.

The continuity between the Liberal DPS and the Conservative CFDS is embodied, not

only in the planned acquisition of primarily expeditionary capabilities, but also in the continued

use of the DPS as the primary guidance document for the CF. The CFDS has, it should be noted,

only been articulated in the electoral platform of the Conservative Party, as well as in the

speeches of the key ministers. This is expected to change in the upcoming DCP, which will

provide a statement of the CFDS and a strategic plan for the CF capability acquisitions in the

near- to medium-term. Yet there remains continuing uncertainty on the expected release date of

this critical document and, judging by the recent leaks of its contents, even greater uncertainty

over the Conservative governments commitment to the long-term rearmament of the CF. In the

short- to medium-term, the CFDS apparently advocates a general curtailment in key CF

platforms that will have a disproportionately large impact on the operational capabilities of the

Air Force and Navy.7 Indeed, the Conservatives appear to have acquiesced to the continued delay

of major recapitalization projects several years into the future, which raises questions of its

commitment to provide the necessary funding for such expensive platforms as future surface

carriers to replace the navys ageing destroyer and frigate fleet, a direct-fire platform to replace

the armys Leopard tanks and now cancelled Mobile Gun System (MGS), and a fighter aircraft

replacement for the air forces CF-18s. 8

7 This includes the elimination of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, 25 percent of the Griffon helicopter fleet, oneIroquois-class destroyer and twoProtecteur-class refuelling and supply ships. See David Pugliese, Forces want toscrap gear, save for new, Ottawa Citizen, 31 January 2007.8 For further information on the service life of these platforms, see the major platform aging tables in Statementby Richard Evraire, Lieutenant-General (retd), Chairman, The Conference of Defence Associations, to the House ofCommons Standing Committee on Finance, 17 October 2006, available at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Parliamentary_Presentations/Statement%20to%20Finance%20Ctte%20Oct%2017-06.pdf.


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The Conservatives de facto emphasis on expeditionary capabilities has coincided with its

publicly articulated inclination to expand Canadas homeland defence and sovereignty protection

capabilities. A Canada First policy, in its domestic sovereignty formulation, will likely become

increasingly poignant given that climate change will open the Arctic to international shipping

and could result in further challenges to the countrys sovereign jurisdiction in the Canadian

North. Yet this domestic orientation will likely be superseded, at least in the near-term, by the

urgent requirement for operational capabilities for Afghanistan. The current mission to Kandahar

creates significant pressure on the government to fulfill its publicly stated promises to revitalize

the CF and prevent unnecessary combat casualties. It is therefore not surprising that the major

capital replacements have, irrespective of the significant delay in the completion of the

procurement process, primarily been focused on the immediate short-term operational needs of

the CF. Indeed, while the Conservatives have been keen to highlight its five major capital

reinvestment projects, the government has also been noticeably silent on the electoral promise to

acquire three armed heavy icebreakers (and a deep-water docking facility) for the Navy. Given

the growing cost of the Afghanistan mission, it is not surprising that this project has according

to the leaked CFDS been replaced by a more modest (and perhaps sensible) effort to acquire a

new fleet of Arctic patrol ships.9 Of course, the current governments clear willingness to

continue delaying much needed recapitalization projects does not make one sanguine on the

long-term viability of this acquisition project.

To be sure, the Conservative government should be commended for providing its own

five-year defence budget increase on top of its predecessors five-year increase, which means

that the CF will feel the immediate effect of these budgetary increases sooner rather than later.

9 See David Pugliese, Canada to better monitor Arctic territory,DefenseNews.com, 2 February 2007, available athttp://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2537434&C=america


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For example, the expected increase of $2.5-billion in the next two years promises to make the

2007-2008 defence budget $16.5-billion. While this is unfortunately not a permanent baseline

increase, it does represent an important expansion of the often atrophied capital component of

the defence budget. Indeed, if the 2009-2011 budgetary promises actually take place, the CF will

be infused with an additional $15-billion. Moreover, the acceptance of accrual accounting

procedures for capital acquisitions means that the platform cost will be spread throughout the

entire procurement process, rather than taken immediately from the years budget (and therefore

potentially delay other needed acquisitions) this will allow for a more effective means of

recapitalization, in so far as it more easily allows for the simultaneous acquisition of multiple

platforms that Canada so sorely requires.10

Yet it remains to be seen whether these consecutive budgetary increases, despite the

apparent consensus among military and political leaders, will be sustained into the future. The

mission in Afghanistan represents a significant gamble that if it fails could irrevocably

damage the realization of the DPS/CFDS vision for the CF. The internal destabilization of

Pakistan could lead to a reinvigorated neo-Taliban insurgency, while the deterioration of Iraq

could be followed by the disengagement of both American and British forces from Afghanistan.

In either case, Canada would be mired in an increasingly dangerous and expansive counter-

insurgency operation with increasing risk of significant CF casualties, and the possibility of a

hasty and premature withdrawal from Afghanistan. NATOs pretensions of an out-of-area role

would be devastated, and Canada would likely embark on a more regional and continental

approach to its international security policy the Canada First policy would, in this scenario,

drift towards neo-isolationism.

10 For more on accrual accounting, see Brian S. MacDonald, Accrual Accounting, the National SecurityException, and Defence Production,Amiens Paper, 1 (2006), available at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Amiens_Papers/Amiens%20Paper%201-2006.pdf.


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That being said, even the success of the mission does not necessarily bode well for the

development of a reinvigorated expeditionary CF. The high operational tempo, with its

increasing personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, will consistently drain funds

that could otherwise be spent on recapitalization, especially given the harsh operating

environment for soldiers and vehicles in Afghanistan. Equipment burnout will accelerate the

rust-out problem with existing (and recently acquired) capabilities, while incidents of post-

traumatic syndrome (PTS) among returning soldiers will likely increase in frequency in the near

future, and endanger the current attempt to expand the CF regular personnel to 75,000 and

incorporate an additional 10,000 reservists.

The mission also appears to have prioritized urgent short-term capital acquisitions that

could come at the expense of long-term recapitalization projects. The Conservatives proposed

procurements, while providing some much needed strategic and tactical airlift capability for the

CF, does little to fix the growing rust-out crisis that afflicts many of the CFs most critical

capability platforms that are close to or at the end of their service life. The CF also appears to be

wrestling with a growing list of acquisition projects to expand its existing capabilities, whether

sovereignty protection for the Arctic or strategic lift for expeditionary operations. Yet the

government, as noted earlier, has yet to announce high-cost capital replacements for the majority

of its increasingly dilapidated platforms among all three services. Indeed, it remains to be seen

whether the government has sufficient funds to undertake significant recapitalization of the CFs

existing capabilities at a time when it is equally keen to expand the size of the CF and undertake

an operationally challenging combat mission in Afghanistan, both of which will require

increasing personnel, O&M and short-term capital acquisition costs for several years in the

future. It should therefore not be surprising that new capabilities for sovereignty protection have


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been downgraded in ambition, while such a critical capability platform as the BHS appears to be

relegated to a study project for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is uncertain whether there

will be any long-term, sustained infusion of resources for CF re-armament. After all, the most

optimistic scenarios from the draft CFDS only expects the CF budget to increase to $36.5 billion

in 2025, which represents a negligible increase if one incorporates inflation and the growth in the

Canadian economy during that period.11 While these concerns may be addressed in the official

version of the CFDS, the current length of the acquisition process cycle currently at 15 years

means that Canada would undergo at least a temporary period of structural disarmament by rust-

out even ifthe increased defence budget is sufficient to eventually undertake full recapitalization

of the CF.

CF Transformation orDe Facto Retrenchment?

If the expected budgetary increases are upheld, the CF is poised to undergo a massive re-

armament program the likes of which has not been seen since the time that Brooke Claxton and

CD Howe held the Defence and Defence Production portfolios.12 It may be more questionable

whether this re-armament is sufficient to fully transform the Canadian Forces, but it certainly is a

significant step after decades of neglect by successive Canadian governments since the late

1960s. The requirement for expeditionary forces has been prominently displayed in Afghanistan,

and has been highlighted in the recent Conservative governments announcement of a number of

capital acquisitions, including some much needed strategic and tactical airlift capability.

Expeditionary forces seem destined to form a critical component in the upcoming DCP/CFDS

addition to the previous governments DPS.

11 Colin Kenny, Defending Canada on the cheap, Ottawa Citizen, 5 February 2007.12 MacDonald, Accrual Accounting, the National Security Exception, and Defence Production, 1.


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Yet one should not be totally sanguine on the future state of the CF. The maintenance and

expansion of CF expeditionary capabilities may be an important means of preventing the further

erosion of Canadas defence assets, but it could also represent a far more limited niche role than

its proponents are likely willing to admit. Robust expeditionary forces require a variety of

capability platforms, which would be used for support and force protection as well as effects-

based force application. The proposed acquisition of a strategic and tactical airlift fleet is a

critical component of this vision. However, this must be joined by the acquisition or replacement

of various other capabilities. Failure to undertake serious recapitalization of Canadas slowly

rusting military platforms, while spending limited resources on new capabilities, would be

disastrous.

Much depends on whether the promised budgetary resources in the coming several years

are both available and sufficient for recapitalization. Yet a critical factor remains the current

mission in Kandahar. Indeed, Afghanistan represents both a blessing and a curse to the CF, as it

highlights the need for a reinvigorated CF but appears to be consuming ever more significant

attention and resources from Ottawa. The same could also be said of the current DPS/CFDS

vision, which appears poised to expand the countrys expeditionary capabilities (and especially

the Armys role in power projection) at the expense of other critical capabilities. Unfortunately,

these gambles may be a necessary means for the CF to finally be infused with sufficient

commitment to prevent its totaldissolution as a viable multi-purpose combat-capable force.

While far from a perfect solution, the current model of transformation despite the serious

reservations that likely plague the other services and the serious risks associated with its

execution may easily turn out to be the only solution to Canadas military woes.

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