sino‐central asian ties: problems and prospects

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Sino‐central Asian ties: Problems and prospectsSwaran Singh aa Research Fellow at IDSAPublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Swaran Singh (2000) Sino‐central Asian ties: Problems and prospects, Strategic Analysis, 24:6, 1109-1127,DOI: 10.1080/09700160008455272

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Sino-Central Asian Ties:Problems and Prospects

Swaran Singh

The extensive Silk Route trade network had connected China andCentral Asia since ancient times. It is in view of this trade network thatCentral Asia had provided successive Chinese regimes the critical bridgeto empires across Russia, Europe, West Asia and beyond. But,considering the fact that Central Asia had ceased to exist as anindependent entity for a very long time, it seems appropriate to begin bydemarcating the geography of what today constitutes this region. Verybriefly, it comprises five ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics (CARs)—namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, andTajikistan—that had declared their independence from Moscow in 1991.As regards China's vision, much of their policy initiatives as also muchof their expert analysis have restricted their focus basically to three CentralAsian republics—namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan—that share land borders with China's sensitive Xinjiang UighurAutonomous Region (XUAR). On the other extreme, however, there arescholars who include even Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into theirframework of Central Asian policy analysis.'If anything, this varietyonly reflects the evolving shades of China's overall vision (or ambitions)vis-a-vis Central Asia which has since continued to be one of theforemost preoccupations for China's policy makers and its politicalleadership.

For CARs, it is China's rising military and economic power that hasbeen both a matter of curiosity and concern. It is primarily these twofundamental elements of national strength that have been missing inCARs state-building exercise; and it is partly absence of thesefundamentals that has been responsible for attracting so much externalattention and interference which, of course, has both negative and positiveimplications. To cite a positive example, while the CARs look forward

Dr Swaran Singh is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

Strategic Analysis. Vol. XXIV, No. 6© The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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to China for making use of its free market and entrepreneurial skills,China remains attracted towards the CARs' rich deposits of hydrocarbonslike petroleum, natural gas and other minerals and metals, access towhich is vital for China's rapid industrial development. By contrast,considering that their ethnic identities have broadly been the basis forcreation of all these CARs, China has to keep vigil on their spill-overeffect on its restive Muslim minorities in its backward Western regions.Besides, continued clashes amongst the multiple territorial claims likethose on Ferghana Valley and the civil war in Tajikistan are apt examplesto show how these disputes have continued to disrupt their inter-stateinteractions both within and with Beijing thereby impacting on theirtravel, trade and commerce.2 Therefore, while the collapse of the formerSoviet Union may have heralded the end of an era in which Chineseleaders had to deal with a formidable superpower on its borders preachinga rival brand of Marxism yet, the emergence of the CARs have createdtheir own difficulties making it at best only a mixed blessing for Beijing.If anything, China seems faced with an equally formidable problem:Islamic fundamentalism, which has flourished in Afghanistan andTajikistan and has direct implications for China's sensitive Xinjiangprovince. But, ethnic violence has also since come to be recognised as amajor problem amongst these CARs thus obtaining for China a jointplatform to deal with this menace. Terrorism has since come to be thecommon issue of the greatest concern between China and these CARs.And, as China begins to evolve its new joint strategies for resolving itsproblems on border demarcation, overlapping ethnic communities andterrorism with these CARs, this paper tries to examine China's inherentand evolving strengths and weaknesses and to plot some broad trendsfor the future of Central Asian policy initiatives.

China's Compulsion for Seeking Engagement

• To begin with, though the collapse of the former Soviet Unionwas initially seen as China's gain in terms of regional power andinfluence, the emergence of these smaller CARs on China'sborders has created its own complexities. This is because CARsbeing formed on the basis of ethnic identity had virtuallyrecharged separatist sentiments among China's minorities livingin its Western provinces like Gansu, Qinghai, and its autonomousregions of Ningxia, Tibet and especially Xinjiang. China is knownto have a whole host of ethnic groupings which have CentralAsian origins and which have been nursing grievances againstBeijing's nationality policies for a very long time. Therefore,given the uncertainties in CARs domestic politics as also in their

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inter-state equations within, as also with the new RussianFederation, their emergence had been a major cause of concernfor Beijing.Secondly, while their ethnic overlap and its inherentcontradictions had disturbed policy planners in Beijing, whatsoon began to spread panic was the fear about the unaccountedex-Soviet nuclear weapons, missiles and fissile materials.Accordingly, this became their most immediate (though shortterm) concern and Beijing with the help of other major powers,played the lead in ensuring their safe retreat. Given the fact thatChina shared borders with Kazakhstan that had inherited thesecond largest nuclear and missile stockpiles (next only to Russia)this threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction acrossborders was the most critical factor goading China's initialengagement with at least a few of the CARs. But, by 1995, withthe last nuclear weapon of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan havingbeen surrendered and both having signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear countries, Chinagradually began to evolve more broad-based state-to-stateinteractions under new forums like the Shanghai Five which hasachieved impressive results during their five summits.Nevertheless, while China may have resolved many of itsimmediate problems some others have continued to persistcompelling it to continue seeking friendship. .

Thirdly, and more recently, in view of happenings within theseCARs and their linkages with the unending quagmire of Afghanpolitics, terrorism has come to be China's critical priority withregard to the CARs. Continued instability within Afghanistanhas been one of the main reasons for continued instability in itsbordering states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistanwhich has direct implications for China's own security andstability.3 Therefore, how China manages its relations withCentral Asia has profound significance not only for securitywithin, but even for its future relations with other Muslim statesin the Middle East and South Asian region.4 This explains whyin recent years Afghanistan has come to be such a majorpreoccupation for China's policy planning community forcingthem to accommodate even a Taliban regime. At the same time,however, the 1990s have witnessed Beijing laying increasing stresson the issue of transnational terrorism at most regional andinternational forums including setting up of "Six plus Two"mechanism for Afghanistan, which includes China, Tajikistan,

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Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan plus Russia andthe United States.Fourthly, apart from these threat-based policy priorities, Beijing'slong term policy-planners have also been keenly interested inensuring access to Central Asian energy sources as also variousother metals and minerals. To recall, China has not been able topump enough oil to satisfy its increasing demand since 1993when it became a net importer of oil. During the past year, itactually imported more than 40 million tons of crude oil and oilproducts, which amounted to 20 per cent of its total consumptionfor that year. This year, going by its imports during the first fourmonths, the estimates have put it at 50 million tons which makesit about 25 per cent of the projected total consumption for thisyear.5 Especially, in view of China's rapid economic growth andfree market economy, its domestic oil demand is expected to riseby around 4 per cent annually, creating a significant challengefor its energy security in the future. Similarly, though only 5 percent of China's total gas geological reserves have been proven sofar, the country's remaining recoverable gas reserves have alreadyreached as much as 1,100 billion cubic meters.6

Fifthly, in addition to safe access and availability of Central Asianenergy sources which requires Beijing to evolve a constructiveengagement with these republics, China has also been anxiousabout Central Asia's US connections that are seen in Beijing aspart of NATO's eastward expansion exercise. All Central Asianrepublics except Tajikistan have already joined NATO's "peacefulpartnership" and its North American Cooperation Council(NACC). Since the beginning of 1996, Washington speciallycreated US Central Command (CENTCOM) that has held militarymanoeuvers alongwith forces of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan andUzbekistan. Washington's Central Asia policy has been gearedby its strategic motivations of (a) seeking elimination of theirnuclear weapons, (b) strengthening its foothold in the backyardof Russia and China and (c) in ensuring its access to energyresources. The CARs, have welcomed US military and politicalsupport primarily to pull out from their continuing economiccrisis as also to ensure their regional stability and national securityfrom perceived threats both inside and from outside. Obviously,these are not the most comforting reasons for policy-makers inBeijing.

Sixthly, Central Asia has been linked to the Russian/Soviet


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empires for a very long time and, therefore, all its operationallinkages to the outside world continue to run through Moscowgiving Russia an advantage over Beijing. Meanwhile, due to USengagement with the CARs, Russia has become increasinglyconcerned and begun to re-assert its special relationship withthese republics. After Vladimir Putin came to power in May thisyear, Russia and the CARs have established an "Alliance

. Relationship" as part of their effort to revive and strengthentheir traditional ties. Russia and the CARs have also begun tostrengthen cooperation in military and military technologies andduring March-April 2000, military establishments of Russia,Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgystan have carriedout joint manoeuvers. Given the fact that despite the best ofrelations China remains concerned with Russia's overall powerprofile, some semblance of control over this region offers oneway of placing some restrictions on any unbridled revival ofRussia's power profile.7

• And finally, many other actors like India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,Saudi Arabia, Japan have also raised China's anxiety levels fromtime to time. Especially, powerful new players like Japan havemoved in a big way, expanding their role in this region that wasconsidered outside its traditional sphere of influence. To recall,Japan's involvement with CARs had begun with Prime MinisterHashimoto's re-orientation of Japan's "Eurasian Diplomacy"during 1997. This had resulted in Keizo Obuchi's first high-levelvisit to this region. This was partly spurred by the failure ofJapan's National Oil Consortium to meet Tokyo's energyobjectives. In 1999, Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura traveledto Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and propounded his thesis ofresolving conflicts through economic development. He signedagreements granting loans of $23.9 million for improvement ofUzbekistan's airports and another 18.3 billion yen for futureenergy sector projects in Azerbaijan and 50 million for culturalexchanges. In all, since 1993 Japan has emerged as one of the topdonors of official development assistance to this region. From1993-1997, Tokyo increased its total package from $2.5 millionto $156,8 million.8 All these factors have created their ownpressure points for Beijing to continue seeking engagement withthe CARs.

Central Asia's Incentives

But having covered China's compulsions for seeking engagement


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with CARs, this obviously has not been a one way street. The CARshave had their own strong reasons for continuing to seek engagementwith China. Initially, of course, all these CARs including even the RussianFederation had.sought refuge in aid packages from Western countriesand Western-led lending institutions. Accordingly, the United Stateshad clearly emerged as the most influential country in this region duringthe early 1990s. But it has gradually lost its pre-eminence during theselast few years. Especially, considering Washingtons motivations, itsstaying power has played its own checks and balances. The USinvolvement in Central Asia, for example, has witnessed a visibledownturn beginning from 1995, when Kazakhstan surrendered its lastnuclear warhead and signed the NPT as a non-nuclear state. This downtrend has further continued in view of gradual sobering down of estimateson Central Asian gas and oil reserves. This has clearly forced the CARsto explore other alternatives.

Both Russia and China have also gained from the fact that many USofficials led by Secretary of State Ms. Madeleine Albright have sincebeen openly critical of Central Asia's democratic standards and human•rights record. Accordingly, the United States, which had initially tried topump in economic aid to seek compliance with its policies has sinceresorted to more symbolic measures like according the CARs participationin western-led forums. In addition to ensuring their economic stabilitythese forums are also interested in ensuring their political indoctrinationin a certain direction. To recall, US had granted $311 million aid toKazakhstan in 1994 followed by another aid package of $460 million forKyrgyzstan during 1996. In 1997, US had signed an agreement withKazakhstan worth 28 billion for exploring resources under the CaspianSea. Till date, however, Kazakhstan has received only $2 billion of directforeign investment in its gas and oil resources of which only $1.5 billionhappens to be from the United States.9 This downtrend in US involvementwith the CARs has since compelled these CARs to explore and build newpartnerships providing China with new opportunities to step in andbuild its own relationship.

China's forays into Central Asia had begun from the first historictour of Central Asia (except Tajikistan) by then Premier l i Peng in April1994 when he had projected China's policy in terms of commercialinterests, investment and trade based on supply of cheap consumer goods.But more than that exploratory travel, it was during his first official tripof Central Asia in 1998, that President Jiang Zemin had promised toprovide them with conveniences to do ocean shipping using Chineseport facilities. He had also used this occasion to revive China's ancientlinks with Central Asia and popularise the theme of reviving the Silk


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Route network that has since caught the imagination of the CAR leaders.To begin with, the CARs have since begun to trade with the Republic ofKorea, Japan, the United States, Australia, Thailand, and Malaysia throughChinese ports. In interviews, officials from Kyrgyzstan said they plan toexport energy and minerals to third countries via northern Chinese ports.Similarly, economists of Uzbekistan say that their country hopes to shipdaily-use items through China to cut costs and increase speed, andTurkmenistan also plans to lay a natural gas pipeline across China toJapan.10

In Tianjin, the largest port in northern China, cotton and mineralsfrom Central Asia are loaded on to ships for Japan and the Republic ofKorea, while electric appliances and machinery from East Asia andSoutheast Asia are shipped the other way round. As early as in 1994,Qingdao, a port city in Shandong Province had become a transit pointfor trade with Central Asia. In 1999, a number of high-ranking officials,businessmen and journalists from Central Asia visited the ports of Tianjin,Lianyungang, Dalian, and Qingdao and many trading companies havesince been set up by the CARs to make good use of these port facilities.Kuanysh Sultanov, Kazakhstan's Ambassador to China, told reportersthat Lianyungang is the nearest gateway to the Pacific Ocean for hiscountry and that Chinese ports will be a lever in the growth of hiscountry's economic strength. And the countries of Central Asia havesince last year started flying charter flights after signing cargo agreementswith Lianyungang city-port authorities.11 Besides, the CARs have alsoevolved a whole range of new channels which have since greatlystrengthened their linkages with China.

China's Policy Initiatives

Without doubt, the Shanghai Five forum has been the most importantcreation that has facilitated China's policy initiatives with regard to CARs.This forum comprises China, Russia and the three CARs of Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan and Tajiktjtan and this was formed during their first summitat Shanghai in April x?96. The primary motivation for its creation hadbeen the disputed borders and overlapping ethnic communities whichhad come to be the most important obstacle towards seeking peace andthereby sought development which was especially important for thenation-building exercise amongst these newly created states of CentralAsia. Going by its track record of the last five summits during these pastfive years this forum has been extremely successful in generating mutualunderstanding and goodwill amongst these problematic countries. Butmore than these specific issues this forum has also tried to project itselfas an alternative cooperative security paradigm for evolving the 21st


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century world order. To quote from Chinese President, Jiang Zemin's,speech at the fourth summit at Bishkek during 1999, "The new securitymodel that we advocate, differs from that derived from the Cold Warmentality, and its successful putting into practice have set a fine examplein the international arena."12 Another important achievement of this lastsummit session was that it finally began its momentum towardsexpansion and the fifth summit at Dushanbe became the first one whenthe President of another CAR i.e. Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, actuallyparticipated in its deliberation as an observer which clearly portends itsfuture.

To briefly recall their contributions—the first summit in April 1996at Shanghai had put in place the first CBMs agreement where five memberstates had committed themselves not to use violence or threat of violenceagainst each other. They had also agreed to have no military exercisesaimed against each other and no military activities within 100 km ofborders. At their next summit at Moscow in 1997 President Yeltsin hadproposed creating a zone of peace along the 10,000 km border shared bythese five countries. During the 1998 summit at Almaty (Kazakhstan),China succeeded in getting through a resolution where all agreed toreject all manifestations of national separatism and religious extremismand to ban on their territories activities harmful to the sovereignty, securityand public order of any of the five countries. The 1999 summit was heldat Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) on August 24-25 which came out with a proposalfor a nuclear weapons free zone in the region and urged all nations tojointly fight international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religiousfundamentalism. And, during the most recent fifth summit at Dushanbe(Tajikistan) on July 5 this year, these five leaders not only reiterated theiragreement on creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the region, tojointly fight international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religiousfundamentalism, set up a Regional Center in Tajikistan to study theseproblems, but also strongly criticised Clinton's ballistic missile defenceprogramme. They have also agreed to enlarge their agenda andorganisation which will now include a series of annual meetings amongsttheir premiers, ministers and officials.

The second element of China's vision in building ties with CentralAsia has been its focus on reviving the ideas and practices of China's SilkRoute network. To begin with, it is important to underline that thehistoric Silk Route was not actually the name of any transnational highwayin any current sense of the term. If anything, it symbolised a series oftrading networks that facilitated the transfer of goods between Westernmarkets in the Middle East and Europe and the Eastern markets primarilyin China. In ancient times this extended from China's modern day city


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of Xi'an in northwest China to the Mediterranean Sea and was the mostactive route across Eurasia.13 Thanks to China's fresh initiatives, during1990s, the last few years have witnessed a revival of interest in the SilkRoute and efforts have been launched for building a rail/road bridgebetween China and Europe through Central Asia. What make thisproposition extremely attractive for China is the fact that this is believedto be at least "8,000 km shorter than corresponding sea routes betweenAsia and Europe via the Suez Canal and considerably faster".14 This willconnect the largest landmass of Eurasia and provide a bridge betweenthe developed regions of Europe on one end and Japan, China andSoutheast Asia on the other. Currently, the Central Asian regionconstitutes the weakest link for this Continental Bridge. And constructionof the Eurasia Continental Bridge has been one proposal that the Chinesehave been pushing hard as it promises to facilitate China's integrationwith Central Asian resources. This idea basically plans to build railways,expressways, air routes and optical fiber, oil and gas pipelines betweenEurope on the one end and Japan on the other."

To look at China's specific initiatives at bilateral level with each ofthese CARs, one could begin by looking at China's interactions with thelargest as also the most influential state amongst the CARS, Kazakhstan.At its birth, Kazakhstan had inherited the largest number of nuclearweapons, missiles and other military equipment from the former SovietUnion which had provided it special visibility and leverage amongstmajor powers. Though, Kazakhstan has since surrendered all its nuclearweapons and joined the nuclear NPT as a non-nuclear state, it stillcontinues to wield influence due to its size and good behaviour andgoodwill in the West. The bilateral relations between China andKazakhstan had entered the primary stage following the Joint Statementon Neighbourly Relations announced by the two Presidents duringNazarbayev's first formal visit to Beijing during 1993. Since then Sino-Kazak bilateral trade has witnessed a steady growth between 10 to 12per cent, and had crossed the $500 million mark during 1997 when itmade Kazakhstan China's second largest trading partner amongstthe countries of Commonwealth cc Independent States next only toRussia.16

Petroleum products obviously remain the mainstay of their tradeand commerce. Kazakhstan's petroleum production has grown at about12 per cent and China has since emerged as a major player in its oilexploration efforts. The two had signed their first cooperative agreementat Almaty in 1997 where China had agreed to jointly develop Kazakhstan'srefining capability, promising to invest $9.5 billion. In 1998, the two hadbegun to operate the Uzen oil-field and the Aktyubinsk oil and gas field


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in Kazakhstan. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)purchased 60 per cent of stake in the Aktobemunaigas oil productionenterprise for $325 million and pledged to invest another $4 billion in thenext 20 years.17 By 2010, the annual production of Kazakh oil is expectedto reach 10 million tons, placing Kazakhstan amongst the top tenpetroleum production countries in the world. Similarly, these twocountries have also debated on long-distance oil pipelines, which,once complete, will allow an increase in annual crude oil exports toChina from the present 100,000 tons to 2.5 million tons. In addition,CNPC is now involved in developing two more oil fields inKazakhstan.18

The steel industry has been another promising area in their bilateralcooperation. Although China's annual crude steel output has exceeded100 million tons, it lacks high-standard, high-quality steel products,especially thin steel products where Kazakhstan has an advantage. In1997, its steel output was up 8 per cent over the previous year, andexports of steel products accounted for half the total shipments. Eachyear about 300,000-500,000 tons of steel products are exported to China.China's Building Corporation is slated to go to Akmola, the newly selectedcapital, to take part in some of these projects. Similarly, seeing that theAlmaty-Urumqi railway has now been in use for some time, the twogovernments have been discussing whether to extend the railway toBeijing or not. Besides, the two have been deliberating on how Chineseenterprises will invest in Kazakhstan's agricultural productsprocessing industries, daily necessities production, tourism and medicalfields.19

Similarly, China's ties with Tajikistan with emphasis on goodneighbourlihood have been guided by the Joint Statement of the People'sRepublic of China and the Republic of Tajikistan on the Basic Principlesof Mutual Relations of September 3, 1993. Since then their trade hadshown a steady increase though for 1998 it showed a decline of 4.9 percent over the previous years and stood at $19.23 million.20 This hasprimarily been due to Tajikistan's internal unrest which has reducedChina's exports and investment. Nevertheless, the two sides havecontinued to make serious efforts. During a summit meeting at China'sport city of Dalian on August 13, 1999, the two sides had signed fivemajor documents. These included (a) Joint Statement on FurtherDeveloping the Two Countries' Relations of Good Neighbourliness andFriendship and Mutually Beneficial Cooperation, (b) Agreement betweenthe People's Republic of China and the Republic of Tajikistan on theSino-Tajik State Border, (c) Agreement for Friendly and MutuallyBeneficial Cooperative Ties between China and Tajikistan; (d) an

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Automobile Transport Agreement; and, (e) a China-Tajikistan Agreementon Prohibition of Illegal Trafficking and Abuse of Narcotic Substances,Psychtropic Substances and Controlled Chemicals Precursors. Like allother CARS, the Tajik Government had also reiterated its position thatthe government of PRC is the only legitimate government of China andthat Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.21 And more recently, duringPresident Jiang Zemin's visit to Dushanbe to attend the fifth summit ofthe Shanghai Five the two sides also signed a Joint Statement of thePeople's Republic of China and the Republic of Tajikistan onDeveloping Relations of Good Neighbourliness and Friendship andCooperation Geared to the 21" Century signed at Dushanbe on July 4,2000.

China-Turkmenistan ties have similarly been projected as aimed atevolving and consolidating equal and mutually beneficial interactionsgeared towards the 21st century. The outline of these ties has beenenshrined in the principles laid out in various bilateral documents startingfrom the Sino-Turkmenistan Joint Communique' on the Establishment ofDiplomatic Relations on January 6, 1992. The other major documentssigned between them include Sino-Turkmenistan Joint Communique onNovember 21, 1992, the Sino-Turkmenistan Joint Statement on FurtherDeveloping and Strengthening the Relations of Friendship andCooperation Between the Two Countries on August 31, 1998 and theJoint Statement Between the People's Republic of China andTurkmenistan signed at Ashkhabad on July 6, 2000. According tostatistics available for 1998 their bilateral trade had reached $12.5million which leaves a lot of room for improvement.22 Besides,Turkmenistan has a special attraction for Beijing considering that itpossesses the fifth largest reserves of natural gas and has substantial oilfields and especially because it has been working hard to explore newexport channels.

And finally, China-Kyrgyzstan ties have also been moving at a ratherslow pace due to their continued border problems. However, theirpolitical interactions have been improving and just a day before hisparticipation in the five-nation summit held at Bishkek last year, ChinesePresident Jiang Zemin and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev signed anagreement which would settle all disputes over common bordersextending 1,000 kilometers. The accord provides a delimitation of theKyrgyz-Chinese frontiers and paves the way for technical experts to beginwork on specific demarcations. This problem had been going on for along time. Akayev assured Jiang that Kyrgyzstan would not allow anyforce to carry out activities against China in Kyrgyzstan and reaffirmedhis adherence to the "one China" policy.23


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Continuing Problems: Overlapping Ethnic Communities

Just like China's strengths, its weaknesses have also made an equallycritical contribution to the evolution of China-Central Asian policyinitiatives. First and foremost, though all nation-states remain concernedover their sovereignty and territorial integrity, few put quite as muchemphasis on these as does China which places it in a special category ofcountries dealing with the CARs. As regards China, while, Hong Kong,Macao, Taiwan and Tibet may have been the most cited examples, theChinese have always been equally concerned with Xinjiang which remainsthe'most important factor determining its vision and views about theCentral Asian region.24 The fact that the CARs were broadly formed onthe basis of their ethnic composition seem to have encouraged China'sminorities like Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Kazakhs to accelerate theirefforts for seeking self-determination which witnessed increased unrestand violence in these regions during the early 1990s. Especially, itsXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where Uighurs (TurkicKazakhs) constitute the majority has been a major factor leading to Chinaadopting a twin policy of bom engagement and containment with itsbordering CARs.

The turbulent Turkic-Muslim majority of XUAR shares commonhistory, tradition and culture with these CARs which has its obviousimplications for the evolution of China's ethnic unity, territorial integrityand its secular identity which is going to face increasing challenges as itemerges as the next global power. Starting from the early 1980s, Chinahad followed a liberal and pragmatic approach to religious and culturalaffairs amongst its over 18 million Muslims. The majority of theseMuslims live in China's XUAR where Uighurs alone numbered 72 millionaccording to China's 1990 census. The second largest Muslim communityin XUAR are Huis who numbered 682,900 and have historically playedas a buffer between Uighurs and Hans with the latter having increasedtheir numbers from a mere 250,000 in 1949 to 6 million in 1990.* Uighurshave also been suspicious of Huis and see them as Han converts who arefound in every county in every province of China. The Hui's havecompletely merged themselves in local communities and are notrecognised as a separate community anywhere outside China. Morespecifically over 1.1 million nomadic Kazaks, who continue to have kinliving in Central Asia's largest country Kazakhstan also play a strongpolitical role in XUAR which also has nomadic Kirghiz (141,900) whohave kin in Central Asia's most democratic country, Kyrgyzstan and areculturally and linguistically related to .Kazaks. The small number ofUzbeks (14,500) have kin living in the politically powerful country of

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Uzbekistan, though Xinjiang's Persian speaking Tajiks (33,500) remainonly distantly related to Tajikistan.26 Accordingly, this ethnic linkagegives XUAR a far more Central Asian profile for it to be considered anexclusive Chinese region.

Therefore, though its 530,000 sq. km landmass that comprises one-sixth of mainland China may have only a 15 million population, it makesXUAR's Muslims so critical in China's vision of Central Asia. China'salleged re-settlement policies have been particularly responsible for theircontinued alienation. According to official figures by China's 1990 census,ethnic minorities of Muslim populations constituted over 60 per centincluding Uighurs 47 per cent, Hui 24 per cent Kazaks 7 per cent, andKyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks roughly 1 per cent each.?7 Reportedly, thecomposition of these ethnic communities has changed considerably infavour of Han Chinese who are now believed to constitute more than 50per cent. In more recent years, Beijing is alleged to have resettled morethan six million Han Chinese in XUAR diluting the population of Uighurs(ethnic Kazakhs) who now constitute less than half of the Xinjiangpopulation.28 All this clearly helped them sustain their Sunni Islamictraditions towards fiercely defending their independence. This traditionhad been particularly evident from the periodical uprisings against Chinaduring 1933,1944 and 1949 all in the name of setting up what was calleda Republic of East Turkestan. The Qing dynasty had annexed this regionin 1759 and given it the name Xinjiang (new dominion) yet, successiveChinese rulers had "never directly controlled its new province becauseof the dearth of Han Chinese available to govern it."29 Just as in the caseof Tibet, Chinese rulers had allowed the natives to rule themselves underthe supervision of Chinese representatives and did not disturb them aslong as they continued to owe allegiance to the Emperor. Given thisvolatile history, the New China under Mao Zedong, during 1955,declared the region as China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region(XUAR) granting it special concessions in terms of religious and culturalfreedoms.

Over the years, however, massive resettlement of Han-Chinese inthis region have been one of Beijing's methods to undermine this so-called 'splittistism'. There have been persistent complaints against Turkishlanguage not being allowed for higher studies which means discriminationin higher education and consequently in employment opportunities forTurkic speaking Muslims. There have also been reports of restrictions orstrict vigil on Uighur publishing activities and about the neglect of theirmonuments and other historic sites. Similarly, various other restrictionslike those on mosque-building, child-bearing etc. which "prevents Uighurfrom developing their culture and civilisation" have been explained by


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Beijing as efforts to "assimilate and sinicize the Uighurs".30 This has itsobvious linkages with the emerging elhno-political currents inside CentralAsia. AH these grievances have "drained China's resources or threatenedChina with contagion or conquest."31 All this has clearly sustained China'scompulsions to continue seeking engagement with the CARs.

Energy Resources: Gas and Oil

Juxtaposed with China's sensitivities of Central Asia's ethnic linkagesto Xinjiang, its ever increasing energy consumption and, therefore, needfor access to Central Asian energy resources has been China's other majorcompulsion guiding its engagement with the CARs. Alongwith otherpowers, China has been engaged in exploring Central Asian energyresources and ensuring its own access and influence. One of the mostambitious projects signed by China includes a $ 11 billion, 5,730 km longgas pipeline project between Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Chinain which a consortium of companies from the United States, Japan andChina have already been conducting preliminary surveys for quite sometime. This project plans to exploit gas deposits from the right bank of theAmu-Darya and is expected to provide an alternative to the gas pipelinefrom Russia's East Siberian region.32 It has been reported that somemore gas pipelines are also under study and one of these is expected tolink the natural gas fields in Russia's Irkutsk with Rizhao of East China'sShandong province. It would later be extended to the Republic of Koreaand Japan to make it commercially viable. The other is expected to runfrom West Siberia to Shanghai via Xinjiang.33 To cite a few more examples,on June 4, 1997, China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) hadoutbid its Russian and American counterparts to obtain exclusive rightsto operate in the Uzen oilfield in western Kazakhstan for the next 20years. The agreement, which was reported to be worth $ 4 billion,provides CNPC with 60 per cent of ownership in a Kazakh firm calledAktobemunaygaz. This was followed by Deputy Premier Li Lanqingsigning a basket of agreements worth $ 9.6 billion during his visit toKazakhstan in September 1997 which included construction of pipelinesfrom western Kazakhstan to western China and another one fromKazakhstan to Turkmenistan.

Therefore, despite repeated estimates which have down-sized CentralAsia's oil and gas reserves, there remains no doubt that Central Asiastores abundant minerals, particularly petroleum and natural gas. It isestimated that the oil deposits in the region could be as much as 200billion barrels, second only to the Middle East; the natural gas depositcould be 8,000 billion cubic meters, only less than those of Russia and the


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Middle East. According to a US State Department Report released in1997, the petroleum and natural gas resources in Central Asia and theCaspian Sea could be converted into 4,000 billion US dollars.34 Besides,this region is also rich in iron, copper, lead, chromium, gold and othernon-ferrous metals and rare metals. For instance, uranium deposits inTajikistan account for one seventh of the total uranium deposits in theworld. It becomes more and more obvious that in the light of the declineof petroleum and natural gas resources in the Gulf region, any powerthat controls these two kinds of strategic natural resources in CentralAsia would be able to dominate the international energy market in the21st century or even control the economic lifelines of some countries.35

But while these two may have been the most critical factors in guidingChina's Central Asia policy since the early 1990s, experts and policy-makers have meanwhile added many more factors that define China'score national interests that broadly guide China's policy initiatives towardsthe CARs.

China's Policy Parameters

China's policy initiatives towards the CARs can be broadlycategorised into two broad strands: (a) reviving the Silk Route as anumbilical cord between China and Central Asia and (b) creating the newframework of 'Shanghai Five' strategic forum which seeks to projectitself as an alternative paradigm for evolving the 21st century worldorder. These remain geared to (a) ensuring China's continued access toCentral Asian energy resources and (b) ensuring that ethnic linkagesbetween CARs and Xinjiang do not have any negative impact on China'sinternal security and external ties. According to Prof. Ma Jiali of Beijingbased China Institute for International Contemporary InternationalRelations (CICIR), the following four strategic concerns have been guidingChina's policies and interactions with these five CARs:

• Firstly, considering that China shares 3,500 km joint borders withthe CARs, the foremost strategic concern of Beijing over thisregion has been to ensure the stability of this northwesternfrontier so as to create a more favourable external environmentthat remains most essential to sustain China's socialistmodernisation.

• Secondly, in view of Washington's attempts at using issues likeTibet, Taiwan and human rights to seek its goals of westernising,weakening and splitting China, it becomes imperative for Chinato ensure that any such engineered social unrest does not affectits security and stability. Accordingly, by strengthening ties with


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the CARs, China must suppress splittdst elements by efficientlyhandling separatists and religious extremist infiltration from theseequally vulnerable countries.

• Thirdly, China's engagement with the CARs provides Beijingwith a buffer zone against the eastward expansion of NATO.Since the Kosovo War during mid-1990s, China has clearly feltsqueezed from both West (NATO's Eastward expansion and itsNew Strategy) and East (US-Japan military alliance and its newinterpretations).

• And finally, the fourth strategic concern of China is to seek astable and reliable source of energy supplies. The rapid economicgrowth has made China hostage to energy supplies andconsidering the abundant oil and gas deposits in Central Asia,evolution of a reliable supply-demand relationship based on fairand reasonable prices will be in the common interest of bothChina and the CARs.36

These elements broadly explain China's core interests in engagingthe CARs since the early 1990s. Factors that have particularly cementedtheir ties include the revelation to China that these Central Asian statesremain equally concerned about threats of ethnic separatism and religiousfundamentalism which has been the latent main worry of China's leadersand policy makers. It had all begun with the opening of the Urumqi-Almaty rail-line during 1992 which had revived regular trade andcommerce.between these two sides. In addition to this rail link whichjoined various Central Asian states to China's domestic markets andproducts, China opened 14 ports of entry to Central Asian trade withXinjiang in April 1994. Later in 1998, China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystanagreed to open a new highway from Kashgar through Krygystan toTashkent in Uzbekistan and the CARs have since been using China'sport facilities to trade with other major nations. Especially for statesbordering on China like Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan, the privilege of bartertrade with China since the Soviet times combined with the new shortageof foreign exchange provided tremendous mutual attraction for cross-border trade and commerce. Also, during the initial years of theirindependence, the shortage of manufactured consumer goods and theavailability of China's cheap consumer goods and complementary natureof their production had facilitated their mutual interactions. But, at thesame time, there have been instances of occasional anti-Chinese reactionsin both Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan as their markets get flooded by low-quality low-priced Chinese products threatening to put local enterpriseout of business.37 But the Chinese have compensated for this excessive


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supply of consumer goods with huge investments in Central Asianenergy sources. And thanks to their continued interactions the twosides have fairly streamlined their interactions during these last tenyears.

Conclusion

To conclude, therefore, China has perhaps been one of the moresuccessful countries in finding a foothold and ensuring its access to theCARs, especially amongst its leaders. While its cautious and steadyapproach in building engagement may have been partly dictated by itsstakes in ensuring its own unity and integrity, this has also made itsengagement with the CARs one of the most cost-effective exercises thusensuring its survival for a very long time. Given the fact that for acountry like China, which has a billion plus people, ultimately it isfundamental needs of food, water, energy, clean environment that willremain the most important elements determining the future course. Anychances of its further development would entail imperatives of a peacefulperiphery including CARs. And considering that CARs themselves stillremain in the midst of their own chaos of nation-building these verycompulsions will also continue to dictate their policies with regard toChina for a very long time. And finally, considering that they sharedeep rooted^ historical linkages that have survived all earlier historicalwatersheds the two sides are very likely to overcome their currentchallenges and pitfalls and to redefine their mutual policies and newequations in due course of time.

NOTES1. Ma Jiali, "Central Asia: Geo-strategic Situation and Big Powers' Policies",

Contemporary Central Asia (New Delhi: vol.111, no.l, April 1999), p. 39.2. David Nalle, "The Ferghana Valley-1999", Central Asia Monitor (London: no.

1, 2000), p.2.3. Julie R. Sirrs, "Mixed Messages: The Contrasting Reactions of Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the War in Afghanistan", Central Asia Monitor(London: no. 2, 2000), p. 1.

4. Diane L. Smith, "Central Asia: A New Great Game?", [Deptt. Of Army, DefenceDepartment, United States], <http:www.writersg.com/milnet/pentagon/centasia/cenasap5.htm>; also Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia andthe Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World", China Quarterly(London: no. 133, March 1993, p. 112.

5. Zhao Shaoqin, "Nation may import 50 m. tons of crude oil in 2000", ChinaDaily (Hong Kong: July 3, 2000, p. 9.

6. Shao Qin, "Experts call for oil strategy", China Daily (Beijing: January 10, 2000.7. Sun Zhuangzhi, "US Strategy in Central Asia", Beijing Review (Beijing: vol. 43,

no. 26, June 26, 2000), p. 11.


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8. Michael Robert Hickok, "The Other End of the Silk Road: Japan's EurasianInitiative", Central Asian Survey (London: vol. 19, no. 1, March 2000), pp. 17,24.

9. Sun Zhuangzhi, "Central Asia not just for US", China Daily (Beijing: July 11,2000.

10. "China provides trade gateway for Central Asia", China Daily (Hong Kong:June 9, 1999), p.5.

11. Ibid.12. Shao Zongwei, "Summit agrees to promote regional security, stability", China

Daily (Hong Kong: August 26, 1999), p. 1.13. Hu Qihua, "Nation in joint oil, gas search", China Daily (Hong Kong: July 7,

2000), p. 2.14. Mark Buries, Chinese Policy towards Russia and the Central Asia, (California:

Rand Corporation, 1999), p. 38.15. Sun Shangwu, "Eurasia network links China with outside world", China Daily

(Beijing: January 14, 2000).16. Dai Xaiohua, "China-Kazakhstan Trade and Economic Cooperation Promising",

Beijing Review. (Beijing: vol.41, no. 20, May 18-24, 1998), p.717. "Kazakhstan Sets Up Working Group to Implement Laying Oil Pipeline to

China", FBIS-CH1-2000-0719, dated July 19, 2000.18. Xaiohua, n. 16.19. Ibid.20. Hu Qihua, "Nation in joint oil, gas search", China Daily (Hong Kong: July 7,

2000), p. 2.21. "Tajikistan inks deals with China", China Daily (Hong Kong: August 14, 1999),

p. 1.22. Hu Qihua, "Alarm Over Separatism", China Daily (Hong Kong: July 5, 2000),

p. 1.23. Shao Zongwei, "China, Kyrgyzstan inks deal on borders", China Daily (Hong

Kong: August 27, 1999), p. 1.24. Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China", in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.),

Central Asia and the World. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,1994), pp. 224-226.

25. Justin Ben-Adam, "China" in David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.),Islam Outside the Arab World. (London: Curzon Press, 1999), p. 191.

26. Ibid.27. Dru Gladney, "The Muslim Face of China", Current History (Philadelphia: vol.

92, n. 575, September 1993), p. 279.28. Diane L. Smith, n. 4.29. Felix K. Chang, "China's Central Asian Power and Problems", Orbis, vol. 41,

no. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 406.30. Sultan Mahmut Kasgarli, "The Uighur Turks of Central Asia", Central Asia

Monitor (London: no. 4, 1999), p. 29.31. Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the implications for China's

policy in the Islamic World", The China Quarterly (London: no.133, March1993), p.69.

32. "Turkmenistan, China Discuss Gas Pipeline Project", FBIS-CH1-2000-0706 datedJuly 6, 2000.

33. Qin n. 6.

1126 Strategic Analysis/Sqptember 2000

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34. Charlet Newman, "The Modern Silk Road", The Chronicle (New Carolina:October 25, 2000).

35. Jiali, n.l, p. 40.36. Jiali, n.l, pp.44-45.37. Yasmin Melet, "China's political and economic relations with Kazakhstan

and Kyrgystan", Central Asian Survey (London: vol. 17, no. 2, June 1998),p. 239.


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sino‐central asian ties: problems and prospects

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