sino-soviet dispute continues

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DEVElOPlENTS AND TRENDS= Sino-Soviet Dispute Continues In one of the most bitter criticisms ever made of the Soviet Union by the Communist Party of another coun- try, Red China has accused the U.S.S.R. of “perfidiously and unilaterally” tearing up hundreds of aid agree- ments and contracts as part of a campaign of economic pressure against Peking. The attack, which included charges against Soviet Premier Khrushchev personally, came in an editorial in the official Peking Peoplds Daily of Feb. 27. It ac- cused Khrushchev of touching off disunity in the Com- munist camp as far back as 1959. The party organ’s blast weakened speculation that Moscow and Peking might be moving toward a recon- ciliation. Particularly when it was followed next day by another People’s Daily statement that Peking will never bow to the “master to their servants” attitude in order to ease the Sino-Soviet rift. The Feb. 27 editorial accused Khrushchev of starting the quarrel which now divides world communism by condemning Red China in its border dispute with India. Khrushchev issued his criticism, the newspaper said, on the eve of his Camp David talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower in September 1959. The 6,ooo-word People’s Daily editorial did not men- tion Khrushchev by name but it cited his specific ac- tions and his direct quotes on many issues, then re- butted them. This was the first time Peking has admitted that the U.S.S.R. has applied economic sanctions against Red China. It was generally known in the West that Khrushchev had scrapped much of his Chinese aid pro- gram (see “Moscow-Peking Relations in Perspective,” Communist Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1) but the People’s Daily reference was to “hundreds” of broken agree- ments and indicated the cut-off was more extensive than originally believed. The official organ of the Chinese Communist Party disclosed that the Soviet crackdown occurred as early as June 1960, after the Romanian Communist Party Congress, when Red China assailed Khrushchev’s friend- ly overtures toward President Eisenhower. “After the Bucharest meeting, some comrades who had attacked the Chinese Communist Party lost no time in taking a series of grave steps applying economic and political pressure against China,” the People’s Daily said. “Disregarding international practice, they perfidious- ly and unilaterally tore up agreements and contracts they had concluded with a fraternal country. These agreements and contracts are to be counted, not in twos or threes or in scores, but in hundreds.” It said these “malicious acts” extended ideological differences to state relations and violated international Marxist principles. The Red Chinese attack on Khrushchev was con- tained in an editorial entitled “A Reply to Comrade Thorez and Other Comrades.” It followed two major developments. The first was publication by the Red Chinese of the texts of criticisms 6 by Khrushchev, the Soviet Party Newspaper Pravda, France’s Communist leader Maurice Thorez and Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliati. The second was the summoning of the Soviet am- bassador in Peking to a meeting with Red China’s Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai and President Liu Shao-chi. Western speculation had centered around the possi- bility that Peking and Moscow would agree to a sum- mit meeting to examine their differences. The Peoplds Daily editorial, however, indicated that though this may take place, there is little ground for believing that a reconciliation can be reached without a complete back- down by one or the other principal in the quarrel. The Red Chinese reiterated that they will, under no circumstances, budge from their opposition to Khrush- chev’s new friend, Yugoslavia, or from their support of his old enemy, tiny Albania (see Communist Affairs, Vol. I, No. 3, p. I I ; and Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 8 and 9). Sino-Soviet Dispute Perplexes Japanese Reds Changes in policy of the Japanese Communist Party often have been influenced by changes in external affairs. As the dispute between the leaders of Com- munist China and the Soviet Union has grown more bitter, the party’s position has been of interest to stu- dents of Japanese politics. Until late 1962, the Party carefully avoided taking sides in the dispute. However, after the 6th Congress of the German Socialist Unity (i.e., Communist) Party in January, articles in Aka- huta (Red Flag), the official Japanese Communist Party daily newspaper of Tokyo, indicated the nature of the dilemma. Akahata, after carrying the text of the Congress speech of Walter Ulbricht, East German Communist leader, on Jan. 17, 1963 and the texts of addresses by Khrushchev and Wu Hsiu Chuan, on Jan. 19 and 20, respectively, published its fust editorial comment on the Party Congress on Jan. 24, under the title “Some attempts by reactionaries and anti-Party revisionists in the International Communist Movement.” The edi- torial upheld the spirit of the November 1957 Moscow Declaration, which stressed “the method of solving the differences of opinion among the brother parties.” Further, the paper reprinted on Jan. 28 the editorial of the Peking Jen-Min Jih-Pao (People’s Daily), official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, under the title: “Let us unite on the basis of de Moscow Declaration and Moscow statement,” which began thus: “There is an attempt to inflict damage on the Moscow Declara- tion by citing the problem of Yugoslavia, by reversing the condemnation of Tito’s groups and with a further objective to discard the Declaration. As a result of this the international Communist movement faces a serious danger internally.” On Feb. 2, 1963, Akahata reprinted an article from the Jan. 30,1g63 Pyongyang Rodong Shinmoon (Work-

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DEVElOPlENTS AND TRENDS=

Sino-Soviet Dispute Continues In one of the most bitter criticisms ever made of the

Soviet Union by the Communist Party of another coun- try, Red China has accused the U.S.S.R. of “perfidiously and unilaterally” tearing up hundreds of aid agree- ments and contracts as part of a campaign of economic pressure against Peking.

The attack, which included charges against Soviet Premier Khrushchev personally, came in an editorial in the official Peking Peoplds Daily of Feb. 27. It ac- cused Khrushchev of touching off disunity in the Com- munist camp as far back as 1959.

The party organ’s blast weakened speculation that Moscow and Peking might be moving toward a recon- ciliation. Particularly when it was followed next day by another People’s Daily statement that Peking will never bow to the “master to their servants” attitude in order to ease the Sino-Soviet rift.

The Feb. 27 editorial accused Khrushchev of starting the quarrel which now divides world communism by condemning Red China in its border dispute with India. Khrushchev issued his criticism, the newspaper said, on the eve of his Camp David talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower in September 1959.

The 6,ooo-word People’s Daily editorial did not men- tion Khrushchev by name but it cited his specific ac- tions and his direct quotes on many issues, then re- butted them.

This was the first time Peking has admitted that the U.S.S.R. has applied economic sanctions against Red China. It was generally known in the West that Khrushchev had scrapped much of his Chinese aid pro- gram (see “Moscow-Peking Relations in Perspective,” Communist Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1) but the People’s Daily reference was to “hundreds” of broken agree- ments and indicated the cut-off was more extensive than originally believed.

The official organ of the Chinese Communist Party disclosed that the Soviet crackdown occurred as early as June 1960, after the Romanian Communist Party Congress, when Red China assailed Khrushchev’s friend- ly overtures toward President Eisenhower.

“After the Bucharest meeting, some comrades who had attacked the Chinese Communist Party lost no time in taking a series of grave steps applying economic and political pressure against China,” the People’s Daily said.

“Disregarding international practice, they perfidious- ly and unilaterally tore up agreements and contracts they had concluded with a fraternal country. These agreements and contracts are to be counted, not in twos or threes or in scores, but in hundreds.”

It said these “malicious acts” extended ideological differences to state relations and violated international Marxist principles.

The Red Chinese attack on Khrushchev was con- tained in an editorial entitled “A Reply to Comrade Thorez and Other Comrades.”

It followed two major developments. The first was publication by the Red Chinese of the texts of criticisms

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by Khrushchev, the Soviet Party Newspaper Pravda, France’s Communist leader Maurice Thorez and Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliati.

The second was the summoning of the Soviet am- bassador in Peking to a meeting with Red China’s Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai and President Liu Shao-chi.

Western speculation had centered around the possi- bility that Peking and Moscow would agree to a sum- mit meeting to examine their differences. The Peoplds Daily editorial, however, indicated that though this may take place, there is little ground for believing that a reconciliation can be reached without a complete back- down by one or the other principal in the quarrel.

The Red Chinese reiterated that they will, under no circumstances, budge from their opposition to Khrush- chev’s new friend, Yugoslavia, or from their support of his old enemy, tiny Albania (see Communist Affairs, Vol. I, No. 3, p. I I ; and Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 8 and 9).

Sino-Soviet Dispute Perplexes Japanese Reds

Changes in policy of the Japanese Communist Party often have been influenced by changes in external affairs. As the dispute between the leaders of Com- munist China and the Soviet Union has grown more bitter, the party’s position has been of interest to stu- dents of Japanese politics. Until late 1962, the Party carefully avoided taking sides in the dispute. However, after the 6th Congress of the German Socialist Unity (i.e., Communist) Party in January, articles in Aka- huta (Red Flag), the official Japanese Communist Party daily newspaper of Tokyo, indicated the nature of the dilemma.

Akahata, after carrying the text of the Congress speech of Walter Ulbricht, East German Communist leader, on Jan. 17, 1963 and the texts of addresses by Khrushchev and Wu Hsiu Chuan, on Jan. 19 and 20,

respectively, published its fust editorial comment on the Party Congress on Jan. 24, under the title “Some attempts by reactionaries and anti-Party revisionists in the International Communist Movement.” The edi- torial upheld the spirit of the November 1957 Moscow Declaration, which stressed “the method of solving the differences of opinion among the brother parties.”

Further, the paper reprinted on Jan. 28 the editorial of the Peking Jen-Min Jih-Pao (People’s Daily), official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, under the title: “Let us unite on the basis of de Moscow Declaration and Moscow statement,” which began thus: “There is an attempt to inflict damage on the Moscow Declara- tion by citing the problem of Yugoslavia, by reversing the condemnation of Tito’s groups and with a further objective to discard the Declaration. As a result of this the international Communist movement faces a serious danger internally.”

On Feb. 2, 1963, Akahata reprinted an article from the Jan. 30,1g63 Pyongyang Rodong Shinmoon (Work-

er’s Newspaper), an official organ of the North Korean Communist Party, which urged unity and solidarity of the “Socialist Camp” and the International Corn- t munist movement. This article also criticized the 6th Congress of the German Socialist Unity Party as fol- lows: “The Congress . . . not only invited the delegate of the Titoites and gave him the rostrum but also al- lowed him to slander and attack the fraternal party enjoying prestige in the Socialist camp, going so far as to applaud him and respond enthusiastically.”

Judging from these and other articles in AX-ahata, the Japanese Party is siding with Chinese Communists in the Moscow-Peking rift. A dilemma of that Party, however, is that by leaning toward Communist China’s hard line, it is laying itself open to political suicide in Japan. The Japanese remember well that the Party’s popularity with the general public dwindled markedly when it moved from a moderate to a more radical ap- proach beginning in 195 I.

World Peace Council Humiliated at Oxford The World Peace Council (W.P.C.) has suffered one

of its greatest humiliations-that of being publicly ostracized by the Conference of Non-Aligned Peace Movements, which met at Oxford, England, Jan. 4-7 to set up a new non-aligned world peace organization. (See news reports in the London Sunday Times, Sun- day Telegraph and The Observer of Jan. 6; and the Manchester Guardian Weekly, the London Daily Tele- graph and the Communist DaiZy Worker of Jan. 9.) Although the organizers had originally invited the W.P.C. to send observers, the assembled delegates over- ruled their leaders and refused admission to the II prominent W.P.C. representatives.

They did so on grounds there was no place for an “aligned” (i.e., Soviet-controlled) body like the WPC in their new and strictly nonaligned organization. One of the conditions for membership is to be willing to condem all nuclear tests without distinction and to criticize, where necessary, all governments, particu- larly one’s own. The Oxford Conference, it should be noted, was called by the European Federation Against Nuclear Arms, a group of pacifists, some of whom at- tended the 1962 Moscow Conference on General Dis- armament and Peace. That Conference, in July, was organized by the WPC to convince the outside world of the Soviet Government’s peaceful intentions.

Although informal discussions were held in London afterwards between some Oxford delegates and the WPC representatives, the “friendly atmosphere” of which was stressed by WPC, this could not disguise the setback. For apart from the humiliation of being excluded from the conference, which provoked consid- erable publicity, the WPC has been widely exposed as the Soviet-controlled front organization that it is; and, worst of all from its own viewpoint, it now faces the competition of a new genuine peace organization.

In writing of the Oxford Conference, the British paci- fist weekly Peace News, of Dec. 21, 1962 said:

“The purpose of the conference being to strengthen the independent peace movement, it is obviously im- portant that the World Council of Peace should not be

closely associated with it. While it must be recognized that the . . . Council has been hospitable and generous on some occasions, such as at the Moscow Congress last July, it must also be faced that it has usually served as the apologist and window-dresser for Soviet . . . policy. It is important that the non-aligned peace movement should break away-and be seen to break away-from the very ideas which have got the world into the present situation. . . .”

Several leading British papers were less charitable than Peace News in commenting on the attempt of the WPC delegation to attend the Oxford meeting. The London Sunday Times of Jan. 6, 1963 headlined its article “WPC Delegation told ‘Keep out,’ ” and men- tioned that the group did, however, “meet members representing 17 countries, including Yugoslavia, India and Ghana, at a social at Ruskin College, Oxford, last night.”

The Sunday Telegraph of Jan. 6 reported that Ilya Ehrenburg and a group of ten other “hand-picked fel- low-communists or svmoathisers” were trying to “gate- crash and take over;’ the Oxford Confer&F, but-had “the gates slammed in their faces.” Thus was inflicted on the “Moscow-dominated World Peace Council one of the most humiliating public setbacks it has ever suffered. . . . The moment it heard of the Oxford scheme, the Kremlin took alarm at the prospect of losing its long lead in global ‘peace’ agitation.”

While U.S. participants at the Oxford meeting strong- ly opposed admission of the WPC delegation, they were by no means alone in taldng such a position, The Observer of Jan. 6 points out. It approvingly cites the leader of the American delegation, Homer A. Jacks, as saying: “We helped to promote their decision about excluding the World Peace Council but I want to make it clear that this is not an American veto. Delegates from Canada, the U.K., some Western European coun- tries and India also strongly expressed their views. We feel it would be wrong to have people we are discussing present even as observers, especially since the frame of reference was strictly non-alignment.”

Huge U.S. loan Strengthens India India has just received “the largest dollar loan with-

out interest ever made by the United States,” accord- ing to a mid-February announcement by John K. Gal- braith, U.S. Ambassador to India. The interest-free $240 million loan is designed to speed up India’s rate of economic development and make India a viable eco- nomic rival to Communist China. This new U.S. strat- egy concerning loans may mark a turning point in checking the spread of totalitarian philosophy insofar as plans for economic development in Asia and other underdeveloped countries is concerned. Furthermore, it will reinforce the U.S. position in India vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. So far, total U.S. aid to India exceeds $4 billions as compared with about $I billion from the Soviet Bloc. This includes 4 MIG jets, which have just been given to India according to a Feb. II announce- ment by the All India Radio.

Since the October invasion, India has received nearly $30 million worth of U.S. military aid, according to

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Paul Grimes’ dispatch in the New York Times of Dec. 21, 1962; long-range aid from the United States, Bri- tain, Canada, Australia, and even France is under study.

The Kennedy administration is not overly enthusias- tic about the two alliances to which Pakistan belongs (Central Treaty Organization and South East Asian Treaty Organization, initiated during the Eisenhower administration), Pakistan’s meager economic growth in the last decade (in spite of over $I billion in U.S. aid), its unsettled problems with India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over Pashtoonistan, its physical division into East and West sections, and the authoritarian as- pects of President Ayub Khan’s “guided democracy” which ruled Pakistan for two years under martial law.

On the other hand, India, representing 80 per cent of the subcontinent’s area, has advanced into the take- off stage of economic growth and gives better promise of being a viable competitor to Communist China. The United States, however, would like to see Pakistan and India form a united front against Communist China. In terms of its national interest, the United States is not willing to give up one in favor of the other-it is certainly difficult to choose between a forthright and loyal ally (Pakistan) and a geopolitically more impor- tant neutral (India). (See, for example, C. L. Sulz- berger’s dispatch in the New York Times of Dec. 24,

1962.) The Sino-Indian border dispute which triggered the

Western military aid to India-for which the Indians are thankful to the United States-continues as a poten- tial problem in that area. In mid-December (1962) six nonaligned Afro-Asian countries (Egypt, Ghana, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia) met in Co- lombo, Ceylon, in an effort to make peace between India and China. Ceylonese Prime Minister Mrs. Siri- mavo Bandaranaike, initiator of the Colombo Confer- ence, visited with Chinese and Indian leaders in Janu- ary and expressed optimism about the settlement of the dispute. (See for example, the Kabul [Afghanistan] Times of Jan. 21, 22, and 24.)

Prime Minister Nehru stated Jan. 21 that the Co- lombo Conference proposals were largely in line with the Indian stand. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mar- shal Chen Yi, stated Jan. 22 that China accepts the pro- posals in “principle.” He added, however, that “China maintains certain points of its own interpretation of the proposals,” but differences “may well be resolved by the two sides through direct negotiation.” On Jan. 23, Nehru told Parliament that India and China must accept all proposals of the Colombo Conference before direct talks could begin. Previously, Nehru had offered to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice at the Hague for arbitration.

Communist China has used a combination of force and diplomacy to try to compel India to negotiate from a weak position and obtain certain concessions. China is primarily interested in that portion of Ladakh through which a major road has been built. The Chinese have been successful in developing friendly relations with its other neighbors and have amounted border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan and Pakistan-none of which have shown sympathy for In dia’s position in the border dispute.

Communists Woo Pakistan After capturing a dominant role in Afghanistan’s

economic sphere (see Communist Afltirs, October 1962, Vol. I, No. 3)) the U.S.S.R. is shifting its policy of peaceful penetration to Pakistan. Beginning in 1953 when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and later the Central Treaty Organization and South East Asia Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union had directed massive propaganda assaults against Pakistan. Re- cently, however, that policy has been reversed.

The Soviet Government’s main plan of attack seems to be directed at driving Pakistan into the neutral camp and out of its alliances with the West. In December 1962, while Pakistan was reappraising the usefulness of its membership with CENT0 and SEATO, the Soviet Union offered $30 million in economic aid. This offer is in addition to oil exploration which the Soviet Union has undertaken in Pakistan since 1961.

Pakistani sources justify receiving aid from the Soviet Union as follows: “If the U.S. can unload colossal mili- tary and economic aid into India despite Mr. Nehru’s neutralism, it is legitimate for us to receive assistance from both the camps in spite of our conspicuous West- ern leanings.” (Leader, a strongly nationalistic daily of Karachi, quoted in Pakistan News Digest, the official publication of the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, Jan. 1, 1963). Ulug Zade, a famous Soviet writer who visited Karachi in December of 1962, was quoted in the same source as calling for more cultural exchanges be- tween Pakistan and the Soviet Union “to bring the people of the two countries closer together.”

On March 2, 1963 Pakistan and Red China signed a boundary agreement on the basis of the accord reached in principle between the two countries and an- nounced Dec. 28, 1962. On the Pakistan side, the agree- ment was signed by the new foreign minister, Zulfihar Ali Bhutto, overriding a U.S. State Department warn- ing and drawing a protest from India’s Prime Minister Nehru.

In another significant development, the first trade agreement ever undertaken between the two countries was signed in Karachi, Pakistan, on January 5, 1963. Pakistan is already experiencing an unfavorable bal- ance of trade with Communist China. During 1961-62, Pakistan’s total imports amounted to $3.5 million with a net deficit of $1.3 million, according to an Associated Press report from Karachi dated Jan. 2, 1963.

Regarding the Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan will hold their fourth round of talks in India in April amid pessimism concerning their success (see Pakistan Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 4, Jan. 30, 1963). Their previous talks at Rawalpindi (December 1g62), New Delhi (mid- January), and Karachi (mid-February) gave meager promise of a future settlement.

Iraqi Revolution Brings Anti-Communists To Power Within weeks the Middle East has witnessed the suc-

cess of two revolutions-first in Yemen and now in Iraq. Both have occurred under the auspices of a mih- tary elite using the tactics and dedicated to principles of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolution in Egypt

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10 years ago. Syria is under pressure, and may blow up next.

The new regime’s apparent anti-Communist orienta- tion has shifted the power balance in the Middle East in favor of the West, and the Communists don’t like it. The U.S. position &-a-v-is the new regime was to sup- port it immediately. Iraq’s former ruler had frequently blamed the United States for all Iraq’s internal prob- lems-a stand due in part to U.S. refusal to allow Iraq to absorb the oil-rich state of Kuwait.

The U.S. position in Iraq has much to gain and little to lose under the new regime as compared with the old. Iraq “had become the most pro-Soviet salient in this part of the World” (Dana Adams Schmidt in the New York Times, Western Ed., Feb. 16). As expected, the coup hurt Moscow, which ranted its protest (see Quotable Quotes, page I 2).

The new government cannot be considered the ulti- mate in anti-Communism, however, since its officials stress that they are fighting the Communist Party and not the U.S.S.R. Schmidt (New York Times, Feb. 18) quotes the new Iraqi Minister of State, Shehadeh Ja- wad, as saying, “We intend to crush abolutely the Communist party in Iraq, not because it is Communist but because it took up arms against us.” While the old agreements with the Soviet bloc would need revising, according to the Minister, he declared, <&we hope to con- tinue friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other friendly Socialist countries and even with Com- munist parties . . . ” Furthermore, the Associated Press -in a Baghdad dispatch dated Feb. 21-cites President Abdel Salem At-if as stating Iraq intended to allow Soviet technicians to remain. He did add, to the un- doubted chagrin of the Communists, that Iraq would use these technicians as the United States had used the Nazis after World War II-obviously a reference to our use of German scientists.

Iraq, according to the Department of State’s 1962 publication “The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive,” has received about $2 16 million dollars in credits from the Sino-Soviet bloc since 1958 and had 830 Sino-Soviet technicians as of June 1962. In addition, according to the Cairo official weekly Arab Observer of Feb. 18, 1963, the Kassem government owed Moscow about “$400 millions” for tanks, trucks, artillery and a jet air force. It will take more than economic gratuities to restore the Soviet prestige lost in the Iraqi revolution, however.

Yemen’s New Orientation: West or East? The Yemeni Civil War has been a continuing cause

for concern, not only because of sustained hostilities in the area, but also because of the catalytic effect it may have on the rest of the Middle East. The recent coup in Iraq may have been precipitated, in part, by the proclaimed success of the Yemeni revolutionary Junta and its subsequent recognition by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The United Nations has been sufficiently concerned about Yemen to dispatch its ace trouble shooter, Dr. Ralph Btmche, to the area Feb. 28. As Communist Affairs went to press, President Kennedy was reported to be considering moving units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the Red Sea, close to the Yemeni hostilities. The

United Arab Republic has committed an estimated 20,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen-troops which are looked on with fear by neighboring Saudi Arabia and its feudal king, Ibn Saud, who considers President Nas- ser of the U.A.R. to be his principal enemy in the Middle East. (Joseph Alsop, in his column distributed Feb. 27, goes so far as to call the Yemen conflict pri- marily one between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia.)

Certainly U.S. recognition represents a new and dif- ferent U.S. policy toward the area than heretofore ob- served. Since World War II the United States has not been held in high esteem by the peoples of the Middle East; often it has been looked upon as an “imperialistic” and “reactionary” country. U.S. support of the Bagh- dad Pact, Israel, and ancient monarchical regimes has reaped the dislike of many nationalist-minded Arab leaders. U.S. recognition of the Yemeni Republican regime hay help towards alleviating this condemnation. U.S. recognition, however, has been considered prema- ture by many (see the article by Dana Adams Schmidt in the New York Times of Dec. 22, 1962).

Britain, according to the New York Times of Feb 13, has been asked to withdraw its mission to Yemen. In what may be a Yemeni attempt to force Britain to rec- ognize the new regime. Britain could be withholding recognition for several reasons, including the fact that on Jan. 16 it reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, a country opposed to Yemen’s new gov- ernment; in addition, Yemen’s previous claims to the British protectorate of Aden have not found favor with Britain.

Furthermore, recent events have raised questions as to the stability and success of the new Junta. The Amman Jordan radio on Jan. 24, quoted the Yemeni information Ministry as stating “ . . . the royalist forces in Yemen are now knocking on the doors of the capital, Sana, on all sides and the hour of victory is very near.”

The Kennedy administration has apparently based its recognition on the grounds that the revolutionary government represents relatively modern, democratic, and progressive forces, that could bring Yemen into the 20th century immune to the blandishments of Com- munist diplomats. Premier Sallal has told Western news agencies that “The present state of Yemeni social life makes the introduction of communism here com- pletely impossible.” It does not follow, however, that the present Yemeni regime is pro-West.

Sallal made the following statement on Jan. 18 con- cerning his efforts to maintain power: “ . . . our friends are behind us; Russia is behind us; the whole of the Eastern camp is behind us . . . ” Radio sana also re- ported on Jan. 21 the text of a letter from Soviet Pre- mier Khrushchev in which the latter stated that the revolutionary regime “can rely in this just struggle on friendly support from the Soviet Union in the future.” In addition, Radio Sana announced that Yemen was currently negotiating with the U.S.S.R. concerning ad- ditional economic, agricultural, and technical aid.

Hewlett Johnson to Retire Hewlett Johnson will no longer be the Red Dean of

Canterbury as of May 31, according to an announce- ment from London on Jan. 4, 1963 (New York Times,

9

Western Ed., Jan. 5, 1963). With the retirement of Dr. Johnson, the Soviet Union loses an ardent admirer, whose uncritical identification of the ideals of Chris- tianity with the practices of the Soviet regime has long been an irritant to the Anglican Church. In an inter- view on Jan. 7 he openly admitted, “I am a Communist -1 am not a member of the Communist Party, but I am a Communist in principle,” (Los Angeles Times, Jan. 8, 1963, Page 19). This only confirmed what long since had been conjectured, notwithstanding his coy denials.

The retirement of the 8g-year-old high cleric of the Church points up both the relative impotence of Com- munist ideology to win over a Christian body even with such an eminent representative in its ranks, and the great strength of England’s free institutions, which have been able to absorb and contain the destructive effect of his praise of the Soviet Union. For an example of Dr. Johnson’s approach, see his book, The Secret of Soviet Strength (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

Kremlin Sends 32 Christians Back to Siberia On Jan. 4, 1963, Associated Press reported the Ameri-

can Embassy’s refusal of asylum to 32 Siberian peasants seeking to leave Russia for religious reasons. Despite the poignant tales of persecution told by the peasants, the Embassy probably had no choice in the delicate situation.

To date, the actual identity of the peasants remains unclear. W. C. Jones, a California industrialist person- ally acquainted with the Baptists in Moscow, in a letter to the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 23, 1963, said they were “part of an extremist sect” (compare Time, Jan. I I, 1963, p. 31). However, most reports said they called themselves “evangelical Christians.” (See, for example, New York Times, Western Ed., Jan. 4, 1963, p. 2).

There is speculation that the group may have been comprised of Russian Baptists who, for one reason or another, had been denied legal recognition in Cherno- gorsk.

Whatever the final explanation, this incident con- firms reports of increasing severity in Soviet religious policy (see Communist Affairs, Vol. I, No. 4, Dec. 1962, p. 12). According to a letter from Moscow cited in the Slavic Gospel News (Chicago: Slavic Gospel Associa- tion, No. 97 [June, 1962 J, p. g), the presence in church of any person under 18 years of age even at a Christmas service constitutes grounds for closure of the church. This is the most severe restriction against religious youth ever promulgated by the Soviet regime. The stories told by the Siberian peasants of forcible separa- tion of children from believing parents (Newsweek, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 32) have no parallel in Soviet history, and are remnn ’ ‘scent of the Tsarist treatment of the Dukhobors (see E. Yaroslavsky, 0 Religii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957)) p. I 86. A growing body of data is supporting the report of C. Elchaninoff in 1961: “Often I was told [in Moscow]: ‘The present persecu- tion of the Church is worse than that in the years 1929-30’ ” (Messenger of The Russian Student Christian Movement, No. 62/63, Paris, 1961).

Emigres Appeal to Russians in Cuba Russian-language broadcasts to Soviet troops in Cuba

were initiated Nov. 3, 1962, by Radio Free Russia, an operation of the N.T.S. (Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz), an organization of political emigres from the U.S.S.R. known in English as the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Taped in the studios of WGS-FM in Wash- ington, D.C., the broadcasts have been flown to the Do- minican Republic and transmitted nightly over Radio Caribe from Santo Domingo. The N.T.S. announce- ment of Feb. 25 states in part:

“The radio program we are conducting for the Soviet troops in Cuba is the only avenue through which the Russian soldiers and ofi-icers in Cuba-actually, their hearts-may be reached. It is futile to hope that they should listen to and be swayed by purely American propaganda (the VOA, for example). They know that -at least, in the case of Cuba-the Americans cannot be entirely disinterested. . . . But when Russians speak to them, they realize that it is really the true interests of the Communist-oppressed Russian people--their own interests-that the N.T.S. has at heart. In what Radio Free Russia tells them-as Russians to Russians-there is, and could be, no ulterior ‘Lforeign” motives. Such was our experience in Hungary, and so it is also in Cuba. . . .

“If the Cubans revolt, the Russians should refuse to shoot at them. They should join the freedom fighters. Only under these circumstances could Castro be toppled from within. If U.S. troops will have to be used, the GI’s will face a very determined Russian force in Cuba, unless the Russian soldiers have been duly educated and conditioned beforehand.”

The National Alliance of Russian Solidarists was founded in Yugoslavia in the early thirties, primarily by the sons of White Russian emigres who were dis- satisfied with the sterility of the political platform of their fathers and sought a dynamic alternative to com- munism. They found their first inspiration in the ideas of Italian fascism, but soon developed their own ideol- ogy, known as Solidarism. During World War II, while collaborating with the Nazis in a desperate effort to break through to their fellow-countrymen across the battle lines, they seemed to have lost most of their fascist notions, and most of the N.T.S. leaders wound up the war period either in Nazi or Soviet prisons. Since the end of World War II the Russian Solidarists have re- ceived limited financial and moral support from West German, French, British, American and similar sources in the non-Communist world. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that N.T.S. has been the subject of criticism from various quarters.

Communists Back Goulart Foreign Policy The Secretary-General of the Brazilian Communist

Party, Luis Carlos Prestes, has “stressed that Brazilian Communists support the foreign policy line of the Joao Goulart government. That government has resumed diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., is undertaking to extend trade relations with the socialist (i.e., Com- munist-ruled) countries, has come out for disarmament and a thermonuclear test ban and in favor of self-deter-

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mination of nations,” according to a TASS dispatch from Havana dated March IO, published in Pravda March I I, 1963. The veteran Brazilian Communist is further quoted as having told an interviewer of the Cuban Communist newspaper Hay that “revolution is not a synonym for force” and that “under contempor- ary conditions in some Latin American countries a revolution is possible without civil war and an armed uprising. . . . But the peaceful path is far from a passive form of struggle.”

Deeply impressed by the “achievements of the Cuban Revolution,” the Secretary-General of the Brazilian Communist Party was quoted by TASS as having stated that the Brazilian people support it because “all workers, even the backward masses of the village, understand that the Cuban Revolution is the vanguard of our own revolution.”

Prestes explained that the foreign policy of Brazil re- flects the position of the “national bourgeoisie” and that, as the latter becomes stronger, its protest against the “imperialistic pillage” of the “American monopolies” increases in strength. But since the “national bourgeoi- sie” is itself an “exploiting class,” it is characterized by “wavering and indecisiveness” in pursuing its anti-im- perialist policies and hence Prestes clearly implies it needs the firm support of the Communists-in order to carry its “anti-imperialist” (i.e., anti-American) policy to its logical conclusion. This calls for not only drastic agrarian reforms but for “state monopoly of foreign trade,” a taboo on the ‘Lexport of profits by foreign monopolies” and the “nationalization of these monopo- lies,” according to the TASS report in Pravda.

In the light of this report, it is interesting to note the State Department’s official claim of responsibility March 15 of a statement that Communists have infiltrated the govermnent of Brazil, made public March 14 in a re- port by a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee and previously attributed to the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon. The report has now been played down.

Upon hearing of the report, President Goulart asked clarification of the charges. He also temporarily called a halt to Brazilian negotiations for badly-needed U.S. aid-ordering his finance minister, Francisco San Tiago Dantas, in Washington on a money-seeking mission, to suspend talks. Dantas is seeking extensive U.S. aid, in- cluding release of some $84 million in aid withheld after the resignation of President Janio Quadros in 1961.

Communists Fare Badly at Moshi Africa’s importance in the East-West power struggle

was highlighted in February by developments at the third Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity (AAPSO) Confer- ence-a Communist-penetrated body which met at Moshi, Tanganyika, after that country’s government refused to allow the meeting to be held at Dar es Sa- laam. Delegates from 58 countries and observers from another 40 attended.

The Conference was a fiasco from a Communist point of view, for they were their own worst enemies in a session that saw them alienating the Africans. For the Communist delegates, the Conference got off to a very bad start with the hard-hitting, anti-Communist open-

, ing speech of Tanganyika’s President, Julius K. Nye- rere. According to Robert Conley, reporting from Moshi for the Nezu York Times, one delegate called that speech “the strongest attack ever made on the Communist bloc by a non-aligned leader at such a con- ference” (the Times Western Ed., Feb. 5). Conley summarized the Conference’s results (New York Times Western Ed., Feb. 15) in part as follows: “ . . . the Africans left with awareness that it had not been a conference at all but a Communist party platform for attacks against the West . . . Africa was forgotten, its aspirations pushed aside, in the delegate’s rush to de- nounce the United States as a ‘rotten, reactionary, de- cadent force’.”

In his opening address-while delegates from the U.S.S.R. and Red China sat in chilly silence-Nyerere warned the delegates to “Be on your guard” against “a new imperialism.” Smith Hempstone, reporting the Conference opening Feb. 4 for the Chicago Daily News Foreign Service, said that Nyerere, in obvious refer- ence to “Communist fishing in Africa’s troubled waters” and to Marxist terminology used by many African lead- ers, warned Africans not to “allow ourselves to become dupes of other people or of the slogans which we used in our struggle for freedom from colonialism.”

Nyerere added that Africans “must not think of this new imperialism in terms of the old colonial powers.” “Imperialism is a byproduct of wealth and power,” he warned. From the economic viewpoint, he charged Communist countries with the “same crime that was committed by the capitalists before”-namely, of be- ginning to use wealth for the purpose of acquiring “power and prestige.” Still addressing himself to the Communist delegations, he said no state had enough wealth to “satisfy the desire of a single individual for power and prestige.” (For other reports on the confer- ence, see Robert Conley’s report in the New York Times, Western Ed., Feb. 5, and that of Russell Howe distrib- uted by the Washington Post, Feb. IO).

The Soviet delegate to the conference, M. T. Zade, in an obvious appeal for the support of other delega- tions, announced that this country was ready to give “practical, effective assistance of all kinds” to other countries engaged in the “struggle for independence.” As at recent AAPSO meetings, &o-Soviet differences were an important topic.

African Students Demonstrate in Sofia In February, conflict broke out between African stu-

dents and Bulgarian authorities in Sofia, due to student demonstrations against indoctrination and a ban on African student unions. All 350 Africans studying in Bulgaria were planning to leave the country, according to the New York Times (Feb. 15, 1963). This includes students from 8 African nations including Ghana, where bitterness concerning the incident was expressed by the Ghana Times; on Feb. 14, the influential news- paper of Accra compared the Sofia clash to last fall’s riots at the University of Mississippi and said Africans were “shocked and dismayed by Bulgaria’s display of ‘racial prejudice.’ ” Similar incidents, but on a smaller scale, were reported in Communist Affairs, Vol. I, No. 3, October 1962.

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