single-arm studies to support drug reimbursement in … · •submissions claimed superior efficacy...
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SINGLE-ARM STUDIES TO SUPPORT DRUG REIMBURSEMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Beth O’Leary Sarah Jane McKenna
Heather McElroy Adam Gordois
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 1
PSD Analyses
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 2
Objectives
► To review Australian PBAC submissions that have used single-arm studies as the primary evidence to ascertain approaches to providing comparative evidence their success the PBAC’s comments on these submissions
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 3
Methods
N=694 • A database of 674 PSDs published between July 2005 and December 2013
N=23
• Searched for the term “single-arm” or “single arm” (N=22) • An additional submission (imatinib, rare diseases) was identified as presenting
case series as the primary clinical data and was included in the data set
N=11
• Trials which included a comparator arm were excluded (N=9) • As were drugs which were modifications of formulations already reimbursed based
on comparative evidence (N=2)
N=12 • Overall, 12 submissions were included in the primary analysis
Update search
• Update search conducted in March 2015 identified 5 additional submissions
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 4
Submissions with evidence from single arm trials
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 5
Generic name Requested indication
Reimbursed indications PBAC decision
Aprepitant Secondary prophylaxis of CINV associated with MEC
CINV associated with HEC
Recommended
Arsenic trioxide Acute promyelocytic leukaemia
Not listed Recommended
Imatinib ALL expressing the Ph+ or the transcript bcr-abl tyrosine kinase in newly diagnosed patients or patients with relapsed or refractory disease
Range of indications Recommended (newly diagnosed) Rejected (relapsed or refractory)
Nilotinib Ph+ CML in adult patients intolerant of or resistant to ≥ 1 prior therapy, including imatinib
Not listed Recommended
Posaconazole Salvage treatment of life-threatening fungal infections
Not listed Recommended
Ribavirin HCV; children and adolescents fulfilling certain criteria
HCV, adults Recommended
Dasatinib ALL expressing the Ph+ or the transcript bcr-abl kinase who are resistant to or intolerant of prior therapy
Not listed Rejected; recommended after resubmission
Eculizumab aHUS
PNH Rejected; recommended after resubmission
Imatinib 4 rare diseases
Range of indications Rejected; recommended after resubmission
Macrogol Faecal impaction, where conventional therapies have failed, and alternative treatments may require hospital admission
Not listed Rejected
Vorinostat Advanced CTCL after failure of 4 systemic therapies
Not listed Rejected
Infliximab RA dose escalation to 5 mg/kg
RA Rejected
Key findings
ESTABLISHING COMPARATIVE EFFICACY AND SAFETY
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 6
11 • submissions claimed superior efficacy and/or safety over the
comparator
9 • used published data to estimate the comparator’s effectiveness
and safety
2 • presented data that appeared to have been collected to inform
the submission
3 • presented no comparator data • efficacy and safety appears to have been inferred from pre- and
post-treatment differences for two of these submissions
Key findings
► For submissions presenting an economic evaluation, the ICER was variable: Three submissions < $15K/QALY or < $15K/life year
gained (LYG) Two submissions < $15 to $45K/LYG
One product with an ICER > $1M was recommended for listing on the LSDP
► All the products had a budget impact of < $10M per year with the exception of the drug recommended for the LSDP
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 7
Key findings
OUTCOMES
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 8
Overall success rate = 9/12 = 75%
Three recommended after resubmission
Six of the 12 drugs recommended for reimbursement (five claimed superiority over the comparator)
Key findings
High clinical need
Evidence of effectiveness in other indications
Five of nine products were already listed for other indications
Low budget impact
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCCESS
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 9
Other single-arm submissions ► PSDs for eight additional products used a single arm of a
comparative study to compare with the submission comparator treatment.
In general, submissions used similar techniques. Cetuximab used analysis of the Medicare Australia claims database to estimate survival in patients with colorectal cancer.
► Since the initial search, there have been further positive recommendations for products based on a primary evidence base of a single-arm study(s):
brentuximab for systemic anaplastic large cell lymphoma
denosumab for giant cell tumours
betaine for the treatment of homocystinuria
nitisinone for hereditary tyrosinaemia type 1 (HT-1)
ponatinib for CML and PH+ ALL
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 10
Study Limitations
► Search strategy may not have identified all relevant PSDs
► Information contained in the PSDs on the evidence base for some products is incomplete
► Public information on some submissions is not available, and submissions included with a recommendation to reject may be resubmitted in the future.
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 11
Conclusions
| ISPOR – Single Arm Studies | April 21st, 2015 12
Half (6/12) of first-time submissions were approved for reimbursement by the PBAC, similar to the approval rate for all first-time submissions to the PBAC 75% (9/12) were eventually approved
While expressing concerns regarding the quality of the comparative evidence, the PBAC accepted the evidence base in the majority of cases
Only five drugs were listed for other indications – suggesting that while this may be helpful, it was not a prerequisite
The PBAC's acceptance of single-arm studies as the primary clinical evidence for drug reimbursement submissions may reflect a recognition of the practical and ethical challenges of undertaking comparative studies in some patient populations
A COMPARISON OF ASIAN AND GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES USING AN EKS METHOD
Peter Davey, Macquarie University; PRIMA Consulting; Emerge Health.
Overview of the presentation
•Background to the study •Methods •Results •Discussion
Background to the study • My experience
• In health and around pharmaceuticals for over 25 years • Projects overseas in a large number of countries which involved
also profiling funding arrangements • Brief period at IMS Health, largest supplier of pharmaceutical data
• What struck me
• Different policies in different markets. • Which are better/worse?
• Prices for the same products vary by market • Lack of consensus about where prices were high
and low
Published studies
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• 35 country prices published individually • Largest comparisons
• Cammeron (2009) 36 developing countries aggregated by region
• Sweeny (2003) 15 countries with individual prices • Most published studies:
• small numbers of developed countries; limited range of products; Japan only Asian country >1
• Problems: • Often unweighted; Often convenience sample of
prices; Rarely develop any formal index; limited number of countries; comparisons back to one country i.e. US vs rest.
Aggregated using average SD from mean
Summary results from published studies Average standard deviations from the mean for each study
Background to this part of the research • Aims of this analysis construct and report 2 international pharmaceutical price indices:
• Indices 1 - As broad a set of countries as possible, while covering a range of regions and countries with different levels of economic development as well as a broad sample of drugs available in each country.
• Indices 2 – On-patent medicines in a more narrow set of countries.
Methods – Challenges • To derive a valid price index it is necessary to have a price for each
country for every time point. • Availability of Molecules, form and strengths vary widely. Trade-off the more
countries the narrower the molecule grouping
• The availability of innovative new chemical entities first in wealthy countries. • newer, high cost therapies cannot be included in a broad international comparison
• Data on international prices and sales volumes are not readily available and all have limitations
• IMS • WHO • Ad Hoc price lists
• IMS most comprehensive data set
Methods – General approach • Products grouped by
outcomes • Equivalence according to
PBAC • Allowed a very broad
definition of equivalence • All products converted to a
daily dose using the WHO DDD
• IMS MIDAS data • March Quarter 2005 through
to the June Quarter 2011 • Sales / units
• Some variation in collection by country
Like molecules – equivalent outcome
EKS method (Elteto, Koves Szulc) P Price index Price per day
(Deflated by CPI)
Q Quantity index number of days
A Numerator Sum of the product of own countries P x Q for each molecule
B Denominator Sum of the product of own countries Q x every other countries P for each molecule
C Numerator Sum of the product of own countries P x every other countries Q for each molecule
D Denominator Sum of the product of every other countries P x every other countries Q for each molecule
Passche index Laspeyres index
Geometric mean of ((A/B),(C/D)) for each unique combination
Fishers Index for each country Geometric mean of all combinations for each country
AF Generate Fishers average
index for the whole set of P and Q
CAF Chain the Fishers average
index for the whole set of P and Q ie T1 x T2=CT2, CT2 x T3
EKS index Fishers index for each country x
CAF
Results – Index 1 Broad molecule
• 9 segments • 50 molecules. • Mostly community
medicines managed by GPs
• Off-patent medicines subject to generic competition.
• 69 Countries – Developed and developing
Segment molecules ace alacepril
alacepril
benazepril
captopril
cilazapril
delapril
enalapril
fosinopril
imidapril
lisinopril
moexipril
perindopril
quinapril
ramipril
spirapril
temocapril
trandolapril
zofenopril
AMISULPRIDE_RISP amisulpride
risperidone
amitriptyline__imipramine_desipramine amitriptyline
imipramine
desipramine
ARIPIPRAZOL_OLANZ_PALIP_ZIPRASIDONE aripiprazol
olanzapine
palip
ziprasidone
cimeti_famoti_nizatid_raniti_roxatid cimetidine
famotidine
nizatidine
ranitidine
roxatidine
fluoxetine_reboxetine_mirtazapine fluoxetine
mirtazapine
reboxetine
fluphenazine_chlorpromazine_trifluoperazine_haloperidol_pericyazine chlorpromazine
fluphenazine
haloperidol
periciazine
trifluoperazine
lansop_omepra_pantop_rabepr lansoprazole
omeprazole
pantoprazole
IN
DEX
1 P
rices
2008_Q1 2008_Q2 2008_Q3 2008_Q4 2009_Q1 2009_Q2 2009_Q3 2009_Q4 2010_Q1 2010_Q2 2010_Q3 2010_Q4 2011_Q1 2011_Q2 1. BULGARIA 3.03 2.96 3.02 3.12 3.45 3.23 3.43 3.76 4.03 3.87 4.01 4.39 4.42 4.32 2. POLAND 2.05 2.03 1.99 1.92 2.09 2.01 2.03 2.16 2.09 1.98 1.98 2.03 2.04 2.00 3. AUSTRIA 1.65 1.62 1.58 1.62 1.80 1.76 1.72 1.79 1.70 1.76 1.66 1.66 1.76 1.83 4. GREECE 2.01 1.78 1.81 1.87 2.17 2.12 1.99 2.05 2.04 1.98 1.96 1.90 2.00 1.82 5. BANGLADESH 2.51 2.34 2.24 2.29 2.31 2.09 1.96 2.13 1.90 1.81 1.94 1.95 1.87 1.79 6. ALGERIA 2.94 2.77 2.78 2.58 2.77 2.19 2.43 2.07 2.02 1.77 1.79 1.79 1.81 1.71 7. NORWAY 1.88 1.83 1.81 1.80 1.90 1.81 1.80 1.72 1.76 1.68 1.74 1.72 1.74 1.70 8. PERU 1.45 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.47 1.38 1.46 1.46 1.45 1.32 1.30 1.42 1.36 1.41 9. S. AFRICA 1.11 1.10 1.22 0.99 1.03 1.15 1.07 1.12 0.94 1.21 1.14 1.91 1.41 1.40 10. VENEZUELA 1.40 1.38 1.34 1.32 1.50 1.39 1.49 1.48 1.39 1.40 1.35 1.39 1.42 1.37 11. JORDAN 1.51 1.43 1.38 1.37 1.45 1.37 1.36 1.36 1.30 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.23 12. LATVIA 1.51 1.45 1.43 1.47 1.55 1.48 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.28 1.23 1.19 1.21 13. LUXEMBOURG 1.45 1.40 1.37 1.31 1.45 1.38 1.42 1.40 1.42 1.37 1.19 1.20 1.14 1.16 14. FRANCE 1.48 1.42 1.34 1.30 1.35 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.12 15. CANADA 1.09 1.03 1.05 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.01 1.09 1.02 1.07 1.10 1.14 1.15 1.10 16. PUERTO RICO 1.39 1.38 1.32 1.26 1.31 1.24 1.24 1.28 1.23 1.20 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.09 17. SINGAPORE 1.14 1.11 0.87 1.11 1.19 1.12 1.15 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.10 1.15 1.09 1.08 18. CHINA 1.05 1.01 0.98 0.95 1.09 1.00 1.04 1.10 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.15 1.06 1.07 19. RUSSIAN FED 1.32 1.30 1.20 1.17 1.29 1.21 1.15 1.19 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.07 20. NETHERLNDS 1.33 1.24 1.23 1.22 1.29 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.12 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.06 21. MEXICO 1.39 1.33 1.27 1.22 1.23 1.14 1.11 1.14 1.12 1.09 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.06 22. JAPAN 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.88 1.19 1.13 1.14 1.17 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.04 23. FR. W. AFRICA 0.98 0.96 0.87 1.03 1.07 1.10 0.94 1.05 0.94 1.07 1.07 1.17 1.06 1.03 24. KOREA 1.36 1.33 1.28 1.27 1.31 1.24 1.24 1.27 1.26 1.16 1.07 1.10 1.08 1.02 25. ARGENTINA 1.35 1.33 1.29 1.25 1.28 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.02 26. LEBANON 1.32 1.28 1.26 1.23 1.33 1.22 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.07 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 27. DENMARK 1.34 1.32 1.28 1.21 1.24 1.20 1.22 1.16 1.18 1.07 1.04 1.09 1.02 0.99 28. ESTONIA 1.19 1.22 1.16 1.16 1.20 1.14 1.10 1.14 1.13 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.04 0.99 29. URUGUAY 1.18 1.12 1.11 1.15 1.22 1.18 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.99 30. INDIA 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.94 1.11 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 0.96 31. CROATIA 1.04 1.05 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 32. LITHUANIA 1.13 1.10 1.03 0.99 1.02 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.02 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.92 33. ITALY 1.05 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.08 1.03 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.91 34. HUNGARY 1.15 1.11 1.03 1.00 1.02 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.89 35. SLOVAKIA 1.33 1.30 1.17 1.13 1.22 1.11 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.89 36. IRELAND 1.34 1.39 1.17 1.22 1.25 1.16 1.11 1.16 1.11 1.01 1.08 1.05 0.95 0.89 37. TURKEY 1.22 1.14 1.09 1.06 1.15 1.07 1.05 1.01 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.88 38. SWEDEN 1.29 1.25 1.26 1.10 1.20 1.03 1.06 1.06 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.88 39. BRAZIL 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.86 40. USA 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.95 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.83 0.80 41. GERMANY 0.88 0.86 0.81 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.72 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.78 0.76 42. MOROCCO 1.11 1.13 1.08 1.06 1.12 1.07 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.75 43. ROMANIA 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.74 44. NEW ZEALAND 1.27 1.18 1.07 1.02 1.03 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.73 0.69 45. SAUDI ARABIA 1.51 1.38 1.18 1.04 1.19 1.12 0.90 0.97 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.71 0.67 0.67 46. SLOVENIA 1.09 1.04 1.02 0.96 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.66 47. TAIWAN 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.63 48. DOMINICAN REP 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.95 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.62 49. VIETNAM 0.42 0.43 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.61 50. CZECH 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 51. PHILIPPINES 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.61 52. SPAIN 0.65 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.57 53. TUNISIA 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.75 0.81 0.73 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.56 54. AUSTRALIA 1.02 0.99 0.95 0.82 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.56 55. C. AMERICA 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.55 56. ECUADOR 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 57. PORTUGAL 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.49 58. EGYPT 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.48 59. PAKISTAN 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.48 60. UK 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.47 61. MALAYSIA 0.94 0.87 0.95 0.86 0.74 0.68 0.61 0.61 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.47 62. INDONESIA 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 63. FINLAND 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.43 64. COLOMBIA 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.34 65. THAILAND 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.31 66. BELGIUM 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.43 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.31 67. CHILE 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 68. HONG KONG 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.28 69. SWITZERLAND 0.39 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24
Index 1 change in average price per quarter 2008 to 2011
Results – Index 2 On-Patent molecules • 25 segments • 27 molecules. • Mostly initiated in
hospital • On-patent medicines
not subject to generic competition.
• 9 Countries - Developed
Segment molecules bevacizumab bevacizumab bortezomib bortezomib cetuximab cetuximab dasatinib dasatinib duloxetine_venlofaxine_desvenlafaxine desvenlafaxine
duloxetine venlafaxine
erlotinib erlotinib etanercept etanercept ezetimibe ezetimibe gefitinib gefitinib imatinib imatinib insulin aspart insulin aspart insulin aspart protamine crystalline insulin aspart protamine crystalline insulin detemir insulin detemir insulin glargine insulin glargine insulin glulisine insulin glulisine insulin lispro protamine insulin lispro protamine lapatinib lapatinib maraviroc maraviroc nilotinib nilotinib oxaliplatin oxaliplatin raltegravir raltegravir rituximab rituximab sorafenib sorafenib sunitinib sunitinib tenofovir disoproxil tenofovir disoproxil
2010_Q1 2010_Q2 2010_Q3 2010_Q4 2011_Q1 2011_Q2
1.US 1.27 1.25 1.32 1.42 1.55 1.57 2. FRANCE 1.18 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.22 1.21 3. AUSTRIA 1.13 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.11 4. AUSTRALIA 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.10 5. SWEDEN 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.06 1.05 1.04 6. FINLAND 0.94 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.01 1.01 7. UK 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.94 8. JAPAN 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.89 9. GERMANY 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.69
US high and increasing
Results - Regional
Broad index – Index 1
On-patent index – Index 2
Discussion • This will be the largest multinational study comparing
indexes of pharmaceutical prices and the first to use the EKS index. A formal index pricing model which allows comparisons between all countries (transitive)
• The study uses wider definition of like molecule than has been previously published. Our definition of like is those pharmaceuticals which provide equivalent outcomes.
• The findings reported in this paper provide a basis for research into what are the factors that determine the level of prices in each country
Discussion • Analysis show that off-patent
pharmaceutical prices fall over time and on-patent increase slightly
• Asian prices for off-patent and possibly on-patent medicines low
• Published studies results are similar to the on-patent developed country results and both are different from the broad index
Discussion – limitations of the analysis • Data are not perfectly comparable
between countries. Some markets prices over-stated rebates and stock give-aways. Some MIDAS data are based on list prices and others invoiced prices.
• Indices are shaped by the molecules for which there is complete cover across our sample countries over the time period covered. So with broad sample limited cover.
End – thank you
School of Public Health and Community Medicine
NOT AS EASY AS IT SOUNDS: CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING THE VALUE FOR MONEY OF IMPLEMENTED VACCINATION PROGRAMS
1. School of Public Health and Community Medicine, UNSW Australia, Sydney, NSW, Australia
2. National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance of Vaccine Preventable Diseases (NCIRS), University of Sydney, Westmead, NSW, Australia
3. Centre for Health Economics Research and Modelling Infectious Diseases (CHERMID), Vaccine and Infectious Disease Institute, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Newall AT1 , Reyes JF1, Wood JG1, McIntyre P2, Menzies R2, Beutels P1,3
Pre-implementation modelling
• Significant uncertainty when predicting the real world impact of vaccine programs
• Nature of vaccine clinical trials – Vaccine efficacy measured in an idealised setting
• Dynamic population effects – Changes (shifts) in the causative organism – Herd protection effects (unvaccinated) – Dynamic transmission models (uncertainty)
• Model predictions (using vaccine efficacy est.) – Over or underestimate program impact
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Post-implementation assessment
• Allows use of real world data on the impact of vaccine programs in assessing the cost-effectiveness – Surveillance data and healthcare statistics (e.g.
Notification, hospitalisation, mortality, adverse events) – Other data from program evaluation (e.g. Vaccine uptake)
• Leading to more robust cost-effectiveness est. -reduced uncertainty
• Research gap: – Issues for post-implementation economic evaluation of
vaccine programs have not been systematically explored
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Methodological challenges
• Estimating the “no-program world” • Estimating the “program world” • Estimating the “future benefits”
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Estimating the “no-program world”
• Q: what would have happened without vaccination? – Issue not exclusive to retrospective evaluations – Typically project forward pre-implementation rates
• Predicting trends in rates can be complex – ID rates may vary over time due to various factors
• Long-established vaccine programs – Using pre-implementation rates may be problematic – Alternative: model removal of vaccination using an
inflation factor on current “program world” rates
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Estimating the program benefits accrued to date
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Estimating the “program world”
• Q: what decline has occurred due to vaccination? – Real world data rather than predictive modeling using
vaccine efficacy est. (non-local setting)
• Surveillance data from setting of introduction – Captures features of population, disease epidemiology,
program implementation, herd impact (without the need for dynamic transmission modelling)
• Limitations of observational data – Attributing causation to decline in ID rates: statistical
methods to establish significance (temporal association) – Lack of routine testing to confirm diagnosis for many IDs
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Estimating the “future benefits”
• Temptation to rely solely on available data (to date) – Full cost to vaccinate recent cohorts but only includes
benefits over a limited period (<duration of immunity) – Problematic when protection is long-lived or when
prevented events occur a long time into future – Issue that specifically affects prevention programs
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Future benefits from doses given out to date
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Benefits of retrospective evaluations
• Value for money achieved – Important given the growing costs of vaccine programs – Bargaining tool for pharmaceutical price negotiation
• Re-evaluation and future decision – Expansion or replacement of vaccine programs – Future marginally improved vaccines (non-inferiority)
• Validation of pre-implementation – Evaluate previous predictive cost-effective models by
comparison to the findings of our cases studies
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Acknowledgments
– Australian Research Council Linkage grant (LP120200043) – Although they do not necessarily endorse the study and
its conclusions we gratefully acknowledge useful discussion with the Reference Group (including Jodie McVernon, Paul Scuffham, Rosalie Viney) for this grant.
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Questions
Published version now available: Newall AT, et al. Vaccine 2014;32(7):759-65
Cost Effectiveness of Catheter-Based Renal Denervation for Treatment Resistant Hypertension – an Australian Payer Perspective Tilden D,1 McBride ME,2 Whitbourn R,3 Krum H,4 Walton T,5 Gillespie J2
1 THEMA Consulting Pty Ltd, Pyrmont, Australia, 2 Medtronic Australasia, North Ryde, Australia, 3 St Vincent's Hospital, Melbourne, Australia, 4 Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 5 Epworth Hospital, Richmond, Australia. Australian Chapter ISPOR Encore 21st April 2015
Objectives •Patients with treatment resistant hypertension (TR-HTN) experience uncontrolled blood pressure despite optimal medical management (OMM) with 3 or more anti-hypertensive drugs including a diuretic. •TR-HTN patients remain at significantly increased risk of cardiovascular and renal morbidity and mortality,1 consume considerable healthcare resources2 and, with limited treatment options, experience significant unmet clinical need. •In randomised clinical trials,3 large registries4 and meta-analyses,5,6 catheter based renal denervation (RDN) has been shown to effectively reduce office systolic blood pressure (SBP) in patients with TR-HTN.
The objective of this analysis is to build upon an existing US economic evaluation,7 known associations between SBP and clinical events and local parameters to determine the cost-effectiveness of RDN from the perspective of the Australian healthcare payer.
1 Calhoun et al., (2008). Hypertension, 51: 1403-19 ; 2 Sapoval et al., (2013). Value in Health, 16(7): A520-1; 3 Esler et al., (2010). Lancet, 376(9756): 1903–9; 4 Schlaich et al., (2014). Am J Kidney Dis., 63(5):A1-A121; 5 Davis et al., (2013). J Am Coll Cardiol., 61(10):E1377; 6 Gosain et al., (2013). J Clin. Hypertens., 15(1):75-84p; 7 Geisler et al., (2012). J Am Coll Cardiol., 60 (14): 1271–7
Methods Population: TR-HTN patients (office SBP ≥ 160 mmHg despite >3 anti-hypertensive drugs including a diuretic). Analytical technique: Markov model with 30 health states reflecting established long-term consequences of hypertension. Model Inputs and Assumptions (Table 1):
• Health state utility values and transition probabilities from Geisler.7 • RDN treatment effect at 6 months from meta-analysis (June, 2013).8 • Australian life tables, resource use, costs and discount rates.
Comparative treatments: RDN+OMM vs OMM alone Analysis perspective: Australian healthcare payer Downstream Outcomes: ICER (cost per quality adjusted life year ($/QALY)) Deterministic Sensitivity Analyses: tested base case assumptions including extent of SBP reduction, durability of effect and baseline SBP.
7 Geisler et al., (2012). J Am Coll Cardiol., 60 (14): 1271–7; 8 McBride et al., (2014). HTAi Annual Conference, Washington, Abstract PO.085
Table 1: Base case model inputs and assumptions
Parameter Value Source
RDN+OMM reduction in SBP (vs OMM alone)
-28.1 mmHg (maintained for model duration)
Meta-analysis of 28 trials (n=896)8
Cost of RDN procedure
$10,724 (no repeat procedures required)
Australian costs a
Health state Utility values and event costs ($AUS)
Health State Hypertension (event free) Stroke MI – acute MI – 1st and ensuing years Heart Failure Angina Pectoris - stable Angina Pectoris - unstable ESRD
Utility 0.96 0.63 0.76 0.88 0.71 0.84 0.74 0.63
Cost/event n/a
$14,262 $15,838
n/a n/a
$20,981 $20,981
n/a
Cost/cycle b
$83.46 $1,783, $559
n/a $535
$2,556, $1,069 $535 $535
$6,688
Utility values from Geisler et al., 2012
Australian cost estimates
Discounting 5% (costs and outcomes) Local requirement c
Horizon lifetime (30 years)
MI = Myocardial infarction, ESRD = End stage renal disease a includes theatre/admission, capital equipment, ablation catheter, consumables, surgery time, angiography, anaesthetist services (and renal stenting in 5%
of patients) b Cost per cycle (1 month) (two values represent first and subsequent months), c Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) Draft Guidelines (2012)
Cost item RDN+OMM OMM Incremental
RDN procedure $10,724.22 $0.00 $10,724.22
Hypertension OMM $9,634.86 $8,850.93 $783.93
Event costs
MI $5,713.66 $6,905.89 -$1,192.23
Stroke $10,370.34 $13,010.35 -$2,640.01
HF $7,269.64 $7,937.43 -$667.79
AP $10,451.65 $10,999.50 -$547.85
ESRD $1,656.68 $2,165.89 -$509.22
Total event costs $35,461.97 $41,019.07 -$5,557.10
Total costs $55,821.05 $49,870.00 $5,951.04
Table 2: Total healthcare costs for duration of the model
Results • Total costs over the duration of the model were $55,821 for
RDN+OMM and $49,870 for OMM alone (Table 2). • The upfront RDN procedure cost ($10,724) was partially offset over
the duration of the model by lower event costs ($5,557) due largely to the lower incidence of stroke (-0.0559) and MI (-0.0524).
Parameter RDN+OMM OMM Incremental
Cost $55,821.05 $49,870.00 $5,951.04
QALYs 11.5690 11.1394 0.4296
ICER $13,852
Table 3: Incremental cost per QALY gained
Results • When compared to OMM, treatment of each patient with RDN was
associated with greater cost ($5,951) and QALYs (0.4296) resulting in an incremental cost per QALY of $13,852 (Table 3).
• Amongst variables tested, results were most sensitive to the magnitude of SBP reduction, durability of effect and baseline SBP
Discussion • With a SBP reduction of -28.1 mmHg at 6 months, RDN was predicted
to reduce the incidence of all CV and renal events over the model duration.
• The lower probability of events with RDN was associated with improved quality adjusted life years and reduced healthcare costs.
• Clinical benefits of RDN in this analysis were conservatively restricted
to CV and renal events avoided as a consequence of reduced SBP. However, RDN also improves other prognostic indicators for CV events such as LV mass, cardiac output9 and central hemodynamics.10
• An ICER of $13,852/QALY would be considered cost effective from an
Australian payer perspective.
• Limitations – RDN treatment effect biased by unblinded studies in meta-analysis; SBP is a surrogate endpoint; durability of RDN not proven beyond 3 years. 9 Schirmer et al., (2014). J Am Coll Cardiol., 63(18):1916-23; 10 Brandt et al., (2012). J Am Coll Cardiol., 60(19):1956-65; 11 Krum et al.,
(2014). Lancet, 383(9917):622-9
Conclusions
• Based upon this analysis, RDN is a cost effective treatment option
for patients with TR-HTN in Australia. • Some uncertainty exists regarding the magnitude of SBP reduction
with RDN and the durability of the treatment effect. However, this should be considered in light of the significantly increased risk of cardiovascular and renal morbidity and mortality in this difficult to treat population.
Meanwhile in 2013…. • In the US – Symplicity HTN3 RCT trial of RDN underway
• Largest RDN RCT to date (N = 535), comparator is maximal medical
therapy (MMT) (maximally tolerated doses of at least three drugs, including a diuretic). Patient randomised 2:1 to RDN + MMT or Control: Sham + MMT – Patients blinded to procedure; blood pressure assessors blinded to study groups.
January 2014: 1st Medtronic announcement of Symplicity HTN31 results: Demonstrated safety profile RDN arm: clinically meaningful reductions in SBP from baseline RDN vs. Control: Primary efficacy endpoint not met
1. Bhatt et al (2014). A Controlled Trial of Renal Denervation for Resistant Hypertension. NEJM. Published online March 25.
Emerging evidence • April 2014: Medtronic present Global Symplicity Registry1 data (N=998) – In clinical
practice, renal denervation resulted in significant reductions in office and 24-hour BPs with a favourable safety profile. (Canada, Western Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Africa, Middle East, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand)
• September 2014 : Meta-analysis2 (5 studies, N=800) reports significant difference for SBP for RDN vs MMT – includes Symplicity HTN3 study
• Jan’ 2015: DENER HTN RCT3, RDN plus standardised stepped-care antihypertensive treatment (SSAHT) (n=53, ITT) vs SSAHT alone (n=53, ITT): RDN + SSAHT vs. SSAHT alone more effective in reducing ABPM (France)
• Jan’ 2015: Analysis of Symplicity HTN34 provides insight into key considerations for patient selection and ablation techniques.
• Feb’2015: PRAGUE-15 RCT5, RDN (n=52) vs reduces SBP comparable to intensified drug therapy (n=54) (Czech Republic)
Overall – RDN is a clinically effective treatment option for treatment resistant HTN, but….. there is more to learn about this therapy
1. Böhm et al (2015) First Report of the Global SYMPLICITY Registry on the Effect of Renal Artery Denervation in patients With Uncontrolled Hypertension. Hypertension. 65:766-774 2. Pancholy et al (2014) Meta-analysis of the effect of renal denervation on blood pressure and pulse pressure in patients with resistant systemic hypertension.Am J Cardiol. 2014 Sep 15;114(6):856-61 3. Aziz et al (2015) Optimum and stepped care standardised antihypertensive treatment with or without renal denervation for resistant hypertension (DENERHTN): a multicentre, open-label, randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Published online January 26. 4. Kandzari et al (2015) Predictors of blood pressure response in the SYMPLICITY HTN-3 trial. Eur Heart J. Jan 21;36(4):219-27 5. Rosa et al (2015) Randomized comparison of renal denervation versus intensified pharmacotherapy including spironolactone in true-resistant hypertension: six-month results from the Prague-15 study. Hypertension 65:407-413
Postscript – What does this all mean for HTA of medical devices ?...
• HTA for decision making related to funding is typically based on RCT evidence BUT…
– In the ‘real world’ the treatment effect may
differ… – How do we reconcile this Paradox? – How should RCT and non RCT evidence be
appropriately considered/weighted in decision making?
Postscript – What does this all mean for HTA of medical devices?...
• Technology, operator experience, patient selection and ongoing management – can all rapidly evolve – BUT..
– HTA processes may have an extended duration – how can we also consider the most up-to-date evidence reflective of technology used and experience in the HTA jurisdiction?.
– How should HTA processes manage disparate evidence and uncertainties where there is no effective alternative and an unmet clinical need, and the new therapy has no safety issues?....
There remains an unmet clinical need for RDN, with no alternative for patients who do not respond to drug therapy. Considering the demonstrated safety profile and demonstrated clinical effectiveness, RDN represents an example of a therapy where a managed entry scheme, under controlled conditions, would enable earlier access, and facilitate evidence collection to address uncertainties.
Back up slides
Parameter (base-case value) Variation
Costs Outcomes ICER
RDN + OMM
OMM Increment RDN + OMM
OMM Increment
Base-case $55,821 $49,870 $5,951 11.5690 11.1394 0.4296 $13,852
SBP reduction with RDN (–28.1 mm Hg)
Pooled 95% UCL (–31.6 mmHg) $54,935 $49,870 $5,065 11.6270 11.1394 0.4876 $10,388
Pooled 95% LCL (–24.5 mmHg) $56,685 $49,870 $6,815 11.5120 11.1394 0.3726 $18,292
Years until SBP benefit lost (linear decay after 3.5 years)
10 $58,243 $49,870 $8,373 11.2945 11.1394 0.1551 $53,989
20 $57,228 $49,870 $7,358 11.3846 11.1394 0.2452 $30,005
30 $56,718 $49,870 $6,848 11.4390 11.1394 0.2996 $22,859
Baseline SBP (178 mmHg) 140 $44,675 $42,482 $2,193 12.2849 11.7388 0.5461 $4,017
160 $51,069 $46,875 $4,193 11.9129 11.3579 0.5550 $7,556
180 $56,307 $50,122 $6,185 11.5370 11.1204 0.4166 $14,849
200 $59,730 $51,855 $7,874 11.2039 10.9870 0.2169 $36,307
220 $62,041 $56,104 $5,936 11.0292 10.6455 0.3838 $15,470
Table 4: Sensitivity Analyses
VALUING EQ-5D-5L:
DOES THE ORDERING OF THE HEALTH DIMENSIONS IMPACT ON HEALTH STATE VALUATIONS?
Brendan Mulhern1,2 & Koonal Shah2,3
1 Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation, University of Technology Sydney
2 School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield 3 Office of Health Economics, London
Acknowledgements
Collaborators: Nancy Devlin (Office of Health Economics) Ben van Hout (UoS) Bas Janssen (EuroQol Group) Louise Longworth (Brunel)
Study funded by EuroQol Group
Introduction
Time Trade Off and Discrete Choice methods used to value EQ-5D-5L
Most valuation studies use ‘standard’ order Extent to which dimension ordering impacts the
coefficients is unclear: Left to right bias (Spalek and Hammad, 2005)? DCE bottom-to-top bias (Shah et al., 2013)? No systematic pattern (Tsuchiya et al., 2014)? Relative importance of the first two EQ-5D dimensions
differs (Rand-Hendriksen and Augusted, 2012).
EQ-5D-5L
Aims
Important to systematically test the impact of reordering the dimensions on: Health state values provided Magnitude of the coefficients
Aim to assess the impact of different dimension orderings on the valuation of EQ-5D-5L health states using TTO and DCE preference elicitation methods.
Methods – Composite TTO
‘Classic’ TTO for states better than dead
Methods – Composite TTO
‘Lead time’ TTO for states worse than dead
Methods – DCE
EQ-5D-5L health state pairs
Methods – Study design
Three EQ-5D-5L orders: Standard (MO-SC-UA-PD-AD):
Used in most valuation studies Reverse (AD-PD-UA-SC-MO):
Provide clear comparison Block (PD-AD-MO-SC-UA):
Move block of functioning dimensions
Two ‘life A’ descriptors Full health and 11111
TTO states DCE state pairs
State 1 State 2
11111 42525 53422
11112 53242 44151
11121 31113 11331
11223 44222 22244
21111 44241 15244
21232 22331 22413
32442 23144 42452
34155
43331
55233
55555
Methods – Interview process
Face to face computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI) in respondents home
10 areas in South Yorkshire, UK Interview process
Background questions and the EQ-5D-5L for their own health.
4 c-TTO examples and practice tasks 10/11 c-TTO health state valuations 7 DCE pairs Feedback and follow up questions
Results - Sample
455 interviews, 20% response rate TTO data excluded for 13 respondents (all same value)
Results - TTO
Descriptive analysis Regression analysis
Results - DCE
Descriptive results Regression
Discussion
Health state dimension order key methodological issue in valuation of EQ-5D-5L/SF-6D-V2
Impact of order on: TTO values (standard vs. other) TTO and DCE coefficients, but not systematic
Implications for previous/future valuation studies? Between subject randomisation, but further research?
Limitations: Only 3 orders tested Sample size? Small number of states valued. Use full design?
For further information contact: [email protected]
References:
Rand-Hendriksen, K, Augestad LA. Time Trade-Off and Ranking Exercises Are Sensitive to Different Dimensions of EQ-5D Health States. Value in Health 2012; 15(5): 777–782.
Shah KK, Tsuchiya A, Hole AR, Wailoo AJ. Valuing health at the end of life: A stated preference discrete choice experiment. OHE Research Paper 12/04. London: Office of Health Economics; 2013.
Spalek TM, Hammad S. The left-to-right bias in inhibition of return is due to the direction of reading. Psychological Science 2005; 16(1): 15-18.
Tsuchiya A, Mulhern B, Bansback N, Hole AR. Using DCE with duration to examine the robustness of preferences across the five dimensions of the EuroQol instrument. EuroQol Plenary 2014; Stockholm.
Menzies
Health Economics
Group
Primary supervisor: Prof Andrew Palmer Encore presentation 6th Asia Pacific ISPOR Conference, Beijing, CHINA Sept 2014
Construct validity of
SF-6D health state
utility values in an
employed population
Siyan Baxter, Kristy Sanderson, Alison Venn, Petr Otahal, and
Andrew J. Palmer
Presenter: Siyan Baxter
Outline
AIM: To investigate the construct validity of SF-6D in a large and diverse Australian State Service workforce To investigate whether SF-6D provides preference based utility values in this population that reflects Australian working population norms
HYPOTHESIS: Utilities differentiate appropriately between health, socioeconomic and work characteristics • that negative associations exist for age, BMI, K10, ERI, and
comorbidities and • positive associations are shown for education and salary
Why is it important?
BACKGROUND: • Lack of utility data in working populations • Greater policy interest in the workplace as a setting for
public health strategies • To compete for public funding workplace health promotion
– follow economic guidelines for evidence-based decisions
– improve methodology of economic evaluations
– beyond business justification model
Must value the health benefits of participating employees
Methods – Data Collection
Tasmanian State Service
TSS (2010)
Source population: 27,659 Random Sample: 12,179 # responders: n= 3,408
(28% response rate) Cross-sectional
Self-reported questionnaire SF12v2
Age, BMI, Occupation, Education Lifestyle (smoking, alcohol, PA)
Mental health, Job stress, Comorbidity
Salary (HR data), Absenteeism
Normative working population
HILDA (2010)
Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia Survey
Wave 11
# cases: n = 17,612 General employed (n=11,234)
Public service subset (n=1,938)
Self-completed questionnaire (SCQ) SF36v1
Age, BMI, Occupation, Education Lifestyle (smoking)
Mental health Salary, Absenteeism
Methods – Data Collection
Tasmanian State Service
TSS (2010)
Source population: 27,659 Random Sample: 12,179 # responders: n= 3,407
(28% response rate) Cross-sectional
Self-reported questionnaire SF12v2
Age, BMI, Occupation, Education Lifestyle (smoking, alcohol, PA)
Mental health, Job stress, Comorbidity
Salary (HR data), Absenteeism
Normative working population
HILDA (2010)
Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia Survey
Wave 11
# cases: n = 17,612 General employed (n=11,234)
Public service subset (n=1,938)
Self-completed questionnaire (SCQ) SF36v1
Age, BMI, Occupation, Education Lifestyle (smoking)
Mental health Salary, Absenteeism
HEALTH
• SF-6D Health utility score: 0-1
• Kessler-10 Psychological Distress Scale; 4 week recall • Low (10-15), Very high (30+)
• Body Mass Index • Age (years) • Comorbidity (23 chronic dx)
SOCIOECONOMIC
• Salary (annual $AUD)
WORK CHARACTERISTICS
• Absenteeism (# days absent in 4 weeks; zero, any) • Job stress
• Low (0), High (>1)
Methods - Measures
• Construct validity tested both internally (TSS) and externally (HILDA) using 1. Mean utility by sample characteristics 2. Pearson rank correlations 3. Multivariable linear regression
• to identify relationship between utility and health, socioeconomic and work characteristics
• examine capability of SF-6D to discriminate between external factors and health status
Methods - Measures
TSS Results – Mean Health Utility
Females (n=2444) Males (n=964)
n mean n mean Mean SF-6D (SE) 2409 0.771 944 0.792
Age (yrs) ≤30 264 0.766 72 0.796
>60 119 0.803 68 0.835
BMI (kg/m2) < 25 1035 0.782 330 0.806
40+ 49 0.723 13 0.806
Comorbidities 0 519 0.819 264 0.825
3+ 647 0.715 197 0.735
K10 Low 1554 0.823 662 0.838
Very high 72 0.584 16 0.596
Salary ($AUD) <$40,000 150 0.775 67 0.794
$120K+ 22 0.813 53 0.807
Absenteeism Zero days 1885 0.788 761 0.804
Any days 510 0.713 180 0.742
Job stress (ERI) Low 746 0.814 311 0.833
High 800 0.714 286 0.738
Mean SF-6D by
characteristic
Low psychological distress
Low job stress
0.00 Death
High job stress
Zero comorbidities
SF-6D Health Utility
Female TSS employees on a health utility score continuum
1.00
0.82
0.72
0.71
0.58
Perfect health (1.7%)
Very high psychological distress
3+ comorbidities
Mean utility 0.771 (0.147)
TSS Results – Mean Utility
TSS Results – Correlations
Females
n=1780
Males
n=773
SF-6D 1 1
K10 -0.6332* -0.6585*
Age 0.0712 0.0484
BMI -0.1105* -0.0918*
Salary 0.0045 0.0509
Comorbidities -0.3958* -0.3318*
Job stress -0.3695* -0.3427*
Absenteeism -0.2539* -0.2101*
Pearson correlations demonstrated that SF-6D health utility was negatively associated with (listed by greatest to least strength) K10 Job stress Comorbidities Absenteeism BMI
Age and Salary were not associated
* p values are statistically significant (p<0.01)
Pearson rank correlations (bivariate)
TSS Results - Summary
• Higher psychological distress • Higher job stress • More co-morbid conditions • Absenteeism • Higher education (females) • Lower physical activity (females)
Associated with lower SF-6D:
No association between SF-6D and age or salary
TSS employee mean health utility is: Men: 0.792 (0.004) Women 0.771 (0.003)
External Validity
TSS
State Service
n=3408
HILDA
All employed
n=11,234
HILDA
Public service subset
n=1938
Mean SF-6D
Males 0.792 0.792 0.801 Females 0.771 0.775 0.784
Negative Association p<0.05
K10* Absenteeism*
K10* Age* BMI (females)* Absenteeism* Employment condition (males)
K10* Age (males)* Absenteeism (females)*
Positive Association p<0.05
Salary* Occupational type (males)*
*denotes p<0.01 Included in the model of normative sample: BMI, K10, age, occupation, employment condition, salary, smoking status, absenteeism
Linear regression
(multivariable)
Conclusions
SF-6D health utility scores appear to have construct validity
and can be used to measure health states within employee populations
• Male health utility scores are higher than females • Health Utility discriminates between
• health factors (comorbidity, body mass index, psychological distress, age),
• socioeconomic factors (salary, in populations within private enterprise),
• work characteristics (job stress, absenteeism, employment condition and occupational type)
Evaluators of workplace health promotion interventions can now: • Place value on employee health outcomes to improve
methodology of health economic evaluations
• Derive QALYs for policy decisions (compete for funding)
Bonus feature: SF-6D has previously been shown to exhibit sensitivity in detecting small changes in healthy individuals… … it may be sensitive to small health differences in working populations
Important Implications
Acknowledgements
pH@W Team: Lisa Jarman, Michelle Kilpatrick, Kim Jose, Kate Chappell, Tasmanian State Service & UTAS Partners Supervisors: Andrew Palmer, Kristy Sanderson, Alison Venn, Statistical Advisor: Petr Otahal HILDA Advisors: Nicole Watson (Melbourne University), Robert Bruenig (Australian National University) Menzies Health Economics Group: Andrew Palmer, Amanda Neil, Lei Si, Barbara De Graaff, Julie Nermut The study was approved by Tasmania Health & Medical Human Research Ethics Committee (EC00337): H0010501
Quality of Life Research: Volume 24, Issue 4 (2015), Page 851-870
From Regulatory Approval to Subsidized Patient Access in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparison of Systems Across Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand
GREG COOK, HANSOO KIM
DISCLAIMER
The views in this presentation do not necessarily reflect the policies of Bristol-Myers Squibb.
OBJECTIVE
To compare the processes and timings of regulatory and subsidised access systems for medicines across 7 jurisdictions within the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia China Japan New Zealand South Korea Taiwan Thailand
METHODS
A questionnaire was developed focussing on regulatory and Health Technology Assessment (HTA) based subsidised access processes and timings in each of the 7 surveyant’s jurisdictions.
RESULTS
Australia and Thailand are the only two jurisdictions that formally allow the subsidised access evaluation process to be conducted in parallel with the regulatory evaluation process. The Australian, Japanese, Korean, New Zealand and Taiwanese systems afford broad coverage, whereas the Chinese and Thai systems provide limited coverage for medicines under patent. The subsidised access systems for all jurisdictions except Thailand have an associated patient co-payment for each medicine/ prescription. The biggest disparity across the study group relates to time from regulatory submission to subsidised access of patented medicines – ranging from just over 1 year (Japan) to a minimum of 5 years (China).
RESULTS Jurisdiction Subsidised Patient
Access System Coverage Patient co-payment
Australia Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS)
• Universal coverage of subsidised medicines for Australian residents
• AUD$37.70 [USD$29.39] (adult) • $AUD 6.10 [USD$4.76] (concession)
China Basic Health Insurance Scheme (BHIS) – urban & rural schemes
• Covering urban and rural residents
• Yes (amount depends on sub-insurance system)
Japan National Health Insurance (NHI) Scheme
• Coverage to all Japanese citizens
• 30% • 10% or 20% (elder and preschool child
South Korea National Health Insurance Scheme (NHI)
• Coverage to 99% of Korean citizens
• 30% • 5% oncology meds; 10% rare disease
meds New Zealand Pharmaceutical
Management Agency (PHARMAC)
• Universal coverage of subsidised medicines for New Zealand residents
• NZD$5 [USD$3.76] • Free (under 6 years of age)
Taiwan National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA)
• Coverage to 99.9% of Taiwanese citizens
• NTD20 [USD$0.64] for meds < NTD100 [USD$3.19]
• add NTD20 [USD$0.64] per additional NTD100 medication cost
• Cap for copayment at NTD200 [USD$6.37] Thailand National List of Essential
Medicines • Coverage of generics
and cost-effective patented medicines for Thai citizens
• No copayment
Fx rates: sourced March 3, 2015
RESULTS
Minimum time from
regulatory submission to subsidised access = 72
weeks
AUSTRALIA
TGA Registration (52 wks)
PBS Listing (37 wks: 17 wk PBAC evaluation + 20 wks)
MEDSAFE Registration (52 wks)
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 110
weeks
TAIWAN
TFDA Registration (80 – 104 wks) NHI Listing (30 – 78 wks)
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 92
weeks
SOUTH KOREA
MFDS Registration (52 – 78 wks: chemicals – biologics)
NHI Listing (52 wks)
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 60
weeks
JAPAN
PMDA Registration (52 wks) NHI Listing (8 – 12 wks)
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 84
weeks*
NEW ZEALAND
PHARMAC Listing (32 wks)
*indicative only as timelines not cited in guidelines # current process (August 2014); specific to urban population only.
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 5 yrs
(260 wks)
CHINA#
CFDA Registration (4 – 5 yrs) BHIS Listing (1 – 5 yrs)
Minimum time from regulatory submission to subsidised access = 104
weeks
THAILAND
Thai FDA Registration (64-78 wks: chemicals; 104 wks: biologics)
NLEM (104 – 156 wks)
Time to progress through regulatory & subsidised patient access systems across Asia-Pacific (Theoretical)
EXAMPLES
Jurisdiction Date of Registration
Date of Subsidised
Access
Time from Registration to Access
Australia July 2011 January 2012 21 weeks Taiwan August 2013 June 2014 42 weeks South Korea November 2011 January 2013 60 weeks New Zealand June 2013 n/a 60+ weeks Thailand November 2012 n/a 91+ weeks
Jurisdiction Date of Registration
Date of Subsidised
Access
Time from Registration to Access
Japan April 2010 June 2010 9 weeks Australia September 2013 December 2013 13 weeks South Korea May 2013 January 2014 30 weeks
Apixaban for VTE-P
Alogliptin for T2DM
CONCLUSIONS
There is consistency across the 7 jurisdictions studied in relation to regulatory and subsidised patient access processes:
regulatory approval is required prior to subsidised access review subsidised access coverage is broad, and the cost of medicine subsidisation is offset, in part, by patient co-payments.
While local differences will always exist in relation to budget and pricing negotiation, there may be efficiencies that can be applied across systems to improve time to subsidised access. Closer understanding of regulatory and subsidised access systems can lead to best-practice sharing and ultimately, timely access and better health outcomes for patients.
SUMMARY/ NEXT STEPS Parallel regulatory and subsidised access evaluation is one area where time efficiencies can be gained. Another potential way to reduce time to subsidised access is to consider how to remove duplication from the regulatory and subsidised access assessments. A recent Collaboration between the European Medicines Agency and the European network for HTA was established and is examining ways of improving the contribution of regulatory assessment reports to the assessment of medicinal products by HTA bodies. While the assessment of relative effectiveness should remain the remit of subsidised access agencies, there are data and review efficiencies that can be implemented. Recommended outcomes from collaborations such as the above could be used globally to improve communications within sponsor companies, expand dialogue between regulators and health technology assessment bodies, support policymaker decisions, and improve time to subsidised access for patients in the future.
PRICE DISCLOSURE IN AUSTRALIA
DELIVERING SAVINGS BUT INDIRECTLY BLOCKING
ACCESS TO INNOVATIVE MEDICINES?
James Harrison, Greg Cook, Hansoo Kim
Bristol-Myers Squibb Australia
1
ISPOR 6th Asia-Pacific Conference, Beijing September 2014
James Harrison, MPH
2
Disclaimer
The views in this presentation do not necessarily reflect the policies of Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Price disclosure – an overview
4
2007 Price disclosure (PD) introduced 2010 PD refined - Early and Accelerated Price Disclosure (EAPD) introduced 2014 EAPD refined – Simplified Price Disclosure (SPD) introduced
A price discounting mechanism to ensure the sustainability of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme by moving the reimbursed price of off-patent drugs towards the competitive market price.
Docetaxel – total expenditure
5
Date Dispensed price per maximum amount* (AUD) October 2012 $3884.96
December 2012 $1002.81 April 2014 $237.54 April 2015 $158.59
*Maximum amount = 250mg; PBS item numbers: 5581R,5582T,5583W,5584X,5585Y,7281F,7282G,7283H,7284J,7285K
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
9,000,000To
tal B
enef
it Pa
id ($
AUD
) December 2012 Price Reduction ~75%
Implications – cost utility analysis
6
• Drug price is a primary driver in cost effectiveness analysis
Implications – cost utility analysis
7
• Drug price is a primary driver in cost effectiveness analysis
Implications – cost utility analysis
8
• Drug price is a primary driver in cost effectiveness analysis
• Ceteris paribus, a reduction in comparator price will increase an ICER
• Decreases likelihood of a new drug being deemed ‘cost-effective’
A simple applied example
9
The cost effectiveness of a new drug (NEW) compared with standard of care (SOC)
Variable Value Cost – SOC 100 Cost – NEW 15,000 Benefit – Alive 1 Benefit – Dead 0 Probability of remaining alive on SOC 10%
Probability of remaining alive on NEW 30%
Time to NEW loss of exclusivity 10
Time Horizon 30 Discount rate 5%
ICER = $21K/0.32QALY = $71k/QALY Assumed decision threshold of $50k/QALY
Multi-cohort structure
10
-30 Cohorts commencing in subsequent years -Each year discounted -Simulated patent expiry of NEW from year 10 -ICERs calculated per cohort
Price decay function - Extracted from Price Disclosure figures - Normalised against date of first reduction - Average price reduction at 0, 12 and 24 months determined - Applied to NEW from year 10 - NEW price floor equals price of SOC ($100)
11
Cycle Weighted average discount
- -
0 16.00%
1 29.98%
2 20.80%
3 20.25%
n 20.00%
Year Applied discount
Price of NEW
9 - $15,000
10 16.00% $12,600
11 29.98% $8,823
12 20.80% $6,987
13 20.25% $5,572
14 20.00% $4,458
… … …
29 20.00% $100
Source: http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/industry/pricing/eapd
NEW Loss of exclusivity in year 10
12
$-
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
$80,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
ICER
($/Q
ALY)
Cohort / year
NEW LOE
Decision threshold of $50k/QALY
13
$-
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
$80,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
ICER
Cohort / year
Aggregating costs and benefits
14
- Over 30 years: aICER = $43,312/QALY
t=23 t=30
∑
- Over 23 years: aICER = $49,437/QALY
∑
∑
An aggregate ICER was calculated by summing horizontally costs and benefits across all cohorts for each year, discounting, totalling, then dividing aggregate costs by aggregate benefits
Summary Individual ICERs - ICERs ranged from $70,875/QALY to $100/QALY -Assuming Price disclosure from year 10, the ICER threshold of $50,000/QALY was reached in year 12 - Applying this as the sole criteria for funding decisions would result in a 12 year delay to access, despite tripling survival rates
Delayed access
15
Aggregate ICERs - Over 30 years, the aggregate ICER was $43,312/QALY - Shortening the time horizon, the threshold was reached at year 23 at an aggregate ICER of $49,437
Earlier access?