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Olli Pyyhtinen Being-with: Georg Simmels Sociology of Association

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Being-withGeorg Simmels Sociology of Association

Olli Pyyhtinen

AbstractThe article discusses Georg Simmels theorizing on the social in the light ofhis treatment of the dyad and the triad, constellations of two and threeelements. What makes the dyad and the triad particularly interesting is thefact that they express the difference between the primary intersubjectivityimmanent to the individuals and the objectified social forms in numericalterms, as quantitatively determined. In the article, it is argued that in itsbasic, methodologically simplest form, the social amounts for Simmel todyadic interaction between I and you, that can be conceptualized as being-with. Nevertheless, a third element is always included also in the dyad, beit only as an excluded third. Therefore, it is claimed that in order to fullyunderstand the dynamics of social relationships, one must look at the inter-play of two socio-logics, bivalent and trivalent. The third not only inter-rupts the supposedly immediate relation between the two elements of thedyad, but it is also capable of transforming it into a completely new figure:a social whole, a we, which obtains a supra-individual life independent ofthe individuals.

Key wordsbeing-with dyad Simmel the social triad

HOW MANY does it take to make a social relation? Two? Three? Ormore? Or perhaps just one? The problem was addressed by theGerman philos opher and sociologist Georg Simmel (18581918) inhis masterpiece Soziologie (1992c), first published a hundred years ago, in1908. In the second chapter to the book, Die quantitative Bestimmtheit derGruppe, Simmel discusses the quantitative determination of social forma-tions. According to him, there exists an explicit correlation between social

Theory, Culture & Society 2009 (SAGE, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore),Vol. 26(5): 108128DOI: 10.1177/0263276409106353

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forms of interaction and the number of elements involved in the interaction.While a clear distinction can be detected also between the forms of smallgroups and those of large groups, Simmel contends that it is only in theinteraction between two elements which he terms the dyad (Zweizahl ) and that of three the triad (Dreizahl ) that the quantitative determina-tion can be specified in numerical terms.

Simmels treatment of the dyad and the triad has been highly influen-tial especially in American sociology and social psychology within the studyof small groups and group dynamics (see e.g. Bean, 1970; Becker andUseem, 1942; Caplow, 1956; Hare, 1952; Levine et al., 1976: 111517;Mills, 1958; Thompson and Walker, 1982), as well as in organization studies(see e.g. Burt, 1992, 2005; Burt and Krez, 1995; Krackhardt, 1999), butapart from a few exceptions, it has rarely been considered in connectionwith his conception of the social (das Sozial ). That is the objective of thisarticle. By playing on the dynamics between the dyad and the triad, I willtry to analyse Simmels notion of the social into its most basic components.Thus the following, centring on the question How many does it take to makea social relation?, will amount to a sort of sociological arithmetic,1 whichexplores the arithmetically definable quantitative determination of socialformations. In the examination, the dyad and the triad are taken as gener-alizable models of all kinds of social constellations or, to play with words,as forms of a socio-logic,2 the dyad presenting its bivalent and the triad itstrivalent variant.

I begin by discussing the basic form of Simmels bivalent socio-logic,the relation between I (Ich) and you (Du). Simmel thinks that the being ofan individual is always being-with a you, that our existence is essentiallycoexistence. After that, attention is drawn to the between in between I andyou, which makes itself felt as the coinciding proximity and distance of Iand you. The between both connects the two partners to one another andprevents them from coming together in a common substance. Then I willmove to discussing the dynamics between the bivalent and trivalent socio-logic. In principle, for Simmel the shift from the bilateral relationship to atrilateral formation marks the emergence of group, a supra-individual entitythat is constituted not only by Iyou relations but also by part-to-whole rela-tions. I will conclude the article by summing up the theoretical relevanceof Simmels conception of being-with.

Being-with-youIn his work, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has analysed thenature of being as always being-with more rigorously than perhaps anyother thinker (see Nancy, 2000, 2008). According to Nancy, it was Heideg-ger who first elucidated the essentiality of the with for being (Nancy, 2008:3). In Sein und Zeit (1972: 26 118), Heidegger contends that being-with(Mitdasein) is essential to Dasein. However, preceding Heidegger, alreadySimmel stated that being-with is constituent to our being. For Simmel, thebasic ontological condition of human existence is that the single human

Pyyhtinen Simmels Sociology of Association 109



being is not alone on earth but becomes determined through being-with-others [Mitdasein anderer] (Simmel, 1992b: 348).3 Being-with is not addedto nor does it come second to being, but being is already given as being-with; being-with constitutes the being of individuals. Simmel holds that thehuman being is in ones whole essence determined by the fact that one livesin reciprocal interaction with other people (1992c: 15, 1999a: 72).4 Evenbeing alone is for Simmel essentially being-with-others. Being alone is notthe sheer absence of social relations but their presence which is thenremoved: to be alone is not like being the only person on the face of theearth but a form of interaction in which the other party is excluded afterhaving real effects on the person (Simmel, 1992c: 96).5

The being of an individual is thus always supported, even constitutedby something other than him- or herself. This makes the other a crucialcomponent in the structure of being for Simmel; being-with others is essen-tial to the constitution of being.6 Accepting this idea has significant conse-quences for our understanding of the social. From the perspective ofbeing-with, to study the social is to explore the conditions and forms of beingalong with others. This is not a new perspective, but it can already be foundin the etymological root of the term sociology: the Latin term socius suggeststhat the social has something to do with our associations with companionsor allies.

Accordingly, and interestingly drawing precisely from Simmel,Michael Theunissen (1984: 6) has defined the social as every type ofrelation to the Other, including the presocial. However, unlike what issuggested by Theunissens statement, the Simmelian other is a lower-caseother that is not to be confused with any of the notions of a capitalized Other,such as the Lacanian one, separation from which, in Lacans view, consti-tutes the social (i.e. separation from the mOther with whom the I cannotbe re-united; Albertsen and Diken, 2003: 15). It is equally crucial to distin-guish it from Meads generalized other, from any of the conceptions whichidentify the other with the alien I (such as the transcendental subject orthe unconscious), from some external force (such as God)7 which is alien tothe I, as well as from the concept of otherness employed by, say, feministor postcolonial theory. For Simmel, by contrast, the lower-case other is tobe encountered in the you, the second person of the personal pronoun. Heconceives of this you at the same time as specific and typified: as specific inthe sense that it does not refer to otherness in general, to a more or lessindeterminate group of others in the plural, but to the other, the you, in thesingular, as the second person; and, as typified in the sense that this youdoes not refer to any singular you, a capitalized Other with a proper name(such as mother, God, etc.) but rather signifies a type, a category, a positionthat a subject comes to occupy when facing me.

In his thinking of the you, Simmel commences from the idea that,besides having an ontological certainty of ourselves, we also hold to the factof you: we feel the you as something independent from our representation[of him/her], as something that is for oneself exactly the same way as our

110 Theory, Culture & Society 26(5)



own existence (Simmel, 1992c: 45). The you who I face is not an object buta subject as much as myself: the other soul has for me the same reality asI myself (Simmel, 1992c: 44). You and I are ontologically equal: the youis . . . a primordial phenomenon to the same extent as the I (Simmel, 1999b:160). Not only does this you have an independent existence but Simmelnotes that it is also immediately experienced as such by me. As much likethe I, the you is a primary immediately experienced category that can betraced back no further (Simmel, 2003: 338, 2005: 23).

The independent being-for-oneself of the you implies that being-with-you is fundamentally marked with distance. Donald Levine (1959: 23) hascorrectly pointed out that for Simmel, distance is the main dimension insocial life: in topics like secrecy, the stranger, value, the pauper, super- andsub-ordination, as well as in the sociology of space, distance plays a signifi-cant role as a theme. Simmel (1992c: 717) stresses that, in principle, allsocial relations can be analysed in terms of spatial and psychologicaldistance/proximity. However, what hasnt been properly noted in the second-ary literature is that distance is of crucial importance for Simmels verynotion of the social too, in the manner that it manifests itself in the bi lateralbond between the I and the you. Sociality between the I and the you appearsas being-with precisely because the you always remains distanced andseparate from the I, and therefore I cannot be united with you in the senseof forming a common substance. While the you is subjectively closer to theI than anything else, the I and the you cannot, nevertheless, becomecompletely fused into each other:

On the one hand, the animated you is our only pair in the cosmos, the onlybeing with which we understand ourselves mutually and which can be felt asone like nothing else, so that we place the other nature, whenever we meanto feel united with it, in the category of the you. . . . On the other hand, theyou has an individuality and sovereignty alongside us like no other . . .(Simmel, 1999b: 162)

Therefore, as Simmel states in Der Platonischer und der Moderne Eros(2004a: 188), there is something unattainable in the other . . . the absolute-ness of the individual self erects a wall between two human beings. Simmelelaborates on this in the essay Psychologie der Koketterie:

The fact that the human being is, in ones most passionate needs, dependenton the being from whom one is separated by perhaps the deepest metaphys-ical gap is the purest, possibly even the archetypical form [Urform] of theloneliness which makes the human being ultimately a stranger not onlyamongst all the beings in the world, but also amongst those who are the closestto him or her. (Simmel, 2001a: 48)

It is precisely the simultaneous proximity and distance of the you thatmakes the Iyou relation a fragile and delicate matter. The problem ofunderstanding, first, is for Simmel tantamount to the question of how we are




able to understand the you: The you and the understanding are the same,expressed in the one as substance and in the other as function a primordial phenomenon [Urphnomen] of the human spirit (Simmel, 1999b:162). Furthermore, Simmel also defines morality (Sittlichkeit) as thedevotion of the I to a you (1992c: 239).

What is of primary interest as regards being-with from a sociologicalviewpoint is of course the social aspect of the Iyou relation. The tensionbetween proximity and distance shaping the relation of the I and the yousets for Simmel (1992c: 45) the deepest psychological-epistemologicalschema and problem of societalization [Vergesellschaftung]. He discussesthe topic in the famous excursus Wie ist Gesellschaft mglich? (How IsSociety Possible?) to the opening chapter of Soziologie. Even though it isanalogous to Kants question of how nature is possible, the problem of thepossibility of society has a completely other methodological sense: unlikenature, the social is not constituted by a transcendental subject, but is builtupon the interplay between I and you. Whereas a meadow, a stream, a treeand a mountain make up a landscape only in the mind of an observer, soci-etalized elements do not need a third party, an observing person to appeartogether, with one another, but are themselves synthetic-active (synthetisch-aktiv) (Simmel, 1992c: 434). Societalized elements are not simply puttogether to stand in a relation of pure exteriority alongside one another, buttheir being is constituted by an essential, originary with based on recipro-cal determination. According to Simmel (1992c: 44), the consciousness ofones societalization emerges from the feeling and realization that one determines others and is determined by others.

So, Simmel asks, how is this determination possible? After all, the youis not an object but a subject much as myself, for the you has for me thesame reality as I myself. Simmel sees that answering the question requiresthat we find the conditions of possibility for encountering the you. Eventhough Simmel himself calls these, in a Kantian manner, aprioric (aprior-ische) (Simmel, 1992c: 43), they are not transcendental-logical but ratherempirical-psychological by nature (Bevers, 1985: 49).8

The first condition is that I perceive you as typified to some extent(Simmel, 1992c: 478). The you is given to me through several generaltraits: female, middle-aged, French, professor of sociology, married, smoker,music lover and so on. It is their fusion and combination which forms forme the individuality of the you (cf. Simmel, 1989: 393). None of these traitsis limited to this or that singular you, but are something turned to theoutside: they transcend the individual toward a type (Simmel, 2003: 422,2005: 87). So, from the viewpoint of the I, you are not defined by yourselfalone but you belong to a social type which you share with other persons.Simmel proposes that the type provides the you with a new form as theindividual-real residue of the person becomes united with it. Due to thisform, it is possible for me to perceive the other as my like, as a co-dwellerof the same specific world (Mitbewohner derselben besonderen Welt)(Simmel, 1992c: 4950). The world in being-in-the-world is always shared;




you are never completely other, but someone with whom I share a world.In fact, as Petra Christian (1978: 129) points out, the I and the you mutuallyground themselves in a dialectical or dialogical fashion. As a primarycategory, you are a constituent component of my own existence, and I myselfam a you to the you.

The general social attributes, however, do not encompass the personcompletely. The type is always at once more and less than the individual(Simmel, 1992c: 50): more insofar as it holds for several individuals, lessinsofar as the individual is not exhausted by the type. That is, for Simmel,the you is not thoroughly social, a sheer social product. Instead of beingmerely a carrier of social roles and general attributes, the you alsopossesses a qualitative uniqueness which is not socially determined: Itseems as if every human being had a deepest point of individuality inoneself which cannot be reproduced [nachgeformt] inwardly by anyone elsewith whom this point is qualitatively divergent (Simmel, 1992c: 48).Accordingly, Simmel coins the second condition of the social as: everyelement of a group is not only a part of society, but is still somethingbesides it (1992c: 51). The a priori of the empirical social life is that lifeis not completely social (1992c: 53).9 For Simmel, the fact that that the youis not fully absorbed by and integrated into a social formation is not a sheernegative condition of society but its positive moment: the social being of anindividual is crucially determined and co-determined by the way in whichthe individual is not social in other respects (1992c: 51). It is only becauseindividuals are not completely socially determined that they are able to beself-determining and identify their actions with themselves (Schrader-Klebert, 1968: 114).

The third condition, finally, concerns bringing the antagonism of thesocial and the individual to a principal harmony (Simmel, 1992c: 59). HereSimmel is dealing not so much with the bond between I and you but withthe relation of the individual to society as a self-sustaining social whole. Heholds that were one to perceive society from a purely objective perspective,it would appear as a system in which the individual has no weight whatso-ever, as an order consisting of functions linked together systematically interms of space, time, concepts and values, completely devoid of the self(Ichform) which, in the last resort, nonetheless carries its dynamics. On theother hand, were one to consider each function and quality as purely indi-vidual, society would become a cosmos whose diversity would appearunfathomable in terms of being and movement. In it, each element couldbe and act as it pleases without, however, changing the overall structure inany way (Simmel, 1992c: 57). Thus, Simmel concludes, in order for societyto be possible as a constellation of mutually related individuals, there hasto be a pervasive correlation of the life of the individual and the surround-ing social whole. According to Simmel, when considered from the viewpointof the individual, the causal nexus which produces the external network ofsociety is transformed into a commitment, conviction and a feeling ofpurpose, as expressed in vocation, for example. By way of this, every




individual receives a specific position in the social milieu by oneself andin accordance with ones own nature, becoming thus societalized (Simmel,1992c: 59). This produces the general value of individuality, which meansthat the individuality of the individual finds a place in the structure ofgenerality (Simmel, 1992c: 61). Then one exists as an individual also in asocial sense and not only in and by oneself.

To sum up the argument so far, for Simmel, our being is essentiallybeing-with. Instead of theorizing this being-with primarily in the form ofbeing among many, Simmel conceptualizes it, in its basic form, as being-with of I and you. For Simmel, our recognition of the you is opposed to theknowledge of an object: the you is a subject who is like me in some respects(when appearing as a representative of a type) and yet different from me,precisely because of having an individuality and sovereignty as a subject.However, as signalled by the notion of being-with, the you is not onlysomeone resembling me and appearing to me as an other self, but the youis also essentially someone with whom I am. Thus the you both supports mybeing and yet forever remains distanced from and alien to me, no matterwhat. This dialectics of distance and proximity, of dissociative association,sets out a question of the between in between I and you. It will be treatednext.

The BetweenThe mutual constitution of the I and the you suggests that the social being-with should not be considered in terms of pure exteriority, as sheer contin-guity of entities. Nor does Simmel conceive the social in its primordial formas the hyper-existence of the community or society.10 Instead of formingan independent existence beyond individuals, the social is located forSimmel between individuals. It is not a static object but a fluctuating,dynamic reciprocity between individuals: the reciprocal effects between theelements . . . carry the whole persistence and elasticity, the whole diversityand unity of the so palpable and so puzzling life of society (Simmel, 1999a:69; cf. 1992c: 34). Indeed, in Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, originallypublished in 1892/3, Simmel warns against hypostasizing this between(Zwischen) as if into an object located between them [i.e. individuals] in aspatial sense. The hypostasization, Simmel argues, is based on an old meta-physical mistake which reifies the flux between elements into a fixed objectstanding outside them (Simmel, 1911: 123).

In Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, Simmel still thought that thesocial must therefore subsist within individuals (1911: 123). For him, theunity of society is realized directly in and by the consciousness of individ-uals: the consciousness of constituting with others a unity is all there is tothis unity (1992c: 43). Simmel reproduces the view in Philosophie desGeldes (1989, first published 1900) yet in a slightly altered form. Whendiscussing exchange (Tausch), which he considers as the purest and mostdeveloped kind of interaction (Simmel, 1989: 59, 2004b: 82), Simmelmakes the following remark:




The concept of exchange is . . . often misconceived, as though it were a rela-tionship existing outside the elements to which it refers. But it signifies onlya condition or a change within the related subjects, not something that existsbetween them in the sense in which an object might be spatially locatedbetween two other objects. (Simmel, 1989: 61, 2004b: 83)

The two changes that the event of exchange brings with it the mutual gainand loss in possessions between the individuals evince for Simmel onlyone causally connected double event in which one subject now possessessomething he did not have before and has given away something he didpossess before (Simmel, 1989: 62, 2004b: 83). So this view confinesexchange solely within the individuals.

In Soziologie, however, which came out in 1908, Simmel liberates thesocial from the confines of the individual consciousness. Now he stressesthat the social is not manifested only within individuals but also spatiallyin the between in between them: The between as a sheer functional reci-procity, the contents of which remain within each of its personal bearers,realizes itself . . . also as the insistence of the space existing between them(Simmel, 1992c: 689, italics added).11 This account is extremely importantfor three reasons. First, it suggests that the interaction between twoelements, which in the last instance concerns an event or a condition withineach of the elements, also manifests itself in space. The between, asNicholas J. Spykman (2004 [1925]: 145) has noted, has thus a doublemeaning: it is both a functional and a spatial concept; the functional reci-procity is felt to be located between the two points of space occupied by theelements themselves. Therefore it is the insistence of the space betweenthat accounts for the social. The social is nothing but a name for that which,in a spatial sense, takes place between the interacting elements; thisbetween marks the disclosure of being-with.

Second, the reference to functional reciprocity means that the socialis not reducible to any substance but, as Simmel notes, amounts to an event(Geschehen) (Simmel, 1999a: 70, cf. 1992c: 33); Simmel desubstantializesthe social by considering it in terms of relations of reciprocal effects. Insteadof perceiving the social as an already objectified entity, he tries to revealthe very event of its emergence (see Pyyhtinen, 2007). Third, the referencealso suggests that the between is literally nothing: it is sheer functionalreciprocity. Thus, to some extent, I and you amounts to nothing; we are withone another, yet I am me and you are you. So, the with of being-with, asJean-Luc Nancy has pointed out in relation to the notion of being-with hefinds in Heidegger, implies proximity and distance, precisely the distanceof the impossibility to come together in a common being (Nancy et al.,2001); I remain myself and you yourself. In other words, the with is theproximity of I and you which renders itself as distance; the with is inbetween I and you, and always implies an in-between. Being-with thuscomes down to sharing nothing, sharing the space between (Nancy et al.,2001). It is, literally, dissociative association.




The between is in itself nothing also in the sense that it appears onlythrough various kinds of relations and associations. Simmel stresses thatthere is no such thing as social interaction in general, but only specificand concrete forms of reciprocal effects or interaction (1992c: 24).12 Ashe puts it in Soziologie, it is only interaction which renders the sheer conti-guity (Nebeneinander) or being alongside one another of isolated individu-als into forms of their being and acting with one another (Miteinander), forone another (Freinander) and even against one another (Gegeneinander)(1992c: 1819). This immediately suggests that social cohesiveness cantake not only the form of harmonious sharing as in friendship and love, butalso that of being-against. For Simmel (1992c: 2848, 310, 327), thoseforms of interaction which oppose individuals or groups to one another, suchas struggle, conflict and rivalry, also fundamentally bind them together. Itis precisely being-with that is played out also in the forms of being-against.

However, to address the cohesive force of conflict and struggle in detailwould go beyond the scope of this article. What is more relevant here is thefact that being-with gains specificity precisely through and in the forms ofinteraction. The existential-ontological fact that being-in-the-world isnecessarily being-with-others is devoid of a precise sociological meaning.Simmel argues that, even though the idea that being is always being-withmust lead to a new mode of investigation in the human sciences, it never-theless does not yet provide sociology with a distinct object of study. Tostudy man as a social animal would make sociology a sheer method and atool of other, already existing sciences, one comparable to induction which,as a principle of study, extends to the field of practically every disciplinewithout, however, reaching the status of an independent discipline in itself(Simmel, 1992c: 1516). To find out what is it that is between individualsrequires thus that we look at the concrete forms of reciprocal effects orinteractions (Wechselwirkungen) between individuals, their specific ways ofcoming together: super- and sub-ordination, conflict, cooperation, rivalry,secrecy, sociability and so on. Simmel (1992c: 35) sees it as the task of sociology to study these forms of relations.

The Dyad and the TriadAs we have seen, instead of being reducible to the hyper-existence of acommunity or society, the social, in its most basic form, is for Simmel dyadicinteraction, being-with-you. However, Simmel does not go so far as to claimthat the social is not objectifiable at all. Notwithstanding the methodo logicalprimacy of the Iyou relation in his conception of the constitution of thesocial, Simmel does not completely ignore hyper-existing social wholes asa topic. On the contrary, Simmel (1992c: 323) insists that sociologicalstudy should cover a whole variety of social forms, from the temporary tothe lasting and from the relations between few individuals to the larger,supra-individual formations. Indeed, Simmel is aware that the dynamicsocial event or occurrence (Geschehen) can become objectified into aninstitution such as language, thought forms, morality, religion, family, law,




money, people, the state and so on (Simmel, 1911: 128). The objectificationof the social from the fluctuating reciprocal interaction between individualsto relatively stable formations is in fact among the key issues of his sociol-ogy (see Fitzi, 2002). In his philosophy of life, Simmel examines the processof objectification as Achsendrehung des Lebens, the turn of the axis of life(see Simmel, 1999c: 245; see also Pyyhtinen, 2007). Accordingly, ScottLash (2005) has argued that there exist two notions of the social in Simmelswork: one as primary or even primordial intersubjectivity (Lash, 2005: 10) or, as Simmel puts it, as fluctuating, constantly developing life-process(1992c: 659) the other as form, which is constraining and life-destroying(Lash, 2005: 20).

The contrast between dynamic sociality and objectified social formscan be elaborated by looking into Simmels discussion in Soziologie of thenumber of persons involved in the interaction. Simmel argues that, socio-logically, the typical differences between all social constellations can bepresented by looking at the differences between the formations of twoelements and those involving three, that is, between the dyad and the triador the two (die Zwei) and the third (der Dritte). Each presents a model ora socio-logic that can be generalized: the one, bivalent, the other, trivalent.In the first instance, Simmel operates in a bivalent mode of thought. Heconsiders the beginning of sociality as a society of two [Gesellschaft zuzweien] (1992b: 348),13 a unity of one human being with another (1992c:44), which can be conceptualized as a relation of an I to a you. The dyadis the simplest social unit, even simpler than that consisting of just oneperson (Einzahl ) (Simmel, 1992c: 124). For Simmel, the relation betweentwo persons precedes the ostensible non-relation of being alone: in beingalone, the influence of others is merely cut off and their presence is turnedfrom actual into ideal.14 Thus, Simmel (1992c: 96) asserts: The numeri-cally simplest formations which in general can still be called social inter-actions seem to express themselves between two elements. A few pageslater he further elaborates on this by stating that the relation between twoelements is the methodologically simplest sociological formation: It offersthe schema, the germ and the material for innumerable formations of moremembers (1992c: 100).

The bilateral relation of I and you thus forms the basic form of social-ity for Simmel. Yet in order to fully understand the dynamics of social rela-tionships, one has to add a third element. It is only when two becomes threethat the spectrum of social relations is played out in its full complexity.While the two presents the first embodiment of synthesis and unification,and also of separation and antithesis, Simmel (1992c: 124) contends thatthe third brings a crossing, reconciliation, rejection of the absolutecontrast to this antithesis. The third provides the twosome with a wider,solidifying social frame (1992c: 115), producing hence a completely newformation (1992c: 121): a supra-individual social whole (1992b: 349,1992c: 101). That is, in the twosome the individuals are confronted only byone another (I encounter a you to whom I am a you), but with the arrival of




the third, the individuals may have a relation with the relation itself. Thedyad does not yet build up any higher unity above its individual elementsbut relies immediately on the one and the other (1992c: 106, cf. 1992b:351). The triad, by contrast, marks the threshold of an independent, supra-individual unity (1992c: 101). To the relation of the I and the you, the thirdadds the dimension of we, making the social formation a social fact in aDurkheimian sense, something objective and transcendent to individuals.According to Simmel (1992c: 11718), any further expansion to the forma-tions of 4, 10, 100, 100,000 and so on does not modify the formation to thesame extent.

The third, Simmel suggests, not only brings a reconciliation to thedissociative association of I and you, but it also marks the threshold of groupdynamics. The arrival of the third produces three types of constellationswhich are not yet possible in the relations between two. First of all, the thirdcan play the part of the impartial (Unparteiische) and mediator (Vermit-tler).15 When in an impartial position, the third appears equally distant fromthe two parties: it may either be completely beyond and untouched by theirinterests and opinions or participate in both sides to the exact same extent.As for the impartiality that is required in arbitration, the third may recon-cile the conflict between the two parties either by leaving the decision intheir hands, so that they can reach a solution by themselves, or by becominga referee (Schiedsrichter) who makes a judgement. As for the position ofthe mediator, Simmel holds that there is no social formation of more thantwo participants in which mediation does not play a part. It is, according toSimmel, precisely the third which presents the type and the schema ofthe mediator; all other cases of mediation are in the final analysis reducibleto it. When playing the part of a mediator, the third may either reinforce thebond between the two parties, as in the case of a common enemy againstwhich the two are sided, or in that of a newborn child which consolidatesthe parents relationship; or it may change the relation between the twoparties into an indirect one so that their relation is mediated by the third(again a child may serve as an example here) (Simmel, 1992c: 1259.)Second, while the impartial and the mediator appear as benevolent in thesense that they wish to contribute to the cohesion of the parties, the thirdmay also seek egoistic interests and try to benefit from the conflict amongthe two. Simmel (1992c: 134) calls this situation tertius gaudens, rejoicingthird. The third type of constellation, finally, could, according to Simmel(1992c: 143), be described as a situation of divida et impera, divide-and-conquer. As in the tertius gaudens, in it the third appears as malevolentand benefits from the disunion of the other two. The difference between therejoicing third and the divide-and-conquer, however, is that whereas therejoicing third pertains to situations in which the two parties stand alreadyin conflict, in the divide-and-conquer they are disunited precisely by theeffect of the third.

Accordingly, and not surprisingly, many commentators have arguedthat it is only the triad, and not the dyad, which marks the threshold of the




social in Simmels work. Julien Freund (1976: 91), for instance, has main-tained that whereas the dyad (Zweizahl ) has more of a social psychologicalimprint, sociologically the triad (Dreizahl ) as a primordial sociological form[soziologische Urform] is the most important. In a similar vein, TheodorLitt (1926: 114) claimed some fifty years earlier that it is only by subsum-ing the I and the you under a comprehensive whole that the conscious appre-hension of the being-for-one-another of the two becomes possible. Indeed,as we saw, the a prioris of societalization Simmel sketches in the excursusWie ist Gesellschaft mglich? suggested that, when we encounter the you,there is always a broader social frame implied in the typical features thatthe you shares with other persons.

Yet the matter is not quite as simple as this. While the third marksthe threshold of the social frame within which the bilateral relation betweenthe I and the you is also embedded, the third may have its effects only inrelation to the relationship between two. Hence, it is neither simply the dyadnor the triad that can be regarded as the basic unit of the social, since theyappear as mutually dependent on one another: the possibility of the dyad isconditioned by the third, and the actions of the third, in turn, alreadypresuppose the dyad. Or, the dyad may be the simplest social formation, asSimmel suggests, but only insofar as it is made possible and produced bythe exclusion of the third.16 This expresses the negative aspect of the quan-titative determination of social forms. It can be illustrated by takingintimacy as an example. Simmel sees the sociality between two persons asthe basis of intimacy. According to him, the magnitude of two elementspresents the numerical limit above which intimacy as a social form cannotoccur: intimacy is something shared by two and only two. That is to say,intimacy is exclusive by nature: in an intimate relationship, something thatthe two partners share only with one another and with no one else is placedat the heart of this relationship and made into its main carrier or primarysource of fulfilment (Simmel, 1992c: 1045). So here the third is that whichinterrupts: it disturbs, disrupts or shatters the intimacy; the intimate relationcollapses or is damaged as soon as a third party comes along. According toSimmel (1992c: 115), the dyad is characterized precisely by the fact that itlacks the interruption and the diversion of the pure and immediate reci-procity. So, intimacy can be achieved only by constantly excluding a third;the exclusion of the third is the only way that two can be together.

In this light, and here we arrive at a crucial factor distinguishing thesociality of two from self-sustaining, hyper-existing social wholes, alsodeath is a third which interrupts. Simmels thoughts on death are impor-tant for understanding his notion of the social bond in its basic dyadicform. Death is a third which ultimately abolishes the bond, a mediatorwhich destroys the very possibility of mediating. Simmel holds that thedyad is fundamentally limited and shaped by death. In self-sustainingsocial wholes, the communal we secures the individual a certain kind ofimmortality: I do not die, at least not completely, insofar as the social whole(family, fatherland, humanity, etc.) of which I am a part lives on (cf.




Blanchot, 1988). The communion revealed in the dyad, by contrast, doesnot outlive the existence of the partners, but rather manifests itself firstand foremost as the being-with of two finite beings.17 In Die Gesellschaftzu zweien, Simmel writes:

The dependence of the group of two upon the pure individuality of its singularmembers makes its existence in a nearer and more palpable manner consis-tent with the end of the individual than what is the case with other bonds;about the latter each individual at the time knows that they can outlast onesown departure or death. (1992b: 349, cf. 1992c: 1012)

So, unlike self-sustaining formations, the dyad is not independent of theindividuals involved. And it is ultimately through death, through the finitudeof the individuals, that the dyadic bond reveals its dependence upon eachindividual partner. In Simmels words, for its life the dyad needs two butfor its death only one (1992b: 34950, cf. 1992c: 102). Hence, just likethe life of the individual, so the life of the bilateral bond is determined bydeath from the outset: we are, from our birth, beings that will die. And soit is with groups as well (1992b: 349).18 Death is the other of life boththat of individuals and that of the dyad through which life gains its specificform and significance.19 Death is thus not external but immanent to the lifeof the relation; death is initially and inwardly tied to life (Simmel, 2001b:82; cf. 1992b: 349, 1992c: 102, 2003: 401). It is not something that, as itwere, determines our lives only just at the moment we die, as pictured inthe image of the Grim Reaper suddenly cutting the thread of life. Rather,the certainty of death is an ever-present feature of our lives: in each andevery moment of life we are of the kind that shall die (Simmel, 2001b: 83).

Therefore, the being-with of two is sociality marked with death, thefinitude of the individuals, I and you. Notwithstanding the fact that deathultimately erases the relation, it is important to understand, however, thatdeath is not a mere negation of the bond between I and you, but it is alsoits positive condition; as a negativity or nothingness death belongs innerlyto the very existence and constitution of the relation.20 As a third separat-ing I from you, death prevents I and you from coming together in a commonbeing or substance, that is, becoming truly one. Nonetheless, at the sametime, death has to be excluded as a third: the relation cannot survive death,live through it (and this is precisely what separates the dyad from the hyper-existence of self-sustaining wholes, as we saw). Due to the very negativityof death the relation between I and you can last only as long as deathremains an excluded third. When death appears, that is, as soon as it isincluded as a third, the two ceases to be: it breaks down to solitude or evento zero.

ConclusionIn his work, Simmel poses the fundamental sociological question about theconditions of possibility of the social. Yet his manner of answering it is quite




original compared to the other giants of the discipline. In sociology, thesocial has typically been grasped by commencing from a subject, be it froman actor or from the community (Gemeinschaft) or society (Gesellschaft).Between these two subjects, the individual and the communal one, therehas been hardly any place left for the relational mode of the social, signalledby the above-discussed with of being-with.21 Whereas the thinking whichtakes the isolated actor as its point of departure sees the relations betweenindividuals as merely relations of exteriority, the theories premised on thenotion of society or that of community tend to neglect the with in favour ofa pure interiority achieved in the hyper-existence of society, or in the figureof a harmonious community uniting individuals who share a commonsubstance.

Simmels merit consists in grasping the social neither in terms of exte-riority nor in interiority: his sociology discloses the intermediary, relationalmode of the social. Instead of starting from isolated actors or from the hyper-existence of society, methodologically Simmel begins with a theory of rela-tions. As the basic unit of social relations he takes the dyad, the being-withof two individuals, I and you. As a result, Simmel avoids assuming the pre-existence of society as a hypostasized, self-sustaining generality and is ableto grasp the social in its nascence, its becoming. Simmels theorizingreminds us that even though the institutionalized social formations may beas far from the living reciprocity between individuals as possible, withoutsuch reciprocity no institutionalized forms would appear in the first place.

Simmels reflections on being-with resonate with more recent thinkerssuch as Heidegger and Nancy. Compared to them, Simmels distinctivecontribution lies in the fact that he ties the preconditions of the intermedi-ary region of the with to an arithmetical understanding of the social, whichhe discusses in terms of dyadic and triadic sociological constellations. Whatmakes the dyad and the triad particularly interesting is the fact that in them,the difference between the two notions of the social the social as being-with immanent to the individuals, on the one hand, and the social as aself-sustaining form, on the other can be expressed as quantitatively determined in numerical terms. An inquiry into the Simmelian bivalent andtrivalent socio-logics might even provide a new perspective on the historyof quantitative reasoning in sociology. Drawing out the specific implicationsof the bivalent and trivalent socio-logics for a mathematical understandingof social life remains, however, a task for a future study.

Of course, Simmel is not alone in addressing dyadic and triadic rela-tionships. Besides the recent organizational analysis and the vast traditionof social psychological studies of small groups and group dynamics thatdraw explicitly on Simmel, there are also many contemporary thinkers whohave discussed the issues and with hardly any direct connection toSimmel. Emmanuel Levinas (1985), for instance, considers intersubjectiverelationships in terms of facing the Other, and it is on the responsibilityfor this Other that the Levinasian ethics is based. Likewise, Ren Girard(1976) models his idea of mimetic desire in accordance with a triadic




relationship of subject, model and object, and Michel Serres (2007) figureof the parasite is essentially in the position of the third. It is easy to findresonances between Simmel and these theorists. However, in a preliminarymanner, it could be argued that Simmel examines the correlation betweenthe number of elements and forms of social relationships in a much moreexplicit and also more rigorous manner than they do. For instance, Simmelshows that there is both a negative and a positive aspect to quantitativedetermination. The negative aspect manifests itself in the dyad: the constel-lation of two elements presents itself as the numerical limit above which theprimary and methodologically simplest social relation cannot take place.Hence the being together of two, modelled according to the idea of intimacy,always presupposes the exclusion of the third. The positive aspect of thequantitative determination, in turn, became evident in the way the arrivalof the third transforms the dyadic, immanent relation into a transcendentsocial fact: the triad is not a sum of Is (and yous), but a completely newfigure that can be characterized by part-to-whole relations. Thus the thirdexcites the dyadic constellation, makes it change its state by forcing a meta-morphosis. The case of divide-and-conquer is perhaps the most evidentexample of the situation where the third operates as an exciter, but it is farfrom being the only one. In fact, Simmels work is full of such thirds; itsuffices only to think of, for instance, the stranger, the pauper or the enemy.They all import qualities into social formations which do not stem from thoseformations themselves, they operate as mediators or relay points and high-light the borderline between the inside and the outside of the group.

To the dyad, the third brings with it the dimension of societalization:it not only interrupts the immediate relation between the two elements butalso refers to a wider social frame, hence linking the dyad to a wider networkof relations ultimately to society. This is the crucial difference between thebivalent and the trivalent socio-logic. The paradox of the dyad, however, aparadox which Simmel does not pay attention to, is that as soon as there aretwo, there are already three; the only way two can be together is by exclud-ing a third. Thus the bivalent socio-logic is always already trivalent. Thethird does not have to be a person but already the dissociative-associativebetween in between I and you presents such a third. Namely, in order forthere to be two there has to be a connecting relation between them, yet assoon as it connects the partners it becomes a middle term between the twothrough which their reciprocal give-and-take must pass. So, in order for thedyad to be possible, the between must at the same time be included (forthere to be I and/with you) and excluded (for there to be two and only two)as a third. The dyad thus expresses perfectly the fact that relation is andmust ultimately be a non-relation: it must disappear as a relation into immediacy in order for there to be only two; as soon as it exists, there arenot two but three.22 In the last instance, relation cannot be anything elsebut nothing (literally no-thing), nothing but proximity which gives itself asdistance, or the negativity of death which shapes and limits the being-withof the two partners from the outset.




Notes

1. Simmel himself does not employ the expression sociological arithmetic, but Inevertheless think it succeeds in identifying the ethos of his analysis of the dyadand the triad.2. The term socio-logic was coined by Sverre Wide (2006), though he uses theconcept in a somewhat different sense than I do here; see also Wide et al. (forth-coming).3. All quotations from German sources have been translated by the author; wherea German source is followed by an English equivalent source, the translation isfrom that English source. Sometimes two alternative German sources are given.4. The purest form of togetherness is present for Simmel in sociability (Geselligkeit). It is characterized by an impulse to be with others, that is, by afeeling for, by a satisfaction in, the very fact that one is associated with others, andthat the solitariness of the individual is resolved into togetherness, a union withothers (Simmel, 2001c: 178, 1997: 121).5. Heidegger, too, has stressed being alone as a deficient mode of being-with.Heidegger sees being alone as imprinted by the existential-ontological fact thatbeing-in-the-world is by necessity being-with along with others (1972: 26 118).To some extent, Heidegger was familiar with Simmels work and took up someaspects of it. David Krell (1992: 95) suggests that Heideggers analysis of being-in-the-world, and also his notions of death and destiny, are influenced by Simmel.However, with a few exceptions (see e.g. Heidegger, 1972: 49n), Heidegger almostnever mentions Simmel by name in his texts. Nevertheless, Hans Georg Gadamer(1975: 521n) reports that, as early as 1923, in a private conversation, Heideggerspoke highly of Simmel and his last pieces of writing. For a comparison of Simmeland Heidegger, see Groheim (1991), Gawoll (1993) and Jalbert (2003).6. Of course, this applies not only to Simmel. Michael Theunissen (1984: 1) hasargued that the Other comprehends all those concepts by means of whichcontemporary philosophy has sought to set out the structure of being-with, or itsoriginal transcendental form. He divides these roughly into two approaches: on theone hand, transcendental philosophy, which conceives of the Other as the alien I,and, on the other, the philosophy of dialogue or dialogicalism, which understandsby the Other the you or the Thou (Theunissen, 1984).7. Simmels student Martin Buber, for instance, conceives of God as the ultimateyou or Thou in his treatise Ich und Du (1923). Quite obviously, Bubers theoriz-ing of the profane Iyou relation echoes some of Simmels ideas even though thestudent does not mention his teacher even once in the book.8. For an interesting and original interpretation of the Simmelian a prioris of soci-etalization as outlining a set of axes of sociability see Kemple (2007: 47).9. Simmel stresses that the divide into social and not-social existence does notmean that the being of the individual would be partly social and partly individ-ual. Unlike sociological individuality based on social comparison and on typicalfeatures, the deepest point of individuality which Simmel calls qualitative indi-viduality (see e.g. 1989: 493, 1992c: 81112, 1995a: 502, 1995b: 131, 1999a:12837, 2001d: 38990) does not pertain to any of the traits of the individual. Onthe contrary, it can be understood only in terms of the singularity of the individ-uals life (Pyyhtinen, 2008). As Simmel writes in Rembrandt: Even if an existence,in one or all of its stages, would look exactly the same as some other one, it would




nevertheless be, with all of its preconditions, derivations, and borrowings as a lifeprocess; as a reality of becoming just this unique current (2003: 398, 2005: 68).Contrary to what Simmels lyrical expression here might suggest, there is nothingmystical in this ontological individuality of the life-process. Rather, it simplyfollows from our mortality: our existence is unique in that we live only once. Thatthe same existence could occur twice is quite nonsensical (2003: 397, 2005: 68);the particular life cannot be deprived of its being-only-once (2003: 424, 2005: 89).10. I have adopted the term hyper-existence from Nancy (2008: 11, 13).11. This remark cannot be found yet in the essay Soziologie des Raumes,published in 1903 (see 1995c: 134), which otherwise is reproduced in the chapterDer Raum und die rumlichen Ordnungen der Gesellschaft in Soziologie (1992c:68798, 70222, 74264) almost to the word. Simmel only added the remark toSoziologie.12. When tracing the genealogy of Simmels notion of interaction from Kantonwards, Petra Christian (1978: 118) has pointed out that whereas in Kants transcendental logic and in Hegels dialectical logic the concept was used as a sheerlogical category, it was with Schleiermacher that it first appeared as a principle ofthe social world. The theoretical context of the concept was transmitted to Simmelvia Wilhelm Dilthey, for whom the concrete living unity of society consisted in theendless play of interactions between individuals (Christian, 1978: 119; Lichtblau,1991: 47). Andreas Ziemann (2000: 11731) has traced much the same line ofdescent of the concept, leading from Kant to Simmel, but he substitutes Helmholtzfor Hegel.13. Rather than referring to a societal whole, society should be understood herein the sense of the social, sociality or the social bond. This is in accordancewith Simmels statement that, in the broadest possible sense, society existswhenever several individuals engage in interaction (1992a: 54, 1992c: 17, 1995d:545).14. What Simmel seems to intend here with the term ideal approximates to theconcept of the virtual. Irrespective of its contemporary reference to a techno -logically simulated environment, that is, to a virtual reality such as the Internet,as a philosophical concept the virtual does not mean something less real, a moreor less imperfect copy or imitation of the real. It is not the opposite of the real, butonly of the actual. Accordingly, Gilles Deleuze (1991: 96) suggests that the bestdefinition of the virtual is to be found in the phrase real without being actual, idealwithout being abstract by Marcel Proust.15. The German Vermittler translates also as arbitrator, conciliator, inter -mediary and middleman, for instance. I have chosen the translation mediator fortechnical reasons.16. The necessity of excluding the third so that there could be two follows, so itcan be argued, directly from Simmels relativistic worldview, according to whichthere is nothing absolute that exists unconnected to other entities (see e.g. Simmel,1989: 1201; see also Kracauer, 1995: 250). Here it would be possible to refer toMichel Serres as well. Serres writes in The Parasite (2007: 57): As soon as we aretwo, we are already three or four. . . . In order to succeed, the dialogue needs anexcluded third.17. Nancys work on community as the exposure of finitude in The InoperativeCommunity (1991) has perhaps explored this linkage of communion with death most




deeply. According to Nancy, community cannot be produced or objectified but onlyexperienced as the experience of finitude, as the community of singular finite beings.In the last instance, it is made up of nothing the community is a groundlessground of nothing but the sharing of finitude, the exposure of singularitiesbefore and in the face of nothing (Nancy, 1991: 2631).18. For the most part Simmel is not very consistent with his terminology. It isreasonable to surmise that by groups Simmel does not refer here to formations ofseveral individuals, but to dyads.19. In Lebensanschauung (1999c: 308), Simmel proposes, in a dialectical fashion,that life demands, from within, death as its opposite, as its other.20. Howard Becker and Ruth Hill Useem (1942: 16, italics in original) also notethat all dyads eventually become broken dyads. Every type of pair is subject to thepossibility of being broken by death of one of its members.21. According to Nancy, this betrays a shortfall in thinking that is common to thewhole Western tradition. It is a fundamental disposition of our whole tradition thatbetween two subjects, the first being the person and the second the commu-nity, there is no place left for the with (2008: 5).22. Serres has examined the idea of relation as ultimately a non-relation in termsof communication in a manner that might clarify things. Using a channel, twostations exchange messages. As soon as the channel works properly it disappearsinto immediacy, since if it is there, it does not work but has turned into noise. InSerres words: If the relation succeeds, if it is perfect, optimum, and immediate; itdisappears as a relation. If it is there, if it exists, that means that it failed. It is onlymediation. Relation is nonrelation (2007: 79.)

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Simmel, G. (2001a) Psychologie der Koketterie, in Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe,Band 12. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2001b) Zur Metaphysik des Todes, in Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe,Band 12. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2001c) Soziologie der Geselligkeit, in Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe,Band 12. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2001d) Goethes Individualismus, in Georg Simmel Gestamtausgabe,Band 12. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2003) Rembrandt, in Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe, Band 15. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2004a) Der Platonischer und der Moderne Eros, in Georg SimmelGesamtausgabe, Band 20. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Simmel, G. (2004b) The Philosophy of Money, 3rd enlarged edn, trans. D. Frisbyand T. Bottomore. London and New York: Routledge.Simmel, G. (2005) Rembrandt: An Essay in the Philosophy of Art, trans. A. Scottand H. Staubmann. New York and London: Routledge.Spykman, N.J. (2004 [1925]) The Social Theory of Georg Simmel. New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction.Theunissen, M. (1984) The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heideg-ger, Sartre, and Buber, trans. C. McCann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Thompson, L. and A. Walker (1982) The Dyad as the Unit of Analysis: Concep-tual and Methodological Issues, Journal of Marriage and the Family 44(4):889900.Wide, S. (2006) The Limits of Purity: An Essay on Socio-logic, paper presentedat the 23rd Nordic Sociological Congress Dissolution of Society, University ofTurku, August 2006.Wide, S., C. Abrahamsson and F. Palm (eds) (forthcoming) Sociologik. Esser omsocialitet och tnkande. Stockholm: Santrus.Ziemann, A. (2000) Die Brcke zur Gesellschaft. Erkenntniskritische und topo -graphische Implikationen der Soziologie Georg Simmels. Konstanz: UniversittsverlagKonstanz.

Olli Pyyhtinen teaches at the Department of Sociology, University ofTurku, Finland. He is currently working on a book provisionally titledRethinking Georg Simmels Social Theory: Bringing the Social to Life(Palgrave Macmillan). In addition to social theory, his research interestsinclude process thinking, materiality and art. [email: [email protected]]




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