Deliverable 7.2Crime Pattern Analysis

T e c h n i c a l U n i v e r s i t y B e r l i n

L a r s O s t e r m e i e r

D r . L e o n H e m p e l

T o b i a s S c h a a f

D a g n y V e d d e r

Project number261826

Call (part) identifierFP7-Security-2010-1

Funding schemeCollaborative Project

SIAMSecurity Impact Assessment

Measures

Criminal Action Pattern Maps

Table of contents

Summary.....................................................................................................................................31. Objectives and methodology..................................................................................................4

1.1 Objectives..........................................................................................................................41.2 Methodology.....................................................................................................................4

2. Theories of crime pattern analysis..........................................................................................53. Reflecting crime pattern analysis at airports and in urban train transport systems ..........9

3.1 Urban train transport: Transport of London...................................................................103.1.1 Frequently recorded crimes ....................................................................................113.1.2 Relations of criminal actions and SMTs....................................................................143.1.3 Mode of action.........................................................................................................143.1.4 Places of action ........................................................................................................163.1.5Provisional Results.....................................................................................................16

3.2 Airports............................................................................................................................163.2.1 Frequently recorded crimes.....................................................................................163.2.3 Mode of action .........................................................................................................193.2.4 Places of action.........................................................................................................203.2.5 Provisional Results....................................................................................................21

4. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................21References ................................................................................................................................22Abbreviations and Acronyms....................................................................................................24

SummaryA major observation made in this report is that while crime pattern analysis prevails in the

context of urban train transport security, risk and threat analysis form the basis for security

planning in the context of airport security, where profiling is becoming increasingly important.

Among the reasons for this are the open design of public transport systems and the closed

design of airports as well as the type of crime that is being frequently recorded. It is therefore

argued that different rationales of selecting and using security technologies in both settings can

be distinguished and analyzed. Another major difference is the emphasis being made on

passengers' perception in urban train transport security discourses, while economic

considerations are being emphasized in all areas of airport security.

Both rationales include various strands of criminological crime pattern theories that are being

used as tools for the planning and allocation of resources. The impact however is different in

the two settings. Crime pattern analysis has a similar impact for security planning in the context

of urban train transport security as it has in urban policing. It serves mainly for the

identification of so-called 'hotspots', the types of crime that are recorded at these locales and a

more ore less vague categorization of victims and offenders. In the context of airport security,

crime pattern analysis typically leads to a profiling of passengers. Most policing resources are

already available at the different security areas, so the question in the context of airport

security not so much where to use resources, but how or against whom to use them. The

different rationales invoke different definitions of security and different dimensions of trust,

efficiency and freedom infringements.

This version of the report has not yet been reviewed externally or by other partners in the SIAM

project. It is suggested to publish a reviewed version on the SIAM website that includes

partners’ comments.

3

1. Objectives and methodology

1.1 ObjectivesThe objective of this report is to deliver descriptions of “typical” crime patterns for airports and

urban train transport systems, including information about the places where criminal actions

might be detected, disrupted or deterred. The focus of the description is twofold. It analyses

the underlying assumption of crime pattern analysis and then describes formal linkages of

frequently recorded crimes, different areas of urban train transport systems and airports,

actors and security technologies. The contribution of this report to the SIAM data base will be a

number of assessment criteria and attributes defining relations of crimes, agencies involved in

dealing with crimes, technologies, and places.1

1.2 MethodologyResearch for this report draws on a number of results from other work packages in SIAM (WP

No. 2, 3 and 6), on official statistics and publications and on academic work on crime patterns.

Reports from work package two provide information about promises that are connected with

Security Measures and Technologies (SMTs) as regards to the prevention or detection of

criminal actions. This information can be used as a starting point to identify “typical” criminal

actions. Work package six provides input for work package seven about typical threat scenarios,

that can be further analyzed in terms of their criminal dimensions. Finally, this report is

supposed to prepare research conducted in the context of work package three that analyses

how the impact of security technologies on criminal actions is being assessed. The guiding

analytical question for this report is if and how crime pattern analysis is being used in the

context of airports and urban train transport systems for crime prevention and resource

allocation purposes. This is important to note because it implies that the report does not itself

generate analysis of crime patterns.

The report is structured in four sections. The first section briefly discusses the objectives and

methodology of the report. The second section reviews theories of crime pattern analysis. The

third section analyses statistics and reports that are relevant for crime pattern analysis at

airports and in urban train transport systems. The fourth section consists of a concluding

narrative.

1 Assessment criteria and attributes in the context of the SIAM project are being used similar to categories and codes in Grounded Theory.

4

2. Theories of crime pattern analysisThe title of the report needs some clarification, because the concept of “criminal action pattern

maps” cannot be found in the criminological literature. Crime pattern analysis in criminology

typically scrutinizes the “temporal and spatial dimensions of crime”, including the “technical

characteristics of criminal events and on the characteristics of known offenders, known victims,

and known targets.” (Brantingham & Brantingham 1984: 20) The emphasis is clearly set on the

temporal and spatial dimensions of crime, this dimension is what has made crime pattern

analysis prominent in crime prevention. Crime pattern analysis usually starts with crime

mapping, drawing on crime statistics and police reports, frequently biased towards crimes like

theft, burglary and assault. It then goes on to locate the crimes on maps. In some cases, police

departments, city governments and private companies are publishing this information on

websites with the level of detail ranging from information structured in administrative districts

to the detailed address where a crime was reported:

Fig. 1: Website of London’s Metropolitan Police showing residential burglary levels in South London wards, source:http://maps.met.police.uk (January 23 2013)

Crime Maps like the one above have by now become a standard tool to indicate areas with high

crime rates in police and media reports (Weisburd/McEwan 1998). While this kind of

information is sufficient to influence local security policies, police-community relations, real

estate markets and personal preventive behavior, it is too vague design preventive measures

5

like the improvement of street lighting or the allocation of police patrol cars. For a more fine-

grained analysis, more detailed crime maps are being used for pattern analysis:

Figure 2: Crime Mapping for Grand Rapids, Michigan/USA, source: http://www.crimemapping.com/map/mi/grandrapids (23January 2013)

The map above shows a cluster of reported crime incidents involving drug and alcohol

violations as well as gun incidents in the south-east of Grand Rapid’s city center. Maps like

these are being used to allocate police patrol cars; in some cities automated software is being

tested that creates operation schedules automatically drawing on analysis of crime maps

(Beck/McCue 2009). This approach, known as “predictive policing”, has been adapted by some

police departments in the United States (e.g. Los Angeles and Chicago) and it is being tested in

the United Kingdom.2 Crime maps are furthermore being used to design other preventive

measures, especially measures that change the environment where the crimes are reported in

a way to make criminal actions more unlikely to happen. The latter approach has by now

become famous as ‘environmental criminology’, a preventive approach in urban and building

design that has the objective to “design crime out”. Ubiquitous measures promoted by

2 Academics having developed this approach have founded companies marketing predictive policingtechnologies (for the US, see www.predpol.com; for the UK see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19623631(both 25 January 2013)

6

environmental criminology thinking include improved lighting in subway stations and parks as

well as the destruction of places where groups can gather and loiter in the public.

A major limitation of crime maps is that they are based on crime reports which are notoriously

inaccurate in representing crime. Statistics about criminal actions typically do not represent

criminal actions that have been dealt with by courts but events where the police or other

security actors have recorded a suspected criminal action. A large number of these criminal files

are frequently being dropped by courts and state attorneys because no evidence and/or no

suspect for the case can be found. Furthermore, the maps are typically biased towards criminal

actions that have occurred in public areas. Crime maps for Manhattan for example do not

represent white collar crime that has been reported at Wall Street. Being a law enforcement

tool or technology on their own, crime maps transport positivist images of crime that need

careful interpretation to be correctly understood.

Critics of crime mapping technologies have pointed out that they often present a positivist

image of crime and criminals and that they can be understood as tools to enforce state-

centered visions of social order rather than an academic analysis that allows to understand

dynamics of crime (Belina 2011). Belina (ibid.) has pointed out that the interesting questions

regarding crime mapping technologies is not what they say about crime but how they change

policing strategies.

Crime Maps can form the foundation for a crime pattern analysis when criminological theories

are used to interpret them. The dominant theory for this has become the “Routine Activity

Approach” by Felson and Cohen (1979). The basic assumption of this approach is that both

criminals and victims follow routines in their everyday practices. Understanding these routines

and locating them on maps is thus thought to be a key to preventing crime by disrupting

routines. A prominent example for this way of analyzing crime patterns is the identification of

so-called opportunity structures. Parking lots at shopping malls for example are frequently

being considered as hot spots for car burglaries. Criminologists frequently point to crime maps

to support the assumption that a “opportunity structure” like a parking lot full of cars somehow

attract criminals which again leads to an increase in other crimes like car burglaries. Other

criminological approaches that stand in this line of thinking are the so-called “Broken Windows”

approach by Wilson and Kelling (1982), and “Evidence-based Crime Prevention” by Sherman et

al. (2002).

7

While this short tour de force through criminological theories of crime maps is by no means

comprehensive, it points to a major challenge for the use of crime pattern analysis in the

context of the SIAM project. SIAM is focused on security technologies that are supposed to be

used to counter five threats identified by the European Union: terrorism, illegal immigration,

organized crime, white collar crime, and cyber crime. These threats comprise a large number of

different criminal actions that cannot be compared internationally. For example, “terrorism”

obviously implies a large number of criminal actions, while “illegal migration” is typically being

recorded as the violation of immigration laws. The two examples show that while threats and

criminal actions are closely related, it is difficult to systematically represent them in an

international context because in each country, different criminal actions are likely to be related

with terrorism and immigration law again varies from country to country. Furthermore, the

meaning of threats differs from context to context, depending on factors ranging from national

security cultures and public sensibilities to organizational cultures. A major argument pushed

forward in this report is therefore that while both frequently recorded crimes and the five

threats are certainly “patterned” in some way, the analysis of these patterns takes into account

different data sources and different criminological theories.

It is therefore important to distinguish different approaches of pattern analysis in security

planning at airports and in urban train transport systems. For this purpose, the notions threat

patterns and crime patterns will be used throughout the report. Work package six has already

brought forward a methodology for threat analysis for security planners.3 It can be argued that

a methodology for threat analysis is a more usable contribution to the SIAM assessment

support system than an analysis of threat patterns in work package seven. The reason for this

lies mainly in the availability of appropriate data and in the scope of threat patterns. Naturally,

security authorities maintain a monopoly on up to date data that can be used to analyze

patterns of terrorism, illegal immigration, organized crime, white collar crime, and cyber crime.

A request of information issued by the authors to the project partners in SIAM showed that

such data is not publicly available for even one of the case studies. Furthermore, threat

patterns have a much broader scope than crime patterns. Patterns of terrorism, illegal

immigration, organized crime, white collar crime, and cyber crime are typically not conferred to

a single locality but are transnational. Airports and urban transport systems can be part of such

patterns as targets, nodes or passage points. Depending on the role of the infrastructures,

3 http://siam-project.eu/images/stories/SIAM_D6.2.pdf (January 25 2013)

8

different security measures can be planned in order to disrupt the pattern. This, however,

cannot be done in this report but lies within the responsibility of security authorities.

In the case of crime patterns, there is some data available, especially in the UK, which allows

drawing a picture of frequently recorded crimes at airports and in urban train transport systems

and the measures that are taken to counter these crimes. In the following section, this data will

be presented and analyzed for airports and urban train transport systems structured along the

following four pattern dimensions:

1. Frequently recorded crimes: What are frequently recorded crimes at airports and in

urban train transport systems?

2. Relations of criminal actions and SMTs: What kind of SMTs can be/are being used to

prevent, or detect frequently recorded crimes?

3. Mode of action: What kind of action is taken to disrupt patterns of frequently recorded

crimes?

4. Places of action: Where do frequently recorded crimes occur and where are counter-

measures being taken?

The short review of crime mapping theories has brought up important distinctions between

crime mapping, crime pattern analysis and threat pattern analysis. All three incorporate visions

of order and disorder and of rational measures to control and maintain them. It has been

argued that from an academic perspective, the focus of interest lies mainly in the questions

how these policing technologies change policing at airports and in urban train transport

systems and what the underlying assumption of the technologies are. Some empirical evidence

for these questions will be discussed in the following section of the report.

3. Reflecting crime pattern analysis at airports and in urban train transport systems

While there is a large body of research available for crime pattern analysis in urban settings, the

use of crime pattern analysis at airports and in urban train transport systems is being largely

neglected. Anecdotal evidence from the research conducted for SIAM suggests that while crime

pattern analysis is frequently being used in the context of urban train transport systems, it plays

a marginal role in the context of airports. Here, threat scenario planning seems to be the

dominant technology for planning policing policies.

9

The research for SIAM has furthermore shown that for the case studies in Berlin, Tel Aviv and

Turin no data is available that allows analyzing the use of crime pattern analysis. Quite in

contrast, in the case of the United Kingdom there is relatively current data available for both

Transport of London and Heathrow airport. Furthermore, the NPA has published a Guidebook

for policing at airports including a typology of policing measures at airports that allows

identifying policing actions that involve crime pattern analysis. The empirical evidence

presented below is by no means transferable to other case studies because it draws on data

from only one airport / urban train transport system. However it does allow deducing

assessment criteria, attributes and questions that can be asked to reflect the use of crime

pattern analysis in assessment processes of security measures and technologies.

3.1 Urban train transport: Transport of LondonPlanning security measures for TfL involves analysis of passengers’ perception and of crime

patterns. Fear of crime is among the most frequently cited reasons for not using public

transport. It is a fear that is frequently renewed by media reports about spectacular cases of

violence in trains or train stations. However it is a platitude to point out that these crimes do

not necessarily correspond with statistics. Planning security measures and technologies does

not mean dealing with statistically relevant crimes only. Instead, it seems it primarily deals with

threats and fears. Both urban train transport officials and law enforcement agencies have to

deal with the fear created by threats and crimes, whether or not they are statistically relevant.

This observation is one aspect limiting the potential of crime pattern analysis for planning

policing strategies. This is especially the case when crime pattern analysis reveals so-called hot

spots of criminal incidents. This could be among the reasons why the TfL Crime Statistics

bulletins do not point out any hot spots on maps (see TfL 2012a, b).

Transport for London’s 2012/2013 Crime Statistics bulletins cover the periods from 1 April June

and from July to September 2012. They comprise statistics from three organizations that are

responsible for policing the Transport for London network: the Metropolitan Police Service

(MPS), British Transport Police (BTP), and Transport for London (TfL). It distinguishes between

four areas in the transport network: The London Bus network, London Underground/Docklands

Light Railway, London Tramlink and London Overground service. While the BTP is responsible

for policing the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, London Tramlink and London

Overground services, the MPS is responsible for policing the rest of London’s transport

network, including the Bus network (TfL 2012a: 3). Noticeably the bulletins include a caveat

10

regarding the reliability of data: “Recorded crime figures relate to crime recorded by the MPS

and the BTP in the quarterly period. The figures do not include crimes that have not been

reported to the police or those that the police decide not to record.” (TfL 2012a: 3) The

discretion to decide not to record crime can be an important strategy to wind down crime

rates.

The bulletins read the statistics as a proof for a very good security situation in the TfL network:

“Public transport in London continues to be a relatively safe and low crime environment.

Currently, over ten million passengers travel on the TfL’s public transport services each day with

very few of them ever experiencing or witnessing crime. Official figures from the MPS and the

BTP show further reductions in levels of crime on the transport network despite increasing

passenger numbers. The risk of becoming a victim of crime is falling.” (TfL 2012a: 3) Quite in

contrast to discourses about threats, the discourse about crime seems to be dominated by a

reassuring narrative by the authorities that crime in the TfL network is under control. As the

trend in crime statistics show, there seems to be evidence supporting this narrative.

3.1.1 Frequently recorded crimes The following table shows the monthly crime rates (incidents per one million passengers) for

the four major TfL-services. The pan-modal trend indicates that the overall crime rate

decreased by 1.2% from April 2011 to September 2012. According to this statistic, an average of

7.7 passengers of one million passengers became a victim of crime.:

Figure 3: Monthly Crime Rates, source: TfL Crime Statistic bulletin 2Q 2012/13, p. 5

A closer look at the type of criminal incidents as well as the total number of crimes in figure

four reveals that the vast majority of criminal offences have been recorded in the bus and

11

underground transport systems. It shows that theft and handling is the only category that has

seen an increase from 2008/09 to 2009/10.

Figure 4: Overview of criminal offenses, source: Greater London Authority 2010, p. 88

Figure five (below) shows that by far the most frequent crimes committed on buses or at bus

stops are criminal damage, robbery, theft and handling and violence against the person (VAP).

With the exception of theft and handling, these categories have seen a significant decrease in

Q2 2012/2013 compared with Q2 2011/2012. The bulletin further shows how London’s

boroughs are affected by bus-related crime, with those boroughs with a border to the City of

London borough counting between 200 and 400 offences and all other boroughs less than 200

offences. Additionally, it points out boroughs seeing an increase or decrease of the crime rate.

Unfortunately this data, based on MPS data, cannot be compared with data from the other

transport services because the BTP data does not provide for information about the location:

“It is not possible to create similar maps of BTP recorded crime. The exact location of crimes

upon the rail network is unknown due to some victims identifying the offence at the end of

their journey which was undertaken across more than one borough.” (TfL 2012b: 8).

12

Figure 5: Bus-related crime levels, source: TfL Crime Statistic Bulletin 2Q 2012/13, p. 6

Figure six shows that the total number of offences counted in the underground and light

railway service is almost half of the bus service’s total. Furthermore, it shows that theft is by far

the most frequently recorded crime, accounting for more than the half of all offences in Q

2012/2013. Other frequently recorded offences are violence against the person, serious public

order, drugs and criminal damage. The type of crime that is frequently recorded in the subway

and light railway service is quite similar to the criminal offences recorded in the bus system.

Figure 6: London Underground and Docklands Light Railway crime levels, source: TfL Crime Statistic bulletin 2Q 2012/13, p. 11

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The very low total of recorded offences in the Tramlink and in the Overground services does

not allow for a comparison of frequently recorded crimes, but it appears quite similar to the

cluster of theft, violence against the person, criminal damage, drugs and public order offences

being the most frequently recorded crimes in all of TfL’s networks.

3.1.2 Relations of criminal actions and SMTsTheft is a crime that is typically being reported some time after the theft occurred, which is the

reason for the limited use of SMTs to reduce levels of theft. Campaigns to raise passengers’

awareness of thefts are probably the most efficient measures to prevent theft. Violence against

the person, criminal damage and public order offences are typically very difficult to prevent

through SMTs. The general-preventive impact of SMTs on these crimes is contested in

criminology. The majority of measures taken to counter these crimes are supposed to detect

such behavior and to act on it. Therefore, both patrols and CCTV are involved in efforts to

reduce violence against the person, criminal damage and public order offences. It is unclear

what the statistics mean with the “drug” category, but both consuming drugs and dealing with

drugs are subject to scrutiny of patrols and CCTV, which at best have a general-preventive

impact.

3.1.3 Mode of actionThe Crime statistics bulletins do not point out any measures to be taken. The mayor of London

has published a strategy called “The Right Direction” that aims to reduce crime in the TfL

network, calling for a broad range of security measures to be taken.4 While it points out a

number of security measures in great detail, it remains vague when it comes to using

technologies to reduce crime. It only mentions that “experiments” are supposed to be made in

order to test how new security technologies can reduce crime: “The Mayor, through TfL and

working with the boroughs, the police, and other stakeholders, will exploit the opportunities

provided by new technology to prevent crime and disorder.” (GLA 2010: 92)

The level of detail regarding specific security measures is great and very relevant for the SIAM

project. The Mayor’s strategy aims to achieve five objectives that have been identified through

what the report calls a “Partnership Strategic Assessment” by TfL , BTP and MPS that “provides

an in-depth analysis of real and perceived issues affecting community safety across the whole

of London’s transport system. The priorities identified in this document are based on the

combined picture for London’s transport system while recognising that crime, ASB and

4 http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/the_right_direction.pdf (29 January 2013)

14

perception issues affect transport modes differently.” (GLA 2012: 27) The objectives that have

been identified in the assessment are (ibid.):

1. Reduce crime and antisocial behaviour on the public transport network

2. Increase confidence in the safety and security of travelling in London

3. Reduce the volume of Londoners injured while travelling in London as a result of

criminal and antisocial behaviour

4. Improve cyclists’ safety and security by tackling crime and antisocial behaviour

5. Contribute to the step change in the walking experience through removing crime and

the fear of crime as a barrier to walking

For evaluating the impact of the measures proposed in the report, reductions in crime rates

and improvements in passengers’ perception are suggested as assessment criteria. This is

important for SIAM because it points out that security is also closely related to trust and that to

achieve both, different measures need to be taken The objective to reduce crime and anti social

behavior on the public transport network is structured into seven priorities, each of which

includes an analysis of the pattern of the crimes to be reduced including a narrative of the

impact of the crime on public transport security, information about suspects and victims, time

and location. The seven priorities are: (1) Reduce violence against the person; (2) Reduce Theft;

(3) Reduce Criminal Damage; (4) Reduce sexual offences; (5) Reduce robbery; (6) Reduce Anti

Social Behavior; (7) Reduce touting and sexual offences involving bogus cabs (GLA 2010: 36-47).

The report cites six security measures that are thought to have contributed to low levels of

crime: (1) visible, accessible policing; (2) targeted, intelligence-led enforcement;(3) staffing of

stations; (4) improvements in design (incorporating new evidence on crime prevention); (5)

introducing new technologies (such as CCTV), environmental improvements; (6) listening to,

and informing, staff and the travelling public (GLA 2010: 33-34).

The objective to increase confidence in the safety and security of travelling in London is struc -

tured into four priorities: (1) Improve confidence in travelling after dark; (2) Improve women’s

confidence in travelling; (3) Improve younger people’s confidence in travelling; (4) Improve

older people’s confidence in travelling. (GTA 2010: 51-54). Measures that are thought to in-

crease confidence are stated as follows: “Customer research indicates that well-lit streets, sta-

tions and bus stops, CCTV cameras and the presence of uniformed transport staff, providing

clear and reliable information about services and alternatives, can all help to reassure people

travelling. TfL has been very successful in improving railway station security over a number of

15

years through enhancements in the physical environment (modernised stations, lighting, CCTV)

and management of stations (customer service, security patrols and Help Points).“ (GLA 2010:

50)

3.1.4 Places of action The efforts to achieve the objectives of the Mayor’s strategy are supposed to be focused on

three types of places (GTA 2010: 27):

• High volume crime/ASB locations (transport hubs)

• High fear/low crime areas

• Strategic interchanges and rail termini (crowded places)

3.1.5 Provisional ResultsThe short analysis of crime pattern analysis in security planning for the TfL network shows that

it draws on a mix of criminological theories and not on a single approach. The analysis of crime

patterns seems to have a very high impact when it comes to identifying priorities, groups of

people and places. It can therefore be understood as a targeting tool that alters the way

resources are being used and that promotes the design of targeted security measures instead

of general-preventive measures. This leads to an important observation: While security

measures proposed in the GLA document explicitly comprise security, efficiency and trust

dimensions, they have a tendency to neglect the freedom infringement dimension invoked

through the targeting of measures to specific groups of passengers. The failure to consider the

freedom infringement dimensions of targeted security measures bears the risk to reduce the

trust of the affected groups and thereby to create the unintended effect of the potential for

more and not less conflicts. The latter effect even bears the possibility of a decrease in the trust

of the users of SMTs.

3.2 Airports

3.2.1 Frequently recorded crimesThe major result of our research on frequently recorded crimes at airports is that no

comprehensive crime statistics for airports comprising data from all authorities with duties at

airports seem to be publicly available. This is the case for Germany, Israel and the UK, where

detailed inquiries have been made, and seems also to be the case for the US, where an internet

search has brought up no usable documents. While this might be astonishing at the first sight, it

16

points to the less important role of crime pattern analysis at airports, where threat scenario

planning is the dominant rationale.

London's Metropolitan Police Service has published data for Heathrow airport that has been

recorded in December 2011 and 2012 in the areas of their responsibility. However, the data is

not very illustrative because it categorizes only 59 of a total of 261 offences in december 2012:

Figure 7: Metropolitan Police Service crime data for Heathrow airport, source:

http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/boroughs/id_month%20-%20mps.htm (30 January 2013)

Data from the partly commercial website www.ukcrimestats.com provides some crime maps

for airports, suggesting that the majority of criminal offences is recorded at the terminal

buildings, in the following map of Manchester airport indicating a concentration of offences in

terminal 1:

Figure 8: A crime map of Manchester Airport, source: http://www.ukcrimestats.com/Neighbourhood/ Greater_Manchester_Police/Airport#Team (30 January 2013)

17

Like the MET's statistics, the crimestats website does not detail the vast majority of offences

recorded at Manchester airport. For december 2011 for example it lists a total of 79 criminal

offences, with 21 anti social behavior offences being the most frequent offence and 55

unspecified offences. Media reports suggest that the majority of the unspecified offences are

theft, one of them labelling Heathrow airport as a „laptop crime capital“ - though the reliability

of these reports remains unclear.5 Other police forces with responsibilities like customs and

border forces usually do not publish statistics detailed to the level of airports. Media reports

suggest that these forces are frequently recording violations of immigration laws as well as

offences related to smuggling drugs and pirated products. In sum, the rather anecdotal

evidence that is available for crimes at airports suggests that theft (of luggage, passengers'

belongings and aircraft spare parts), violence against the person, violations of immigration laws

and smuggling of drugs and pirated drugs are among the frequently recorded crimes at

airports.

A detailed list of crimes that „police at airports are most likely to deal with“ and crimes that are

uniquely found at the airport or different to deal with is provided in a document titled

“Guidance on Policing at Airports”, published by the UK's National Police Improvement Agency

(NPA 2011, 21):

3.2.2 Relations of criminal actions and SMTs

Unsurprisingly, no relations between criminal actions and SMTs are drawn in the documents

cited in the previous section (3.2.1). An influential document drawing these relations is the

Reference Handbook for “Guidance on Policing at Airports”, published by the UK's National

Police Improvement Agency (NPA 2011). The handbook clearly defines a framework for airport

policing: „Airport policing is organised under the Airport Security Planning Framework defined

5 See for example: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/2482615/Heathrow-Airport-is-laptop-crime-capital.html (30 January 2013)

18

by the Policing and Crime Act 2009. This Framework brings together stakeholders who

contribute to airport security, enabling them to work together effectively. It builds on existing

arrangements and the Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) used at many

airports to assess risk.“ (NPA 2011: 8) All UK airports are required to agree on a local airport

security plan with the airport operator paying for policing services except for costs arising from

policing the border (ibid, p. 12). The airport operator is described to hold police forces

accountable in a very strict way (ibdi.), which is a major difference to policing in other areas.

The relations of criminal actions and SMTs are predominantly being defined as risks and threats

in this planning framework. Ar each airport, a Risk Advisory Group is established that identifies

risk and recommends measures to counter those risks. A Security Executive Group then draws

an Airport Security Plan, operationalising the Risk Report via a Police Services Agreement (ibid.).

Airport Security Plans are not being published, therefore it cannot be analysed how they create

relations between criminal actions and SMTs based on a specific Risk Report.

3.2.3 Mode of action The reference handbook lists a number of similarities and differences in airport policing

compared to policing in other environments (NPA 2011, 20):

The differences in policing can largely be attributed to the unique opportunity structures at

airports. The handbook furthermore lists eleven policing areas and assigns functions to each of

them, revealing some relations of threats and risks with security measures and pointing out

special aspects to consider for the functions in the airport context:

19

Policing

Area

Crime

Investig

ation

Counter

Terroris

m

Firearms Incident

Manage

mnt

Licensin

g

Operatio

nal &

Continge

ncy

planning

Public

order

Roads

policing

Training Neighbo

urhood

policing

Uniform

Patrol

Vulnerab

ilities to

crime

Lead

agency

Standing

authorit

y

Commerc

ial

pressures

Risks Operatio

nal

Planning

Airport

focused

Airside

driving

Airport

officers

and staff

Costs Routine

arming

Theft of

luggage

MANPA

DS

Third-

party

firearms

Critical

incidents

Educati

on

Continge

ncy

Planning

Non-

airport

focused

Parking

enforce

ment

Non-

airport

officers

and staff

Model

Theft of

freight

Traninin

g for non

police

staff

Comman

d

structure

s

Enforce

ment

Media

Witness

stateme

nts

Peacefu

l

protest

Shoplifti

ng

Covert

tactics

Covert

tactics

Figure 9: Policing areas and fucntions, compiled from NPA 2012, pp. 26-31

3.2.4 Places of actionBy law, airports worldwide are divided into four security areas: Landside; Airside; Security

Restricted Area (SRA); Critical Part (PA). Security measures are usually tailored according to the

different areas as the areas typically designate different constellations of responsibilities among

the police services and private security services at airports. Some security measures, like the

search of passengers and staff, can only be found at the control lines between the landside and

airside areas. The overall security design of airports as closed transport systems defines the

places where security measures are taken with crime pattern analysis pointing out the security

area where a crime typically occurs.6

The following graphic shows an idealised airport, designating the four security areas:

6 The NPA handbook describes a pattern of theft from duty free stores occuring in the airside area in detail, see NPA 2012: 78.

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Figure 10: Security areas at airports, source: NPA 2012, 37

3.2.5 Provisional ResultsA rationale driving by thinking in terms of risks and threats is dominating security planning at

british airports, and anecdotal evidence suggests that this observation can be generalised for

most airports on the world. The impact of crime pattern analysis in this situation is difficult to

assess. It can be argued that it is likely to have an important role for the implementation of

airport security plans because this is where the day to day planning for the use of resources is

done. This argument is supported by the observation that in a Scrutiny Review of Policing at

Manchester Airport, one of the most frequent calls for improvement is for enhancing

intelligence sharing among the different police authorities at airports (GMPA 2012).

4. ConclusionDifferent rationales of selecting and using security technologies in the contexts of urban train

transport security and airport security can be distinguished and analyzed. One characteristic is

the different impact of crime pattern and threat pattern analysis. It serves mainly for the

identification of so-called 'hotspots', the types of crime that are recorded at these locales and a

more ore less vague categorization of victims and offenders in urban train transport security. In

the context of airport security, threat pattern analysis typically leads to a profiling of

passengers. Another major difference is the emphasis being made on passengers' perception in

urban train transport security discourses, while economic considerations are being emphasized

in all areas of airport security.

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Both rationales include various strands of criminological crime pattern theories and are being

used as tools for the planning and allocation of resources.

The different rationales point to two questions related to the use of crime pattern analysis. In

the context of urban train transport security, it provides answers to the question where

resources should be allocated. At airports, most policing resources are already available at the

different security areas, so the question here is not so much on where to use them, but on how

or against whom to use them. Both questions imply different definitions of security and

different dimensions of trust, efficiency and freedom infringements. This affects the way that

the behaviour of passengers becomes normalised, the groups of people being targeted and

excluded. Maybe the most obvious difference is the basis for interventions in both rationales. In

order to better understand the basis, it is helpful to distinguish between the anticipative

concepts of precaution, pre-emption and preparedness and prevention. The three concepts

stand for a gradual decrease of the threshold for interventions, thus bearing the potential

increase of freedom infringements compared to preventive security measures (see Anderson

2010; Krasmann 2012). The rationale that has been analyzed for urban train transport security

can be characterised as preventive, whereas airport security increasingly becomes anticipative.

This observation can form a starting point to be further investigated in work package 3, where

the assessment of the impact of SMTs will be empirically analysed. With regards to deliverable

7.1, the report shows that the typology of SMTs needs to be overhauled. The data in this report

can furthermore help to define the impact assessment values developed in deliverable 7.1 in

more detail.

References

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Brantingham, Paul/Brantingham, Patricia (1984): Patterns in Crime, New York/London

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http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

GLA Greater London Authority

GMPA Greater Manchester Police Authority

NPA National Policing Improvement Agency

SMT Security Measures and Technologies

SIAM Security Impact Assessment Measures

TfL Transport for London

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