should banks be the guardians of digital identity? · of the scheme architecture and governance...

SHOULD BANKS BE THE GUARDIANS OF DIGITAL IDENTITY?

A WHITE PAPER PRODUCED BY FINEXTRA IN ASSOCIATION WITH HID GLOBAL MARCH 2020

01 Introduction .......................................................... 3

02 Global digital identity models and trends .................. 6 03 Threats and opportunities for

banks in digital identity .........................................11

04 Biometrics authentication and integrating true identity .........................................................13

05 Towards full digital identity lifecycle management… ........................................16

06 Conclusion ...........................................................18

07 About ..................................................................197 What should financial institutions be doing about blockchain right now? 25

| SHOULD BANKS BE THE GUARDIANS OF DIGITAL IDENTITY?

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01INTRODUCTION

The single, interoperable digital identity will be a dominant technology trend over the next decade, within the financial services industry and more broadly in our digital economies.

Often pushed by digitally-minded governments, there are digital identity schemes at all levels of maturity worldwide. And where they are already well established they have evolved differently in different markets over the past 20 years. Many of the best examples, that have delivered high population penetration and efficiency and security for consumers and businesses, have had bank collaboration at their heart.

In these cases, banks have been able to leverage their trusted role in the economy, their technical expertise and experience with shared infrastructure, to drive a level of success in opt-in digital identity schemes that governments have not been able to achieve on their own.

But banks can’t take their prime position in digital identity for granted. Even in countries where banks have already driven the digital identity agenda, regulation and market structure can change and new competition will emerge.

In countries that are still formulating federated digital identity frameworks, or looking to expand government national ID schemes into private sector usefulness, banks also need to be aware that the big tech giants and other globally networked companies have serious potential to upend the global market for digital ID.

If banks get digital identity right, they stand to realise benefits in streamlined sales processes and customer onboarding, reduced losses from fraud and regulatory fines, and the potential for new revenue generating identity-based products and services. But more importantly, they can maintain their central role as arbiters of trust and stay relevant in the transforming digital economy.


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FROM MANY TO ONE

From a bank perspective, a digital identity could be considered to include the whole electronic customer file, including versions of documents provided at onboarding to verify a customer is who they say they are to meet KYC regulation. These are often official government documents such as birth certificate, passport and driver’s licence. On top of these, the identity is enhanced with additional personal information provided by the customer, the product and permission settings the bank associates with them, and their transaction history.

On top of the core identity elements, banks will associate authentication methods, such as signature, PIN and passwords, and increasingly biometric data that is unique to the individual identity. This biometric data may or may not be mandatory at the sign-in stage, but is often captured when a customer wants to use a particular digital channel or opt-in for a more convenient and secure authentication process.

In most countries around the world, consumers would find they have multiple digital identities each established separately with every financial services provider they use. Depending on the sophistication of the financial institution, there may even be duplicated digital identities across product lines or subsidiary business units. Users might also have a single digital identity established for government services, or – more common still today -- this would also be duplicated across many government departments. There is no interoperability of these identities at all.

Open banking and other regulation is changing this so a customer could choose to give a new service provider access to aspects of their single digital identity at an existing bank to prove their identity as part of onboarding. They could also share other elements of that identity, with fine grained permission, in line with the recent regulatory trend for user-driven data management and privacy protections.

The benefits of a federated digital ID model are many. Efficiency is increased as duplicate proofs of identity don’t need to be managed by government and private sector entities, and consumers aren’t repeatedly asked to provide the same set of documents. Usage can easily spread beyond government and financial services to telcos, other utilities and retailers. Onboarding and service provision can be made much more streamlined. And consumers can stop oversharing irrelevant information when providing identity assurance. For example a proof of age does not really require exposing information such as address, height or driver’s licence conditions.


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A federated model also leverages multiple systems, eliminating reliance on a single service provider. In other words, there is no single point of control or failure that can compromise everyone’s data. And the more widespread adoption of secure identity authentication and digital identities will play a key role in addressing the alarming rates of fraud, particularly around payment cards, that persist in most countries. In the UK, for example, 21% of adults have had their payment card cancelled or replaced as a result of attempted fraud during the past 12 months, according to research by comparethemarket.com.

Banks need to ask themselves what they have to gain from contributing to a successful digital identity scheme in their key markets. What are the network effects that would accrue to any bank participating in a successful scheme, and what would the benefits of their actions be to their society at large?

But also, banks need to ask what they can gain as an individual organisation if they develop digital identity expertise and services within a federated scheme, and more importantly integrate that fully into their own systems and processes. And if the political and industry landscapes in their country are holding back the development of federated schemes, banks need to learn from emerging best practice in identity lifecycle management and authentication to position themselves for future developments and avoid competitive disintermediation.

To help provide answers to some of these questions, and prompt further discussion, this paper looks at the following topics:

• Some of the latest developments in digital identity models worldwide.• Threats to the bank business model and opportunities for new service areas

resulting from these developments.• The latest developments in biometrics and other techniques that can be

used to authenticate access to all or part of a digital identity.• Critical factors to the success of failure of integrating authentication

throughout the identity lifecycle management in improving current processes, onboarding, customer sales conversion, account servicing and fraud reduction.

http://www.comparethemarket.com


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02GLOBAL DIGITAL IDENTITY MODELS AND TRENDS

In any discussion about digital identity, it is important to differentiate between centrally controlled and mandated government schemes, and a federated digital identity model. In the latter, a government provides a legislative and governance framework, and may be a provider of digital identity services itself, while also allowing interoperability and encouraging banks and other organisations to create and share digital identity services.

Within federated digital identity models there are examples that have been live for more than 20 years. To get a big picture view of current trends, it is useful to look at how some of these longest standing models have evolved, and also examine what is happening with some of the more recent examples to emerge.

BANK-DRIVEN MODELS THAT HAVE REACHED CRITICAL PENETRATION —SCANDINAVIA

Globally, the Scandinavian countries are heralded as early pioneers in digital identity, particularly in financial services circles. This is because the success of digital identity in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark has been driven largely through the cooperation in the banking sector.

In Finland, banks issue identities and stores and outlets use it to provide digital access to their services. They pay a fee to the banks each time the identity is used. This scheme, known as TUPAS, predated the introduction of the country’s non mandatory government electronic identity card scheme in 1999, and because of its wide adoption, is seen as the main reason the government eID scheme has not achieved widespread adoption.

TUPAS was administered by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services, and as the banks offered a relatively uniform interface for accepting online payments, eCommerce sites and even government agencies widely adopted the service. It did require bilateral arrangements between participants, so some of the smallest banks and businesses were not represented, and there was some criticism that the stranglehold the banks had on digital identity services led to a lack of competitive pricing.


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TUPAS was replaced in 2019 as part of a project to modernise the architecture to use digital certificates and other more sophisticated security approaches. The changes were driven by a desire to harmonise with the EU Regulation on Identification and Trust Services, more commonly known as eIDAS, which came into effect in member states in 2016.

The Finnish government also took the opportunity to loosen the hold of the banks in this market by established the Finnish Trust Network (FTN), a framework that allows strong authentication service brokers to resell eID solutions in Finland using a single standardised service contract, with capped access pricing.

Bank-provided digital identities can still be used in the network, however, and the increased competitive pressure in this space should put pressure on the established banks to innovate further in this space.

Beside the Finland example, in Norway, the BankID digital identity scheme was successful right from the start thanks to its openness. But it only reached a critical mass of eID uptake when the government integrated taxes and student loans into BankID, despite the country also offering a separate government ID.

Swedish BankID, however, was initially only available for use within the financial services sector, and only became successful once it was made available for any business to use.

A 2019 report published by Arkwright stated that Norway’s BankID has a penetration of 74%; Sweden’s BankID, 78% penetration; Denmark’s NemID, 85% penetration and Finland’s TUPAS, 87% penetration.

Being early adopters, these countries’ identity schemes have obviously had time to grow and evolve. But time is not their only success factor. They have benefited from a high level of consumer trust in banks, and to a slightly lesser extent government, in their societies. But it is the collaboration and openness of the scheme architecture and governance framework put in place by the banks that has played the biggest role.

EMERGING BANK-BACKED SCHEMES BASED ON BLOCKCHAIN —CANADA AND SPAIN

In Canada, a network approach has been taken to the e-identity challenge, with some parallels to the Nordic models. But there are differences, mainly in the storage of data and consumer trust in privacy protections.


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In May 2019 a blockchain-based digital identity verification network backed by the country’s banking industry went live. The Verified.Me service is delivered as an app for consumers that uses IBM blockchain technology to share encrypted information about them in real-time with select third parties. No information is stored in the actual app. This is important because privacy is a major concern for Canadian citizens, who balk at the idea of a national identity and any type of centralised government database that would store personal data.

It was developed in cooperation with five of Canada’s major financial institutions – CIBC, Desjardins, RBC, Scotiabank and TD, which supported the service at launch. BMO has since also gone live, with National Bank of Canada also due to join the network.

In a report by The Mobey Forum, Verified.Me scheme managers day claim their business case aims to provide cost savings for service providers through a 50% reduction in the onboarding process. This would amount to tens of millions of dollars saved if it managed to shift just 15% of service provider interactions from physical to online.

In Spain, another blockchain-based identity scheme is in the works, but has not yet gone live. Alastria is the name of a multi-sector consortium bringing together banks, telecom providers, energy companies, universities, smart city organisations and developers for what it claims is the world’s first regulated national network based on blockchain with an initial focus on digital identity.

Forty-one of the not-for-profit consortium’s members are from the banking and financial sector, including Santander, Banco Sabadell, Caixa Bank and Visa Spain. While it is focused through various committees in driving the development and deployment of blockchain more generally, it is underpinning all projects running on its infrastructure and network with a digital identity standard, the Alastria ID, which allows transactions to have legal validity.

While this is some way off seeing market release and widespread adoption, the consortium has some strong support from large corporates, including banks, as well as public administration bodies and universities. When the digital identity part of the scheme does launch, Alastria says it will not only be “GDPR compliant” but will also be the easiest way to fulfil GDPR user rights, providing a fully-fledged identity management solution from identity creation to attestation and claim management, including consent as well as issuer revocation and user deletion rights.


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GOVERNMENT-BACKED FEDERATED SCHEMES LOOKING FOR MORE BANK INVOLVEMENT — UK AND AUSTRALIA

When the UK’s Government Digital Service launched the government digital ID scheme Gov.UK Verify in 2016, it set a target to reach 25 million registered users by 2020, aiming to become the default system for accessing government services. Plagued by delivery delays and reduced scope, the service has managed to reach just 5.7 million registered individuals by the start of 2020, although the rate of adoption has increased in the past 12 months. A key part of the slow start is the early trouble the government had with its plan to develop private-sector use cases and frameworks.

Since launch, the UK Government has now partnered with Barclays bank, identity provider Digidentity, credit reporting agency Experian, the Post Office and verification service SecureIdentity to offer this service. Consequently, all these private sector organisations are certified to verify identity on behalf of the UK government.

But further uses cases for these IDs in accessing anything beyond government services need to be developed. And private sector involvement is the key. That’s why the government ran a Call for Evidence consultation in 2019 that sought views on how government can support the development and secure use of digital identities fit for the UK’s growing digital economy. The results of that consultation are due to be published in spring 2020.

In Australia, the Commonwealth Government’s Digital Transformation Agency has for the past five years been pursuing a digital identity strategy that addresses some of the data privacy and structural concerns associated with a failed national ID card proposal in the 1980s.

It is launching the fourth iteration of its Trusted Digital Identity Framework (TDIF) in 2020, with a federated approach called GovPass that ensures interoperability of the government’s own digital identity service with any additional identity service providers that gain accreditation – from the private sector or state governments.

The government’s own myGovID identity app is already in beta stage, with availability in iOS and Android stores, and a full rollout and national marketing strategy is due by mid 2020. The main purpose for this ID is initially related to tax and business registration affairs, though this is set to expand to other government and health departments.


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In 2019 Australia Post’s DigitalID service was also accredited under the TDIF. It can be used by consumers to prove identity to not only the postal service, but also a number of mid-tier financial services organisations, licensed premises serving alcohol, and online businesses such as AirTasker. At the time it was accredited it claimed to have close to one million users.

But now the Digital Transformation Agency and the Reserve Bank of Australia are agitating for the country’s largest banks to also become accredited digital identity providers under the federated scheme. Their headline reason for this is that they feel banks need to do more to address the rate of Card Not Present (CNP) fraud.

TRUST AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT VS THE ROLE OF BANKS

A review of mature and currently evolving digital identity models worldwide suggests that unless a government is making electronic identification compulsory – as in the Aadhaar stack in India, Estonia’s e-ID cards or Singapore’s NDI scheme – early involvement with and collaboration within the financial services sector is a critical success factor for realising the economic benefits and public convenience.

Governments do, however, play a critical role in setting out the legislative framework and consumer rights protections that are required for public acceptance of any digital identity scheme, regardless of who is running it or acting as digital identity providers.

As demonstrated in the Scandinavian context, banks can offer identity-as-a-service to businesses that can’t or do not wish to store their clients’ personal data. And, they could extend their customer bases to include ID-only clients, offering identity as a separate, fee-based service for individuals who do not otherwise transact with them. Based on this greater understanding of customer interactions in the economy, they could also offer extended financial advisory services and behaviour-based insurance.


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03THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS IN DIGITAL IDENTITY

In a federated digital identity model there is, by design, competition for providing digital identity services. Banks are exceptionally well positioned to drive digital identity systems because of their established mechanisms for validating user information for commercial and regulatory purposes. But it’s not a foregone conclusion that this will always be the case. While the framework for government digital identity schemes can take years to develop, innovation around the edges happens fast.

As demonstrated in the Scandinavian context, banks can offer identity-as-a-service to businesses that can’t or do not wish to store their clients’ personal data. And, they could extend their customer bases to include ID-only clients, offering identity as a separate, fee-based service for individuals who do not otherwise transact with them. Based on this greater understanding of customer interactions in the economy, they could also offer extended financial advisory services and behaviour-based insurance.

But to deliver effectively on these potential new business models, banks will have to demonstrate that they are at the leading edge of fraud prevention, and that customers can have confidence in the bank’s ability to protect their identity. The stakes are much higher for customers when it is not just an account balance at risk. If a fraudulent transaction occurs, banks can easily keep customers happy by restoring their balance. But if an identity is compromised, making good is much more difficult for the bank. In this case, prevention is far better than cure.

If banks don’t make best use of their established position, they could cede ground to the big tech giants already building out identity strategies on top of their dominance in consumer devices and social media data gathering. Other global networked financial organisations such as Mastercard are also making significant investments in privacy-by-design digital identity. And within more mature countries, as in Finland, governments may seek to increase competition or cap pricing for identity services by enabling new digital identity brokers to operate on a level playing field alongside banks.


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New start-ups are also emerging to serve digital identity needs in niche markets. For example UK start-up Yoti has a digital identity solution initially aimed at young people who need to prove they are over 18 in order to buy alcohol. With an easy-to-use app set-up that includes reliable ID checks of data and security features on traditional source documents such as driver’s licences and passports, it is accepted by more than 12,000 UK convenience stores and claims more than 6 million users – more than the UK government’s own digital ID scheme. It is also expanding its acceptance into new areas such as event ticketing, property rental, and identity validation for online dating and classifieds services.

Banks also need to consider how they handle the ongoing verification of genuine presence when it comes to authenticating the ID for a transaction. Also, how can customers manage aspects of their identity themselves? And, in light of recent privacy regulations worldwide, how can authentication methods and identity be “forgotten” if requested by the customer?


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04BIOMETRICS AUTHENTICATION AND INTEGRATING TRUE IDENTITY

Many progressive banks have long since abandoned simple one-factor username/password combinations for access to their online banking channels. And regulations such as Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) set forth by the European Banking Authority (EBA) for all electronic payments over 30 euros are further heralding the end of simple one-factor authentication.

There are lots of different approaches to multifactor authentication, and biometrics are a key part of many of them. Chinese banks have extensively deployed facial recognition and finger vein recognition across their ATM estates, an approach that has been common among Japanese banks for more than a decade. Similarly, Latin America has rapidly embraced fingerprint technology as the preferred mode to provide security and convenient access to financial services via ATMs. In Brazil, for example, the majority of bank ATMs have advanced multispectral fingerprint imaging devices for authentication.

Voice recognition has also been added to the mix by many banks. But organisations face a constant arms race against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats using artificial intelligence powered ‘deepfakes,’ to accurately emulate a customer’s characteristics.

To counter this, future innovations in biometrics will further evolve the current generation of “liveness tests” and add behavioural biometrics that could include keystroke dynamics, gait analysis, facial gestures, or mouse use characteristics.

A recent report published by Juniper Research predicts that fingerprint hardware will maintain its leading position in biometric payments, with more than 4.6 billion smartphones estimated to be equipped with fingerprint sensors by 2024 globally.


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In the same time frame its expected that facial recognition hardware such as Face ID integrated in iPhones, will be deployed on more than 800 million mobile devices, respectively 90% of smartphones, following an annual growth of more than 50%. In 2019, facial recognition hardware was deployed on some 96 million mobiles.

PROVING A CLAIM OF TRUE IDENTITY

Particularly in the case of smartphones, however, the biometric print or scan is just being used as an authentication factor or credential to prove a claim of digital identity ownership, equivalent to a PIN, rather than to prove a claim of true identity.

For biometrics to be tied to true identity requires a different approach that should be a key part of certified digital ID creation. It should also be integrated closely with banks’ onboarding processes if they are to make the most of the opportunities afforded by the latest developments in digital identity.

An ID based on this true identity is issued by the bank acting as the identity-proofing party, and the biometrics of the person that was identity-proofed are embedded in the digital ID. In a federated scheme this can be in the form of “card”, usually an app, but other formats are possible. A single-bank digital identity lives in the bank’s internal systems, to be accessed by the customers via permitted channels. With that in place, the holder of the identity can digitally share or present the identity-proofed ID and use the validated biometric to prove that the person in possession of the ID is who he or she claims to be.

For example, a customer who is new to a bank would normally require regulated identity and document checks before they can be onboarded. Traditionally this might involve sighting and photocopying of birth certificate, passport and or driver’s licence inside a bank branch, and recording of a signature.

If that bank were a provider of a certified digital identity, it would need to capture biometric data at this stage as well. But this whole process can be easily removed from the world of photocopies and visits to the branch.


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With the establishment of digital identity schemes, often there is integration with electronic driver’s licence and passport records. So a “selfie” taken on a device can be matched against those government records. A final in-person check could be conducted, if required, and within minutes a bank employee could look at the individual applicant, visually match them against the recorded selfie and source document image (e.g.) passport and activate the identity.

This is just an example of a possible onboarding flow. Actual integrations and processes will be dictated by the availability of electronic source identity documentation and local and regional regulation. For example, biometric passports might not be available. Increasingly accurate AI and Machine Learning tools for image recognition could also assist the capture and validation of images, faces and documents.

What is certain is that a slick user experience, a streamlined onboarding process and effective marketing of both these will be important factors to get right for any organisation looking to become an identity service provider.

Banks looking to establish themselves in this space will need to consider more than just how they deal with brand new customers for digital identity. They also need to give the same consideration to how they treat existing bank customers who want a digital ID. Do they have to go through the same initiation process as a brand new customer? If the bank has already served them for years, what shortcuts and incentives can they offer?

Also, for onboarding brand new customers who choose to present a digital ID issued by another bank or issuing body, how are they treated and given an optimal experience to maximise completion in the acquisition channel?


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05TOWARDS FULL DIGITAL IDENTITY LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT

Whether it’s taking place within a federated digital identity scheme, or purely within a bank’s systems and processes, onboarding is really just the first step in the digital identity lifecycle. Once the onboarding process is complete and a digital identity is created, banks also need to consider how they handle the ongoing verification of genuine presence when it comes to authenticating the ID for a transaction. Also, how can customers manage aspects of their identity themselves? And, in light of recent privacy regulations worldwide, how can authentication methods and identity be “forgotten” if requested by the customer?

A full consideration of the digital identity lifecycle should cover:

Claiming the identity, registration and verification – As well as the relevant personal attributes, the onboarding phase should include the capturing of multiple authentication methods that are able to be used in different situations throughout the lifecycle, with appropriate balance of risk and customer convenience. The authentication methods should be verified, and the identity can then be enhanced with additional internal or external information.

Issuance – Upon verification, the credentials can be issued as a digital identity, linked to at least one (preferably more) authenticator.

Ongoing authentication and authorisation of service delivery – Customers expect to be able to log in and authenticate across multiple channels and devices, and are becoming increasingly comfortable that the type of transaction or interaction they want will determine the level of authentication they are asked for. Banks need to be able to either switch up entirely to more secure authentication methods for particular authorisations, or to be able to add additional (multi) factors of authentication, while maintaining a smooth user experience for the customer.


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In federated schemes, there may be a requirement to pass authentication through brokers or to an original issuer of a digital identity. Similarly, under open banking and payments models, banks need to consider the prevention of data loss, identity theft and non-compliance with data protection rules, using identity verification and fraud prevention solutions to ensure their own compliance and also that of the third-party providers they work with.

Self-service identity management – a key theme to emerging digital identity regulation and best practice worldwide is that customers should be in control of their own identities. To this end banks need to consider how all inherent and assigned attributes can be presented and managed by the customer, along with permissions and preferences for third-party sharing – all protected by the appropriate level of authentication.

Leveraging aspects of the data identity to better serve the customer – Effective data security, anti-fraud and authentication approaches require achieving a much more granular view of a customer than has traditionally been possible. By having to define parameters such as malware detection, geolocation, IP address, device used and behavioural patterns such as unusual time of day, excessive transactional value or unknown beneficiaries, banks can gain additional customer insight to provide proactive customer service and product suggestions, in addition to achieving their security goals.

Removal of attributes and IDs – Under the GDPR regulation in Europe, and similar developments elsewhere, customers have the right to be forgotten entirely, or have certain stored attributes removed. This doesn’t have to be driven through self-service channels, but processes and back-end systems need to be put in place for customers who want to leave.


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06CONCLUSION

A basic process for establishing a core digital ID can prove that a customer is who they say they are and contain only static data such as name, date of birth and biometric data to verify identity and track the provenance of the digital information.

This core of the digital ID is the minimum required for interoperability in a federated ID scheme, so can be accepted by other participating organisations as long as the agreed set of standards are adhered to.

But the big picture of all data and context that could be attached to the core digital ID is much wider, and applies just as much to non-federated identity schemes. By adding in the potential for assigned data – such as address and contact details – and accumulated data attributes – such as transaction and credit history – to the ID, the potential use cases and benefits in the ecosystem grow exponentially.

If a bank can implement the right level of orchestration and permissions for all the attributes it holds internally that could be associated with the ID given the customers permission, alongside external attributes that a consumer might grant it access to, it will be in a good position to tackle a number of outstanding pain points faced by customers and institutions alike.

Customers won’t have to repeat themselves to update details, and banks get improved data quality and a single view of the customer. Customers benefit from increased control of data and accounts and are protected from the inconvenience of fraud, while banks reduce their reputational and financial loss from fraud and regulatory fines. Customers can sign up for new products and services much quicker, while banks reduce drop-off rates in their sales funnels.

Some of these benefits can be achieved by banks acting alone to improve their existing customer identity and access management and onboarding processes. But the effect is much more pronounced if these internal improvements are made in the context of a single digital identity ecosystem that operates cross-industry and cross-sector in a trust network.


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07ABOUT

Finextra This report is published by Finextra Research.

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20 HID GlobalHID Global powers the trusted identities of the world’s people, places and things. We make it possible for people to transact safely, work productively and travel freely. Our trusted identity solutions give people convenient access to physical and digital places and connect things that can be identified, verified and tracked digitally. We enable organizations to protect digital identities in a connected world and accurately assess cyber risk to deliver trusted transactions while empowering smart decision-making. Our innovative solutions help organizations to detect fraud and mitigate threats in real time while ensuring only authorized people can securely access sensitive information without compromising user experience. HID’s comprehensive identity lifecycle management offering for digital and physical security includes digital PKI certificates, mobile and cloud based solutions. Our extensive portfolio offers secure, convenient access to on-line services and applications and helps organizations to meet growing regulatory requirements while going beyond just simple compliance. Headquartered in Austin, Texas, HID Global has over 3,000 employees worldwide and operates international offices that support more than 100 countries. HID Global® is an ASSA ABLOY Group brand.

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should banks be the guardians of digital identity? · of the scheme architecture and governance...

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