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SHORTENING DEVELOPMENT CYCLE TIMES:A MANUFACTURER A S PERSPECTIVE

by

Arnoud De Meyer*

N° 89 / 52

* Associate Professor of Technology Management and AreaCoordinator, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance,77305 Fontainebleau, France.

Director of Publication :

Charles WYPLOSZ, Associate Deanfor Research and Development.

Printed at INSEAD,Fontainebleau, France.

SRORTENING DEVELOPMENT CYCLE TIMES: A MANUFACTURER'S PERSPECTIVE

Arnoud De Meyer

INSEAD

Fontainebleau, France

August 1989

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Abstract

Shortening development cycle times, without giving in on development costs

or quality has become an important management goal. In this paper, six

hypotheses about what effects design cycle times are formulated. These

hypotheses concern resource availability, vendor involvement, systems

integration, design process technology, workforce flexibility and

manufacturing lead time reduction. These hypotheses are tested on a

database of European manufacturers, and a framework is proposed to interpret

the results.

Key words: development cycle time, development, manufacturing, vendor

relations, integration

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SHORTENING DEVELOPMENT CYCLE TIMES: A MANUFACTURER'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Introduction

The performance of product development activities in the firm have

traditionally been measured against three categories of standards: the

quality of design; the cost or the utilisation of resources to obtain that

design; and the lead time in which the design could be made ready for market

introduction. It is often argued that these three categories of performance

measures are strongly inter-related. Scherer (1986), Mansfield (1971),

Boehm (1981) have demonstrated that the cost and the development time are

inversely related, and that costs increase if the development time is

shortened.

In earlier studies, time was considered to be important, but often the

attitude was that it was incompressible in an efficient way. The most often

quoted exponent of this attitude is Brooks' Mythical Man Month (1975). The

argument used by this school is that a reduction of the development time

requires a proportionally higher deployment of resources and should only be

done if there are forceful market reasons to shorten the development time.

In a review of the literature, Graves (1989) asserts quantitatively that a

compression of 1% in the development time would result in a cost increase of

1.2% to 2.0%. Moreover the issue of development time is often blurred by

an implicit assumption that development time and quality are positively

related. The longer one can work on a design, the better the design of the

product would become.

Over the last few years, the development time has received considerably more

attention. Three main categories of reasons can be found to explain this

increased interest. There is first the prevalent perception that product

life cycles are shortening. Recent large scale empirical research to verify

this hypothesis is not widely available. Qualls et al (1981) provided some

empirical evidence that the product life cycle is shortening at least during

the introductory and growth stages of household appliances. Other data

about the microelectronics or automobile industry is of a more anecdotal

nature (Urban & Hauser, 1980). But whether product life cycles have

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actually shortened is perhaps less important than the prevalent perception

that they have been reduced. This has tended to force practitioners' minds

on how to shorten development cycle times.

A second category of reasons has to do with the increased variety of

products offered to the customer. Increased product customisation,

increasing the number of options on basic product packages, and

manufacturing strategies based on cost efficient design flexibility (De

Meyer et ai, 1989) all lead to an increased need for improving the company's

design and engineering capabilities. Jaikumar (1987) extends the arguments

up to the point where he predicts that in the era of post-industrial

manufacturing, the real line function will be engineering, while pure

manufacturing might be reduced to a staff function. In such a world,

engineering and design will have to live up to the same expectations as to

those which manufacturing has to live up today: deliver the product on time

to the customer. This will lead to a greater need for control over the

components which make up the development time.

A third category of reasons can be derived from a combination of what some

call "time-based competition" (Stalk, 1988), and of some aspects of just-in-

time ideas applied to design and development. The argument goes as follows:

if one applies production concepts to development, time becomes the

equivalent of work-in-process. It plays the role of buffers in between the

activities and creates the slack in the development system which, in

manufacturing, is provided by excess capacity or in process inventory. The

just-in-time school (see, for example, Schonberger (1982) argues that

reduction of work-in-process is needed to expose problems in the production

system, and to focus managers' attention on these problems. This approach

will ultimately lead to a better understanding of the production process. In

the same vein, reduction of the slack time in product development should

lead to a better understanding of and control over the development process,

and consequently entail a better overall quality of the product design.

Consequently, with respect to development times, the goal must be to

understand better the "how" of the development process, in order to control

it in a more effective way. Shortening development cycle times cannot be a

goal in itself--there is of course an under-limit to the amount of time

needed to develop a new product. The issue is how we can improve product

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development performance, by better controlling the time needed to develop

that new product or service. In this context, reduction of design cycle

time is probably the most pressing issue ►nder the present circumstances,

but it cannot be the ultimate one in product development.

We can conclude that lead time has become an important dimension in its own

right, and reducing it has received a lot of management attention. But this

should not make us forget the trade-offs, or rather, the interrelatedness of

the three categories of quality, resource utilisation and time mentioned

hefore. The issue is not reduction of or control over lead times per se,

but reductions in lead time for a given level of design quality and resource

utilisation.

In this paper, we want to develop some hypotheses about shorter development

cycle times, and this based on a non-exhaustive literature review, and test

these hypotheses on the data collected within the European Manufacturing

Futures Project.

2. Ways to shorten development cycle times

Shortening the time between conception and having the product ready for

market introduction is clearly not a challenge for the development

department alone. Nearly all scholars indicate the systemic nature of

product development and the need for a close collaboration between the

firm's development function, the production function and the commercial

function. To avoid confusion we will use further in this paper "development

cycle time" to indicate the time used for the whole set of activites which

are required inside the firm (i.e. conception, product planning, product and

process engineering, pilot run and production ramp up) to make the product

ready for the market introduction phase. Let us now derive some hypotheses

on how to shorten that development cycle time.

Earlier work on time and delays in development focused most often on the

relation between time and resource allocation. In a review paper on tools

for planning and monitoring in research and development by Pearson (1983),

there is no reference to any attempt to use these tools to try to reduce the

development cycle time. The attitude which prevails in this paper is a

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reactive one: delays in development exist and one should try to keep them to

a minimum. There is no indication of a proactive attitude of how one could

continously reduce development cycle times through better planning and

monitoring. Hardingham (1970) argued that a large proportion of the reasons

for delay in project completion are due to a lack of resource availability.

Norris (1970) and Wilkes and Norris (1972) were more comprehensive and

reported that the percentage contribution to the total time lost through

delays was fairly evenly divided among unexpected technical difficulties,

lack of manpower and delivery of supplies and services. But, again, one

finds here a strong reference to resources availability, even if it is in

the form of manpower. In the context of the time/cost trade-off referred to

earlier, this lead us to the formulation of a first hypothesis:

H1: increased resource availability viii lead to shorter development

cycle times.

One third of the delays are, according to Wilkes and Norris (1972), due to

tardy delivery of supplies and services. This indicates the importance of

the role of vendors and suppliers in the shortening of development cycle

times. Imai et al (1985), in their discussion of five Japanese cases of

innovation, stress at length the role of the inter-organisational network,

consisting of affiliated companies, small and entrepreneurial parts

suppliers, and a network of cooperative R&D relationships. Wheelwright

(1989) mentioned that automobile manufacturers with a more than average

performance in shortening development cycle times, involve the suppliers to

a larger extent in the design of components and this through sub-contracting

of design or common development.

This idea fits very well with the models proposed by Von Hippel (1988) on

the role of users or vendors in the development of new products. Though

he studied the influence and efforts by users and vendors in the innovation

process from the point of view of appropriateness of benefit and costs, the

argument can be extended to the time needed to develop a product. This

leads us to a second hypothesis:

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H2: development cycle times can be shortened by taking a systems view

of the innovation process, involving suppliers and vendors,

through subcontracting in the development process.

More recent work has shifted the emphasis from resource deployment to

reduce delays, to new forms of organisations to reduce development cycle

times, keeping resource allocation and quality of the design constant. The

higher involvement of users and vendors, by some called the "integrated

enterprise" or production linking (Ferdows, 1987) (and referred to in the

second hypothesis), is one of the approaches. Another stream of ideas

emphasizes the need for data integration.

The functions necessary to bring a product from conception to the market are

predominantly data-intensive. Product and process development have been

described by many scholars (Pelz and Andrews (1965), Allen (1977), Utterback

(1982), De Meyer (1983)) as mainly a process of creative data-gathering and

processing. This data can Lake many forms: geometric representations,

algorithms, product and supplier specification, scientific literature, etc.

In order to function properly, it would seem appropriate that all parties

involved in the development process would have ready access to a convenient

database about the appropriate materials, components, sub-assemblies,

finished products, manufacturing processes, equipment, tools, market data,

and other relevant information. Moreover for these technologies to work in

concert to produce the right product at the right time, the data they all

use must be consistent, accurate and complete.

In earlier days, most of these databases were based on some hard copy

system, and isolated computerised databases. Exchange and interpretation of

data would be supported mainly by oral communication (Allen, 1977).

However, today's computerised relatienal databases should, in theory at

least, allow the replacement of part of the network of individuel personal

contacts and isolated databases by a common engineering/manufacturing/

marketing database. This leads us to a third proposition:

H3 : improving the development cycle times is positively influenced by

the integration of existing computerised information systems.

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A third area of organisational activities has to do with what is called

parallel or simultaneous engineering activities. The idea itself is not

new. The differences between sequential and parallel strategies have

already been discussed by Abernathy in 1971. But the issue has been

rediscovered by a larger audience through the work of Imai et al (1985) on

five cases in the Japanese industry, Hayes et al (1988), and the work by

Clark and Fujimoto (1989) on the worldwide automobile industry. The idea is

quite simple. In order to shorten development cycle times one should

replace the sequential execution of the different stages through which the

product development goes, by a partially parallel execution of these stages.

Product planning should, for instance, start long before the concept study

is finished, or product and process engineering should be carried out in

parallel. By doing so, the duration of each stage has not to be reduced,

but the overall length of time will be reduced. The principle is simple

enough, and has been advocated for some years in specific areas (such as for

the close interaction between product and process engineering (Ettlie,

1987)), but its practical execution creates a lot of problems. Imai et al

have summarised it as such: "By necessity, the overlapping approach

amplifies ambiguity, tension, and conflict within the group. The burden of

coordinating the intake and dissemination of information rises as well, as

does the responsibility for management to carry out on-the-job training on

an ad hoc and intensive basis."

How can one make this parallel or simultaneous engineering into a workable

form of organisation? Imai et al (1985), emphasize the need for a "shared

division of labour and responsibility" between the development engineering

and manufacturing people. Clark and Fujimoto (1989) consider four aspects

of management skills and operating capabilities which are conditions for a

successful implementation of overlapping development activities: (1)

downstream skill in, and willingness to forecast upstream changes and to

cope with them flexibly; (2) upstream skill in, and willingness to forecast

consequences of its output to downstream and to cope with them; (3)

integration mechanisms to handle increase information load between upstream

and downstream; and attitudes which facilitate integration; and (4)

operating capabilities in short cycle production systems. Hayes et al

(1988) emphasize on top of this the need to identify problems and conflicts

early, pull together people to work on them and solve them.

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Essential in all this seems to be the need to have very open communication,

and an early sharing of information. This would reinforce the importance of

the third hypothesis. Fiexibility in action, adaptation to new concepts, or

knowledge of willingness to take into account constraints imposed by

downstream activities is a second element. Clark and Fujimoto (1989)

explain at length what this implies in die making, and suggest that familiar

manufacturing programmes such as reduced set-up times, line-flow processes,

multi-functional workers, and rigorous process control, all leading to a

reduced manufacturing lead time, create an environnent where effective

simultaneous engineering is possible. This leads us to a fourth hypothesis:

H4 : manufacturing productivity programmes aimed at reducing

manufacturing lead time, will contribute to the shortening of

development cycle times.

Fruin (1989) has carried out a very extensive and in-depth case-study of

what he calls Toshiba's "development factory". He argues convincingly that

Toshiba (and other Japanese electronics manufacturera) have two types of

factories, i.e. one type for normal mass production, and one type which is

specialised in developing, introducing and ramping up new products.

Speeding up development is obviously one of the goals of this development

factory. Among the ten characteristics which differentiate the development

factory from the others are: (1) emphasis on economies of scope; (2) the

(large) size of the development factory; combined with (3) high

specialisation by function and product area (more than 50% of the workers

are indirect workers); (4) centrality in the organisation; (5) high leverage

of the companies' skills in the factory; (6) a tremendous feeling of

community; (7) liveliness ("it is pleasant to work here"); (8) management of

effort rather than of resources; (9) market sensitivity and (10) a clear

strategy of state-of-the-art automation. Many of these characteristics have

an influence which go beyond the single issue of development speed. But

apart for the automation, ail of these programmes are people-oriented.

Managing the human reources in such a way that the company can make better

use of the problem-solving capacity, flexibility and creativity of the

workforce can indirectly and directly contribute to speeding up the

development cycle. This leads us to a fifth hypothesis:

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H5: training programmes and human resources management activities

aimed at increasing the workers' problem-solving capability and

flexibility will reduce the development cycle time.

Finally some scholars, but in particular vendors of computer technology,

argue that automation should lead to reduced development time. Design

process technologies, i.e. ail physical tools or systems which support the

designer in his work, should contribute to a faster development. Computer

aided design, engineering or software engineering, local area networks, desk

top graphics, (super) computers offer means to reduce the development

cycles. Much of it is not yet installed, and the empirical data to support

the positive impact of technology on development cycle times is scant.

However, anecdotal evidence would lead us to formulate a sixth hypothesis:

H6: automation of the design process through computerised design

process technologies will lead to shortened development cycle

times.

3. Methods and database

The hypothesis formulated in the previous section will be tested on the

database of the European Manufacturing Futures Project. In this project (*)

data is collected through yearly surveys between 1983 and 1988 on the

manufacturing strategy of large European companies. Each year between 165

and 225 companies have answered. In Table 1, some summary characteristics of

the 1988 sample are provided. The analysis is limited to the data for the

period from 1986 to 1988, since these three surveys cover the period for

which the change in performance was gauged. To test the hypothesis four

sets of data will be used.

(*) The European Manufacturing Future Survey is part of a larger research

programme, the Global Manufacturing Futures project. This project is

carried out by J. G. Miller at Boston University, J. Nakane at Waseda

University (Tokyo) and Kasra Ferdows and Arnoud De Meyer at INSEAD

(Fontainebleau).

The first set consists of data on specific action programmes in

manufacturing. A major part of the questionnaire was dedicated to gauging

the degree of emphasis placed by the respondents on various action

programmes. From 1986 to 1988, a list of 36 to 39 action programmes were

offered to the respondents for which they could indicate on a Lickert scale

their degree of emphasis on each of them.

These lists were of course not exhaustive. The fact that they changed

slightly over time is an indication that one can never describe the full

set of feasible action programmes in manufacturing. Nevertheless, being the

result of cumulative experience of an international team of production

researchers in the U.S., Japan and Europe, the list is credible.

Furthermore, the list has gone through recursive examinations of being

presented to a large number of executives and being modifed over several

years.

As has been said before, for the 1986 and 1987 survey, we have data on a

Lickert scale (ranging from 1 to 5 in 1986, and from 1 to 7 in 1987),

indicating how the respondents intended to emphasize the particular action

programme. In the 1987 and 1988 survey, we also have data on past action

programmes, i.e. not only what they intended to do, but which action

programmes they had emphasized in the previous year. In this case of 1988,

we have only binary data, in the sense that the respondents were asked to

tick off those action programmes which they had greatly emphasized. For

1987, we have a 7-point Lickert scale.

The second set of data concerns manufacturing performance. In the 1988

survey, we measured the changes in eight performance measures between 1985

and 1987. The respondents were asked to take 1985 as a base year for each

of the performance measures listed in Table 1 and indicate how much it

changed by the end of 1987. One of the performance parameters is the "speed

of new product development". This parameter will be used to differentiate

the companies which have considerably improved their development cycle time,

from those who did not.

The third and fourth set of data consists of, respectively, a list of 7

organisational innovations and 10 technological programmes for which the

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respondents were asked in 1988 to indicate on a 7-point Lickert scale how

useful these programmes have been in the past.

A final word of caution. The questionnaire was developed for and answered

by senior manufacturing managers. What will be discussed in further

sections is consequently from a manufacturers' viewpoint. The same

questions asked of an R&D manager could lead to different results.

Moreover, the unit of analysis is a business unit, not an individual

project. Consequently, we test the actions which lead to an overall

performance improvement, not the improvement for individual projects.

4. Results

The question concerning how the "speed of new product development" had

changed was answered by 119 companies. This group of companies is far from

homogeneous as a rapid glance of Table 1 will reveal. There are some

general characteristics, however. Ail of them are large, European-based.

None of the samples we work with is biased towards a particular industry or

European country.

Insert Table 1 here

The mean value for the performance indicator is 105, and the standard

deviation 11. The mode is 100: 79 respondents indicated that their

performance in speed of introducing new products has not changed. The

distribution of this performance indicator is not normal. To create a group

of high performers, which can be contrasted with low performers, we defined

the high performers as those which reported an improvement higher than the

average for the whole sample, plus one standard deviation. This approach to

single out high performers has been used in previous studies in a different

context (Allen, 1966). The group of low performers was defined as those

companies for which the speed of new product development remained the same

or has actually deteriorated. There are 25 high performers and 94 low

performers.

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Not ail of these 119 companies answered in 1987 and 1986. The numbers of

high performers for which data is available for 1987 is 15 and for 1986 it

is 7. The number of low performers fox which data is available in 1987 and

1986 is respectively 42 and 27.

Do a higher amount of resources make a difference? To test the first

hypothesis, some of the demographic data on the companies was analysed for

1987 and 1988. (Table 2). The questionnaire provides data on the proportion

of sales spent on R&D, the proportion of internai versus external sourcing

of process know-how and the number of manufacturing engineering employees as

a proportion of the total number of manufacturing employees. There is

almost no significant difference between the high and low performers on any

of these measures. If anything, it is surprising that the amount of money

spent on R&D, or the ratio of engineering personnel to total manufacturing

personnel is actually lover for the high performers. Thus, more across the

board spending on R&D or having more people available for engineering does

not lead in the short or medium term to a better performance in development

cycle time. Ail of these indicators are not project specific. It can, of

course, be that though the overall spending is of the same level, the

resource commitment per individual project is different.

Insert Table 2 here

To study the other hypothesis, the list of action programmes will be used.

This list is obviously too long for our purposes. Some of the programmes,

such as plant relocation, closing plants, or determining a manufacturing

strategy have no direct connection with shorter development cycles. The

action programmes were regrouped under the headings of "design process

technology", "human resource management", "integration", "manufacturing

flexibility", "vendors" and "commitment to development" (Table 3). The

different columns in this table have, of course, different implications.

Emphasis on future or on past action plans entails a different degree of

commitment. One can assume that respondents are fairly honest about what

they have emphasized in the past, and that there is some degree of wishful

thinking in the emphasis on future action plans. But in the questionnaire

we ask specifically which action plans will be emphasized in the near future

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(2 to 5 years). Given the long lead times involved in manufacturing

programmes, we assume that these future action plans are the ones which our

respondents have already committed to. So we can reasonably assume that

both past and future action programmes, as they were emphasized in 1986 and

1987 have eventually had an impact on the performance improvement over that

period. The future action plans in 1988 are, of course, of a different

nature. Here the argument can be made that the emphasis placed on

particular programmes is perhaps a consequence of superior performance in

speed of new product development.

Insert Table 3 here

What does the data show? One finds the strongest differences between high

and low performers with respect to vendors and production and inventory

control systems. Vendor quality, vendor lead time reduction and purchasing

management were all more heavily emphasized in 1986 and 1987 future plans.

Vendor quality is also the single programme that in the 1988 past action

plans was significantly more emphasized. And the better performers will

keep on emphasizing vendor lead time reduction and vendor quality. This

gives considerable support to hypothesis 2.

Though generally speaking the integration of information systems is more

heavily emphasized by the high performers, there are no statistically

significant differences. However, those respondents who have realised a

better performance, will emphasize more heavily integration of information

systems with manufacturing and this in a significant way. Consequently,

hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed, but the change in attitude for the future

seems to indicate that manufacturers have high expectations on what can be

done with integration of information systems in the near future.

Manufacturing flexibility is characterized by a set of six programmes:

manufacturing lead time reduction, computer aided manufacturing, flexible

machining systems, reducing set-up times, just-in-time and zero defects.

For none of these programmes was there really a difference in the past

(except for a very slight indication in 1988 that just-in-time and reducing

set-up times would be a bit more emphasized). But four of these programmes

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will be significantly more emphasized in the future by the better

performers. Why this change (which we could also observe for integration of

manufacturing information systems)? Perhaps because this manufacturing

flexibility is a "second order" programme: other elements have to be in

place before one tackles the issue of manufacturing flexibility. To verify

how strong this commitment to manufacturing flexibility was, the following

analysis vas done. One of the action programmes is the "improvement of new

product introduction capability". This goes beyond simply speeding up the

development process, but it includes definitely the speed. Those

respondents who score high, i.e. 6 or 7 on the Lickert scale, were isolated

and contrasted with the others, to examine which other programme they

emphasized significantly more (Table 4).--To avoid us simply choosing

respondents which tend to score high on every item, those sets for which the

average score on all the action programmes was 6 or more were discarded--.

The first thing that is noticeable is the length of the list. Many

programmes were positively correlated with improving the new product

introduction capability. Moreover, nearly all of the programmes related to

manufacturing flexibility and integration of information systems can be

found on the list. If they have not been emphasized in the past, they will

be in the future!

Insert Table 4 here

Human resource management has been somewhat differently emphasized in the

past. In 1986, it was a change in management/labour relations, and there is

a weak indicator for job enrichment in 1987. Job enlargement and management

training are emphasized more strongly by the high performers on the list of

the future action programmes. Perhaps a similar reasoning as for

manufacturing flexibility can be developed. Indeed one can find in Table 4

a higher emphasis by those who want to improve the new product introduction

capabilities on a change in management/labour relationship and management

training.

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For the design process technologies (CAD and value analysis), there seems to

be no difference between high and low performers, with the exception of the

future emphasis placed in 1988 on value analysis.

In Table 3, there is a last group which is called commitment to development,

and which groups the development of new processes for either old or new

products, and the emphasis placed on the improvement of new product

introduction capabilities. This category was formed, partially to test the

first hypothesis in another way. Indeed, one can argue that the financial

data given in Table 2 are a very imperfect indication of the resources

allocated to speeding up the new product development. The three action

plans which are grouped under commitment to development are another proxy

for speed of new product development. There is no apparent reason why

developing new processes would necessarily mean improving the development

cycle time. But if the company works on this development cycle time, it

should be reflected in emphasis on these three action plans. The results

are interesting. Commitment to development of new processes either for old

(1987) or new products (1986 and 1988) is emphasized more heavily by the

high performers than by the low performers. The same is true in 1988 for

the emphasis placed on new product introduction capabilities. Commitment to

the development process has a positive impact on speeding up the introductin

of new production.

Another way of testing the hypothesis is by looking at the usefulness of

some of the programmes (Table 5). The usefulness was obviously only gauged

for those programmes which had been implemented by the respondents'

companies.

Insert Table 5 here

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The high performers do put a significantly higher emphasis on the

restructuring of the procurement network, and (administrative) process

controls. These (technical) process controls recur in the list of

significantly more emphasized technological innovations. Automated

materials handling, computer aided process design and computer aided

inspection and testing are the other technological innovations more strongly

emphasized as being useful by the group of high performers.

This data provide some support for the second, fourth and sixth hypothesis.

A different approach to the procurement of components has been useful for

those who have shortened the time for new product introduction. Getting the

manufacturing process better under control, be it with either administrative

or technological tools helps also. Improving the logistics process through

better materials handling is another useful tool to speed up the

introduction of new products. Usefulness of control, and of better

materials handling supports the fourth hypothesis.

Some programmes which one would have expected to be useful given our

hypothesis, do not stand out: integration of information systems and

electronic links to supplier and customers; worker training and motivation

programmes; computer aided design. Some of these results can be explained

by the fact that the respondents to the questionnaire are senior

manufacturing managers: computer aided (product) design, for example, is

outside their realm of authority and responsibility, and they might not be

aware of the positive and/or negative effects of C.A.D. But the results on

integration are consistent with the tests mentioned above, and should be

within the understanding and experience of our respondents. The only

conclusion we can ome to is that integration of information systems has so

far not yet contributed to the shortening of new product introduction times.

The fact that they are heavily mentioned as future action plans in 1988 can

only mean that the expectations are high.

5. Discussion

The results of the tests do not support the hypothesis in a straightforward

way. Keeping in mind that the empirical data is obtained from a group of

senior manufacturing managers, one can assert the following conclusions:

a. An improvement in new product introduction time does not require a

substantially higher availability of financial resources for

research and development or human resources in across the board

engineering. But a higher commitment of the company to the

development of new processes and to the improvement of the

innovation process has a positive effect. The message could be

that throwing money at the problem does not necessarily help, but

that focusing the minds on the problem, and reallocating the

resources to improve the design capabilities has a positive effect.

This is in fact a conclusion similar to what has been proposed for

quality improvements or inventory reduction programmes.

b. The second hypothesis is the one which is best supported by the

data. Improved purchasing management, better relations with the

vendors seem to have positive effects. Restructuring of the

procurement network vas perceived to be useful by the high

performers. Improving new production introduction times is

dependent on involving vendors, in other words taking a systems

vie, of the development process.

c. Changes in the management of human resources and the relationship

between management and labour have contributed to improving new

product introduction times, but the usefulness of specific

training, motivation or job enlargement programmes is not clear.

However, the high performers will emphasize job enlargement and

management training in the near future.

d. Both the integration of information systems and the improvement of

manufacturing flexibility have not particularly been emphasized in

the past by high performers, and they are not perceived to have

been particularly useful to them in the past. But the expectations

for the future appear to be high. The high performers emphasize

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them in their future action plans for 1988, and these action plans

are positively correlated with the emphasis on the improvement of

the innovation process as a whole.

e. Design process technologies such as CAD do not explain shorter

development cycles. The lack of evidence might be due to the

composition of the sample. This interpretation is somewhat

supported by the fact that the high performers seemed to appreciate

more strongly the usefulness of technologies typical for the design

of the production process.

How can these results be interpreted in a broader framework? When, in the

introductory section, the hypothesis were proposed, there was the implicit

assumption that the different tools and organisational changes could and

would be implemented simultaneously. The results seem to suggest that the

hypotheses do not have to be rejected outrightly, but that there might be

some rank order in the tools and changes to be implemented. As was

suggested in the results section, there are perhaps first and second order

effects. To interpret the results, we suggest the framework presented in

Figure 1. As prior conditions to shortening development cycles, the company

has to (a) make a clear commitment to this objective; (b) adopt a systems

view, i.e. involve vendors and suppliers in the process; and (c) change the

relations between management and labour, i.e. shift from a Taylorian view of

the workforce to a more collaborative approach. The general environment

that this creates will lead to a first significant reduction in the

development cycles. Once the first results are obtained, the company can

Lake a next hurdle by investing in the integration of information systems,

the implementation of process design technology, the increase in flexibility

of the workforce, and the reduction of manufacturing lead time. It is

suggested here, but beyond the scope of the tests, that the combination of

these four categories of actions will enhance the chances of success of

implementing simultaneous engineering and integrated organisations and

groups. All of these action programmes and their consequences will then, in

their turn, contribute to shorter development cycles.

Insert Figure 1 here

-20-

If the model can be validated by further tests, it has some important

managerial consequences. First, companies which intend to invest in shorter

development cycle times should be wary of programmes involving hugh resource

outlays across the board. Money will not necessarily help, and some

programmes seem to be preconditions for the implementation of other

programmes. Some of the more sophisticated actions such as simultaneous

engineering, or integration of information systems, require a climate of

commitment and a systems view, and perhaps already a few successes in

shortening development cycle times, obtained through simpler means.

Secondly, shortening design cycle times is not a challenge for the

development department alone. Perhaps the automation of the design process

technologies can help, but according to the results of tests on our

manufacturing database, other functions such as manufacturing, purchasing,

personnel management, etc. can have an important impact on development

times.

6. Conclusion

Shortening development cycle times, keeping quality and resources constant

has become an important target for management effort. Shorter product life

cycles, reduction of slack in the development process and the increased

demand for production variations and modifications have forced companies to

examine the duration of the development process. In this paper, the data

gathered through the European manufacturing futures survey was used to test

six hypotheses on the role of resource availability, human resource policy,

vendor relations, integration of information systems, design process

technologies and manufacturing lead time reduction. The results show that

the relations are not as straightforward as one would expect. There seem to

be some first and second order type of programmes which can contrebute to

shorter development cycle times.

-21-

Table 1: General characteristics of the sample

(n=174)

Median of annual sales revenues ECU 1,219,929,000

Average pre-tax return on assets 16.4%

Average pre-tax profit as a % of sales 7.8%

Average market share of primary product 26.5%

Average market share of main competition 22.8%

Average growth rate (units sold) 11.3%

Average number of countries in which therespondent has plants 2.3

-22-

Table 2: Demographic data of high and low performers

High Low

R&D as a % of sales (87) 4.3 5.0

R&D as a % of sales (88) 7.6 6.1

Sales attributed to new products (87) 24.0 16.0

Sales attributed to new products (88) 34.0 38.0

Internal sources for process know-how (*) (87) 5.0 5.4

Internal sources for process know-how (*) (88) 4.8 5.3

Industrial engineering personnel as % of total

personnel (87) 18% 14%

Manufacturing, process and/or industrial

engineering as % of total personnel (88) 7% 5%

1988

past action (*) future emphasis

levn=94

highn=25

lown=94

highn=25

.65 .64 5.3 5.7

.49 .60 5.3 6.0

.45 .64 4.3 5.1

.34 .44 4.1 4.5

.45 .36 4.5 4.8

.47 .56 5.1 5.8

.61 .64 5.4 5.8

.33 .40 4.5 5.4

.55 .84 5.4 6.3

- - -

.54 .72 4.9 5.7

.52 .36 4.4 5.0

.29 .44 3.9 5.2

-23-

TABLE 3

1986 1987

Future emphasis past action future emphasis

low high low high low highn=27 n=7 n=42 n=15 n=42 n=15

3.4 4.1 4.3 4.1 5.0 5.3

3.6 4.2 4.5 4.4 5.3 5.4

3.1 2.9 4.4 4.1 4.9 4.6

2.7 2.5 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.7

3.3 2.5 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.5

- 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.2

morker training

vendors

- - - -

Vendor lead timereduction

- 3.7 4.5 4.4 5.3

Vendor guality 3.2 4.0 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.9

Purchasing management 3.1 4.1 - - -

Production & inventorycontrol systems

3.6 4.4_ 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.2

Design Process Technology

Computer-aided design 2.8 3.4 3.2 3.8 4.0 5.0

Value analysis 2.7 3.4 3.5 3.3 4.1 4.6

Intégration

Integrating informe-tion systems betweenmftg and other functions

Integrating informationsystems within aftg

!lumen Resource Management

Job enlargement

Job enrichment

Changing labour/management relations

Supervisor/managementtraining

Manufacturing Flexibility

Mftg lead time réduction 3.6 3.5

Computer-aided mftg 2.9 3.5

F.M.S. 3.2 3.2

Reducing set-up times 3.0 3.5

Just-in-Lime - -

Zero defects - -

4.3 4.7

4.1 3.7

3.6 3.6

4.0 4.4

4.7 4.1

-

-24-

Commitment to dvpalt

Developing new pro- 3.4 2.8 4.6 3.3cesses for old products

Developing new pro- 3.0 4.1 4.2 4.3

casa for new products

Improving new product - - 4.6 4.1introduction capabilities

Note: the average scores which are underlined are differentunderlined with a broken line are different on a 10%

4.7

4.8

4.5

4.7

5.2

-

4.7

4.9

5.3

5.4

4.9

4.5

5.6

6.0

-

4.4

5.6

5.7

.49

.49

.33

.49

.47

.47

.33

.41

.31

.52 5.0

.56 4.5

.40 4.5

.64 4.8

6.0

5.1

5.1

5.7

.60 4.9 5.8

.64 5.4 6.2

.36 4.8

.56 4.3

5.2

5.4

.64 4.6 6.0

froc■ Bachlevel

other on a 5% level; the ones which are

(*) yes or no answer

-25-

Table 4

Action programmes enphasized significantly more by those respondentsvho vill eaphasize strongly winproving nev product introduction capability"

(on a 5% significance level)

Change labour/management relationships

Manufacturing reorganization

* Management training

Manufacturing lead time reduction

Vendor lead time reduction

Computer-aided design

* Developing new processes for new products

Developing new processes for old products

Integrating information systems across functions

* Integrating information systems withing manufacturing

* Vendor quality

* Just-in-time

Flexible machining systems

* Production and Inventory Control Systems

(*) Significant on a 1% level.

-26-

Table 5a: Usefulness of organisational innnovation

Low High(n=83) (n.24)

Quality improvement programmes 5.3 5.7

Internai restructuring/reorganisation 4.8 4.5

Restructuring of the procurement network 4.1 4.8

Integration of information systems 4.7 5.0

Lead-time reduction programmes, inc. JIT 4.7 5.3

Worker training programmes 4.9 5.4

Process controls 4.9 5.6

Worker participation and motivation programmes 5.0 5.5

Table 5b: Usefulness of technological innovations

CAD 4.8 5.6

CA-Process-D 3.9 5.3

Computer driven materials requirements,planning and scheduling 5.5 5.7

Automated shop floor data collection 5.0 4.8

Computer numerically controlled machines 4.8 5.0

Robotics for welding, painting, picking andplacing 4.3 5.8

Process controls 5.0 5.8

Automation systems for materials handling 4.6 5.8

Computer aided inspection and testing 4.9 5.8

Electronic link to suppliers/customers 4.3 5.0

commitment systems view

change in management/labour climate

shorter development cycles

- integration ofinformation systems

- implementation ofprocess designtechnologies

- investment in manu-facturing lead timereduction

- increase in workforceflexibility

. simultaneousengineering

. organisationalstructures

Figure 1: Framework for shortening development cycle times

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INSEAD VORKING PAPERS SERIES

"The R L D/Production Interface°.

'Subjective estimation ln integratingcommunication budget and allocationdectsionso a case study', January 1986.

'Sponsorship and the diffusion oforganitetional innovetiont a prelininary viev".

'Confidence intervels; an «Orle.'investigation for the sertes in the N-Coapetltlon e .

"A note on the readuction of the vorkveek•,July 1985.

"The real «change rate and the fiscal«mets of • naturel resource discovery',Revised versiont February 1986.

"Judgmental blases in sales forecasting",February 1986.

'torecasting political risks forinternational operatione, Second Draft:March 3, 1986.

"Conceptualizing the strategic process indiverelfied firme: the rola and nature of thecorporal. influence process", tebruary 1986.

"Analysing the issues concerningtechnological de-maturity".

' Froc e lydiametry' to 'Pinkhsairation's■isspecifying advertlsing dynaelcs ratel),affects profitability".

"The economics of retail firme, RevisedApril 1986.

' Spatial coapetition à la Cournot•.

'Comperaison internationale des marges brutesdu commerce", June 1985.

86/16 B. Espen ECKBO andNervis M. LANGUR

86/17 David B. JEKISON

86/18 James TEBOULand V. MALLERET

86/19 Rob R. VEIT2

86/20 Albert CORRAT,Gabriel HAVAVINIend Pierre A. MICHEL

86/21 Albert CORHAY,Gabriel A. HAVAVINIand Pierre A. MICHEL

86/22 Albert CORDA?,Cabriel A. HAVAVINIand Pierre A. MICHEL

86/23 Arnoud DE MEYER

86/2♦ David CAUTSCHIand Vithala R. MO

86/25 8. Peter CRAYand Ingo VALTER

86/27 Karel COOLand Ingemar DIERICKI

86/28 Manfred KETS DEVRIES and Danny MILLER

86/29 Manfred K£T5 DE VRIES

86/30 Manfred KITS DE VRIES


86/31 Arnoud DE MEYER,Jinichiro NAKANE,Jeffrey C. NILLERend Katt& FERDOVS

'Les prises des offres publiques, la noted'information et le marche des transferts decontrôle des sociétés'.

'Strategle capability transfer In acquIsIclunIntegrattoe. May 1986.

' Towards an operational définition ofservices', 1986.

'Nostradamus; a knovledge-based forecastingedvisor'.

'The pricing of equity on the London stock«change: seasonelity and sire preelua•,June 1986.

' Risk-presle seasonality in U.S. and Europeanequity markets', February 1986.

'Seasonality In the risk-return relationshipssoue international evidence", July 1986.

'An exploretory study on the lategratIon ofinformation systems in manufecturing*,July 1986.

'A methodology for specification andaggregation in product concept testing'.July 1986.

'Protection', August 1986.

'Negative rtek-return relationships inbusiness strategys pwrados or trulee',October 1986.

86/10 R. MOENART,Arnoud DR MEYER,J. BARBE andD. DESCROOLMEESTER.

86/11 Philippe A. NAERTand Alain BULTEZ

86/12 Roger BETANCOURTand David GAUTSCBI

86/13 S.P. ANDERSONand Damien J. NEVEN

86/14 Charles VALDMAN

1986

86/01 Arnoud DE NETER

86/02 Philippe A. NAERTMarcel VEVERDERGOand Guide VERSVEJVEL

86/03 Nichet). BRIME

86/04 Spyros MAKRIDAKISand Michèle 'Maori

86/05 Charles A. VTPLOSZ

86/06 Francesco CIAVAZ2I.Jaft R. SBEEN andCharles A. VIPLOSZ

86/07 Douglas L. MscLACHLANand Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

86/08 José de la TORRE andDavid R. NECKAR

86/09 Philippe C. RASPESLAGR86/26 Barry EICRENGREEN 'The economic consequences of the Franc

and Charles VYPLOSZ

Poincare, September 1906.

"Intecpreting organizational texts.

'Vhy folio., the leader?".

' The succession gamet the real story.

' Pleribility: the nul. competittve battle,October 1986.

'Plexibility: the next competttIve haute',Revised Version; Match 1987

86/15 Mihkel TONBAK andArnoud DE MEYER

' 8oir the managerial attitudes of firme withIMS dicter froc other nAnutacturing f1rnmiaurvev results'. June 1986.

86/32 Karel COOLend Dan SCRENDFL

Performance differences &mons strategle croup«webers', October 1986.

1987

87/01 Manfred KETS DE VRIES • Priai:mers of leadership'.

87/02 Claude VIALLET

'An empirical investigation of international

omet pricine, November 1986.

87/03 David CAUTSCHI

and Vithala RAO

87/04 Sumantra GHOSHAL and

Christopher BARTLETT

87/05 Arnoud DE MEYERand Kasra PERDOVs

*A methodolory for epecification and

aggregetlon in product concept tentine,

Revlsed Version: January 1987.

°Organizing for innovations: case of the

multinational corporation', February 1987.

•Managecial focal points in manufacturingatrategy*, February 1987.

87/06 Arun K. JAIN, 'Customer loyalty as e construct In theChristian PINSON and marketing ot banking services • . July 1986.Naresh K. NALHOTRA

86/33 Ernst BALTENSPERGERand Jean DERMINE

86/34 Philippe BASPESLAGN

and David JENISON

86/35 Jean DERMINE

86/36 Albert CORNA/ and

Gabriel BAVAVINI

86/37 David GAUTSCRI and

Roger BETANCOURT

86/38 Gabriel HAVAVINI

86/39 Gabriel OAVAVINIPierre MICHELand Albert CORSA!

86/40 Charles VYPLOSZ

86/41 Kasra PERDONS

and Vickham SKINNER

86/42 Kasra PERDOVS

and Per LINDBERG

86/43 Damien NEVEN

86/44 Ingemar DIERICKX

Carmen MATUTESand Damien NEVEN

•The rola of public pollcy ln insuringfinancial st•bllityl e cross-country.comparative perspective", August 1986, Revlsed

November 1986.

•Acquisitions: myths and reality*,

July 1986.

"Measuring the market value of a bank, •

primer • , November 1986.

•Seamonallty In the aalt-return relationahlptnome international evIdence*, July 1986.

•The evolutloo of reteiling: • suggeated

gaconomic interpretatioe.

•Financial innovation and recent developmentsin tbe French capital markets*, Updated:September 1986.

*The pricing of common stocks on the Brusselsstock etchanget • re-examin•tion of theevid•nce", November 1986.

•Capital (lova liberalisation and the ENS, •

french perspective', December 1986.

•Manufacturing in ■ nev perspective',

July 1986.

' fliS as Indicator of manufacturing strategy*,December 1986.

'On the existence of equIlibrium in hoteling'smodale . November 1986.

•Value edded ta* and competition»,December 1986.

87/07 Rolf 8ANZ and

Gabriel HAVAVINX

87/08 Manfred KETS DE VRIES

87/09 Lister VICKERY,

Mark PILKINCTON

and Paul READ

87/10 André LAURENT

87/11 Robert FILDES and

Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

87/12 Fernando BARTOLOMEand André LAURENT

87/13 Sumantra GHOSHALand Nitln NOHRIA

87/14 Landis GABEL

87/15 Spyros NAKRIDAKIS

87/16 Susan SCHNEIDER

and Roger DUNBAR

87/17 André LAURENT and

Fernando BARTOLOME

87/10 Reinhard ANCELNAR and

Christoph L1EBSCHER

87/19 David BEGG and

Charles VYPLOSZ

87/20 Spyros HAKRIDAKIS



87/23 Roger BETANCOURT

David GAUTSCHI

"Equity pricing and stock market ano•alles',

February 1987.

"Leaders vho can't manage", February 1987.

»Entrepreneurial actIvities of European )(Ms•,Marck 1987.

"A cultural viev of organizationol change",

Hardt 1987

»Forecasting and lors funetions". March 1987.

'The Janus Oead: lemming from the superforand subordlnate faces of the manager's job",

April 1987.

"Multinational corporations as differentiatednetvorks', April 1987.

"Product Standards and Competitive Strategy, An

Analysis of the Prineiples". Nay 1987.

'KETAFORECASTING: Vays of improving

PorecastIng. Accuracy and Usefulnese,

May 1987.

*Takeover attempts: vhat does the language tell

use, June 1987.

"Managers' cognitive .aps for upvard and

dovnvard relationshIps', June 1987.

'Patents and the European blotechnology long! estudy of large European pharaaceutical flans",

June 1987.

"Vhy the EMS? Dynamic gaines and the cquilihrtua

policy mime. May 1981.

"A nev approach to statistical forecantine,

June 1987.

"Strategy formulation: the impact of national

culture', Revlsed: July 1907.

'Conflicting Ideologics: structural and

mottvational consequences", August 1987.

'The deaand for retall products and thehousehold production andel: nev vices oncoaplemcntarity and subotttutabtlity-.

87/24 C.B. DERR andAndré LAURENT

87/25 A. K. JAIN,N. K. mALmereA andChristian PINSON

'The Internai and external c eeeee s: atheoretical and cross-cultural perspective',Sprint 1987.

'The robustness of KDS configurations ln theface of incomplete data • . March 1987, Revised:July 1987.

'seasonaligy. sire presto. and the relatton-Adpbetveen the rtsk and the return of Prenchcoaaon stocka'. Noveaber 1987

'Comblning horizontal and vertical

dIfferentlation: the principle of ans-mindifferentlation', Ocrez:ber 1987

87/41 Cavriel HAVAVIN, and

Claude VIALLET

87/42 Damien NEVEN andJacques-P. TRISSE

87/26 Roger BETANCOURTand David CAUTSCHI

'Demand co■plenentarities, household productionand retail essortments", July 1987.

87/43 Jean GABSZEV1CZ andJacques-F. TRISSE

'Location', December 1987

•In there • capital shortage in Europe7*,

August 1987.

'Controlling the interest-rate risk of bonds:an introduction to duration mnalysis andimmunization strategiee, September 1987.

•Interpreting atrategic behavfori basicassumptions themes in organiration • , September

1987

'Spatial competition and the Core', August

1987.

"On the optimality of central places•.September 1987.

•German, French and British sanufacturingstratesies legs différent than one /hittit•,

September 1987.

'A proceas framevork for analyzIng cooperation

betveen September 1987.

'European manutacturers: the dangers ofcomplacency. Insights fro. the 1987 European

manuf•cturing futures survey, October 1987.

'Coapelltive location on netvorks under

discrI.inatory pricing • , September 1987.

'Prisoners of leadership", Revised version

October 1987.

'Privatisation: its motives and likely

consequences', October 1987.

'Strategy formulation: the impact of nationalculture', October 1987.

'The dark side of CE0 succession', Noveaber

'Product compatibility and the scope of entry',

Noveaber 1987

87/44 Jonathan HAMILTON,Jacques-P. TRISSEand Anita VESKAMP

87/45 Karel COOL.David JEMISON and

Ingemar DIERICKX

87/46 Ingemar DIERICKXand Karel COOL

1988

88/01 michael LAVRENCE andSpyros NUCRIDAY/S

88/02 Spyros MARRIDŒIS

88/03 James TEBOUL



88/06 Reinhard ANCELMAR

88/07 Ingenar DIERICKX

and Karel COOL

88/08 Reinhard ANCELMAR

and Susan SCHNEIDER

88/09 Bernard SINCLAIR-

DESCACNé


DESGAGNé


DESCACN6

• Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot

in • .del of location cholce, December 1987

'Business strategy, market structure end rial:-

return relattonships, s causal lnletpretatlon'.

December 1987.

'Asset stock accumulation and sustainabllItyot compétitive advantage', December 1987.

'factors affecting judgementel forecaata andconfidence Intervale. January 1988.

"Predicting recessions and other turnIng

points", January 1988.

"De-industriallze service for Quality', Januar),

1988.

'National vs. cocporste culture: implications

for human resource management • . January 1908.

'The svinging dollar: is Europe out ot step1',

January 1988.

'Les conflits dans les canaux de distribution",

January 1988.

'Competitive advantage: a resource ba5ed

perspective', January 1988.

'Issues in the study of nrganizational

cognition', February 1989.

'Price formation and product design through

bidding', February 1988.

"The robuatness of some standard auction pane

fors", February 1988.

"Vhen stationary strategles are equillbriu■

biddIng strategy: The single-crossing

properte, February 1988.

87/27 Mlchael BURDA

87/28 Gabriel HAVAVINI

87/29 Susan SCHNEIDER andPaul SRRIVASTAVA

87/30 Jonathan HAMILTON

V. Bentley MACLEODand J. P. TRISSE

87/31 Martine OUINZII andJ. P. TRISSE


87/33 Yves DOZ andAmy SRUEN

81/34 Kasra FEADOVS andArnoud DE NEYER

87/35 P. J. LEDERER and

J. F. TRISSE


87/37 Landis LABEL



1987

87/40 Carmen MATUTES and

Pierre RECIBEAU

88/12 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/14 Alain NOEL

88/15 Anil DEOLALIKAR andLars-Hendrik ROUER

88/16 Gabriel HAVAVIN1

88/17 Michael BURDA

88/18 Michael BURDA

88/19 M.J. LAVRENCE andSpyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/20 Jean DERMINE,Damien NEVEN andJ.F. »MISSE

88/21 James TEBOUL

88/22 Lars-Hendrik RÔLLER

88/23 Sjur Didrik PLANand Georges ZACCOUR

88/24 B. Espen ECKBO andNervis LANGORR

88/25 Everette S. GARDNERend Spyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/26 Sjur Dldrlk FLANand Georges ZACCOUR

88/27 Murugappa KRISHNANLars-Rendrik RÔLLER

'Business tiras and managers in the 21stcentury', February 1988

'The interpretetion of striategies: e study ofthe impact of CEOs on the corporation',?Web 1988.

•The production of and returns from industri•linnovationr an econometric maya!, for adeveloping country'. December 1987.

'Market efficiency and equity pricingsinternational evidence and implications forglobal investing', March 1988.

"N000polistic coapetition, tests of adjusteentand the behavior of European employsent',September 1987.

' Retlections on 'Vett Unenploreent • inEurope*, November 1987, revised February 1988.

'Indtvldual bias in judge.ents of confidence',Match 1988.

'Portfolio sélection by mutuel fonds, anequilibriun Bodel', March 1988.

' De-industrialise service for quality',Match 1988 (88/03 Revised).

"Proyer Quadrette Ponctions vith an Applicationto AT&T• . May 1987 (Revised March 1988).

"Equilibres de Nash-Cournot dans le marchéeuropéen du gas: un cas où les solutions enboucle ouverte et en feedback colncident",Mars 1988

' Information disclosure, ■eans of payment, andtakeover presle. Public and ', rivet, tenderoffers In France', July 1985, Sixth revision,April 1988.

'The future of forecasting'. April 1988.

"Sent-coapetitive Cournot equilibriun inmultistage oligopolles', April 1988.

• Entry gime vith resalable capacity*,April 1988.

88/29 Nareah K. mALAOTRA.Christian PINSON andArun K. JAIN

88/30 Catherine C. ECKELand theo VERMAELEN

88/31 Sumantra CHOSHAL andChristopher BARTLETT

88/32 Kesrl FERDOVS andDavid SACKRIDER

88/33 Mihkel M. TOMBAK



88/36 Viltss TIBREVALA andBruce BUCHANAN

88/37 Murugappo KRISIINANLars-Hendrik RÔLLER



88/40 Jose( LAKONISHOK andTheo VERMAELEN


88/42 Paul EVANS

88/43 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE

88/44 Essam MAHMOUD andSpyros MAKRIDAKIS

88/45 Robert KORAJCZTXand Claude VIALLEt

88/46 Yves DOZ andAmy SHUEN

'Consumer cognitive conpleally and thedimensionality of multidiaensionel scalingconf igurations', May 1988.

"The financial fallout from Chernobyl: riskperceptions and regulatory response. May 1988.

'Creation, adoption, and diffusion ofinnovations by subsidiaries of multinationalcorporations • , June 1988.

'International manufacturing: positioningplants for success', June 1988.

'The importance of flexibility inmanufacturing', June 1988.

' Plexibility: an important dimension Inmanuf•cturing', June 1988.

"A strategic enrayais of investeent in flexiblemanufaeturing syste■s', July 1988.

' A Predictive Test of the MtiO Model thatControls for Non-stationarity', lune 1988.

'Regulating Price-Liability Coapetition Tolaprove Velfere, July 1988.

' The Motiviting Rale of Envy ; A PorgottenFactor in Management, April 811.

"The Leader as Mirror : Clinicat Reflections",July 1988.

'Anoaalous price behavior •round repurchasetender offere. August 1988.

"Assymetry in the ems, intentional orsystemict", August 1988.

"Organizational development in thetransnational enterprise'. June 1988.

'Croup décision support systems iaplementBayesian rationalite. September 1988.

'The state of the art and future directionsin coabining forecaste, September 1988.

'An eapirical investigation of international&s'et pricing'. November 1986. revised August1988.

' Froa Intent to outcone: a process iranevorkfor partnerships', August 1988.

88/13 Manfred KETS DE VRIES 'Alexithymia in organisational lite: theorganisation man revistted • , February 1988.

88/28 Sumantra GROSRAL and

'The multinational corporation as • netvork:C. A. 11ARTLETT pe-epectives tram interorgantrational theory',

v.„ IORA

89/01 Joyce K. BYRER andTavfik JELASSI

89/02 Louis A. LE BLANCand Tavfik JELASSI

89/03 Beth H. JONES andTavfik JELASSI

89/04 Kasra FERDOVS andArnoud DE MEYER

89/05 Martin KILDUFP andReinhard ANGELMAR

89/06 Mihkel M. TONBAK andB. SINCLAIR-DESCAGNE

89/07 Damien J. NEVEN

89/08 Arnoud DE MEYER andRenaut SCHOTTE

89/09 Damien NEVEN,Carmen MATUTES andMarcel CORSTJENS

89/10 Nathalie DIERKENS,Bruno GERARD andPierre BILLION

"The impact of language theories on DSSdialog", January 1989.

"DSS software melectiont e multiple eriteriadecisical meth°40101tY". January 1989.

«Negotiation supports tbe affects of eonputerintervention end confit« levai on bergainingoutcome", January 1989."Lastleg improvement 1* manufacturingperformance: In seareb of a nev theory",January 1989.

"Shared history or sbared culturel The affectsof tins, culture, and performance oninstitutionaliratioo ta simulatedorganisations", January 1989.

"Coordinating menufacturing and businessstrategles: I", February 1989.

"Structural adjustment in European retailbanking. Some viev from industrialorganisation", January 1989.

'Trends in tbe development of technology andtheir effects on the production structure inthe European Gammumity", January 1989.

"Brand proliferation and entry deterrence",February 1989.

"A market based approach to the valuation ofthe assets in place and the grouthopportunities of the fine, December 1988.

88/47 Alain BULTEZ,Els GIJSBRECHTS,Philippe NAERT andPlet VANDEN ABEELE

88/48 Michael BURDA

88/49 Nathalie DIERKENS

88/50 Rob VEITZ andArnoud DE MEYER

88/51 Rob VEITZ

"Asymmetrie cannibalism betveen substitut•items llated by retailers", September 1988.

' Reflections on 'Vait unemployment' inEurope, II", April 1988 revised September 1988.

"Information asymmetry and equity issues•,September 1988.

"Managing expert systems: from inceptionthrough updating", October 1987.

'Technology, vork, and the organisation: theImpact of expert systems", July 1988.

88/63 Fernando NASCIMENFOand Vilfrled R.VANHONACKER

88/64 Kasra PERDOVS

88/65 Arnoud DE MEYERand Kasra FERDOVS

88/66 Nathalie DIERKENS

88/67 Paul S. ADLER andKasra FERDOVS

"Strategic pricing of differentiated consumerdurables in • dynaste duopoly: m numerienlanalysis", October 1988.

"Chartiug strategic roles for internationalfactories", December 1988.

"Quality up, technology dovo", October 1988.

"A discussion of exact masures of informationassymetry: the example of Nyers and NajlufBodel or the importance of the .aset structureof the firme', December 1988.

"The chief technology officer", December 1988.

88/52 Susan SCHNEIDER and

"Cognition and organizational analynis:Reinhard ANGELMAR 'Binding the store?", September 1988. 1989


88/54 Lars-Hendrik RÔLLERand Mihkel M. TOMBAK

88/55 Peter 8OSSAERTSand Pierre MILLION

88/56 Pierre BILLION

88/57 Vilfrled VANHONACKERand Lydie PRICE

88/58 8. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNEand Mihkel M. TOMBAK

88/59 Martin KILDUFF

88/60 Michael BURDA

88/61 Lars-Hendrik RÔLLER

88/62 Cynthia VAN BULLE,Theo VERNAELEN andPaul DE VOUTERS

"Vhateser happened to the philosopher-king: theleader's addiction to pover, September 1988.

"Strategic choke of flexible productiontechnologies and velfare implications",October 1988

"Nethod of nommants teste of contingent claiesesse[ pricing models", October 1988.

"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation ofthe random valk hypothesis: Additionalempirical evidence and implication for testsof asset pricing models", June 1988.

« Data transferability: estimating the responseaffect of future events based on historicalanalogy", October 1988.

"Assessing economic inequality", November 1988.

"The interpersonal structure of decisionmaking: a social comparison approach toorganizational choice", November 1988.

• ■ismatch really the problem? Some estimatesof the Chelvood Gate II modal vith US data",September 1988.

"Modelling colt structure: the Bell Systenrevisited", November 1988.

"Regulation, taxes and the market for corporatecontrol in Belgium", September 1988.

89/27 David KRACKEARM andMartin KILDUPP

89/28 Martin RILDUFP

89/14 Reinhard ANCELIIAR

89/29 Robert COCIL andJean-Claude LARRECHE

89/30 Lars-Bandrik ROUERand Mihkel M. TOMHAK

89/31 Michael C. BURDA andStefan GERLACH

89/32 Peter BAUD andTavfik JELASSI

89/15 Reinhard ANCELNAR

89/16 Vilfried VANHONACICER,Donald LEHMANN andFarcin. SULTAN

"Friendship patterns and cultural attributions:the control of organisational diversite,April 1989

"The interpersonal structure of decisionmaking: a social comportant: approach toorganisstional choice", Revised April 1989

"The battlefield for 1992: product strengthand geographic coverege", May 1989

"Compatition and Investment in FlexibleTechnologies• , May 1989

"Durables and the US Trade Deficit", May 1989

"Application and *veinette° of a .ulti-criteriadecision support system for the dynsaicselection of U.S. manufacturing locations*,May 1989

89/11 Manfred KeTS DE VRIES "Understanding the leader-strategy interface:and Alain NOEL applicatloa o1 the •trategic relationship

lot aechod', rebruary 1989.

89/12 Wilfried VAMIONACKF./1 •Istlaatlog dynanic response *ode', when thedota are subject to di ((exeat temporalaggregatIon", January 1989.

89/13 Manfred RETS DE VRIES "The lapostor syndrome: ■ disquletingober/amas/a ln organixat tonal lire'. FebruarY1989.

' Product Innovation: • tool for coepetitiveadvantage', Match 1989.

"[valu/dies • tire', DrodUct innovationperformance • , March 1989.

"Comblaing related and sparse data ln Ilnearregressloo modela'. February 1989.

89/17 Cilles AMADO,Claude FAUCHEUX andAndré LAURENT

89/18 Srinivasan SALAM.-RISIINAN andMitchell KOLA

89/19 VIIIrled VANVONACKER,Donald LE MAN» andFareena SULTAN

89/20 Vilfried VAMMONACKERand Russell VINER

89/21 Arnoud de NEYER andKsar& FEROOVS

89/22 Manfred RETS DE VRIESand Sydney PERZOV

89/23 Robert KORAJCZYK andClaude VIALLET

89/24 Martin KILDUFF andNitchel ABOLAFIA

89/25 Roger BETANCOURT andDavid CAUTSCHI

89/26 Charles REAN,Edmond mALINVAUD.Peter BERNHOLZ.Francesco CIAVAllIand Charles VTPU7SZ

"Changement organisationnel et réalitésculturelles/ contrastes franco-Américains•,March 1989.

"Information arynnetry, market (allure andjoInt-ventures: theory and evidence.Match 1989

oCoablaing related and 'perse dote In Ilnear'agression modela',Revised Match 1989

"A ratier/al rende. behavior Bodel of choke'.Revised Ranch 1989

"Influence of menvfacturIng isprovenentprogrames on performance • , Aprli 1989

'10vat 1s the cola of rharacter InpsYchoaneysisT April 1989

"Squity risk priais and the pricing of forelgn«change tisk" April 1989

' The social destruction of reelity:Organisations' confli t ' as social draeà'April 1989

'Tvo essentiel characteristics of retellmarkets and [heir econo•ic consequences'March 1989

' Placroeconomic policies for 1992: thetransition and dater', April 1989

89/33 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESCACNB

89/34 Sumantra GROSEAL andNit tin NOIIRIA

89/35 Jean DERMINE andPierre BILLION

89/36 Martin KILDUFF

89/37 Manfred RETS DE VRIES

89/38 Manfrd RETS DB VRIES

89/39 Robert KORAJCZYK andClaude T1ALLET

89/40 Balaji CHAKRAVARITY

89/41 B. SINCLAIR-DBSCACNEand Nathalie DIERKENS

89/42 Robert ANSON andTavfik JELASSI

89/43 Michael BORDA

89/44 Balaji CBARRAVARTBIand Peter LORANCE

89/45 Rob VEITZ andArnoud DE MEYER

"Design fie:1611117 la aomptioalaticindustries", May 1989

negalsite varlety versas abared values:mammies corporate-dfulgion relationahips inthe M-Fora orgentsatine, May 1989

•Deposit rate celllngs mmd the market value ofbanks: the case of Prame 1971-1981", May 1989

"A dispositlonal appromek to social netvorks:the case of organisations/ choke", May 1989

*The organisations/ foot: balancine s leader'shubrisv , May 1989

"The CHO blues*, June 1989

*An empirical investigation of international«set pricing", (Revised June 1989)

"Management systems for innovation andproductivity", June 1989

°The strategic supply of precisione, June 1989

°A develop.eot framevork for computer-supportedconflict resolutionn , July 1989

"A note on firing coite and ce benefitsin equilibrium unemployment°, June 1989

•Strategic adaptation in multi-business firms",June 1989

•itanaging expert systems: n franevork and casestudy", June 1989

89/46 Marcel CORSTJENS,Carmen MATUTES andDamien NEVEM

"Entry Encouragement", July 1989

89/47 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "The global dimension in leadership andand Christine MEAD organization: issues and controversies".

April 1989

89/48 Damien NEVEN and

Lars-Hendrik ROLLER"European integration and trade flous",

August 1989

89/49 Jean DERMINE "Home country control and mutual recognition",July 1989

89/50 Jean DERMINE "The specialization of financial institutions,

the BEC modal", August 1989

89/51 Spyros MAKRIDARIS "Sliding simulation: a nev approach to time

series forecasting", July 1989

shortening development cycle times: a … · market introduction is clearly not a challenge for the...

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