shopping for truth pluralism: on ontological...

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Will Gamester – [email protected] August 2018

Shopping for Truth Pluralism: On Ontological Motivations

Abstract: This paper provides something of a shopper’s guide to truth pluralism, by providing a critical but

sympathetic investigation of the principle motivations given in its favour. Pluralists hold that different regions

of discourse – e.g., scientific, mathematical, normative, institutional – are true in different ways. The principle

arguments for truth pluralism have thus far been derived from ontological premises: it is because different

discourses are concerned with such different kinds of thing – e.g., the physical world vs. numbers vs. normative

properties vs. the socially constructed world – that we should think that they are true in different ways. I offer

a detailed critique of the most developed versions of this argument, due to Douglas Edwards (2018) and Michael

Lynch (2009), determining its limitations as thus far developed, and indicating where, if anywhere, compelling

arguments may lie.

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1. Truth, Pluralism, Realism, Anti-Realism

Many people, I’d wager, would agree that (1)-(5) are true (given requisite familiarity with the

concepts and entities involved):

(1) Felix (the cat) is furry.

(2) Lexy (the electron) is negatively charged.

(3) 7 is prime.

(4) Torturing children is wrong.

(5) Prince William is married.

Supposing that they are all true – that there is a property, truth, that (1)-(5) all exemplify – we

might ask after the nature of this property. What truth consists in is, historically, one of the great

philosophical questions.1 And given our purposes here, the parties in the traditional debate about the

nature of truth can be usefully split into two groups.

On the one hand, we have Representational theories. According to Representationalists,

potential “truthbearers” – sentences, propositions, or beliefs – represent the world as being a

particular way. A truthbearer is then true just in case how it represents the world corresponds to how

the world, in fact, is. Thus (1) represents the world as one in which Felix is furry, and it is true just in

case Felix is, in fact, furry. Different Representational theories will disagree about the nature of the

representation or correspondence relation (what it is for a truthbearer to represent the world as thus-

and-so) or the nature of its relata. For instance, some theories may have it that the “worldly” relatum

is a fact or a state of affairs that obtains, which the truthbearer as a whole corresponds to. Others

endorse a compositional approach, in which the components of the truthbearer represent various

entities. E.g., the singular term ‘Felix’ represents a particular cat, Felix, and the predicate ‘is furry’

represents a property, furriness; (1) is then true just in case the object that ‘Felix’ represents

exemplifies the property that ‘is furry’ represents. The crucial feature shared by all Representational

theories is that the truthbearer’s being true depends on that putative part of the world that it

represents: on the world being as the truthbearer represents it as being.2

1 And thus, inevitably, has had its detractors as a well-formed question, or one to which we might have a substantial, interesting answer. Given our interests here, we can assume that the traditional dispute is in good standing: that truth is a “substantial”, interesting property, and that the right answer as to its nature will be an informative philosophical analysis in non-truthy terms. 2 For an excellent overview of Representational or “correspondence” theories of truth, see David (2016).




By way of contrast, we can group together all those Non-Representational theories that do

not so understand the nature of truth. Prominent in this collection are, for instance, coherence

theories, according to which a truthbearer’s being true consists in its cohering with a specified class

of other truthbearers.3 There are also theories in the pragmatist tradition. Charles Peirce (1878)

understood truth in terms of convergence: what is true is what would be believed at the ideal limit of

inquiry. William James (1907), it seems, understood truth in terms of what was useful to believe. In

the verificationist tradition, one might understand truth in terms of verification or, more strongly,

proof. Or consider Crispin Wright’s (1992: 48) generalisation of the notion of a mathematical proof:

superassertibility. For (1) to be superassertible is, roughly, for there to be a state of information

accessible to a suitably receptive inquirer such that (1) is assertible in that state of information, and

(1) would remain assertible through any improvement to that state of information. Despite their

manifest differences, none of these theories appeals to a cat, Felix, or his state vis-à-vis furriness to

understand the truth of (1). Instead its truth is a matter of coherence, convergence, utility,

verification, proof, or superassertibility. Hence they are Non-Representational.

This, then, is the traditional battle: Representationalists (of many different, disagreeing sorts)

versus Non-Representationalists (of many different, disagreeing sorts). But underlying the traditional

dispute is a monistic assumption: that the nature of truth is uniform for all truthbearers. And there is

mounting interest in the view that this monistic assumption is mistaken: that while truth is

Representational for some truthbearers, it is Non-Representational for others.

Interest in truth pluralism, so understood,4 seems to have been sparked by the fact that many

of us find our intuitions more inclined towards realism or more inclined towards anti-realism

depending on the domain of inquiry in question. When it comes to the “medium-sized dry goods” of

everyday life or the posits of our best scientific theories, many of us are happy with realism: there are

such entities out there, getting on with things largely independent of us. As such, Representational

theories seem plausible: (1) and (2) represent the world as being a certain way, and they are true

because there are worldly entities out there that render them so.

But when it comes to mathematical objects like numbers, normative properties like

wrongness, or socially constructed things like marriage, many of us are inclined to be more suspicious.

The promise of Non-Representational theories is that they offer us a way of understanding how (3),

(4), and (5) are true that does not appeal to these suspicious entities. Perhaps (3) is true, not because

it represents a mathematical object as having a mathematical property, and there is such an object,

floating about somewhere, exemplifying that property; but because it is, say, superassertible (perhaps

3 See Walker (2001). 4 Our focus here is pluralism so described, but there are other theories that deserve the name.




in virtue of having been proven). In general, we might think that truth is Representational in

discourses concerned with domains of inquiry about which we are realists, but is Non-

Representational in discourses concerned with domains of inquiry about which we are anti-realists.5

Thus Crispin Wright, whose works galvanised the recent interest in pluralism, suggests that it

‘might contribute to a sharp explanation of the differential appeal of realist and anti-realist intuitions

about [different domains].’ (1998b: 58) But as far as motivation for the theory goes, there are at least

two good reasons, I think, that we should look beyond our domain-variable anti-/realist intuitions.

First, there are oodles of ways to understand the realism/anti-realism distinction that do not,

on the face of it, appeal to localised variation in the nature of truth. The anti-realist might be tempted

by error theory, or fictionalism – so there are no atomic truths, or no literal truths, within the

discourse. Or instead by the claim that the declarative sentences of a discourse function to express

motivational, desire-like states, rather than representational, belief-like states, as per expressivism or

“non-cognitivism”. And perhaps derivatively by the idea that the discourse is not truth-apt at all. Or

perhaps there are literal atomic truths in the discourse, but their truth is not absolute but merely

relative – to a person or culture or standard of taste, for instance.6 Or perhaps the entities or facts

they represent are mind-dependent, or “socially constructed”, or abstract, or less-than-fully-real in

some other sense. Each of these options, and more besides, holds some promise to explain our anti-

realist intuitions without, it seems, appealing to Non-Representationalism about truth. In short, truth

pluralism is born into a world of fierce theoretical competition of daunting historical pedigree. Why

prefer pluralism? Must we fight off all contenders?

Second, it’s not obvious why the localised anti-realist should be tempted by a localised Non-

Representationalism about truth per se. Suppose that ‘7 is prime’ is true in virtue of cohering or being

superassertible or whatever. If it is true that 7 is prime, then – by denominalisation – 7 is prime. So,

on the face of it, one is committed to there being a mathematical entity – the number 7 – that

exemplifies a mathematical property – being prime; and so to there being a mathematical fact – that

7 is prime. While one hasn’t appealed to mathematical entities or facts to explain how ‘7 is prime’

gets to be true, one’s commitment to the truth of the statement seems to commit one to the existence

of the relevant entities and facts nonetheless. One is then still saddled with the task of explaining the

nature of such entities.7 So to the extent that one’s anti-realism is motivated by some kind of

5 A note on terminology: ‘domains of inquiry’ are things like mathematics, chemistry, ethics, aesthetics; I use ‘discourses’ to refer to classes of truthbearers that are concerned with different domains of inquiry. Rendering rigorous these intuitive distinctions is a complicated business: see Lynch (2009: 78-82); Wyatt (2013), Edwards (2018: ch.4), and Gamester (ms-a). As such concerns are orthogonal to my own, I stick to paradigm cases here. 6 This might induce a kind of truth pluralism – e.g., assessment-sensitive truth vs. assessment-insensitive truth (Wyatt & Lynch 2016) – but it’s prima facie not of the kind we’re interested in here. 7 Consider, for instance, how odd it would be for someone to maintain, without pretence etc., that 7 is prime while denying that there are any prime numbers. This sounds incoherent. ‘Fa’ entails ‘∃xFx’.




scepticism about the entities of a given domain, it’s not obvious what benefits one has accrued via

Non-Representationalism alone.8

None of this is to argue that truth pluralism isn’t part of the best explanation of our domain-

variable realist and anti-realist intuitions. But the open-minded theorist would be rightly sceptical, at

this stage, if no more compelling reason for preferring this theoretical option could be found.

The most prominent attempts to find a more rigorous argument for pluralism thus far have

drawn from ontological premises: it is because the entities that different discourses are concerned

with are so very different (the physical world vs. numbers vs. normative properties vs. the socially

constructed world) that we should be pluralists. While some are objective, others are projected; while

some exist in one way, others exist in another; while some are mind-independent, others are mind-

dependent; while some are natural, others are non-natural; while some are concrete, others are

abstract. I here engage in a critical but sympathetic investigation of these motivations, focusing

especially on the arguments of Douglas Edwards (2018) and Michael Lynch (2009), to see how far they

can take us. I will argue that, as thus far formulated, the conclusions we are entitled to are rather

conditional and limited; but also aim to indicate what seem to be the most promising avenues of

approach.

The project is crucial. As pluralism draws increased attention, both friendly and unfriendly,

still remarkably little has been done to secure the theory on a solid foundation.9 This paper thus

contributes something of a shopper’s guide for the initiated and uninitiated alike. I do not intend for

the discussion to be definitive: there are avenues that will remain un(der)explored, either through lack

of space or imagination; and while I pick my own preferred way through the thicket, others may get

different mileage from different considerations. But my goal is to highlight what has, has not, and

needs to be done to find compelling motivation for pluralism on ontological grounds, and thus move

substantially beyond what has been provided in the literature to date.

To put some cards on the table. I am sympathetic with the pluralist project, but ultimately

sceptical that ontological differences between entities in different domains are the place to look for a

compelling motivation. I’m more optimistic that pluralism can be motivated by appeal to

representational differences between discourses. For instance, in more recent work, Lynch (2013a)

has suggested that metanormative expressivists, who hold that value judgements like (4) express

8 One’s anti-realism might be motivated by something else, of course; e.g., that one takes the truths in a domain of inquiry to be epistemically constrained (potentially knowable). But see fn.13. 9 Since the seminal work of Wright (esp. 1992), pluralism has received two book-length treatments (Lynch 2009; Edwards 2018), two edited volumes (Pedersen & Wright 2013; Pedersen et al. fc), at least three doctoral dissertations (Wyatt 2014; Gamester 2017; Kellen fc), and masses of articles. Besides the books and dissertations, to my knowledge only Ball (2017), Cotnoir & Edwards (2015), Lynch (2001; 2013a; 2015; fc), and perhaps Pedersen (2014) provide anything more than a cursory positive case for pluralism.




motivational, desire-like, states, should be Non-Representationalists about normative truth; an

argument I too have made (Gamester ms-b).10 Alternatively, Brian Ball (2017) suggests that truth is

Non-Representational in mathematical discourse because it is referentially indeterminate, while it is

Representational in discourses that are referentially determinate. Even if our motivation for these

representational differences is drawn from ontological premises (which it may not be), it is the

representational differences, not the ontological differences, that are taken to motivate truth

pluralism.11 But that’s as maybe. My goal here is to take the possibility of an ontological motivation

for truth pluralism as seriously as possible.

2. On Edwards

2.1 On Ontological Pluralism

Our focus in this section will be Edwards’s (2018) recent vital contribution to the debate. But

Edwards’s sophisticated view was prefigured in a paper co-authored with Aaron Cotnoir, and it will be

useful to first run through that paper’s argument, to get a sense of what an ontologically-driven

argument for truth pluralism looks like and the principle worries it faces.

The Cotnoir & Edwards (2015: 128-130) argument for truth pluralism is drawn from an

underlying ontological pluralism, cashed out as the view that the nature of existence varies between

different entities:

‘(Alexander’s Dictum) To exist is to have causal powers’ (2015: 119).

‘(Neo-Fregean Principle) To be is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in

a true sentence.’ (2015: 120)

The idea is that, while certain entities – especially “concrete” entities like tennis balls or the

Eiffel Tower – exist in virtue of having causal powers as per (AD), other entities – “abstract” entities

like numbers, for instance – exist in virtue of being the referent of a singular term in a true sentence

as per (NFP). Think, for instance, of the intuitionist view according to which mathematical entities are

10 This was hinted at by Wright (1998: 191); see also Lynch (2015; fc). 11 By contrast, as we will see below (fn. 16), Edwards suggests that moral expressivists should think that moral properties are projected, which motivates Non-Representationalism about moral truth. This is a representational difference motivating an ontological difference, but it is the ontological difference, for Edwards, that motivates truth pluralism.




constructed with the properties they have by proofs carried out by mathematicians. For such entities,

says Cotnoir & Edwards’s ontological pluralist, this is what their existence consists in.

Call the kind of existence captured by (AD), BEING1; and that captured by (NFP), BEING2. Given

this, Cotnoir & Edwards (2015: 128, lightly edited) offer the following argument for truth pluralism:

(I) BEING1 and BEING2 are equi-fundamental. Premise

(II) BEING1 grounds TRUTHi. Premise

(III) TRUTHj grounds BEING2. Premise

(IV) TRUTHi = TRUTHj. Assumption for reductio

(V) BEING1 grounds BEING2. From (II), (III), (IV), transitivity

of grounding

(VI) If x grounds y, then x is more fundamental than y. Definition of ‘grounding’

(VII) BEING1 is more fundamental than BEING2. From (V), (VI)

(VIII) Contradiction. From (I), (VII)

(IX) TRUTHi ≠ TRUTHj. Reductio from (I)-(VIII)

(III) follows from (NFP) as an account of the nature of existence. The ontological pluralist’s

rationale for (II), as best as I can extract it, is given below. Given (I), then, it seems the ontological

pluralist must reject (IV), which is just the monistic assumption that the nature of truth is uniform.

The picture is that what’s true sometimes depends on what’s out there, but what’s out there

sometimes depends on what’s true; and thus that the nature of truth is sometimes Representational

and sometimes Non-Representational.

Now, one might worry about the overall picture here. For (NFP) accounts for the existence of

certain entities in terms of certain true sentences. If these sentences are to be true, then they must

exist. What kind of existence do they have? If BEING2, then we’re off on a vicious regress. To stop

the regress, at least some of these sentences must have BEING1. But then all BEING2 looks like it is,

ultimately, grounded in BEING1.12

Nonetheless, even if we’re not entitled to the “equi-fundamentality” premise, we can readily

see how the argument for truth pluralism would proceed. Suppose Felix is our thing with BEING1, and

suppose that his furriness grounds some of the causal powers in virtue of which he exists. Plausibly,

Felix’s furriness then does not depend at all on our representing him as such. The truth of (1) does

12 Cotnoir & Edwards seem, at this point in the paper, to take the equi-fundamentality of BEING1 and BEING2 to be constitutive of ontological pluralism, in which the case the view collapses. But I think it’s dispensable.




not explain Felix’s furriness; instead, (1) is true in virtue of how the world is: because Felix exemplifies

the property of furriness. From here, it is a short step to a Representational theory of truth.

But now suppose that 7 is our mathematical object with BEING2 and suppose that (3) is the or

a true sentence in virtue of which it exists. If we were to try and account for the nature of (3) in

representational terms, then we would have to appeal to the number 7 and its properties, as the

“worldly” relatum. But this would be circular: we’re accounting for the existence of 7 in terms of (3),

and the truth of (3) in terms of the existence of 7. Thus, Non-Representationalism.

Setting aside any further details or quibbles about the argument as such, let me cut straight

to what I take to be the biggest worry for this kind of approach. Suppose that our preferred Non-

Representational account of truth for sentences like (3) is superassertibility. But now take the

principle (NFP*):

(NFP*) To be is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in a superassertible

sentence.

The worry is: from the truth pluralist’s own perspective, what could motivate (NFP) as an

account of the nature of existence over (NFP*)? (NFP*) does due diligence to ontological pluralism:

we can still think of the number 7 as existing in virtue of being constructed via a proof, for instance.

And by hypothesis it is extensionally adequate. But (NFP) is critical for the argument. Otherwise we

can just think of (3) as being true in virtue of correctly representing a constructed state of affairs.

(NFP*) is thus the theoretically conservative option: it does all the work (NFP) does, but without

engendering a bifurcation in the nature of truth.

One possible objection to (NFP*) is that other sentences, like those concerning the furriness

of cats, can be superassertible (or whatever) without the relevant entities existing. But both sides

agree that superassertibility is sometimes sufficient for existence (numbers), but sometimes not (cats).

This is just a commitment of the ontological pluralism. And while the advocate of (NFP) will maintain

that it is only when superassertibility is truth that it is sufficient for existence, the advocate of (NFP*)

will maintain that this gets the order of explanation the wrong way around. It is because

superassertibility is only sufficient for existence in some cases that in those cases the sentences are

true.

Similarly, one might hold that (NFP) is necessary because truth somehow demands existence

in a way that mere superassertibility does not. But “demands” in what sense? It cannot be a

metaphysical demand, for it is no part of the nature of truth that the singular term has a referent if

truth is Non-Representational. It could be “conceptual” or “analytic”. But the advocate of (NFP*) can




just agree: if truth is always Representational, then reference (and hence existence) is necessary for

truth. Again, (NFP*) just puts the order of explanation the other way around.

In sum, it is difficult to see what could motivate (NFP) over its alethically innocent counterpart.

Once we have the pluralism out there in reality, it’s not clear why we would need the pluralism in the

nature of truth too. Truth pluralism appears to be a theoretical spinning wheel.13

2.2 On Objective and Projected Properties

In his recent work, Edwards’s (2018) provides a new, “strong” argument for truth pluralism,

based not on ontological pluralism, but on the ontological status of different properties. Let us get a

grip on the structure of the argument first. Edwards’s truthbearers of interest are (utterances of)

sentences, especially those of atomic singular-term-plus-predicate ‘a is F’ form. We assume that

predicates, like ‘is F’, ascribe properties, like F-ness. Given a particular predicate, Edwards (2018: 67)

says that we can distinguish three options for the property it ascribes: (a) it is objective; (b) it is

projected; or (c) there isn’t one. (c) is an error-theoretical option we will now set aside.

What is it for a property to be objective or projected? Edwards explicates this via the following

biconditional:

‘(P) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff the object referred to by

‘a’ has the property referred to by ‘F’.’ (2018: 68)

A property, F-ness, is objective iff there is a left-to-right order of explanatory dependence on

(P): any particular object, a, falls under the predicate ‘F’ because it has the property of F-ness. F-ness

is projected iff if there is a right-to-left order of explanatory dependence on (P): a has the property of

F-ness because it falls under the predicate ‘F’. More on this contrast later.

13 A similar thought applies to the idea that the truths are epistemically constrained in a discourse (fn. 8). If mathematical facts, e.g., are constructed by us using proofs, then presumably they are knowable. That is, the truths being epistemically constrained is a symptom of the nature of mathematical facts, not mathematical truth. In a similar spirit, Pedersen (2014) has suggested that, if mathematical intuitionism is correct, then the mathematical domain might be “metaphysically incomplete”, in the sense that some state of affairs might fail to either obtain or not obtain, since it might at present be neither proven nor refuted. He also suggests that truth pluralists only endorse Representationalism when the domain is metaphysically complete. But he provides no reason at all to think that Representationalism is incompatible with metaphysical incompleteness. (NB The principles (SCOM) and (N-EQ) that appear in the argument at (2014: 267-8) presuppose this contention.)




Assume, then, that there is at least one objective and at least one projected property: FO and

FP respectively. This is our ontological foundation. The argument to truth pluralism is as follows (2018:

84-8). Take the following biconditionals (2018: 84-5), and suppose them all to be true:

(FT) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff ‘F’ is true of the object

referred to by ‘a’.

(TO) ‘F’ is true of the object referred to by ‘a’ iff ‘a is F’ is true.

(TP) ‘a is F’ is true iff the object referred to by ‘a’ has the property referred to by ‘F’.

Edwards argues that we can get a left-to-right explanatory dependence on (TP) when the

property is objective, but a right-to-left explanatory dependence on (TP) when the property is

projected, via (FT) and (TO).

Suppose that a1 has the property referred to by ‘FO’. Since FO is objective, by (P) this explains

why a1 falls under the predicate ‘FO’. Given (FT), this in turn explains why ‘FO’ is true of a1; and given

(TO), this explains why ‘a1 is FO’ is true. Assuming the transitivity of explanation here, ‘a1 is FO’ is true

because the object referred to by ‘a1’ has the property referred to by ‘FO’ (i.e., because a1 is FO); which

is just an instance of (TP) with a left-to-right order of explanatory dependence.

But suppose instead that a2 has the property referred to by ‘FP’. Since FP is projected, by (P)

this is because a2 falls under the predicate ‘FP’. This leaves us with the question of why a2 falls under

the predicate ‘FP’. Given (FT), Edwards suggests we appeal to ‘FP’ being true of a2; but why is ‘FP’ true

of a2? Given (TO), we might say it is because ‘a2 is FP’ is true. Again, given the transitivity of explanation

here, we can thus say that the object referred to by ‘a2’ has the property referred to by ‘FP’ (i.e., a2 is

FP) because ‘a2 is FP’ is true. This is just an instance of (TP) with a left-to-right order of explanatory

dependence.

So, if F is objective, then the truth of the sentence ‘a is F’ is dependent on how things stand

with regards to a and F-ness, as per Representational theories of truth. But if F is projected, then how

things stand with regards to a and F-ness is dependent on whether or not ‘a is F’ is true, which is

contrary to Representational theories of truth. Therefore, if there is some exemplified objective

property and some exemplified projected property (e.g., some ‘a1 is FO’ is true and some ‘a2 is FP’ is

true), then the nature of truth is sometimes Representational, and sometimes Non-Representational.

We get an argument for truth pluralism given a certain ontological diversity: that there are objective

and projected properties.

Progress. Note, however, what the argument requires. Granted, by definition we cannot

explain why a2 falls under ‘FP’ in terms of a2’s being FP given that FP is projected. So we need some




other explanation. Edwards’s proposal – that we explain this via ‘FP’ being true of a2, and ultimately

in terms of ‘a2 is FP’ being true – is a sensible and intriguing one, but Edwards goes so far as to suggest

that the idea that truth ‘is dependent on predicate satisfaction, is compatible only with the [objective]

conceptions of properties… and not with the [projected] one.’ (2018: 86) This is too hasty. For all

that’s been said, there may be some other explanation of why a2 is in the extension of ‘FP’. This

becomes more pressing when we notice the limitations of Edwards’s proposal. Note, for instance,

that Edwards requires that we have a singular term for every entity x in the extension of ‘FP’, otherwise

there is no sentence ‘x is FP’ to be true.14 That there are rival explanations is acknowledged in a

footnote (2018: 88, fn.2), where Edwards says of a rival inferentialist view that ‘one would need to

show that this is the best way to understand the operation of these predicates.’ But an opponent

might reasonably press this very concern against Edwards’s proposal, given both its limitations and

import.

Nonetheless, supposing that this is the best explanation of why entities exemplify projected

properties, then we have a compelling argument for truth pluralism from objective and projected

properties. Structurally, then, the argument is reasonably compelling. But qua motivation for

pluralism, what matters is whether or not there are both objective and projected properties. To

consider this, we need to make things more concrete.

It is highly plausible that there are objective properties. The reason that iron falls under ‘is

metallic’ is because it is metallic. Of course, this isn’t a complete explanation: we also need an

metasemantic explanation of why ‘is metallic’ ascribes being metallic. After all, if ‘is metallic’ ascribed

the property of being invisible, then iron would not fall under ‘is metallic’, though it would still be

metallic.

However, I’ve found that it’s much more difficult to find a plausible example of a projected

property, in Edwards’s sense. Recall that for a property, F-ness, to be projected requires that any

object a that is F is F because it falls under the predicate ‘F’. The most plausible contender, I think, is

being in the extension of this predicate. If any object is in the extension of this predicate, then trivially

it is so because it is in the extension of this predicate; i.e., because it is in the extension of ‘is in the

extension of this predicate’. But I doubt that there are any such objects, and thus no true instance of

‘x is in the extension of this predicate’.

But what other property might be like this? Edwards suggests:

14 If we shifted from sentences to propositions with concepts as constituents, we’d have to think of concepts as something like abstract entities, rather than mental particulars, to avoid an analogue of this problem.




‘One example here is the property of being cool: motorbikes have the property of being cool

because motorbikes fall under the predicate of ‘is cool’; rather than vice versa.’ (2018: 68)

But this, I submit, is simply false. If motorbikes are cool, then what makes them cool is

presumably the way they look, the sound they make, the freedom they give you, the associated

clothing, the kind of person who rides them, and that sort of thing. Falling within the extension of a

predicate – even the predicate ‘is cool’ – is not the kind of thing that makes something cool.15

Now, one might concede the general point while suggesting that falling under ‘is cool’ is still

part of the explanation that it is cool. But why think this? For one thing, the other factors are plainly

necessary and sufficient qua explanation (if they weren’t sufficient, being in the extension of the

predicate could hardly tip the balance; let alone if there were no other factors). For another, we might

imagine that the word that happens to ascribe coolness is manifestly uncool, perhaps being difficult

to say or ugly-sounding, e.g., ‘is phlarnckipeul’. There’s nothing cool about falling within the extension

of that predicate. But thinking coolness is projected rules the very possibility of an uncool ‘cool’

predicate.

A less frivolous example. At various points, Edwards suggests that moral properties might be

projected. The suggestion, then, is that what makes torturing innocent children wrong is that it falls

within the extension of the predicate ‘is wrong’. But this is perverse. It is, inter alia, the cruelty and

suffering involved that makes it wrong, not falling within the extension of a predicate. There’s nothing

wrong with that (consider: ‘is wrong’ might have meant something else). And Edwards’s

concentration on linguistic representation has the prima facie absurd consequence that nothing would

be wrong with torturing innocent children if we didn’t have a word to ascribe wrongness: if we all

forgot it, say, or if we’d just never come up with one, perhaps because we were all grotesquely

amoral.16

It is useful to consider an example from Nelson Goodman here, concerning constellations:

‘Has a constellation been there as long as the stars that composed it, or did it come into being

when selected and designated? … [If the former, then d]oes this mean that all configurations

of stars whatever are always constellations whether or not picked out and designated as such?

15 I guess it is quite cool to fall within the extension of a predicate in general, simply because the phenomenon of linguistic representation is pretty cool. But my point, I take it, is clear enough. 16 According to Edwards (2018: 67-9), moral expressivists like Blackburn (1993: 181) and Gibbard (2006) that are happy to say that there are moral properties are committed to them being projected. Blackburn does notoriously talk of “projection”, but it is precisely for the kinds of reasons covered in the text that Blackburn (2010) now thinks that talk of “projection” was misleading. Expressivists are typically at pains to emphasise that expressivism does not entail that morality is mind-dependent. See e.g. Blackburn (2010), Köhler (2014), Schroeder (2014).




I suggest that to say that all configurations are constellations is to say that none are: that a

constellation becomes such only through being chosen from among all configurations, much

as a class becomes a kind only through being distinguished, according to some principle, from

other classes.’ (Goodman 1996: 156)

Goodman’s thought is that for a configuration of stars to exemplify the property of being a

constellation requires that it is first “picked out and designated as such” by us.17 If Goodman is right,

does that make being a constellation a projected property in Edwards’s sense? Only if being “selected

and designated” as a constellation requires that we have some word ascribing the property of being

a constellation; but that’s not obvious. Suppose that the first constellations were named by two

people star-gazing one night, pointing out groups of stars that looked to them like familiar things:

“That’s the Big Dipper!”, “That’s Orion!”, “That’s the Great Bear!” Now we have three constellations.

But there’s no reason to think our pair would have to have a word (or even a concept) specifically for

the general property of being a constellation; they might only come up with such a word when they

sit back and reflect on what they were doing, and if they want a general term for their named

configurations of stars. The problem is that Edwards’s conception of projection is very particular. In

general – and this is an important lesson – we can think that a property is dependent on us and our

representations in some (highly) significant sense without being committed to this specific kind of

linguistic dependence.18

Similar objections apply to Edwards’s other purportedly projected properties, which are

primarily properties that are plausibly socially constructed; e.g., being the Governor of New York or

being a woman (2018: 72-3). Now, perhaps a natural response for Edwards is to maintain that the

kinds of thing that I’ve said explain why something is, say, cool in fact explain why it falls under the

predicate ‘cool’, which in turn explains why it is cool. In the spirit of his overall theory, he might say

that how motorbikes look, sound, etc., is what makes ‘motorbikes are cool’ true (perhaps because

they make it superassertible or coherent or whatever), which explains why motorbikes fall under

‘cool’, which in turn explains why they are cool. But while coherent, it’s difficult to see what the

independent motivation for this might be; on the face of it, the additional cogs in the explanatory

machinery look redundant.

17 Goodman thinks this principle extends to any kind, but it is plausible for constellations. 18 I intentionally move back-and-forth between talk of explaining why something is F and talk of explaining why something has the property of F-ness. If we wanted to make use of this distinction to defend projected properties we would have to deny that something that is F necessarily has the property of F-ness (and not because we’re sceptical of the existence of properties).




Moreover, the notion of projected properties might be problematic on its own terms.

Suppose a’s coolness is explained by its falling under ‘cool’. But now we define a new predicate, ‘is

hip’, which just means the same as ‘is cool’. Is a now cool in virtue of falling under ‘hip’? Is its coolness

thus overdetermined? Or, as coolness is gradable, could a now be more cool; and could we make it

cooler and cooler by defining more predicates? Alternatively, if we read the ‘because’ here as being

one of metaphysical explanation – of what being cool consists in – then it seems that we get a brand

new property for each predicate (hipness, etc.). So no two predicates can ascribe the same property,

wreaking havoc with our semantics.

2.3 On Sparse and Abundant Properties

Given these kinds of worries, one might well expect a substantive defence from Edwards, but

he provides very little defence of projected properties per se. The reason is quite straightforward.

Edwards maintains that the distinction between objective and projected properties ‘broadly

correspond[s] to the distinction between sparse and abundant properties’ (2018: 68), and he takes

this distinction to be well-motivated. Our questions become: what is this distinction and why think

the two “broadly correspond”?

On an abundant conception of properties, any (consistent) predicate whatsoever ascribes a

property, no matter how gerrymandered those entities in its extension. If we define the predicate 'is

quurkey' as: for any x, x is quurkey iff (x is a quark or x is a turkey), then 'is quurkey' ascribes the

property of quurkeyness; despite the fact that, intuitively at least, there is no genuine similarity that

just the quarks and turkeys have in common. On a sparse conception of properties, by contrast,

properties ground genuine similarities between entities and are of causal-explanatory

significance. Being a quark is a property, as is being a turkey; but quurkeyness, no. One problem with

a sparse conception of properties, for Edwards, is that we have to deny that some predicates ascribe

properties, which leaves us in need of a semantic value for those predicates. But on an abundant

conception of properties, we cannot make sense of the difference between a causal-explanatorily

significant property like being a quark and a gerrymandered property like being quurkey. Thus

Edwards (2018: 35), taking his lead from David Lewis (1983), endorses a pluralistic approach: there

are sparse and abundant properties. Some predicates ascribe sparse properties ('is a quark'), others

merely abundant ('is quurkey').

Do merely abundant properties provide plausible examples of projected properties? Not

obviously. If Gobbles is quurkey, then the complete explanation of why Gobbles is quurkey is that he




is a turkey (or that he is a quark, if he is a quark). There is, on the face of it, no explanatory role for

his falling under ‘quurkey’ to play here. Why, then, think that the distinctions line up?

We've thus far said nothing about what sparse and abundant properties are, except that

sparse properties ground genuine similarities and are causal-explanatorily significant, while abundant

properties do/are not. Edwards (2018: 37) is avowedly neutral on whether sparse properties are best

understood as universals, tropes, or natural classes. But when it comes to abundant properties,

Edwards foregrounds "predicate nominalism":

‘On this view, there are properties insofar as there are extensions of predicates: to have the

property of being red is to be in the extension of 'red' ... On this view, properties are taken to

be abundant: there are as many properties as there are extensions of predicates ... On this

view of properties, it is not the case that an object is in the extension of a predicate 'is F'

because it has the property of being F; rather the object has the property of being F because

it falls under the predicate 'is F'.’ (Edwards 2018: 34-5)

Suppose one thinks that all and only the (abundant) properties there are correspond to all and

only the predicates we have: an object has the property of being F just in case it is within the extension

of the predicate ‘is F’. Now, to avoid the truth of this biconditional being a massive and ever-evolving

coincidence, where properties happen to pop in and out of existence depending on what predicates

we happen to have, one ought to endorse the projective reading of (P). This is predicate nominalism.

From the moment he introduces the notion of abundant properties, then, Edwards has the generative

predicate nominalist view in mind; and in general (e.g., 2018: 86), he talks as though any conception

of abundant properties is committed to abundant properties being projected. Call this, abundance-

projectivism.

However, the kind of worries raised above might make us sceptical of predicate nominalism,19

and as Edwards’s notes in a footnote to the quote above, predicate nominalism is not the only game

in town. The class nominalist, for instance, maintains that any class of entities share a property:

abundant properties are classes. An object can be a member of the class of quarks and turkeys without

there being a predicate ascribing the property of quurkeyness; as indeed Gobbles was until earlier on

today. In which case, the alignment breaks down.

19 Predicate nominalism faces serious worries (e.g., Armstrong 1978: ch.2; Edwards 2014: ch.5.2) but (i) so do other theories of properties; and (ii) these are normally levelled against predicate nominalism as a monistic theory of properties, rather than as part of a pluralistic theory. So I won’t bother running through independent objections here.




Strikingly, in a footnote when he introduces the objective/projected distinction, Edwards

suggests that abundance-projectivism

‘still applies if we are thinking about properties as classes, and classes as mind-

independent. This is because, even if there is a vast number of classes, we still need to make

sense of a predicate selecting a particular class, and thus having the particular extension it

does, which will be dependent on our practices.’ (2018: 68, fn.12)

But the reasoning here is difficult to follow. As mentioned above, when it comes to predicates

and properties, one salient class of questions is metasemantic: we can ask of a particular predicate

why it ascribes the particular property it does (e.g., why ‘metallic’ ascribes metallicness; why ‘quurkey’

ascribes quurkeyness). If this is what Edwards means by ‘mak[ing] sense of a predicate selecting a

particular class’, then he is presumably correct that the answer to this question will often enough

mention our practices. But this question must be kept separate from the question of why an object

exemplifies a property: why iron is metallic; or Gobbles is quurkey. That we explain the meaning of

‘quurkey’ by reference to our practices does not make Gobbles’s being quurkey dependent on us, any

more than our doing so for ‘metallic’ makes iron’s being metallic dependent on us. The answers might

be connected – e.g., if predicate nominalism is true – but we cannot presuppose this.

So the alignment between abundance and projection is based on a highly controversial

understanding of the nature of abundant properties. Now, perhaps predicate nominalism is just the

best option here; if so, Edwards has shown how to leverage the distinction between sparse and

abundant properties into an argument for truth pluralism, which is a vital contribution indeed.20 For

my money, however, the problems faced by projected properties alone give us reason to be sceptical

of any view of abundant properties that entails abundance-projectivism. And without that, the

argument cannot get started.

3. On Lynch

3.1 On Causal Representationalism

We will return to Edwards’s contribution below, but for now we’ll look elsewhere to see if we

can find the beginnings of a new way forward.

20 Though it is unusual to think that e.g. normative, mathematical, or socially constructed properties in particular are abundant. Edwards’s further reasoning here is that such properties have narrow cosmological role, which he takes to be a sign of abundance, and hence projection. This is discussed below.




The broad issue we’ve encountered hitherto has concerned the motivation for thinking that,

in certain cases, how things stand with regards to some state of affairs – like 7’s being prime – depends

specifically on the truth of (3). Even if 7’s being prime is dependent on us, or even (3), in some way,

why go in for that order of explanation? Why not say that (3) is true in virtue of representing some

fact that depends on us, or (3), in some way?

An intriguing suggestion is put forward here by Michael Lynch (2009). Lynch’s key move is to

suggest that a plausible Representationalism about truth ought to be understood in a particular way,

and that – given certain ontological assumptions about e.g. mathematical, institutional, or moral

entities – this account is restricted in scope: it cannot be correct for certain regions of discourse.

Hence the need for Non-Representationalism.

Lynch’s primary truthbearers of interest are beliefs composed of concepts, which I’ll denote

with angle-brackets: <furry> is the concept of furriness.21 According to Lynch (2009: 22-32),

Representationalism about truth finds its plausible contemporary guise in theories of representation.

A theory of representation will tell you what it is for <Felix> to represent Felix and <furry> to represent

furriness; the belief that Felix is furry is then true just in case the object that <Felix> represents

exemplifies the property that <furry> represents; i.e., iff Felix is furry. Lynch (2009: 25) presents us

with a toy version of such a theory, which I’ve adapted for our example:

CAUSAL: <furry> denotes furriness = instances of furriness cause, under appropriate

conditions, mental tokenings of <furry>.

The broad thought is that my concept <furry> represents furriness because, other things being

equal, seeing something furry tends to make me think, ‘Blimey, that’s furry’ (rather than, say, ‘Blimey,

that’s on fire’). It is because there is an appropriate causal relationship between the concept and the

property it represents.22 Non-Representationalism comes on the scene for Lynch because Causal

Representationalism cannot accommodate certain regions of discourse. CAUSAL has it that a concept

<G> represents G-ness by virtue of being causally responsive to G-ness.

‘But where responsiveness is not plausible – either because the [mental] states in question

aren’t appropriately causally responsive or because the external environment contains no Gs

that can be so causally responsive – then it is less likely that mental-states with G-ish content

21 Lynch primarily talks in terms of beliefs, only sometimes propositions. He also suggests (2009: 23) that the considerations apply mutatis mutandis to sentences. 22 Lynch (2009: 26) also considers a toy teleosemantic theory of representation, but we’ll stick to the causal example, since their implications are the same for our purposes.




have that content because they represent Gs. Some other explanation of their content

becomes more likely. And – to anticipate the central lesson – if we nonetheless wish to

maintain that the relevant mental states are true, some other account of what makes them

true must be pushed onto the field.’ (2009: 33)23

Lynch’s motivation for thinking that responsiveness is not plausible in certain regions of

discourse then appeals to the ontological status of the entities in some domains of inquiry: when the

entities are mind-dependent or abstract, for example, they cannot enter into the appropriate causal

relationship. But before considering these arguments, several key points that affect the overall

dialectic need to be addressed.

First, Lynch does not actually provide anything by way of argument for Causal

Representationalism. Instead, his strategy is to align this view with an outlook that is

‘widely accepted within philosophy and implicitly accepted by many cognitive scientists and

psychologists…

The over-arching research program of cognitive science takes it that the mind – that is, the

brain – is an organ part of whose function is to represent the world around it, so the organism

whose mind/brain it is can more successfully negotiate that world.’ (2009: 22)

But Lynch’s Causal Representationalism seems more controversial than he lets on. For

instance, concepts for Lynch are capable of entering into causal interactions – so presumably they are

mental particulars, rather than abstract objects or abilities, as other theories of concepts would have

it. If concepts are also components of beliefs, then beliefs must be structures composed out of mental

particulars. We might, for instance, think of concepts as like words in a language of thought (Fodor

1975), and beliefs as sentences stored in a “belief box”. Alternatively, if we take the standard line that

concepts are components of propositions, then propositions must be structures of mental particulars.

Perhaps, like Scott Soames (2010), we can think of propositions as being mental acts of predication.

These are all respectable positions, but highly controversial. My point is that, even granting the

widespread acceptance of the representational gloss on the “over-arching research program” of

cognitive science, Lynch’s causal interpretation of this program carries with it further substantive and

23 By ‘the [mental] states in question aren’t appropriately causally responsive’ to the external environment, I suspect that Lynch has in mind the expressivist (“non-cognitivist”) contention that certain sentences, like ‘Torturing children is wrong’ express motivational, desire-like states (e.g., disapproval of torturing children), rather than representational, belief-like states; which takes centre-stage in Lynch (2013a). As mentioned, this would be part of a representationally-driven, rather than ontologically-driven, argument for pluralism, which I thus pass over for present purposes.




controversial commitments. (Indeed, Lynch himself explicitly thinks that Causal Representationalism

isn’t plausible for certain regions of discourse; hence pluralism!) It would be surprising, to say the

least, to discover that any representational theory was committed to something like a language of

thought or a Soamesian view of propositions, for instance.

Setting this aside, some commentators have worried about the scope of CAUSAL as it stands.

Here, for instance, is Stewart Shapiro (2009) on <nitrogen> and <gravitational field>:

‘To belabor the obvious, nitrogen does not “cause, under appropriate conditions, mental

tokenings of” [<nitrogen>]… For one thing, we are (almost) always in the presence of nitrogen.

Similarly, mental states with gravitational-field-ish content are not causally responsive to an

external environment that contains gravitational fields. Every external environment contains

a gravitational field.’24

Now, this is only an objection if we think that states concerning “theoretical” entities like

nitrogen and gravitational fields should be in the scope of our Representational theory of truth;

otherwise the lesson might just be that Non-Representationalism is right for such discourses. But the

point for present purposes is that this highlights that Lynch’s CAUSAL is just a toy Representational

theory – useful for illustrative purposes, but not intended as a serious analysis. This substantively

affects the dialectic.

First, we can expect that our theory of representation will ultimately be much more

sophisticated than CAUSAL, such that it may well extend to concepts like <nitrogen>.25

Second, once reference has been secured causally for certain concepts, there is a natural

extension whereby we can use these concepts to secure reference to further entities. As a toy

example, suppose that <quark> and <turkey> refer to quarks and turkeys respectively due to standing

in the appropriate causal relation to quarks and turkeys. Then we can secure reference to quurkeyness

derivatively as above: for any x, x is quurkey iff (x is a quark or x is a turkey).26 In this way, the causal

account can provide us with “source intentionality” – a set of concepts which can be used to explain

the reference of further concepts. Indeed, the structure of this strategy is enshrined in Lewis’s (1970)

proposal for “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, though Lewis is not committed to a causal

explanation for our source intentionality. Very roughly, given a scientific theory – about, say, nitrogen

24 See also Connolly (2012). 25 For more sophisticated causal theories, see e.g. Fodor (1987), Rupert (1999), Ryder (2004). 26 This requires that the logical terminology in this definition is already meaningful too. It is far from obvious how to extend the causal account to such terminology, which is a sure limitation of this strategy, and of causal metasemantics in general.




– one can “Ramsify” out the theoretical term: replace every occurrence of the term with a variable, x,

which is bound by an existential quantifier. So, your “Ramsified” theory says that there is an entity, x,

that has all the features that the theory takes nitrogen to have. Providing that the other terms that

occur are all already meaningful (in our case, through having their reference explained causally), this

allows us to say that <nitrogen> refers to that entity, supposing there is one, that satisfies this

description. Providing your source intentionality is rich enough, then, one may be able to secure

reference to further entities despite the absence of the relevant causal relation.

While highly programmatic, these points need to be borne in mind. The dialectical problem,

of course, is that Lynch wants to motivate truth pluralism by arguing that the causal theory of

representation is limited in scope. But it is difficult to estimate, prior to having details, what the scope

of our Extended Sophisticated Causal Representationalism might be. In Shapiro’s (2009) words: ‘There

may nevertheless be a scope problem for the envisioned correspondence based property… but we’ll

have to wait for details to find out what it is.’

Finally, even supposing that some Extended Sophisticated Causal Representationalism is

correct and limited in scope, what this shows is that this theory of representation isn’t right for certain

concepts. But that leaves open that some other theory of representation is right for these concepts.

That is, we might introduce a pluralistic theory of representation or reference.27 While <Felix>

represents Felix in virtue of some causal relation, <7> represents 7 in virtue of something else. We

might nonetheless still think of truth as Representational across-the-board.28

3.2 On Abundant, Mind-Dependent, Non-Natural, and Abstract Entities

For the time being, let’s set aside these dialectical issues and ask what concept, <G>, might

fall outside the scope of Causal Representationalism. Lynch’s suggestion is that ‘the external

environment contains no Gs that can be so causally responsive’. The highlighted clause is important.

As emphasised from the outset, if e.g. (3) is true even in a Non-Representational sense, then we’re

27 Indeed, we might think of the above extension to Causal Representationalism as doing so already: our metasemantics for some terms in causal, for others is descriptive. 28 This is Shapiro’s suggested modification. This would be a kind of Representational or “correspondence” pluralism about truth; see especially Sher (1998, 2004, 2013, 2015, 2016) for extensive development of this idea. I should say that I am actually unsure to what extent we need think of this as a kind of pluralism about representation, however. JRG Williams (forthcoming), for instance, details a unified global metasemantics – a kind of Lewisian “interpretationism” – that predicts that certain apparently rival causal and inferential metasemantic theories may in fact be true generalisations for certain concepts. If this pans out, then our account of the nature of representation is, in a sense, both one and many. (NB Williams uses Neander’s (2017) teleosemantic account of representation to secure his own “source intentionality”, and I borrow the phrase from him, though he does not use the source intentionality to explain further representation in the definitional, descriptive way indicated here.)




committed to there being something which is prime; so I do not think it would be wise to postulate

that there are no primes whatsoever.29 Rather, the idea is that the entities in question, while existent,

are not causally responsive. So why think this? As mentioned, Lynch’s broad strategy here is to appeal

to the ontological status of the entities that these concepts are concerned with.

Interestingly, one distinction that Lynch doesn’t explore is that between sparse and abundant

properties. This is exciting, since it suggests a way of combining the views of Edwards and Lynch.

While sparse properties ground genuine similarities and hence are causal-explanatorily significant,

abundant properties by definition do not. Therefore, abundant properties like being quurkey

presumably cannot enter into the relevant causal relations for CAUSAL to apply. However, while

abundant properties plausibly fall outside the scope of Causal Representationalism so characterised,

it is much less likely that they will fall outside the scope of any Extended Causal Representationalism.

The concepts that we possess that group together arbitrary, gerrymandered groups of entities are ipso

facto unlikely to be very useful, and thus are likely to be ones that we have conjured up; either

artificially, like <quurkey>, or through more natural processes. The metasemantics for such concepts

is thus plausibly derivative from pre-possessed concepts, which the Causal Representationalist will

maintain are explained causally. Abundant properties thus do not seem to be an especially promising

avenue here. Where else might we look?

We find three different suggestions in Lynch. First, he suggests that theories like CAUSAL are

committed to:

‘True beliefs map[ping] objects that exist and have their properties mind-independently... An

object exists (or has some property) mind-independently at some time just when it would

continue to exist (or have that property) even if there were no minds that represented it as

having that property.’ (2009: 33)

So, if an entity is mind-dependent, says Lynch (2009: 34-5), then it is outside the scope of

CAUSAL.30 Lynch’s examples are socially constructed properties like being illegal, or constitutionally

protected, or violating the Geneva Convention. But why think a theory like CAUSAL is committed to

the mind-independence of the entities represented? In its defence, Lynch only says that it is ‘a

consequence of the fact that representational views intend their position to be realist.’ (2009: 33) But

intention is one thing, commitment another.

29 Though contrast Lynch (2008: 122-3). 30 See also Lynch (2001: 724; 2004: 385).




The thought must be that mind-dependent entities cannot enter into causal relations. But

this is prima facie surprising, as we seem to appeal to such entities in causal explanations much as we

do mind-independent entities. To explain why Prince William inherits all or some of Catherine

Middleton’s estate in the event of her death without a will, we will cite the fact that they are married.

To explain why someone is fined for speeding, we will cite the fact that it is illegal. To explain why

someone is structurally oppressed, we might cite the fact that they are a woman. Whether or not all

explanation is causal, presumably some explanation is causal; and these look like standard cases.

However, we might think that there is a difference in the kind of causal role we attribute to

mind-dependent and mind-independent properties. Crispin Wright’s (1992: 196) notion of “Width of

Cosmological Role” is useful here:

‘Let the width of cosmological role of a subject-matter of a discourse be measured to the

extent to which citing the kinds of states of affairs with which it deals is potentially

contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our being in attitudinal

states which take such states of affairs as object.’

Take Prince William’s being married. The question is whether or not there is anything we can

explain in terms of his being married, other than our believing that he is married, that cannot be

explained by the fact that he is believed to be married (or other mental states). That he inherits

Catherine Middleton’s estate is, for instance, plausibly explained by the fact that the right people

believe that he is married to her. If there is no other explanatory work to do, then his being married

has only narrow cosmological role.31 Contrast this with iron’s being metallic. This explains the way

iron acts around magnets; and this explanation makes no appeal to our believing that iron is metallic.

Thus iron’s being metallic has wide cosmological role.

Suppose, then, that mind-dependent or socially constructed properties have only narrow

cosmological role. What are the implications regarding CAUSAL? At first, one might think that CAUSAL

is blocked on grounds of circularity. For suppose we try to explain the content of <married> in terms

of a causal relation, however sophisticated, between <married> and instances of marriage. Since

marriage has narrow cosmological role, the thought goes, the explanation must go via beliefs about

marriage. But these beliefs will be partially composed of the concept <marriage>; so we’re back to

square one. However, Wright allows that even states of affairs with narrow cosmological role can

explain ‘our being in attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object’. Now, one might

31 I will move between saying that a fact or state of affairs has narrow/wide cosmological role and saying its constituent property does so. I trust no confusion will result.




wonder how this can avoid circularity if the state of affairs is mind-dependent; after all, if the state of

affairs depends on our attitudinal states, then aren’t our attitudinal states hereby explaining

themselves? But the trick is to realise that Prince William’s being married might be dependent on

other mental states, other than those about his being married per se. This is analogous to the point

raised earlier concerning Goodman’s constellation example. A configuration being a constellation can

be dependent on us and our practices without specifically depending on our having a word or concept

for the property of being a constellation, and thus a belief with that content. Again, these underlying

factors can explain why Prince William is married, which can explain why we believe this, which can in

turn explain his post-bereavement entitlement to his wife’s estate, etc.

But perhaps this points to a way forward. For suppose we’re convinced that there are states

of affairs with a super-narrow cosmological role, such that the only explanations they are “potentially

contributive” to are those that go via our beliefs about them: one cannot explain why you believe that

Prince William is married in terms of his being married, even as part of a ‘vindicatory explanation’

(Wright 1992: 169) of that attitude. One worry about this strategy is that error theory and fictionalism

become more and more attractive as the cosmological role becomes narrower. The reason that being

a witch has super-narrow cosmological role, after all, is because there are no witches.

It’s worth returning briefly to Edwards for a last time at this point, for width of cosmological

role plays a prominent role in his theory. Edwards (2018: 70) suggests that narrow cosmological role

is a sign of a property being abundant or projected. Is there a route from narrow cosmological role to

projection, and hence to pluralism? Well, suppose that a property, F, has only narrow cosmological

role. Then one might worry that a’s being F cannot explain why a falls within the extension of ‘is F’;

i.e., that the objective reading of the (P) biconditional is unavailable. If so, then perhaps we’ll need

the projective reading. But first, even if the objective reading is blocked, there may be some other

explanation other than the projective reading, as mentioned above. Second, narrow cosmological role

does not rule out that a’s being F explains why a falls within the extension of ‘is F’ via our beliefs about

a’s being F. That is, it renders the explanation of a’s falling within the extension of ‘is F’ a mind-

dependent matter. For instance, Prince William falling within the extension of ‘is married’ is to be

explained exclusively in terms of our beliefs concerning Prince William and his status vis-à-vis

marriage. This is a substantive conclusion, but it is insufficient to render being married a projected

property. On the face of it, it makes Prince William’s marriage a mind-dependent state of affairs; but

precisely the question at issue is why we should take this to motivate Non-Representationalism about

the truth of (5).

One crucial lesson we can draw is that it’s very hard to see how mind-dependence might

motivate Non-Representationalism, or even frustrate Causal Representationalism – though some of




these questions deserve more sustained attention that they have received or I can give them here.32

A second suggestion from Lynch that goes by rather quickly concerns naturalness:

‘Moral propositions represent a slightly different puzzle: torture is certainly wrong, but it is

difficult to know how wrongness – even if we grant that it is a property – can be a natural

property with which we can causally interact.’ (2009: 34)

Philosophers have certainly worried that moral properties – in all their purported categorical

reason-giving glory – look suspicious and difficult to fit into the natural order of things as described by

science.33 The thought, as best as I can extract it, is that if there are moral properties, then perhaps

they are non-natural properties; that is, properties not subject to investigation by the natural

sciences.34 The further thought must be that such non-natural properties must be incapable of

entering into causal relations, otherwise they would be subject to such investigation. Hence they fall

outside the scope of CAUSAL. This is certainly intriguing, though it is prima facie surprising to hear

that the non-naturalist – traditionally the arch moral realist – should go in for a Non-

Representationalist theory of moral truth. But given the kind of metasemantic problems that are

taken to plague non-naturalism, perhaps this is a sensible move.

The final suggestion seems to concern the abstractness of certain entities:

‘That two and two are four is unimpeachable, but even granting that numbers are objects,

how can any thought of mine be in causal contact with something like a number? Numbers,

whatever else they turn out to be, are presumably not objects with which we can causally

interact.’ (2009: 34)

Presumably because numbers seem to be abstract objects, which are causally impotent.35

The purported existence of non-natural and abstract entities (and perhaps those with super-

narrow cosmological role) seem to me the most promising avenues for arguing that certain of our

32 One potential avenue I like here: We might think of narrow cosmological role as ruling out using an entity to explain the practical success of actions performed by rational agents with the relevant mental states, as in Blackburn’s (2005) “success semantics” or the anti-deflationary “Success Argument” (e.g., Gamester 2018). As I interpret his grand philosophical vision, Blackburn (e.g. 2013b: 128-30) takes this as a sign that the states in question are non-representational in function. In this way, this ontological distinction might motivate a representational distinction, which might in turn motivate truth pluralism. 33 The locus classicus must be Mackie (1977); Edwards (2011: 29, especially fn.3) suggests just this concern in the context of discussing truth pluralism. 34 “Natural” is notoriously used in different senses. E.g., for Lewis (1983), less natural properties are less fundamental and more gerrymandered. But I don’t think this is what Lynch has in mind here. 35 See also Lynch (2001: 724; 2004: 385).




concepts fall outside the scope of CAUSAL on ontological grounds. As such, it’s worth rehearsing what

else must be done to have a compelling motivation for truth pluralism on this basis.

First, we need to be convinced that Causal Representationalism is correct for some concepts.

Second, having been given the details of an Extended Sophisticated Causal Representationalism we

need to be shown that concepts for non-natural or abstract entities fall outside its scope. Third, we

need to be convinced that no other account of representation can work for these concepts. Given all

this, if we’re still convinced of the truth of moral or mathematical discourse, then taking moral or

mathematical entities to be non-natural or abstract motivates Non-Representationalism about moral

or mathematical truth. In conclusion: there is much work to be done. But at least now we have a

clearly marked way forward.

4. Conclusion

Pluralists are fond of asserting that Representational and Non-Representational theories are

only locally plausible for disjoint discourses,36 but only very rarely do they take the time to argue that

this is so. In Cory Wright’s (2012: 93) apt assessment: ‘pluralists (as a group) have done amazingly

little to expound on the scope problem or to go far beyond the usual glosses on it’. On the flip side,

objectors often accuse pluralists of “double-counting”:37 given, say, the differences between the

entities in different domains, we don’t also need to say that the nature of truth varies between

different discourses. I have tried to adjudicate this dispute by keeping one eye on the worry that

pluralism might introduce a theoretical spare wheel while taking seriously the idea that the ontological

differences might themselves motivate truth pluralism, by rendering different theories plausible.

From Edwards, we have learned that the distinction between objective and projected

properties provides a compelling motivation for pluralism, while worrying that projected properties

look suspicious outside of a controversial interpretation of what it is to be an abundant property.

From Lynch, we learned that non-natural or abstract entities may fall outside the scope of an Extended

Sophisticated Causal Representationalism. If such a theory is right for other concepts – which, I’ve

emphasised, is controversial – and no other theory of representation works, then we have an

argument for truth pluralism.

Through this discussion I hope to have provided a much better sense of what has been done

and, more importantly, what still needs to be done to provide a compelling motivation for truth

36 E.g., Lynch (2005: 32-3; 2006: 63; 2013b: 22); Pedersen (2006: 102; 2010: 93; 2012: 589); Wright & Pedersen (2010: 209-10); Edwards (2011: 29); Cotnoir & Edwards (2015: 118); Pedersen & Wright (2016: §2). 37 E.g., Sainsbury (1996); Blackburn (2013a); Dodd (2013); Asay (2018); Bar-On & Simmons (fc). For Blackburn, the differences are between the propositions in different discourses, not the entities.




pluralism on ontological grounds. While others might be hopeful, at this stage I lean towards

pessimism. If this pessimism is warranted, then pluralists ought to look elsewhere.

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