sherman v. town of chester, no. 13-1503-cv (2d cir. may 16, 2014)

8/12/2019 Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 13-1503-cv (2d Cir. May 16, 2014)

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131503cv

Shermanv.TownofChester

In the

United States Court of AppealsFor the Second Circuit

AugustTerm,2013

No.131503cv

NANCYJ.SHERMAN,

PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

TOWNOFCHESTER,

DefendantAppellee.*

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt

fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.No.12cv647 EdgardoRamos,Judge.

ARGUED:MARCH18,2014

DECIDED:MAY16,2014

Before:STRAUB,

SACK,

and

LOHIER,

Circuit

Judges.

*TheClerkofCourtisdirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptionofthiscaseto

conformtothelistingofthepartiesshownabove.

Case: 13-1503 Document: 98-1 Page: 1 05/16/2014 1226083 45


2/45

SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER

2

AppealfromanorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor

theSouthern

District

ofNew

York

(Edgardo

Ramos,

Judge)

granting

defendantTownofChestersmotiontodismissplaintiffStevenM.

Shermanscomplaint.

WeholdthatShermanstakingsclaimwasripeunder

WilliamsonCountyRegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankof

JohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985). Seekingafinaldecisionfromthe

TownwouldbefutilebecausetheTownusedunfairandrepetitive

procedurestoavoidafinaldecision. Additionally,thestate

proceduresprongofWilliamsonCountyissatisfiedbecausethe

Townremoved

the

case

from

state

court.

Sherman

also

adequately

allegedataking. Accordingly,weREVERSEthatpartoftheDistrict

CourtsdecisionthatdismissedShermanstakingsclaim.

WeVACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodismiss

Shermansfederalnontakingsclaimssolelyonripenessgrounds

andtodeclinetoexercisesupplementaljurisdictionoverShermans

stateclawclaims. Finally,weAFFIRMtheDistrictCourtsdecision

todismisscertainclaimsonthemerits.

MICHAELD.DIEDERICH,JR.StonyPoint,NY,for

NancyJ.Sherman.

ANTHONYCARDOSO(StevenC.Sternonbrief),

SokoloffSternLLP,CarlePlace,NY,forTownof

Chester

J.DavidBreemer,PacificLegalFoundation,

Sacramento,CA,

foramicuscuriaePacificLegal

Foundationinsupportofappellant.



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3

STRAUB,CircuitJudge:

Hungry

Joe

packed

up

his

bags

and

wrote

happy

letters

home.

Hehadflownthe25missionsrequiredtocompleteatourofduty.

ButthingswerenotsosimpleonCatch22sPianosaisland.Hesoon

discoveredthatColonelCathcarthadjustraisedthenumberof

missionsto30,forcingHungryJoetounpackhisbagsandrewrite

hishappyletters. Atthetime,Yossarianhadflown23missions.

TheColonellaterincreasedthenumberto35.When

Yossarianwasjustthreeawayfromthatmark,thenumberwas

increasedto40,andthento45.WhenYossarianhad44missions

underhis

belt,

the

Colonel

made

the

number

50.

And

later

55.

WhenYossarianreached51missions,heknewitwasnocause

tocelebrate: Hellraisethem,Yossarianunderstood.Heappealed

tosquadroncommanderMajorMajortobeexemptedfromflying

hisfourremainingmissions. EverytimeIgetcloseheraisesthem,

Yossariancomplained.MajorMajorresponded,Perhapshewont

thistime. ButofcourseYossarianwasright. ColonelCathcart



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4

raisedthenumberto60,then65,then70,then80,withnoendin

sight.

PlaintiffStevenM.ShermanmusthavefeltalotlikeYossarian

inhisdecadeofdealingwithdefendantTownofChester. In2000,

Shermanappliedforsubdivisionapprovalwhilehewasinthe

processofbuyinganearly400acrepieceoflandfor$2.7million.

Thatapplicationmarkedthebeginningofhisjourneythroughthe

Townseverchanginglabyrinthofredtape. In2003,theTown

enactedanewzoningordinance,requiringShermantoredrafthis

proposeddevelopmentplan.Whenhecreatedarevisedproposalin

2004,theTownagainenactednewzoningregulations.Whenhe

createdanotherrevisedplanin2005,theTownchangeditszoning

lawsoncemore. Andagainin2006. Andagainin2007.

Ontopoftheshiftingsandsofzoningregulations,theTown

erectedeven

more

hurdles.

Among

other

tactics,

the

Town

announcedamoratoriumondevelopment,replaceditsofficials,and



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5

requiredShermantoresubmitstudiesthathehadalready

completed.When

the

Town

insisted

that

Sherman

pay

$25,000

in

consultantsfeesbeforehecouldobtainahearing,hemighthave

thought,TheColonelwilljustraiseitagain. Andhewouldhave

beenright. Afterpayingthe$25,000,hewastoldheowedan

additional$40,000,andthathewouldalsohavetorespondtoa

lengthyquestionnaire.

Bythetimethislawsuitwasfiled,overtenyearshadpassed.

Inthattime,Shermanbecamefinanciallyexhaustedforcedto

spend$5.5millionontopoftheoriginal$2.7millionpurchase. The

DistrictCourt(EdgardoRamos,Judge)ruledthatShermansclaim

undertheTakingsClausewasnotripeunderWilliamsonCounty

RegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankofJohnsonCity,473

U.S.172(1985),becauseShermanhadnotreceivedafinaldecision

onhis

property

and

seeking

afinal

decision

would

not

be

futile.

The

courtreasonedthatwhileShermanmayhavetojumpthroughmore



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6

hoopsinthefuture,hehadnotestablishedthathisapplication

woulddefinitely

be

denied

inthe

end.

To

Sherman,

this

must

have

soundedalotlike:Perhapshewontraisethenumberthistime.

Weconcludethatunderthesecircumstances,Shermanwas

notrequiredtoobtainafinaldecisionfromtheTown. Shermans

takingsclaimwasripeandadequatelyalleged. Accordingly,we

REVERSEthatpartoftheDistrictCourtsdecisionthatdismissed

thetakingsclaim,andweREMANDforfurtherproceedings

consistentwiththisopinion.

BACKGROUND

Theallegations

recited

below

are

taken

from

the

complaint,

andweassumetheyaretrueforthepurposesofthisappeal.

Thiscaseconcernsthedecadesworthofredtapeputinplace

bytheTownofChester,itsTownBoard,anditsPlanningBoard.

The

Town

Board

is

the

governing

body

of

the

Town,

and

the

PlanningBoardappearstogiveatleastpreliminaryapprovalto

developmentproposals.



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7

InMarchof2000,ShermanappliedtothePlanningBoardfor

subdivisionapproval

sothat

he

could

use

and

develop

MareBrook.

Theproposedprojectwouldinclude385unitsofhousingaswellas

anequestrianfacility,baseballfield,tenniscourts,clubhouse,on

siterestaurantandagolfcoursethatwovethroughtheproperty.

WhenShermancompletedhispurchaseofthepropertyin2001,it

wasalreadyzonedforresidentialuse. Butsoonthereafter,

Shermanstroublesbegan.

I. TheMoratoriumInJuly2001,theTownBoardannouncedthatitwasimposing

asix

month

moratorium

on

major

subdivision

approvals

retroactive

toMay1,2001. AtleasttwomembersoftheTownBoardexpressed

theviewthattheMoratoriumwasspecificallyaimedatPlaintiffs

MareBrookproject. Shermanwastheonlydeveloperaffectedeven

though

other

projects

were

similarly

situated.

Whenthesixmonthperiodexpired,themoratoriumwas

extended,whichsingularlyaffectedSherman. Duringthe



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8

extension,Shermanappliedforaminorsubdivisionapprovalthat

waspermitted

under

the

moratorium.

However,

the

Town

still

refusedtoallowShermantopursuetheapplication.

ShermanbroughtsuitagainsttheTowninstatecourt,andasa

resultofthelawsuit,theTownendedthemoratorium,butnotuntil

January2003. Inotherwords,thesixmonthmoratoriumlastedover

ayearandahalf.

II. DraftEnvironmentalImpactStatementandtheFirstZoningChange

InOctober2003,thePlanningBoarddeemedcomplete

ShermansDraftEnvironmentalImpactStatement(DEIS). That

determinationestablishedthatShermansapplicationtotheTown

wassatisfactoryinformandcontent.

In2003,theTownBoardapprovedthefirstinaseriesof

changestoitszoningregulations.WhenShermanlearnedofthe

newrequirementsearlythenextyear,hewasassuredbytheTown

Planner,GarlingAssociates,thathecouldmeetallitsrequirements



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9

withonlyamodestamountofadditionalworkandthathewould

soonobtain

preliminary

approval.

III. MoreChangestotheZoningRegulationsApproximatelyfivemonthslater,sometimeinlateMayto

earlyJune2004,Shermanfinishedrevisinghisplan. ButtheTown

hadalreadyamendeditszoningregulations. GarlingAssociates,

whichhelpedwritethenewregulations,didnottellShermanabout

thechangeseventhoughitwasadvisingShermanaboutcomplying

withthe2003regulations. Theseamendmentscreatedseveralnew

requirements,furtherdelayingSherman.

Ittook

him

approximately

eleven

months

toonce

again

revise

hisapplication. InMay2005fiveyearsafterhefirstsought

subdivisionapprovalhefinallymetwithsomesuccess. The

PlanningBoardapprovedtheMareBrookproposal. Butthissuccess

was

not

to

last.

The

Town

Board

refused

to

entertain

Shermans

application,despiteholdingmeetingsconcerninganother

development.



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10

Onemonthlater,theTownamendeditszoninglawforathird

timewithout

informing

Sherman

inadvance.

Sherman

revised

his

applicationagain,andinFebruary2006,theTownforthefourth

timechangeditszoninglawwithoutwarningSherman. Sherman

respondedbysubmittingyetanotherrevisedplan,thisoneinMarch

2007. Thatsamemonth,theTownchangeditszoningforthefifth

time,anditonceagaindidnotletShermanknowthesechanges

werecoming.

Fedup,ShermanfiledsuitinfederalcourtinMay2008,a

precursortothecasebeforeusnow.

IV. FurtherObstructionInNovemberandDecemberof2008,Shermanresubmittedhis

MareBrookapplicationandSupplementalDEIS. Bythispoint,over

eightyearshadpassedsinceShermanfirstappliedforsubdivision

approval.



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11

A. TheTownEngineerIn

January

2009,

the

Town

Engineer

gave

Sherman

a

list

of

correctionstothe2008SupplementalDEIS. Aspartofthatlist,the

TownEngineerdemandedfinaldesignsforwaterandsewerplants.

ButShermancouldnotsubmitthefinalwaterandsewerdesigns

untilotheraspectsoftheplanlikethenumberandlocationofthe

homeswerefinalized. That,inturn,requiredpreliminary

approval,whichistheverythinghewastryingtoobtainfromthe

TownEngineer.

Afewmonthslater,theTownappointedanewTown

Engineer.The

new

appointee

needed

time

toget

up

tospeed

on

MareBrook. TheTownbilledShermanfortheexpenseofhavingthe

newTownEngineerreviewtheentireMareBrookproject,even

thoughShermanalreadypaidforthefirstengineertoconductthat

same

review.

The

new

Town

Engineer

had

an

entirely

new

set

of

questions,concerns,anditemsforShermantoaddress. Despitethat,



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12

fortwoyearsthenewTownEngineermaintainedhispredecessors

requirementregarding

sewer

and

water

plant

designs.

B. TheChairmanInSeptember2009,Shermansubmittedtwodifferentversions

ofhissubdivisionproposal. Bynow,theproposalshadbecome

muchmoreconventionalthanhisfirstapplication,andtheydidnot

includetherecreationalfacilitiesinitiallyenvisioned.

Soonaftersubmittingtheproposals,Shermandiscoveredthat

thePlanningBoardChairmanhadbeenreplaced. Thenew

Chairman,DonSerotta,wasopenlyhostiletowardsthe

MareBrookapplication

and

had

written

letters

tothe

Town

in2001

againsttheproject.

Forthreemonths,thePlanningBoardrefusedwithout

explanationtoputShermansproposalsontheagenda. Thenin

December

2009,

Serotta

explained

that

Sherman

needed

to

pay

$25,000inconsultantsfees. YetShermandidnotreceiveaninvoice



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13

forthosefeesasrequiredbytheTownCodeforapproximatelytwo

months.

Serottahadotherdemandsaswell.Herequiredanadditional

clusterplan,whichwouldleadtoanotherreworkingofShermans

DEIS. Serottaalsoinsistedthatallroadsmustbetwentyfourfeet

wideinsteadofthirtyfeet. ThisrequiredShermantoredrawhis

planstorelocatecurbs,drainage,waterandsewermains,and

grading.

Later,SerottacanceledShermansappearanceatthePlanning

Boardsmonthlymeetinganddemanded$40,000morein

consultantsfees. ThePlanningBoardalsoinsistedthatSherman

respondtoaquestionnaire,whichrequiredShermantoprovide,

amongotherthings,anevaluationofatrafficintersectioninthe

TownofMonroe(locatedmilesaway)andthedetailsofawetlands

walkingtrail

crossing

that

did

not

cross

any

wetlands.



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14

Shermanwasalsorequiredtoanswerallinquiriesbylocal

residents.Some

answers

tothese

questions

needed

tobe

repeated

twentytofortytimesbecausethePlanningBoarddidnotpermit

himtoquoteapreviousanswer.

C. TheTownPlannerInSeptember2010,thePlanningBoardvotedtoaccept

ShermansDEISascomplete,sevenyearsafterhisoriginalDEISwas

deemedcompleteinOctober2003. Afewmonthslater,TedFink

replacedGarlingAssociatesastheTownPlanner. Finkrequestedan

additionalstudyregardingtrafficontheothersideoftown,even

thoughSherman

had

long

before

completed

that

study.

Fink

also

sentmonthlylistsofdemandstoSherman,whichincludeda

wetlandstudy,aconcertedspeciesstudy,andaconstraints

study. Thenewstudiesconcludedthattherewerenochangessince

those

same

studies

were

completed

in

2003.

Fink

also

required

ShermantoredotheDEISthathadjustbeendeemedcomplete.



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15

V. FinancialLossesandSubsequentDeathThe

Towns

machinations

to

prevent

the

development

of

MareBrookwerenotwithouttheircost. Betweentaxes,interest

charges,carryingcosts,andexpenses,Shermanspentapproximately

$5.5millionontopoftheoriginal$2.7purchaseprice. Asaresult,

Shermanbecamefinanciallyexhaustedtothepointoffacing

foreclosureandpossiblepersonalbankruptcy. Andwhilethecase

waspendingonappeal,Shermandied.NancyJ.Sherman,his

widow,wassubstitutedforhimonappealashispersonal

representative.2

VI. ProceduralHistoryAsalreadymentioned,in2008Shermanfiledsuitagainstthe

Townandotherdefendantsinfederalcourt.Hebroughtmanyof

thesameclaimsthatheraisestoday. TheTownmovedtodismiss,

arguingamongotherthingsthatShermanstakingsclaimwasnot

2NancyShermanwassubstitutedafterthebriefswerefiled. Forthisreason,and

forthesakeofsimplicity,wewillreferonlytoStevenShermanthroughoutthis

opinion.



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16

ripebecausehehadnotsoughtcompensationfromthestate.

Shermanvoluntarily

dismissed

the

case

and

then

filed

the

case

now

beforeusinstatecourt. TheTownremovedtofederalcourt,where

itonceagainmovedtodismissinpartonripenessgrounds.

TheDistrictCourtdismissedsomeofShermansfederal

claimsonthemerits,andmostbecausetheywereunripe. While

acknowledgingitwasaclosecase,theDistrictCourtconcludedthat

Shermanhadfailedtoshowthatseekingafinaldecisionfromthe

Townwouldbefutile.

Shermantimelyappealed.

DISCUSSION

Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsordergrantingamotion

todismissunderRule12(b)(6),acceptingastrueallallegationsinthe

complaintanddrawingallreasonableinferencesinfavorofthe

nonmoving

party.

To

survive

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion

to

dismiss,

the

complaintmustincludeenoughfactstostateaclaimtoreliefthatis

plausibleonitsface. Aclaimwillhavefacialplausibilitywhenthe



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17

plaintiffpleadsfactualcontentthatallowsthecourttodrawthe

reasonableinference

that

the

defendant

isliable

for

the

misconduct

alleged.Wilsonv.Dantas, F.3d,2014WL866507,at*2(2dCir.

Mar.6,2014)(internalcitationsandquotationmarksomitted).

AlthoughShermanbroughtnumerousfederalandstate

claims,themaindisputeonappealconcernsShermanstakings

claim,whichwasdismissedasunripeunderthefirstprongof

WilliamsonCountyRegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankof

JohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985). TheDistrictCourtdismissedmost

oftheotherfederalclaimsforthesamereason,andsomeofthem,in

thealternative,forfailuretostateaclaim. Finally,theDistrictCourt

declinedtoexercisesupplementaljurisdictionoverShermansstate

lawclaims.3

3TheDistrictCourtalsodismissedShermansfreedomofreligionandrightto

associationclaimsasfrivolous. Shermanhasnotchallengedthatrulingon

appeal.



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18

I. TakingsClaimandWilliamsonCountyRipenessWe

evaluate

the

ripeness

of

a

takings

claim

under

the

two

prongtestestablishedbytheSupremeCourtinWilliamsonCounty.

Fortheclaimtoberipe,theplaintiffmustshowthat(1)thestate

regulatoryentityhasrenderedafinaldecisiononthematter,and

(2)theplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationbymeansofan

availablestateprocedure. Doughertyv.TownofN.HempsteadBd.of

ZoningAppeals,282F.3d83,88(2dCir.2002).

BecauseWilliamsonCountyisaprudentialratherthana

jurisdictionalrule,wemaydeterminethatinsomeinstances,the

ruleshould

not

apply

and

we

still

have

the

power

todecide

the

case. Sansottav.TownofNagsHead,724F.3d533,545(4thCir.

2013);seealsoHornev.DeptofAgric.,133S.Ct.2053,2062(2013)

(recognizingthatWilliamsonCountyisnot,strictlyspeaking,

jurisdictional);

Suitum

v.

Tahoe

Regl

Planning

Agency,

520

U.S.

725,

73334(1997)(describingtheWilliamsonCountyprongsastwo

independentprudentialhurdles).



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19

A. TheFinalDecisionProngSherman

concedes

that

the

Town

has

not

reached

an

official

finaldecision.Hearguesinsteadthathedoesnotneedtomeetthis

requirementbecauseseekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutile.

[T]hefinalityrequirementisnotmechanicallyapplied. A

propertyowner,forexample,willbeexcusedfromobtainingafinal

decisionifpursuinganappealtoazoningboardofappealsor

seekingavariancewouldbefutile. Thatis,apropertyownerneed

notpursuesuchapplicationswhenazoningagencylacksdiscretion

tograntvariancesorhasduginitsheelsandmadeclearthatallsuch

applicationswill

be

denied.

Murphyv.NewMilfordZoningCommn,

402F.3d342,349(2dCir.2005).

Additionally,[g]overnmentauthorities,ofcourse,maynot

burdenpropertybyimpositionofrepetitiveorunfairlanduse

procedures

in

order

to

avoid

a

final

decision.

Palazzolo

v.

Rhode

Island,533U.S.606,621(2001);seealsoMacDonald,Sommer&Fratesv.

YoloCnty.,477U.S.340,350n.7(1986)(Apropertyownerisof



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20

coursenotrequiredtoresorttopiecemeallitigationorotherwise

unfairprocedures

inorder

toobtain

this

determination.).

Whilethesetwoexceptionstothefinalityrequirement

futilityandunfair/repetitiveproceduresaredistinctconcepts,in

thiscase,theanalysesforthetwoarethesame. Shermanarguesthat

seekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutilebecausetheTownused

andinalllikelihoodwillcontinuetouserepetitiveandunfair

proceduresinordertoavoidafinaldecision.

Thefinaldecisionrequirementfollowsfromtheprinciple

thatonlyaregulationthatgoestoofar,resultsinatakingunderthe

FifthAmendment. Suitum,520U.S.at734(internalcitations

omitted).Normally,[a]courtcannotdeterminewhethera

regulationhasgonetoofarunlessitknowshowfartheregulation

goes.MacDonald,477U.S.at348.However,inthiscase,Sherman

isnot

challenging

any

one

regulation.

Rather,

he

argues

that

the

repeatedzoningchangesandotherroadblockstheprocedurehe



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21

hadtoendureconstitutedataking. SeeAppellantsBriefat27. A

finaldecision

isnot

necessary

toevaluate

whether

that

obstruction

itselfconstitutedataking.

InDelMonteDunesatMonterey,Ltd.v.CityofMonterey,the

NinthCircuitruledthatseekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutile

undersimilarcircumstances. 920F.2d1496,1506(9thCir.1990). In

thatcase,thepropertyownerssubmittedaproposaltodeveloptheir

propertywith344residentialunits. Id.at1502. Theplanwasdenied

bytheplanningcommission,andthecityplannersstatedthata

proposalwith264unitswouldbereceivedfavorably. Id.Whenthe

ownerssubmittedanew264unitplan,itwasdenied,andthecity

plannersthistimestatedthataproposalwith224unitswouldbe

receivedfavorably. Id.Whentheownerssubmittedanew224unit

plan,itwasdeniedaswell. Id. Thatdecisionwasappealedtothe

citycouncil,

which

referred

the

project

back

tothe

planning

commissionwitharequestthatitconsidera190unitplan. Id. The



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23/45


23

everytimeShermansubmittedorwasabouttosubmitaproposal

forMareBrook,

the

Town

changed

itszoning

regulations,

sending

Shermanbacktothedrawingboard. Itretroactivelyissuedasix

monthmoratoriumondevelopmentthatappearstohaveapplied

onlytoShermansproperty. Thatsixmonthmoratoriumwas

extendedforanotheryearuntilafterShermansuedtheTown. Town

officialsalsorepeatedlyaskedShermantoresubmitstudiesand

plansthathadalreadybeenapproved.

TheDistrictCourtadoptedanarrowerviewoffutilitythan

theNinthCircuits:thatwhiletheripenessdoctrinedoesnot

requirelitigantstoengageinfutilegesturessuchastojumpthrough

aseriesofhoops,thelastofwhichiscertaintobeobstructedbya

brickwall,thepresenceofthatbrickwallmustbeallbutcertainfor

thefutilityexceptiontoapply. Shermanv.TownofChester,No.12

Civ.647,

2013

WL

1148922,

at*9(S.D.N.Y.

Mar.

20,

2013)

(internal

alterationomitted). Applyingthatstandardtoourcase,thecourt



24/45


25/45


26/45


26

ensuresthatacourtknowshowfararegulationgoesbeforeitis

askedtodetermine

whether

that

regulation

goes

too

far.

Inthis

case,wearenotdealingwithanyoneregulationbuttheTowns

decadeofobstruction. Afinaldecisionisnotnecessarytoevaluate

whetherthatobstructionwasitselfataking.

B. StateProceduresProngUnderthesecondprongofWilliamsonCounty,aplaintiffs

claimisripeonlyiftheplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationby

meansofanavailablestateprocedure. Dougherty,282F.3dat88.

WhileWilliamsonCountypreventsaplaintifffrombringinghis

takingsclaim

infederal

court

before

first

seeking

compensation

from

thestate,itdoesnotprecludestatecourtsfromhearing

simultaneouslyaplaintiffsrequestforcompensationunderstate

lawandtheclaimthat,inthealternative,thedenialofcompensation

would

violate

the

[Takings

Clause

of

the]

Fifth

Amendment

of

the

FederalConstitution. SanRemoHotel,L.P.v.CityandCnty.ofS.F.,

545U.S.323,347(2005). Thisisbecause[r]eadingWilliamson



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27

Countytoprecludeplaintiffsfromraisingsuchclaimsinthe

alternativewould

erroneously

interpret

[the

Supreme

Courts]

cases

asrequiringpropertyownerstoresorttopiecemeallitigationor

otherwiseunfairprocedures. Id.(quotingMacDonald,477U.S.at

350n.7).

ShermanfirstbroughtsuitagainsttheTowninfederalcourt

in2008. TheTownarguedthatthetakingsclaimwasunripeinpart

becauseShermanhadnotallegedthathesoughtandwasdeniedjust

compensationbyanavailablestateprocedure. Shermanvoluntarily

dismissedthecase,andfollowedSanRemobyfilinghisfederal

takingsclaimandhisstatelawclaimforcompensationinstatecourt.

TheTownthenremovedthecasefromstatecourttofederalcourt,

whereitarguedonceagainthatthetakingsclaimmustbedismissed

becauseitcanbeheardonlyinstatecourtunderWilliamsonCounty.

InSansotta

v.

Town

of

Nags

Head,

724

F.3d

533

(4th

Cir.

2013),

theFourthCircuitconcludedthatwhenthedefendantremovesa



28/45


28

takingsclaimtofederalcourt,thestateproceduresprongof

WilliamsonCountydoes

not

apply.

We

agree

with

that

courts

reasoningthatrefusingtoapplythestatelitigationrequirementin

thisinstanceensuresthatastateoritspoliticalsubdivisioncannot

manipulatelitigationtodenyaplaintiffaforumforhisclaim. Id.at

545.

TheremovalmaneuverpreventsShermanfromlitigatinghis

federaltakingsclaimuntilhefinisheslitigatinghisstatelawclaim

forcompensation. Inotherwords,itpreventsShermanfrom

pursuingbothclaimssimultaneously,nomatterwhatforumthey

arebroughtin. ThisrunsagainstSanRemo,whichallowsplaintiffs

todojustthat. Inotherwords,theremovaltacticcandeny[]a

plaintiffanyforumforhavinghisclaimheard,oratleastforcethe

plaintiffintothekindofpiecemeallitigationthat,underSanRemo,

cannotbe

required.

See

id.at547.



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29

Weconcludethatwhenadefendantremovesatakingsclaim

fromstate

court

tofederal

court,

the

second

prong

ofWilliamson

Countyissatisfied. Shermanstakingsclaimisripe,andwemay

addressthemerits.

C. MeritsoftheTakingsClaimThelawrecognizestwospeciesoftakings:physicaltakings

andregulatorytakings. BuffaloTeachersFednv.Tobe,464F.3d362,

374(2dCir.2006). Thiscaseconcernsaregulatorytaking,which

occurswhenthegovernmentactsinaregulatorycapacity. Id.

Thegravamenofaregulatorytakingclaimisthatthestate

regulationgoes

too

far

and

inessence

effects

ataking.

Id.

Regulatorytakingsarefurthersubdividedintocategorical

andnoncategoricaltakings. HuntleighUSACorp.v.UnitedStates,

525F.3d1370,1378n.2(Fed.Cir.2008). Acategoricaltakingoccurs

in

the

extraordinary

circumstance

when

no

productive

or

economicallybeneficialuseoflandispermitted. TahoeSierraPres.

Council,Inc.v.TahoeReglPlanningAgency,535U.S.302,330(2002).



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30

Anythinglessthanacompleteeliminationofvalue,oratotalloss,

isanon

categorical

taking,

which

isanalyzed

under

the

framework

createdinPennCentralTransportationCo.v.NewYorkCity,438U.S.

104(1978). TahoeSierra,535U.S.at330(internalquotationmarks

omitted).

InTahoeSierra,theSupremeCourtadvisesthreetimesto

resistthetemptationtoadoptwhatamounttoperserulesfor

regulatorytakings. Id.at326;seealsoid.at321,342. Inthatcase,the

Courtaddressedwhethertemporarymoratoriaondevelopment

constitutedataking. Id.at321. Itconcludedthattheanswerwas

neitheryes,alwaysnorno,never. Id. TheCourttherefore

rejectedacategoricaltakinganalysisanddecidedthatissuewas

bestanalyzedwithinthePennCentralframework. Id.

WefollowtheSupremeCourtsguidancetoresistperserules.

Likethe

temporary

moratoria

atissue

inTahoe

Sierra,

evaluating

the

typeofobstructionatissuehereisnotsusceptibletoayesalwaysor



31/45


31

nonevercategoricalapproach.WewillthereforeanalyzeShermans

takingsclaim

within

the

PennCentral

framework.

We

will

then

considertheTownsargumentthattheclaimistimebarred. And

becauseweconcludeunderthenoncategoricalmethodthat

ShermanhasstatedaclaimthattheTowneffectedataking,weneed

notdecidetheissueunderthecategoricalapproach.

1. NonCategoricalTakingandPennCentralThePennCentralanalysisofanoncategoricaltakingrequires

anintensiveadhocinquiryintothecircumstancesofeachparticular

case. BuffaloTeachersFedn,464F.3dat375. Weweighthree

factorstodetermine

whether

the

interference

with

property

rises

to

thelevelofataking:(1)theeconomicimpactoftheregulationonthe

claimant;(2)theextenttowhichtheregulationhasinterferedwith

distinctinvestmentbackedexpectations;and(3)thecharacterofthe

governmental

action.

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

Shermansclaimpassesthistest.



32/45


32

First,theTownsactionseffectivelypreventedShermanfrom

makingany

economic

use

ofhis

property.

New

studies

were

demandedaftertheywerealreadycompleted;newdeficienciesin

Shermansproposalswerefoundaftertheywerealreadyapproved;

newfeeswererequiredaftertheyhadalreadybeenpaid;andnew

regulationswerecreatedwhenShermancompliedwithwhathad

previouslybeenrequired. BecausetheTownkeptstringinghim

along,Shermancouldneverdevelophisproperty. TheTownwon

itswarofattrition.

Second,theTowninterferedwithShermansreasonable

investmentbackedexpectations,amatterofteninformedbythe

lawinforceintheStateinwhichthepropertyislocated.Ark.Game

&FishCommnv.UnitedStates,133S.Ct.511,522(2012).When

ShermanboughtMareBrook,itwasalreadyzonedforresidential

use.His

reasonable

expectation,

therefore,

was

that

hewould

begin

recoupingthatinvestmentafterareasonabletimetogettheTowns



33/45


33

approvalonatleastsomeformofdevelopment.Hecouldnothave

expectedthe

Towns

decade

ofobstruction

that

pushed

him

tothe

brinkofbankruptcy.

Thethirdfactorthecharacterofthegovernmentactionis

themostelusive. SeeJohnD.Echeverria,MakingSenseofPenn

Central,23UCLAJ.ENVTL.L.&POLY171,18699(2005)(outlining

ninepossibledefinitionsofcharacter);ThomasW.Merrill,The

CharacteroftheGovernmentalAction,36VT.L.REV.649,66171(2012)

(outliningsixthemesorideasconsideredbycourtswhen

evaluatingcharacter).

InPennCentralitself,theCourtstatedthat[a]takingmay

morereadilybefoundwhentheinterferencewithpropertycanbe

characterizedasaphysicalinvasionbygovernmentthanwhen

interferencearisesfromsomepublicprogramadjustingthebenefits

andburdens

ofeconomic

life

topromote

the

common

good.

438

U.S.at124(internalcitationomitted). Inthiscase,theTowns



34/45


34

actionsarenotpartofapublicprogramadjustingthebenefitsand

burdensofpublic

life.

Rather,

the

Town

singled

out

Shermans

development,suffocatinghimwithredtapetomakesurehecould

neversucceedindevelopingMareBrook. TheTownsalleged

conductwasunfair,unreasonable,andinbadfaith. Thoughthe

precisecontoursofthecharacterfactormaybeblurry,wecan

neverthelessconcludethattheTownsconductinthiscasefalls

safelywithinitsambit.

BalancingthePennCentralfactors,weconcludethatSherman

statedanoncategoricaltakingsclaim.

2. StatuteofLimitationsTheTownarguesthatShermanstakingsclaimisbarredby42

U.S.C.1983sstatuteoflimitations,whichthepartiesdonot

disputeisthreeyearsinthiscase. SeeOrmistonv.Nelson,117F.3d

69,

71

(2d

Cir.

1997).

According

to

the

Town,

in

evaluating

whether

Shermanstatedaclaim,weshouldhaveconsideredonlywhat

occurredinthethreeyearsbeforethecomplaintwasfiled.



35/45


35

Butthatargumentwouldmeanthatagovernmententity

couldengage

inconduct

that

would

constitute

ataking

when

viewedinitsentirety,solongasnotakingoccurredoveranythree

yearperiod.Wedonotacceptthis. TheTownusedextremedelay

toeffectataking. ItwouldbeperversetoallowtheTowntousethat

samedelaytoescapeliability.

TheonlywayplaintiffsinShermanspositioncanvindicate

theSupremeCourtsadmonitioninPalazzolothatgovernment

authoritiesmaynotburdenpropertybyimpositionofrepetitiveor

unfairlanduseproceduresistoallowtothemaggregateactsthat

arenotindividuallyactionable. See533U.S.at621. Aclaimbased

onsuchadeathbyathousandcutstheoryrequiresacourtto

considertheentiretyofthegovernmententitysconduct,notjusta

sliceofit.

Infact,

insupport

ofthe

prohibition

on

repetitive

and

unfair

procedures,theSupremeCourtcitedacasemuchliketheonebefore



36/45


36

us:Montereyv.DelMonteDunesatMonterey,Ltd.,526U.S.687(1999).

Thatcase,

already

described

above

inmore

detail,

involved

nineteen

differentsiteplansandfiveformaldecisionsoverfiveyears. Id.at

698. Cityplannerskeptdemandingproposalswithfewerresidential

unitsafterthepropertyownerscompliedwiththepreviousdemand.

Id.at69598;seealsoTahoeSierra,535U.S.at33334(citingDelMonte

Dunesandsuggestingthatdelayinbadfaithcouldsupportatakings

claim).

InNationalRailroadPassengerCorp.v.Morgan,theSupreme

Courtallowedhostileworkenvironmentclaimstosimilarlybe

evaluatedintheirentirety. 536U.S.101(2002). Inthatsituation,the

unlawfulemploymentpractice...cannotbesaidtooccuronany

particularday. Itoccursoveraseriesofdaysorperhapsyears....

Id.at115(internalquotationmarksomitted). Andeachactthat

makesup

the

unlawful

conduct

islikely

not

actionable

on

itsown.

Id. Asaresult,theSupremeCourtconcluded,hostilework



37/45


37

environmentclaimsaretimelysolongasanactcontributingtothat

hostileenvironment

takes

place

within

the

statutory

time

period.

Id.at105.

Althoughthiswayofapplyingastatuteoflimitationsis

generallyusedintheemploymentdiscriminationcontext,wehave

notlimitedittothatareaalone. SeeShomov.CityofNewYork,579

F.3d176,18182(2dCir.2009)(concludingthatthecontinuing

violationdoctrinecanapplytoEighthAmendmentdeliberate

indifferenceclaims);seealsoFahsConstr.Grp.,Inc.v.Gray,725F.3d

289,292(2dCir.2013)(percuriam)(concludingthatforEqual

Protectionclaimsbroughtunder1983,[w]hereaplaintiff

challengesacontinuouspracticeandpolicyofdiscrimination...the

commencementofthestatuteoflimitationsperiodmaybedelayed

untilthelastdiscriminatoryactinfurtheranceofit(internal

quotationmarks

omitted)).



38/45


38

Here,Shermansclaimisbasedonanunusualseriesof

regulationsand

tactical

maneuvers

that

constitutes

ataking

when

consideredtogether,eventhoughnosinglecomponentis

unconstitutionalwhenconsideredinisolation. Asinthecontextof

thecasesdescribedabove,itcannotbesaidthatShermansproperty

wastakenonanyparticularday. ButbecauseShermanalleges

thatatleastoneoftheactscomprisingthetakingoccurredwithin

threeyearsoffilingthecase,hisclaimisnottimebarred.We

thereforeneednotreachtheissueofwhetherthelimitationsperiod

istolledunder28U.S.C1367(d).

II. OtherFederalClaimsTheDistrictCourtruledthatotherfederalclaimswereunripe

forthesamereasonitconcludedShermanstakingsclaimwas

unripe. BecausewehavedeterminedthatShermanstakingsclaim

was,

in

fact,

ripe,

the

District

Courts

ruling

can

no

longer

stand.

Therefore,forthefederalnontakingsclaimsthatweredismissed



39/45


39

solelyonripenessgrounds,theDistrictCourtshouldconsideron

remandwhether

Sherman

stated

aclaim.

Someclaims,however,theDistrictCourtdismissedforfailure

tostateaclaim. Theywere(A)claimsunder42U.S.C.1981and

1982;and(B)aproceduraldueprocessclaimbasedontheTowns

consultantsfeelaw. Thoseclaimswereproperlydismissed.

A. Section1981andSection1982ClaimsTheDistrictCourtconcludedthatShermandidnotstatea

claimbasedon1981,anditdeniedasfutileShermansrequestto

addaclaimunder42U.S.C.1982forthesamereasonsitdismissed

the1981

claim.

SeeSherman,

2013

WL

1148922,

at*6n.6.

Forbothclaims,Shermanmustallegefactssupportingthe

Townsintenttodiscriminateagainsthimonthebasisofhisrace.

SeeRiverav.UnitedStates,928F.2d592,60708(2dCir.1991).Jews

are

considered

a

race

for

the

purposes

of

1981

and

1982.

United

Statesv.Nelson,277F.3d164,177(2dCir.2002).



40/45


40

ShermansallegationsthattheTowndiscriminatedagainst

himbecause

he

was

Jewish

are

insufficient.

He

states

that

the

municipalDefendantsknewthathewasJewish,andthatata

TownBoardmeeting,heheardTowncitizensexpressfearthat

MareBrookmightbecomeaHassidicVillagelikethenearby

KiryasJoel.Healsoallegesthatamodelhomewasvandalized

withaspraypaintedswastika.However,noneofthisislinkedto

anyTownofficial.Nordoesheallegethatanysimilarlysituated

nonJewsweretreateddifferently. Therefore,theDistrictCourt

correctlydismissedthe1981claimanddeniedShermanleaveto

amendtoaddthe1982claim.

B. DueProcessChallengetoConsultantsFeeLawTheDistrictCourtalsoproperlydismissedShermansclaim

thattheTownsimpositionofitsconsultantsfeelawdidnot

provide

sufficient

procedural

due

process.

Town

Code

48

3

providesthatanapplicantforapprovalofanylanddevelopment

proposalshallreimbursetheTownsreasonablefees. Pursuantto



41/45


41

485(A),[a]napplicantmayappeal,inwriting,totheTownBoard

forareduction

inthe

required

reimbursement

amount.

The

appeal

mustbefiledwithinfifteendaysfromthedeliveryofthevoucher

itemizingtheservicesperformedandtheamountchargedforthose

services. 485(B);483(K)(L). Theitemizedvoucheris

accompaniedbyanotice,informingtheapplicantofthese

requirements. 483(L).

Shermanmakestwoargumentsinsupportofhisdueprocess

claim.4 First,hearguesthattheTowndidnotprovideSherman

withactualnoticeofwhathewasbeingaskedtopayfor....

AppellantsBrief58.However,thecomplaintstatesthatwhilehe

initiallydidnotreceiveinvoicesfortherequiredconsultantsfees,

4Shermansargumentsinsupportofthedueprocessclaimraisedforthefirst

timeinhisreplybriefarewaived. SeeJPMorganChaseBankv.AltosHornosde

Mexico,S.A.deC.V.,412F.3d418,428(2dCir.2005)([A]rgumentsnotmadein

anappellantsopeningbriefarewaivedeveniftheappellantpursuedthose

argumentsinthedistrictcourtorraisedtheminareplybrief.).Wealsodonot

considerShermansargumentthattheprovisionsinquestionviolatedNewYork

lawbecausetheDistrictCourtdeclinedtoexercisesupplementaljurisdiction

overthatclaim.



42/45


43/45


43

opportunityforahearingaregiven,dueprocesswillbesatisfied,

regardlessof...whether

the

owner

takes

advantage

ofthe

opportunityforahearing. Brodyv.Vill.ofPortChester,434F.3d121,

131(2dCir.2005);seealsoSmigav.DeanWitterReynolds,Inc.,766

F.2d698,70809(2dCir.1985)(rejectingproceduraldueprocess

challengetotheimpositionofcostsandattorneysfeesbecausethe

partyhadanopportunitytobeheardbutfailedtotakeadvantage

oftheopportunity). TheDistrictCourtthereforeproperly

dismissedthisclaim.

III. StateLawClaimsThe

District

Court

declined

toexercise

supplemental

jurisdictionoverShermansstatelawclaimsonthegroundthatit

haddismissedallofhisfederalclaims. BecauseShermanstatedat

leastonefederalclaim,wealsovacatetheDistrictCourtsdecision

to

remand

the

state

law

claims

to

state

court.



44/45


44

CONCLUSION

Because

of

the

way

the

Town

handled

Shermans

MareBrook

proposalandsubsequentlitigation,Shermansclaimbecameripe.

Accordingtotheallegationsinthecomplaint,whichwetakeastrue

forthesepurposes,theTownemployedadecadeofunfairand

repetitiveprocedures,whichmadeseekingafinaldecisionfutile.

TheTownalsounfairlymanipulatedthelitigationofthecaseina

waythatmighthavepreventedShermanfromeverbringinghis

takingsclaim. Itremovedthecasefromstatecourt,andthenmoved

todismissonthegroundthatthetakingsclaimmustbeheardin

statecourt.

We

cannot

accept

this

tactic.

Throughout

itall,

the

TownpreventedShermanfromdevelopinghisland.HadtheTown

actedmorereasonably,theclaimmayneverhavebecomeripe,and

notakingmayeverhadoccurred.WeREVERSEtheDistrictCourts

decision

to

dismiss

Shermans

federal

takings

claim.

BecausetheWilliamsonCountyripenessrequirementsare

satisfied,weVACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontotheextentit



45/45


dismissedShermansfederalnontakingsclaimssolelyonripeness

grounds.On

remand,

the

District

Court

may

consider

whether

Shermanhassufficientlystatedthoseclaims.

WeAFFIRMtheDistrictCourtsdecision(1)todismiss

Shermans1981claim,(2)todenyShermanleavetoamendtoadd

a1982claim,and(3)todismissShermansproceduraldueprocess

claimbasedontheconsultantsfeelaw.

Becauseatleastonefederalclaimhasbeenstated,we

VACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodeclinetoexercise

supplementaljurisdictionoverShermansstatelawclaimsonthe

groundthatallthefederalclaimshadbeendismissed. Onremand,

theDistrictCourtmayreconsiderwhethertoexercisesupplemental

jurisdictioninlightofthenewpostureofthecase.

WeREMANDtotheDistrictCourtforfurtherproceedings

consistentwith

this

opinion.


sherman v. town of chester, no. 13-1503-cv (2d cir. may 16, 2014)

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