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SHELDON WOLIN 'S VISION OF POLITICS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

Over fifteen years ago a study of the political science professionshowed that political theory was regarded as a field of study in

which little significant work had been produced.' The low esteem inwhich political philosophy or political theory was held was not sur-prising considering the growing commitment to the "scientific"study of politics within the profession. Traditional politicalphilosophy was held by some social scientists to be a subject best leftto the history of ideas within departments of history. Of equal con-cern is the fact that many teachers of political science considered thequestion closed. One introductory text for political analysis advisesstudents that the dispute over the scientific study of politics isfoolish, and that it is advisable to study politics rather than to fight"over the only way to do it."2

There are, of course, a number of influences within the socialsciences which have called the enterprise of political philosophy intodoubt. 3 Specifically, there is a denial that reason can provide a guideby which men can make judgments as to the superiority of values.Preferences or values, some contend, are reflections of an epoch orare determined by one's environment. Social scientists can factuallyaccount for values held, but there is no scientific way by which onecan choose between values. Guided by positivism, politicalphilosophy has become discredited. Since positivism claims man cannever attain certainty of the truth, the enterprise of politicalphilosophy can never be fruitful. Historicism, on the other hand,denies the possibility of political philosophy for slightly differentreasons. Knowledge of the good cannot be understood apart fromthe historical circumstances in which it exists. Since all "truths" arevalid only for their time and place, the search for knowledge ofpolitical things that is true and just for all men, independent of theirhistorical situation is held impossible. Both the influence ofpositivism and historicism have combined to call into question thepossibility of political philosophy.

The contemporary suspicion of the study of political philosophy

1. Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Trends in American Political Science:Some Analytical Notes," American Political Science Review, LVII (December, 1963),pp. 933-947.

2. D.A. Strickland, L.L. Wade and R.E. Johnson, A Primer of Political Analysis(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 1.

3. For a discussion of this see, Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? and OtherStudies (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 9-55.

84 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

parallels the tension that has existed between the philosopher andthe non-philosopher through the ages. The relationship of thephilosopher to the city has never been tranquil, as revealed by thefate of Socrates. But we should also remember that Socratesphilosophized in Athens until he was an old man. The significance ofhis life, philosophy, necessitated a formal defense when philosophywas accused of subverting the foundation of the city. Death was notthe only punishment accorded those who threatened the city. Exiletoo was a means of eliminating the "guilty" and was offered toSocrates as an alternative to death. The acceptance of his fate waspart of the Socratic vindication of philosophy. In this sense, the con-temporary denigration of political philosophy and its banishment isnot surprising, but this provides little solace to those who are awareof the consequences for the city.

To appreciate properly the relationship of the philosopher to thecity requires some appreciation of philosophy. The defense ofpolitical philosophy begins with the study of political philosophy.Yet the contemporary denial of the possibility of the former has ledto a rejection of the latter as an exercise of little merit other than ofhistorical interest.

Prominent among the contemporary defenders of political theoryhas been Sheldon Wolin. Wolin's writings address the attack againstpolitical theory by social scientists and also offer an explication ofthe tradition of political theory from Plato to contemporarythinkers. Not only has he provided a commentary on the substanceof political theory, but Professor Wolin has provided guidance onhow to read political theory or political philosophy.

My appraisal of Sheldon Wolin's contribution to political scienceinitially will (a) examine his understanding of the nature of thetheoretical enterprise, and how the student of political theory is tounderstand the works of the great political theorists. As we shall see,Wolin has devoted considerable energy to an attempt to describehow the theorist has engaged in discourse with the continuing tradi-tion of political theory while at the same time responding to the par-ticular political crisis of the time. Attention will be given to what hedescribes as "epic" theory, and to the characteristics of the epictheorist. (b) Following this discussion, the examination will focus onthe insights and difficulties that result from Wolin's understandingof political theory. This will be discussed primarily in the context ofhis explication of Plato's writings. These sections will be basedprimarily on Wolin's principal work, Politics and Vision although

SHELDON WOLIN ' S VISION OF POLITICS 85

arguments from his other writings are incorporated frequentlythroughout the analysis. (c) The concluding body of the appraisalexamines Wolin's approach to political theory as he has applied it tothe crisis of American politics. In this section emphasis is given to ananalysis of articles and commentary published in scholarly journalsas well as magazines of opinion. Again, the strengths and weaknessesof his approach to political theory will be evaluated. The last sectionsubstantively is concerned with the condition of American politics,the role of the political theorist in providing citizen education, andthe role of science in the political science profession.

Throughout the writings of Sheldon Wolin a concern with citizenparticipation appears. For this reason, the emphasis upon the par-ticipation of citizens in politics that appears in this analysis ofWolin's work is consistent with the importance it is given in histeachings.

Sheldon Wolin's most comprehensive study of political philosophyis entitled Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation inWestern Political Thought.' The title itself is revealing. It reflects

4. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in WesternPolitical Thought (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).Throughout this review the following abbreviations will be used within the text of theessay to refer to Wolin's writings.

Politics and Vision (P&V)."Political Theory As a Vocation, " American Political Science Review, LXII

(December, 1969), pp. 1062-1082. (P.T.V.)Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory (Los Angeles: William Andrews

Clark Memorial Library of the University of California, 1970). (H.)"Political Theory: Trends and Goals," International Encyclopedia of the Social

Sciences, Vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 318-331. (P.T.T.G.)"Hannah Arendt and the Ordinance of Time, " Social Research, 44 (Spring, 1977),

pp. 91-105. ( H.A.O.T.)"Stopping to Think," The New York Review of Books, XXV (October 26, 1978), pp.

16-21. (S.T.)"Exchange on Hannah Arendt," The New York Review of Books, XXVI (January

25, 1979), pp. 46-47. (E.H.A.)"The State of the Union, " The New York Review of Books, XXV ( May 18, 1978), pp.

28-31. (S. U.)"Reagan Country, " The New York Review of Books, XXVII (December 18, 1980),

pp. 9-12. (R.C.)"Political Theory and Political Commentary," in Political Theory and Political

Education, edited by Melvin Richter (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,


Wolin's view that political philosophy constitutes in two senses aform of "seeing" political phenomena. First, and most obviously,political philosophy provides a description of the political. Second,and of greater import, the enterprise constitutes a form of aestheticor religious vision (P. &V. , 18). The second meaning of vision con-cerns the imaginative capacity of the philosopher, which, in Wolin'swords, like the imaginative capacity of Coleridge's poet, is " an`esemplastic' power that `forms all into one graceful intelligentwhole"' (P. &V., 18). Through the use of fanciful statements, thepolitical philosopher exaggerates aspects of political phenomenathat provide through abstraction a sense of the whole that is normal-ly not visible. Unlike propositions which intend to prove or disprove,the sole intent of fancy is illumination. Since no theorist, accordingto Wolin, has the capacity to observe all political things directly, im-agination is a device that enables the theorist to provide throughabstraction "interconnections where none can be" (P. &V., p 19).The imaginative element in political thought, Wolin suggests, pro-vides more than a methodological construction of the whole. It isalso a medium which expresses the political theorist's fundamentalvalues or the theorist's vision of the idea of the good.

Wolin describes this imaginative "seeing" as an architectonic vision, "wherein the political imagination attempts to mould thetotality of political phenomena to accord with some vision of theGood that lies outside the political order" (P. &V., 19). The orderingprinciple of political theorists has varied throughout the tradition ofWestern political thought, e.g., it has been religious, historical, andin recent times, economic. Despite the variation of the architectonicimpulse, Wolin observes, there are characteristics common to theenterprise. "All of these dimensions possess a futurist quality, a pro-jection of the political order into a time that is yet to be" (P. &V.,20). In addition, the exaggerated portrayal of the political order ex-

1980), pp. 190-203. (P. T. &P. C. )Carter and the New Constitution, " The New York Review of Books, XXV (June 1,

1978), pp. 16-19. (C.N.C.)"Review Essay: Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics: A Critique," American

Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), pp. 125-150. (C)"Paradigms and Political Theories, " in Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to

Professor Michael Oakeshott On the Occasion of His Retirement, edited by PrestonKing and B.C. Parekh (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1968), pp. 125-152.(Par. &P. T. )

SHELDON WOLIN' S VISION OF POLITICS 87

pressed in the vision provides a glimpse of the possibilities ofpolitical life which serves as "a necessary complement to action"(P. &V., 20). As an example of the relationship between vision andaction, Wolin points to Plato who recognized that political actionwas conscious and deliberate. Action properly guided requires aperspective that transcends the immediate historical context inwhich it is formulated and applied. In this sense, the architectonicvision opens new courses of action formerly invisible to political ac-tors.

In later writings Wolin classifies these political visionaries as "epictheorists" (P.T.V., 1078-1081 and H., 4 ff.). "Epic" theory isdistinguished from other forms of theory and method by its structureof formal features and its "structure of intentions" (P. T. V., 1078).To explain the formal features of epic theory, Wolin invites a com-parison between epic theory and Thomas Kuhn's notion of "extraor-dinary" science. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhndistinguished those scientific theories which "inaugurate a new wayof looking at the world, which includes a new set of concepts, as wellas new cognitive and normative standards," from previous theories(P. T. V., 1078 and Par. & P.T., ff.). These theories, according toKuhn, mark a break from previous scientific theories and identifythe great scientific mind. Epic theory, Wolin suggests, also in-augurates a new way of looking at the world that parallels the im-portance of "extraordinary" science. Existing political structuresand interrelationships are reassembled in a novel way.

The attention that is devoted to the formal features of epic theoryis brief. Most of Wolin's discussion centers on the structure of inten-tions. This dominates his discussion of Hobbes as an epic theorist. Hemeans by the structure of intentions:

...the controlling purposes of the theorist, the considerations which determinehow the formal features of concept, fact, logic, and interconnection are to bedeployed so as to heighten the effect of the whole (P.T.V., 1078).

Wolin insists that all epic theories share a persistent feature. All ofthem are guided by a public concern, a quality that he holds to beintrinsic to "being engaged in political theory" (P.T.V., 1078-1079,emphasis in the original). All of the epic theorists possess a quality of"caring for public things" which has led to the formulation oftheories that are "critical and, in the liberal sense, radical" (P. T. V.,1079). Once again, Wolin draws upon an observation from Kuhn.


Scientific revolutions follow the exposure of anomalies, phenomenathat cannot be and yet should be explained by existing theory (Par.and P.T., 136). Anomalies draw attention to the deficiencies in ex-isting theory. So, too, for the epic theorist does the problematicalcharacter of political life surface in times of crisis. Dominantly con-cerned with the problems in-the-world, according to Wolin, epictheories issue from crises in the world (P. T. V., 1079-1080 andP. &V., 8-11). During crisis, political phenomena are less effectivelyintegrated by institutional forms" (P. &. V., 8). Conventional mean-ings for political phenomena are destroyed, and political behaviorbecomes random. The disorder of the actual world poses a challengeto the Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. "The range of possibilitiesappears infinite, for now the political philosopher is not confined tocriticism and interpretation; he must reconstruct a shattered worldof meanings and their accompanying institutional expressions; hemust, in short, fashion a political cosmos out of political chaos"(P. &V., 8).

Another dimension, a psychological one, of the structure of inten-tions emerges in Wolin's analysis of Hobbes within the epic tradi-tion. The public concern of the theorist is still emphasized but itsrelationship to crisis is de-emphasized. Wolin does not say that epictheory only emerges in time of crisis. He does say that crisis drawsforth epic theory, but even in periods of tranquility the prospect ofpotential upheaval leads to an overwhelming concern for order andstability. But even this relationship receives scant attention in theHobbes discussion. Here a different orientation serves to define epictheory. "The phrase `epic tradition' refers to a type of politicaltheory which is inspired mainly by the hope of achieving a great andmemorable deed through the medium of thought" (H., 4). He em-phatically states that other objectives, such as hypotheses for scien-tific investigation or knowledge for its own sake, are secondary. Theintent of the great minds was not to solicit reaction to the "logical orfactual merits of the words, but an attempt to compel admirationand awe for the magnitude of the achievement" (H., 5).

Plato, Wolin argues, is the "paradigmatic figure" of this tradi-tion, and the Republic is held to be the "heroic issue of his politicalfrustrations" (H., 5). Two related reasons are given for Plato's use ofepic theory as the medium for establishing his "memorable deed."Political life, he understood, would corrupt the philosopher by thetemptation to pursue power and gain the favor of the masses. To re-main aloof would assure integrity, but the isolation would also


preclude the accomplishment of a great deed. Wolin offers,however, a historical link to Plato's motivation for writing theRepublic. The great philosopher's failure at Syracuse to guidepolitical life and the lack of a significant political deed led to thecreation of this dialogue. "The Republic was a redemptive act,redeeming in thought what had been denied in practice" (H., 5 andPar. P.T., 144). Immediately, however, Wolin qualifies this bystating that redeeming is only one element in the structure of inten-tions. The ultimate epic expression was the idea that theory mightact as a "form for expressing action in thought (H., 6).

Wolin offers Machiavelli, Bentham, Marsilius, More, Hobbes,Rousseau, and Marx as examples of the heroic impulse in politicaltheory. Epic theorists may act for a variety of reasons such asredemption or compensation for previous failures as well as pride.To understand fully this intent, Wolin states, we must recapture"the excitement of those who first took self-consciously to inventingpolitical theories" (H., 10). Emphasizing the use of epic theory bythe Greeks, he suggests that "early theorists were not only striving topersuade their audiences of a truth, but, above all, to astonish themby a deed" (H., 10). Astonishment, the ultimate recognition, wasthe end of epic theory. In this sense, epic theory extends the spatialdimensions of its considerations so that the totality of political lifewas reflected upon (H., 11).

As mentioned above, Hobbes is also classified as an epic theorist.Of Hobbes, Wolin writes:

The epic impulse infected all of his writings, causing him to venture into suchwidely varied fields as philosophy, political theory, mathematics, science, andtheology, and to go forth in the temper of one who seeks glory by a memorabledeed (H., 15).

Basing his argument on the Autobiography composed by Hobbes atthe age of eighty-four, Wolin contends that Hobbes was not intenton making a contribution in each of these areas but was adamant ontheir mastery. Hobbes' attack was directed towards the giants of thefield, and the desire was "to establish his own supremacy" (H., 15).It is observed by Wolin that Hobbes treats these confrontations asphysical combat so that his achievement bears the semblance of aheroic act. Wolin later adds, however, that Hobbes was "concernednot just to win intellectual victories, but to win them because theymight serve to better the human political condition in fundamentalrespects" (H., 18). Hobbes hoped to usher in a cultural revolution


that would eliver his age from the errors of the classical tradition.Wolin emphasizes that Hobbes' indictment of the classical tradition"was not meant to refute old errors, but rather to undo a far morecomplex achievement, and one far harder to rectify" (H., 18). Evenmore than Machiavelli, Wolin argues, Hobbes was determined todestroy previous paradigms (Par. & P.T., 140). In order to bring thiscultural revolution about, Hobbes had to free mankind from theclassical theories and ideas which had heretofore guided society.

Wolin adds that Hobbes believed that such a transformation "waspossible because his own age had demonstrated that...men couldproduce theories which would transform the world in thought andpractice" (H., 19). Having viewed the accomplishments wrought bymathematics and science, Hobbes' model, Wolin suggests, was thescientist-hero. Galileo and Kepler had demonstrated to the age theaccomplishments that could be achieved through human reasononce the authority of the past was renounced. Wolin adds,"...Hobbes wrote from the midst of a scientific revolution whichseemed to snap the continuity between the present and the past, ex-posing the wisdom of the ancients as convenient targets for sarcasm"(P. &V., 242).

Not only did the success of the scientific revolution contribute toHobbes' belief that he could transform his age, but in addition,Wolin suggests, political creativity was also encouraged by the tur-bulence of seventeenth century England. The chaos of the civil warsand revolution "aroused a sense of opportunity in Hobbes..."(P. &V., 242). The upheavals in the political, social, religious, andeconomic spheres came together to disrupt the existing order. ForHobbes the possibility of continuous disorder nurtured a sense ofpossibility as well as fear. Fear, for Wolin, was another side of thedream of creativity (P. &V., 243). The fear of social and politicaldisintegration that would bring England "to the edge ofnothingness" inspired, Wolin claims, "one of the most importantconceptions of the political thought of the seventeenth and eigh-teenth centuries, that of `the state of nature,' the condition ofpolitical nothingness" (P. &V., 244).

The conditions to actualize the transformation of previousparadigms existed in Hobbes' time. "Hobbes believed that for thefirst time political philosophy was genuinely in a position to bringboth truth and peace" (P.&V., 245). Political philosophy must com-prehend the reasons why modern science had been so successful, andattempt to change the backward state of political philosophy so that

L


it too could be so successful. Wolin contends that Hobbes attributedscience's progress to a willingness to reject traditional modes ofthought and inquiry. In Wolin's words, "The unprecedenteddevelopment of `science' was pictured by Hobbes as an intellectualdrama of creative destruction" (P.&V., 245). Wolin believes thatHobbes attempted to convert it to the uses of philosophy, i.e., "tomake creative destruction the starting point for philosophicalmethod" (P. &V., 246). The emphasis for Hobbes, according toWolin, was on the construction of a new reality.

Nine of the ten chapters of Politics and Vision examine theWestern tradition of political thought in light of the basiccharacteristics attributed to political visionaries or epic theorists andtheir response to both historical needs and enduring questions. Theemphasis throughout the book is on understanding the activity ofpolitical theory and thus the essence of the enterprise (P. &V., 2).Wolin refrains from offering a definition of political theory orphilosophy because "political philosophy is not an essence with aneternal nature" (P. &V., 1). First, he argues that the field ofpolitics, the subject of the activity to be both understood and actedupon, is a created one (P.&V., 5). He denies that the politicalphilosopher can define the political in any desired manner since theraw data is supplied to the theorist by institutional practices and ar-rangements. But the significance and meaning of these ar-rangements are not rooted in the nature of things. The concepts ofpolitics are brought into being by the political theorist as is thevocabulary by which the meaningfulness of political life isunderstood.

As discussed in the context of the common characteristics of epictheorists, the activity of political theory reveals itself through time.Political theory or philosophy is held to be fundamentally public.Wolin means by this two things. First, the object being examined isconcerned with what is common to the whole community, and heproperly points to Cicero's description of the commonwealth as a respublics', a "public thing" (P. &V., 4) . Second, philosophy "claims to

5. It should be noted that though his later article "Political Theory: Trends andGoals," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12 (New York: Mac-millan, 1968) does offer a definition of political theory which includes philosophy asone of its components, Wolin uses political theory and political philosophy inter-changeably throughout Politics and Vision.


deal with truths publicly arrived at and publicly demonstrable"(P. &V., 4). In a revealing note, Wolin makes the following state-ment:

To be sure, there is Plato's lament that certain truths are uncommunicable.Whatever may be said about such truths, they cannot be said to have anyphilosophic value. The same holds for the so-called secret doctrines imputed tothe ancient philosophers. Esoteric doctrines may be accepted as a form ofreligious instruction, but not of philosophical teaching (P. &V., 435, n. 1).

The sharing of the truth, according to Wolin's view, is necessaryfor it to be philosophical. Wolin does not, and this point will be ad-dressed below, suggest what is intrinsic to religion that defines itsconcern as private knowledge and what makes philosophicalknowledge intrinsically public. Philosophy is defined by Wolin as"the love or passionate pursuit of wisdom-that is, a knowledgewhich would enable men to become wiser in the conduct of life"(P. T. T. G., 319). Applied to the realm of political life, politicalphilosophy makes men wiser in the handling of common affairs.Here Wolin does not pause to make the distinction that knowledgecan be known and still not applied. The possession of knowledgemust be distinguished from its application. Knowledge may bevalued for its own sake or it may be valued for its utility. They arenot the same. Wolin's definition of the value of knowledge statedabove implies application and is consistent with his denial in Politicsand Vision that uncommunicable truths are of value and thatesoteric teaching can be philosophical. There is another confusion inWolin's discussion of the public nature of philosophy. The object ofknowledge, politics or some aspect of the political, may be public bynature. Knowledge of that public object may, however, remainprivate or be made public. For philosophers to possess knowledge ofthe political and refrain from public disclosure of that knowledgedoes not make the knowledge less philosophical nor the object lesspublic. Wolin confuses the nature of the object with knowledge ofthe object.

Wolin observes that political theorists aim to understand and alterthe whole of politics but that the whole is known to them in a par-ticular context. As stated above, a political crisis often calls forth theepic theorist to provide a new guidance for restructuring public life.Wolin holds that theorizing about politics involves a paradox.Whereas the aim is to provide an understanding about the whole ofpolitics, each theorist, forced by the necessity of reducing the whole


to manageable proportions, emphasizes some aspects at the expenseof others (P. T. T. G., 319). The same point is made in a slightly dif-ferent way in Politics and Vision: "Every politicalphilosophy... represents a necessarily limited perspective from whichit views the phenomena of political nature" (P. &V., 21).

Wolin observes yet another aspect of the relationship between theexisting political order and political theory. He states, "institutionsestablish a previous coherence among political phenomena; hence,when the political philosopher reflects upon society, he is not con-fronted by a whirl of disconnected events or activities hurtlingthrough a Democritean void but by phenomena already endowedwith coherence and interrelationships" (P. &V., 7). The existingcoherence, of course, is not simply experienced but has been provid-ed by a continuous tradition of political thought. Wolin suggeststhat the tradition is the greatest inhibitor on the politicalphilosopher. The legacy from previous political philosophers has thefunction of "preserving the insights, experience, and refinements ofthe past, and compelling those who would participate in theWestern political dialogue to abide by certain rules and usages"(P.&V., 22). Although the philosophical inheritance may inhibittheoretical speculation initially because it sets the terms of thedebate, there is also a facilitating aspect of the tradition. Providingfamiliar vocabulary, symbols, and concepts, the tradition facilitatesdebate and allows for new insights to be incorporated.

Different political theorists, Wolin contends, have confronteddistinct political problems peculiar to their time and place, (e.g.,the expansion of the size of the political community called into ques-tion the ordering principles of the polls, and the success ofmathematics and science raised doubts about the status of politicalknowledge). Each of the great minds addressed the fundamentalpolitical questions as they were manifested in the issues of the day.Because these issues raised fundamental questions about politics, theinsights of the past were examined for their applicability to the pre-sent. The consequence of this is that "a political philosopherunavoidably infects his own thought with past ideas and situations"(P.&V., 26). There is both a regress to past thought and a cumula-tion of thought which constitutes a political tradition (P. &V., 26).

Because the insights of the past are combined with those of thepresent, the Western political tradition appears for Wolin not as a"fund of absolute political wisdom," but as a tradition that is con-stantly acquiring new insights and "continuously evolving grammar


and vocabulary to facilitate communication and to orient the under-standing" (P. &V., 26-27). Understood in this fashion, individualpolitical philosophers as well as the Western tradition of politicalthought as a whole is best studied in light of historical development.In his words:

...since the history of political philosophy is, as we shall see, an intellectualdevelopment wherein successive thinkers have added new dimensions to theanalysis and understanding of politics, an inquiry into that development is notso much a venture into antiquarianism as a form of political education (P. &V.,27).

As an example of the continuation of the tradition in the twentiethcentury, Wolin turns to Hannah Arendt. In an issue of SocialResearch dedicated to the memory of Hannah Arendt, Wolin ap-provingly writes that her theorizing was "an act of recovery, or reac-quiring lost meanings of remembering" (H.A.O.T., 96). The act ofrecovery was not archaeology, but "a mode of re-flection and in-sight which carried the mind back to a privileged moment..."(H.A.O.T., 96, emphasis in the original). Arendt sought within thetradition, especially the pre-Socratic and the Socratic traditions,what was essentially political. Though Wolin has been critical ofportions of Arendt's teachings,° he holds her dialogue with the pastas keeping within the tradition of Western political thought andshowing how the great political theories of the past "might be usedto illuminate the predicaments" of the age (H.A.O.T., 92-93). Pasttheories, he suggests, should be studied to improve our understan-ding of politics and should not be judged in light of contemporarystandards. To understand Aristotle as the first great politicalbehavioral scientist is to ascribe only "antiquarian interest" to histhought and is to acknowledge that there is greater merit in readingcontemporaries (P. T. V., 1077). Arendt's act of recovery extractedthe understanding of politics from the past, and for this reason shemaintained the tradition.

II

The study of the history of political theories teaches, Wolin

6. See, Sheldon Wolin, "Stopping to Think," The New York Review of Books, XXV(October 26, 1978), pp. 16-21, and "Exchange on Hannah Arendt," The New YorkReview of Books, XXVI (January 25, 1979), pp. 46-47. Wolin's review was of HannahArendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, Thinking and Vol. 2, Willing.

SHELDON WOLIN'S VISION OF POLITICS 95

argues, that "the political order is articulated through its history"(P. T. V., 1077); and that the present has to a significant extent beenmodeled by the past. All but two of the chapters of Politics and Vi-sion are explications of the thought of the great thinkers of theWestern political tradition in light of the historical perspectivepresented in the first chapter. In order of examination, Wolin writesof Plato; the Romans; Christian political thought, primarilyAugustine; Luther, Calvin; Machiavelli; Hobbes; Liberalism,primarily Locke; and a final chapter primarily dealing withSocialism. The last two chapters emphasize the dominant trends ofthe modern period. This book is ambitious in design. A detailed ex-amination of each of the chapters would be an undertaking as am-bitious as Politics and Vision. Rather than attempt to deal with thewhole superficially, attention will be placed on one chapter tohighlight the types of questions and analysis that are brought to bearby Wolin.

There is no better place to begin than the beginning of the tradi-tion, Plato. Wolin's treatment of Plato is particularly useful for thispurpose because his discussion of the Greek philosopher encompassesall aspects of epic theory. He, more than any other philosopher,Wolin contends, presented the case for political philosophy beingthe architectonic science for society. Through Wolin's analysis ofPlato, we are able to observe how the epic theorist's response to thedisorder of the actual world, the epic theorist's creation of a politics,and the limits placed on that vision.

Wolin speaks of political philosophy as having been "invented" bythe Greeks (P.&V., 28). One must presume that by invention hedoes not mean human construction, but finding or discoveringpolitical philosophy similar to Cicero's view that Socrates broughtphilosophy to the cities from heaven.' Political philosophy, ac-cording to Wolin, was prepared by a radical alteration of the tradi-tional view of nature. Nature was held to be governed by the gods,and the Greek philosophers of the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. "ap-proached nature as something comprehensible to the human in-tellect, something to be explained rationally without recourse to the

7. See, Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,1964), p. 13. The reference is to Cicero's statement: "Socrates autum primusphilosophiam de vocavit e caelo et in urbus conlocavit et in domus etiam intorduxit etcoegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere. " Cicero, Tusculan Disputa-tions v. 10.


whims of the gods" (P.&V., 29). According to Wolin, these pre-Socratic philosophers explained all phenomena, human and non-human, in terms of nature. The Sophists are credited with ex-tricating politics from nature and asserting that politics was adistinct field of inquiry.

Plato, according to Wolin, rests his inquiry on the distinction firstarticulated by the Sophists and later by Socrates: "that the politicalmust first be differentiated from the other dimensions of life"(P.&V., 32). One of the great insights of Plato, singled out byWolin, was the view that political society constituted an orderedwhole with interrelated functions. No one prior to Plato conceivedof political life as consisting of differentiated roles and functionseach contributing to the whole. Locating this argument in thePlatonic dialogues, the Republic and the Laws, Wolin sees thephilosopher-statesman, auxiliary, or producer defined in terms oftheir contribution to the political whole. "The harmonization andintegration of these roles made of political society a functioning in-terdependent whole" (P. &V., 33). Plato's expectation of the unity tobe achieved in political society was possibly exaggerated, he sug-gests, but the great achievement of Plato was the perspective thatthe political had to be viewed as a whole.

With Plato, Wolin writes, the ordering vision of politics con-fronted the phenomena of politics for the first time (P. &. V., 34). Noone has ever advanced the case for political philosophy as the ar-chitectonic science for society in such comprehensive way as Plato.Political philosophy should govern, but to do so two assumptionsabout the nature of politics had to be accepted: all politicalphenomena must be "comprehensible to the human mind andmalleable to human art" (P. &V., 35).

Wolin thus finds a duality between the "form-giving role ofpolitical thought and the form-receiving function of "political 'mat-ter' " (P. &. V., 35). Political philosophy was not intent simply todescribe political phenomena but aimed to transform extantpolitical life in light of a vision of the Good. Knowledge of theperfect order, what Wolin identifies by the words eidon and idea,are indispensable for the political transformation. "The effect of thiswas to impart to political philosophy a projective quality" (P. &V.,35). What Wolin holds to be projected, of course, is the good societyin light of the vision of the good. Plato, according to this view,possessed throughout his life a conviction "that men could effect ajunction between truth and practice" (P. &V., 36). Politicalphilosophy was then held to be a practical enterprise.

SHELDON WOLIN 'S VISION OF POLITICS 97

Statecraft is identified as the means to fashion souls. To bringabout the rightly ordered individual required the creation of a right-ly ordered society, since the individual resided within a social set-ting.

In addition to the reform of political society and the moral im-provement of its members, Wolin finds Plato's political theoryequally concerned with the security of philosophy (P.&V., 37).These motivations are, of course, related in that philosophy was themeans for accomplishing the other objectives. Philosophy must thenrule. To possess knowledge of the idea of politics, Wolin suggests, isto have intellectually fashioned out of the chaos of actual politicallife, an intellectual notion of the proper society informed by the vi-sion of the Good (P. &V., 38). In thought, if not in deed, the politicalphfOosopherrhad accomplished what the ruler in practice had not.Viewed in this manner, Wolin continues, the "philosopher acquir-ing power or the ruler acquiring philosophy did not symbolize aharnessing of opposites but a blending of two kinds of power; a join-ing of complements" (P.&V., 38).

Plato's political philosophy, Wolin holds, must be understood inlight of the Greek political experience. His recognition of politicscame from the turbulent quality of Athenian democracy. Actualpolitical life violated the Platonic standards since rule was not basedon wisdom, and almost all aspects of political life violated the worldof Forms and the Idea of the Good. Political life was constantly influx as groups pursued private gain (P. &V., 41). Actual political lifewas indicative of the distorted view of reality and the irrationality ofa society uninformed by a vision of the Good.

At this point, Wolin introduces important distinctions. For Plato,he suggests, political philosophy is "knowledge pertaining to thegood life at the public level and political ruling, the right manage-ment of the public affairs of the community" (P. &V., 42, emphasisin the original). Politics, Wolin asserts, was concerned with the"struggle for competitive advantage, of the problems of distributingthe good things of life among the various groups of society, and ofthe instabilities engendered by changing social and economic rela-tionships among the members" (P.&V., 42). Politics, for Plato,Wolin asserts, was evil and viewed with hostility by politicalphilosophy (PL&V., 42). The inability to harmonize the relation-ship between "the idea of the political and the idea of politics" isheld to be the central weakness in Plato's philosophy (P. &V., 42-43),emphasis in the original).


Wolin contends that Plato lost sight of the political context whichconcerned such political questions as proper conduct in specificsituations or the nature of attainable goods in political life. Ofgreater concern to Wolin, the neglect of the political context is saidto encourage a "dangerous kind of political art," the art of imposi-tion (P. &V., 43). True political art, in contrast, concerns the recon-ciliation of antagonistic positions, and it involves the creation ofareas of agreement. Wolin sees the crucial difference between the"art of imposition" and the "democratic" leader, now substituted byhim for the true political art, in terms of different constituencies(P.&V., 45). The popular leader's constituency was the communitywith all of its diverse contending forces, while the Platonic leader'sconstituency was the realm of truth (P.&V., 45-46).

For Plato, Wolin contends, the motivation of the ruler wasaesthetic. His aim was to give his materials the imprint of perfectbeauty. "In the Platonic scheme, the community occupied a middleposition between the impulse motivating the ruler and the pattern ofGood at which his art was aimed" (P. &V., 46). Furthermore, Wolinargues, Plato drew upon analogies of the physician, weaver, and ar-tist to explain ruling. The standard of judging the product in eachart is primarily aesthetic. Continuing the analogy with art, Wolinobserves that the ruler could eliminate any obstacle to the path ofthe true form. Applying this to the Republic, Wolin takes literallythe discussions in Book III where most of the poets are banishedfrom the city (399a ff.) and where practitioners of medicine choosewho shall live and who shall die (410a) and the discussions in BookVIII where the "class of idle, extravagant men" are cut out of the ci-ty (564b) and the tragic poets are excluded (568b). He adds the pro-posal in the Republic that those over ten years of age must be banish-ed from the city to insure the success of forming the community tothe lists of actions Plato sanctioned for statesmen (P&V., 47). Theentire political community is transformed towards the idea of theGood, and the statesmen, according to Wolin, and treat the politicalmatter as an artist treats unformed matter.

Citizenship for Plato, Wolin suggests, is defined not in terms ofparticipation, but in terms of the shared "benefits flowing from thatprinciple" (P.&V., 47). Participation, he adds, is not highly valuedby Plato because citizens act on the basis of opinion-not truth. Toemphasize participation in political decisions was " to pave the wayfor government by `opinion"' (P. &V., 58).

Wolin offers a criticism of Plato's de-emphasis of citizen action.


First, issue is taken with Plato's view of the "degree of precision thatpolitical knowledge might attain" (P. &V., 58). He suggests thatsuch a view of political knowledge was a result of Plato's borrowingfrom mathematics, medicine or other fields, and not a result of closescrutiny of political life. Aristotle is invoked by Wolin to support theclaim that political knowledge is not precise. Wolin then twists theargument slightly by suggesting that "insight into the eternal Formsof knowledge," is not that relevant for making political judgments.Where judgments determine public questions, not only are questionsof well-being addressed but also questions of belonging (P. &V., 60).Plato's concern ignores the sense of involvement of the citizens.

Since most political judgments concern the distribution of goodsand honors of society, Wolin contends that the issue of citizen par-ticipation is less the degree of truth expressed and more "the kind ofrationality demanded of a judgment that is to apply to the wholecommunity" (P. &V., 61). Given the character of the political,Wolin advances the standard of fairness, the establishment of "a ruleapplicable to all in roughly the same way..." (P.&V., 61). Rarely,he adds, are citizens treated in the same way and this reflects on thecrudity of political judgments. Due to this fact, Wolin asserts,political expediency has emerged as a solution for creating commonrules among uncommon citizens. The reason for this, Wolin con-tends, is that "political society is simultaneously trying to act and toremain a community," and yet at the same time remain sensitive todifferences within the society (P. &V., 62). Participation, Wolin sug-gests, "is not intended as a symbol of truth but as a tangible expres-sion of that sense of belonging which forms a vital dike against theforces of anomie. In its political aspect, a community is not heldtogether by truth but by consensus" (P. &V., 62).

Participation, understood in this way, consists of two aspects: themaking of political judgments and the promoting of a sense of acommunity. Wolin concedes that there is never a substitute forknowledge in making judgments. The primary emphasis, of course,is on the promoting of a sense of community especially in light of theinequities that result from the distribution of goods and honors. Thenotion of political belonging can also be described as patriotism,devotion to one's homeland.

But an obvious question flows from Wolin's criticism of Plato,especially the treatment of participation in the Republic. Does Platoaddress patriotism within the dialogue and in what manner? Theproblem is treated, not surprisingly, in relation to the natural dif-


ferences of citizens. In Book III, Socrates repeats a tale or lie toGlaucon which states that all men were fashioned beneath theearth, and, upon being formed, their mother, the earth, sent themto their land (414d-e). The land was their mother and all citizensbrothers. Citizenship, according to the lie, is natural not conven-tional. But the tale, Socrates continues, is not complete. The godwho fashioned men did so with different metals. Rulers were mixedwith gold, auxiliaries mixed with silver, and the farmers and othercraftsmen mixed with iron and bronze (415a-d). In other words, thehierarchy of the political community is natural and not conven-tional. Men can accept the justness of the city's distributions becausethey are rooted in nature.

Does not participation as employed by Wolin rest also on alie-perhaps noble but perhaps not? Does Wolin not assume anatural equality of souls, and then justify political participationbased on equality on two grounds: first, that the level of precisionrequired for making political judgments does not preclude par-ticipation by all citizens; and, second, that the inclusion of thepopulation in political judgments nurtures a sense of belonging orcommunity? The concluding pages (P. &V., 58-68) of Wolin's discus-sion of Plato reveal the critical problem. Stated within theframework of political philosophy, the problem is: "Who or whatshould rule?"

The classical tradition, including both Plato and Aristotle, be-lieved that rationality should rule over irrationality. Modernpolitical philosophy, especially Hobbes, believed that men's interestsflowing from their passions established a basic quality in men(P. &V., 277). As Wolin argues, reason was transformed into an"agency of personal subjectivism: `For the thoughts are to the desiresas scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the thingsdesired"' (P. &V., 277) . Since each man is as capable of knowing hisown interest as the next, all men are for political purposes equally asreasonable. Superiority, as such, becomes insignificant. Wolin in-dicates that the attraction of politics, based on Hobbes' teaching, isits vital link to mens' interest. Despite Wolin's criticism that the con-nection between interests and politics destroyed the "distinctiveidentity of the `political,' " (P. &V., 280) his emphasis on citizen par-ticipation as a means of promoting belonging within the communityis but an extension of Hobbes' position, and his criticism of Plato islargely informed by this Hobbesian perspective.


III

The extensive description of Sheldon Wolin's understanding of thenature of political philosophy, and how his approach to the study ofthe Western political tradition provided in the first section of thisessay, indicated that for Wolin the study of political philosophy is aventure into political education. We have been cautioned againstreading and evaluating the writings of the great minds as if theywere merely preparatory for contemporary writings. The value ofstudying the tradition, for Wolin, is then to engage those minds asstudents so that we can better understand political phenomena.Anything which impairs the "act of recovery, of reacquiring lostmeanings of rememberings," (H.A.O.T., 96) to use Wolin's words,is antithetical to the task. To what extent does Wolin's understan-ding of political philosophy and his approach meet his owndemands? To this question, we now turn.

As Wolin suggests in his writings, there is a beginning of politicalphilosophy, and many, including Cicero, identify the pursuit of thetruth about politics as commencing with Socrates. Politicalphilosophy has also constituted a tradition insofar as politicalphilosophers have engaged the political and philosophical teachingsof their predecessors. Aquinas, Maimonides, and Farabi werefamiliar with some of the philosophical teachings of the paganphilosophers, and the relationship of their inquiries into the natureof political truths and the inquiries of the pagans is of importance.The importance, however, is the question at hand.

For Wolin the significant alterations within the tradition arebrought about by historical conditions. Changing historical situa-tions expose difficulties in existing political arrangements and theaccompanying understanding of those arrangements. Romanwriters were faced with dual problems; according to Wolin, "thetension between the demands of space and the design of institutionswas accompanied by an intensification of political conflict andrivalry" (P.&V., 71). The lack of attention to questions of foreignpolicy and interstate relations in Greek philosophy, especially thatof Plato and Aristotle, is, according to Wolin, a consequence of apsychological "inability to think politically in terms of an areabroader than the polis" (P. &V., 73); while Machiavelli's conceptionof space was conditioned by the flux of Italian politics (P. &V., 217).As discussed above, Wolin wishes to escape a simple determinismwhich would explain all political philosophy in light of extantpolitical conditions.


But how does one go about deciding whether Plato's slight atten-tion to matters beyond the polis's borders is a result of apsychological condition about the peculiar geographical conditionsof ancient Greece? Understood only as responses to historical condi-tions, Platonic dialogues are a reflection of specific Greek confronta-tions with political reality. Plato's work, so understood, would bethe highest or among the highest of Greek political expressions. He iseither a product of his way of life or a mark of his time, but histeachings would be viewed as relevant only to ancient Greece or histime. While Wolin straddles both cultural relativism and historicismwithout embracing either, $ he does embrace a historical view ofpolitical theory. Political philosophy approached in this mannerabandons the claim of truth advanced by the philosopher and in-stead examines those ideas in light of explanations either unknown tothe philosopher or external to him. At best, political doctrines areexamined in terms of their contribution to later or contemporaryviews.°This is all the more alarming in light of Wolin's expresseddesire to "reacquire lost meanings of rememberings."

The emphasis given to changing political situations in Wolin's ap -

proach to political philosophy impedes the act of recovery or the at-tempt to "reacquire the lost meanings of rememberings." This is evi-dent in his study of Platonic political philosophy. Despite the atten-tion that Wolin devotes to Plato's role within the epic tradition,there is little attention devoted to the form in which the Platonicwritings appear. Nor is concern clearly given to the relationship ofone dialogue to another, except to demonstrate the appearance ofcommon themes and the possible chronological relationship of onedialogue to another. 10 He does say near the end of his chapter on

8. In numerous instances Wolin speaks of thought in terms of historicism, i.e., thatideas are a reflection of their time. See, for example, Politics and Vision, p. 416, wherehe writes of "the century articulated its ultimate longing"; and, "the centurydesperately longed."

9. For a penetrating discussion of this problem, see, Leo Strauss, " PoliticalPhilosophy and History," in Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? and OtherEssays (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 56-57.

10. In various places Wolin will refer to a dialogue as being later than the Republicor Laws, but there is no observation as to whether the chronology of the dialogues isimportant. See, Wolin, Politics and Vision, pp. 33, 48, 53. Only in his discussion ofPlato within the epic theory does any reference to chronological significance appear. Inthis context, Plato's early failure in practical politics at Syracuse is used to explain hislater motivation for writing the Laws, Wolin, Hobbes, p. 6. He is not guilty on thewhole of looking for a "mature" or "immature" Plato.

SHELDON WOLIN ' S VISION OF, POLITICS 103

Plato, "The greatest mistake a student can make is to assume thatPlato, like Aquinas or Hobbes, was a thinker severely and angularlysystematic" (P. &V., 66). Wolin does not mean that Plato did nothave a formal system of thought, as indicated by a later commentwhich compares the "formal system" of Plato with Roman politicalthought (P.&V., 71). Wolin holds Plato to be a thinker full of"doubts, ambiguities, and anguishing dilemmas" (P. &V., 66).Platonic thought consists of unresolved contradictions.

To ignore the form of Platonic writing, the dialogue, is to ignorethe most obvious characteristic that the reader confronts. And to ig-nore the fact that Plato does not include himself as an interlocutor isto ignore the second most obvious characteristic of the Platonicdialogue. At least the careful historian, if not the perplexed studentof political philosophy, would give wonder at the relationship ofthese characteristics of the dialogues to their philosophicalsubstance. Wolin assumes the existence of a formal system ofPlatonic thought in the same way that many moderns present a for-mal system. The presumption on his part assumes that Socrates andthe Athenian stranger speak for Plato, and that these teachings in allof the dialogues must be consistent. But must one not simply ask, areall conversation or dialogues within or without the classroom consis-tent? Do they not depend on the subject of the discussion, on thecharacteristics of the discussants, and on the location of the discus-sion? If the form of the writing imitates speech, must we not recoverthe significance of the imitation in the "act of recovery. " ''

One example from the Republic should demonstrate the dangersof divorcing the substance of a Platonic dialogue from its form.Wolin, as indicated above, contends that Plato's scant attention tointernational relations is a consequence of the particular Greek con-text in which he lived. But does Plato ignore such questions in thedialogue? In conversation with Adeimantos, Socrates brings into be -

ing a city in speech which is characterized by its concern for pro-viding the utmost necessities of life while excluding the luxuries.Unhappy with the character of the city, Glaucon interrupts and in-sists upon the introduction of the relishes of life. It is only with thetransformation of the city of necessity to a city of luxury and the lat-

11. To understand the importance of the dialogue form for the substance of thePlatonic dialogues, see two excellent and most helpful discussions: Jacob Klein, ACommentary on Plato 's Meno (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,1965), pp. 3-31, and Leo Strauss, The City and Man, p. 50-62.


ter's need to introduce the objects and services from abroad that doc-tors and war are introduced (373d-e). The establishment of virtue inthe city is accompanied by the introduction of injustice (373d-e) inthe form of the conquest of foreign land. The origin of war is firmlyrooted in the city and in the desire of the polls to provide more thanthe necessities of life. What is obvious from the dialogue is not an ig-norance of looking beyond the water's edge but rather the directionof attention towards other aspects of politics which also shed somelight on internal arrangements. To understand the argument of thedialogue, one must understand the dialogue as a whole. But onemust not, as Wolin does, impose an artificial whole on the Platonicwritings. Instead one must recover the whole by understanding thedramatic character.

The failure to approach the Republic in the context of its dramaticsetting also leads to the misconception that Plato desired if not an-ticipated the implementation of the city of speech. This constructionof Plato's intent colors the reading of particular arguments advancedwithin the dialogue. As an example, it was noted earlier that Wolinreads the banishment of the poets from the city as evidence of thePlatonic ruler's elimination of obstacles to the establishment of thecity. This is the surface argument, but to read the banishment of thepoets only as a part of a blueprint, however, is misleading. The rela-tionship of speech to deed in the Republic is far more complicatedthan Wolin acknowledges, and the establishment of the city inspeech is so dependent upon problematical conditions that a carefulreader is made aware of what must exist for the philosopher torule. 12

Instead of approaching the dialogues as philosophical workswhich enable the student to grasp the truth of the argument, Wolinstands external to the dialogues and treats them as historical matter.The consequence is to deny that which he posits as his objective:"The reacquisition of lost meanings."

12. Two essays are recommended for reading Plato 's Republic. First, the " Inter-pretive Essay " by Allan Bloom in his translation of The Republic of Plato (New Yorkand London: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1968) and Leo Strauss, "On Plato'sRepublic" in The City and Man. Both essays direct the reader to an important abstrac-tion used by Plato which effects the treatment of certain subjects such as medicine,gymnastics, and poetry.


IV

Wolin has become a frequent contributor to The New YorkReview of Books. His articles have covered a number of subjectsranging from review articles of the posthumous volumes of HannahArendt's writings to an analysis of the contemporary presidency andits significance as a barometer of the nation's health. A discernibleargument can be constructed from Wolin's numerous observationsabout the American political scene; an argument, we may add, thatis quite consistent with the two concluding chapters of Politics andVision.

It is useful to provide an account of the general argumentunderlying his analysis of the state of American political life. Statedsimply, for Wolin the Union is in a state of crisis. "The crisis has todo with the grounding of our major political institutions: with theirpower, legitimacy, and above all, their constitution" (S. U., 28). Thenation is faced with a crisis of identity-"how we define ourselves asa collectivity" (S. U., 28).

Unlike other modern peoples, Wolin suggests, America attempted"a deliberate act of collective self-definition," which was experi-enced at the revolution and at the Constitutional Convention. Heasserts that Jefferson's reference in the Declaration to "self-evidenttruths" is to be taken seriously. Those truths were "about humanequality, inalienable rights, and the new basis of legitimacy, `theconsent of the governed' " (S. U., 28). The Declaration's conceptionof the collectivity, Wolin continues, can be described as democratic."It attempted to ground public authority in the specific capacity ofthe people to constitute their own political identity... " (S. U., 28).

The democratic conception of the Union is also expressed in thePreamble to the Constitution. "We the People...," the openingwords, indicate a conscious decision on the part of the framers toconstitute themselves in a specific way. Wolin distinguishes thePreamble from other passages of the Constitution that bear "the im-print of the dominant elites and of their concern to frustrate thepotential power of the lower classes..." (S. U., 28), and later he iden-tifies "the separation of powers, checks-and-balances, dividingpower between the states and the central government, and the in-direct elections of the senators and the president" as the constitu-tional means to "neutralize collective power" (S.U., 28). Nowheredoes Wolin make reference to the Records of the Federal Convention


of 1787 or other documentation to support his assertions. One canonly surmise that the complexities of constitutional exegesis werelaid to rest for Wolin in 1913 with the publication of Charles Beard'sAn Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the UnitedStates. In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the UnitedStates, Joseph Story observed "that this phraseology ["We the peo-ple"] was a matter of much critical debate in some of the conven-tions called to ratify the constitution." 13 The controversy over thephraseology centered on the fear of some states that the newlyestablished national government would consolidate power andwould destroy the states and with them the liberties of the people. AsStory, Farrand, and others have observed, the language of thePreamble modified that of the third article of the Articles of Con-federation." The alteration of the Articles' wording, according toStory, emphasizes that the Constitution is "an act of the people, andnot of the states in their political capacities."

Wolin would appear quite consistent with the framers' view thatthe Preamble distinguishes the Constitution from a mere treaty orcompact, and in the words of the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Mar-tin (1 Wheat. R. 305, 324), "the constitution of the United Stateswas ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereigncapacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitutiondeclares, by the people of the United States." Wolin, however, usesthe Preamble neither to establish the supremacy of national law overstate law or to use its phraseology as a means of securing the powersof the national government against encroachment from the states.Rather, the fact that the establishment of the government was an actof the people is used by Wolin to distinguish between the authorityof the Constitution and the ultimate authority, the people. Theauthority of the fundamental law exists by virtue of the Constitutionbeing a product of the will of the people. In Wolin's words, "in thisview, government is not so much `based upon' the Constitution asgrounded in the people" (S. U., 28) . Institutional authority is derived

13. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (New York: De Capo Press,1970) Vol. 1, Sec. 464.

14. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (NewHaven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 190.

15. As quoted in Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Vol. 1, Sec. 463.


not from the Constitution, "but from the power which had produc-ed the Constitution." Political life belonged to the people.

The distinction between the will of the people on one hand andthe Constitution on the other hand also leads Wolin to an error ofconstitutional construction that Joseph Story had warned against."The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers con-fided to the general government, or any of its departments. It can-not confer any power per se; it can never amount, by implication, toan enlargement of any power expressly given." 16 Clearly the govern-ment and the fundamental law are grounded in the people, as Wolinsuggests; but the governmental powers, contrary to Wolin, arebased on constitutional authorization. The authority of the peoplemust still be expressed so that its prescriptions and proscriptions canbe known to the rulers and the ruled, and that expression, of course,is the Constitution. The notion that a sovereign people firstestablishes a fundamental law, and, second, then derives law fromthe Constitution is what modern democratic theory understands asself-legislation. Self-legislation is not a continuous plebiscite norshould it be. The Preamble to the Constitution establishes thesovereignty of the people and their stated ends as the people, but itdoes not justify government by plebiscite.

As discussed above, Wolin acknowledges the existence of an an-tidemocratic position among the framers. He even believes thatthese "eighteenth-century elites controlled the process ofconstitution-making" (S. U., 29). Despite their desire to rest controlof the country in the hands of the elites, Wolin adds that the pro-ponents of elitism still "accepted the need for democratic legitimacy,but argued that once the political order is established, the people, asa corporate, volitional body, is dangerous and has to be deactivatedand kept at a distance" (S. U., 28). The success of the elites, Wolinargues, was incomplete primarily because "they never managed todevelop a convincing justification for their own elitism" (S. U., 29).Family, rank, privilege, and wealth were the social norms used tojustify the elites of the old regime, but these were discredited duringthe Revolutionary War. As a consequence, the elites "failed...to fur-nish substitutes for what they had discredited" (S. U. , 29).

Wolin's characterization of the nature of the founding isproblematic at best. As a descriptive claim it presents an extreme,but not unusual, view of the motives of the founding fathers andtheir product. It is not unusual since the Beardian thesis has becomeso widely disseminated, but its adoption does not necessarily


demonstrate its correctness. Nor does it follow that because Madisonand others recognized the dangers to which popular forms ofgovernment are susceptible, that these founders either held the peo-ple as dangerous or democracy unacceptable. Nothing in the con-stitutional scheme precludes the formation of majorities. True, theMadisonian construction requires the formation of majoritiesthrough coalitions, but this does not mean, as Wolin asserts, that themajorities are not responsive to popular pressures. True, majoritiesmust also be sustained and determined, but this does not mean theMadisonian construction is antithetical to democratic principle.

Wolin exhibits a blind partisanship to participatory democracy;and blind partisanship, of any form of government, is not thehighest form of loyalty. By distinguishing between the Preamble andthe rest of the Constitution, he unjustifiably establishes par-ticipatory democracy as the only legitimate democratic form.Democracy is measured in light of participation, i.e., in light of thepeople's opportunity to act directly on those questions affectingthem. As a prescriptive claim, Wolin's discussion of democracyacknowledges but simply dismisses the dangers of direct democracyfeared by the founding generation. The grounds of Wolin's prescrip-tion rest on a faith and a reading of human nature neversystematically argued in the corpus of his work.

The flight from democracy, according to Wolin, only began withthe ratification of Madison's Constitution. Madison's nurturing ofinterests to act as the "cohesive political forces" of the nation was in-tended to frustrate action by popular majorities as well as to replacethe people with interests as the central concern of the regime. Wolinbelieves that this substitution was furthered in the twentieth centurywhen "pluralism" became "the unofficial ideology of the Republicand the main dogma of academic political science. Pluralismperpetuated the Madisonian concern to have organized interestgroups, rather than the `people,' recognized as the authoritative ac-tors in politics"

(S. U., 29; see also P. &V., 389 ff.). Arthur Bentley,"the arch-theorist of pluralism," replaced Madison as the theoreticalfather of the political process.

Quite obviously, in Wolin's mind, the American regime hasundergone significant changes since it initially set out to defineitself. The political odyssey has been a betrayal of the promise ofdemocracy. Our present is no brighter than our past. The nation nolonger is a loose structure of government. Now it shows tendencies ofwhat he calls "a state system." In his words, "A state exists when


power and authority are centralized; when their scope and applica-tion are, in principle and for the most part, unlimited except by pro-cedural requirements; and when the basic tendency is toward the in-tegration of the various branches of government rather than towardtheir separation" (R. C., 9). Wolin believes that the American systemof power demonstrates a basic tendency towards the "state system,"but it has not completely realized a full integration of power. "Themost appropriate phrase for it [the American system of Power] is`political economy' " (R. C., 9). The political, for Wolin, is con-stituted by the state, "especially the president and the giantmilitary-administrative establishment," while the " èconomy' is asystem for the production, consumption, and use of goods and ser-vices." In the American economy, a disproportionate amount ofpower, resources, and money are "distributed among, or owned by,a relatively small number of giant corporations" (R. C., 9). Becausethe economy of a highly developed society is dependent ontechnological innovation and scientific knowledge for its dynamiccharacter, there is a distinctive integration of science, technology,and production.

As is the case with all "advanced societies," Wolin contends,science, technology, and production are the source of infinite expan-sion. This is, he observes, one of the distinctive characteristics of ad-vanced societies. Since there are no natural limitations to scientificknowledge or technological innovation, growth or expansion for theAmerican economy is also without natural limitation. Wolin labelsthis " `growth' without end" modernization. Although his essays onthe state of contemporary American politics do not examine thefoundation of unlimited growth, Wolin has properly identified inPolitics and Vision one of its major sources as the teachings of JohnLocke. In his words, "Philosophy, according to Locke's directive,ought to promote the àdvantages and conveniences of human life';its concern ought to be with the everyday world and its ambitionssatisfied by the modest improvements possible there" (P.&V., 298).Locke is held responsible for narrowing the concerns of the politicalto "the sum of protective arrangements which left men to àcquirewhat they further want' (P.&V., 302).

Unlimited acquisition, of course, is one aspect implied in Wolin'sunderstanding of modernization. Of equal importance appears to bethe liberation of technology and science from moral guidance.Wolin refers often to the fact that scientists and technicians guidecritical decisions rather than having technical questions informed by


political and moral understanding. Again, Wolin does attend to thisaspect of modernity in Politics and Vision, and he identifies thedominance of science over philosophy with the teachings ofMachiavelli and Hobbes. It is Hobbes, however, who brought to fullfruition Machiavelli's concern that political philosophy was in abackward state compared to science. Hobbes propagated the "beliefthat the value of political philosophy could be measured by theachievements in science and mathematics..." (P.&V., 245). Yet,Wolin argues, this ultimately led to despair for Hobbes. The im-provement of man's political condition depended on the develop-ment of a science of politics patterned after geometry and physics.With the development of the new science came a vocabulary andbody of knowledge about politics which was esoteric and not withinthe direct reach of the citizen; "hence the only way that politicalknowledge could be translated into a shared public philosophy wasthrough imposition by authority and acquiescence by the citizenry "

(P. &V., 261-262). The centrality of this conclusion for Wolin's thesisis obvious: the elevation of scientific knowledge to hierarchial pre-eminence has contributed to the passivity of the modern citizen andcontributed to his dependence on elites. Furthermore, politicalphilosophy itself has been reduced in importance for the communityas well as the citizen.

The stimulus for "modernization" is the responsibility not ofgovernment but of the "private sector" of the economy. This divisionof labor, Wolin continues, is a characteristic of the "capitalistpolitical economies of the twentieth century." "Innovation, risk-taking, and experimentation" are the responsibilities of the privatesector; although, Wolin observes, the state has subsidized privateenterprise with public funds. Despite the necessity of innovation fora constantly expanding society, innovation, Wolin reminds hisreaders, is also destructive, "machines take the place of workers andtheir skills; factories deplete villages." Recognizing the destructiveface of innovation, capitalism must guard itself against self-destruction. "So innovation needs to be encouraged yet restrainedfrom excess" (R. C., 9), but, Wolin argues, the means employed bycapitalism to promote self-restraint have had only limited success."The reason is simple: a system which is built upon self-interest andrelentlessly cultivates that motive cannot plausibly fosterdisinterestedness or civic virtue" (R.C., 9). To provide innovationand competition and still maintain social stability, the politicaleconomy must provide necessary conditions, e.g., regulation of

SHELDON WOLIN' S VISION OF POLITICS 111

money, educated workers, a system of social control, to mention on-ly some of those indicated by Wolin. These conditions required forinnovation must be justified or, in Wolin's words, rationalized tosociety. "Rationalization has been the primary responsibility of thefederal bureaucracy..." (R. C., 9).

In the American political economy the leadership nurtures "thefiction that the state is based upon democratic consent and that itsactions are therefore legitimate" (R. C. , 9). The emphasis for Wolinis clearly on the fictional status of democracy in America. "Theunspoken assumption of its leaders is that it neither needs nor can itfunction with the uncertainties and divisions inherent in ademocratic politics (R. C., 9). Operated by technicians and guidedby a hierarchical model of decision-making, the emphasis in thepolitical economy is not placed on citizen participation. Wolin goesso far as to say, "it is a commonplace that the modern state precludescontinuous political participation by the citizens as well as genuineself-government" (R. C., 9). In fact, an apathetic electorate isdesired, promoted, and rationalized. Technical knowledge isemployed to "mystify the public." Politics is characterized by theelites, according to Wolin as "a dirty business" (S. U., 29), in order tomake political life distasteful to the people. Central to the Americanpolitical economy is the apathetic citizen. Whereas the decisionscritical for the country are made by elites, democracy, Wolin con-tends, requires citizen "sharing in the deliberations and decisionsabout the forces and conditions affecting their daily lives" (R. C.,12). As evidence of the elites' promotion of apathy, Wolin has ex-egetically examined the January 19, 1978, "State of the Union Ad-dress," of President Carter. In the address Carter quotes Lincoln'scall for a Government for the people. But, Wolin insists, "Carter, incontrast, omitted the crucial reference to government `by' and `of'the people" (S. U., 31). The intent of the elites is to promote a passivecitizen body.

The press and television, Wolin argues, also are among thepurveyors of pseudodemocratic ideas. The media purports to pro-vide political education for the country. This, Wolin claims,especially is the self-proclaimed function of the political commen-tator (P. T. and P.C., 195-6) who introduces the citizens to policyissues and provides them a way to think about politics. Wolin hastwo basic criticisms of the media. First, criticism of public officials,discussed in the context of the press' analysis of the contemporary


presidency, encourages belief in "the futility of democratic action"(C.N.C., 16). Public officials, especially the Chief Executive, ap-pear incapable of solving incurable problems. This results in publicpessimism, reduction in public expectations for political action, andpublic passivity. Second, citizens who are informed about politicallife through political commentary believe that they are genuinelyengaged in deliberation about politics. "He is encouraged to believethat he is being asked to make up his mind on an issue or to indicatehis policy preference" (P. T. and P.C., 196). Not only is the citizennot deliberating on policy issues, the citizen, for Wolin, is givenlimits as to the acceptable political alternatives for any issue. Thosealternatives, of course, are established by the political economy(P. T. and P.C., 196). The effect, according to Wolin, is to insurethat the citizenry think only the thinkable. Citizens believe theyhave access to information and those alternatives necessary for pro-per choice. This for Wolin is as illusionary as the existence ofgenuine democracy.

Institutionally, the presidency of the United States, for Wolin, hasbeen the office which has perpetuated the illusion and legitimatizedthe exercise of state power (R. C., 9). Unlike Congress whichrepresents local interests, the president is "the only official who cancredibly claim to be both selected and elected by the society as awhole, the president has assumed the role of the people's mediator,persuading a parochial Congress to rise to the level of the generalgood, energizing a stodgy bureaucracy, and defending the peoplefrom foreign powers and dominations " (R. C., 9). The office in thiscentury is defined in light of its democratic base as expressedthrough popular election. In his words, "the president seems to em-body the seamless authority of the sovereign people itself" (R.C.,9).

At first glance Wolin's view of the "state of the union" appears tobe cut from the same fabric as the views of the institutionalreformers of the '5Os and '6Os. Wolin's reading of legislative-executive relations, for example, is not dissimilar from that ex-pressed by the Committee on Political Parties of the AmericanPolitical Science Association in their 1950 report, "Toward a MoreResponsible Two-Party System," or that of reformers such as JamesMcGregor Burns. 16 Effective governmental action is prevented

16. American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," the Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American PoliticalScience Review Supplement Vol. 44 (September, 1950), and James Mac Gregor Burns,The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963.


because of the ability of parochial interests to thwart the will of themajority. Both the character of the American political party system,fragmented and weak with no effective means of insuring partydiscipline, and the organization and procedures of the nationallegislature must be changed if responsible government is to be in-stituted. "Responsible" government, in this instance, means respon-sive government; a government that is responsive to the will of thepeople. The intent is to enable the popular will to guide the formula-tion and implementation of public policy. Institutionally, the Presi-dent is identified as the office most expressive of the popular will,and the Chief Executive is expected to provide political direction toCongress through the use of his political party.

Woodrow Wilson is commonly credited as the theorist of respon-sive government, and is acknowledged as such in the A.P. S. A.Report. His emphasis, however, was on leadership and simple partygovernment.'' For Wilson the responsibility of an administration,specifically the role of the president, is to provide organization andleadership to a heterogeneous nation subject to disintegration.Responsive government sought the judgment of the people as to theproper direction of policy, but the people do not direct policy.Wilson's words on this subject deserve to speak for themselves:

...Leadership cannot belong to the multitude: masses of men cannot be self-directed. Neither can groups of communities[.] We speak of the sovereignty ofthe people, but that sovereighty, we know very well, is of a peculiar sort, quiteunlike the sovereignty of a king or of a small easily concerting group of confi-

17. For example, in their impressive study of American political parties AustinRanney and Willmoore Kendall wrote: "The doctrine in question [responsible partygovernment) was first advanced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries byWoodrow Wilson, A. Lawrence Lowell, Henry James Ford, and Frank J. Goodnow. "

Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System(New York, Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956), p. 151. In one of themost important studies of presidential selection and parties to be published in recentyears, James Ceaser makes an important distinction for a proper understanding ofWilson. "Wilson molded his view of parties to fit his view of political leadership; theparty system was the means and leadership the end. Party government advocates, bycontrast, often obscure the question of whether party government is an end or ameans." James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 197.


dent ment. It is judicial merely, not creative. It passes judgment or gives sanc-tion, but it cannot direct or suggest.'

s

A multitude is incapable of providing single and prompt responses tothe complex questions of government. Yet, as Wilson understood,this is the responsibility of government; it is not carried out at theballot-box.

Woodrow Wilson's lasting vision of responsive government in-spired many of the political party reform measures implemented inthe late 1960's. The "plebiscitary system" of presidential selection,initiated in the Democratic Party by the Hughes Commission Reportof 1968 and the McGovern-Fraser Commission, sought to nominatethe party's candidates through popular choice as well as to rule theparty by "mass opinion in contrast to the rule of settled groupswhich compromise their interests in a bargaining process."1 ' Thiswave of political party reform altered the restraints on outrightdemocracy designed by the Founding Fathers. "Democratic stan-dards are now held up as absolute, and checks on popular authorityare everywhere called into question. "20

Wolin's position on the direction of the reform measures is not en-tirely clear. He does suggest that the search for participatory formsresulted from the protest movements of 1960s and "reflected ageneral awareness that the major institutions and processes ofAmerican politics were at odds with certain basic democratic ideasabout self-government, freedom, equality, and shared power"(R. C., 10). Even though the consequences of the party reforms havenot satisfied the advocates of participatory democracy or the partyregulars, for different reasons, one might view the changes as thefirst step towards a fundamental alteration in the regime. Zealousadherents of responsive government can dismiss these failures asevidence that further reform, i.e., increased democratization is re-quired. There is reason to believe, however, that Wolin questionsthe motivation of the reformers. Whether this skepticism dates backto 1968 or 1980 is unclear from his essays. At least since 1980, Wolinhas characterized the kind of elections (1968 and 1972) conductedunder the reform procedures as discouraging genuine democratictendencies. His logic is as follows. Elections since 1968 have been us-

18. Woodrow Wilson, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966) 6: p. 235.

19. James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development, p. 283.20. Ibid., p. 304.


ed to define the people. The people are those who constitute theelectorate or those voters who support a particular candidate. Uponthe completion of the election, the electorate dissolves, "leavingbehind a `mandate' that stands as the legitimating principle for anew `administration"' (R.C., 10). His conclusion is critical, " ...the`decision' of the electorate is understood as endowing the new of-ficers of the state with legitimate authority" (R. C., 10). In otherwords, once again the people have abdicated their democraticresponsibility of deliberating and deciding those issues that affecttheir daily lives. The people are no closer to genuine participation.Their desire to participate was discouraged while they continue tobelieve that democracy is practiced.

It is clear from the above discussion that Wolin differs significant-ly from the institutional reformers of the '50s and '60s. Whereas thethrust of Burns and other reformers was to empower the presidencythrough the elimination of restraints on that office, Wolin findsdependence on the presidency unacceptable in light of his advocacyof participatory democracy. Furthermore, Wolin also believes thatthe crisis of American democracy cannot simply be resolved throughinstitutional restructuring. The phenomenon of the apatheticcitizen, symptomatic of democracy 's ill, is not unique to Americanpolitical life, but, according to Wolin, is a phenomenon experiencedin democratic regimes for the last hundred and fifty years. One ofthe primary sources of citizen disinterest in, if not repulsion of,politics rests in the roots of modern liberalism.

Contrary to the common characterization of modern liberalismwhich views the tradition as holding an optimistic view of humanreason's capacity to restructure man and society, Wolin holdsliberalism to be "a philosophy of sobriety, born in fear, nourished bydisenchantment, and prone to believe that the human condition wasand was likely to remain one of pain and anxiety" (P.&V.,p293-294). John Locke is presented as the dominant philosopher ofsobriety although significant contributions to the tradition are latermade by David Hume and Adam Smith. Locke's conception of man,as characterized by Wolin, is sober insofar as man is held to be " in-capable of omniscience or perfection," and is held to be foreverdestined to a life of mediocrity (P.&V., 296-297). The emphasis forLocke, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, is on the limitations ofhuman possibility. Locke's influence, Wolin submits, was gradualand indirect, but his teaching "worked to erode confidence in thepossibility of political philosophy's providing the knowledge for


dramatic advance" (P.&V., 297). Without the confidence thathuman action is informed by "intellectual certainty," men are reluc-tant to propose sweeping plans and are more willing to accept thestatus quo in politics (P.&V., 298).

Not only does Wolin believe that Locke contributed tophilosophy's doubting its own importance, but Locke's emphasislimited the jurisdiction of the political to "life, liberty, health, andindolency of body, and the possession of outward things" and thusreduced the political to the "sum of protective arrangements whichleft men to `acquire that they further want' " (P. &V., 302). Thesubstance and knowledge of politics was with practical guarantees.These, Wolin suggests, are matters soon taken for granted. "On theother hand, the form of knowledge which enabled men to acquirewhat they wanted had an immediate and continuing attraction"(P.&V., 302). The consequence, according to Wolin, is critical.Politics became uninteresting and men sought their politicalsatisfactions through non-political institutions. The dominantbeneficiary was economics and economic theory.

Gradually, Wolin continues, political phenomena were analyzedin economic terms and by economic methods. "As a result of this andsimilar types of reasoning, many traditional political conceptsreceded in importance or vanished altogether," e.g., social harmonywas left to "the spontaneous equilibrium of economic forces," andpolitical participation was reduced to the defensive protection ofone's rights (P. &V., 304-305). Although economics itself is later call-ed into question by thinkers, political philosophy and politics neverregain their former status; nor does the pre-Lockean understandingof citizenship as a self-fulfilling activity regain its ascendancy. Thislatter problem constitutes the dominant problem of our age. ForWolin, citizen participation is the dominant concern of theory andpractice.

In an examination )f the relationship between political theoryand political commentary, Wolin once again suggests that thepolitical theorist must not abdicate his critical role. Political com-mentary, dominantly the activity of columnists and television com-mentators, is held to be the "analysis or examination of currentpublic events, personages, institutions, policies, or problems whichissues in an informed observation or interpretation" (P. T. and P. C.,194). Such commentary has become so important to Americanpolitics as to have become institutionalized. The difficulty withpolitical commentators, according to Wolin, is their failure to go to


the roots of political questions. Their function requires that they in-terpret the political system so that the public is capable of thinkingabout politics, and responding to the issues. "By the issues he selectsand the form in which he presents them, the commentator projects aversion of politics and a version of the good citizen" (P. T. and P. C.,195). The version of politics is the conventional version of theregime. Commentators restrict themselves to the prevailingunderstandings and practices.

Wolin suggests that all regimes are defined in terms of principles,and, obviously, the inclusion of a principle necessitates the exclusionof its opposite. "By the same token, they also favor some groups overothers, even when the principle purports to apply to all citizens"(P.T., and P.C., 201). Despite the fact that every regimediscriminates, Wolin observes, "most systems, or their spokesmen,are shy about defining the system as one which promotes, for exam-ple, injustice as well as justice, inequality as well as equality, slaveryas well as freedom" (P. T. and P. C.; 201). Consequently, every socie-ty has secretly suppressed principles as well as their advocates.Wolin acknowledges that these "secret" principles cannot be"publicly professed" because "they are the source of anomalies ormanifest evils which the society wants to deny, conceal, or explainaway" (P. T. and P. C., 202).

Whereas political commentators do not enter into the discussionof "secret" principles, the coexistence of accepted and rejected prin-ciples "establishes the conditions in which political theory is possi-ble." The examination and explication of "unsuspected interconnec-tions in society, especially between the features which are taken forgranted or as matters of pride and those which are cause for shame"(P. T. and P.C., 202), is left to the theorist. In this way the politicaltheorist contributes to political education by revealing the pro-blematic character of society as well as enabling the citizen to seefamiliar phenomena differently. One can only speculate thatWolin's own venture into political commentary is self-explained byhis statement, "...political commentary is not an unnatural act for atheorist but a necessity" (P. T. and P.C., 203).

In the past political theorists, according to Wolin, have fulfilledtheir responsibilities as commentators. As evidence of their par-ticipation in commentary, Wolin provides a historical list which in-cludes Plato's interpretation of Athenian politics, Machiavelli's com-mentary on Florentine politics, and the newspaper and magazinecommentary of Harrington, Locke, Burke, Hegel, Marx, and


Weber. The list should have suggested to Wolin that the "necessity"that political theorists write such commentary is far moreproblematic than he reveals. Perhaps the most evident clue is pro-vided in the contrast between Plato and Burke. Quite clearly Burke'swritings cannot be divorced from the political issues of his day. Withthe exception of A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of theSublime and Beautiful, Burke's writings were concerned with prac-tical political questions. To unravel Burke's suspicion of theoreticalor metaphysical speculation, one goes to his Reflections on theRevolution in France. Burke's explication of the relationship be-tween a representative and his constituency is found in a speech tohis Bristol constituency. Simply a cursory examination of the titles ofhis publications demonstrates the importance for Burke of under-standing politics in their context. In Reflections on the Revolution inFrance, Burke wrote: "Circumstances (which with some gentlemenpass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle itsdistinguishing colour, and discriminating effect. The circumstancesare what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or nox-ious to mankind."

Whereas one can easily establish Burke's positions on these vitalissues of the day, Plato's interpretation of Athenian politics is not soeasily demonstrated. Despite the historical existence of many of theinterlocutors in the dialogues and the historical settings in whichthey take place, one cannot simply read a particular dialogue as if itwere a historical work or commentary. Even reading Machiavelli'smajor political writings as commentary poses more difficulty than isevident from Wolin's Observations.The Prince, and Discourses, andthe Florentine Histories contain common references to historicalpersonages and events, but the accounts and characterizations oftenare different. A simple examination of the interpretations ofMachiavelli's work indicates the serious effort made by scholars toreconcile these seeming disparities.

This is not to suggest that Machiavelli's teaching about Florentinepolitics will forever escape us, but to recover that teaching requiresgreater labor than to discern the opinions of Burke on the AmericanRevolution or Wolin on the Reagan election. Why? A number of ex-planations can be provided. First, political commentary is neverpracticed in isolation. By definition the sharing of political views is apublic activity. Public activities involve consequences not only forthe public but for the individual participants as well. Both of theseconsequences must be considered by the political commentator. In a


regime which maintains freedom of publication, the legal andpolitical consequences if not the social and economic repercussionsfor the commentator, may be of little consideration, But, as Wolinmust know, the free press has not always existed nor does it flourishin all nations today. Because dangers to a pamphleteer or commen-tator existed, care was taken by them as to how they wrote as well asto whom the observations were addressed. As we know from the ear-ly history of our nation, pseudonyms were commonly employed bymen of letters to insure their safety. 21 Other writers employed stylesof writing that obscured the appropriateness of their observations totheir own political or religious situation.

22

Second, self-protection was not the only reason why politicalphilosophers were reluctant to enter the public debate ascharacterized by Wolin. They were concerned about weakening thepower of law and undermining the bonds of society. To expose thesoul of a regime, its first principles, to public debate is to call intoquestion publicly the justness or soundness of those principles. InAristotle's words:

To change the practice of an art is not the same as to change the operation of alaw. It is from habit, and only from habit, that law derives the validity whichsecures obedience. But habit can be created only by the passage of time; and areadiness to change from existing to new and different laws will accordinglytend to weaken the general power of law. The Politics (1269b20-23)

Not all men are philosophers nor are all men reasonable. As a conse-quence of this observation, it follows that reasonableness cannotprovide the bond for a regime for all if not most people. Habit,perhaps even salutary prejudice, is indispensable for political life.The most thoughtful men must not endanger the fragility of thepolitical order. There are speeches appropriate for the publicmarket as well as those appropriate for discussion among thephilosophical. We must give a serious hearing to Publius' observa-tion in The Federalist, Number 49:

...as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in thegovernment, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the govern-ment of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which

21. Douglass Adair, "A Note on Certain of Hamilton's Pseudonyms, " in Fame andthe Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, edited by Trevor Colbourn (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974, p. 272,

22. See, Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: TheFree Press, Publishers, 1952), pp. 22-37.


perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisitestability.

Neither Aristotle or Publius deny the importance of reason for theimprovement of political life. The question raised by both concernswhether or not the reasonableness of the law and the political orderwhich promulgated those laws is sufficient to maintain the politicalorder. Or, as Aristotle argued, is it necessary to rely on the decentprejudices of men in order to habituate men into right action? Thereis always a segment of the population capable of careful delibera-tion, but their numbers are always in doubt. The question hinges onan understanding of human nature. Wolin's confidence in man'scapacity to understand all issues is consistent with his advocacy ofpublic discussion of first principles, and both positions are essentialto his commitment to participatory democracy.

It is also Wolin's perception that contemporary political scienceperpetuates this "ideological bias" in the United States. It is a conse-quence, according to him, of contemporary political science's con-cern with regularity rather than irregularity. Contemporarypolitical theory, by which Wolin means the scientific approach topolitics, is dominated by the concern for method (P. T. V., 1062; cf.,P. T. T. G., 328). "There has been an effort to inbue political scien-tists with what is understood to be the ethic of science: objectivity,detachment, fidelity to fact, and deference to intersubjectiveverification by a community of practitioners" (P. T. V., 1064).Because theory is concerned with testable hypotheses, it is concernedwith the discovery of uniformities in political behavior, and "thekind of world hospitable to method invites a search for thoseregularities that reflect the main patterns of behavior which societyis seeking to maintain" (P. T. V., 1064). Wolin indicates that this ismost evident in systems theory.

Contemporary political theory, he contends, has "surrendered thecritical function" which has always been one of its dominantcharacteristics, a radical critique of the basic principles of politics.For this reason he distinguishes between the scientist and theorist.Both attempt to clarify men's views of the world, but "only theformer attempts to change the word itself" (P.T.V., 1064). Wolinindicates that this is most evident in systems theory.

Wolin is not alone in his concern over the status of political theoryand the consequences of a political science dominated by science.Yet Wolin's harshest words, unrestrained indignation, were aimed


not at the complacent but the knowing. In a review essay co-authored with John Schaar, the two critique Essays on the ScientificStudy of Politics edited by Herbert J. Storing. Storing and his co-authors set out to examine the writings of a "handful of politicalscientists responsible for the articulation of the prevailing scientificapproach and for the establishment of the most frequently pursuedlines of thinking and research." 23 Specifically, they examined votingstudies and the writings of Arthur F. Bentley, Harold D. Lasswell,and Herbert Simon. Professor Leo Strauss contributed an epiloguedevoted to an explication of the roots of the scientific study ofpolitics and the consequences of the approach for the nation and theprofession. Wolin and Schaar wrote that "It is a polemical work,conducted mainly on political and ideological grounds rather thanon the ground of philosophy" (C., 128), and that "each essay lackshumor, grace, and generosity" (C., 126). The authors are said to be"fanatics" who throw all of their opponents into one pit and ignorereal differences, who exaggerate the capacities of their opponents,and who expose the personal depravities of their opponents (C.,127).

The most striking characteristic of the Wolin and Schaar critiqueis its tone; their critique is without humor, grace, and generosity.Many of the Wolin and Schaar indictments are puzzling indeed,since Wolin accuses the authors of sins that could also be associatedwith his own work. Three examples are provided to demonstrate thisobservation. First, in the review Storing et al. are accused of con-cluding each essay "on a note of heavy irony and dark prophecy..."(C., 126). As a "choice example" they quote from the closing lines ofProfessor Strauss' epilogue:

Nevertheless one may say of it [the scientific study of politics] that it fiddleswhile Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not know that it fiddles,and it does not know that Rome burns.

To be certain, the indictment quoted is serious and the prognosisdark, but these qualities say nothing of the validity of Strauss' obser-vation. More to the immediate point, however, seven years after theEssays on the Scientific Study of Politics was published, Wolin wrote

23. Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. VI.


the following about the leaders of the behavioral revolution whoproclaimed epic theory irrelevant:

...The only trouble is that the world shows increasing signs of coming apart; ourpolitical systems are sputtering, our communication networks invaded bycacophony. American society has reached a point where its cities areuninhabitable, its youth disaffected, its races at war with each other, and itshope, its treasure, and the lives of its young men dribbled away in interminableforeign ventures. Our whole world threatens to become anomalous.

Yet amidst this chaos official political science exudes a complacency whichalmost beggars description (P. T. V., 1081).

To be certain, there is a distinction between the "complacency" thatWolin observes in contemporary theory and the "fiddling" observedby Strauss. But Wolin does recognize the flicker of flames in the city,and one is left to wonder why Strauss' observation is dismissed as a"note of heavy irony and dark prophecy."

Second, in the review Wolin and Schaar object to the researchdesign of the Storing book. Their indictment, however, transcendsmere accusation that these practitioners of scientific political sciencedisplay heterogeneous qualities.

It is characteristic of the fanatic to throw all his opponents into one pit, and toignore real differences of quality, action and intention among them. H. Simon,A.F. Bentley, H. Lasswell, and the authors of the major voting studies areselected and discussed on the unexamined assumption that all of them subscribeto the same fundamental tenets, entertain the same understanding of scienceand share the same depraved views of philosophy and politics. But, surely, thedifferences among these workers are many and basic. (C., 127).

The authors of the Essays never asserted, of course, that thesepolitical scientists were uniform on all tenets, but that theirunderstanding of political science did derive from a common viewthat political science was best practiced in light of modern social or"behavioral" science. Although there are differences within social or"behavioral" science, there are also some shared fundamentalassumptions, and an understanding of the foundations of socialscience is critical for a proper examination of contemporary politicalscience. This manner of procedure is not unusual and is not a validjustification for labeling anyone a fanatic. Wolin himself, sevenyears later, wrote the following:

The close linkage between contemporary ideas of theory and of methods


justifies treating them as members of the same family, forming a community ofcommon features which I have labelled "methodism" (P. T. V., 1065).

And third, later in their review, Wolin and Schaar raise the samepoint in a slightly altered form. They object to a description of thenew science of politics as "a judicious mating of dialecticalmaterialism and psychoanalysis to be consummated on a bed sup-plied by logical positivism." The reviewers suggest that Strauss'argument is a bald pronouncement because none of "the new scien-tists attacked in this volume would subscribe to all three positions,that there is evidence of hostility on the part of some of themtowards the participants in this bedroom scene, or that an honest ex-amination...would show a logical incompatibility with one or theother of the three positions..." (C., 145). In the published reply toWolin and Schaar, Strauss responded that the incompatibility ofthese positions "does not preclude their coexisting in more or lessdiluted forms in not a few people, some of whom can even be foundamong the new political scientists."24

Professor Strauss' response requires no additional explication forWolin, for it is an observation made by him in Politics and Vision.In his discussion of the thought of nineteenth and twentieth centurysocial and political writers, Wolin offers an explanation for his pro-cedure of collecting what are conventionally held to be diversethinkers under one roof.

... My premise is that the ideas which have significantly influenced our politicaland social world, and shaped the way that we interpret it, represent a blend ofthe theories of a highly diverse group of writers. In the way that we understandthe world we are partly the debtors of Marx, but also of de Maistre, partly ofLenin, but also of managerialism (P. &V., 358).

These three examples are very indicative of the hostile tone takenby Wolin and Schaar in the review. In response to the review, thecontributors to the Storing volume accuse Wolin and Schaar of notfairly reproducing their arguments; a charge, it may be noted, madeinitially by the reviewers against the co-authors. A careful com-parison will substantiate the indictment made against Wolin andSchaar. It is unfortunate that the review was so vitriolic, for issueswere raised that could have contributed to our understanding ofpolitics. One of the charges made against Storing and his colleagues

24. American Political Science Review LVII (March, 1963), p. 153,


was "an exaggerated moralism which converts all political issues in-to moral issues, and analyzes political phenomena by means ofmoral categories" (C., 136). Furthermore, Wolin and Schaar positthe view "that there are many aspects of political practices and ar-rangements which can be profitable investigated without alwaysarguing out first principles..." (C., 136). One is tempted to win amere debator's point by observing the paradox in which Wolin'sargument has placed him: as a political commentator the theoristmust expose the non-theorist to the first principles of the regime, butas a political scientist, writing for a professional audience, thetheorist must demonstrate restraint. Apart from this observation, aserious question is posed about moral categories-if that is a faircharacterization of Storing and his colleagues.

Although the charge of "exaggerated moralism" was madespecifically in the context of a discussion of Storing's article onHerbert Simon, the accusation is implied if not explicitly madeagainst the others as well. Since citizen participation has been aprimary concern of Wolin's publications, the necessity to return tofirst principles to understand properly voting will be discussed. Theessay on "Voting Studies," was authored by Walter Berns. Wolinand Schaar state properly that Berns finds fault with voting studiesbecause these studies explain political behavior by sub-political fac-tors. Reference is made to psychological, economic, or sociologicalfactors in order to explain the opinions held by voters, and Bernsargues that this method distorts the significance of opinion.Opinions, Berns argues, are reasoned statements of why people holda position. In the case of political opinions about candidates orissues, the opinions offer reasons why a voter prefers one candidateor position over another. A preference reflects a voter's judgment asto the proper course for the country, and, in Berns' words, "howevernaive or uninformed, [it] is a political opinion, precisely because itexpresses a view of the common good." 26 Voting studies, Berns con-tinues, explain voting not in terms of man's opinion-forming faculty,what Aristotle might describe as prudence, but as a response todispositions generated by economic, psychological, or sociologicalconditions. Only man, Berns argues, can form opinions and actupon them. To ignore the relationship between voting and thisuniquely human faculty is to deny what is specifically political

about voting.

25. Walter Berns, "Voting Studies, " in Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scien-

tific Study of Politics, p. 40.


Wolin and Schaar offer two criticisms of this particular argu-ment. First, Berns is criticized for "smuggling" into the voter' sopinion a statement of the common good. He implies in their choicea notion of the common good which is not necessarily present. Here,Wolin and Schaar do not fairly represent the Berns position. Bernsdoes not say that all men can articulate their understanding of thecommon good. Often, he suggests, a man will claim not to knowwhy he prefers X to Y or his position will be explained in terms ofpersonal advantage. But, Berns adds, he is likely to give a reasonwhy he does not know or ultimately justify, when pressed, his per-sonal claim in terms of a common good. "Rare is the man who willadmit publicly that he voted only with his own interests in mind." 28

To state Berns' position succinctly, voters have opinions as to whythey make choices, and those opinions reflect a notion of some goodor end. Since the decision concerns the public, there is containedwithin these opinions notions of the public good. This hardlydeserves to be called "smuggling" in a notion of the public good. Toexplicate is not to smuggle.

The second criticism concerns the distinction made by Berns be-tween action guided by opinion and an action resulting from aresponse to external stimuli. "Man alone of all the animals has thisfaculty to form opinion, which is why man alone is a politicalanimal." 27 Wolin and Schaar dismiss this position with ridicule notargument.

This, of course, proves nothing about man being a political animal, because onemight just as easily argue that dogs are animals which are not in the habit ofgiving reasons for their responses and, therefore, they alone are politicalanimals. At best, Berns has given us a not very helpful tautology: the "faculty "

of forming opinions is a peculiarly political faculty (C., 132).

First, Berns' argument is hardly a tautology, and, second, is ittrue that his observation is not very helpful? If we may insist uponWolin's own prescription for political theorists, is it not more helpfulto engage in discourse with this venerable position than to ridicule?The question concerns the relationship of logos, speech with reason,to political life. Wolin and Schaar refer to the influence ofAristotelian political science on Berns and his colleagues, and cer-

26. Ibid., p. 41.27. Ibid., p. 42.


tainly they recognize the influence of Aristotle on Berns' argument,but they fail to demonstrate the inferiority of the position to alter-natives.

The definition of citizenship for Aristotle emphasizes delibera-tion:

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administrationof a polls is said by us to be a citizen of that polls; and, speaking generally, apolls is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life (Politics, 1275619-21).

This is, of course, the second definition of citizenship presented inthe third book of the Politics. Earlier Aristotle defined a citizen asone who shared in the administration of justice and in offices(1275a20-25), but he acknowledged that this definition was bestadapted to a democracy (1275b5-7). The second and more inclusivedefinition substitutes deliberation for administration or ruling.Citizenship properly understood concerns the deliberative capacityof man. Why and in what way is deliberation to be distinguishedfrom administration? Deliberation necessitates a choice betweencontending values. It requires a reflection upon the proper course ofaction. Administration may require choice, but the decisions under-taken in this capacity are choices of implementation. The interestingand fundamental questions are deliberative, and men make thosechoices through their faculty of reason.

Deliberation is not often used by contemporaries in the precisesense that Aristotle used the word. Behavioral science is concernedwith decision-making and not deliberation. But the substitution ofdecision-making for deliberation is not simply a matter of choice orstyle. Students of decision-making acknowledge that decisions canbe derived in many ways, and not all of them are thoughtful. Theymay acknowledge that direction from the Delphic oracle or publicopinion polls may not be the most rational means, but few socialscientists would deny that this was a means of making a decision.But deliberation is not deliberation without a rational decision. Thedeliberative act may fall short of the mark, but the act was guidedby man's rational capacity.

The responsibilities of citizens in a modern democracy are not thesame as they were in ancient democracies. Most citizens today definetheir duties to the country in terms of voting. Voting is the moderncitizen's deliberative act. Is this responsibility fulfilled by enteringthe voting booth? Do we accept literally the command, "Vote. Itmakes no difference for whom you vote, as long as you vote?" Does a


citizen vote when he flips a coin to make his decision? Aristotle andBerns say no to these questions. A mechanical act of pulling a lever isnot voting. This dimension of voting must not be lost or we also losethe full significance of political life.

As previously acknowledged, not all citizens vote wisely. Thatconclusion was known prior to the publication of the early votingstudies. The dimension of this problem which must not be lost, andis one of Berns' important observations, is the fundamental dif-ference between voting and buying a bar of soap. Contemporarypolitical science reduces both of these acts to decision-making. Butthe political significance of voting is distorted by the reduction to acommon denominator. Voting is a public activity while the pur-chase of a commodity is a private act. Stated differently, the conse-quences of voting are public while the consequences of spending areprivate. The de-emphasis of the full meaning of voting must not beallowed. Berns was not engaged in an "exaggerated moralism" butdemonstrated the effects that voting studies have on our under-standing of voting.

Given Wolin's concern for the participation of citizens in politicallife, it is remarkable that he is not sympathetic to this position. Andsince many of the positions that Wolin and Schaar condemned intheir review Wolin echoed seven years later, one can only wonderwhat motivation guided their review.

IV

The writings of Sheldon Wolin reflect an enthusiasm for politicaltheory and the importance of that enterprise for the city and man.This alone distinguishes his contribution from that of numerouspolitical scientists. Wolin is aware that the professional classificationof theoretical inquiry as normative and empirical marks an altera-tion in the understanding of theory as traditionally understood. Forhim, most empirical studies reflect a concern for method and not in-quiry into the fundamental nature of political life.

Politics and Vision, Wolin's major contribution to politicaltheory, reflects the application of a historical approach to thethoughts of the great political minds or, to use his terms, the "epictheorists." There is a recognition that the task of the politicaltheorist is to engage these previous political writings in order torecover their lost meanings. This is, of course, a difficult task. Wolinapproaches the recovery of those teachings with a sense of urgency.


The crisis of American political life, according to him, is but areflection of the demise of liberalism. As citizens we have lost oursense of the importance of politics and our energies have beendirected towards the satisfaction of our personal needs. Apathy andpassivity characterize contemporary citizenship. The responsibilityfor rekindling an enthusiasm for public life rests with the politicaltheorist.

For Wolin, in the words he used to characterize Hannah Arendt'sunderstanding of political theory, "The task of political theory wasto rethink the political in the present" (H.A.O.T., 97). Thisnecessitates a return to the tradition of "epic theory" in order toreacquire the understanding of the political in the thought of thesepolitical visionaries. Wolin shares with many students of politicalphilosophy an admiration for the great minds and a recognition thattheir teachings can improve our understanding of political things aswell as ultimately improve our own political condition. Althoughthe language used by him to characterize "epic theory" is borrowedin large part from contemporary students of philosophy of scienceand not political philosophy proper, Wolin shares with manystudents of political philosophy the view that the "epic theorists"were responsible for new beginnings. These new approacheschallenged existing ways of understanding politics, and the "epictheorists" left in place of the old a new paradigm by which tounderstand political life.

"Epic theory" is encouraged, according to Wolin, by crisis. But,quite obviously, that crisis is experienced by an entire population.Consequently, the "epic theorist" cannot simply be explained aseither a product of his time or as a simple product of his way of life.If, as acknowledged by Wolin, the "epic theorists" provide an ar-chitectonic vision that illuminates the nature of the political, thenthese thinkers are unusual. One would expect of great minds motiva-tions and achievements not expected of thinkers with lessercapacities.

A perennial problem for the student of political philosophy is notto ascribe to the uncommon mind the characteristics of the commonmind. Wolin, of course, does precisely this. As discussed above, hesuggests that the intent of great minds was, first, to obtain admira-tion and awe through their great achievements and, only second, toobtain knowledge for its own sake. This suggests that politicalphilosophers sought the adulation of the population. Wolin assumesthat the laurels desired by the great minds are similar to the honors


sought by the common minds. Plato's failure at Syracusenecessitated that he accomplish his memorable deed throughphilosophy while Hobbes, for Wolin, appears to act for the sake ofmere fame. As discussed above, Wolin acknowledges that Hobbesdid not seek easy victories, but rather he sought to do battle with thegiants. Greater glory is earned slaying a Goliath than earned slayinga minor league Philistine. Wolin's explanation ignores the possibilitythat the honors of the city hold little allurement to the great minds.Areading of the philosophical tradition gives this considerationplausibility. One of the common themes reappearing in politicalphilosophy concerns the relationship of philosophy to the city. Theantagonism between the two needs little elaboration. We need onlyreturn to a study of Plato ' s The Apology of Socrates or Rousseau tofind the nature of the antagonism explicated, or, in a more comicalbut serious treatment, Aristophanes' treatment of the philosopher inThe Clouds. The nonphilosophical man remains perplexed as well assuspicious about the philosophical way of life while the philosphicalman remains doubtful about those things most honored by the city.

The significance of what motivated a Plato or a Hobbes is greaterthan first meets the eye. In part, the manner in which we approachthis question has consequences for the recovery of their teachings. AsWolin properly suggests, the claim of some of the "epic theorists" isto have established a new beginning in political philosophy. A newbeginning, of course, necessitates a rejection of the old way. If weare to recover the full tradition, we must recover the grounds onwhich the traditional understanding was indicted. Wolin's ap-proach impedes the recovery of this understanding because he ob-fuscates the confrontation between the old and the new.

Unless knowledge of political things is progressive, as in thenatural sciences, the confrontation between political philosophiesdoes not result in refutation only in contradiction. 28 As students ofpolitical philosophy, we are left to examine conflicting claims con-cerning the truth of political things. This necessitates that we remainopen to the possibility that earlier political philosophers possessedthe most important truths. The claims must be understood on theirown grounds otherwise we deny ourselves full and impartial accessto the wisdom of the tradition. Stated simply, we must start with theexplicit statements of the philosopher in the attempt to determine

28. See, Leo Strauss, "Political Philosophy and History, " in Leo Strauss, What IsPolitical Philosophy? and Other Essays (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 56-77.


precisely what was said and how it was intended to be understood.Only then is it possible to discuss the full significance of a statement.Hobbes' selection of philosophers to be attacked indicates the impor-tance that he gave to their teachings and is not explained simply byhis desire to do battle. Wolin's emphasis on the historical situation ofthe "epic theorist" or his attempt to attribute to the philosophers adesire for distinction deter us from properly interpreting the text.

One does not understand in any fundamental sense the politicalteachings of Plato and Aristotle by "explaining" them in terms of the"spatial dimension of the polis" (P. &V., 72). If this serves as an ac-count of their contribution then the teachings of Plato and Aristotleare appropriate only to their historical situation. Wolin, in fact,does suggest that these Greek thinkers were unable to "thinkpolitically in terms of an area broader than the polis" (P. r&V. , 73).Even if Wolin's observations were valid, a point not granted, theydo not constitute an interpretation of these political philosophies. Aninterpretation would require an explication of Plato's and Aristotle'sunderstanding of the relationship between size and political com-munity as they presented their teachings. Whether or not the spatialdimensions of the Greek polis provided the "raw stuff of politics"from which Plato and Aristotle began their analysis of the regimemay be an interesting question. But this question is neitherphilosophical or their own. The polis for Wolin is simply a historicalform of social organization. But this was not simply the case forPlato and Aristotle. To be sure, they lived within the polls and wereaware of its problems. The polls, however, was also a philosophicconcept of the political. One may acknowledge that the polis dif-fered in many ways from the Roman Empire and the modern state.There is one thing common, however, in all of these historical situa-tions. All of them are political. And since Plato and Aristotle addressthe nature of political things, it is more vital to discern theirphilosophical teachings than their historical surroundings. The lat-ter should not be confused with the former.

A principal concern of Wolin has been citizen participation in thepolitical process. This theme is central to his discussion of "epictheory" in Politics and Vision as well as the guiding principle of hisanalysis of contemporary political life. As discussed above, Wolin iscommitted to participatory democracy, a form of government, hebelieves, whereby people have the opportunity to act directly onthose questions affecting them. Democracy, stated in Lincoln'sterms, is government of the people, for the people, and by the peo-


pie. Clearly the emphasis for Wolin is on democracy by the people.The more governmental institutions and power rest in the control ofthe people, the more democratic the form. And, conversely, the lessdirect control enjoyed by the people, the less democratic the form.Representative democracy in theory as well as practice is an im-perfect form of government by the people. Reform proposals, ac-cording to the logic of the argument, are superficial, perhaps evenopiates administered to the people, unless they enable the people toparticipate in a meaningful way.

Wolin's argument is not new to American political life nor todiscussions of democracy by political philosophers, both Ancientand Modern. Aristotle, for example, observed in the Politics that,"The underlying idea of the democratic type of constitution is liber-ty" (1317b). Democracies, he continues in Book VI, consist of twobasic characteristics. The first characteristic is the interchange ofruling and being ruled in turn. This Aristotle describes as liberty.The second democratic characteristic "consists in living as you like"(1317b9-16). Aristotle describes this second attribute as freedom,and he identifies this condition as "the privilege of freeman, since,on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave."Everyone, Aristotle observes, would like to be ruled by none or tolive as he wishes, but this is impossible. Consequently, one will beruled only by those who in turn will be ruled by him. This is the con-nection between liberty and freedom.

Aristotle acknowledged the desire of citizens to live as they wish,but he also emphasized its impossibility. Where all men act on theirown, political life ceases to exist. Democracy, consequently, con-tains within itself the logic of its own dissolution. Even participatorydemocracy must be restrained from zealously pursuing freedom toits ultimate conclusion. This, however, is not so simple. Sincefreedom and liberty are the characteristics of democracy, an opposi-tion to the further implementation of these characteristics is viewedas a betrayal of democracy rather than as its defense.

Aristotle observed that the establishment of a democracy is not theonly business of a legislator. A far greater difficulty is its preserva-tion (1319b32-37). His advice on this matter cannot be dismissed byany friend of democracy.

...he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws,whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservations of thepolis. He must not think the truly democratic or oligarchical measure to be that


which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that whichwill make them last longest. (1320al-4).

The discussion of democracy in The Politics describes a regimewith the "greatest amount of democracy" "an extreme democracy."This distinguishes the extreme forms from the more moderatevarieties. But the more moderate varieties of democracy still deserveto be called democratic..

Aristotle's discussion remains vital for those who respect anddesire the characteristics of a democratic way of life, liberty andfreedom. The importance of liberty and freedom for man as well asthe conditions necessary for their existence endure as questionsunaltered by the time or place that they are addressed. Despite thedifferences that exist between the ancient polis and the large com-mercial republics of modernity, the issues of the perpetuation andthe proper utilization of freedom and liberty continue to exist.Despite the value that our generation, like previous generations,places on freedom, we are aware that freedom cannot be the highestend for man. The value of freedom is in its exercise, and we exercisethat freedom for a higher end. Participation, we must remindWolin, is valued also for itself, but its ultimate justification concernsthe purposes for which it is exercised.

Not all men seek the same objectives for themselves or for thepolitical order in which they live. Wolin emphasizes that the resolu-tion of conflicting objectives is the responsibility of the politicalorder. The resolution of conflicting claims, of course, requires astandard by which to judge. Are all objectives pursued within thepolitical community of equal dignity? Are all men capable of judg-ing properly? These questions, though sensitive to our democraticcredo, must not be dismissed. These are the philosophical questionsto which we must return. We would be wise to take the admonitionwith which Wolin closes Politics and Vision seriously,

The urgency of these tasks is obvious, for human existence is not going to bedecided at the lesser level of small associations: it is the political order that ismaking fateful decisions about man's survival in an age haunted by thepossibility of unlimited destruction (p. 434).

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Hampden-Sydney College JOSEPH E. GOLDBERG

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