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Culpa in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen.Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004, pp. 125.) A Great Debate, certainly but selective in surprising ways, and of course, open-ended, not least,perhaps, for the participants themselves.

JOHN BISHOPDepartment of PhilosophyThe University of AucklandPrivate Bag 92019Auckland 1142New Zealanddoi:10.1093/mind/fzp127 Advance Access publication 29 October 2009

Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World,by Zenon Pylyshyn. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007. Pp. xiv + 255.H/b 25.95, $34.00.

A new book by Zenon Pylyshyn is always a cause for celebration among

philosophers of psychology. While many hard-nosed experimental cognitive

scientists are attentive to philosophers concerns, Pylyshyn stands alone in the

extraordinary efforts he takes to understand, address, and struggle with the

philosophical puzzles that the mind, and perception in particular, raises.

Pylyshyns most recent work, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects

with the World, does not disappoint. It is philosophically rich. Indeed, the

approach to object perception that Pylyshyn develops in this book takes

inspiration from Evanss (1982) and Perrys (1979) work on demonstratives

and indexicals, draws on Dretskean (1981, 1986, 1988) ideas about represen-

tation, and tangles with Strawson (1959), Quine (1992), and Clark (2000,

2004) over how to understand the role of concepts in perception. In short,

it is just the kind of book philosophers of psychology should lavishly slather

with clotted cream and joyously devour at their next tea party.The main focus of this review will be Pylyshyns theory of FINSTs (an

acronym for Fingers of INSTantion, for reasons to be soon clarified).

FINSTs are the primary subject of the first three chapters of Things and

Places, after which they basically disappear for about eighty pages, to reappear

in the final and lengthiest fifth chapter, where they are put to use in a spec-ulative (and, to my mind, slightly incredible) explanation of data from mental

imagery experiments. The fourth chapter is an engaging polemic against

using subjective experience as a source of evidence about psychological pro-

cessing and, in particular, the danger in assuming that because mental images

appear to have spatial properties, they must be represented spatially. This

chapter stands alone and would be of interest to followers of the imagery

debate or, for that matter, to instructors looking for counter-examples when

Mind, Vol. 118 . 472 . October 2009 Mind Association 2009

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teaching Descartes incorrigibility principle (on a certain reading) to intro-

ductory philosophy students.FINSTs are Pylyshyns answer to the subtitle of his book: theyarehow the

mind connects with the world. Roughly, the idea is this. Hardwired into theearly vision system is a mechanism that registers objects. Properties of objects

grab hold of this mechanism via a causal connection, and, once grabbed,the mechanism keeps track of these objects through their various changes and

movements. Crucial to Pylyshyns description of FINSTs is that they do not

predicate anything of the objects to which they attach. In this sense, FINSTsfunction like demonstratives or indexicals in natural language. Just as we canpoint to the blue jay on the telephone wire and say look at that, without

having to attribute blueness or jayness to the blue jay (without, arguably,having even to conceive of the blue jay as an object), the objects that the

visual system tracks with FINSTs (Pylyshyn calls these objects FINGs) are

identified non-conceptually.Pylyshyns experiments with multiple object tracking are a primary source

of evidence for FINSTs. In these experiments, subjects must track a numberof objects moving about a computer screen on which other similar or iden-

tical objects are also moving. Pylyshyn and colleagues found that subjectscan track up to three or four objects at a time, and that they do so without

encoding information about objects properties, including colour, size, shape,

and location (p. 37). Correctly, Pylyshyn does not deny that properties ofobjects are responsible for capturing a FINST, but he insists that the early

vision system need not represent the causes that activate its FINST mecha-nisms. FINSTsregisterobjects withoutrepresentingthem (those familiar with

the work of Dretske1988can profitably think of FINSTs as indicatingobjects).

Analogously, a puff of wind can cause the eye to blink, and no doubt proper-ties of the wind (e.g. its force) cause the activation of the blinking mechanism,

but there is no reason to suspect that the mechanism represents properties ofthe wind.

Naturally, this sketch of FINST theory raises a number of questions, butI will focus on just two of the more important ones. First, what is the role of

FINSTs in concept formation? Second, how, precisely, do FINSTs connect themind with the world?

Pylyshyn writes on numerous occasions that FINSTs are necessary toground concepts (pp. 9, 17, 32, 57, 58, 95). However, Pylyshyn appears not

to notice that his understanding of grounding is ambiguous. In fact, Pylyshynappears to have two very different processes in mind when he speaks ofgrounding. Grounding in the first sense refers to the process by which an

object is picked out as a subject for predication. In the second sense, ground-ing refers to the way concepts acquire their meaning. I have questions about

how FINSTs ground in either sense. My worries about the first sense of

grounding emerge from my scepticism about whether FINSTs do in factprovide the answer to how the mind connects with the world. However,


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before turning to this issue, I wish first to make the case that Pylyshyn does

indeed conceive grounding in two distinct ways and then to raise somequestions about whether FINSTs can ground concepts in the second of

these two ways.The first sense of grounding is evident in this passage: Part of our project

in postulating FINSTs is that we need to get our cognitive mind to selectsomething before we cognize the something in terms of a concept (p. 57).

This sense of grounding suggests the analogy Pylyshyn sees between FINSTs

and demonstratives. In order to sayofthe blue jay on the telephone wire that

it is blue, or a jay, or an object, or on a telephone wire, one must first be able

to identify the subject of predication. It is thatwhich is blue, is a jay, and so

on. Moreover, thanks to demonstratives, we can distinguishthisthing (a bluejay) fromthatthing (a cardinal) without having to conceptualize either (this

is especially apparent when our abilities to distinguish outstrip our concep-

tual resources, as they might when we distinguishthisshade of blue from that

one). In a similar spirit, Pylyshyn intends FINSTs as the means by which early

vision identifies and tracks FINGs (his term for things individuated non-

conceptually) that later stages of vision then adorn with concepts.So far so good, but now matters become cloudy, because Pylyshyn takes

this first role of FINSTs to identify preconceptually a subject for future

predication to be identical to a role that is in fact very different.

Immediately following the sentence quoted above, Pylyshyn wonders how

conceptualization might occur without FINSTs:

Otherwise the question arises: In virtue of what is that an X? which starts us onthe slippery slope of asking the same question about each of the conditions for

X-hood. Question: In virtue of what is that an object? Answer: Because it has mass

and moves through smooth continuous trajectories in space. Question: And what

does it mean that it has mass, and so on? That question requires that we have the

conceptmass, and how do you ask about its trajectory unless you have the concept

trajectory and so on recursively. The recursion has to end somewhere Thats

where FINSTs come in. (p. 57)

However, Pylyshyn gives no clue why FINSTs should come in here. Theproblem about how concepts derive their meaning is, although perhaps

related to the problem about how objects are identified as subjects for pre-

dication, nevertheless different.Pylyshyn apparently mixes up two stories. One story the one he tells

is intended to answer the question: How does the early vision system, which,as Pylyshyn says, is data driven, identify or individuate (preconceptually)

objects in the world? FINSTs are the answer to this question. But story two is

supposed to answer a different question: What anchors or breaks through

the recursive process of concept definition, so as to prevent an explanation ofconcept meaning that is viciously circular? That this second story must differ

from the first becomes clearer when one considers that theories of linguistic

demonstratives are typically not mentioned in theories of concept meaning.


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In so far as FINSTs are like demonstratives, we should wonder why they

are important in a theory of concept meaning. But, more to the point,how could a FINST endow concepts with meaning? Grant that objects are

preconceptually identified with FINSTs. Answers to the questions Pylyshynasks above seem no closer: What does it mean to say that this is an object,or has mass, or moves through smooth trajectories in space? How does the

reference-determining function of a FINST secure concept meanings?Remember, FINSTs do not refer to properties, but to FINGs, which are

non-conceptualized objects. Being told that that FING, which happens to

be a blue jay, is blue, or a jay, cannot ground the concepts blueorjay, becausethe blueness and jayness of a blue jay are not themselves FINSTed (even if

they are causes of FINSTing).Philosophers and psychologists have proposed numerous accounts of con-

cept grounding. Fodor (1975), for instance, suggests in Language of Thoughtthat concepts are composed of other concepts, and he avoids charges of

circularity with the assumption that (at least some) concepts are innate.Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued that concepts bottom out in basic

concepts like up, down, forward, and backward, which owe their meaning to

facts of human anatomy (e.g. that human beings are usually vertical whenconscious, and that many sensory organs are in the front of the body). Of

course, whether either of these accounts is correct is beside the point. Thepoint is that FINSTs cannot ground concepts in the sense of grounding that

interests these theorists, despite Pylyshyns suggestion that they can.

Alternatively, if FINSTs can do this, Pylyshyn has not told us how. It is abig step between an account of the non-conceptual registration of objects anda theory about how concepts like massacquire their meaning.

Let us now consider the first sort of grounding that Pylyshyn assigns toFINSTs. FINSTs are supposed to explain how the mind connects with the

world. Theyarehow the mind connects with the world. Certain properties of

an object grab hold of the FINST mechanism, and, once the FINST is estab-lished, subjects are able to track this object through space and time. FINSTs,

as Pylyshyn notes, are especially handy when playing hockey or soccer, wheresuccess often requires tracking players as they move about the rink or field

(p. 21). But, how, exactly, do FINSTs connect with the world? Pylyshyn con-fesses that an inspiration for his FINST theory were memories of his comic

book hero Plastic Man, who could extend his arms great distances in order to

grab objects (usually villains) and hold them as they struggled to run away.The connection to the world that literal grabbing produces is easy to under-

stand. Nothing more needs to be said: having ones hand wrapped around an

object is as sure a way of having a connection to that object as anything is. But

this obvious sort of connection is much simpler than a connection thatrequires a complex causal chain between the object and that to which it is

connected. When I take the steamed crab out of the pot using a pair of tongs, ismy hand connected to the tongs, to the crab, or, maybe, to both?


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Given that FINSTs are presented as the way our visual percepts connect to

the world, one would think that Pylyshyn has a response to this notoriousobject-of-perception problem. Yet, all of the experimental evidence Pylyshyn

accumulates in support of FINSTs is consistent with their being attached notto objects, but to retinal images. Of course, Pylyshyn is aware of this concern.He observes that properties become predicated of theobjectto which a FINST

connects. But where on the causal chain is this object? Pylyshyn says, [S]owhat determines the particular link in the causal chain that has the predicated

property? There are several views on this question, which I will not discusshere. It is one of the big questions about how reference is naturalized and is

beyond the scope of this mongraph (p. 97).

Yet, with no answer to this big question, why share Pylyshyns confidencethat FINSTs actually do connect with the world? In any event, the assertion

thatthey do leaves the question howthey do it unanswered. Comparison withDretskes work, 1981, 1986, is illuminating in this context. Dretske, like

Pylyshyn, believes that the mind connects with the world via some sort ofcausal (more precisely, nomological) relation, and, like Pylyshyn, he appreci-

ates that mental states are connected causally to a multitude of things, forexample, a percept bears causal connections to the world, the retina, the optic

nerve, and so on. The question thus presses: in virtue of what are our mentalstates about the world rather than about links between them and the world?

Dretskes answer is, very roughly, that the world is the nearest point ofinvariance. Stimuli more proximal than the world can and do vary while

the world remains the same (see especially Dretske1986

). As with my earliermention of approaches to concept grounding, whether Dretskes solution

to the object of perception problem ultimately succeeds is beside the point.The point is that we cannot really understand how the mind connects with

the world without solving the object of perception problem (at least, if theconnection is supposed to be causal in some sense see Hatfield (2009) for

doubts about such theories). When Pylyshyn chooses to leave this problemfor another day, he is doing no less than ignoring the topic that the subtitle

of his book promises to address.Before closing, I would like to return to a remark I made about Pylyshyns

use of FINSTs to explain some experimental results concerning mental imag-ery. So-called pictorialists like Kosslyn have long defended the view that

mental images are represented in a functional space (see, e.g. 1980).

Explaining the proportional amounts of time a subject takes to travel fromone point to another in a mental image of a map is, Kosslyn believes, use

of a pictorial representation of the map. Pylyshyn (1981) has countered thatsubjects in Kosslyns map-imagery experiments use tacit knowledge of

distances and speed to produce behaviour that simulates the behaviourthey would exhibit if they were gazing at a real map. No functional space

is involved, Pylyshyn argues, and, indeed, he denies the coherence of the veryidea (section 5.3).


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However, Pylyshyn claims, his account leaves one remaining question(p. 136). How, he asks, does this simulation create the appropriate observedtime delays? Surely it is not the case that a subject simply counts the secondsuntil the right amount of time has gone by! (p. 136). FINSTs enter the frayat just this point. Pylyshyns idea is that rather than relying on pictorialrepresentations, subjects interactions with mental images involve a kind ofprojection of that image onto objects in the world. Subjects use objects in theexperimental environment to stand in for points on their mental image of

the map. Thus, point A of the map is associated with FING 1 (e.g. a clock onthe wall), point B with FING 2 (e.g. a computer), and point C with FING 3

(e.g. a printer). Of course, not just any objects in the world are candidates for

FINSTing. The subject must FINST objects that are situated so that distancesbetween them are proportional to distances on the points of the imaged map.Having FINSTed appropriately related FINGs, subjects performance isexplained by assuming that when asked to imagine moving from points Ato C, they shift their attention from FING 1 to FING 3. Pylyshyn summarizes,[t]he view I am proposing is that the spatial properties represented byour mental representations derive from the spatial properties of selected(i.e. FINSTed) concurrently perceived objects that are located in real space(p. 185).

My main reason for scepticism about this index projection hypothesis,as Pylyshyn calls it (p. 181), is that it asks us to accept that every time wemake judgements about distances between imaged points, the world offersup objects that will stand to each other as points on the imaged map. Clearly,this welcome, if mysterious, complicity requires some explaining. To be fair,Pylyshyn seeks to squelch suspicions of divine intervention with variousproposals, but this work seems as yet quite speculative.

These critical points about Pylyshyns application of FINSTs to mentalimagery studies, like the points I made about the role of FINSTs in conceptgrounding, should on no account be taken as dismissive of Pylyshyns exper-imental investigations of perception or the ideas he develops to account forhis findings. As I mentioned at the start of this review, Pylyshyn is a singularfigure in cognitive science an extraordinary psychologist who is profoundlydedicated to understanding and responding to philosophical concerns. Thingsand Placesbelongs in the bookcase of anyone who believes that uncrackingphilosophical puzzles about the mind requires a hefty dose of empirical study.

(Thanks to Gary Hatfield, Alan Sidelle, and Zenon Pylyshyn for commentson an earlier draft.)

References

Bogdan, R. (ed.) 1986: Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press.Clark, Austen 2000: A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford

University Press.


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2004: Feature Placing and Proto-objects. PhilosophicalPsychology, 17, pp. 44369.

Dretske, Fred 1981: Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

1986: Misrepresentation. In Bogdan (ed.) 1986, pp. 1736. 1988: Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/Bradford.Evans, Gareth 1982: Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.Fodor, Jerry 1975: The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.Hatfield, Gary 2009: Getting Objects for Free (Or Not): ThePhilosophy and Psychology of Object Perception. In Hatfield(ed.) 2009, pp. 21255.

Hatfield, Gary (ed.) 2009: Perception and Cognition: Essays in thePhilosophy of Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kosslyn, Stephen 1980: Image and Mind. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.

Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson 1980: Metaphors We Live By.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Perry, John 1979: The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Nous, 13,pp. 321.

Pylyshyn, Zenon 1981: The Imagery Debate: Analog Media VersusTacit Knowledge. Psychological Review, 88, pp. 1645.

Quine, Willard 1992: Pursuit of Truth, revised edition. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

Strawson, Peter 1959: Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.London: Methuen.

LAWRENCE SHAPIRODepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin MadisonMadison, WI 53711USAdoi:10.1093/mind/fzp128 Advance Access publication 28 October 2009

Self-Consciousness, by Sebastian Rodl. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 2007. Pp. xi + 207. H/b $39.95.

Sebastian Rodls Self-Consciousnessis a difficult book to review. Partly, this is

due to the fact that the book is located at the intersection of two philoso-

phical traditions. Indeed, in the preface Rodl himself suggests that it would


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