session: emerging capital markets, a look forward paper: future opportunities for emerging markets...
TRANSCRIPT
Session: Emerging Capital Markets, a Look Forward
Paper: Future Opportunities for Emerging Markets in MENA countries
Presenter: Dr Robert Stone,Oxford Policy Management
2
• The recent development of MENA securities markets
• What is required for a securities market to take off into growth?
• What causes financial crises?• Implications of the present crisis for
emerging markets• Opportunities for MENA securities markets
What we propose to cover
3
The recent development
of MENA securities markets
4
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Market capitalization (current US$bn) Value traded (current US$bn)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Figure 1: MENA Stock Exchanges, 2001-2007MENA stock exchanges, 2001-2007
5
MENA Value Traded and Turnover Ratios,2001-2007
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Value traded (current US$) Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (T/O estimated for 2004)
Figure 2: MENA Value Traded and Turnover Ratios, 2001-2007
Left Scale Right Scale
6
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Market capitalization(current US$bn)
Value traded (currentUS$bn)
Stocks traded, turnoverratio (%)
Figure 3: High Income OECD Stock Exchanges, 2001-2007
Left Scale
Right Scale
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
High Income OECD Exchanges, 2001-2007
7
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
United Kingdom
United States
Japan
Euro area
Hong Kong, China
West Bank and Gaza
United Arab Emirates
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Oman
Morocco
Lebanon
Kuwait
Jordan
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Bahrain
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Turnover Ratios, 2007(%)
8
Full scale Foreshortened scale
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
West Bank and Gaza
United Arab Emirates
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Oman
Morocco
Lebanon
Kuwait
Jordan
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Bahrain
0 50 100 150 200 250
West Bank and Gaza
United Arab Emirates
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Oman
Morocco
Lebanon
Kuwait
Jordan
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Bahrain
515
Market Capitalization of selected MENA Exchanges, 2007 (US$bn)
9
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Amman Stock Exchange (JDm)
Market Capitalization Value Traded
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007(Aug)
Palestine Stock Exchange (US$m)
Market capitalisation Value traded
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Tadawul Saudi Arabia (SARm)
Market Capitalization Value traded
-
100,000.00
200,000.00
300,000.00
400,000.00
500,000.00
600,000.00
700,000.00
800,000.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cairo & Alexandria SE (LEm)
Market capitalization Total value traded
Market Cap. & Value Traded in Selected MENA Exchanges
10
What is required for a securities market to take off into growth?
11
The flow of investment funds: the basic story
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
FIRMS
Investment
12
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
FIRMS
Deposits
BANKS
Loans
The flow of investment funds: enter the banks
13
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
FIRMS
Pension funds
Banks
Insurance companies Mutual
funds
Financial advisers
Securities markets
The flow of investment funds:with advisers and markets
14
• An increase in contractual savings leads to a growth in the stock and bond markets
• The impact is greater where corporate information is more transparent
• The impact is greater where:– the financial system is market based– pension fund contributions are mandatory– international transactions in securities are
lowerSee G. Impavidom A.R, Musalem and T. Tressel, ‘The Impact of Contractual Savings institutions on Securities Markets’ (World Bank PRWP No, 2948, 2003)
The system behaves like a system!
15
• The contractual savings institutions (pension funds and life insurance companies) need the securities market – they must be able to select assets with varying risks.
• The securities markets need the contractual savings institutions – they must have institutional investors
The NBFIs are systematically linked
16
Moving from a ‘Pay as You Go’ system toa funded system
PILLAR 1 State pension
PILLAR 2 Mandatory pension
PILLAR 3 Voluntary pension
Pensions: the Three Pillars
17
00
2020
4040
6060
8080
100100
19941994 19951995 19961996 19971997 19981998 19991999 20002000 20020011
pension funds
insurance companies
mutual funds
Source: D. Linneberg, ‘The Future of Capital Markets in Developing Countries.’ (Brookings-WB-IMF FMD conference, 2003)
Chile: financial savings by institutional investors (% of GDP)
18
(total outstanding)(total outstanding) (Issuance)(Issuance)
00
11
22
33
44
55
66
77
19941994 19951995 19961996 19971997 19981998 19991999 20002000 200120010,00,0
0,50,5
1,01,0
1,51,5
2,02,0
2,52,5
3,03,0
outstanding
issuance
Source: D. Linneberg, ‘The Future of Capital Markets in Developing Countries.’ (Brookings-WB-IMF FMD conference, 2003)
Chile: deepening the domestic corporate bond market (US$ billion)
19
DateShare offerSectorValue US$m
07/1994EgisPharmaceuticals44.6
09/1994Richter 1Pharmaceuticals60.0
07/1995OTP 1Banking88.9
11/1995Richter 2Pharmaceuticals48.6
11/1995MOL 1Oil & Gas237.0
03/1996BorsodChemPlastics74.7
07/1996TVKPetrochemicals176.2
05/1997MOL 2Oil & Gas303.8
05/1997Richter 3Pharmaceuticals218.4
10/1997OTP 2Banking212.8
11/1997MATAVTelecom1,013.3
03/1998MOL 3Oil & Gas331.4
Privatization Public Offers in Hungary,1994-1998
20
Share offering and datePercentage sold
Residual Stateholding
US$ offerprice
and proceeds
Value of residual holding
MOL 1November 1995
42%58%$8.10Proceeds $237m
$462m
MOL 2May 1996
22%36%$16.25Proceeds $304m
$575m
MOL 3March 1997
11%25%$30.00Proceeds $331m
$738m
Source: OPM research
The more you sell, the more you get – the privatization of MOL,
Hungary, 1995-1997
21
• 40% sold to France Telecom in 2000 for $508m• Investment of $500m in upgrading systems• 10.5% sold by Government in public offer in
October 2002• Proceeds were $86.2m• 90% of the offer was subscribed by Jordanian
investors …• … including 33% ($28m) by Jordanian retail
investors
The privatisation of Jordan Telecom
22
What causes financial crises?
23
Charles Mackay in 1852, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds: –
• Money, again, has often been a cause of the delusion of multitudes. Sober nations have all at once become desperate gamblers, and risked almost their existence upon the turn of a piece of paper. …
• Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.
This is not a new phenomenon!
24
Financial crises inevitably cause major set backs to “financial development” in any country). They are also regular occurrences in both rich and poor countries– sub-prime plus Northern Rock plus Bear Stearns plus private
equity/hedge funds in the rich countries in rich countries 2007/8 and the second wave of failures in September/October 2008
– LTCM (1998), the Savings & Loan crisis in 1980s and many others before that in USA and in the rich West and East
– in the Emerging Market Economies, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, Argentina – all since 1990
– in other developing countries, many examples – a total of 112 examples in 93 countries in 1970-2000 with another 51 incipient crises
Recent crises
25
Proposition: there are a number of different causal factors but a broad similarity in how any initial spark of crisis can becomes an inferno.
Five Elements to the pathology:1. Increases in interest rates / tighter liquidity2. Increases in general uncertainty3. Asset market effects (negative) on balance sheets of both
companies and banks4. Intensified informational Problems for lenders
and possibly 5. Bank runs and panics
Causes versus the Pathology of Crises
26
TRIGGER SHOCK
Stock Market decline and/or
other assetprices fall
Increase in uncertainty
Real interest rates rise
Bank Panic?
Further asset prices fall and rises in real
interest rates
Economic activity
declines & balance sheets
worsen
Unanticipated GENERAL
decline in price levels
Economic activity declines
& balance sheets worsen
REAL debt burdens rise everywhere
Asymmetric information
effects worsen
(A) Crisis in the Financial Sector
(B) Debt deflation - real burden of debt increases
Government interevention at this point can prevent a recession becoming a depression!
Based on Frederick S Mishkin, “Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective,” NBER Working Paper No. W5600, May 1996
The sequence of events in a financial crisis
27
Many of the previous financial crises have been LIQUIDITY crises – and have been correctible by plugging in lots of new Central Bank money (e.g. LTCM in 1996) or new international loans (Mexico in 1994). But not all.
Today’s crisis also involves significant INSOLVENCY elements. For example:• several 100 thousands of sub-prime and near sub-prime borrowers in USA• an increasing number of mortgage lenders and not merely the main
specialist sub-prime lenders• many home builders as order falls and cancellation rates increase• many hedge-funds and other lenders who hold the securities (especially
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) created from the original sub-prime loans
• some non-financial companies as the retreat of the hedge funds (a non-traditional source of capital and liquidity) causes bond yields to rise and availability of funds to decline relative to recent levels
• some banks ( starting with Northern Rock & Bear Stearns) whose business models have been built on the assumed availability of relatively cheap and liquid funds from other financial institutions. Mark to market is a stern
The Sub-Prime Example
28
Implications of the present crisis for emerging markets: news from the IMF
29 Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008
Until recently, emerging markets have been relatively much less volatile …
30
…but they are beginning to be seen as more risky than they were …
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008
31 Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008
…so global flows to emerging markets are falling…
32 Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008
This could be good news or bad news
33
Opportunities for MENA securities markets
34
• You can’t rely mainly on foreign capital to build the securities market– It’s more volatile than domestic capital, partly because– It’s more subject to extraneous disruptions.– In any case, even to the extent that we want foreign capital, you
need a strong domestic market to attract it
• To build the domestic securities market, you need– More liquidity, which means– More domestic institutional investors and– More firms listing and raising capital on the market
Summary of key lessons
35
0
50
100
150
200
250
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OECD market cap
OECD traded value
EAP market cap
EAP traded value
MENA market cap
MENA traded value
Figure 8: Market comparisons, 2001-2007, percentage of GDP
There is plenty of room for MENA domestic securities markets to grow
36
• Preconditions for contractual savings development, and indeed development in general appear to be:– A hard core of sound banks and insurance companies– A long term government commitment to financial
sector reform and sound macroeconomic policies– A long-term commitment to the creation of a sound
regulatory and supervisory frameworkFrom: G. Impavidom A.R, Musalem and D. Vittas, ‘Contractual Savings in Countries with a Small Financial Sector (World Bank, 2002)
Meanwhile, some general principles – to recap:
37
Specific factors impacting on stock market development in the Middle East and Central Asia include
-The quality of institutions-Remittances and-Natural resources
Does this also apply to North Africa?See Andreas Billmeier and Isabella Massa, “What Drives Stock Market Development in the Middle East and Central Asia – Institutions, Remittances or Natural Resources?” IMF Working Paper WP/07/157, July 2007
Specific factors in MECA markets
38
Requirements that the market cannot control
• The establishment of macroeconomic stability• The evolution of a funded pension system which and insurance
companies as institutional investors in the market.• Where there are substantial enterprises owned by the state (e.g.
banks, telecommunications, minerals), the floating of such enterprise on the stock exchange through a public offering of some of their shares.
• The passing and implementation of sound securities and related laws and the establishment of efficient regulators to implement them – again as a means of reducing systemic risk.
• The development of a liquid and transparent market in government securities, which established the risk-free rate of return as the benchmark for corporate securities.
• The removal of fiscal disincentives for investment in shares and bonds.
39
Asset backed securities and
derivatives
Corporate bonds and equities
Government Bond market
Treasury Bill Market & Foreign Exchange Markets
Money Markets
Banks
Stock M
arkets
Derivatives m
arkets
Source: V. Sundarararjan, ‘Financial Market Development: Sequencing of Reforms to Ensure Stability.’ (Brookings-WB-IMF FMD conference, 2003)
Sequencing: the hierarchy of markets
40
• for brokers to shift some of their focus from trading to origination – they need to become corporate financiers, not just dealers;
• for stock exchanges to ensure appropriate listing rules and for bonds and equities, rules which minimise delays and excessive regulation while ensuring transparency;
• for adequate supporting infrastructure to be developed, e.g. trading platforms, clearing & settlement, depositories, etc
• for insurance companies and mutual funds to work with the exchanges and brokers to ensure favourable conditions for underwriting new issues and large scale trading.
What is required of the markets
41
Capital Market Forum thanks you for taking the time to go through this presentation with us
For further information please visit our website
www.p-s-e.com /forum