session 42 markus lundkvist

Strengths and weaknesses in risk assessments

Presentation at Transportforum

Linköping, Sweden, 2010-01-14

Markus Lundkvist, Risk analystSwedish Maritime Administration

Aim

To address some inherent strengths and weaknesses in maritime risk assessments

SMA tasks and and budgeted costs 2009

Pilotage 47 M€Maritime Traffic Information 6 M€

Fairways and Aids to Navigation 30 M€ Icebreaking 25 M€

Cartography 7 M€Search and Rescue 27 M€

Transport policy and regulations 10 M€

Administration 25 M€

-----------------

Appr 177 M€

Etymology of risk

The term risk may be traced back to classical Greek risk, meaning root, stone, cut from firm land, and was later used in Latin for cliff. Latin and vulgar Latin resicum, risicum, riscus: cliff, récif, Felsklippe are the origins of Italian risico, risco, rischio, Spanish riesgo and French risque.

The original term is used in Homer’s Rhapsody M of Odyssey “Sirens, Scylla, Charybdee and the bulls of Helios (Sun)”. Odysseus tried to save himself from Charybdee at the cliffs of Scylla, where his ship was destroyed by heavy seas generated by Zeus.

English borrowed the term from Spanish, German from Italian and both were backed up by the French risque of the 18th century. Dictionaries confirm that it was a metaphor for “difficulty to avoid at sea”. These lexical borrowings happened at the end of the Middle Ages, when the Renaissance took place and people dared to discover the world.

The idea of risk appears to have taken hold in the 16th and 17th centuries, and was first coined by Western explorers as they set off on their voyages to explore the world. The term ‘risk’ has most likely come into English through Spanish or Portuguese, where it was used to refer to sailing into uncharted waters. From the 16th century onwards, the term therefore attained a beneficial meaning, for example in middle-high-German Rysigo was a technical term for business, with the meaning “to dare, to undertake a business and aspire for economic success”.

Rolf Skjong, DNV , at http://www.dnv.com/resources/publications/dnv_forum/2005/no_3/rizanotquiteGreektoDNV.asp

Early risk assessment / management

“One of the most effective preventive measures was a ban on sailing in winter, putting the seas out of bounds during the worst weather. The ban was not applied uniformly. In Rome, the period during which navigation was permitted lasted only from 27 May to 14 September.”

“From the mid-13th century, the maritime authorities in large Mediterranean ports introduced very strict legislation on freeboard, in order to combat the abuses of unscrupulous shipowners and captains who overloaded their ships, at the risk of losing them, in order to earn more from the freight.”

In 1330, the maritime authorities in Genoa had already laid down not only very precise rules for calculating the maximum draught of certain ships, but also an inspection procedure and a whole range of penalties for anyone contravening the rules.”

Boisson, P., 1999: Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations and International Law.

Definition of Risk Assessment in this presentation

Step 1Hazard

indentification

Step 2Risk assessment

Step 3Risk control options

Step 4Cost benefit assessment

Step 5Decision making recommendations

Decision makers

Strategic and operational risk assessment - VTS

Risk Control Measures / Options

Formal Safety Assessment

(FSA)

Regulation of VTS area and service

(Swedish Transport Agency)

IMO - Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines

Goal Maritime safety

VTS provides valuable services

to mariners (Swedish Maritime

Administration)

Collisions, groundings and contacts are avoided

Strategic risk assessment

Operational risk assessment

Present VTS areas

Källa: IALA Recommendation V-119, s. 12

HazIDFarled/ Hamn

Område i farled/hamn Riktning Olyckstyp Bakomliggande orsaker

Fartyg som ffa kan vara inblandade (typ, storlek, lots ombord etc)

På vad baseras bedömningen (inträffad händelse eller identifierat möjligt scenario)

1

Yttre området

Väst/syd på Trubaduren

In / ut Kollision / närsituation

Osäkerhet vilken bordningsposition som skall användas.

Samtliga ftg som är på väg till och från Göteborg eller yttre ankarrutor

Inträffad händelse. Utgående ftg kan vara ovetande om inkommande fartygs intentioner. Och/eller anta att ftg är på väg till annan bordningsposition än vad som är tänkt.

2

Yttre området

Väst/syd på Trubaduren

In / ut Kollision / närsituation

Manövrering vid embarkering / debarkering av Lots. Ftg kan göra oväntade manövrar för övrig trafik, nedsaktningar / oväntade girar. Pga. att fokus flyttas från sjövägsreglerna till att ta ombord lots.

Samtliga ftg som är på väg till och från Göteborg eller yttre ankarrutor

Inträffad händelse. Upphinnande ftg som är under omkörning av lotspliktigt ftg (som här skyldigt att hålla kurs och fart) kan plötsligt göra oväntade manövrar. Dessa situationer uppstår även för utgående trafik, men dock ej lika frekvent. Även lämnandet av lots anses "lindrigare".

Source: Report above.

Defective radio watch

Too lateradio call

Pomerania Rio Grande

Poorcooperation

Fear for engine alarm?

Too late speed reduction

Acceptance of a too narrow margin

in distance

Causes/factors

Neglecting the AB´s warnings

Too vague changeof course

All steering gears were not running

Concentration on telephone call

Limitedexperience?

High confidence in the radar

COLLISION

Vessel on starboard?

Limitededucation?

Nonchalance?Wrong radio

channel ?

Nonchalance?

?Too much respect

Too much respect

Routine/ Obligation?

??

?

Poor cooperation

Neglecting the AB´s warnings

?

Act/EventAct/Event Causes/factors

1. Anomaly in ship position, draught, course, speed, (or in waterway)

2. Anomaly becomes observable for VTSO

3. VTSO becomes aware of the situation

4. VTSO calls ship to inform or to ask about intention

5. Bridge team understands the question/information

6. Bridge team undertakes appropriate measures

7. Anomaly is corrected with sufficient marginal to avoid accident

2. Slight delay in radar, AIS, information from mariners

3. Workload, experience, operational procedures

4. Communication means

5. Workload, status

6. Situational awareness and correct action

7. Ship manoeuvrability , fairway size and configuration

Event tree

1. Anomaly in ship position, draught, course, speed, (or in waterway)

2. Anomaly becomes observable for VTSO

3. VTSO becomes aware of the situation

4. VTSO calls ship to inform or to ask about intention

5. Bridge team understands the question/information

6. Bridge team undertakes appropriate measures

7. Anomaly is corrected with sufficient marginal to avoid accident

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Nop=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Nop=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Nop=?

Yesp=?

Yesp=?

Nop=?

Yesp=?

Nop=?

Nop=?

Accident Possible Preventive information

Tracking Overall assessment

Year

Type

Ship Can the scenario still occur? Any recent barriers?

Would maritime traffic information at an early stage prevented the scenario)

Would VTS detect the anomaly? If yes, how long time before the accident?

Would the bridge team be in position to receive and understand the information/question?

Would the time margin have been sufficient for evasive action on board?

Would VTS have avoided the accident?

2003 G Solvita Om vakthavande befäl överhuvud taget var på bryggan är oklart. Allt befäl ombord var alkoholpåverade. Omständigheten kan tyvärr upprepas.

Nej. Bryggan kan ha varit obemannad. Befälen var höggradigt berusade.

Ja. Fartyget hade framförts på ett avvikande sätt genom norra Öresund under 25 minuter.

Nej pga berusning. Ingen på bryggan

Utan betydelse då besättning inte hade kontroll över fartygets framförande.

Nej

2003 G Oosterbrug Fartyget använde orättade BA-kort. Kan hända igen.

Kort om tid Kort om tid. Cirka 2 minuter

Nej Nej Nej

2004 G Fjord Ice Ljussättningen i Flintrännan ändrades till följd av grundstötningen.

Det hade troligen funnits tid att kontakta fartyget för information.

Man hade 10 minuter på sig att observera det felaktiga framförandet.

Förmodligen Troligen Möjligen

2004 G Domiat Detta är, om något, en osannolik grundstötning

En VTS-operatör som fått vetskap om fartygets djupgående hade haft gott om tid att stoppa fartyget.

Ja, genom rapportering av för stort djupgående vid rapporteringspunkt. Många timmar.

Sannolikt ja. Bfh hade troligen i högre grad lyssnat på VTS-operatör än sin egen besättning.

Ja Ja

2005 K Pomerania & Rio Grande

Om man inte kör enligt sjövägsreglerna kan detta hända igen

Det är inte önskvärt att en tredje part blandar sig i hur fartyg framförs i en situation mellan två eller fler fartyg.

Nej Nej Nej Nej

Evaluation VTS –accident investigation reports, the Sound

CASUALTYID SUBCLASS CATEGORY DATEOFLOSS

TOTAL _100_USD

MAINDEDUCT_USD

CLAIMDETAILS VESSELTYPE

20000001Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 01-jan-00 75265 41088

C/W BERGEN ARROW AT DURBAN ROAD Container


COLLISION WITH PORT ARTHUR AT NEW ORLEANS Bulker


C/W NEW HAI HUNG AT HONG KONG Bulker


COLLISION WITH ATLAS AT CADIZ Dry Cargo


C/W PASADENA UNIVERSAL Bulker


ENTANGLED PROPELLER AND C/W VENTO DE MELTIMI AT ALEXANDRIA Dry Cargo

20000046Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 21-feb-00 4262 67500

STRUCK BULKWAYU AT MARACAIBO Dry Cargo

20000062Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 09-feb-00 60397 45000

C/W TUG PIONEER AND BARGE AT SEMARANG Container

20000108Hull and Machinery Insurance Collision 16-mar-00 493 39807

COLLISION WITH MAERSK CASTRIES AT FREEPORT BAHAMAS Container

Claims data 2000-2009H&M, LoH Swedish ClubProbability: 1

SAFEDOR (2007)Swedish dataProbability: Sw. Accident dbase

ASEK 4 (SIKA, 2009)Probability: 1Assumption of average delay

ASEK 4 (SIKA, 2009)FSA GuidelinesProbability: Sw. Accident dbase

Claims data 2000-2009 (contact, P&I) Swedish ClubProbability: 1 (contact)

Negligible in most cases .

Estimation approach

Some strengths and weaknesses

Human factor in risk assessment

Strategic risk assessment

Operational risk assessment

Hazard identification Human factor (based on STA report ”Summary of reported marine casualties”, 2008)

• Alcohol or other intoxicants

• Alternative navigation aid was not used

• Other circumstances influenced by the human factor

• Misjudgement of other ship’s movement

• Misjudgement of own ship’s movement

• Too high speed

• Attempt to carry out the operation in spite of unfavourable circumstances

• Did not keep to starboard in the fairway

• Position of own ship not good enough. “Dead reckoning” not noted in the chart

• Inadequate competence for the task

• Slept while on watch

• Special circumstances (sickness, lack of sleep, too long working hours)

• Available warning systems were not adequately used

• Available navigation aid was not used

• Poor planning of the operation

Source: Swedish Transport Agency, 2008: Summary of reported marine casualties, near-accidents and accidents to persons, Swedish merchant and fishing vessels 2008

Frequency assessment - models?

RCMs impact on:Lateral distributionGrounding candidatesCausation factor

Frequency assessment – Reported accidents involving Swedish and foreign ships per port call in Sweden

0

0,0001

0,0002

0,0003

0,0004

0,0005

0,0006

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Grounding

Contact

Collision

Sources: Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate, 2002 /Swedish Transport Agency, 2008: Sjöolyckor i svenska farvatten. Swedish Maritime Administration, 2008: Sektorrapport.Sjöfartens utveckling 2008.

Consequence assessment -

Source: ITOPF, 2009: Oil tanker spill statistics 2008.

Spills over 700 tonnes.

Oil transported and number of oil spills > 7

tonnes.

Some strengths and weaknesses in FSA

FSA step Strengths Weaknesses

Hazard identification Widened knowledge of accident scenariosStructured identification

Limited insightSimplification of causal chains

Risk Assessment(Frequency, probability)

Estimation of probability – good decision

Changing system (rules, technology, traffic regime)Geographically (and poor) statistics

Risk assessment(Consequences)

Impact distribution on different values

Monetary valueLimit of accident impact

Risk Control Options Limited Limited insight in combinationsLimited number of RCMs evaluatedLimited insight in effect

Cost-Benefit Assessment

Effectiveness approach Rough costs, poor data, sensitive to state of market

Final questions

When are collisions and groundings predictable? For whom are they predictable? When is the accident probability 1? Differences - operational and strategic risk assessments?

What strengths and weaknesses in risk assessments have You identified?

What are the similarities and differences compared to medievial risk assessment?

Final message

• Use risk assessment but use them carefully• It is a strength to acknowledge the weaknesses in the assessment• What it the option to risk-based approach?•

Thank You for Your attention!

session 42 markus lundkvist

Technology

term risk

risk assessment step

etymology of risk

idea of risk

definition of risk assessment

maritime risk assessments

risk assessments presentation

risk control options