CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 SEPARATION OF POWERS CASE DIGESTS: ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936 FACTS: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province. On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition. Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. RULING: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was

acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 FACTS: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a

function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature. TANADA v. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.

These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. IN RE DICK Facts: R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a periodical published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the war between

the United States and the German Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation but before the Governor-General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. Issue: Whether or not the Governor General could exercise the deportation power in the absence of statutory authority? Held: Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. AYTONA VS. CASTILLO 4 SCRA 1 FACTS: The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warrantoproceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief. 5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention in force.

HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show. Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies

as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution. Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the “exclusive” charge to the “the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,” independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens’ assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,

concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite. Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. Alejandrino v. Quezon Facts: The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases beinguttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner'scomplaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect. Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?

Held. The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. VERA VS. AVELINO Facts: The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate. During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election. Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. Issues: Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid. Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. Held:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC

FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections?

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

BARCELONA VS. BAKER This case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus which it alleged that Barcelon is detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of Batangas, in the Province of Batangas, and that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is is wholly without legal authority and not under or by virtue of any process issued by any court. Respondents admit that theyare detaining the body of the said Felix Barcelon, but deny the right of the court to inquire into the reasons therefor by virtueof the resolution issued by the Philippine Commission and the executive order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the Governor-General is hereby authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said provinces because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said provinces were in open insurrection against the constituted authorities; and the said bands, or parts of them, and some of their leaders, were still in open resistance to the constituted authorities. ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which the legislative and executivebranches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habes corpus in the province of Cavite and BAtangas

HELD: NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the very object of the rebels or insurrections or invaders has been accomplished. IN THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that the President, or the Governor-General, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might require it .the conclusion set forth in the said resolution and the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of the facts. That one branch of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government. The doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts has been recognized in this case. The authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the legislative and executive branches of the government and their decision is final and conclusive upon the Judicial Department and upon all persons. Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas corpus is denied. AVELINO VS. CUENCO FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case. 2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court. 2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt. ENDENCIA VS. DAVID Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of thePhilippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).

The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting

a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. LAWYERS AGAINST … VS. SECRETARY FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal. HELD: I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that

concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. II. The Court rules in the negative. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.” The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. PORK BARREL: The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC Facts: 1. A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT). 2. In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations which were disqualified by the Commission on Election from participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because they allegedly do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector of society, the majority is of the view that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. Hence, con t ra ry to the Ang Bagong Bayan i , the par ty -l i s t sys tem is no t the exc lus ive domain o f sec to ra l representatives belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors” but may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector. Issue: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of thiscourt in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections Held: 1. We hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections. However, since the court adopts in this decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the Comelec in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to all the present petitions for the Comelec to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this decision. What is the objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution? To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the house of representatives. Who are included in the party list system? Sectoral and Non-sectoral parties.

What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties? Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 1 Political parties can participate in the party-list system “[f]or as long as they filed candidates who come from the different marginalizedsectors that we shall designate in this constitution.” 2 Three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2 ) regional parties or organizations; and (3 )sectoral parties or organizations 3 Mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, “one-half of the seatsallocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.”