sem 11 just war iraq lybia 2011

8132019 Sem 11 Just War Iraq Lybia 2011

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullsem-11-just-war-iraq-lybia-2011 122

Was Iraq an unjust war A debate on the

Iraq war and reflections on Libya

DAVID FISHER AND NIGEL BIGGAR

International Affairs 983096983095983091 (983090983088983089983089) 983094983096983095ndash983095983088983095copy 983090983088983089983089 The Author(s) International Affairs copy 983090983088983089983089 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Published by Blackwell PublishingLtd 983097983094983088983088 Garsington Road Oxford 983151983160983092 983090983140983153 UK and 983091983093983088 Main Street Malden MA 983088983090983089983092983096 USA

The case against the war Round I

David Fisher

There has been much recent debate about whether the 983090983088983088983091 Iraq war was legalwith both Tony Blair and his Attorney-General summoned before the ChilcotInquiry to give evidence on this point But a more fundamental question iswhether the war was moral

On this question the Chilcot Inquiry has been more reticent perhaps reflectinga more general scepticism in society about whether moral questions can have objec-tive answers But there is a way of thinking going back to Aquinas Aristotle andbeyond that insists that there are rationally based ways to answer such questions

The just war tradition sets a number of tests to be met if a war is to be justIt has to be undertaken for a just cause with right intention with competent

authority and as a last resort the harm judged likely to result should not outweighthe good achieved taking into account the probability of success in its conductthe principles of proportion and non-combatant immunity have to be met andthe war must end in a just peace

All of this may appear deliberately over-prescriptivemdasherecting so many hurdlesthat war would become impossible But the just war tradition recognizes thatwars can be just and may sometimes be necessary What it insists upon are twofundamental requirements as simple as they are compelling Is there a just causeAnd will the harm likely to be caused by military action outweigh the good tobe achieved by that cause In other words is the war in question likely to bring

about more good than harmSo how does the Iraq war fare against these criteria

This article is based on a debate between Dr David Fisher and Professor Nigel Biggar held at Chatham Houseon 983090983090 March 983090983088983089983089 in conjunction with the Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmamentto mark the launch of David Fisherrsquos book Morality and war can war be just in the twenty-first century (OxfordOxford University Press 983090983088983089983089) A fuller account of David Fisherrsquos views on the Iraq war are in the book espch 983089983088



David Fisher and Nigel Biggar

983094983096983096International Affairs 983096983095 983091 983090983088983089983089Copyright copy 983090983088983089983089 The Author(s) International Affairs copy 983090983088983089983089 The Royal Institute of International Affairs

Just cause

Different reasons for the war were adduced at different times by the British andUS governments Indeed in the months preceding the war so many reasons were

adduced particularly by the US administration that it was not always clear whatthe rationale for military action was But the declared basis for the military opera-tion common to both governments was according to the British governmentrsquospublished war aims lsquoto rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and associ-ated programmes hellip as set out in relevant UNSCRsrsquo983089 Military operations wereundertaken to enforce the disarmament obligations imposed on Saddam Husseinrsquosregime by the UN and to remove the threat to regional peace and security

Saddamrsquos disappearing WMD

We now know from the Iraq Survey Group that Iraq did not have weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) The Iraq Survey Group concluded that lsquoIraq by themid-983089983097983097983088s was essentially free of militarily significant WMD stocksrsquo althoughSaddam retained a strategic ambition and capability to reacquire them once thesanctions regime had ended983090 Even this startling disclosure would not necessarilyinvalidate the coalitionrsquos disarmament objective as a just cause if there were reason-able and strong grounds for believing that Saddam had such weapons So werethere such grounds

The belief reflected the advice of all the relevant experts including the UNweapons inspectors Saddam had had biological and chemical weapons and hadused chemical weapons After the first Gulf war it was discovered that his stocks

of chemical and biological weapons had been much higher and his nuclearprogramme further advanced than intelligence had suggested So there weregrounds for concern that while substantial stocks had been destroyed Saddammight have retained some chemical and biological weapons and might even beseeking to reconstitute his nuclear programme Having underestimated hiscapability before the analysts were keenmdashperhaps too keenmdashto avoid makingthe same mistake again

Their concerns were reinforced by the fact that Saddam behaved as if he hadthe weapons He refused to cooperate fully with the UN weapon inspectors andwithdrew cooperation altogether in 983089983097983097983096 It was difficult to understand why if

he had nothing to hide he did not cooperate with the inspectors to secure theremoval of sanctions No western democratic leader would behave in such a wayincurring the penalties of sanctions and threatened military action This compara-tive judgement was however flawed For Saddam was not a western democraticleader but an Arab despot to whom the standards of western rationality anddemocratic values did not apply

983089 lsquoIraq Military Campaign Objectivesrsquo para 983089 The text is quoted in full as Annex C to The review of intelligenceof weapons of mass destruction report of a committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Lord Butler (Butler Report)HC983096983097983096 (London House of Commons 983089983092 July 983090983088983088983092)

983090 Iraq Survey Group Final report 983091983088 Sept 983090983088983088983092 vol I p 983091983092 httpwwwglobalsecurityorgwmdlibrary report983090983088983088983092isg-final-report accessed 983090 Feb 983090983088983089983088



Was Iraq an unjust war


The belief that Saddam had WMD was therefore mistaken but not unreason-able But was this belief the real reason why military action was undertaken

Right intention

It is not enough to have a just cause the military action must be undertaken for the sake of that cause and so with right intention Many opponents of the war thoughtthat the disarming of Iraq was only a pretext and that there must have been othermore sinister reasons for military action

The motivations of the US and UK governments in the drive towards warwere undoubtedly mixed with considerations of realpolitik jostling uneasily withhigher-minded concerns Criticism can in particular be levelled at the way thecase for war was presented including the unqualified claims made in the intelli-gence dossier published by the UK government in September 983090983088983088983090 and the unjusti-

fied linkage made by the US government between Saddamrsquos regime and Al-983121aedaterrorists Both made the threat appear more direct immediate and serious thanit was But none of this provides grounds for doubting that both governmentsgenuinely believed that Saddam had a WMD capability and were concerned overthe consequent threat to peace and security in the region and more widely Thatbelief was mistaken but not unreasonable So the objective of disarming Iraq of itsWMD capability in enforcement of UN resolutions could have constituted a justcause for military action There are however two crucial qualifications

First war inevitably causes suffering The just war criteria therefore requirestrong evidence of the gravity and likelihood of the threat to be countered The

evidential bar is set high by the just war criteria not arbitrarily but by the grimlogic of war whereby the suffering caused is certain while the gains are lesscertainmdashparticularly the gains from action against threats such as that posed byIraq that are not actual or imminent

It was thus not enough to have a reasonable belief that Saddam had WMDthat belief needed to be based on strong evidence of the seriousness of the threatBut the intelligence reports on which the judgements of Saddamrsquos capability werebased were lsquosporadic and patchyrsquo in the words of the Butler report983091 or in thecase of the Iraqi defector known as lsquoCurveballrsquo flaky in the extreme983092 The highevidential standards set by the just war criteria were therefore not met

The second and related difficulty is that since the military action to disarm Iraqof its WMD capability was being undertaken to enforce UN Security Councilresolutions it was important that the US and UK governments had the requiredcompetent authority to act on behalf of the UN

983091 Butler Report para 983091983091983088983092 Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd lsquoDefector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq warrsquo Tuesday 983089983093 February

983090983088983089983089 httpwwwguardiancoukworld983090983088983089983089Feb983089983093defector-admits-wmd-lies-iraq-war accessed 983089983094 Feb983090983088983089983089





Competent authority

Lord Goldsmith produced an elegant legal argument to show that the coalitionhad competent authority inherited from earlier UNSCRs But whatever its legalmeritsmdashand these were disputedmdashthe weakness of such an approach is that a

justification for the claim to be embarking on war on behalf of the UN requiredmore than an argument to show that force had been authorized by the UN inthe past it needed evidence that such military enforcement action was still theavowed wish of the international community This was why the British govern-ment had been rightly keen to secure a second resolution explicitly authorizingthe use of force at the present time The failure to secure support for that resolu-tion was itself evidence of the lack of international consensus for military actionThe failure arose moreover not from a threatened veto by one or two recalcitrantnations but because there was no broad alliance favouring action Nor was there an

urgent humanitarian crisis to be averted such as might have justified action hadthere been substantial international support even without UNSCR approval aswas the case with the 983089983097983097983097 NATO operations in Kosovo This lack of internationalsupport cast doubt on the claim that the US and British governments had therequired competent authority It also reflected a widespread concern that militaryaction was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort

Last resort

UNSCR Resolution 983089983092983092983089 passed on 983097 November 983090983088983088983090 while declaring Iraq inmaterial breach of its disarmament obligations had given Saddam a final chanceto prove otherwise The UNMOVIC inspectors had arrived in Iraq only on 983090983096November 983090983088983088983090 and had not yet had time to complete their work In their 983095 Marchreport they had begun to report a greater degree of Iraqi cooperation Many feltthat the inspectors should have been given more time

There were genuine concerns whether military action was being undertakenas a last resort and in view of these there was a reluctance to support a secondresolution authorizing force This in turn cast doubt on whether the conditionof competent authority was met and so reinforced the concern that there was nota just cause for action Doubt over whether each of these conditions individuallywas met did not amount to a decisive argument against war But the doubts taken

together reinforced each other and so strengthened the overall concern that therewas not a sufficient just cause

It is moreover the single most serious charge against those who planned theIraq war that they massively underestimated the harm that would be caused bymilitary action





Principle of proportion

The next just war requirement is that before war is begun a careful assessmentshould be undertaken to seek to ensure that the harm likely to be caused does notoutweigh the good achieved taking into account the probability of success

Judged against the initial military campaign this condition was met Casualtieswere much lower than in the first Gulf war Against the limited casualties couldbe set the removal of the threat to regional peace and security achieved by theoverthrow of Saddamrsquos regime and the opportunity this furnished to disarm Iraqof its WMD

So it looked in April 983090983088983088983091 Eight years later the balance sheet looks differentNo WMD were found Meanwhile the casualties military and civilian havecontinued to mount with US military deaths to date at over 983092983092983088983088 British at 983089983095983097and civilian deaths at over 983089983088983088983088983088983088983093 Most of these casualties are not the result

of coalition military action but stem from the devastating attacks that the Iraqishave been making on one another as insurgent groups struggle for power Theoverall totals also mask recent improvements both politically and in much reducedcasualty levels

These improvements are significant But the cost of getting there has been highand in particular much higher than anticipated by those planning the invasionCoalition leaders could not reasonably be expected to have forecast the precisecasualty levels that would follow military action But they are open to criticismfor not having given sufficient consideration to what would be the effects ofregime change and for not having formulated robust plans to re-establish civilgovernance promptly thereafter and effect a peaceful transition to democracy Justas they had undertaken worst-case assessments of Saddamrsquos WMD capability sothey had undertaken best-case assessments of what would happen after the regimehad been changed Coalition forces were as a result ill-prepared to deal with theconsequent breakdown of law and onset of a violent insurgency

As casualties have mounted in the eight years since the invasion it has becomeincreasingly difficult to maintain that more good than harm was produced bymilitary action however evil and oppressive the Saddam regime had undoubtedlybeen Nor set against the good to be achieved would any government have beenable to secure support in 983090983088983088983091 for military action expected to cost over 983089983088983088983088983088983088civilian lives Crucially the careful assessment of likely consequences in advance of

military operations required by the just war tradition was not undertaken Norwas there adequate planning of how to achieve the prompt restoration of peacefulconditions after military operations

983093 The military casualty figures are collated from government sources by the Brookings Institution andpublished in the Brookings Iraq Index see httpwwwbrookingseduiraqindex accessed 983091983089 Jan 983090983088983089983089 Thetotal civilian casualty figures are documented civilian deaths from violence as estimated by the Iraq BodyCount on 983091983089 Jan 983090983088983089983089 see httpwwwiraqbodycountorgdatabase accessed 983091983089 Jan 983090983088983089983089





Jus in bello proportion and non-combatant immunity

Turning to the conduct of the war the just war tradition requires that the harm judged likely to result from individual military actions should not be dispro-portionate to the good achieved and that non-combatant casualties should beminimized

In the initial military campaign the use of force was proportionate and successfulefforts were made to minimize civilian casualties But in the ensuing counterinsur-gency operations there have been lapses on both counts Excessive force was usedparticularly during the first year of the occupation for example in the assault onFallujah and civilians were ill-treated both by US forces most notoriously at AbuGhraib and by British soldiers in Basra among them Baha Mousa who sufferedunlawful death in custody

The verdict

The Iraq war was like most wars fought from a mixture of motives But inthe main the reasons for undertaking the war were honourable and the concernsover WMD proliferation genuinely held The tragedy of the Iraq conflict is thatthose responsible were trying to make the world a better and safer place andwere supported by military forces that have on the whole exhibited remarkablerestraint and courage But as the just war doctrine forged from painful experi-ence over the centuries teaches noble aspirations are not enough to justify armedconflict

The war failed fully to meet any of the just war criteria There were doubtswhether the operation was undertaken with competent authority and as a lastresort These doubts in turn fuelled the concerns that there was not sufficient

just cause Doubts about the justice of the cause in turn reinforced concernsover whether the principle of proportion could be metmdashconcerns both over thegood to be achieved and over the harm war would bring about Crucially noadequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seekto ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achievedNor were there robust plans for how to establish a just peace after the initialmilitary campaign had been concluded

The doubts over whether individual conditions were met were grounds for

concern The charge against the Iraq war is not however that it fell somewhatshort of a number of conditions but rather that such individual failures whentaken together reinforced each other building up cumulatively to support theconclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and withoutadequate planning on how to achieve a just outcome It thus failed the two keytests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken designed to ensurethat military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result

Our political leaders may have had noble objectives in embarking on militaryaction But moral fervour is not enough to ensure right decisions are taken Moralreasoning needs to be guided by the judicious exercise of practical wisdom lsquothe





habit of sound judgement about practical situationsrsquo983094 Political leaders are requiredto exercise this virtue in its highest form which Aquinas called lsquostatesmanshiprsquo983095 It was such statesmanship that was signally lacking in the decision to embark on

military action in 983090983088983088983091

The case for the war Round I

Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war

I agree the invasion and occupation of Iraq were gravely flawed The claim thatIraq possessed WMD destruction was it now seems false The reason for thishowever lies not in government deception but in errors of interpretation by awide range of intelligence agenciesmdashnot only the British and American but

also the French the German and the Russian983096 A second error was that the USarmed forces still reacting against their experience in Vietnam were ill-disposedto undertake counterinsurgency operations983097 Both of these errors were grave butnot I think morally culpable On the other hand the following grave errors were morally culpable

The first of these was Washingtonrsquos severe underestimation of what it wouldtake to rebuild Iraq after the invasionmdashespecially the number of troops necessaryto secure law and order which is the precondition of any political flourishingWere it not for Donald Rumsfeldrsquos indulgence of the vice of wishful thinkingthis could have been avoided983089983088

Next was Paul Bremerrsquos mistake of disbanding the Iraqi army and policethrowing lots of young men many of them armed out onto the streets with nolegitimate way of earning an income and thus fuelling insurgency The intent waswell-meaning namely the de-Barsquoathification of the statersquos security institutionsBut it was imprudent as was foreseenmdashbut not by a Bremer made impatient by amanagerial mentality that brushes aside complexity and ambiguity in its lust forclean decisive solutions983089983089

And then there was the wicked physical and psychological abuse of prisonersat Abu Ghraib and elsewhere

So I agree the invasion and occupation of Iraq were afflicted by grave errorssome of them morally culpable But then so was the war against Hitler In his

983094 Peter Geach Virtues (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 983089983097983095983095) p 983089983094983088983095 Aquinas Summa Theologiae 983090a983090ae983093983088983089 in St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae vol 983091983094 Prudence trans Thomas

Gilby OP (London Blackfriars Eyre amp Spottiswoode 983089983097983095983092)983096 For a fuller account of this point and of those in the following two paragraphs see Nigel Biggar lsquoInvading

Iraq what are the morals of the storyrsquo International Affairs 983096983095 983089 Jan 983090983088983089983089 pp 983090983097ndash983091983088983097 Thomas Ricks Fiasco the American military adventure in Iraq (London Penguin 983090983088983088983095) esp pp 983090983094983092ndash983095983089983088 Donald Rumsfeldrsquos spokesman Larry Di Rita dismissed the claim that the invasion needed to show early

benefits to the Iraqi people by saying lsquoWe donrsquot owe the people of Iraq anything Wersquore giving them theirfreedom Thatrsquos enoughrsquo George Packer The assassinsrsquo gate America in Iraq (New York Farrar StrausGiroux 983090983088983088983093) p 983089983091983091 And according to George Packer lsquoIn his [Rumsfeldrsquos] view and that of others inthe administration hellip freedom was the absence of constraint hellip Remove a thirty-five-year-old tyranny anddemocracy will grow in its placersquo ( Assassinsrsquo gate pp 983089983091983094ndash983095)

983089983089 Packer Assassinsrsquo gate p 983089983097983088





983089983097983092983089 attempts to bolster American support for Britain President Roosevelt lsquosexeduprsquo the Greer incident into a Nazi act of aggression983089983090 and he claimed to possess alsquosecret maprsquo of Nazi designs on Latin Americamdasha map far more dodgy than any

Iraq dossier since its very probable forgery by the British was probably known byRoosevelt983089983091 Further the Allied prosecution of the war was morally vitiated byBomber Harrisrsquos vengeful hatred Montgomeryrsquos ally-alienating conceit Pattonrsquosreckless vainglory and Zhukovrsquos wanton ruthlessness Further still it was alsomorally vitiated by the RAFrsquos (arguably) indiscriminate bombing of Germancities by the not uncommon shooting in cold blood of German prisoners of warby US troops during the Battle of Normandy983089983092 and by the Red Armyrsquos rape ofan estimated 983090 million German women983089983093

And while Allied efforts liberated western Europe from the murderous handsof Hitler which was very good it also delivered eastern Europe up to the tendermercies of Stalin which was very bad

Most wars even just ones are morally flawed Therefore the fact that the Iraqventure involved serious moral errors does not yet tell us that it was unjust overall

The limits of law

Many people seem to think that the invasion was clearly illegal and that thereforeit was basically unjust Neither is true Whether or not the authorization of theUnited Nations Security Council was given is a matter of unresolved dispute UNresolutions are the fruit of political consensus and political consensus is oftenachieved through creative ambiguity Accordingly some understood UN Resolu-

tion 983089983092983092983089 to be sufficient to authorize military action others did not There isno court with international authority to decide one way or another What wehave instead are international lawyers who advocate a case for a particular inter-pretation of the legal text in terms of its contextmdashin particular the history ofits negotiation and the analogy or otherwise between the political circumstancesof the early 983090983088983088983088s and those of the early 983089983097983097983088s In other words the legal inter-pretation is neither pure nor plain but depends upon a political assessment andits moral assumptionsmdashabout both of which there is ample scope for reason-able controversy Therefore if by lsquoclearlyrsquo one means lsquoincontrovertiblyrsquo the Iraqinvasion is not lsquoclearly illegalrsquo

However let us suppose that the Security Councilrsquos authorization was lackingand that the invasion was illegal Even if that were so it could not be the final wordsince positive law is always subject to moral law If that were not so then thosewho plotted to assassinate Hitler in July 983089983097983092983092 would be criminal traitors simply (asthey were in the eyes of German law until at least the late 983089983097983097983088s) whereas in fact

983089983090 Robert Dallek Franklin D Roosevelt and American foreign policy 983089983097983091983090ndash983089983097983092983093 (New York Oxford University Press983089983097983095983097) pp 983090983096983094ndash983097

983089983091 Nicholas John Cull Selling war the British propaganda campaign against American lsquoneutralityrsquo in World War II (NewYork Oxford University Press 983089983097983097983093) pp 983089983094983096ndash983095983093

983089983092 Antony Beevor D-Day the battle for Normandy (London Viking 983090983088983088983097) pp 983090983092 983089983088983094 983089983090983089 983089983093983091 983089983093983096 983092983091983096983089983093 Antony Beevor Berlin the downfall 983089983097983092983093 (London Viking 983090983088983088983090) p 983092983089983088





they were also and foremost moral heroes Beyond the legal question always liesthe moral question No one may park his or her conscience in the space markedlsquolawrsquo

The force of this assertion is all the more evident when we consider the fact thatthe power of the UN to uphold international law is severely compromised by thepolitics of the Security Council983089983094 Take the following analogy A neighbour a fewhouses away is murdering his children It is against the law for you to intervenedirectly You call the police to ask them to intervene instead Before they canintervene however the police have to get authorization from a committee Anymember of this committee can prevent authorization by issuing a veto In thiscase a committee member is related to the householder or has investments in hisbusiness He therefore vetoes any authorization for the police to intervene to saveyour neighbourrsquos children What will you do Will you break the law and inter-vene yourself Or will you stand by and watch the children being slaughtered

That is the situation in which current international law lands us On the onehand it forbids individual states to intervene militarily in the affairs of a sovereignstate unless authorized by the Security Council to do so On the other hand itmakes the power of the Security Council to issue authorization hostage to thepolitical interestsmdashsometimes cynicalmdashof its members Thus NATO did not seekSecurity Council authorization to intervene in Kosovo since Russia would havevetoed it because of its cultural ties with Serbia Strictly then NATOrsquos inter-vention was illegal Nevertheless most people now regard it as legitimatemdashbywhich they mean lsquomorally justifiedrsquo It follows that even if the invasion of Iraqwas illegal that does not suffice to make it immoral

Civilian deaths

Some suppose that the scale of civilian casualties in Iraq establishes the immoralityof the intervention Most discussions cite a figure of between 983089983088983088983088983088983088 and 983089983094983088983088983088983088which is indeed a terrible cost Yet the liberation of Europe from Nazi dominationcost the lives of 983095983088983088983088983088 French civilians and about 983093983088983088983088983088983088 German ones throughAllied bombing My point here is not that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant as evil asAdolf Hitler (although the difference between them was more one of opportunitythan of inclination) Nor do I intend a general analogy between the war againstHitler and the invasion of Iraq No my point is rather that Allied belligerencyin the Second World War which is very widely regarded as just neverthelessinvolved massive civilian casualties and that therefore massive civilian casualtiesin Iraq do not by themselves suffice to render the 983090983088983088983091 invasion unjust

Moreover whereas the deaths of French and German civilians in the SecondWorld War were the direct responsibility of the British and Americans the vastmajority of Iraqi civilian deaths is directly attributable to foreign or native insur-gents Not being a utilitarian I do not regard an agent as equally responsible forall the effects of his actions No agent is primarily responsible for the reactions of

983089983094 For a fuller account of this point see Biggar lsquoInvading Iraqrsquo pp 983091983091ndash983093





other agents Sunni or Shirsquoi insurgents and Al-983121aeda agents were not compelledto send suicide bombers into crowded marketplaces or to hack off the heads ofhostages They chose to do so And even if they were motivated by nationalist or

Islamist resentment at foreign or western intrusion that is not a sufficient warrantNeither nationalism nor Islamism is its own moral justification Sometimes foreignintervention is morally right and should be accepted So yes the occupyingpowers had an obligation to maintain law and order in which they failed initiallyBut the insurgents also had a moral obligation not to target civilians intentionallyand that is one in which they have failed persistently

Just cause an atrocious regime

Whether or not the 983090983088983088983091 invasion and occupation of Iraq were basically just orunjust is decided by three standard criteria just cause last resort and right inten-

tion Was there sufficient just cause According to the Christian tradition of justwar thinking to which I adhere just belligerency is motivated by love for neigh-bours in the specific form of righting a grave wrong done to them One kind ofsuch wrong is a statersquos murder of its own citizens on a massive scale Let us callthis state-atrocity

Was Saddam Husseinrsquos regime guilty of such atrocity Undoubtedly The983089983097983096983096 Anfal campaign against the Kurds killed at very least 983089983088983088983088983088983088 some by wayof chemical WMD983089983095 And between 983089983097983097983089 and 983090983088983088983091 according to western humanrights groups at least a further 983091983088983088983088983088983088 people were victims of state violence983089983096 SoSaddam Husseinrsquos regime was responsible for the murder of at least 983092983088983088983088983088983088 of its

own people in the 983089983093 years from 983089983097983096983096 to 983090983088983088983091 That certainly makes it atrociousaccording to Human Rights Watch it also makes it genocidal983089983097 This is sufficient just cause for military intervention Note it is not sufficient to make interventionmorally right because there are other criteria yet to be met but it is sufficient tosatisfy the single criterion of just cause

One implication of my view of just cause is that it makes Iraqrsquos possession ofWMD a secondary issue It augments the just cause and it gives remote peopleslike the Americans and the British an interest in taking that cause up but it is notnecessary to make it sufficient But what exactly would have been so evil aboutSaddam Husseinrsquos possession of WMD especially nuclear weapons Three thingsfirst it would have made the regime immune from hindrance as it perpetrated

further domestic atrocities second it could have made the regime immune fromretaliation the next time it invaded a Kuwait third and last but not at all least itwould have enabled the regime to supply WMD to Al-983121aeda or other terroristsseeking to maximize civilian casualties If you find alarm over Saddam Husseinrsquospossession of WMD hard to credit it might help if you were to imagine how

983089983095 Anne Clwyd lsquoWhy did it take you so long to get herersquo in Thomas Cushman ed A matter of principlehumanitarian arguments for war in Iraq (Berkeley University of California 983090983088983088983093) pp 983091983089983089ndash983089983090

983089983096 William Shawcross Allies the US Britain Europe and the war in Iraq (New York Public Affairs 983090983088983088983092) p 983089983094983088983089983097 Human Rights Watch lsquoGenocide in Iraq the Anfal campaign against the Kurdsrsquo July 983089983097983097983091 httpwwwhrw

orgreports983089983097983097983091iraqanfal accessed 983090983096 March 983090983088983089983089





things would now stand if Colonel 983121adhafi had chemical biological and nuclearweapons at his disposal

Last resort incontinent containment

The fact that Iraq turned out not to possess WMD certainly reduces the problemrsquosurgency but it does not eliminate the problem No one doubts that SaddamHussein was intent on resuming his efforts to acquire WMD the moment the UNinspectors left and the coalition troops withdrew from his borders This brings usto the issue of last resort Given the problem of Iraqrsquos persistent resolve to acquireWMD one solution was forcible regime change But were there other less costlyequally effective options The obvious candidate is containment

What were the prospects of successful containment Note that the question is notwhether containment had been effective but whether it would have continued to be so

I doubt it Kenneth Pollack has argued that before the invasion containment wascollapsing beyond repair Since 983089983097983097983095 France Russia and Chinamdashall members ofthe Security Councilmdashhad been pressing for a relaxation of sanctions and inspec-tions in order to obtain oil and military contracts and to collect debts owed Inparticular China had been constructing a nationwide fibre-optic communicationsystem which would have enabled Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries to target Americanand British aircraft in the no-fly zones983090983088

Now of course Pollack is famous for being a proponent of regime change soyou might think that his views on containment are not trustworthy If so let mepoint out that Thomas Ricksmdashwhose damning account of the intervention bears

the indicative title Fiascomdash both relies on Pollack and corroborates the Chinesetransgression983090983089 What is more Ricks also suggests that maintaining the no-flyzones in northern and southern Iraq was so straining the US military that theycould not have been enforced much longer983090983090

And one must add the fact that Security Council members themselves werebreaking sanctions before the invasion when it was generally believed that Iraq had WMD hardly bolsters confidence in their resolve to tighten containment after-wards

Therefore it seems to me that the tragically famous Dr David Kelly Britainrsquosexpert on biological weapons and a former UN weapons inspector was correctwhen he wrote shortly before the invasion that lsquoafter 983089983090 unsuccessful years of

UN supervision of disarmament military force regrettably appears to be theonly way of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq hellip The long-term threat hellipremains Iraqrsquos development to military maturity of weapons of mass destruc-tionmdash something only regime change will avertrsquo983090983091

983090983088 Kenneth Pollack The threatening storm the case for invading Iraq (New York Random House Council onForeign Relations 983090983088983088983090) ch 983095 lsquoThe erosion of containmentrsquo esp pp 983090983090983092ndash983095

983090983089 Ricks Fiasco pp 983090983095 983092983093983091983090983090 Ricks Fiasco pp 983092983091ndash983093983090983091 David Kelly lsquoOnly regime change will avert the threatrsquo Observer 983091983089 Aug 983090983088983088983091 This is a reprint of an article

that is described as written lsquodays before the Iraq warrsquo The emphasis is mine





Right intention proven serious

Just cause and last resort are two of the decisive criteria The third is right inten-tion It is not enough for there to be a wrong to react to One must react with

the intention of righting or correcting it And if one is sincere in onersquos inten-tion one will give thought to what that righting will require and will commitcorresponding resources to realizing it The coalition did not lack postwar plansnor did they fail to commit resources for reconstruction but the initial plansand resources were woefully and culpably inadequate Nevertheless it is morallysignificant that after their initial failures the occupying powers did not walkaway They sought to compensate for their errors over six years and at great costAnd judging by General Petraeusrsquos lsquosurgersquo and its aftermath their compensatoryaction has met with considerable success983090983092 Right and sincere intention was notlacking at the beginning and over time that intention has proved itself committed

and seriousIntending something seriously however is not the same as achieving it There

is such a thing as noble failure Well-meaning and earnest intentions can befrustrated by accidents of history the just may be robbed of victory by a changein the wind And sometimes the fate of what one rightly sincerely and seriouslyintends inevitably moves out of onersquos own hands and into othersrsquo Whether andhow far the Iraq intervention will achieve a political regime that is a propor-tionate improvement on Saddam Husseinrsquos depends increasingly on what Iraqis doand fail to do and whether their efforts meet with good fortune or bad

What the settled upshot will be is not clearmdashand it cannot be clear Differentpeople of different political persuasions and different temperaments give differentestimates Iraqis interviewed by Guardian journalists are invariably apocalypticabout their countryrsquos present and future On the other hand Canon AndrewWhite who lived under Saddam and now pastors the beleaguered Christiancommunity in Baghdad wrote in March that lsquowhile things are still awful theyare slowly improving Despite the atrocities the fear of the Saddam regime is goneand we do have democracyrsquo983090983093

As for me I plant my flag in the position articulated by the spokesman ofthe group of young professional Iraqis who visited Christ Church in Oxford lastMarch At the end of our meeting I asked them bluntly lsquoShould the invasion of983090983088983088983091 have happenedrsquo Without hesitating the spokesman responded lsquoIt was good

that it happened It could have been done better And it isnrsquot overrsquo

983090983092 Thomas Ricks Gamble General Petraeus and the untold story of the American surge in Iraq 983090983088983088983094ndash983096 (London AllenLane 983090983088983088983097) ch 983089983089

983090983093 In an email to the author dated 983089983088 March 983090983088983089983089





The case against the war Round II and reflections on Libya

David Fisher

Nigel Biggar offers a valiant ethical defence of the Iraq war with much of whichI agree But I have three main difficulties with his argument

First he is justifying a war that might have been fought rather than the warthat was actually fought The reasons he offers for the war are not those that theBritish government actually used He suggests that Iraqrsquos possession of WMDwas a secondary issue but that is not how it was presented by the British govern-ment for whom it was the primary ground for war The just war tradition looksunkindly on political leaders changing their reasons for action as wars run intodifficulties reflecting concern over the abuse to which such licence might be pronein the hands of unscrupulous politicians In war as one just war commentatorremarked lsquoyou have to call your shots as in billiardsrsquo983090983094

Second the additional reasons he advances do not in my view furnish therequisite missing justification Biggar argues that the fact that there were no WMDmatters less than that Saddam was intent on resuming his efforts to acquire themonce sanctions were lifted This is the argument also used by Mr Blair in his evidenceto the Chilcot Inquiry on 983090983097 January 983090983088983089983088 where he counselled that we should beasking not the March 983090983088983088983091 question but the 983090983088983089983088 question What kind of threatwould we be facing now if no action had been taken against Saddam in 983090983088983088983091 983090983095

Saddamrsquos strategic intentions were a legitimate cause for concern But it seemsdoubtful that there would have been much support in 983090983088983088983091 for a case for warbased on what might happen in 983090983088983089983088 For if our concern in 983090983088983088983091 had been based

solely on Saddamrsquos strategic intent rather than actual possession it would alwayshave been possible to argue that there was time for other options to be deployedto prevent him fulfilling his strategic intent including rigorous arms inspectionsand better targeted (so-called lsquosmartrsquo) sanctions

Such alternative options were not as Biggar notes without their difficultiesbut nor were they without their successes Indeed the previous arms inspectionregime had been rather more successful than is commonly supposed Saddam didnot after all have any WMD a fact that the newly reinstalled inspectors wouldno doubt have been able to confirm had they not been prematurely withdrawnto make way for military action Given the availability of alternative options tothwart Saddamrsquos strategic intention the requirement of last resort would not havebeen met What gave the case for military action in 983090983088983088983091 its force and urgency wasthe belief that Saddam did actually possess the weapons

Biggar also suggests that there were humanitarian grounds for overthrowing abrutal tyrant as Mr Blair argued in a speech a year after the war983090983096 The objectionto this claim is twofold First as Blair himself acknowledged this had not beenthe reason given by the British government at the time Second since the benefits

983090983094 Brian Orend The morality of war (Toronto Broadview Press 983090983088983088983094) p 983092983097983090983095 Rt Hon Tony Blair evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry 983090983097 Jan 983090983088983089983088 wwwiraqinquiryorguktranscriptsoral

evidence accessed 983090 Feb 983090983088983089983088983090983096 Rt Hon Tony Blair MP speech in Sedgefield constituency 983093 March 983090983088983088983092





of regime change are uncertain while the harm caused by military action is onlytoo evident just war thinking insists that the grounds for military action to effectregime change need to be compellingmdashfor example to put an end to an actual

or imminent humanitarian catastrophe Otherwise we risk bringing about moreharm than good

Such humanitarian grounds might have justified action in 983089983097983096983096 to preventSaddamrsquos atrocities in Anfal to which Biggar alludes They were the basis forcoalition operations in Iraq in 983089983097983097983089 to protect the Kurds in lsquosafe havensrsquo fromattacks by Saddamrsquos forces But the difficulty with using this argument to justifyaction in Iraq in 983090983088983088983091 is that no such humanitarian catastrophe was then takingplace nor was one imminently expected There was just the steady brutal oppres-sion of his people by a ruthless dictator In the absence of such a crisis the humani-tarian case for military action is weak

My third difficulty is of a more philosophical nature Biggar claims that the

justice of the decision to go to war is judged against three decisive criteria justcause last resort and right intention But he curiously omits to mention the crite-rion of proportion This test is not an optional extra but is central to the just warassessment It is well summarized by Vitoria lsquoCare must be taken to ensure thatthe evil effects of war do not outweigh the possible benefits sought by waging itrsquo983090983097

Assessing the consequences of our actions is not all that matters in moralreasoning as consequentialists mistakenly suppose Far from it intentions moralprinciples and the virtues needed to enact those principles are all crucial983091983088 Butconsequences are part of the moral reckoning It is surely not unreasonable torequire of our political leaders that before embarking on military action they should

undertake a careful assessment to seek to ensure that military action is not likely tobring about more harm than good In so applying the principle of proportion acomparative judgement has to be made between the good to be achieved and theharm likely to result Where the good to be achieved or harm averted is very greatsuch as defeating the monstrous tyranny of Nazism the casualties worth bearingmay be high But where the good to be achieved is less clear-cut the harm thatcould be justified in its achievement is correspondingly reduced

Such assessment is not easy since in war as in other contexts moral judgementshave to be made in conditions of uncertainty The assessment needs to be regularlyupdated such updating easing some of the difficulties over the initial assessmentIt requires the judicious exercise of the virtue of practical wisdom But howeverdifficult a careful assessment of the foreseeable consequences of military actionhas to be undertaken The charge against the coalition leaders is that they did notadequately do this They thus acted with a degree of recklessness They failed toexercise the necessary practical wisdom in thinking through the effects of militaryaction to impose regime change and they did not formulate robust plans to dealwith its aftermath This was a crucial just war test that they failed

983090983097 Vitoria On the law of war 983091983089 sect 983089983095 in Vitoria political writings ed Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance(Cambridge Cambridge University Press983089983097983097983089) 983091983089983093

983091983088 This view of ethics which I call lsquovirtuous consequentialismrsquo is developed in Morality and war especially ch 983095





The differences between Biggarrsquos position and mine can be illustrated furtherby considering current coalition operations in Libya

Is the coalition intervention in Libya just

The injustice of the Iraq intervention occasioned much debate around the ideathat this might mark an end to the period of liberal interventionism making itdifficult to justify future interventions or garner international support for themThe logic of the claim that an unjust intervention in Iraq would undermine thelegitimacy of future humanitarian operations was never entirely clear Becauseone intervention not itself undertaken for humanitarian reasons was unjust ithardly follows that all humanitarian interventions are unjust Nonetheless it didappear that the appetite and capacity of the international community for interven-tion might have waned after the war in Iraq not least given the heavy engagement

of forces there and in AfghanistanThis feeling seemed moreover to be borne out by the endless wrangling in

the international community as 983121adhafirsquos forces set about brutally suppressingthe popular uprising against his tyranny The popular uprisings in Egypt andTunisia had successfully led to regime change but that in Libya seemed likelyto be suppressed by the determination of one tyrant to use force to hold ontopower By mid-March 983090983088983089983089 983121adhafirsquos forces had regained control of most of theareas occupied by the rebels and were about to attack the main rebel strongholdof Benghazi a city of a million people which 983121adhafi had threatened to clearlsquohouse by housersquo

Contrary to the expectation of many pundits at this moment the interna-tional community decided to act On 983089983095 March 983090983088983089983089 following an earlier plea forhelp from the Arab League the UN Security Council passed Resolution 983089983097983095983091This resolution authorizes UN members lsquoto take all the necessary measures toprotect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in the LibyanArab Jamahiriya including Benghazi while excluding a foreign occupation forceof any form on any part of Libyan territoryrsquo983091983089 US UK and French air forcesshortly thereafter commenced operations to implement the resolution and othercountries subsequently joined the operation including importantly the Arabstate of 983121atar NATO subsequently took over military command

So is this intervention just and how does it differ from that in Iraq Let usconsider each of the just war criteria in turn

Just cause The protection of innocent civilians from actual or imminent attackconstitutes a just cause The 983090983088983088983093 UN summit endorsed the concept advancedby the 983090983088983088983089 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereigntyof an lsquointernational responsibility to protectrsquo This was based on the idea thatlsquosovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidablecatastrophemdashfrom mass murder and rape from starvationmdashbut when they are

983091983089 wwwunorgNewsPressdocs983090983088983089983089sc983089983088983090983088983088dochtm accessed 983091983089 March 983090983088983089983089





unwilling or unable to do so hellip the responsibility must be borne by the broadercommunity of statesrsquo983091983090

983121adhafi has been not only unwilling to protect his people but actively engaged

in their slaughter He has thereby forfeited his right to non-intervention and theinternational community has a responsibility to try to prevent further massacresof innocents It is critical to this judgement that in contrast to the situation inIraq in March 983090983088983088983091 the humanitarian catastrophe was actually taking place sounderlining the urgent need for action

Right intention Military action has to be undertaken for the sake of the just causeand so with right intention Critics of the Libyan intervention have claimed thatother less creditable motives are at work including the prestige of political leadersand the importance of Libyan oil It is argued that it is inconsistent to intervenein Libya but not Yemen or other states whose governments are also opposing

popular uprisingsAs always political motivations are no doubt mixed But there are no good

reasons for doubting that humanitarian motives are to the fore There are alsostrong humanitarian reasons for intervening in Libya but not elsewhere becauseof the scale of suffering taking place there It is moreover never a valid excuseto fail to offer help in one case where one can because one cannot offer helpeverywhere We should do good where we can even if we cannot do it every-where

Competent authority In stark contrast to Iraq the Libyan intervention is explic-itly authorized by the UN Security Council under Resolution 983089983097983095983091 and has also

been supported by the Arab League The coalition governments have thereforecompetent authority

Last resort This condition requires that military action be undertaken only if otheroptions are unlikely to succeed 983121adhafirsquos actions had been universally condemnedand an array of sanctions imposed but none of these measures were deterringhim from his brutal assault on his own people With his forces poised to attackBenghazi coalition operations commenced just in time to prevent the slaughterthat would have occurred The last resort condition was met

Proportion The next requirement is that before military action is undertaken acareful assessment should be made with the aim of ensuring that the harm likely to

arise will not outweigh the good achieved taking into account the probability ofsuccess Such assessment is as noted earlier difficult because we take moral decisionsin conditions of uncertainty but it is nonetheless crucial to the just war appraisal

So are there reasonable grounds for supposing that the harm likely to be causedby coalition operations will not outweigh the good to be achieved That goodas specified in the just cause is the protection of civilians from slaughter So thisquestion becomes are there good grounds for supposing that the military opera-

983091983090 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The responsibility to protect (Ottawa Inter-national Research Centre Dec 983090983088983088983089) p viii





tion will succeed in preventing civilian slaughter and that fewer civilians will bekilled than would otherwise be the case Judged against that narrowly prescribedobjective the answer is I believe yes Just imagine the slaughter that would have

been perpetrated if 983121adhafirsquos troops had been allowed to fight through the denselypopulated city of Benghazi lsquohouse by housersquo This assessment is however subjectto regular reassessment as the military action progresses Just war thinking is notstatic but dynamic

Jus in bello The conduct of operations needs to comply with the principles ofproportion and non-combatant immunity The operations in the first two weeksof the war have so far complied with these stipulations with proportionate forcedirected against military targets and considerable efforts made to minimize civiliancasualties This has included the cancellation of RAF bombing missions becauseof the presence of civilians near the targets

Just peace Will the military operation lead to a just peace That is a very difficultquestion to answer not least since how events unfold will depend in large measureon the actions of the Libyan people themselves It is important to stress that theobjective of the military operation is limited to the protection of civilians Theobjective is thus much more circumscribed than that of the Iraq invasion wherethe coalition leaders having brought about regime change by the military opera-tion did thereby assume responsibility for the establishment thereafter of a justpeace By contrast the justice of the outcome of the military operation in Libyawill be assessed on the narrower grounds of whether the protection of civiliansis achieved

It is hoped that affording protection to the Libyan people will give them theopportunity to choose their own destinies in the way the Egyptian and Tunisianpeoples are doing and that this will indeed lead to a just peace and democraticfuture for them But that outcome is very far from assured as the military actionon the ground ebbs and flows and the inexperience of the rebels becomes onlytoo apparent It will also be shaped by many other factors in addition to andindependent of the military intervention including the economic humanitarianand political support that the international community will need to furnish theplanning for which should now be a high priority

Conclusion While military operations are still under way judgements of how

far they comply with just war criteria are inevitably provisional and subject toreassessment as events unfold At the time of writing there are however groundsfor concluding that the Libyan intervention is just Crucially the intervention inLibyamdashunlike that in Iraqmdashis an avowedly humanitarian operation undertakento halt a humanitarian catastrophe taking place which only such military actioncould stop Again unlike that in Iraq the operation also has wide internationalsupport both regional and international and is authorized by the UN SecurityCouncil That support has undoubtedly been strengthened by the limited andpurely humanitarian objectives set which learning from the lessons of Iraq havewisely excluded western military occupation of an Arab country





So my conclusion is that while the Iraq invasion was unjust the Libyan inter-vention is so far just

The case for the war Round II and reflections on Libya

Nigel Biggar

While David Fisher and I differ in our final judgement on the Iraq venture ourpoints of agreement are remarkable We agree that the belief in Iraqrsquos possession ofWMD though mistaken was lsquonot unreasonablersquo and we agree that lsquoin the mainthe reasons for undertaking the war were honourable and concerns over WMDproliferation genuinely held hellip [T]hose responsible were trying to make theworld a better and safer placersquo Our agreement is remarkable because it gainsayswhat now passes for common sense

That said we disagree on some interesting and important points First Fisherclaims that given lsquothe grim logic of war whereby the suffering caused is certainwhile the gains are less certainrsquo just cause for belligerency requires strong evidenceof the gravity and likelihood of the threat to be countered and that this was notforthcoming in the case of Iraq My initial response is to say that the logic of waris actually more complicated than that and that it does not stack the odds against

just belligerency quite as high as Fisher implies For sure it is certain that war willcause suffering but how much suffering it will cause remains uncertain And againstthis combination of certainty and uncertainty must be posed in some cases (forexample that of Libya) the double certainty that not going to war will permitevils and that these evils will be grave and atrocious

Still I agree that war causes terrible evils and that therefore one may notembark upon it justly for less than very serious reasons The persistently atrociousnature of a regime is one such Some (including I suspect Fisher) would objectthat this is insufficiently just cause and that there needs to be a current humani-tarian crisismdashas in Kosovo in 983089983097983097983096 I do not see why I can see that a crisis makesintervention by a western democracy more politically feasible since dramatic mediareports will generate popular demand for urgent action But I do not see that itmakes a moral difference In a national society if the identity of a serial killer isknown one does not wait for him to strike again before taking action So whyin international society should the fact that a Hitler has finished liquidating the

Jews grant him immunity from interference until he decides to turn on the SlavsOrdinary life under an atrocious tyrant in a faraway land may seem peaceableenough to us but that is only because we are not living in daily terror of being thenext victims on his list Saddam Husseinrsquos regime may not have been slaughteringKurds or Marsh Arabs in the early 983090983088983088983088s but according to the UNrsquos Commissionfor Human Rights in 983090983088983088983090 it was nevertheless guilty of lsquosystematic widespreadand extremely graversquo violations of human rights983091983091 Why is this not sufficient justcause for military intervention

983091983091 United Nations Commission on Human Rights lsquoResolution on Human Rights Abuses in Iraqrsquo 983089983089 April 983090983088983088983090





It might be argued that advancing a humanitarian case as just cause is entirelybeside the point since the public reason that Washington and London gave forinvading Iraq was the threat of WMD But the problem of WMD and the problem

of the atrocious nature of the regime are not separate WMD were a problembecause it was this regime with this record that either had them or was intent onacquiring them If Iraq had been Sweden its possession of WMD would hardlyhave been a problem Moreover it is not true that the governmentsrsquo public casesfor invasion were articulated simply in terms of the threat of WMD The humani-tarian motive was a consistent ingredient in Tony Blairrsquos advocacy983091983092

It is quite true that Britain would not have invaded Iraq in 983090983088983088983091 simply forhumanitarian reasons That does not mean however that we would have beenwrong to do so It merely means that we (as distinct from say Israel and theUN) had no special interest in shouldering this particular just cause Had SaddamHussein been entrenched on the other side of the English Channel the story wouldhave been very different This is where WMD become significant The clandes-tine proliferation of WMD resulting perhaps in Saddam Husseinrsquos possession ofthem and leading perhaps to his conveying them to the likes of Al-983121aeda makesthe atrocious character of the Saddam regime our problem And it remained ourproblem even when it turned out that Iraq lacked the WMD we thought he hadbecause he still remained intent on acquiring them

lsquoResulting perhaps hellip leading perhapsrsquo yes the threat was possible rather thanactual and classic just war doctrine rightly wanting to preclude going to war onwhimsical grounds requires pre-emptive military action to be directed against athreat that is grave and imminent To require the threat to be imminent makes sense

with reference to conventional armies massing on borders where its maturity isbound to be clear and visible However it makes less sense when we are talkingabout an atrocious regime or terrorist group coming to possess WMD especiallynuclear weapons through the global black market For the realization of this verygrave threat may well be largely invisible to us (Yes we succeeded in trackingLibyarsquos efforts to arm itself with WMD but we failed to track North Korearsquos andour record on Iran is mixed) So the question that faces us is this given the gravityof the possibility the imperfection of our intelligence about it and the provenmalevolence of the parties involved how much benefit of doubt are we obligedto extend What degree of risk are we bound to shoulder Must we wait until the

threat matures and emerges into the openmdashby which time the moment for actionmay have passed For sure it is imprudentmdashand so immoralmdashto go to war toosoon But it is equally imprudent to go to war too late Therefore I am inclinedto think that the manifest and persistent intent of Saddam Husseinrsquos atrociousregime to acquire WMDmdashdespite a decadersquos worth of UN resolutions sanctionsand rising threatsmdashcombined with evidence of sustained communication and

983091983092 See eg Mr Blairrsquos statement to the House of Commons just before the invasion on 983089983096 March 983090983088983088983091 (Tony BlairlsquoFull statement to the House of Commons 983089983096 March 983090983088983088983091rsquo in Cushman ed A matter of principle especiallyits climax pp 983091983091983096ndash983097)





cooperation with Al-983121aeda983091983093 was sufficient to justify military action by thosewith an interest in undertaking it

One of the most important features of David Fisherrsquos argument to which I

object is his identifying the criterion of proportion as one of the lsquotwo key testsrsquoof justice in going to war Accordingly he writes that a just war requires that lsquoacareful assessment should be undertaken to seek to ensure that the harm likely tobe caused does not outweigh the good achievedrsquo My complaint is that this sets thebar impossibly high In most spheres of human activity no one can lsquoensurersquo thatthe benefits of his or her action will outweigh the costs and what is impossibleshould not be sought While some consequential consideration is appropriate (forexample lsquoCan we afford to do this materially and politicallyrsquo lsquoIs this course ofaction clearly counterproductiversquo) we should steer clear of utilitarian delusionrefusing the pretence of mathematical certainty The consequences of what we doripple right across the world and down the whole length of history far beyond our

seeing our controlling and our measuring We cannot even discern the end-resultsof our actions far less measure the lsquoquantitiesrsquo of good and evil in them We couldnot discern them in 983089983097983091983097 or in 983089983097983092983088 and how exactly can we now lsquoweighrsquo thebenefit of destroying the Nazi regime against the costs of 983095983090 million dead and theexpansion of Stalinrsquos empire of terror Since consequential reasoning is necessarilyselective and speculative it is just not possible to mount a strong case in its termsThe practical upshot of Fisherrsquos requirement therefore is that we will never goto war until after Srebrenica

Finally David Fisher judges that the Iraq war lsquofailed fully to meet any of the just war criteriarsquo I do not agree I think that it met lsquojust causersquo lsquolast resortrsquo and

lsquolegitimate authorityrsquo I also think (and I think even he thinks) that it met lsquorightintentionrsquo It did involve elements of culpable disproportion but their costlycorrection demonstrated that the declared intention was sincere and serious Ofcourse my judgements are vulnerable to othersrsquo doubt and dissent but then what

judgement is not

Turning towards Libya (briefly)

First of all I note how the dispute over the meaning of UN Resolution 983089983097983095983091confirms my point in Round I about the irreducibly controversial nature of inter-

983091983093 According to the Butler Report between October 983090983088983088983090 and February 983090983088983088983091 the Joint Intelligence Committee( JIC) reckoned that Al-983121aeda agents had been involved in the production of chemical and biological agentsin Kurdish northern Iraq and that they had been in contact with the Iraqi Directorate General of Intelligenceover four years since 983089983097983097983096 perhaps in search of toxic chemicals (Butler Report para 983094983090 p 983089983089983097) It is true that inNovember 983090983088983088983089 the JIC concluded that lsquothere is no evidence that these contacts led to practical cooperationwe judge it unlikely because of mutual mistrustrsquo (p 983089983089983097) This judgement however seems too confident sincecommon interests can make unlikely allies No one ever imagined that Hitler and Stalin would overcome theirprofound ideological hostility to agree a non-aggression pact but this they did in 983089983097983091983097 and Shirsquoa Iran nowsupports Sunni groups such as the Taleban and Hamas The JICrsquos own subsequent assessments tend to confirmthis point noting in October 983090983088983088983090 that lsquoSaddamrsquos attitude to Al 983121aida has not always been consistentrsquo and thatlsquoAbu Musab al Zarqawi [a senior Al-983121aeda figure] was relatively free to travel within Iraq proper and to stayin Baghdad for some timersquo and in March 983090983088983088983091 that al Zarqawi had established (presumably with the regimersquospermission) sleeper cells in Baghdad for activation during a US occupation of the city (p 983089983090983088)





national law Some international lawyers and countries (eg Philippe Sands andRussia) read the resolution restrictively others (eg Malcolm Shaw and Britain)read it permissively983091983094 The difference between them is caused not by the text itself

but by the political and moral views brought to its interpretationThose who make the restrictive reading want to make a sharp distinction

between protecting civilians and pursuing regime change But given the natureof the regime and given 983121adhafirsquos own threats to show no mercy to his enemieshow exactly are dissident citizens to be kept safe while 983121adhafi remains in power

Critics of the military intervention insist that the Libyan people should beallowed to forge their own destinymdashand that western powers should thereforedesist from interfering But this is simplistic What if the people are powerlessto topple a resolutely repressive regime What if only external intervention willmake it possible for the people to forge a more liberal destiny Such is the situationin Libyamdashas it was in Iraq It is telling that the relevant peoples themselves are not

burdened by the qualms of fastidious western anti-imperialists on 983090983090 March 983090983088983089983089the Guardian a resolute critic of the Iraq invasion reported that the Iraqi peopleseemed to be lsquobroadly supportiversquo of (predominantly western) military interven-tion in Libya even to bring about regime change983091983095

Of course if Libyan regime change is to be successful in the long term then itmust be substantially the work of Libyans It is quite right therefore that foreignpowers should limit themselves to playing a supportive role But it is also prudentthat they refrain from defining in advance the limits of what they will do sincethat should depend on how events develop The idealmdashfor both Libyans and therest of the worldmdashis that the 983121adhafi regime falls and is replaced by a law-abiding

public-spirited regime So long as that seems possible foreign powers should standready to help make it so But if it comes to pass that only an independent consti-tutional state in Cyrenaica is possible then foreigners should support that insteadRather than fix our endgame now we should remain nimble

On the other hand we do need to remember the limits of our powermdashmaterialpolitical and military There may come a time when we should admit that we cando no more even if the ideal still eludes our grasp and even if we have failed to getvery near it at all It was right and admirable that we triedmdashin spite of inevitableuncertainty about costs and benefitsmdashto save the Libyan people from 983121adhafirsquosmerciless repression and to help them build a better future Still there may comea time when further striving becomes obviously disproportionate and imprudentWe were obliged to try we are not obliged to succeed

983091983094 lsquoCoalition bombing may be in breach of legal limitsrsquo Guardian 983090983097 March 983090983088983089983089 p 983093983091983095 lsquoIt is the right of the people to protest against tyrantsrsquo Guardian 983090983090 March 983090983088983089983089 p 983095



Copyright of International Affairs is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or

emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holders express written permission

However users may print download or email articles for individual use





Just cause

Different reasons for the war were adduced at different times by the British andUS governments Indeed in the months preceding the war so many reasons were

adduced particularly by the US administration that it was not always clear whatthe rationale for military action was But the declared basis for the military opera-tion common to both governments was according to the British governmentrsquospublished war aims lsquoto rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and associ-ated programmes hellip as set out in relevant UNSCRsrsquo983089 Military operations wereundertaken to enforce the disarmament obligations imposed on Saddam Husseinrsquosregime by the UN and to remove the threat to regional peace and security

Saddamrsquos disappearing WMD

We now know from the Iraq Survey Group that Iraq did not have weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) The Iraq Survey Group concluded that lsquoIraq by themid-983089983097983097983088s was essentially free of militarily significant WMD stocksrsquo althoughSaddam retained a strategic ambition and capability to reacquire them once thesanctions regime had ended983090 Even this startling disclosure would not necessarilyinvalidate the coalitionrsquos disarmament objective as a just cause if there were reason-able and strong grounds for believing that Saddam had such weapons So werethere such grounds

The belief reflected the advice of all the relevant experts including the UNweapons inspectors Saddam had had biological and chemical weapons and hadused chemical weapons After the first Gulf war it was discovered that his stocks

of chemical and biological weapons had been much higher and his nuclearprogramme further advanced than intelligence had suggested So there weregrounds for concern that while substantial stocks had been destroyed Saddammight have retained some chemical and biological weapons and might even beseeking to reconstitute his nuclear programme Having underestimated hiscapability before the analysts were keenmdashperhaps too keenmdashto avoid makingthe same mistake again

Their concerns were reinforced by the fact that Saddam behaved as if he hadthe weapons He refused to cooperate fully with the UN weapon inspectors andwithdrew cooperation altogether in 983089983097983097983096 It was difficult to understand why if

he had nothing to hide he did not cooperate with the inspectors to secure theremoval of sanctions No western democratic leader would behave in such a wayincurring the penalties of sanctions and threatened military action This compara-tive judgement was however flawed For Saddam was not a western democraticleader but an Arab despot to whom the standards of western rationality anddemocratic values did not apply

983089 lsquoIraq Military Campaign Objectivesrsquo para 983089 The text is quoted in full as Annex C to The review of intelligenceof weapons of mass destruction report of a committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Lord Butler (Butler Report)HC983096983097983096 (London House of Commons 983089983092 July 983090983088983088983092)

983090 Iraq Survey Group Final report 983091983088 Sept 983090983088983088983092 vol I p 983091983092 httpwwwglobalsecurityorgwmdlibrary report983090983088983088983092isg-final-report accessed 983090 Feb 983090983088983089983088






Right intention














Competent authority




Last resort

























The verdict














Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war




















The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not



























Right intention














Competent authority




Last resort

























The verdict














Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war




















The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not


























Competent authority




Last resort

























The verdict














Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war




















The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not










































The verdict














Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war




















The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not





























Nigel Biggar

The flaws of war




















The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not






























The limits of law














Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not





























Civilian deaths
























































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not










































































David Fisher







































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not



















































































Nigel Biggar




























judgement is not











































judgement is not






















sem 11 just war iraq lybia 2011

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