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DOI: 10.1177/0011128707312525 2010 56: 167 originally published online 16 April 2008Crime & Delinquency

Christian Seipel and Stefanie Eiflerof Person and Situation in a General Theory of Crime

Opportunities, Rational Choice, and Self-Control : On the Interaction

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Opportunities, RationalChoice, and Self-Control

On the Interaction of Person andSituation in a General Theory of Crime

Christian SeipelUniversity of Hildesheim, GermanyStefanie EiflerUniversity of Bielefeld, Germany

In this article, deviant action is analyzed on the basis of ideas derived fromGottfredson and Hirschi’s self-control theory. Presumedly, self-control ininteraction with opportunities can explain deviant action. This assumption iselaborated using the concept of high- and low-cost situations from rationalchoice theory. From this point of view, the hypotheses are that self-controlpredicts deviant action in low-cost situations, whereas utility predicts deviantaction in high-cost situations. Two test strategies are employed in anempirical examination of these hypotheses. A standardized questionnaire waspresented to a sample of 494 German adults aged 18 to 80. The results ofboth test strategies show that the assumptions of an interaction effect betweenself-control and opportunities are fundamentally supported.

Keywords: self-control; rational choice; opportunity; situational analysis;theoretical integration; general theory; high-cost situations;low-cost situations

Theoretical and empirical analyses of self-control theory as proposed byGottfredson and Hirschi (1990) are the starting points of our study. Since

its introduction, this theory has inspired numerous empirical investigations

Crime & DelinquencyVolume 56 Number 2April 2010 167-197

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167

Authors’ Note: Please note that the order of authorship does not reflect differential contribu-tions to this work, which has been a joint endeavor in every sense; on the contrary, the orderwas guided by chance.We would like to thank Susanne Rippl, Kurt Salentin, and three anony-mous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Please direct all cor-respondence to Stefanie Eifler, PO Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany; e-mail:[email protected].



and initiated many critical discussions. The authors claim that their theoryexplains different forms of deviant action, and they draw up the thesis thatthis action is likely to occur for two reasons: First, it specifies a personalitytrait, which counts as a characteristic; furthermore, it describes the extent towhich a person is inclined to the short-term positive consequences of crim-inal actions: the concept of self-control.1 Second, this theory specifies theconcept of opportunity. This concept describes the simple fact that criminalaction occurs only when opportunities are given. Although the authors ofself-control theory define the concept of self-control in a precise way, theydiscuss the concept of opportunity insufficiently. Furthermore, they fail tobe precise in their ideas on the relation of the concepts of self-control andopportunity, which is why many authors have elaborated on this relation(cf. Longshore, 1998; Longshore & Turner, 1998). It is, however, strikingand problematic that in previous discussions, different versions of the rela-tion between self-control and opportunities have come up, whereas a satis-fying theoretical and empirical conclusion of this aspect of the self-controltheory has not yet been defined.This study takes up the idea of an interaction between self-control and

opportunities, and it develops it further. It proposes an innovative contri-bution to this discussion by resorting to the social psychological conceptof the interaction between person and situation (cf. Magnusson, 1978;Magnusson & Ekehammar, 1978; Magnusson & Stattin, 1981) and by elab-orating on the relation between self-control (person) and opportunity (situ-ation). To achieve this, the concept of opportunity is specified by connectingthe high- and low-cost thesis (cf. Kliemt, 1986) with reflections on self-control theory. The study further includes the presentation of two testingstrategies and their operationalizations, as well as the description of thesample that was used to carry out an analysis of deviant action in everydaysituations. Finally, the study discusses the explanation and comparison ofthe central results of the two testing strategies and closes with a summaryand depiction of the limits of this investigation.

Interaction of Person and Situationin the Analysis of Deviant Action

Interaction of Person and Situationin Self-Control Theory

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) developed self-control theory as a gen-eral theory of deviant action. Like classical criminology, this approach

168 Crime & Delinquency



conceptualizes criminal action as the result of a decision or, rather, anaction carried out with the intention to gain maximum benefit. Following theclassical school in criminology, the theory of deterrence is unilaterally con-cerned with the functions of punishment, and it has developed the idea thatcriminal actions can be prevented by threatening negative sanctions. Self-control theory, however, is concerned with the positive consequences ofdeviant actions. Deviant action, such as stealing and committing fraud, canbe attractive; someone has the possibility to get hold of someone else’spossessions—or else, items that are impossible for the agent to acquire legally.As mentioned briefly, the authors of self-control theory specify two

causes for deviant action: the concept of self-control (specifically, low self-control), which refers to people’s tendency to base their behavior on theshort-term positive consequences of their actions, on one hand, and theirinability to consider the long-term negative consequences of their actions,on the other. Presumedly, persons with low parameter values in terms ofself-control are inclined to numerous forms of deviant action.In elaborating on this definition, the authors describe the characteristics

of people with low self-control: Such persons show a strong orientation tothe here and now (impulsivity); they care little for others; they show littleaccuracy, persistency, and reliability (simple tasks); they are adventurous(risk seeking); they are keen on physical action (physical activities); theyare indifferent toward others and insensitive (self-centered); and they havea low frustration tolerance (temper).Compared to this precise definition, the concept of opportunity is indis-

tinctly described. The authors refer only casually to the routine activityapproach, which has been proposed by Cohen and Felson (1979). Accordingto self-control theory, deviant action is likely when a person with low self-control is faced with an adequate opportunity for crime.Self-control theory has been subject of many empirical studies so far,

some of which have analyzed direct effects of self-control upon variousforms of delinquent action—for example, imprudent behaviors (Arneklev,Grasmick, Tittle, & Bursik, 1993), criminal action (Grasmick, Tittle,Bursik, &Arneklev, 1993), juvenile delinquency (Baron, 2003), gang delin-quency (Chapple & Hope, 2003), problematic behavior of youth (Vazsonyi,2003), academic misconduct (Vowell & Chen, 2004), risky sexual behavior(Hope & Chapple, 2005), and aggressive behavior in an academic context(DeLi, 2004).Although the authors of self-control theory have claimed the applicabil-

ity of their theory to white-collar crime, other authors have questioned thataspect (cf. Reed &Yeager, 1996;Yeager & Reed, 1998). In general, the idea

Seipel, Eifler / Opportunities, Rational Choice, and Self-Control 169



of self-control’s direct effects upon delinquent action was supported. In par-ticular, one dimension of self-control—namely, risk seeking—proved rele-vant (Farrington, 1995; Piquero & Rosay, 1998). Other studies were relatedto the idea of an interaction between self-control and opportunities.Because the authors of self-control theory were indefinite and even contra-

dictory in their discussions of this topic (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), thesestudies are heterogeneous in their conceptualizations of opportunities and therelation between opportunities and self-control. Based on the explanationsgiven in the relevant literature, four interpretations have been proposed: Firstare scholars who rate the variable opportunity as being low (Lamnek, 1994) oras having no relevance at all within self-control theory (Fetchenhauer &Simon, 1998). Second is the view that opportunities independently influencedeviant behavior (Brownfield & Sorenson, 1993). Third, researchers presumea statistical interaction between self-control and situational conditions (Eifler,1998, 1999, 2002; Grasmick et al., 1993; Longshore, 1998; Longshore &Turner, 1998; Seipel, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). Fourth is the contradictory viewoffered by Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993), who comment on the relationbetween self-control and opportunity as follows:

In the view of the theory, opportunities to commit one or another crime oranalogous acts are limitless. Opportunities to commit a particular crime maybe severely limited, however. . . . Self-control and opportunity may thereforeinteract for specific crimes, but are in the general case independent. . . .Further, in many cases, self-control and opportunity are not independent. (p. 50)

Up to now, the idea of an interaction between self-control and opportu-nity lacked clarity—namely, in a theoretical view, as well as in an empiri-cal one. Yet, the first and fourth explanations of the importance of theopportunity variable in self-control theory are untenable for logical reasons.The first view ignores the present discussion in literature regarding an inde-pendent effect of opportunities and an interactional effect between oppor-tunities and self-control; the fourth viewpoint appears as an immunizationstrategy. The second branch proposes direct effects of opportunites upondeviant action. Although there is some evidence in favor of this view (cf.Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005), we argue that both opportunity and self-controlby themselves are insufficient for explaining deviant behavior. Thus, wefocus on the idea of an interaction between self-control and opportunities,which is the essential part of the third viewpoint.Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) implicitly suggest that self-control and

opportunity somehow have a common effect on deviant behavior. Previous




research that referred to this idea is based on statistical interactions only. Itfailed to model the interaction between self-control and opportunity. Thefollowing study takes up this line of research and aims at a further clarifi-cation of the interaction thesis.

Interaction of Person and Situation:Deviant Action in High- and Low-Cost Situations

The idea that human action is triggered by characteristics of the agentsas well as by the situations they face is common in the social sciences. It ispart of modern rational choice approaches to deviant action and part of thesociopsychological concept of the interaction between person and situation.At first, we elaborate on modern rational choice approaches. One branch

of rational choice theory is based on the principle of the subjective expectedutility (SEU; Savage, 1954) of criminal offending (Clarke, 1997; Clarke &Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The SEU principle states thatpeople make rational decisions based on the extent to which they expect thechoices to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. An offender isviewed as a reasoning criminal (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) who commits acrime after having deliberated upon its gains and losses. These persons tryto minimize their risks of crime by considering the time, place, and othersituational factors.Our working assumption is that although persons are influenced by such

considerations, the limitations of information collection, storing, and process-ing make persons, in our view, more bounded rational than optimally rational(Simon, 1957; see also Bachmann, Paternoster, &Ward, 1992). Over the pastseveral decades, the rational choice perspective has been applied to a varietyof criminal action, including drunk driving (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;Seipel, 2000), burglary (Wright & Decker, 1994), robbery (Wright & Decker,1997), shoplifting (Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996), drug selling (Jacobs, 1996),white-collar crime (Simpson, Piquero, & Paternoster, 1998), and airlinehijacking (Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005). Although the assumptions ofthe rational choice approach have been generally supported in these studies,some studies revealed stronger effects of informal social control upon minorforms of delinquency (cf. Tibbetts & Myers, 1999).Next, we deal with the concept of the interaction of person and situation.

Magnusson (1978; Magnusson & Ekehammar, 1978; Magnusson & Stattin,1981) has especially touched on the question of the consistency of actionsover situations versus time spans or, rather, the long-term versus cross-sit-uational consistency within the scope of interactional models of action. In




this context, he mentions coherence, if action in situations changes in a law-ful, consistent, and sometimes individually specific way without beingabsolutely or relatively stable. In contrast to this idea stands his idea ofabsolute consistency. Specifically, he argues that a person displays certainaction regardless of the situation. This idea of an absolute cross-situationalconsistency corresponds to the above-explained interpretation of a pureeffect of self-control on deviant action: Whether a situation is favorable orunfavorable, the probability is high for a person with low self-control toshow deviant action. In that way, assumptions regarding variations of self-control and variations within characteristics of crime opportunities can bespecified to make assumptions comprising a view to an explanatory prob-lem of the interaction between person and situation. In our opinion,Magnusson’s differentiation between coherence and absolute consistencycan suitably clarify the aforementioned, imprecise phrasing of the relationbetween self-control and opportunity. In particular, we adopt the idea ofcoherence, which we explain below.At this point, we need to examine the concept of opportunity. In the

scope of criminological theories, Clarke (1980) and Clarke and Cornish(1985) have proposed a theoretical analysis of the circumstances of deviantaction within the framework of the rational choice approach. Deviant actionis conceptualized as an explicit choice determined by subjective cost–benefit considerations. The presumption is that agents always choose theaction that promises the highest benefit. Clarke and Cornish consideropportunity a situation in which physical opportunities enable the carryingout of deviant action. To determine the situational markers easing deviantbehavior, Clarke and Cornish draw back on the routine activity approach(cf. Cohen & Felson, 1979), which refers to an analysis of deviant actionsin a strict sense—namely, “illegal acts in which someone definitely andintentionally takes or damages the person or property of another” (Glaser,1971, p. 4; cited in Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589). Yet, the theoreticalanalysis is limited to such deviant activities in which direct contacts occurbetween at least one potential offender and either the potential victim or anobject that the potential offender tries to take away or destroy.The routine activity approach is essentially a victimological approach, but

it allows for a reading of the minimal situational conditions for victimizationand the minimal situational conditions for deviant action (for more informa-tion, see Eifler, 1999; Eifler et al., 2001): This is the spatial–temporal coinci-dence of “motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capableguardians” (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589). In case of a potential offender,the presence of a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians can be




seen as the minimal situational conditions for the carrying out of deviantactions in the present context (cf. LaFree & Birkbeck, 1991).As alluded to earlier, previous studies employed different measures of

opportunities. In the present context, such opportunities are regarded astemporal–spatial parts of our everyday experience. Although self-controltheory features an interaction between self-control and opportunities, recentstudies have revealed that the explanatory power of opportunities some-times exceeds the one of self-control (cf. Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005).To clarify the influence of self-control and opportunities on the deci-

sions of individual agents, we draw on the consideration that opportunitiescan be classified according to the probability of being caught and punished(Eifler, 2000; Eifler et al., 2001; Seipel 1999a). The detection and the pros-ecution of deviant action are conceptualized in the rational choice approachand in self-control theory as a negative consequence. In the terminology ofthe rational choice approach, they are called costs of deviant action. In thatmanner, opportunities linked to a high risk of being caught are costly andtherefore unfavorable opportunities. In opposition are opportunities that arelinked to a low risk of being caught; they are less costly and therefore favor-able opportunities.This consideration refers to a discussion in the domain of general soci-

ology, which deals with differential conceptualizations of choice situationsbased on the anomalies in the scope of analyses of rational choice theories.In the following, we try to make the high- and low-cost thesis, as noticed inrational choice theory and environmental sociology, fruitful for criminolog-ical analyses. We further aim at defining a closer connection between per-sonality-related considerations and rational choice approaches to explaindeviant action.Although rational choice theory deals with the question of why the

model of the rational agent is not explanatory in some situations, the dis-cussion in environmental sociology deals with why certain attitudes, suchas environmental consciousness, have only a small effect on ecofriendlyactions. To find a solution to this problem, both strings of discussion referto the high- and low-cost thesis. When rational choice theory is used as amicro-level theory to explain individual behavior, one presumption, amongothers, is that a rational choice is suitable for high-cost situations but not forlow-cost situations (Preisendörfer, 1999; Zintl, 1989).High-cost situations are distinguished by the dominance of the cost aspect

of an action. There is high pressure on the agent: He or she has to expectconsiderable consequences when deciding to act deviantly. According tothe rules of the rational choice model, a decision is expected in which the




meaning of subjective dispositions, personal characteristics, values, andattitudes in general are backgrounded.In low-cost situations (where choice represents a low-cost situation,

e.g.), there is no cost pressure if the decisions do not have a huge effect onthe agent. In low-cost situations, the decision for or against an action canand must be explained by further assumptions. Therefore, the less relevantvariables of high-cost situations are considered, such as personal character-istics, values, and attitudes.In connection with the high- and low-cost thesis of ecofriendly action,

which is a controversial discussion in environmental sociology (cf. Diekmann& Preisendörfer, 1992, 1998; Kühnel & Bamberg, 1998) is the argument thatin low-cost situations, attitudes toward the environment most influence action.Costs can be in the form of monetary expenditures, time-consuming

activities, uncomfortable actions, or social disapproval (cf. Diekmann &Preisendörfer, 1998; Preisendörfer, 1999). For the most part, the high- andlow-cost thesis does not assume an additive but an interactive effect; that is,the relevance of attitudes and values in the explanation of action dependson the type of situation. The following part of our study adapts these ideasto criminological questions.

Research Question and Hypotheses

The results of the discussion in the scope of rational choice theory andenvironmental sociology that are presented in this article can be used toderive hypotheses concerning the relevance of personal characteristics anddecision-relevant variables to explain deviant behavior under considerationof opportunities. Opportunities that facilitate and complicate deviant actionare specified in the context of the high- and low-cost thesis. High-cost sit-uations are therefore situations that offer little situational incentives fordeviant action (i.e., unfavorable conditions). Low-cost situations are thosein which the situational incentives support deviant action (i.e., favorableconditions). The high- and low-cost thesis is discussed within the scope ofrational choice theory and environmental sociology in connection withresearch on attitude–behavior relations (Preisendörfer, 1999).We broaden this approach by not simply viewing the high- and low-cost

thesis as being limited to the question of the relevance of attitudes but byexpecting that the assumptions of the thesis present a fruitful theoreticalextension for a precise understanding of the relevance of personal character-istics. Even though personal characteristics are a relatively stable construc-tion in terms of time—which, in contrast to attitudes, cannot be changed that




easily—we start from a similar effect of attitudes and personal characteristicsto explain deviant action, thus postulating the following interaction thesis:Attitude variables and personality traits are less explanatory in a high-costsituation than in a low-cost situation. Furthermore, utility has a strongereffect in a high-cost situation than in a low-cost situation.Findings of prior research suggest reasonable support of our thesis: In

general, self-control explains minor forms of delinquent action. In addition,utility exerts stronger influences on severe delinquency, such as fraud. Assuch, we apply the high- and low-cost thesis to the analysis of deviantaction: If an agent is presented with a favorable opportunity for deviantaction or a low-cost situation, personality traits contribute largely to theexplanation of such activities. If an agent is presented with an unfavorableopportunity for deviant action or a high-cost situation, the rational choicetheory is more suitable to explain deviant action because the agent expectsto be caught and pays attention to the possible consequences of his or heraction. The intensity of the effect of low self-control on the choice of analternative of deviant action recedes with the rising costs that are expectedin case of detection, whereas the effect of the rational choice theory ondeviant action diminishes with the lesser costs expected in case of detec-tion. This interaction hypothesis has not been subject of an empirical test sofar but is examined in this study. The method and procedures follow.

Method

To carry out an empirical analysis of the research questions, a survey wasconducted using a standardized questionnaire (cross-sectional study). The sur-vey was run by the 21 participants of the research project OpportunityStructure and Crime, directed by Eifler (for details, see Eifler et al., 2001).

Sample

The study refers to a convenience sample of German adults. Each pro-ject collaborator was to recruit 25 participants, according to a set quotaregarding the characteristics of age and sex.The plan was to include males and females of three age groups (18–30,

31–45, and 46–65) in equal parts of the study. As a result, there were 525participants in the study. Those who worked on this project delivered thequestionnaires personally. All participants answered their questionnaires inabsence of the project collaborators and returned it in a sealed envelope.The participants were largely part of the circle of friends, relatives, andacquaintances of the project collaborators.




The participants received written instructions on the overall backgroundof the study. Overall, 31 of the 525 questionnaires had to be excluded fromanalysis because of incomplete treatment or because of contradictory orobviously false information. Thus, the data of 494 interviewees were ana-lyzed. Of those 494 participants, 49.6% were female and 50% were male(missing values explain the difference to 100%). At the time that the surveywas conducted, their median age was 39 years, and 50% were younger than36. The youngest was 18; the eldest was 80. There were no differences inage distribution in the male and female groups. Whereas the sex distribu-tion in the sample corresponds to the relevant information in the Germandata report of 1999 (Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office],2001), it shows that the age group of 18–40 is slightly overrepresented incomparison to the population of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Operationalization

Within the field of environmental sociology, two strategies for testing thehigh- and low-cost thesis have been pursued (cf. Preisendörfer, 1999).We adaptthese strategies to criminological questions in the following examination.The first test strategy refers to actions that are distinguished by the

expected costs of the consequences. To apply this strategy and to check theextent to which the effects of the self-control variable differ on the carryingout of deviant actions—depending on whether low-cost or high-cost actionsare examined—we need to arrange deviant actions according to the extentof their low-cost or high-cost character. The first test strategy allows for ananalysis of the differential explanation of self-control and actors’ cost–benefitanalyses with regard to various forms of deviant actions, which have beena priori defined as low- or high-cost actions.The second test strategy considers the same actions in varying opportu-

nities. This strategy does not compare the effects of the different actions,but it does check whether the effects of self-control differ with the sameaction, depending on whether the actor is faced with a low- or high-costsituation. The second test strategy uses an experimental variation of costaspects in a given standardized choice situation. The explanations of utilityand self-control have been established for a low-cost and a high-cost situation.Therefore, an analysis in the scope of the first test strategy refers to

cross-situational cognitive strategies of agents and to cross-situational costaspects of certain forms of criminal behavior, whereas an analysis withinthe scope of the second test strategy refers to the decision for criminalaction in only one situation—in the sense of a single offense. The concepts




of opportunity, self-control, and utility were operationalized in each teststrategy and are separately elaborated for both strategies.

Test Strategy 1: Favorable and Unfavorable Actions

Independent variable: Opportunity. Test Strategy 1 defines differentforms of ecofriendly actions as being low-cost and high-cost actions, asdescribed in environmental sociology. To pursue this strategy, one needsdifferent deviant actions that are tied to different costs for the agent, in caseof detection. The questionnaire uses drunk driving (V152), embezzlement(V155), and concealing the reception of a false amount of change (V156).2

Drunk driving is defined as a high-cost action, whereas embezzlement andthe reception of a false amount of change count as low-cost actions. Thisclassification is based on theoretical considerations, with the presumptionbeing that an agent expects higher costs when caught driving with anexceeded blood alcohol limit. The arrangement of the three variables pre-supposes that the agents perceive them the same way. One hint at the valid-ity of this presumption involves the answers to the questions of whether itis illegal in Germany to keep an extra amount of change (V138) and to keepmoney that one has found (V139).3 Only 22.9% stated that it is in fact ille-gal to keep extra change, and only 32.8% state that it is illegal to keepmoney that one has found. This finding suggests that the interviewees per-ceived those actions as low-cost actions.

Independent variable: Self-control. The self-control scale developed byGrasmick and colleagues (Grasmick et al., 1993) was introduced to testself-control theory. It comprises four items for each of the six parts of self-control, which are all phrased in the direction of low self-control. Giventhat influences of the item course cannot be excluded, the following studyuses a translation of the original scale in which two items measure low self-control and two items measure high self-control. By that variation of meth-ods, we try to minimize the problem of response sets. To answer the 24items, a 4-point rating scale was set (1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree).For the following analysis, the variables have been recoded so that highnumeric data represent low self-control.Table 1 shows the phrasing of the items, their mean values, standard

deviations, item-total correlations (rit), and item difficulties (i), as well asreliability coefficients for each subscale (Cronbach’s α). A confirmatoryfactor analysis was carried out (not presented here) on the basis of the inter-correlations of the six dimensions of self-control (cf. Table 2). This analysis





Table 1Subscales and Items for the Assessment of Self-Control (Cronbach’s αα)

Subscales and Items M SD rit i

IMP: Impulsivity, α = .5681 I often act on the spur of the moment. 2.74 .77 .37 2.332 I normally plan a long time ahead. (–) 2.37 .79 .48 2.563 I spend more time thinking about the

far future than the near future. (–) 2.66 .79 .29 2.324 I often do things I like, even though there

could be long-term negative consequences. 2.29 .71 .27 2.76SIM: Simple Task, α = .6641 Even if I do not manage a task right away,

I usually keep going. (–) 1.90 .61 .39 3.102 I like very difficult tasks that push

me to my limits. (–) 2.39 .84 .47 2.543 I often try to avoid doing difficult tasks. 2.24 .72 .51 2.694 Things that are easy to do are those I like best. 2.48 .79 .41 2.37TEM: Temper, α = .6881 Even if I am involved in a serious argument,

I can easily stay calm and discuss things rationally. (–) 2.35 .69 .46 2.622 I lose my temper easily. 2.01 .70 .58 2.963 I can easily stay calm, even when I’m upset. (–) 2.40 .66 .56 2.564 When I’m really angry, others better leave me alone. 2.98 .74 .31 2.10CEN: Self-Centered, α = .6361 I have trouble taking advantage for myself if

others are disadvantaged (–) 2.08 .77 .49 2.892 It is easy for me to support other’s problems. (–) 1.99 .68 .31 3.083 If others are angry with me, it is their problem. 2.46 .78 .38 2.514 I usually try to get what I want, even though

others have a hard time because of that. 2.02 .66 .50 2.96PHYS: Physical activity, α = .7191 I prefer mental to physical activity. (–) 2.21 .72 .59 2.642 I prefer reading and thinking to doing

things outside. (–) 2.58 .75 .50 2.313 I usually feel better when I’m in action than

when I’m sitting and thinking. 2.64 .77 .55 2.254 I seem to have more energy and a drive for

activity than other people my age. 2.27 .74 .40 2.68RISK: Risk Seeking, α = .6541 I sometimes take a risk for fun. 2.16 .81 .52 2.882 I prefer security to excitement and adventure. (–) 2.07 .71 .48 2.913 Sometimes I take small risks voluntarily. 2.54 .84 .50 2.514 I usually try to avoid things that

could get me in trouble. (–) 2.12 .75 .25 2.88

Note: Negative signs in parentheses (–) indicate reverse-coded items. rit = item-total correlations;i = item difficulties.



failed to establish self-control as a unidimensional construct. Instead, itrevealed that only four of the six dimensions of self-control form a latentconstruct—namely, simple tasks, temper, self-centered, and risk seeking.Two dimensions could not be included: impulsivity and physical activity.

Independent variable: Utility. To capture the concept of SEU, one itemwas put into the questionnaire that asked for the general view on the per-ceived costs of transgressions (V149): “If I committed a small transgressionof law, it could challenge my profession and career” (1 = highly improba-ble, 5 = highly probable; M = 2.58, SD = 1.17).

Dependent variable: Deviant action. Three forms of deviant action—self-reported drunk driving, embezzlement, and concealing extra change—were investigated as dependent variables in Test Strategy 1.

Test Strategy 2: Favorable and Unfavorable Situations

Independent variable: Opportunity. In Test Strategy 2, the scenario tech-nique was used for measuring low- and high-cost situations (cf. Rossi &Anderson, 1982). The present study took the wrong-change situation as anexample. Thus, Test Strategy 2 does not include all deviant actions thatwere part of Test Strategy 1. Features of favorable and unfavorable oppor-tunities were derived using the routine activity approach (Cohen & Felson,1979). A favorable opportunity (low-cost situation) is defined by theabsence of potential witnesses and the presence of an attractive good,whereas an unfavorable opportunity (high-cost situation) is defined by thepresence of a potential witness and the absence of an attractive good.Consequentially, two features—capable guardians and suitable targets—weresystematically varied so that the coverage of low- and high-cost situations


Table 2Spearman Intercorrelations of Self-Control Dimensions

Self-Control IMP SIM TEM CEN PHYS RISK

Impulsivity (IMP) 1.00Simple tasks (SIM) .01 1.00Temper (TEM) .13 .29 1.00Self-centered (CEN) .19 .19 .14 1.00Physical activity (PHYS) .17 .01 .08 .06 1.00Risk seeking (RISK) .38 .02 .13 .36 .04 1.00



was based on a two-factor experimental design where each factor was dis-tinguished in two ways: Factor 1 = Capable Guardians, yes/no; Factor 2 =Suitable Targets, yes/no. According to our definition of favorable and unfa-vorable opportunities, two of these experimental conditions were used tooperationalize a low- and high-cost situation (see Figure 1).The use of scenarios in written surveys refers to Abelson’s script theory

(1976), which argues that people cognitively code situations of everyday lifeaccording to scripts. As applied to our situation, one can presume that in cer-tain conditions, all interviewees associate the scenarios with situations thatthey have experienced in a similar way (Eifler, 2007). Each participantanswered one of the four categories of the wrong-change situation so that ofthe 494 participants, 122 were faced with a high-cost situation and 122 werefaced with a low-cost situation. The groups were formed in parallel with aview to the features of age (ϕ = .037, ns) and sex (ϕ = –.008, ns). In addition,the respondents had similar socioeconomic statuses (ϕ = .161; cf. Table 3).4


High-Cost Situation

Imagine it is a Saturday afternoon. You are on your way home from your shopping

spree and you would like to get some bread rolls for tomorrow’s breakfast. You stop in

a bakery on your way. The shop assistant welcomes you in a friendly way (f2). There

are other customers waiting at the counter (f1). You buy bread rolls worth 7 Marks. The

shop assistant treats you very obligingly (f2) and you pay with a ten-mark bill. She

gives you change on a hundred-mark bill and does not seem to notice her mistake.

Low-Cost Situation

Imagine it is a Saturday afternoon. You are on your way home from your shopping

spree and you would like to get some bread rolls for tomorrow’s breakfast. You stop in

a bakery on your way. The shop assistant is not too friendly (f2). There are no other

customers in the store (f1). You buy bread rolls worth 7 Marks. You are served harshly

(f2) and you pay with a ten-mark bill. She gives you change on a hundred-mark bill and

does not seem to notice her mistake.

Figure 1Scenarios for Measuring Opportunity

Note: Factor 1 = Capable Guardians; Factor 2 = Suitable Targets.



Independent variable: Self-control. Test Strategy 2 used the self-controlscale by Grasmick et al. (1993). To establish measurement models for self-control, confirmatory factor analyses were carried out. In the sense of striv-ing for validity, it was necessary to create identical measurement models forthe two test groups. In a first step, single measuring models were calculatedfor each subscale of self-control. Each of the four items belonging to onesubscale was tested with regard to its relation to the latent construct asdefined by the subscale. Because each group consisted of the data of 122participants, it was possible to establish the measurement models for theself-centered and simple tasks dimensions, whereas we had to omit theremaining dimensions.

Independent variable: Utility. The concept of SEU was operationalizedas a product of subjective expectations and evaluations of relevant conse-quences of deviant action. Six consequences of the wrong-change situationwere considered on the basis of logical reasons: social approval, materialenrichment, bad conscience, detection by the cashier, detection by a witnessof the crime, criminal procedures. The interviewees were asked to imaginethat they had kept the complete change. They were asked to indicate the


Table 3Forming the Test Groups in Parallel

Low Cost High Cost Σ

Test Groups n % n % n %

Age18–29 40 51.3 38 48.7 78 32.3730–45 40 48.2 43 51.8 83 34.44≥ 46 42 52.5 38 47.5 80 33.19Total 122 50.6 119 49.4 241 100.00GenderMale 61 49.6 62 50.4 123 50.41Female 61 50.4 60 49.6 121 49.59Total 122 50.0 122 50.0 244 100.00Life chancesa

1 27 56.3 21 43.7 48 19.672 58 43.3 76 56.7 134 54.923 10 55.6 8 44.4 18 7.384 27 61.4 17 38.6 44 18.03Total 122 50.0 122 50.0 244 100.00

a. See note 4.



probability of the consequences and to evaluate them.5 The answers wererecoded in the sense of a double negative (Heider, 1958; for discussion, seeAjzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) so that the scales stretched from –2(highly improbable) to 2 (highly probable). They were multiplied for eachconsequence. The consequence of social acceptance (SEU 1), for example,has an equal utility for all interviewees who perceived social acceptance asbeing highly improbable and very comfortable or highly probable and veryuncomfortable. Table 4 shows the item formulations and specifies themeans and standard deviations of the remaining SEU items.Again, confirmatory factor analyses were used to calculate measurement

models for all utility items. Identical measurement models in both groups hadto be identified for the analysis of utility in high- and low-cost situations. Itbecame obvious that SEU 4 and SEU 5 (according to their utility of detect-ing a wrong-change situation) and SEU 6 (according to a potential criminalprosecution) could be grouped in reliable and valid measuring models. Theremaining SEU items were not included into further data analyses.

Dependent variable: Deviant action. Following the description of thewrong-change situation, the interviewees were asked to imagine how theywould act in such a situation (see Figure 1). Two possible actions—keepingthe money and correcting the mistake—were given as possible answers.Although perhaps trivial to mention, in the present context, there was noactual action in natural situations; our aim was to measure presumableaction in simulated situations that were supposed to resemble everydayexperience. Table 5 shows the frequency of presumable deviant action.


Table 4Items for the Assessment of Utility

and Descriptive Statistics in Test Groups

Low Cost High Cost

Items M SD M SD

SEU 1 Most persons that are important to me think 1.20 2.04 0.91 1.66it is okay if I keep the whole amount of change.

SEU 2 I can buy things I usually cannot afford. 0.85 2.32 0.84 1.74SEU 3 I will suffer from a bad conscience. –0.75 2.55 –0.93 2.18SEU 4 The shop assistant will realize her 0.19 2.24 0.33 1.67

mistake and will approach me about that.SEU 5 Somebody else will watch 0.64 2.55 0.28 1.61

me and approach me about it.SEU 6 My behavior can lead to legal prosecution. 1.30 2.61 0.87 1.94



Results

Test Strategy 1: Favorable and Unfavorable Actions

The analysis in Test Strategy 1 is based on the data of all 494 intervie-wees. As a first step, it included an isolated test of the influences of self-control and utility on the selected actions. As a second step, it included asimultaneous test of the two theories. This part of the analysis allows fordifferential statements about the effects of the two theories in low- andhigh-cost situations. The analysis of the connection among self-control,utility, and the different actions is analyzed on the basis of linear structuralequation models (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). The models are calculatedusing maximum likelihood estimation, and the model fit is judged by rootmean square error of approximation and goodness of fit index coefficients.For the measurement of self-control, four dimensions were chosen—namely, simple tasks, self-centered, risk seeking, and temper. Drunk dri-ving was interpreted as the high-cost action, whereas embezzlement andwrong change were taken as the low-cost actions.Figure 2 shows that the postulated high- and low-cost thesis can be sup-

ported empirically. Self-control has a stronger influence on low-costactions when compared to high-cost actions. However, both actions show arelatively strong relationship to self-control. The effects are perceivablystronger in both cases than those that found for attitudes in the context ofenvironmental research. In this case, the relationships ranged from .10 to.20 (Pearson’s r)—yet, without explicit measuring models. But even on apure correlational level, self-control seems to have stronger effects in thecontext of criminological research.The next step includes testing the effects of the direct measurement of

utility on low- and high-cost actions. First, only the effect of utility on bothactions is tested. In this case, the model refers to drunk driving and embez-zlement. Figure 3 shows the influences of utility on both actions.


Table 5Frequency of Presumable Deviant Action

in High- and Low-Cost Situations

Wrong-Change Situation Low Cost (n = 122) High Cost (n = 122) Total (n = 494)

Keeping the money 36 (29.5) 37 (30.3) 136 (27.5)Correcting the mistake 86 (70.5) 85 (69.7) 358 (72.5)

Note: Percentages in parentheses.




Figure 2Structural Equation Model on the Influenceof Self-Control on High- and Low-Cost Actions

Self-Control

Simple Tasks

Self-Centered

Temper.95

.99

.78

.22

.47

.10

ML-Estimation:

RMSEA = .097

GFI = .96

Risk-Seeking.73

.51

DrunkDriving

Embezzlement

WrongChange

High Cost

Low Cost

R2 = .24

R2 = .43

1.00 .00

.89

.73

.22

.47

.49

.65

Note: Maximum likelihood estimation: root mean square error of approximation = .097, goodnessof fit index = .960.

Figure 3Structural Equation Model on the Influenceof Utility on High- and Low-Cost Actions

Utility

ML-Estimation:

Saturated model

PerceivedCosts

.00

DrunkDriving

Embezzlement

High Cost

Low Cost

R2 = .04

R2 = .02

1.00 .00

.00

–.20

–.12

1.00

1.00

Note: Maximum likelihood estimation: Saturated model.



The isolated test supports some presumptions of the rational choiceapproach. Utility has a stronger effect on the high-cost action when com-pared to the low-cost action. In comparison with the effects of self-control,the coefficients for utility are remarkably lower. However, the fairly simplemeasurement of utility with only one indicator has to be accounted for. Asa final step, the analysis includes a simultaneous test of rational choicetheory and self-control theory. It aims at testing whether the empiricallybased hypotheses of the isolated tests apply under stricter conditions.Therefore, a model is constructed in which both concepts are taken as pre-dictors of high- and low-cost actions. Figure 4 shows the results of thissimultaneous test.The differential effects are maintained on both actions found in the iso-

lated tests. Self-control shows a stronger influence than does utility. Evenunder consideration of possible advantages owing to measurement errorsfor self-control, a dominant effect of utility on deviant actions cannot bepresumed—with regard to high-cost or low-cost actions.


Figure 4Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Self-Control and

Utility on High Cost and Low Cost Actions

Self-Control

Simple Tasks

Self-Centered

Temper.95

.99

.78

.22

.47

.10

Risk-Seeking.73

.52

DrunkDriving

Embezzlement

WrongChange

High Cost

Low Cost

R2 = .25

R2 = .43

1.00 .00

.88

.73

.22

.46

PerceivedCosts

.00 Utility1.00

.47

.65

-.10

-.01

ML-Estimation:RMSEA =.082GFI = .96

Note: Maximum likelihood estimation: root mean square error of approximation = .082, goodnessof fit index = .960.



Test Strategy 2: Favorable and Unfavorable Situations

As explained above, in the scope of the second test strategy, opportuni-ties were experimentally manipulated and set in the form of situationdescriptions as high- and low-cost situations. The analysis refers to the dataof 122 participants in each of two groups. First, this procedure allowed anisolated test regarding the influences of self-control and utility on presum-able action. Second, it allowed a simultaneous test regarding the influencesof self-control and utility on concealing an error in the amount of changereceived. The empirical analyses were carried out on a bivariate level and amultivariate level. Table 6 presents the results of the bivariate analysesregarding the influences of self-control on presumable deviant action.It shows that only two dimensions of self-control are related to keeping

the wrong change; however, it turns out that no influence of risk seekingexists. For the influences of utility on deviant action, only multivariateanalyses are presented (owing to lack of space). The results of the multi-variate analysis have been calculated using linear structural equationmodels (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Presumable action was set as adichotomous variable. Thus, the analyses are based on tetrachorical corre-lation coefficients in connection with asymptotic covariance matrices.6

Weighted least squares estimations were applied, and root mean squareerror of approximation and goodness of fit index coefficients were chosento evaluate the model fit (Bollen, 1989). Only those dimensions of self-control that exerted influences upon deviant action in the aforementionedbivariate analyses were included in these multivariate analyses: self-centered


Table 6Influences of Self-Control on Deviant Action

in a High- and Low-Cost Situation

Self-Control High-Cost Situation Low-Cost Situation

b SE b SEImpulsivity .18 .10 .01 .09Simple tasks .14 .09 .26* .10Temper .14 .08 .14 .08Self-centered .43* .13 .76* .18Physical activity .04 .10 .12 .10Risk seeking .10 .10 –.06 .08

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients and standard errors are given.*p < .05.



and simple tasks. As such, these two dimensions of self-control exert aninfluence on keeping the wrong change in the expected direction. This rela-tionship presents in high-cost situations as well as low-cost situations. Forthe dimension self-centered, however, even in a high-cost situation, self-control has a remarkable effect on presumable action. The models are wellfit to the data (see Figures 5 and 6).The isolated test regarding the influences of utility on presumable action

also supports the thesis that a higher supposed benefit of deviant actionleads to a higher probability of keeping the wrong change. Again, only theresults of multivariate analyses are presented here. This thesis proves inde-pendent of the question about what kind of situation this presumable actionis witnessed. The coefficients for assessing the model fit also show satisfy-ing values (see Figure 7). Yet, the isolated test hints at something that hasbeen observed in the simultaneous test regarding the influences of self-control and utility: By comparing the intensity of the influences of self-controland utility, it reveals that self-control exerts a stronger influence on keepingthe extra change in a low-cost situation; it also shows that utility leads to aslightly stronger explanation in high cost situations (cf. Figure 6 and 7).


Figure 5Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Self-Control (Self-Centered) on Presumable Action in a High- and Low-Cost Situation

Self-CenteredAction

R2 = .39 (.33)

CEN 1

CEN 4

WrongChange

.42

.61

.001.00

.63

WLS-Estimation:RMSEA = .068 (.095)GFI = .99 (.99)

CEN 2.63

.96

(.46)

(.45)

(.71)

.21

.76

(.74)

(.54)

(.74)

(.58)CEN 3

.62

(.85)

.62

(.38)

* values in brackets printed in italics refer to the low cost situation; items for the assessment of self-centered (CEN) are given in Table 1 Note: Values in parentheses refer to the low-cost situation. Weighted least squares estimation:

root mean square error of approximation = .068 (.095), goodness of fit index = .990 (.990).See Table 1 for the items regarding the assessment of self-centered (CEN).




Simple Tasks Action

R2 = .05 (.26)

SIM 1

SIM 4

WrongChange

.50

.69

.001.00

.56


SIM 2.23

.53

(.86)

(.64)

(.31)

.68

.71

(.60)

(.83)

(.37)

(.51)SIM 3

.24

(.62)

.87

(.62)

* values in brackets printed in italics refer to the low cost situation; items for the assessmentof simple tasks (SIM) are given in Table 1

Figure 6Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Self-Control (SimpleTasks) on Presumable Action in a High- and Low-Cost Situation

Note: Values in parentheses refer to the low-cost situation. Weighted least squares estimation:root mean square error of approximation = .126 (.029), goodness of fit index = .990 (.990).See Table 1 for items regarding the assessment of simple tasks (SIM).

Figure 7Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Utility on Deviant

Action in a High- and Low-Cost Situation

UtilityAction

R2 = .12 (.05)

SEU_4

SEU_6

WrongChange

.58

.54

.001.00

.68


SEU_5.35.22

(.43)

(.27)

(.65)

.88

.65

(.86)

(.60)

(.75)

(.23)

* values in brackets printed in italics refer to the low cost situation; items for the assessment of utility (SEU) are given in Table 4 Note: Values in parentheses refer to the low-cost situation. Weighted least squares estimation:

root mean square error of approximation = .098 (.084), goodness of fit index = .990 (.990).See Table 4 for items regarding the assessment of utility (SEU).



The simultaneous test of the influences of self-control and utility, con-ducted in the third step, leads to a result that supports the appropriatenessof the high- and low-cost thesis of deviant behavior developed in this article:For two dimensions of self-control—namely, self-centered and simpletasks—one can observe that the influences of self-control on keeping themoney are stronger in a situation without possible witnesses and a cashierwho is described as being unfriendly (i.e., a low-cost situation) than the cor-responding influences of utility. In a situation with witnesses and a friendly


.21

1.00

WLS-Estimation:

RMSEA = .124 (.090)

GFI = .97 (.98)

Action .00

Utility

.56

.88

.56

.69

.22

.69

Self-Centered

CEN 2CEN 3CEN 1

.96.36

.80.20

.77

.40

CEN 4

WrongChange

SEU_4SEU_5

SEU_6

.53

.45

.74

R2 = .41(.55)

(.50)(.40)

(.57)

(.71)

(.78)(.57)

(.78)(.31)

(.54)

(.55)

(.39)(.90)

(.71)

(.70)

(.15)

(.68)

* values in brackets printed in italics refer to the low cost situation; items for the assessment of self-centered (CEN) are given in Table 1; items for the assessment of utility (SEU) are given in Table 4

Figure 8Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Self-Control (Self-Centered)and Utility on Presumable Action in a High- and Low-Cost Situation

Note: Values in parentheses refer to the low-cost situation. Weighted least squares estimation:root mean square error of approximation = .124 (.090), goodness of fit index = .970 (.980).See Table 4 for items regarding the assessment of utility (SEU); see Table 1 for items regard-ing the assessment of self-centered (CEN).



cashier (i.e., a high-cost situation), keeping the change depends more onhow potential negative consequences are perceived and assessed than doesself-control (cf. Figure 8 and 9).The results of Test Strategy 2 show that the presumable action depends

on influences of self-control in a low-cost situation and on the influences ofutility in a high-cost situation, as we expected. By taking a close look at thesummary of the results of our two test strategies, we interpret them as sup-porting the high- and low-cost thesis tested and elaborated on. Self-controlas a personality trait proves to be a stronger predictor in comparison to utility


Figure 9Structural Equation Model on the Influence of Self-Control (Simple Tasks)and Utility on Presumable Action in a High- and a Low-Cost Situation

.39

1.00

WLS-Estimation:

RMSEA = .086 (.091)

GFI = .98(.96)

Action .00

Utility

.61

.92

.57

.63

.16

.67

SimpleTasks

SIM 2SIM 3SIM 1

.44.25

.87.75

.58

.66

SIM 4

WrongChange

SEU_4SEU_5

SEU_6

.14

.61

.63

R2 = .16 (.24)

(.37)(.39)

(.60)

(.79)

(.78)(.63)

(.80)(.62)

(.83)

(.59)

(.36)(.62)

(.31)

(.65)

(.23)

(.38)

* values in brackets printed in italics refer to the low cost situation; items for the assessment of simple tasks (SIM) are given in Table 1; items for the assessment of utility (SEU) are given in Table 4

Note: Values in parentheses refer to the low-cost situation. Weighted least squares estimation:root mean square error of approximation = .086 (.091), goodness of fit index = .980 (.960).See Table 4 for items regarding the assessment of utility (SEU); see Table 1 for items regard-ing the assessment of simple tasks (SIM).



for low-cost actions, as well as for deviant action in low-cost situations.High-cost actions, as well as deviant action in high-cost situations, can ratherbe seen as a result of a rational choice than as one of a personality trait.

Discussion

This study elaborated on the concept of the interaction between personand situation in the scope of self-control theory by means of the high- andlow-cost thesis. As such, it offers a useful venture in the context of theanalysis of deviant behavior in everyday life. We assumed that personalityvariables have a stronger effect in low-cost situations (favorable opportuni-ties), whereas utility has a stronger effect in high-cost situations (unfavor-able opportunities). An empirical analysis regarding the significance ofopportunities in the scope of self-control theory offers different possibilitiesfor operationalization. Some researchers work with additional assumptions; therefore, the oppor-

tunity variable is portrayed in a a general, unspecific way (e.g., Eifler, 1998;Grasmick et al., 1993; Longshore & Turner, 1998). Specifically, the situationalcircumstances cannot be controlled when participants are asked about oppor-tunities in which deviant actions are “possible to do easily,” “gratifying at themoment,” and “without much chance that somebody who might do somethingabout it would quickly find out” (Grasmick et al., 1993, p. 19); when oppor-tunities are operationalized in connection with a statement on the intensity ofsomeone’s tobacco consumption, namely, the availability of money to buy cig-arettes; when people are asked how many of their current friends engage incrime other than illicit drug use; and if gender is used as a proxy variable tooperationalize opportunities (Longshore & Turner, 1998). This method of operationalization can lead to distorting effects when

participants have their own concepts of situational opportunities. Given thatwe wanted to avoid the disadvantages of those operationalizations andbecause field studies are hardly possible owing to ethical considerations,we decided on a different way of measuring opportunities: We adapted thetest strategies developed in the context of the high- and low-cost thesis ofecofriendly actions to criminological questions.In the first strategy, three different actions were classified as high- and

low-cost actions according to logical considerations. Even though thismethod cannot be used to create specific situational conditions, it is usefulbecause it enables testing the effects of personality traits and utility inhigh- and low-cost situations. In our second strategy, we used the vignettetechnique to operationalize opportunities so that we could capture more




than just the self-report of deviant action. With vignette analysis, one cangive a set of standardized hypothetical situations and experimentallymanipulate the features of opportunities, to analyze causal connectionsamong situational features, theoretical concepts, and presumable actions.The testing of the high- and low-cost thesis of deviant behavior with thesetwo strategies empirically supports the postulated interaction thesis. Theself-control personality trait has a stronger effect in a low-cost situation,whereas utility has a stronger effect in a high-cost situation.However, there are weaknesses in the method used in this study. A

stricter and fairer test, as well as a better comparison between the two teststrategies and the two theories, would presuppose almost identical measur-ing instruments. Yet, the operationalization of self-control is not identicalfor the two test strategies: The first considered four of the six dimensions,whereas the second considered only two dimensions and these in separatedmodels. This restriction is due to the design of our study. If one operational-izes opportunities via vignettes and wants to systematically vary the situa-tional influences, it is unwise to give all variants to all interviewees; thus,smaller groups had to be questioned. This smaller number of cases leads to restrictions in the possibilities of data

analysis. As such, the rather simple operationalization of self-control in thesecond strategy is due to severe estimation problems related to sample size. The weighted least squares estimation, which had to be applied in the

present context because of a dichotomous dependent variable, requireslarge samples. Given that we intended to establish comparable measure-ment models for all groups, we had to accept these restrictions. Utility wasoperationalized extensively and appropriately in the second strategy only:The operationalization of utility is less elaborated in the first strategybecause this strategy is not explicitly realized in the questionnaire; thus, itcounts as a secondary analysis of the data. In upcoming studies, it will be necessary to set up a fair operational-

ization for self-control and utility for both strategies. In this study, theaspect of operationalization seems to be less problematic, given that theexpected relations were empirically proved. However, it could be assertedthat the result came up only because of the reduced operationalization ofthe two independent variables. One can argue against this attitude becausethe two strategies confirm the interaction hypothesis and because in eachmethod, either the self-control variable or the utility variable was poorlymeasured.A further restriction might relate to the generality of the results of our

analysis. We selected a nonprobability sample, which could be a serious




restriction of our research aims if we were to make generalizations of ourresults. But we did not aim at generalizing the results of the sample survey toan entire population. Instead, we were interested in testing causal hypothesesamong self-control, utility, and opportunity. To test those causal hypotheses,one does not need probability samples but a design in which one can rule outalternative explanations. Thus, we cannot give a concluding statement regard-ing whether the empirical basis of the low-cost thesis, as found in this article,is valid for all forms of deviant action. We had to restrict ourselves on thestatements regarding the special form of deviant action studied here, as wellas on the set situation. Additionally, an adaptation of the results is possibleonly for groups that are similar to the one investigated here.In view of the fact that the high- and low-cost thesis of deviant behavior

can be empirically supported in this study, it would be worth it to expandthe study to include other samples, to further situations and deviant actions.

Notes

1. Throughout this article, the term self-control refers to the concept specified byGottfredson and Hirschi (1990); therefore, it is explicitly differentiated from its use in a gen-eral psychological context.

2. The following questions were prefaced with “We will now present examples for smalloffenses. Please state how often you have committed one of those in your life”: “driving whileconsciously having exceeded the blood alcohol limit” (V152: M = 1.11, SD = 1.37), “keepingbills found on the streets” (V155: M = 0.76, SD = 0.93), “consciously keeping a false amountof change received” (V156: M = 0.93, SD = 1.08). Response formats were as follows: 0(never), 1 (1 time), 2 (2–5 times), 3 (6–10 times), 4 (11–20 times), 5 (more than 20 times).

3. The question was phrased as follows: “Please state whether the following actions areillegal or legal in Germany: It is prohibited by law . . . to keep an extra amount of changereceived [V138], . . . to keep money found in the streets [V139].” Response format was as fol-lows: 1 (yes, prohibited by law), 2 (no, allowed by law), 3 (do not know). (Whereas keepingan extra amount of change violates the German civil law, keeping money one has found isagainst the German criminal law.)

4. The participants’ socioeconomic statuses were measured using Weber’s concept of lifechances, according to a procedure described by Blossfeld and Timm (1997). As such, partici-pants were assigned to four ordinal categories of life chances, according to their education andoccupational training: 1 = highest life chances (high level of education and university degree);2 = higher life chances (high level of education and university of applied sciences degree);3 = lower life chances (low or medium education and occupational training); 4 = lowest lifechances (low or medium education and no occupational training).

5. The questions and answers were phrased as follows: expectations, “How do you rate theprobability of one of the consequences in case you kept the complete change?” (1 = highlyimprobable, 5 = highly probable); evaluations, “Please reflect on how comfortable or uncom-fortable these situations are for you” (1 = very uncomfortable, 5 = very comfortable).

6. The correlation matrices that are the basis of the structural equation models are availableupon request.




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Christian Seipel is senior lecturer at the Institute for Social Sciences at the University ofHildesheim, Germany. His areas of research include criminology, social science researchmethods, and political sociology. His publications include Integrative Sozialforschung.Konzepte und Methoden der qualitativen und quantitativen empirischen Forschung (IntegrativeSocial Research. Concepts and Methods of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches; withPeter Rieker, 2003) and Methoden kulturvergleichender Sozialforschung. Eine Einführung(Methods of Cross-Cultural Social Research. An Introduction; with Susanne Rippl, 2008).

Stefanie Eifler is assistant professor at the Faculty for Sociology at the University ofBielefeld, Germany. Her areas of research include criminology, sociology of health and illness,and social science research methods. Her publications include “Evaluating the Validity of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior Using Vignette Analyses,” in Quality and Quantity (2007).




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