Self-Presentation of Personality: An Agency-Communion Framework

Delroy L. Paulhus

University of British Columbia

and

Paul D. Trapnell

University of Winnipeg

Draft date: December 31, 2007

PART 1: OVERVIEW OF SELF-PRESENTATION

In its most general sense, all of human personality may be seen as self-

presentational (Goffman, 1959; Tedeschi, 1972). That is, each behavioral event

communicates information about the self. To most personality psychologists, however,

the term implies a degree of inauthenticity: Some aspects of behavior are designed to

convey an image, rather than an accurate representation of one’s personality. We follow

suit here, in using the term self-presentation to refer to motivated inaccuracy in one’s

public self-portrayals. Because human motivation is so rich and diverse, self-

presentation is no less so.

Indisputably, self-presentation is responsive to situational demands. When

requested to do so, people can tailor their self-presentations exquisitely (e.g., Godfrey,

Jones, & Lord, 1986; Holden & Evoy, 2005; Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995). They

also embellish their representations in important real-world encounters. Job applicants,

for example, present themselves more favorably during interviews than they do after they

have been hired (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). People tend to self-promote

more with potential dating partners than they do in interactions with old friends (Rowatt,

Cunningham, & Druen, 1998; Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). Proctored

questionnaire administrations draw more socially desirable responding than do

anonymous internet studies (Richman, Weisband, Kiesler, & Drasgow, 1999). As a rule,

people present themselves more favorably to public audiences than they do in private

situations: Indeed, Baumeister (1982) viewed this discrepancy as the ultimate

operationalization of self-presentation.

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In this chapter, however, we are more concerned with chronic individual

differences in self-presentation. We will argue that such dispositions constitute strong

and pervasive aspects of personality. People differ in the degree to which they are

attuned to self-presentation demands, are motivated to self-present, and in the nature of

the image that they are motivated to present.

Both the process and individual differences literatures are vast. For book-length

reviews, see Schlenker (1980) and Leary (1995). Because our mandate here is to reframe

rather than exhaust the literature, our coverage is necessarily selective. The key elements

of the reframing are an audience distinction (public vs. private) and a content distinction

(agentic vs. communal aspects of personality). As detailed below, agentic aspects

involve “getting ahead” whereas communal aspects involve “getting along” (Bakan,

1966; Hogan, 1983). Our two-level framework is previewed in Figure 1. The framework

will be applied throughout in all four sections of this chapter

Insert Figure 1 here

As noted above, our emphasis is on individual differences in self-presentation

rather than the psychological processes maintaining these differences. However, the

process literature has begun fertilizing the individual differences literatures. Therefore, a

brief review of the process literature is in order.

The process of self-presentation

What are the psychological processes that unfold during an episode of self-

presentation of personality? The answer is as complex as personality itself and only a

handful of researchers have devoted sustained attention to the topic. Even fewer have

focused on implications for assessment (e.g., Holden & Fekken, 1995; Rogers, 1977).

3

The process most certainly involves the determination of whether or not one’s behavior

will be public (i.e., observed by important others) and, if so, deciding on the appropriate

image to present to that audience (Leary & Kowalski, 2000).

It is well-known that awareness of an audience alters people’s behavior in a

variety of ways (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). But the production of an effective public

self-presentation may require significant effort and attention. This process of regulating

public self-presentations is often called impression management. If the context is private,

there is no need for impression management and people are often frank with themselves

-- even about issues that arouse shame and guilt. If the affective consequences are too

severe, however, internal defensive processes such as self-deception are activated.

This contrast between impression management and self-deception corresponds

roughly to the psychoanalytic distinction between conscious and unconscious processes.

Within that tradition, the assumption is that defensive processes can (in fact, must)

operate outside of conscious awareness (Weinberger & Silverman, 1979; Westen, this

volume). Confirmation of such self-deceptive processes in the laboratory has been

handicapped by the modern prohibition against inducing a serious psychological threat.

One advance was the tightly controlled experiment by Gur and Sackeim (1979): They

demonstrated a motivated discrepancy between people’s conscious and unconscious

recognition of their own voices. Only a handful of other controlled experiments have

verified the operation of an unconscious self-presentation process (Quattrone & Tversky,

1984; Paulhus, Nathanson, & Lau, 2006).

Those working within the information processing tradition have couched such

issues in the language of automatic vs. controlled self-presentation (Gilbert et al., 1988;

4

M. Leary, 1995; Paulhus, 1993; Schlenker, 1980). In a series of studies, Paulhus and his

colleagues showed the clearest evidence for an automatic component of self-presentation

(e.g., Paulhus & Levitt, 1986; Paulhus, 1995). A key finding was that self-descriptions

are more positive under a high cognitive load, for example, when respondents are

speeded or engaged in a distracting task (Paulhus, Graf, & van Selst, 1989).

Another research group providing a detailed account of the transformation of

public to private self-presentation is the team of Robert Hogan and John Johnson. They

argue that repeated public self-presentations become automatized so that effort is no

longer required. As a result, people’s frank self-descriptions are indisinguishable from

their habitual self-presentations (Hogan, 1983; Johnson & Hogan, 1981).

Consistent with the cognitive tradition, such models attempt to minimize the role

of motivation. Implicitly, however, it pervades such models. For example, the choice of

controlled behavior is directed largely by motivation (e.g., altering one’s dating style

after negative feedback). Moreover, the conditions under which behavior is automatized

may well involve motivation (e.g., practicing for job interviews).

In a welcome development, the process of self-presentation is now being studied

at the physiological level. The self-regulation approach, for example, links psychological

resources to physical resources. The fact that psychological resources are finite is

evidenced by the demonstration that people show a measurable depletion in energy and

performance on subsequent tasks (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). Moreover,

psychological resources can be renewed with a boost in physical resources (Baumeister,

2007). Other consequences for physical health have been detailed by Leary et al. (1999).

Finally, exciting new brain-image research has begun to address self-presentation at the

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neuroscience level. For example, self-enhancement was reduced by activating the medial

prefrontal cortex with transcranial magnetic stimulation (Kwan, Barrios, Ganis, Gorman,

Lange, Kumar, Shepard, & Kennan, 2007). All this physiological work is especially

important because it provides a mechanism for explaining deleterious effects of self-

presentation.

In sum, public contexts tend to activate impression management processes

tailored to the current audience. In many cases, the result is a favorably-biased self-

description. The key elements are flexibility and appropriateness. In private contexts,

where the only audience is the self, personality descriptions may still be biased because

of self-deception or habitualized impression management. In Figure 1, then, the Private

Promotion side of Figure 1 subsumes self-deception as well as automatic self-

presentation.

The content of self-presentation: What images are presented?

Are self-presentations infinite in number? Given the complexities of our social

and work lives, do we really attempt to fine-tune the content of our images to suit each

context? As Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) have pointed out, dealing with such a daunting

array of daily tasks would require a comprehensive “social intelligence” more elaborate

in nature than any standard notions of non-social intelligence. Instead, others have

argued that there are a finite number of common self-presentation roles (e.g., Jones &

Pittman, 1982; Robins & John, 1997). Some people may confine themselves in a stylistic

fashion to only one role, whereas others may show some flexibility (Paulhus & Martin,

1988). According to the influential interactional framework of Timothy Leary (1957),

6

people may show flexibility in undemanding situations but revert to their predominant

role under stress.

To date, the most influential taxonomy of images is the quintet proposed by Jones

and Pittman (1982): People can present themselves to embody either intimidation,

supplication, ingratiation, self-promotion, or exemplification. Research confirms that

these five are among the most common in everyday interactions (Bolino & Turnley,

1999).

Other groups have developed individual difference measures capturing a variety

of self-presentation images (Holden & Evoy, 2005; Leary et al., 1999). Most

comprehensive is the set of 12 self-presentational tactics isolated and measured by Lee,

Quigley, Nesler, Corbet, and Tedeschi (1999). Interestingly, recent research using those

same taxonomies suggests that the differences measures can be summarized in two over-

arching themes, namely Agency and Communion (Carey & Paulhus, 2008): The two

default self-portrayals are (1) agentic (strong, competent, clever) and (2) communal

(cooperative, warm, dutiful). Such research helped convince us of the value of the

agency-communion framework for organizing the content of self-presentations.

Individual differences in SP attunement and and motivation

As previewed earlier, our focus in this chapter is on individual differences, rather

than context effects, in self-presentation. At least three categories of individual

differences have been given substantial attention: (1) attention or attunement to self-

presentation and (2) motivation to engage in in self-presentation, and (3) the amount of

distortion involved in the self-presentation.

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Attunement: Some individuals are more responsive to self-presentation issues

than others. At least two personality concepts have triggered research because of the

combination of intuitive appeal of the concept and a solid research instrument.

The notion of self-monitoring is that some people pay attention to the social

demands of their current situation and adjust their behavior to act in an appropriate

fashion. That compelling idea has led to widespread use of the Self-Monitoring Scale

(Snyder, 1974), especially by social psychologists. High scorers tend to show a variety of

laboratory and real-world behavior indicating their behavioral flexibility (e.g., Gangestad

& Snyder, 2000).

Other researchers have reframed the concept of self-monitoring. For example, the

incremental validity of self-monitoring above and beyond extraversion has been

questioned by John, Cheek, and Klohnen (1996). Briggs and Cheek (1988) separate the

extraversion component from the other-directedness factor with distinct subscales. A

conceptual revision motivated Lennox and Wolfe (1984) to develop a revised instrument

distinguishing ability and sensitivity subscales. Nonetheless, Snyder’s scale continues to

be the most popular choice in the research literature.

The other influential individual difference construct addressing attunement is

public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980). The idea was that some individuals are

especially reactive to public attention to their behavior. The standard instrument for

measuring public self-consciousness is one of three subscales of the Public and Private

Self-Consciousness scale: It also included measures of private self-consciousness and

social anxiety (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).

Motivation: A variety of relevant personality constructs have arisen out of

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different assumptions about motivation. One assumption is that people differ in

selfishness. Machiavellians, for example, are assumed to misrepresent themselves as part

of a general pattern of instrumentally-driven behavior (Christie & Geis, 1970). Other

constructs based on the same assumption include suclinical psychopathy (Paulhus &

Williams, 2002) and unmitigated agency (Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). In all these cases,

exploitative self-presentation stems from a more general egocentric personality.

On the other hand, chronic self-presentation may stem from chronic insecurity.

Such was the basis for Crowne and Marlowe’s (1964) concept of need for approval:

Crowne’s (1987) later concluded that the motive was more defensive than promotional.

A similar notion underlay Watson and Friend’s (1969) notion of fear of negative

evaluation and current conceptions of subclinical narcissism (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).

A perfectionistic self-presentation may also derive from a deep insecurity (Sherry,

Hewitt, Flett, Lee-Baggley, & Hall, 2007). Such defensive motivations are directly

contrasted with the acquisitive motivations in Arkin’s (1981) two-factor model: People

may chronically self-present for either promotional or defensive reasons (see also Lee et

al., 1999; Millham, 1974).

Several research groups have offered taxonomies of possible motivations for self-

presentation. Swann and colleagues have emphasized two: self-enhancement and self-

verification (e.g., Swann, 1990). Others have suggested that people are motivated at

various times to self-enhance, self-verify, or be accurate (Leary, 2007; Sedikides, 1993).

An even broader taxonomy of self-presentational motives was provided by Robins

and John (1997). They offered intuitively compelling labels to capture four reasons why

people’s self-perceptions might depart from reality. The Egoist is motivated by self-

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enhancement; the Politician, by popularity; the Consistency-Seeker, by consistency. Only

the fourth type, the Scientist, is motivated by accuracy. To date, there are no specific

measures of these four tendencies and, therefore, their structure and validity is untested.

Nonetheless, the labels do ring true as capturing the primary motives.

Amount of self-presentation. The remainder of our chapter focuses on measuring

the degree of distortion in an individual’s self-presentation. Although the possible

motives are numerous, the typical content of self-presentation tends to resonate with

themes of agency and communion. The crossing of content theme with the public and

private distinction -- as depicted in Figure 1 -- forms the basis for Parts 3 and 4. The next

section provides more background on the agency-communion distinction as well as a

theory of how those themes turn out to dominate self-presentation behavior.

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PART 2: AGENCY AND COMMUNION (A & C) AS

CONCEPTUAL COORDINATES FOR PERSONALITY

In this chapter, we make a strong case for two dimensions of self-presentation

content. The prominence of these two dimensions, we will argue, ensue from the

centrality of two human meta-values -- agency and communion. Before we make that

case directly, we provide the reader with an over-view of the literature on that topic.

These two dimensions, we will show, are not arbitrarily chosen from a wealth of options.

In our view, they represent the single most powerful framework for organizing the field

of human personality. They link values to motives, and motives to goals, traits, and

biases (Paulhus & John, 1998). This multi-layered prominence of agency and

communion, we will argue, also extends to the structure of self-presentation. Whether

the audience is self or others, people organize the content of their representations in terms

of these broad conceptual coordinates.

The Organizational Sweep of Agency (A) and Communion (C)

Originating with Bakan's (1966) book, the superordinate labels of agency and

communion have helped frame key issues in personality psychology, sociology, and

psychotherapy. Twenty-five years after Bakan’s book, the theoretical impact of the A &

C distinction was reviewed and extended by Wiggins (1991). He pointed out parallel

distinctions in the literatures on evolutionary theory, gender roles, language, and religion

(see below).

The application of A & C as a conceptual framework has not subsided in recent

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years. They have played central roles in recent work on interpersonal behavior

measurement (Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2004), interpersonal measurement techniques

(Pincus, Gurtman, & Ruiz, 1998), narrative interpretation (McAdams, Hoffman,

Mansfield, & Day, 1996), social psychology (Abel & Wojiscke, 2007; Kelley??), and

interpersonal psychotherapy (McMullen & Conway, 1997; Kiesler & Auerbach, 2003).

Most recently, Len Horowitz and colleagues (2006) have reworked several ingredients of

the earlier theoretical positions on agency and communion.

Below, we briefly review several domains of individual difference research where

the application of A and C has proved especially fruitful.

Interpersonal traits

Even earlier than Bakan, a group of clinical researchers in the San Francisco Bay

area were developing a similar two-factor conception of personality (Laforge, Leary,

Naboisek, Coffey, & Freedman, 1954). This work was elaborated in the influential book

written by Timothy Leary (1957). That group went beyond the two-axis framework to

flesh in the intermediate angles, and create what was later dubbed the interpersonal

circumplex (Wiggins, 1979). Especially influential were Leary’s labels for the trait level

concepts, namely, dominance and nurturance.

Especially important for the present chapter was the importance this group placed

on the Sullivanian notion that personality emerges from interpersonal engagement. The

crux of self-presentation theory is clearly a form of interpersonal engagement.

Picking up from these earlier writers, Jerry Wiggins put the measurement of

interpersonal traits on a solid footing. His extensive research program yielded the

Interpersonal Adjective Scales -- still the most reputable instrument for measuring both

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the interpersonal axes and the intermediate traits around the interpersonal circle

(Wiggins, 1979). A later version used personality statements rather than adjectives and

incorporated the Big Five personality traits (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990). In view of a

further merger, Wiggins and Trapnell (1996) were able to separate agentic and communal

aspects of each of the Big Five traits.

Agency and communion also came to play an key role in the influential

contributions of Robert Hogan. For example, they provided the meta-theoretical

assumptions that frame his socio-analytic theory (Hogan, 1983). He captured the

distinction succinctly in his characterization of the two primary human motives as

“getting along and getting ahead”. Along with John Johnson, Hogan went further to

argue that the nature of personality is essentially self-presentational (Johnson & Hogan,

1981). His work best exemplifies our position that self-presentations of an agentic and

communal nature is fundamental to personality.

Alternative labels for the “Big Two” factors

In recent year, a number of other researchers have pointed to the value of a 2-

dimensional representations of personality (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2002;

Digman 1997; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Saucier & Goldberg,

2001). Needless to say, all these models stand in stark contrast to the currently dominant

5-factor organization (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; John & Srivastava, 1999).

These alternative 2-factor models have rather different theoretical histories and

none of the three applies the venerable agency-communion distinction. Digman’s (1997)

labels were growth and socialization. whereas Saucier and Goldberg’s (2001) labels were

dynamism and social propriety. DeYoung and colleagues (2002) preferred plasticity

13

and stability. Despite the disparate labels, a closer examination of the item loadings and

scale correlates reveals that the three models are remarkably similar in structure and

content to agency and communion.

Note that, in all of these systems, the “Big Two” dimensions of personality are

both positive: That is, high scores are valued on both dimensions. However, the nature of

those two forms of positivity is dramatically different. Indeed, they seem to be associated

with two different value systems.

======================original=================

Values

The reigning structural model of values is undoubtedly that Schwartz (1992). His

model comprises a circumplex -- but agentic and communal values are viewed as polar

opposites! By contrast, Bakan’s (1966) message was that agency and communion are

relatively independent, not that they are polar opposites. However, Bakan’s ideas did not

enter the personality literature until papers by Wiggins (1979) and Hogan (1983).

Hogan’s more grounded interpretations – getting ahead and getting along – came much

later.

Recently, Trapnell and Paulhus (in press) pointed out that A & C dimensions can

be uncovered in comprehensive analyses of values and motives (see Roberts & Robins,

2000).

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================paul’s suggestion===============

Values

The reigning structural model of values is undoubtedly that of Schwartz (1992).

His model is a quasi-circumplex in which the relative compatibility or incompatibility of

ten value categories (e.g., power, benevolence, tradition) is represented by their relative

distances around a circumplex. In contrast to the orthogonal model of A and C proposed

here, however, Schwartz’s model depicts agentic and communal values as polar

opposites.

Bakan’s (1966) essay implied that agency and communion are relatively

independent “dualities” of human existence, rather than polar opposites. However,

Bakan’s ideas did not enter the personality literature until papers by Wiggins (1979) and

Hogan (1983). Hogan’s evolutionarily grounded interpretations – getting ahead and

getting along – came almost twenty years after Bakan.

Recently, Trapnell and Paulhus (in press) pointed out that superordinate A & C

dimensions can be identified both in Schwartz’ value taxonomy and in comprehensive

analyses of life goals (e.g., Roberts & Robins, 2000).

===============================================

…Two direct measures of A & C values are now available. Locke (2000) has developed

measures of A & C values for use in studying interpersonal interactions. The instrument

15

developed by Trapnell and Paulhus (in press) was designed for more general use. In

several studies, the authors showed that A & C values are relatively independent and

have different patterns of correlates.

Of key importance for this chapter is the notion that these two value systems

naturally lead to two rather different self-presentation styles (Paulhus & John, 1998).

The style associated with Agentic traits (egoism) involves power and superiority striving,

competence, and personal success. In contrast, the style associated with Communal traits

(moralism) involves adherence to group norms and traditions, as well as prosocial

attitudes and behavior toward individuals.

Masculinity and femininity

Social scientists have long noted the strong historical and conceptual parallel

between male vs. female gender roles and agentic vs. communal social roles. In the

1970s, this parallel had an impact on the psychological measurement literature,

culminating in a new approach to assessing gender roles. Sandra Bem (1974) overturned

the traditional bipolar notion by constructing independent measures of masculinity and

femininity. However, Wiggins and Holzmuller (1978) showed that Bem’s two

dimensions are psychometrically indistinguishable from the personality dimensions of

dominance and nurturance. Paulhus (1987) further used Wiggins (1979) circumplex

model to illustrate that while desirable masculinity and femininity will tend to be

uncorrelated (e.g., dominance and warmth), so too will undesirable masculinity and

femininity (e.g., coldness and submissiveness). Consequently, overall interpersonal

masculinity and overall interpersonal femininity describe a bipolar gender typicality axis

(e.g., cold+dominant versus warm+submissive). Bem’s (1974) orthogonal model was a

16

joint consequence of Bem’s restricted focus on desirable traits and the fact that

interpersonal agency and communion tend to be orthogonal dimensions.

A related controversy arose in the field of moral development. Gilligan (1982)

argued that the moral development of men and women need to be evaluated on different

dimensions. Men are to be evaluated with respect to instrumental (i.e., agentic) values;

women, with regard to relationship (i.e., communal) values. Here again, we see the

association of agency and communion with gender-based value systems.

A two-factor conception of self-presentation helps unify these literatures. Most

societies make a clear distinction between what is desirable for men and what is desirable

for women. From childhood, boys and girls are encouraged to present themselves as

“sugar, spice, and everything nice” or “snips, snails, and puppy-dog tails”.

Indeed, Bem (1974) created her independent measures by selecting items that

were more desirable for one sex than the other. While intending to discriminate male and

female roles, Bem ended up recapitulating the two fundamental human values of agency

and communion.

Cultural Dimensions

Increasing awareness of the contrast between Asian and Western culture has

prompted a new generation of research on broad cultural influences. Triandis’s (1989)

system led to the placing of countries and cultures within a 2-factor system of

individualistic and collectivistic values. Subsequently, Markus and Kitayama (1991)

carried this distinction into the social psychological literature by contrasting independent

self-concepts with interdependent self-concepts. The parallel between these culture

dimensions and the A & C coordinates is evident. In their more recent writings, these

17

issues have been couched specifically in terms of the A & C labels (Markus & Kitayama,

2003; Phalet & Poppe, 1997).

Combinations of A & C

Does a positive self-presentation on one fundamental dimension require a positive

self-presentation on the other? Given their relative independence, no such implication

can be drawn (Paulhus & John, 1998). Indeed, such discrepancies in self-presentation

have been given attention under the labels “unmitigated agency” and “unmitigated

communion”.

===================original=====================

A primary theme of Bakan's (1966) essay on agency and communion is the

destructive implications of unmitigated agency, that is, agentic striving at the expense of

(or untempered by) communal considerations. Among the most intensely researched trait

constructs associated with this region of the interpersonal circumplex are narcissism,

Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, a trio of socially malevolent tendencies dubbed the

"Dark Triad" by Paulhus and Williams (2002). Dark Triad dispositions represent the

epitome of unmitigated agency in the sense elaborated by Bakan (1966) and Helgeson

and Fritz (1999).

The relation of these traits to gender, life goals, and sexuality offer additional

reasons to examine the Dark Triad as criteria of agentic and communal values.[NEEDS A

18

LEAD IN SENTENCE OF A DIFFERENT SORT FROM THIS ONE, WHICH FIT THE

JPA MANUSCRIPT BUT DOESN’T FIT WELL HERE.]. . . First, unmitigated agentic

traits fall along an axis through the interpersonal circumplex associated with especially

large gender differences (see Paulhus, 1987; Lippa, 2001). Second, this same personality

axis describes the region of strongest association between major life goals and personality

(Robins & Roberts, 2000). Third, this axis defines one of the two primary axes of

intersection between personality and sociopolitical ideology (the second being openness

to experience; see (McCrae, 1997; Saucier, 2000; Trapnell, 1994). Fourth, it defines the

region of strongest association between personality and variation in sexual behavior.

[HOW TO END THIS PARAG?]

For all these reasons, we examine the relation of Dark Triad dispositions to global

A and C values. We would anticipate positive correlations with agentic values and

negative correlations with communal values for all of the Dark Triad dispositions. [This

parag works in the in press JPA article but not here].

===================================================

==================replace with this?====================

A primary theme of Bakan's (1966) essay on agency and communion is the

destructive implications of unmitigated agency, that is, agentic striving at the expense of

(or untempered by) communal considerations. Although we consider agency and

communion to be orthogonal axes of social meaning, it is possible the transverse axis in

19

that space associated with unmitigated agency—an axis running from high agency/low

communion to high communion/low agency—may have special status in human social

life and human social cognition.

Among the most intensely researched trait constructs associated with this region

of the interpersonal circumplex are narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, a trio

of socially malevolent tendencies dubbed the "Dark Triad" by Paulhus and Williams

(2002). Dark Triad dispositions represent the epitome of unmitigated agency in the sense

elaborated by Bakan (1966) and Helgeson and Fritz (1999). The behavior tendencies

described by the Dark Triad together constitute an evolutionarily fundamental problem to

social living—deceit and defection, i.e, feigning reciprocation, cooperation and

relationship in the service of exploitative self-interest. Perhaps human social cognition is

especially “prepared” to discriminate human behavior along the Dark Triad axis (e.g.,

xxx, xxx). Regardless, this axes is implicated in gender roles and stereotypes, sexual

strategies distinguishing men and women, and the relation of broad personality

dispositions to human values and ideologies.

Unmitigated agentic traits, for example, fall along an axis through the

interpersonal circumplex describing the largest gender differences in interpersonal traits

(see Paulhus, 1987; Lippa, 2001). This same personality axis describes the region of

strongest association between major life goals and personality (Robins & Roberts, 2000).

Third, this axis defines one of the two primary axes of intersection between personality

and sociopolitical ideology (the second being openness to experience; see (McCrae,

1997; Saucier, 2000; Trapnell, 1994). Fourth, it defines the region of strongest

association between personality and variation in sexual behavior (detailed below).

20

=========================================

================or with this?================

A primary theme of Bakan's (1966) essay on agency and communion is the

destructive implications of unmitigated agency, that is, agentic striving at the expense of

(or untempered by) communal considerations. Among the most intensely researched trait

constructs associated with this region of the interpersonal circumplex are narcissism,

Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, a trio of socially malevolent tendencies dubbed the

"Dark Triad" by Paulhus and Williams (2002). Dark Triad dispositions represent the

epitome of unmitigated agency in the sense elaborated by Bakan (1966) and Helgeson

and Fritz (1999).

The relation of these traits to gender, life goals, and sexuality offer additional

reasons to examine the Dark Triad as a uniquely important region within the plane of

agentic and communal values. First, unmitigated agentic traits fall along an axis through

the interpersonal circumplex associated with especially large gender differences (see

Paulhus, 1987; Lippa, 2001). Second, this same personality axis describes the region of

strongest association between major life goals and personality (Robins & Roberts, 2000).

Third, this axis defines one of the two primary axes of intersection between personality

and sociopolitical ideology (the second being openness to experience; see (McCrae,

1997; Saucier, 2000; Trapnell, 1994). Fourth, it defines the region of strongest

association between personality and variation in sexual behavior (detailed below).

21

======================================

Sociosexuality.

Simpson and Gangestad (1991) introduced the term unrestricted sociosexuality to

describe relatively stable variation among individuals (normal individuals, that is, as

opposed to psychopaths) in willingness to pursue sexual relations without the

requirement of relationship investment or commitment. Scores on their sociosexuality

inventory (SOI), which measures these tendencies are reliably correlated with all of the

measures of unmitigated agency (i.e., the Dark Triad: Harms et al., 2001).

Gender differences in unrestricted sociosexuality are quite pronounced, with men

in virtually all countries investigated scoring higher than women (Schmitt, 2005). The

impressive magnitude of those differences figures prominently in evolutionary accounts

of psychological gender differences (Buss & Schmitt, 1993), and in explanations of A

and C patterning of traits, values, and goals within sex (e.g., Simpson et al., 2004). In

Hogan’s (1983) terms, "getting along" (C) and "getting ahead" (A) represent

evolutionarily mandated meta-motives associated with hierarchy advancement within

groups (A) and maintenance of social harmony (C). Both facilitate reproductive success,

an outcome that defines the "ultimate" antecedent of human striving.

In short, A and C dimensions of social value have opposite associations with

sociosexual variation. Sociosexuality and dispositional conceptions of masculininity and

femininity together define a common bipolar gender difference axis that cuts across the

bidimensional social meaning space of agency and communion. Male typic and female

typic sociosexual orientations and correlated interpersonal traits may co-define a bipolar

22

continuum of sexual strategies that distinguishes men from women but are bidimensional

with respect to A and C referents of social value.

Religion.

Although religion serves numerous group, dyadic, and individual psychological

functions, overall these tend to be communal rather than agentic functions. These include

enhancement of feelings of security and belonging, facilitation of social coordination and

cooperation, and preservation of culture, all of which serve to "bind" people together and

“build” individual resiliency and community harmony. Robust gender differences exist

with women tending to believe in a faith more often, and more strongly, than do men

(Stark, 2002). Religious interest, motivation, and commitment tends to be positively

correlated with communal traits (Taylor & MacDonald, 1999) and values (xxxx) and

negatively associated with Dark Triad traits (xxxx) , and unrestricted sociosexuality.

(xxx)

In the last three sections, two dramatically different image profiles have emerged.

Agentic individuals tend to be male, non-religious, and hold egoistic values. In contrast,

communal individuals tend to be female, religious, and hold moralistic values. As

detailed in Part 2 and 3 of this chapter, these individuals also engage in different self-

presentational strategies.

Links between Values, Motives, Traits, and Self-Presentation

Although differing in the details, most personality psychologists assume an

interplay between traits, motives, values, and life-goals (McAdams ???; Roberts &

Robins, 2000; Woike et al., 1999; Winter et al., 2005). PERVIN’S CHAP

23

Paulhus and John (1998) have offered a path sequence that applies specifically to

the A & C model of personality. They argue that emergence of personality structure

begins with (relatively orthogonal) genetic contributions from the Big Five traits (e.g.,

McCrae et al., 2001). Superimposed is the influence of socialization driven by two pre-

eminent values – agency and communion. Over the course of development, this

socialization process induces correlations among the Big Five. Hence, the two-factor

structure appears in higher-order factor analyses involved in all four of the above models.

Interestingly, A & C seem to have more impact on self-conceptions under

conditions of acute evaluative load. For example, if respondents are hurried or forced to

co-attend to a concurrent task, the 5-factor structure reduces to a 2-factor structure

(Paulhus, 2002). Such results indicate that our 2-factor self-conceptions are more

“automatic” than our 5-factor self-conceptions. In short, it appears that our automatic

self-conceptions emphasize agency and communion. Assuming that automatic responses

are more socialized than controlled responses (Paulhus & John, 1998), then the 2-factor

structure of A & C orginates in society’s two predominant socialized values. 1

Paulhus and John (1998) went further to argue that the two fundamental motives

ensuing from two fundamental values are also responsible for the 2-factor nature of

socially desirable responding (See PART 3) and private self-enhancement (see PART 4).

1 Alternative models are certainly viable. McCrae (1994), for example, argues that values ensue from personality, not the other way around.

24

PART 3: SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING

Socially desirable responding (SDR) is the term applied to self-presentation on self-report

questionnaires (for a review, see Paulhus, 1991). When asked to rate their own personalities,

people tend to bias their ratings in the favorable direction (Edwards, 1970). When measured as a

stable individual difference, this tendency is often called a social desirability (SD) response style

2 (Jackson & Messick, 1962). As a local, context-driven behavior, it is known as an SD response

set. The rationale behind measuring SDR is the diagnosis of dissimulation: High scores on an

SDR measure raise concern about a respondent’s answers on other questionnaires.

This concern extends to response tendencies beyond a simple favorability bias. People may

purposely fabricate a unfavorable image, for example, misrepresent themselves as mentally ill

(Baer et al., 2003) or incompetent (Furnham & Henderson, 1982).

A variety of SDR scales have been developed over the years. Attempts to determine the

underlying dimensionality have exploited a variety of methods (e.g., Holden & Evoy, 2005;

Messick, 1960; Paulhus, 1984) and have yielded a variety of answers. In this chapter, we focus

on measures of favorable self-presentation and argue for two relatively orthogonal factors

corresponding to the A & C axes introduced in the previous section.

We begin with a brief historical review of socially desirable responding. That history led us

ultimately to the view that the A vs. C content distinction and public vs. private context

distinction help organize and clarify the field. Figure 3 shows how these two distinctions map

onto the generic schema provided earlier in Figure 1.

A History of Competing Operationalizations

2 Abbreviating the term further to “social desirability” leads to misleading characterizations such as “high in social desirability”. That terminology should be reserved for labeling individuals who possess desirable attributes.

25

Personality psychologists have interpreted socially desirable responding in (at least)

three different ways. To some, SDR is an idiosyncratic behavior unique to questionnaire

responses; To others, SDR is a personality construct that generalizes to other self-presention

contexts; Still others see SDR as an accurate report of a desirable personality.

Such diversity in interpretations has led to a diversity of operationalizations.

Unfortunately, this same diversity led to a singular lack of empirical convergence among SDR

measures (Holden & Fekken, 1989; Jackson & Messick, 1962; Paulhus, 1984).

Minimalist Constructs. Some SDR scales are based on a compilation of the total amount

of desirable responding in an individual’s answers. One standard approach entails (a) collecting

SD ratings of a large variety of items, and (b) assembling an SDR measure comprising those

items with the most extreme desirability ratings (e.g., Edwards, 1970; Jackson & Messick, 1962;

Saucier, 1994). The rationale is that individuals who claim the high-desirability items and

disclaim the low-desirability items are likely to be responding on the basis of an item's

desirability rather than its accuracy. This operationalization of SDR was open to a serious

criticism: Some people actually do have an abundance of desirable qualities and may just be

telling the truth (e.g., Block, 1965).

An alternative operationalization of SDR has been labeled role-playing (Wiggins, 1959).

Here, some participants are asked to 'fake-good', that is, respond to a wide array of items as if

they were trying to appear socially desirable. Other participants are asked for a 'straight-take':

That is, an accurate description of themselves. The items that best discriminate the two groups'

responses are selected for the SDR measure. This approach led to the construction of the MMPI

Malingering scale and Wiggins's Sd scale, which is still proving useful after 30 years (see Baer,

Wetter, & Berry, 1992).

26

Although both operationalizations seemed reasonable, corresponding measures (e.g.,

Edwards's SD-scale and Wiggins's Sd-scale) showed notoriously low intercorrelations (e.g.,

Jackson & Messick, 1962; Holden & Fekken, 1989; Paulhus, 1984; Wiggins, 1959). A critical

difference in the two item sets is that the endorsement rates of SD items were relatively high

(e.g., "I usually expect to succeed in the things I do.") whereas the endorsement rates for Sd

items (e.g., "I never worry about my looks.") were relatively low. To obtain a high score on the

Sd scale, one must claim many rare but desirable traits. Thus the Sd scale (and similarly-derived

measures) indirectly incorporated the notion of exaggerated positivity.

Conceptually elaborate constructs. Other attempts to develop SDR measures employed

the rational method of test construction. Here, item composition involved specific hypotheses

regarding the underlying construct (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964; Hartshorne & May, 1930;

Marlowe & Crowne, 1964; Sackeim & Gur, 1978). The items were designed to trigger different

responses in honest responders than in respondents motivated to appear socially desirable. In

this respect, the notion of exaggerated positivity was incorporated in the item creation.

Such measures were available as far back as Hartshorne and May (1930). Most influential

was the MMPI Lie scale, written to identify individuals deliberately dissembling their clinical

symptoms (Hathaway & McKinley, 1951). Eysenck and Eysenck (1964) followed a similar

rational procedure in developing the Lie scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory.

Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive program of construct validity was that carried out by

Crowne and Marlowe (1964) in developing their SDR measure. As with the other measures, the

items concerned improbable virtues and common human frailties. In contrast to the purely

empirical methods, high scores were accumulated by self-descriptions that were not just positive,

but improbably positive.

27

Crowne and Marlowe (1964) elaborated the character of high scorers by studying their

behavioral correlates in great detail. Such research led the authors to a personality interpretation

for the underlying construct, namely, need for approval. As a result, the Marlowe-Crowne scale,

as it came to be called, served two roles in the subsequent personality literature: (1) an indicator

of dissimulation on questionnaires, and (2) a measure of a personality construct in its own right

(Crowne, 1979). The two roles were linked: High scorers dissimulate on the Marlowe-Crowne

scale because they fear disapproval from others.

Accuracy Constructs. Other writers never accepted the dissimulation interpretation of

SDR measures, maintaining instead that they measure known personality traits. High scorers are

to be taken at their word and actually do enjoy a socially desirable character (Block, 1965;

McCrae & Costa, 1983; Milholland, 1964). To support the accuracy position, these researchers

provided evidence that the self-reports on SDR instruments correlate with reports by

knowledgeable informants.

Historically, the most influential example is the vigorous set of arguments set out in Block's

(1965) book, the Challenge of Response Sets. His view was that high scores on Edwards's SD

scale (as well as the first factor of the MMPI) represented a desirable personality syndrome

called ego-resiliency. His evidence included the confirmation by knowledgeable observers (e.g.,

spouses) of many of the desirable qualities that were self-ascribed on the SD scale.

McCrae and Costa (1983) developed a similar argument for the accuracy of self-descriptions

on the Marlowe-Crowne and EPQ Lie scales. Because high scores were largely sustained by

spouses, McCrae and Costa suggested that they reflect good social adjustment instead of SDR.

An integrative perspective. Few personality assessors are willing to completely accept the

accuracy position. An obvious case where respondents cannot be taken at their word is with the

28

assessment of narcissism. A spate of studies has demonstrated that the favorable claims of

narcissists (e.g., “People admire me”) are rarely substantiated by the facts (e.g., Robins & John,

1997a; Paulhus et al., 2003). Instead, the data indicate that narcissists are better characterized by

their insecurity and inaccuracy (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).

A reconciliation between the faking and accuracy positions can be drawn from work by

Millham and Jacobson (1978). They provided evidence that high Marlowe-Crowne scorers

would lie and cheat to impress experimenters with their good character. Both faking and

accuracy can be explained under the umbrella construct of need for approval. High scorers

realize that carrying out socially conventional behavior is usually the best way to gain approval;

they also realize that deceit works better in a number of situations where detection is very

unlikely. An alternative view involves the consistent effort to project an identity. To ensure that

others view one as socially-adjusted, there are times when one may have to exaggerate the facts.

In sum, the available uni-dimensional measures of SDR appear to tap some unclear

combination of distortion and reality. It is the distortion component that helps explain why some

respondents describe themselves in positive terms across a variety of trait dimensions.

Two Factor Models of SDR

Alpha and Gamma. The notion that SDR appears in two distinct forms was recognized by

a number of early researchers (e.g., Jackson & Messick, 1962). Factor analyses consistently

revealed two independent clusters of SDR measures noncommittally labeled Alpha and Gamma

by Wiggins (1964). A typical factor analysis result is provided in Figure 2.

The Alpha factor was most clearly marked by the Edwards (1968) SD scale, the MMPI K-

scale (Hathaway & McKinley, 1951), Byrne's (1961) Repression-Sensitization scale and

Sackeim and Gur's (1978) Self-Deception Questionnaire. Measures falling on the Gamma factor

29

included Wiggins's (1959) Sd scale. Others loading strongly included Eysenck's Lie scale, , the

Marlowe-Crowne scale, the Good Impression scale (Gough, 1957), the MMPI Lie scale

(Hathaway & McKinley, 1951), and Sackeim and Gur's (1978) Other-Deception Questionnaire.

For many years, researchers debated how to interpret the Alpha and Gamma factors. Ultimately,

Paulhus (1984) settled on the labels Self Deception and Impression Management (see Fig. 1).

A two-factor measure. After several preliminary versions, Paulhus (1986) offered

measures of these two factors with scales labeled Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) and

Impression Management (IM). They formed early versions of the widely-distributed Balanced

Inventory of Desirable Responding – BIDR Version 6 (Paulhus, 1991; 1998), Sample items

include: SDE (“My first impressions about people are always right”) and IM (“I always pick up

my litter.”). The BIDR is now as widely used as the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

The SDE and IM scales form a useful combination of response style measures because they

capture the two major SDR dimensions with only a small to moderate intercorrelation. Their

utility was demonstrated in several studies of self-presentation in a job applicant context.

Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell (1995) showed that the IM scale, but not SDE, was extremely

sensitive to faking instructions requesting various degrees of self-presentation. In an actual

applicant setting, the IM scale showed a special sensitivity to self-presentation (Rosse et al.,

1998).

In other studies, the SDE scale, but not the IM, predicted various kinds of self-promotional

distortions. These include tendencies toward over-claiming (Paulhus et al., 2004), narcissism

(Paulhus, 1998a) and hindsight bias (Hoorens, 1995). High-SDE individuals also exhibit a

discordance with reality as indicated by an discrepancy in self-ratings of agency relative to

ratings by group consensus (Paulhus, 1998a). More recently, SDE has also shown utility in

moderating the validity of other self-report scales (Berry, Page, & Sackett, 2007; Otter & Egan,

in press). More than forty other studies, the majority from other laboratories, have help elaborate

30

the construct validity of the SDE and IM scales. For an extensive list, readers are invited to link

to the following web site (www.psych.ubc.ca/~dpaulhus/research/BIDR).

The adjustment correlates of these response style measures correspond to the adjustment

correlates of agency and communion. In general, SDE, but not IM, is positively related to self-

perceptions of mental health (e.g., Bonanno, Lomakina, Kovacevic, Field, Noll, & Keltner,

2002; Brown, 1998; Nichols & Greene, 1997; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Paulhus, 1998b). High

SDE can also have a positive impact on performance in certain circumstances (Johnson, 1995).

In a study of discussion groups, however, high SDE scorers were perceived negatively after

several meetings (Paulhus, 1998a). Those results bear directly on the debate about whether

positive illusions are adaptive (see PART 4).

Untangling Content and Audience

The labels Self Deception and Impression Management turned out to be, at best, incomplete

characterizations of Alpha and Gamma. This problem was uncovered by a series of studies

varying self-presentation instructions (Paulhus, 2002). The Impression Management label for

Gamma measures was justified by their sensitivity to instructional manipulations such as

“respond in a socially desirable way” (e.g., Paulhus, 1984; Wiggins, 1964). A closer

examination indicated that such instructions were interpreted by respondents to mean “Respond

as if you are a "nice person", “well-socialized”, or "good citizen." In retrospect, the instructions

were tantamount to “act communal”.

With a more agentic instruction (e.g., "Respond as if you are strong and competent.”), Alpha

measures were actually more responsive than Gamma measures3 (Paulhus, Tanchuk, & Wehr,

1999). In short, Alpha-related measures may be no more self-deceptive than are Gamma

measures.

What, then, are we to make of the Alpha and Gamma factors of SDR? It appears that

current measures of these factors confound content with manipulability. Both forms of

3 When subjects were notified that their answers could land them a summer job (emphasizing competence), then both scales showed significant increases (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1994).

31

distortion appear under anonymous conditions, suggesting a self-deceptive quality. Yet, with

appropriate faking instructions, both are subject to impression management.

Insert Figure 3 Here

According to Paulhus (2002), the solution was to discard Alpha and Gamma and

distinguish the content of SDR measures (agentic vs. communal) from their responsiveness to

an audience manipulation (public vs. private). That distinction is represented by the two levels

in Figure 3. Dissimulation to a public audience involves impression management of either

agentic or communal forms. Dissimulation to a private audience (i.e., the self) involves self-

deception of either form.

The content difference in SDR measures maps onto the agentic and communal values

elucidated in Section 2 of this chapter. Excessive pressure from agentic values induces a

tendency to exaggerate one's social and intellectual status. This tendency leads to

unrealistically positive self-perceptions on such personality traits as dominance, fearlessness,

emotional stability, intellect, and creativity. Self-perceptions of high scorers have a

narcissistic, "superhero" quality. Paulhus and John (1998) summarized this form of distortion

using the term egoistic bias.

Excessive adherence to communal values induces a self-deceptive tendency to deny

socially deviant impulses and claim sanctimonious, "saint-like" attributes. This tendency is

played out in overly-positive self-perceptions on such traits as agreeableness, dutifulness, and

restraint. Paulhus and John (1998) labeled this version moralistic bias.

Responsiveness to audiences, that is, impression management, must also be distinguished

in terms of content. People can be motivated to deliberately exaggerate their standing on

agency or communion. Thus the usual two clusters of traits are involved but the exaggeration

is more deliberate. Agency Management, that is, asset-promotion or bragging occurs on

attributes such as competence, fearlessness, and creativity. Such behavior is most commonly

seen in job-applicants or in males attempting to impress a dating partner. Deliberate

exaggeration of communal attributes is termed Communion Management and involves excuse-

32

making and damage control of various sorts. Such deliberate minimization of faults is likely in

religious settings, in employees who are trying to exemplify integrity, or legal defendants

trying to avoid punishment.

Measures of all four types of SDR measures are now available (Paulhus, 2005). Indeed,

two of the four have been available for some time as subscales in the BIDR-6. Self-deceptive

enhancement can be measured with its namesake (SDE) (see Paulhus, 1998a). The Impression

Management scale is better renamed as Communal Management to better indicate the scale’s

content.

Two new measures were developed to tap the missing cells in Figure 3. The concept of

self-deception on communal traits involves the denial of socially deviant thoughts and

behaviors: They are incompatible with the preservation of one’s social groups. The new

subscale, Self-Deceptive Denial (SDD), includes such sample items as “I have never been cruel

to anyone.” and “I have never hated my parents.” The fourth measure, Agentic Management,

consists of items related to agency content but with low endorsement-rates in straight-take

administrations. The low endorsement rates for such items permit room for manipulators to

deliberately enhance impressions of their agency. Examples are "I am very brave" and "No one

is more talented than I". Such items tend not to be claimed, even by narcissists, under

anonymous conditions. But the endorsement rate is higher under agency-motivated conditions

than under anonymous conditions (Lonnqvist et al., 2007).

The impression management scales, Agentic and Communal Management, appear to be

most useful in tapping response sets rather than response styles. They perform very well in

capturing the degree of situational press to appear agentic or communal (Carey & Paulhus,

2008). Because scores are influenced strongly by context subtleties, these scales are not as

useful as individual difference measures. In private administrations, much of the individual

difference variance represents actual content differences in positive qualities.

Summary

The traditional concern in the social desirability literature is with self-presentation on

questionnaires. Such concern led to the development of numerous SDR scales measuring the

33

degree to which respondents exaggerate their assets or minimize their social deviance. The

assumption is that high scores indicate dissimulation, not only on the SDR scale, but on all other

questionnaires in the same package.

A fifty year history of structural analyses of SDR scales repeatedly confirmed that

multiple underlying concepts were being being tapped. We have argued here that a clearer

understanding of this extensive literature emerges from our two-level framework: audience

(public vs. private) and personality content (agency vs. communal).

The SDR approach has been of special interest to personality psychologists because of

their continuing reliance on self-report questionnaires (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Tracy & Robins,

this volume). Nonetheless, there remains some difficulty with confirming the degree to which

they tap exaggeration, that is, departure from reality.

34

PART 4. SELF-ENHANCEMENT

Although this concept overlaps conceptually with SDR, its historical origins are quite

distinct. It began with an early study suggesting that positive self-biases are maladaptive

(Frenkel, 1939). Forty years later, two methodologically superior papers provided evidence that

positive self-biases may be more adaptive than accurate self-evaluations (Alloy & Abramson,

1979; Sohn, Mischel, & Chaplin 1979). Undoubtedly, the key impetus was the review by Taylor

and Brown (1988), where they claimed that positive illusions are both common and adaptive.

Rather than SDR scales, this literature employs measures such as social comparison (e.g., better

than average) or self-criterion criterion discrepancies. Because a normative comparison is

involved, such measures promised to do a better job than SDR scales in distinguishing distortion

from truth.

Taylor and Brown (1988) defined this bias as an overly-positive self-evaluation. The

qualification—overly-positive— is of central importance given the key requirement of

exaggeration in defining self-presentation. There is little dispute about the fact that some people

harbor overly-positive self-evaluations whereas others are more accurate. To date, minimal

attention has been paid to under-estimated evaluations (see Zuckerman et al. ).4

Self-enhancement can be demonstrated even on anonymous self-descriptions (Baumeister,

1982; Brown, 1998). As such, the phenomenon corresponds to the private audience component

of SDR. Because of its history, little attention has been directed at the public audience version of

self-enhancement. Because self-reports vary with degree and nature of the audience, scores on

self-enhancement measures should vary to the same degree as do SDR measures (Carey &

4 Part of the problem is where to draw the line. The same self-evaluation can be viewed as over-estimated, under-estimated, or accurate, depending on the choice of observer (J. Campbell, 1990).

35

Paulhus, 2008). Nonethelesss, that issue has attracted less interest and the focus below is on

distortion in private self-beliefs.

Three issues have dominated the self-enhancement literature. One is how to measure

self-enhancement. A second considers whether self-enhancement is adaptive or not. The third

concerns the breadth and structure of self-enhancement.

1. Operationalizing self-enhancement

Although the concept might seem straightforward, much controversy has arisen over the

choice of operationalization. Here, we will entertain five that warrant special attention.

Social comparison. The most popular choice has been to index self-enhancement as the

tendency to view oneself more positively than one views others. Following Kwan, John, Kenny,

Bond, and Robins (2004), we refer to this operationalization as social comparison. A well-

replicated body of research indicates that a majority of people tend to rate themselves above

average on lists of evaluative traits (e.g., Alicke, 1985). If pervasive, this tendency certainly

implies an illusion: After all, it is not possible for a large majority of people to actually be better

than average.5

To index a general tendency, self-enhancement scores are typically aggregated across a

wide set of evaluative traits. Respondents may be asked for separate ratings of self and others or ,

alternatively, a direct comparison of themselves relative to the average other. A number of

studies have confirmed that individuals scoring high on such indexes of self-enhancement tend to

be well-adjusted (Brown, 1986; Campbell et al., 2002; Kurt & Paulhus, in press; Taylor et al.,

2003).

5 Although impossible if everyone were referring to the same dimension, individuals tend to define evaluative traits (e.g., intelligence) in idiosyncratic fashion to ensure that they score high (Dunning, 2005). In that sense, everyone can legitimately report being above average.

36

Note, however, that this operationalization makes it difficult to distinguish self-

enhancement from true differences in positive traits (Klar & Giladi, 1999; Robins & John, 1997).

After all, many people are actually above average – even across a large set of traits (Block &

Colvin, 1994). In short, the social comparison operationalization lacks a reality criterion against

which the validity of the self-descriptions can be evaluated.

Criterion discrepancy. This limitation led a number of other researchers to

operationalize self-enhancement as a criterion discrepancy, that is, the over-estimation of one’s

positivity relative to a credible criterion. This category of measures includes both difference

scores and residual scores. Rather than absolute values, higher numbers indicate the degree to

which respondents’ self-ratings exceed their criterion scores. Almost invariably, discrepancy

measures of self-enhancement have shown negative associations with long-term adjustment

outcomes (e.g., Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; John & Robins, 1994; Kwan et al., 2004;

Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993: but see Bonanno Field,

Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002).

Over-claiming technique. The over-claiming technique (Paulhus et al., 2003) also

emphasizes departure from reality, but in a different fashion. Respondents are asked to rate their

familiarity with a set of persons, places, items, or events. Twenty percent of the items are foils:

That is, they do not actually exist. Such responses can be scored via signal detection method to

yield both accuracy and bias scores for each respondent.

Of great practical advantage is the fact that the the departure from reality aspect is

included in the questionnaire along with the self-ratings. It is represented here by the answer key

distinguishing reals from foils: That is, a familiarity rating is accurate to the extent that real items

are claimed and foils are disclaimed.

37

The original over-claiming questionnaire comprised academic items such as philosophy,

history, literature, and science. On these items, the accuracy index correlated substantially with

IQ scores whereas the bias index correlated moderately with trait self-enhancement measures

such as narcissism (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). When the items concerned lay

topics such as sports, music, films, etc., the bias link was more subtle. Correlations with

narcissism were significant only for topics that the respondent valued.

Krueger’s method. This method might be called the idiosyncratic-weighting method

(Krueger, 1998; Sinha & Krueger, 1998). Each participant’s self-ratings are correlated with his

or her desirability ratings of the same items. Effectively, the method weights each rating by the

desirablity as judged by the rater. Other methods assume implicitly that the social consensus

regarding the social desirability of each item within a test is shared by all respondents.

The method also has the advantage of adaptibility because the weights can be adjusted to

address context differences. For example, judgments of social desirability differ substantially

across home, school, and leisure contexts (Vazire, 2006).

Kwan’s method. Three other operationalizations of self-enhancement warrant mention

here. Kwan’s method (Kwan et al., 2004) exploits the statistical sophistication of Kenny’s

(1994) social relations model. The technique decomposes self- perception into perceiver effect,

target effect, and unique self-perception components.

The method is superior in controlling for complex contamination factors inherent in its

competitors. The downside of this technique is that it can only be applied to round-robin ratings:

That is, all participants have to rate each other.

2. Adaptiveness of self-enhancement

38

Taylor and Brown’s (1988) claim for the adaptiveness of self-enhancement (“positive

illusions”) was supported by research such as the Brown (1986) study: He showed that

individuals who claimed to be above average across a wide variety of traits also scored high on a

standard self-esteem scale. A number of subsequent studies have shown the same pattern of

adaptive outcomes (e.g., Campbell et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004).

The Taylor-Brown proposition certainly conflicts with traditional conceptions of mental

health that emphasize the importance of perceiving oneself accurately (e.g., Allport, 1960;

Jahoda, 1958; Rogers, 1951). Contemporary critics of Taylor and Brown have tended to side

with the more traditional view. In their comprehensive rebuttal, for example, Colvin and Block

(1994) disputed both the logic and evidence presented for the adaptive value of self-

enhancement. They acknowledged that positive illusions might be helpful in mood regulation

and, therefore, might provide temporary relief from negative affect. Unacceptable to the critics

was the notion that self-enhancement had sustained benefits.

To dispute the empirical evidence, critics pointed to two specific faults with the critical

studies cited by Taylor and Brown (1988). First was their use of the social comparison

operationalization, which lacks a reality criterion against which the validity of the self-

descriptions can be evaluated (Robins & John, 1997).

Critics also pointed to the problem of using self-report outcomes when studying self-

report predictors. If individual differences in self-favorability bias contaminate both the predictor

and outcome, this common method variance will induce an artifactual positive correlation

(Colvin & Block, 1994). For that reason, many critics have insisted that the criterion measures

for adaptiveness be independent external measures such as peer-rated adjustment (Paulhus,

39

1998), expert ratings of adjustment (Colvin et al., 1995; Robins & John, 1997), or school grades

(Robins & Beer, 2001; Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003).

Finally, a combination of the above two problems introduces an artifactual association

even when hard outcome measures are used. If self-enhancement is operationalized by self-

report (e.g., the social comparison index), then high scores represent a composite of true positive

traits. But positive traits are known to have objectively better life outcomes including good

adjustment (Block, 2002; Colvin & Block, 1994).

Such criticism led many researchers to turn to the criterion-discrepancy

operationalization of self-enhancement.6 When external criteria were used to evaluate outcomes,

discrepancy measures of self-enhancement showed long term maladaptive outcomes (e.g.,

Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001;

Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993). It is worth reviewing the key studies reported by critics.

Key Studies. The first empirical response to Taylor and Brown (1988) was the John and

Robins (1994) study of performance in a group task. Each participant’s self-rated performance

was compared against two criterion measures: (1) others’ ratings of the target’s performance and

(2) a concrete measure of success (money earned). Others’ ratings were the average value that

the target received from the five co-participants in the group. The discrepancy between self-

ratings and the two criterion measures provided two indicators of self-enhancement. Results

showed that higher scores on both indicators were negatively associated with ratings of

adjustment by 11 trained psychologists.

Colvin and colleagues (1995) went further to conduct two longitudinal studies and a

laboratory study. They assessed self-enhancement by comparing participants’ self-evaluations

6 We use the term discrepancy to subsume difference scores and residual scores. Rather than an absolute values, we refer to directional values with higher numbers indicating a self-rating greater than the criterion rating..

40

with trained examiners’ assessments of their personalities. Self-enhancement scores were then

correlated with evaluations of adjustment from another set of trained observers. Results of their

longitudinal studies showed that self-enhancement was associated with poor social skills and

psychological maladjustment five years before and five years after the assessment of self-

enhancement. The laboratory study showed that, in a confrontational situation, self-enhancers

were rated negatively by both expert raters and peers.

Even with the discrepancy operationalization, however, the outcomes of self-

enhancement are not uniformly negative. For example, Paulhus (1998) investigated reactions to

self-enhancers in two longitudinal studies where small groups met weekly for a total of seven

weeks. Results showed that, although high self-enhancers were initially perceived favorably,

those perceptions became more and more negative over time. Paulhus concluded that self-

enhancing tendencies were a ‘mixed blessing’ (p.1207).

This mixed blessing was also evident in later research reported by Robins and Beer

(2001). They showed, in two studies, that self-enhancing tendencies had short-term affective

benefits but did long-term damage to self-esteem and task engagement as disconfirmation of

overly positive self-assessments became evident. On objective indicators of academic

performance, self-enhancement did not predict higher academic performance or higher

graduation rates. In the most recent study, Gramzow et al. (2003) also used college grades as the

outcome criterion. In two studies, higher discrepancies between reported and actual GPA

predicted poorer grades in the current course. Even with concrete behavioral criteria, then, the

research seems to dispute claims that self-enhancement has any long-term adaptive outcomes.

Further developments. Taylor and colleagues (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1994) responded

to the critiques while holding fast to the original claim that self-enhancement is adaptive. Taylor

41

and Armor (1996), however, clarified that position in two important ways. First, they explained

that self-enhancement should be viewed not as a trait, but as an adaptive strategy to be applied

when needed. They also disputed the critique of using self-report self-esteem scales as criteria

for adjustment: They argued that self-esteem is an inherent component of good psychological

adjustment. Moreover, feeling good about oneself can only be measured via self-report.

In their most recent response, Taylor and her colleagues presented data indicating that

(even) trait self-enhancement is adaptive (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003).

That study was impressive in its breadth of operationalizations of self-enhancement – including

the method favored by many critics, that is, self-criterion discrepancy. The criteria for

adaptiveness included peer- and clinician rated mental health. In support of the Taylor-Brown

proposition, even the discrepancy operationalization seemed to show adaptive external

correlates.

However, details of their method and results suggest that their conclusion should be

regarded with some caution. Regarding their discrepancy measure, for example, no associations

were confirmed with independently-measured outcomes (e.g., clinician ratings and peer-judged

mental health): All significant correlates were contaminated with self-report method variance.

Moreover, the self-peer discrepancy measure in that study was not based on a reliable or valid

criterion: They used a single peer rating, which is unlikely to be reliable. Other studies have

used three or more raters (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1995; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998). In

short, the measure that Taylor and colleagues treated as a discrepancy measure was ultimately

another self-report of positive traits. Predictably, it showed adaptive external correlates – even

when the latter were measured by valid external criteria.

However, support for the Taylor-Brown proposition can be found in research from other

42

sources. In a field study of Bosnian war refugees, Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, and Kaltman

(2002) were able to measure discrepancy self-enhancement as well as clinician ratings of

adjustment. Self-enhancers were rated as better adjusted. The unusual sample and the extreme

adversity of the situation makes this study unique among those using a discrepancy measure of

self-enhancement. Either factor might explain their singular finding.

Direct competition. Only two studies have provided a head-to-head comparison of the

adaptive value of self-enhancement operationalizations. Kwan and her colleagues compared

three operationalizations (Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004). In addition to the social

comparison and discrepancy methods, they used their new technique described earlier. Results

indicated that both the discrepancy measure and their novel measure were negatively related to

task performance – the only objective outcome included in the study. The social comparison

measure failed to predict the outcome.

Kurt and Paulhus (in press) have also provided a head-to-head comparison of the social

comparison and criterion discrepancy methods. They also expanded the outcomes to include

four different measures of psychological adjustment. Results showed that, in the same sample,

social comparison had positive associations and discrepancy measures had negative associations

with externally evaluated adjustment – except self-rated self-esteem.

In sum, the literature indicates that the criterion discrepancy measure is more valid than

the social comparison method for tapping chronic self-enhancement. Based on research with the

more valid measure, we conclude that chronic self-enhancement is linked to maladaptive

attributes. The jury is still out on the direction of causation.

Three exceptions are noteworthy. One is that chronic self-enhancement may promote

intra-psychic forms of adjustment, for example, self-esteem and happiness. Second is that self-

43

enhancement may yield better short-term interpersonal adjustment in the sense of engagement

with strangers. Third, self-enhancement may pay off in severe settings (e.g., refugee victims),

where a formidable self-confidence is required for psychological survival.

In sum, no universal conclusion can be drawn regarding the Taylor-Brown claim for the

adaptiveness of self-enhancement. In retrospect, this outcome is not surprising: It simply

confirms the inherent complexity of defining psychological adjustment (Paulhus, Fridhandler, &

Hayes, 1997; Scott, 1968).

3. The structure of self-enhancement

Although typically unspoken, the assumption in most research on self-enhancement is

that the tendency is uniform across domains. Researchers assume that respondents who self-

enhance in one domain (e.g., their competence) also self-enhance in other domains. Paulhus and

John (1998) challenged that assumption by asking “How many types of self-enhancement are

there?”.

Based on the evidence favoring the criterion-discrepancy method, Paulhus and John

(1998) chose it as the unit of bias measurement. For each personality variable, a comparison was

made between self-ratings and a more objective criterion, namely, ratings by knowledgeable

peers (i.e., friends, family). In the case of intelligence, IQ scores were used as a criterion. Each

self-rating was regressed on its corresponding peer-rating to create a residual score representing

the departure of the self-rating from reality. Factor analysis of a comprehensive set of

personality variables was used to uncover the structure of self-enhancement.

Using the Big Five dimensions of personality plus intelligence to represent personality

space, our factor analyses of residuals revealed a smaller space than the 5-space of either self- or

peer-ratings. The first two major dimensions appeared as in Figure 4. Factor 1 was marked by

44

the Extraversion and Openness residuals whereas Factor 2 was marked by the Agreeableness and

Dutifulness residuals. 7 Clearly, the structure of bias bears little resemblance to the standard Big

Five structure. A closer examination suggests that these factors represented agency and

communion.

Insert Figure 4

Several replication studies helped to clarify the meaning of the bias factors through the

addition of a wide variety of marker measures. These included traditional measures of SDR

(BIDR, Marlowe-Crowne scale) as well as related measures of self-enhancement (e.g.,

Narcissistic Personality Inventory). The additions allowed us to project a variety of bias and

personality measures onto the two bias factors.

Results showed a striking match with the SDR factors detailed in PART 3. SDE and

narcissism projected onto the Agentic factor. Projections onto the Communal factor were strong

for the Impression Management and Denial scales but weaker for Eysenck's Lie scale, the MMPI

Lie scale and the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

Another correspondence is significant – Positive Valence and Negative Valence (Benet-

Martinez & Waller, 1997). Specifically, Positive Valence projected most clearly onto the

Agentic factor whereas Negative Valence projected onto the Communal factor. This

correpondence adds to the construct validity of these two self-enhancement factors. Agentic

self-enhancement concerns positive assets: People individuate by promoting their achievements

Communal self-enhancement concerns negative attributes. People submerge in their groups by

minimizing their social deviance.

7 The results were more clear when we separated Conscientiousness into Dutifulness and Ambition following Paunonen and Jackson (1996). Dutifulness is most faithful, conceptually and empirically, to the Communal factor.

45

Summary

Once again, our two-level framework has proved fruitful. The same Agentic and

Communal self-presentation factors found in SDR have been re-capitulated via the novel

residual-factoring method. This finding is noteworthy because the latter technique requires only

personality content measures. In fact, there is no overlap whatsoever in the two methodologies.

The convergence of results across the two techniques adds substantial credibility to both

methods of factoring self-presentation. The interpretation of the self-enhancement factors

becomes more clear and SDR factors gain more credibility as indicators of departure-from-

reality. That is, high scores on both factors involve overly-positive self-descriptions.

Since publication of the Paulhus and John (1998) paper, attention to agentic and

communal aspects of self-presentation has burgeoned. For example, Campbell et al. (2002)

exploited the distinction to clarify the difference between self-esteem and narcissism. Others

have applied it to examining cultural differences in the structure of self-enhancement (Church et

al., 2007; Kurman, 2001; Yik, Bond, & Paulhus, 1998). Memory distortion is greater for

agentic than for communal self-enhancers (Djikic, Peterson, & Zelazo, 2005). A variety of other

self-enhancement behaviors depend on agency-communion distinction (Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, &

Bezmenova, 2007; Pauls & Stemmler, 2003).

5. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The vast research on self-presentation is scattered across the literatures on social, clinical,

and I-O psychology as well as personality per se. Even within the latter, the literature is

enormous and disconnected. In this chapter, we have tried to integrate the disconnected units

within a two-level model. The first facet turns on the nature of the audience: public vs. private.

46

The second facet concerns the content of the image presented: People tend to offer images

consistent with some combination of agentic qualities (strong, competent, clever) and communal

qualities (cooperative, warm, dutiful).

That two-level model allowed us to organize three domains of research on self-

presentation: socially desirable responding, self-enhancement, and, to a lesser extent, underlying

cognitive processes. Resonating throughout the chapter is the historical failure of researchers to

recognize the complex nature of positivity. Individuals motivated to self-present do not all

behave the same way because the definition of positivity has (at least) two interpretations and

different audiences may differentially value those two interpretations of positivity.

47

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Table 1.

Correlations of BIDR Subscales with the Big Five personality

factors.

Self-Deception Impression Management

Enhancement

Denial

Extraversion .47 .16 .06

Openness .43 .10 .13

Stability .24 .25 .13

Conscientiousness

.21 .41 .31

Agreeableness -.10 .50 .35

71