self-efficacy mechanism in human agency · 2018-02-19 · they no longer need to judge their...

Self-Efficacy Mechanism inHuman Agency

ALBERT BANDURA Stanford University

ABSTRACT: This article addresses the centrality of theself-efficacy mechanism in human agency. Self-per-cepts of efficacy influence thought patterns, actions,and emotional arousal. In causal tests the higher thelevel of induced self-efficacy, the higher the perfor-mance accomplishments and the lower the emotionalarousal. Different lines of research are reviewed, show-ing that the self-efficacy mechanism may have wideexplanatory power. Perceived self-efficacy helps to ac-count for such diverse phenomena as changes in copingbehavior produced by different modes of influence,level of physiological stress reactions, self-regulation ofrefractory behavior, resignation and despondency tofailure experiences, self-debilitating effects of proxycontrol and illusory inefficaciousness, achievementstrivings, growth of intrinsic interest, and career pur-suits. The influential role of perceived collective effi-cacy in social change is analyzed, as are the social con-ditions conducive to development of collective inefficacy.

Psychological theorizing and research tend to cen-ter on issues concerning either acquisition ofknowledge or execution of response patterns. Asa result the processes governing the interrelation-ship between knowledge and action have beenlargely neglected (Newell, 1978). Some of the re-cent efforts to bridge this gap have been directedat the biomechanics problem—how efferent com-mands of action plans guide the production of ap-propriate response patterns (Stelmach, 1976,1978).Others have approached the matter in terms ofalgorithmic knowledge, which furnishes guides forexecuting action sequences (Greeno, 1973; Newell,1973). ,

Knowledge, transformational operations, andcomponent skills are necessary but insufficient foraccomplished performances. Indeed, people oftendo not behave optimally, even though they knowfull well what to do. This is because self-referentthought also mediates the relationship betweenknowledge and action. The issues addressed in thisline of inquiry are concerned with how peoplejudge their capabilities and how, through their self-percepts of efficacy, they affect their motivationand behavior.

122 • FEBRUARY 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

Recent years have witnessed a growing conver-gence of theory and research on the influential roleof self-referent thought in psychological function-ing (DeCharms, 1968; Garber & Seligman, 1980;Lefcourt, 1976; Perlmuter & Monty, 1979; Rotter,Chance, & Phares, 1972; White, 1959). Althoughthe research is conducted from a number of dif-ferent perspectives -under a variety of names, thebasic phenomenon being addressed centers on peo-ple's sense of personal efficacy to produce and toregulate events in their lives. ,

Efficacy in dealing with one's environment isnot a fixed act or simply a matter of knowing whatto do. Rather, it involves a generative capabilityin which component cognitive, social, and behav-ioral skills must be organized into integratedcourses of action to serve innumerable purposes.A capability is only as good as its execution. Op-erative competence requires orchestration andcontinuous improvisation of multiple subskills tomanage ever-changing circumstances. Initiationand regulation of transactions with the environ-ment are therefore partly governed by judgmentsof operative capabilities. Perceived self-efficacy isconcerned with judgments of how well one canexecute courses of action required to deal withprospective situations.

Function and Diverse Effects of Self-Percepts of Efficacy

Self-percepts of efficacy are not simply inert es-timates of future action. Self-appraisals of opera-

This article was presented as a Distinguished Scientific Contri-bution Award address at the meeting of the American Psycho-logical Association, Los Angeles, August 1981.

The research by the author reported in this article was sup-ported by Research Grant M-5162 from the National Institutesof Health, U.S. Public Health Service.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Albert Bandura, De-partment of Psychology, Stanford University, Building 420, Jor-dan Hall, Stanford, California 94305.

Vol. 37, No. 2, 122-147Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0003-066X/82/3702-Ol22$00.75

tive capabilities function as one set of proximaldeterminants of how people behave, their thoughtpatterns, and the emotional reactions they expe-rience in taxing situations. In their daily lives peo-ple continuously make decisions about what coursesof action to pursue and how long to continue thosethey have undertaken. Because acting on misjudg-ments of personal efficacy can produce adverseconsequences, accurate appraisal of one's own ca-pabilities has considerable functional value. Self-efficacy judgments, whether accurate or faulty,influence choice of activities and environmentalsettings. People avoid activities that they believeexceed their coping capabilities, but they under-take and perform assuredly those that they judgethemselves capable of managing (Bandura, 1977a).*

Judgments of self-efficacy also determine howmuch effort people will expend and how long theywill persist in the face of obstacles or aversive ex-periences. When beset with difficulties people whoentertain serious doubts about their capabilitiesslacken their efforts or give up altogether, whereasthose who have a strong sense of efficacy exertgreater effort to master the challenges (Bandura& Schunk, 1981; Brown & Inouye, 1978; Schunk,1981; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979). Highperseverance usually produces high performanceattainments.

High self-percepts of efficacy may affect pre-paratory and performance effort differently, inthat some self-doubt bestirs learning but hindersadept execution of acquired capabilities. In apply-ing existing skills strong self-efficaciousness inten-sifies and sustains the effort needed for optimalperformance, which is difficult to realize if one isbeleaguered by self-doubts. In approaching learn-ing tasks, however, those who perceive themselvesto be supremely self-efficacious in the undertakingfeel little need to invest much preparatory effortin it. Salomon (in press) provides some evidencebearing on this issue. He found that high perceivedself-efficacy as a learner is associated with heavyinvestment of cognitive effort and superior learn-ing from instructional media that children considerdifficult, but with less investment of effort andpoor learning from media that they believe to beeasy. Thus some uncertainty has preparatory ben-efits. An aid to good performance is a strong senseof self-efficacy to withstand failures coupled withsome uncertainty (construed in terms of the chal-lenge of the task, rather than fundamental doubtsabout one's capabilities) to spur preparatory ac-quisition of knowledge and skills.

People's judgments of their capabilities addi-

tionally influence their thought patterns and emo-tional reactions during anticipatory and actualtransactions with the environment. Those whojudge themselves inefficacious in coping with en-vironmental demands dwell on their personal de-ficiencies and imagine potential difficulties as moreformidable than they really are (Beck, 1976; Laz-arus & Launier, 1978; Meichenbaum, 1977; Sar-ason, 1975). Such self-referent misgivings createstress and impair performance by diverting atten-tion from how best to proceed with the undertak-ing to concerns over failings and mishaps. In con-trast, persons who have a strong sense of efficacydeploy their attention .and effort to the demandsof the situation and are spurred to greater effortby obstacles.

Microanalytic Research Strategy

Psychological theories postulate intervening mech-anisms through which external factors affect be-havior. Attempts to verify a theory commonly seekevidence of covariation between behavior and theexternal factors believed to instate the interveningevents, without including independent probes ofthe postulated mediator. Demonstrations of envi-ronmental-action covariation increase confidencein a theory, but they do not establish firmly itsvalidity because the covariation can be mediatedthrough other mechanisms capable of producingsimilar effects. A postulated mediator is not di-rectly observable, nevertheless it should have ob-servable indicants other than the actions it pre-sumably governs. Hence the most stringent test ofa theory is provided by anchoring the hypothesizedmediator in an independently measurable indicantand confirming that external factors are indeedlinked to an indicant of the internal mediator andthat it, in turn, is linked to overt behavior.

In testing propositions about the origins andfunctions of perceived self-efficacy, a microana-lytic methodology is employed (Bandura, 1977a).Individuals are presented with graduated self-ef-ficacy scales representing tasks varying in diffi-culty, complexity, stressfulness, or some other di-mension, depending on the particular domain of

1 In the case of habitual routines, people develop their self-knowledge through repeated experiences, to the point wherethey no longer need to judge their efficacy on each occasionthat they perform the same activity. They behave in accordancewith what they know they can or cannot do, without giving thematter much further thought. Significant changes in task de-mands or situational circumstances, however, prompt self-ef-ficacy reappraisals as guides for action under altered conditions.

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • FEBRUARY 1982 • 123

INTRASUBJECT

I I IMEDIUM HIGH LOW MEDIUM HIGH

LEVEL OF SELF-EFFICACY

Figure 1. Mean performance attainments as a functionof differential levels of perceived self-efficacy. (The leftpanel shows the performances of groups of subjects whoseself-percepts of efficacy were raised to either low, me-dium, or high levels; the right panel shows the perfor-mances of the same subjects at different levels of self-efficacy [Bandura, Reese, & Adams, in press].)

functioning being explored. They designate thetasks that they judge they can do and their degreeof certainty. An adequate efficacy analysis requiresdetailed assessment of the level, strength, and gen-erality of perceived self-efficacy commensuratewith the precision with which performance is mea-sured. This methodology permits microanalysis ofthe degree of congruence between self-percepts ofefficacy and action at the level of individual tasks.2

Of central interest to self-efficacy theory is thedynamic interplay among self-referent thought,action, and affect. In this approach, self-referentthought is indexed in terms of particularized self-percepts of efficacy that can vary across activitiesand situational circumstances rather than as aglobal disposition assayed by an omnibus test. Mea-sures of self-percepts are tailored to the domainof psychological functioning being explored. A spe-cial merit of the microanalytic approach is thatparticularized indices of self-efficacy provide re-'fined predictions of human action and affectivereactivity.

Causal Analysis of Self-Perceptsof Efficacy

Some of the research conducted within the efficacyframework has sought to clarify the causal linkbetween self-percepts of efficacy and action (Ban-dura, Reese, & Adams, in press). For this purposedifferential levels of perceived efficacy were in-duced in phobic subjects, whereupon their coping

behavior was measured. In one experiment thelevel of perceived self-efficacy was raised throughenactive mastery of progressively more threaten-ing activities. This was achieved through a se-quential procedure in which mastery of each taskwas followed by a self-efficacy probe until subjectsachieved their preassigned low, moderate, or highlevel of self-efficacy. The next phase of the studyincluded successive modifications of self-efficacylevel within the same subjects.

Inspection of Figure 1 shows that performancevaries as a function of perceived efficacy. Increas-ing levels of perceived self-efficacy both acrossgroups and within the same subjects gave rise toprogressively higher performance accomplish-ments.

Judgment of self-efficacy from enactive infor-mation is an inferential process in which the rel-ative contribution of personal and situational fac-tors must be weighted and integrated. Fine-grainanalysis of enactive mastery and the growth of self-efficacy during the course of treatment reveals thatself-percepts of efficacy may exceed, 'match, orremain below enactive attainments, depending onhow they are appraised.3 That self-efficacy is not

2 The question arises regarding whether making self-efficacyjudgments in itself can affect performance by creating publiccommitment and pressures for consistency (Rachman, 1978).In applying the microanalytic procedure, special precautionsare taken to minimize any possible motivational effects of theassessment itself. Judgments of self-efficacy are made privately,rather than stated publicly. Judgments of level and strength ofefficacy are made for a variety of activities in different situa-tions in advance of behavior tests, rather than immediately priorto each performance task. Research on the reactive effects ofefficacy assessment shows that performance and fear arousalare the same regardless of whether people do or do not makeprior self-efficacy judgments (Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & How-ells, 1980; Brown & Inouye, 1978). Nor are people's perfor-mances affected by whether they make their self-efficacy judg-ments publicly or privately (Gauthier & Ladouceur, 1981;Weinberg, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1980). Contrary to the consis-tency demand notion, degree of congruence between self-ef-ficacy judgment and action is unaffected or reduced when self-efficacy judgments are reported publicly, with knowledge thatthey will be inspected, rather than if they are made privatelyunder conditions in which no one will ever see them (Telch,Bandura, Vinciguerra, Agras, & Stout, 1981). When public in-spection of their judgments is made salient, people are inclinedto become conservative in their self-appraisals, which createsefficacy-action discordances. Veridical self-appraisal is thus bestachieved under test conditions that reduce social evaluative fac-tors.

3 During the efficacy-induction phase the mastery tasks werepresented in a standard hierarchical order, rather than variedin accordance with changes in subjects' perceived efficacy. Ifa small success instilled a large increase in perceived self-effi-cacy, to present next a correspondingly high mastery task wouldrisk raising self-efficacy beyond the preassigned level. Thesetreatment process data reveal the impact of each incrementalmastery experience on subsequent self-percepts of efficacy.After subjects reached their preassigned level of perceived self-


10

<8 100K-

0 80z

i 600

UJ 400.

t-g 20oQ:n" 0

- o

_ 0--0—0—0--0-1!

~ • v°''° s^"*'. </'' ""•—•""*_

—-I l l 1

ft

t,o--o

?- -°. / -o-o- *

-i'. ."'•-•-•

• — • ENACTIVEMASTERY

o— o SELF-EFFICACY

i i iPRE M TREATMENT PRE M TREATMENT

Figure 2. Data from two moderately phobic subjects,illustrating how similar mastery experiences have vari-able effects on perceived self-efficacy over the course oftreatment. (PRE represents the subjects' pretest status;M, the changes produced in perceived self-efficacy bythe preparatory modeling alone; and TREATMENT, thechanges in subjects' self-percepts of efficacy measuredafter each task mastery [Bandura et al., in press].)

merely an isomorphic reflection of past perfor-mance can be illustrated by a few representativecases. For the female subject presented in the leftpanej °f Figure 2, modeling and initial enactivesuccesses heightened self-efficacy substantially.But her self-percepts of efficacy did not subse-quently change, even though progressively moretasks were mastered. An additional success pro-duced maximal self-efficacy. The male subject por-trayed in the right panel judges himself to be moreand more efficacious with each enactive success.However, self-percepts of efficacy consistently ex-ceed prior enactive attainments.

In Figure 3 the patterns of changes are plottedfor two markedly phobic subjects. The subject inthe upper panel gains considerable self-efficacyfrom merely observing the feared activities mod-eled, but subsequent enactive successes producelittle additional change for some time. Thereafter,advancing mastery is accompanied by variablegrowth of self-percepts of efficacy that, at eachhierarchical step, are well above the preceding taskmastery. For the subject in the lower panel, self-efficacy outstrips performance in the initial phaseof treatment, reaches a plateau in the intermediatephase, then drops below performance, and remainsbeneath it until self-efficacy eventually surpassesperformance.

Because people are influenced more by how theyread their performance successes than by the suc-cesses per se, perceived self-efficacy was a better

predictor of subsequent behavior than was perfor-mance attainment in treatment. The finding thatself-percepts of efficacy often surpass final perfor-mance as predictors of future performance re-ceives support from other studies concerned withmarkedly different activities (Bandura & Adams,1977; DiClemente, 1981; Kendrick, Craig, Law-son, & Davidson, Note 1; Mclntyre, Mermelstein,& Lichtenstein, Note 2).

In preliminary explorations of the cognitive pro-cessing of enactive experiences, people registernotable increases in self-efficacy when their ex-periences disconfirm misbeliefs about what theyfear and when they gain new skills to managethreatening activities. They hold weak self-per-cepts of efficacy in a provisional status, testing theirnewly acquired knowledge and skills before raisingjudgments of what they are able to do. If in thecourse of completing a task, they discover some-thing that appears intimidating about the under-

u<o:o

zUJ

UJo-

100

80

60

20

n

cr'/

/ >•-•"'*/ ^0

: *•***/; / y

T i i iPRE M TREATMENT

UJ

2'Q:ou.

z ^LU

CtUJD-

100

80

0 60

^

20

o

- P4K •,— m-^*^^

^ '

1 /* "*&'

a~o •— * ENACTIVE/^ / MASTERY

- P i °—° SELF-o' •' EFFICACY

T"iYPRE M TREATMENT

efficacy, the performance test gauged fully what they were ableto do; at which point actions corresponded closely to self-per-cepts.

Figure 3. Data from two severe phobics, illustratinghow similar mastery experiences have variable effectson perceived self-efficacy over the course of treatment.(PRE, represents the subjects' pretest status; M, thechanges produced in perceived self-efficacy by the pre-paratory modeling alone; and TREATMENT, the changesin subjects' self-percepts of efficacy measured after eachtask mastery [Bandura et al., in press].)


taking or suggests limitations to their mode of cop-ing, they register a decline in self-efficaciousnessdespite their successful performance. In such in-stances apparent successes leave them shakenrather than emboldened. As they gain increasingability to predict and to manage potential threats,they develop a robust self-assurance that servesthem well in mastering subsequent challenges.

VICARIOUS INDUCTION OF DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS

OF PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY

A further experiment was designed to provide aneyen more stringent test of the causal contributionof perceived self-efficacy to action by creatingdifferential levels of self-efficacy vicariously. Inthis mode of efficacy induction, persons observecoping strategies being modeled, but they them-selves do not execute any actions. Consequently,motoric mediators and their effects do not comeinto play. In vicarious influence observers have torely solely on what they see in forming generalizedperceptions of their coping capabilities.

The same causal paradigm was used in whichlevel of performance was examined as a conse-quence of induced differential levels of self-effi-cacy. The model displays emphasized two as-pects—predictability and controllability—that areconducive to the enhancement of self-percepts ofefficacy. In demonstrating predictability the modelrepeatedly exemplified how feared objects arelikely to behave in each of many different situa-tions. Predictability reduces stress and increasespreparedness in coping with threats (Averill, 1973';Miller, 1981). In modeling controllability themodel demonstrated highly effective techniquesfor handling threats in whatever situation mightarise.

Self-efficacy probes were made at selectedpoints in the modeling of coping strategies untilsubjects' perceived self-efficacy was raised topreassigned low or medium levels. The" thirdlevel—maximal self-efficacy—was not includedbecause some phobics would undoubtedly haverequired at least some performance mastery ex-periences to attain complete self-efficaciousness.As shown in Figure 4, the higher level of perceivedself-efficacy produced the higher performance at-tainments.

The combined findings lend validity to the thesisthat self-percepts of efficacy operate as cognitivemediators of action. The efficacy-action relation-ship is replicated across different modes of efficacyinduction, across different types of phobic dys-

! tooF

90

80

70

60

50

40INTER6ROUP

I

INTRASUBJECT

ILOW MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM

LEVEL OF SELF-EFFICACY

Figure 4. Mean performance attainments by differentgroups of subjects at different levels of perceived self-efficacy (intergroup) and by the same subjects at higherlevels of perceived self-efficacy (intrasubject) [Banduraet al, iii press].

functions, and in both intergroup and intrasubjectexperimental designs. Microanalyses of efficacy-action congruences reveal a close fit of perfor-mance to self-percepts of efficacy on, individualtasks. People successfully execute tasks that fallwithin their enhanced range of perceived self-ef-ficacy, but shun or fail those that exceed their per-ceived coping capabilities.

Predictive Generality Across Modesof Influence

In the social learning view, judgments of self-ef-ficacy, whether accurate or faulty, are based onfour principal sources of information. These in-clude performance attainments; vicarious experi-ences of observing the performances of others; ver-bal persuasion and allied types of social influencesthat one possesses 'certain capabilities; and phys-iological states from which people partly judgetheir capability, strength, and vulnerability.

Enactive attainments provide the most influ-ential source of efficacy information because it canbe based on authentic mastery experiences. Suc-cesses heighten perceived self-efficacy; repeatedfailures lower it, especially if failures occur earlyin the course of events and do not reflect lack ofeffort or adverse external circumstances..

People do not rely on enactive experience as thesole source of .information about their capabilities.Efficacy appraisals are partly influenced by vicar-ious experiences. Seeing similar others performsuccessfully can raise efficacy expectations in ob-servers who then judge that they too possess the


capabilities to master comparable activities. By thesame token, observing others who are perceivedto be of similar competence fail despite high effortlowers observers' judgments of their own capabil-ities (Brown & Inouye, 1978). Vicariously derivedinformation alters perceived self-efficacy throughways other than social "comparison. As previouslynoted, modeling displays convey information aboutthe nature and predictability of environmentalevents. Competent models also teach observers ef-fective strategies for dealing with challenging orthreatening situations.

Verbal persuasion is widely used to get peopleto believe they possess capabilities that will enablethem to achieve what they seek. Although socialpersuasion alone may be limited in its power tocreate enduring increases in self-efficacy, it cancontribute to successful performance if the height-ened appraisal is within realistic bounds. Persua-sive efficacy influences, therefore, have their great-est impact on people who have some reason tobelieve that they can produce effects through theiractions (Chambliss & Murray, 1979a, 1979b). TOthe extent that persuasive boosts in self-efficacylead them to try hard enough to succeed, suchinfluences promote development of skills and asense of personal efficacy.

People rely partly on information from theirphysiological state in judging their capabilities.They read their visceral arousal in stressful andtaxing situations as an ominous sign of vulnerabil-ity to dysfunction. Because high arousal usuallydebilitates performance, people are more inclinedto expect success when they are not beset by aver-sive arousal than if they are tense and viscerallyagitated. In activities involving strength and stam-ina, people read their fatigue, aches, and pains asindicants of physical inefficacy.

Information that is relevant for judging personalcapabilities—whether conveyed enactively, vicar-iously, persuasively, or physiologically—is not in-herently enlightening. Rather, it becomes instruc-tive only through cognitive appraisal. The cognitiveprocessing of efficacy information concerns thetypes of cues people have learned to use as indi-cators of personal efficacy and the inference rulesthey employ for integrating efficacy informationfrom different sources (Bandura, 1981).

The aim of a comprehensive theory is to providea unifying conceptual framework that can encom-pass diverse modes of influence known to alterbehavior. In any given activity skills and self-be-liefs that ensure optimal use of capabilities are re-quired for successful functioning. If self-efficacy

is lacking, people tend to behave ineffectually,even though they know what to do. Social learningtheory postulates a common mechanism of behav-ioral change—different modes of influence altercoping behavior partly by creating and strength-ening self-percepts of efficacy.

The. explanatory and predictive power of thistheory was tested in a series of experiments inwhich severe snake phobies received treatmentsrelying on enactive, vicarious, emotive, and cog-nitive modes of influence (Bandura & Adams,1977; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977; Bandura,Adams, Hardy, & Howells, 1980). This type ofdisorder permits the most precise tests of mecha-nisms of change because participants rarely, ifever, have contact with reptiles while the treat-ment is in progress. Consequently, the changesaccompanying treatment are not confounded byuncontrolled experiences arising from contact withthe threats between sessions. In each study in thisseries, the1 level, strength, and generality of copingself-efficacy for a variety of threatening tasks wasmeasured prior to and after treatment.

In the treatment employing enactive mastery asthe principal vehicle of change, phobies are as-sisted by performance induction aids in dealingwith what they fear. As treatment progresses theprovisional aids are withdrawn, and self-directedmastery experiences are then arranged to authen-ticate and generalize personal efficacy. In the vi-carious mode of treatment, phobies merely observethe model perform progressively more threateningactivities without any adverse effects. In the thirdtreatment tested, which draws heavily on a cog-nitive modality (Kazdin, 1973), phobies generatecognitive scenarios in which multiple models ofdiffering characteristics cope with and masterthreatening activities. As a further test of the gen-erality of efficacy theory, an emotive-oriented pro-cedure was also examined. In this desensitizationtreatment people visualize threatening scenes whiledeeply relaxed until they no longer experience anyanxiety arousal. Imaginal conquest of fear and ac-quisition of a self-relaxation coping skill can boostperceived self-efficacy.

Results of these studies confirm that differentmodes of influence all raise and strengthen self-percepts of efficacy. Moreover, behavior corre-sponds closely to level of self-efficacy change, re-gardless of the method by which self-efficacy isenhanced (Figure 5). The higher the level of per-ceived self-efficacy, the greater the performanceaccomplishments. Strength of efficacy also predictsbehavior change. The stronger the perceived ef-


tn

oI-

111Q.

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

— ENACTIVE-- VICARIOUS• • • • CONTROL

- o SELF-EFFICACY• PERFORMANCE

PRETEST POSTTEST PRETEST POSTTEST PRETEST POSTTEST

Figure 5. Level of perceived self-efficacy and coping behavior displayed by subjects towardthreats after receiving treatments relying on either enactive, vicarious; emotive, or cognitivemodes of influence. (In the posttest phase, level of self-efficacy was measured prior to andafter the test of coping behavior. The scores represent the mean performance attainments withsimilar and generalization threats [Bandura & Adams, 1977; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977;Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & Howelis, 1980].)

ficacy, the more likely are people to persist in theirefforts until they succeed. Consistent with self-ef-ficacy theory, enactive mastery produces the high-est, strongest, and most generalized increases incoping efficacy! The latter finding is corroboratedby other comparative studies demonstrating thatenactive mastery surpasses persuasive (Biran &Wilson, 1981), emotive (Katz, Stout, Taylor, Home,& Agras, Note 3), and vicarious (Feltz, Landers,& Raeder, 1979) influences in creating strong self-percepts of efficacy;

Self-efficacy theory explains rate of change dur-ing the course of treatment as well (Bandura &Adams, 1977). Self-percepts of efficacy formedthrough partial mastery experiences at differentpoints in treatment predict, at a high level of ac-curacy, subsequent performance of threateningtasks that subjects had never done before.

The degree of relationship between self-percepts.of efficacy and action can be quantified in severalways. Correlations'pan be computed between ag-gregate scores of perceived self-efficacy and per-formance attainments. At a more particularized.level of analysis, "degree of congruence betweenself-percepts and action can be gauged by record-ing whether persons judge themselves capable ofperforming each of the various tasks using a cutoffstrength value and computing the percentage ofaccurate correspondence between self-efficacyjudgment and actual performance on individualtasks. Dichotomizing self-efficacy judgments onthe basis of a minimal strength value inevitablyloses some predictive information. The most pre-cise microanalysis of congruence is provided by

computing the probability of successful perfor-mance as a function of strength of perceived self-efficacy. All three indexes reveal a close relation-ship between self-percepts of efficacy and actionregardless of whether efficacy is instated by enractive mastery, vicarious experience, cognitivecoping, or elimination of anxiety arousal (Bandura,1977a; Bandura et al, 1980).

Influences that operate through nonperfor-mance modes are of particular interest becausethey provide no behavioral information for judgingchanges in one's self-efficacy. Persons have to infertheir capabilities from vicarious and symbolicsources of efficacy information. Even in the caseof enactiyely instated self-efficacy, performanceis not the genesis of the causal chain. Performanceincludes among its determinants self-percepts ofefficacy. We know from the research of Salomon(in press), for example, that self-perceived learningefficacy affects how much effort is invested ingiven activities and what levels of performance areattained. Thus, judgments of one's capabilitiespartly determine choice of activities and rate ofskill acquisition, and performance mastery, in turn,can boost perceived self-efficacy in a mutually en-hancing process. It is not as though self-rperceptsof efficacy affect future performances but play norole whatsoever in earlier performance attain^ments. Questions about causal ordering of factorsarise in enactively based influences when inter-active processes are treated as linear sequentialones and causally prior self-efficacy determinantsof past performance accomplishments go unmea-sured.


Predictive Generality Across Domainsof Functioning

The preceding experiments examined the explan-atory and predictive generality of self-efficacy the-ory across different modes of influence applied tothe same type of dysfunction. Tests of the gener-ality of this theory have been extended to diverseareas of functioning. One study designed for thispurpose included severe agoraphobics, whose liveswere markedly constricted by profound copinginefficacy that makes common activities seemfilled with danger (Bandura et al., 1980).

The treatment included group sessions in whichthe participants were taught how to identify sit-uational arid ideational elicitors of anxiety, how tomanage anxiety arousal through thought and self-relaxation, and how to use proximal goal settingin gaining coping skill. But the critical ingredientof treatment involved field mastery experiences.Therapists, who accompanied the agoraphobicsinto community settings, drew on whatever per-formance induction aids were required to enabletheir clients to cope successfully with what theydreaded. As treatment progressed therapists re-duced their guided participation and assigned theclients progressively more challenging tasks to per-form on their own. • ,

Assessment of self-efficacy and performance ac-complishments in previously dreaded situations—traveling by automobile, using elevators and es-calators, climbing stairs to high levels, dining inrestaurants, shopping in supermarkets, and ven^turing forth alone into public places—reveals sub-stantial increases in perceived coping efficacy(Figure 6). In microanalyses conducted both priprto and at the completion of treatment, behavioralchange corresponded closely to level of self-effi-cacy change.

A variety of studies applying different modesof influence to diverse domains of functioningspeak further to the issue of perceived self-efficacyas a common mechanism mediating psychologicalchanges. Perceived self-efficacy predicts degree ofchange in diverse types of social behavior (Kazdin,1979; Barrios, Note 4); varieties of phobic dys-functions (Biran & Wilson, 1981; Bburque & La-douceur, 1980); stress reactions and physiologicalarousal (Bandura et al., in press); physical stamina(Weinberg et al., 1979; Weinberg, Yukelson, &Jackson, 1980); self-regulation of addictive behav-ior (Gondiotte & Liechtenstein, 1981; DiClemente,1981); achievement strivings (Bandura & Schunk,1981; Collins, 1982; Schunk, 1981); and career

choice and development (Betz & Hackett, 1981;Hackett & Betz, 1981; Hackett, Note 5). In thesediverse lines of research, predictive success isachieved across time, settings, performance vari-ants, expressive modalities, and vastly differentdomains of psychological functioning. Moreover,measures of self-percepts of efficacy using themicroanalytic approach predict variations in levelof changes produced by different modes of influ-ence, variations among persons receiving the samemode of influence, and even variations within in-dividuals in regard to the particular tasks they arelikely to master or fail (Bandura, 1977a; Banduraet al., 1980). Some of these areas of research arediscussed more fully because they clarify differentaspects of the mediating self-efficacy mechanism.

Although self-efficacy judgments are function-ally related to action, a number of factors can af-fect the strength of the relationship. Discrepanciesmay arise because of faulty self-knowledge, mis-judgment of task requirements, unforeseen situa-tional constraints on action, disincentives to act onone's self-percepts of efficacy, ill-defined globalmeasures of perceived self-efficacy or inadequateassessments of performance, and new experiencesthat prpmpt reappraisals of self-efficacy in the timeelapsing between probes of self-efficacy and ac-tion. These and other sources of discordance arediscussed fully elsewhere (Bandura, in press) andwill not be reviewed here.

Perceived Self-Regulatory Efficacy

Exercise of influence over one's own behavior isnot achieved by a feat of willpower. Self-regula-tory capabilities require tools of personal agencyand the self-assurance to use them effectively(Bandura, in press). People who are skeptical oftheir ability to exercise adequate control over theiractions tend to undermine their efforts in situationsthat tax capabilities. Relapses in self-regulation ofrefractory consummatory behavior provide a fa-miliar example.

Marlatt and Gordon (1980) have postulated acommon relapse process in heroin addiction, al-coholism, and smoking in which perceived self-regulatory efficacy operates as a contributing fac-tor. People who have the skills and assurance intheir coping efficacy mobilize the effort neededto succeed in high-risk situations. Mastery of pro'b-lem situations further strengthens self-regulatoryefficacy. In contrast, when coping skills are under-developed and poorly used because of disbelief inone's efficacy, a relapse will occur. Faultless seuv


control is not easy to come by for pliant activities,let alone for addictive substances. Nevertheless,those who perceive themselves to be inefficaciousare more prone to attribute a slip to pervasive self-regulatory inefficacy. Further cpping efforts arethen abandoned, resulting in a total breakdown inself-control.

Studies of behavior that is amenable to changebut difficult to sustain over an extended periodconfirm that perceived inefficacy increases vul-nerability to relapse. In this research, investigatorsmeasured the self-judged efficacy of cigarette

smokers to resist smoking under various social andstressful inducements after they had quit smokingthrough various means (DiClemente, 1981; Mc-Intyre et al, Note 2). Although all participantsachieved the same terminal behavior, they did notexhibit the same level of self-regulatory efficacy.Compared to abstainers, relapsers expressed lowerself-efficacy at the end of treatment about theirability to resist smoking under subsequent insti-gating conditions. The higher the perceived self-regulatory efficacy, the more successfully smokingwas checked during the follow-up period. In con-

100

90

< 70

u. 60oi- 50

I 40cta 30

20

100

90

CO Qr.x: 8Oc/)K 70LL0 60

1 50

Si40

20

- 0---0 SELF-EFFICACY• • PERFORMANCE

WALKING ALONE

PRE-TEST

POST-TEST

o

HEIGHTS

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

PRE-TEST

POST-TEST

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

o

RESTAURANT

IPRE-TEST

POST-TEST

PRE- POST-TEST TEST

Figure 6. Level of perceived self-efficacy and coping behavior displayed by subjects indifferent areas of functioning before and after receiving treatment (Bandura, Adam's, Hardy,& Howells, 1980).


trast, neither demographic factors nor smokinghistory and degree of physical dependence on nic-otine differentiated relapsers from abstainers.

In a microanalysis of the relation between self-percepts of efficacy and smoking, Condiotte andLichtenstein (1981) assessed, at the completion oftreatment, subjects' perceived capability to resistthe urge to smoke in a variety of situations. Per-ceived self-regulatory efficacy predicted monthslater which participants would relapse, how soonthey would relapse, and even the specific situationsin which they experienced their first slip. More-over, perceived self-efficacy at the end of treat-ment predicted how participants were likely torespond to a subsequent relapse, should it occur.The highly self-efficacious subjects reinstated con-trol following a slip, whereas the less self-effica-cious ones displayed a marked decrease in per-ceived self-efficacy and relapsed completely.Evidence that changes in self-percepts of efficacypredict coping and self-regulatory behavior sug-gests that self-efficacy probes during the course oftreatment can provide helpful guides for imple-menting a program of personal change.

Interactive Perceived Efficacy andPostcoronary Rehabilitation

Social environments may place constraints on whatpeople do or may aid them to behave optimally.Whether their endeavors are socially impeded orsupported will depend, in part, on how efficaciousthey are perceived to be. The impetus for inter-personal judgments of efficacy is strongest in closerelationships involving interdependent conse-quences. This is because actions of a partner basedon faulty self-percepts of efficacy can producedetrimental consequences for, all concerned. Sincerisky actions are also the means of securing valuedbenefits, veridical mutual judgments of efficacyprovide a reliable basis to promote advantageousendeavors and to dissuade foolhardy ones. Fullunderstanding of how perceptions of efficacy af-fect courses of action under close social interde-pendencies requires analysis of interactive efficacydeterminants.

Recovery from a heart attack presents an im-portant problem in which to study both the impactof interactive efficacy and the contribution of self-percepts of efficacy to health-promoting habits. Inrecovering from a heart attack, the restoration ofperceived physical efficacy is an essential ingre-dient in the process. The heart heals rapidly, but

psychological recovery is slow for patients whobelieve they lack the physical efficacy to resumetheir customary activities. They avoid physical ex-ertion and recreational activities that they previ-ously enjoyed, they are slow to resume vocationaland social life in the belief that they will over-burden their debilitated cardiac capacity, and theyfear that sexual activities will do them in. The re-habilitative task is to restore a sense of physicalefficacy so that postcoronary patients can lead full,productive lives.

Physicians typically use one or more of the fourprincipal sources of efficacy information to raiseand strengthen perceptions of cardiac robustnessin postcoronary patients. Enactive efficacy infor-mation is compellingly conveyed through stren-uous treadmill exercises. Vicarious efficacy infor-mation is provided by enlisting the aid of formerpatients who exemplify active lives. Persuasiveefficacy information is furnished by informingpatients about what they are capable of doing. Aheart attack is apt to give rise to overattentivenessto cardiac activity and misattribution of fatigue toan impaired heart. The meaning of physiologicalefficacy information is explained to ensure thatpatients do not misread their physiology, for ex-ample, by interpreting cardiac acceleration as por-tending a reinfarction.

As a first step toward clarifying some aspects ofthe efficacy restoration process, a research projectbeing conducted in collaboration with Ewart, Tay-lor, DeBusk, and Reese is examining the impactof enactive and persuasive efficacy information onresuming physical activities. Several weeks afterpatients have experienced a myocardial infarction,their self-percepts of physical efficacy are mea-sured for physical exertion, cardiac capability,emotional stress, and sexual >activities.

Psychological recovery from a heart attack is asocial, rather than an individual, matter. Becauseone spouse's notions about the other's physical ca-pabilities can aid or retard the recovery process,the spouse's judgments of the patient's physicalefficacy are measured under three levels of in-volvement in the treadmill activity. All of the pa-tients being studied are men, so the wives' judg-ments of husbands' efficacy are tested: when sheis uninvolved in the treadmill exercises; when sheis present to observe the husband's stamina as heperforms on the treadmill under increasing work-loads; or when she performs the strenuous tread-mill exercises, to experience personally the physicaldemands of the task, whereupon she observes herhusband do the same. In the informative consul-


vCJ<CJLLLLUJ

IL

IDin

<<JtoI0_

Qii iLLJ

LUCJCCHI0.LLO

I

2LUCt1-t/>

IUU

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

• • PATIENT'S JUDGMENT

o--o SPOUSE'S JUDGMENT

-

^"*'^^'^^,+" o

^**^^ .--* — '"' ** "

- •^ '"0

o-^

-

_.

• '

-

1 I I

PRE T C

inni \j\j

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

n

-

- /x**°

^-*^O

x/

//^ . ' ^0

_ 8<::- ^^ ^^^ — ~*~m^'^

-

-

-

1 1 1

PRE

PRE PRE T

TREATMENT PHASESFigure 7. Illustrative variations in patterns of perceived physical efficacy for different

couples at pretest (PRE), after treadmill exercises (T), and after the combined influence oftreadmill exercises and medical consultation (C).

tation with the medical staff, which follows thetreadmill activity, couples receive informationabout the patient's cardiac functioning and its re-lation to physical, vocational, and sexual activity.

Self-efficacy probes are taken at each step in theprocess. In addition, before and after the efficacyenhancing program and six months later, patients'cardiac output and physical activity level are mon-itored continuously for several days to determinehow much they are exerting themselves. Prelimi-nary findings reveal that treadmill exercises andmedical consultation have differential impact onself-percepts of physical efficacy in different do-mains of functioning. Microanalytic measures of

perceived self-efficacy thus provide refined feed-back of what various treatments are doing.

Wives who are actively involved in the test oftheir husbands' physical stamina judge their phys-ical efficacy more highly than if they do not ob-serve their treadmill performances. Patterns ofperceived efficacy vary, sometimes widely, fordifferent couples. Figure 7 illustrates the majorvariations. The recovery process is expected to befastest under congruent high efficacy; slowest un-der congruent low efficacy; and at an intermediatelevel when the patient and the spouse differ injudgments of the patient's capability to resumedaily activities.


Cultivating Intrinsic Interest ThroughDevelopment of Self-Efficacy

Most of the things people enjoy doing for their ownsake originally had little or no interest for them.But under appropriate learning experiences, al-most any activity, however silly it may appear tomany observers, can become imbued with consum-ing significance. The process by which people de-velop interest in activities in which they initiallylack skill, interest, and self-efficacy is an issue ofsome importance. Positive incentives are widelyused to promote such changes. Some writers (Deci,1975; Lepper & Greene, 1978) have questioned thewisdom of such an approach, on the grounds thatrewarding people for engaging in an activity ismore likely to reduce than to increase subsequentinterest in it. Extrinsic incentives presumably de-crease interest by weakening competency drivesor by shifting causal attributions for performancefrom internal motivators to external rewards.

The effects of extrinsic incentives have receivedextensive study. Results show that rewards can in-crease interest in activities, reduce interest, or haveno effect (Bates, 1979; Kruglanski, 1975; Lepper,1980; Ross, 1976). In evaluating the role of incen-tives in human functioning, it is important to dis-tinguish between whether incentives are used tomanage performance or to cultivate personal ef-ficacy.

TASK-CONTINGENT INCENTIVES

Extrinsic rewards are most likely to reduce interestwhen they are given merely for performing overand over again an activity that is already of highinterest (Condry, 1977; Lepper & Greene, 1978).In such situations rewards are gained regardless ofthe level or quality of performance. However, evenunder the limiting conditions wherein rewards arebelieved to produce reductive effects, incentivessometimes enhance interest (Arnold, 1976; Dav-idson & Bucher, 1978), boost low interest but di-minish or do not affect high interest (Calder &Staw, 1975; Loveland & Olley, 1979; McLoyd,1979), or reduce low interest but do not affect highinterest (Greene, Srernberg, & Lepper, 1976). Ap-parently a wide array of other factors—level ofpreexisting interest and ability, magnitude and sa-lience of rewards, type of activity, degree of re-ward contingency, accompanying social mes-sages—can radically alter or override the effectsof rewards given simply for undertaking a task.

COMPETENCE-CONTINGENT INCENTIVES

The controversy over the effects of performance-irrelevant reward on high interest has led to ne-glect of the important issue of whether incentivesfor performance attainments cultivate interest andself-percepts of efficacy. Rewards for task mastery,which reflect on personal efficacy, should be dis-tinguished from performance-contingent rewardsgained by performing routine activities. A garmentworker paid on a piece-rate basis for sewing shirtsday in and day out is unlikely to develop a growingfondness for sewing, even though rewards arehighly contingent on performance.

Conceptual analyses of intrinsic interest withinthe framework of social learning theory (Bandura,in press) and the theory of intrinsic motivation(Deci, 1975; Lepper & Greene, 1978) assign per-ceived competence a mediating role. The alter-native theoretical approaches, however, postulatesomewhat different underlying mechanisms. Incognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975), interestis an expression of an inborn drive for competenceand self-determination; in attribution theory (Bern,1972; Lepper & Greene, 1978), interest is a productof retrospective judgments of the causes of one'sperformances; in social learning theory (Bandura,1981, in press), interest grows from satisfactionsderived from fulfilling internal standards and fromperceived self-efficacy gained from performanceaccomplishments and other sources of efficacy in-formation.

There are several ways in which incentives fortask mastery can contribute to the growth of in-terest and self-efficacy. Positive incentives fosterperformance accomplishments. Gaining knowl-edge and skills that enable one to fulfill personalstandards of merit tend to heighten interest anda firm sense of personal efficacy. Success in at-taining desired outcomes through challenging per-formances can further verify existing competen-cies. This is because people usually do not performmaximally, though they possess the constituentskills. It is under incentives that test upper limitsthat people find out what they are able to do. Bymobilizing high effort, incentives can help to sub-stantiate talents, even though no new skills are ac-quired in the process.

Rewards also assume efficacy informative valuewhen competencies are difficult to gauge fromperformance alone, which is often the case. Tocomplicate further the competence validation pro-cess, most activities involve diverse facets so thatperceived adequacy may vary widely, depending

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • FEBRUARY 1985J • 133

on how the differing aspects are subjectivelyweighted. Because of these ambiguities level ofreward imparts social information on the qualityof performance. In this process competent perfor-mances are perceived as the reason for the rewards,rather than the rewards being viewed as the causeof competent performance (Karniol & Ross, 1977).

Several lines of research confirm that positiveincentives promote interest when they enhance orauthenticate personal efficacy. Both children andadults maintain or increase their interest in activ-ities when rewarded for performance attainments,whereas their interest declines when they are re-warded for undertaking activities irrespective ofhow well they perform (Boggiano & Ruble, 1979;Ross, 1976). The larger the extrinsic reward forperformances signifying competence, the greaterthe increase in interest in the activity (Enzle &Ross, 1978). Even incentives for undertaking atask, rather than for performance mastery, canraise interest if engagement in the activity providesinformation about personal competence (Arnold,1976). When material reward for each task com-pletion is accompanied by self-verbalization ofcompetence, fchildren sustain high interest in theactivity (Sagotsky & Lewis, Note 6).

PROXIMAL SELF-MOTIVATION

Contingent incentives are not necessarily the bestvehicle for enlisting the type of sustained involve-ment in activities that builds interest and self-ef-ficacy where they are lacking. In social learningtheory an important cognitively based source ofmotivation operates through the intervening pro-cesses of goal setting and self-evaluative reactions(Bandura, 1977b, in press). This form of self-mo-tivation, which involves internal comparison pro-cesses, requires personal standards against whichto evaluate performance. By making self-satisfac-tion conditional on a certain level of performancemastery, persons create self-incentives for theirefforts.

Self-motivation is best summoned and sustainedby adopting attainable subgoals that lead to largefuture ones. Whereas proximal subgoals provideimmediate incentives and guides for action, distalgoals are too far removed in time to effectivelymobilize effort or to direct what one does in the

• \

here and now. Proximal goals can also serve as animportant vehicle in the development of self-per-cepts of efficacy. Without standards against whichto measure their performance, people have littlebasis for judging how they are doing or for gauging

their capabilities. Subgoal attainments provideclear markers of progress along the way to verifya growing sense of self-efficacy.

There are at least two ways in which proximalgoals might contribute to enhancement of interestin activities. When people aim for, and master,desired levels of performance, they experience asense of satisfaction (Locke, Cartledge, & Knerr,1970). The satisfactions derived from subgoal at-tainments can build intrinsic interest. When per-formances are gauged against distal goals, similaraccomplishments may prove disappointing be-cause of wide disparities between current perfor-mance and lofty future standards. As a result in-terest fails to develop, even though skills are beingacquired in the process. As already noted, a senseof personal efficacy in mastering tasks is more aptto spark interest in them than is self-perceivedinefficacy in performing competently.

That proximal self-motivation can build intrinsicinterest in disvalued activities receives supportfrom a study in which children who exhibited grossdeficits and disinterest in mathematical tasks pur-sued a program of self-directed learning underconditions involving either proximal subgoals, dis-tal goals, or no reference to goals (Bandura &Schunk, 1981). Under proximal subgoals childrenprogressed rapidly, in self-directed learning,achieved substantial mastery of mathematical op-erations, and developed a strong sense of self-ef-ficacy in solving arithmetic problems (Figure 8).Distal goals had no demonstrable effects. In ad-dition to its other benefits, goal proximity fostersveridical self-knowledge of capabilities, as re-flected in high congruence between judgments ofmathematical self-efficacy and subsequent math-ematical performance.

As shown in Figure 9, it was mainly childrenin the proximally self-motivated condition, all ofwhom felt highly efficacious, who displayed thenotable level of intrinsic interest. Children in theother conditions generally expressed self-doubtsconcerning their capabilities and showed littlespontaneous interest in solving arithmetic prob-lems. Regardless of treatment conditions, self-per-cepts of moderate to high strength were positivelyrelated to interest.

The relationship of the growth functions of self-efficacy and interest warrants systematic investi-gation. There may exist some temporal lag be-tween newly acquired self-efficacy and corre-sponding growth of interest in activities that aredisvalued or even disliked. In the temporal lagpattern, self-efficacy fosters mastery experiences


90

80

O 70

HI

u.UJif)u.o

6O

50

40

30

•—• PROXIMAL GOALS•--• DISTAL GOALSo—o NO GOALS

- o— -o CONTROL

PRETEST.1 2POSTTEST

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

'PRETEST PQ3JTEST

Figure 8. The left panel shows the strength of children's self-percepts of arithmetic efficacyat the beginning of the study (pretest) and before (1) and after (2) taking the arithmeticposttest; the right panel displays the children's level of achievement on the arithmetic testbefore and after the self-directed learning (Bandura & Schunk, 1981).

that, over a period of time, provide self-satisfac-tions conducive to growth of interest. If, in fact,effects follow such a temporal course, then in-creased interest would emerge as a later, ratherthan as an instant, consequence of enhanced self-efficacy. The threshold notion suggests an alter-native pattern. It may require at least moderatelyhigh self-efficacy to generate and sustain interestin an activity, but interest is not much affected bysmall variations above or below the threshold level.Indeed, supreme self-assurance may render activ-ities unchallenging and thus uninteresting. Bothstrength and optimal level of perceived self-effi-cacy correlate with intrinsic interest, but thethreshold notion yields the more consistent positiverelationships (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Schunk,Note 7). Temporal lag and threshold effects areby no means incompatible. In fact both probablyoperate in the developmental process.

SELF-EFFICACY DETERMINANTS OF CAREER

INTERESTS AND PURSUITS

Choices during formative periods shape life pathsthrough selective development of competencies,interests, and affiliative preferences. Hackett andBetz (1981) have been developing a causal modelof career choice in which perceived self-efficacyfunctions as a major mediator. One of the impor-

tant issues addressed in this line of research is howthe career interests and pursuits of women are con-stricted by self-beliefs that traditionally male oc-

14

12

LU10

O 8<f>zo:

PROXIMAL DISTALGOALS GOALS

NOGOALS

CONTROL

Figure 9. Average number of arithmetic problemschildren in the different conditions chose to solve whengiven free choice of activities (Bandura & Schunk, 1981).


cupations are inappropriate for them because theylack the capabilities to master requisite skills.

Efficacy analyses of career decision making,(Betz, 1981) reveal that males perceive themselvesjto be equally efficacious for traditionally male andfemale vocations. In contrast, females judge them-selves highly efficacious for the type of occupationstraditionally held by women, but inefficacious inmastering the educational requirements and jobfunctions of vocations dominated by men. Thesedifferential perceptions of personal efficacy areespecially striking because the groups do not differin their actual verbal and quantitative ability onstandardized tests. It is not the subskills that se-lected college students possess, but how they per-ceive and use them that makes the difference.Regardless of sex, level of perceived self-efficacycorrelates positively with range of career optionsseriously considered and the degree of interestshown in them.

Hackett (Note 5) has devoted special attentionto perceived mathematical self-efficacy becausemodern technologies have made quantitative skillsincreasingly important to a wide range of careeroptions and professional advancement. Using apath analysis, Hackett found that sex, sex role so-cialization, and high school preparation affect per-ceived self-efficacy in quantitative capabilities.Perceived self-inefficaciousness in dealing withnumbers in turn affects mathematical anxiety andmath relatedness of college major.

The causally prior contribution of perceived ef-ficacy to socialization practices and educationalpreparation remains an important problem of fu-ture research to determine through longitudinalanalysis. It follows from the present model of ca-reer development that parental career-related ef-ficacy will influence the range of vocational optionsthey consider viable for their offspring. Students'differential self-percepts of efficacy for masteringoccupational entry requirements are likely to in-fluence what types of courses they choose to pursueduring their secondary educational preparation.Societal practices require of women a robust senseof self-efficacy not only to enter careers dominatedby men, but to fulfil the heavy demands arisingfrom dual workloads of career and household.

Self-Efficacy Conception ofFear Arousal

Perceptions of self-efficacy affect emotional re-actions as well as behavior. This is especially true

of anxiety and stress reactions to unfamiliar orpotentially aversive events. Self-efficacy theorysuggests an alternative way of looking at humananxiety. Psychodynarnic theories generally attrib-ute anxiety to intrapsychic conflicts over theexpression of tabooed impulses. The external objectof anxiety is considered to be of limited signifi-cance because the threat posed by the impulse canbe projected onto any number of things. In thisapproach anxiety is rooted in the prohibited im-pulse.

Conditioning theory assumes that formerly neu-tral events acquire fear-provoking properties byassociation with painful experiences. This theoryexternalizes the cause in the stimulus—It is thestimulus that is said to1 become aversive. If a persondevelops a phobia of mountain driving as a resultof running into a stately roadside redwood, it isnot the road that is changed by the aversive ex-perience. Rather, it is perceived competence indriving and anticipatory thought patterns thatundergo change.

From the social learning perspective, it is mainlyperceived inefficacy in coping with potentiallyaversive events that makes them fearsome. To theextent that one can prevent, terminate, or lessenthe severity of aversive events, there is little reasonto fear them. Hence experiences that increase cop-ing efficacy can diminish fear arousal and increasecommerce with what was previously dreaded andavoided.

A sense of controllability can be achieved eitherbehaviorally or cognitively (Averill, 1973; Lazarus,1980; Miller, 1979). In behavioral control individ-uals take actions that forestall or modify aversiveevents. In cognitive control people believe they canmanage environmental threats, should they arise.These two forms of controllability are distin-guished because the relationship between actualand self-perceived coping efficacy is far from per-fect. Indeed, there are many competent peoplewho are plagued by a sense of inefficacy, and manyless competent ones who remain unperturbed byimpending threats because they are self-assured oftheir coping capabilities.

BEHAVIORAL CONTROL

The effects of behavioral control on fear reductionand stress responses have been amply documentedwith both children and adults. Ability to exercisebehavioral control over potentially aversive eventseliminates or decreases autonomic reactions tothem (Gunnar-vonGnechten, 1978; Miller, 1979).


Control over events makes them predictable, thusreducing uncertainty, which in itself can be ame-liorative. It might, therefore, be argued that it ispredictability, rather than behavioral mastery, thatis stress reducing. However, behavioral controldecreases arousal over and above any benefits de-rived from the ability to predict they occurrenceof stressors. If anything, having foreknowledge ofwhen aversive events will occur without being ableto do anything about them increases anticipatorystress reactions, (Gunnar, 1980; Miller, 1981). Butsince predictability signals safety as well as danger(Seligman & Binik, 1977), it can have oppositeeffects at different points in time—raising antici-patory arousal just prior to stressful events whilereducing arousal during safe interim periods.

Being able to manage what one fears can di-minish arousal because the capability is used toreduce or to prevent pain. But there is more to theprocess of stress reduction by behavioral controlthan si'mply curtailing painful stimuli. In someforms of behavioral mastery, previously frighten-ing events occur undiminished, but they becomenonthreatening when activated personally (Gun-nar-vonGnechten, 1978). Here it is the personalagency of causality, not curtailment of the eventsthemselves, that reduces fear. And in situations inwhich the opportunity to wield control exists butis unexercised, it is the self-knowledge of copingefficacy, rather than its application, that reducesanxiety arousal (Glass, Reim, & Singer, 1971).

COGNITIVE CONTROL

A painful event has two arousal components to it-discomfort produced by the aversive stimulationand the thought produced arousal. It is the thoughtcomponent—the arousal generated by repetitiveperturbing ideation—that accounts for much ofhuman distress. As noted earlier, people who judgethemselves1 inefficacious dwell on their coping de-ficiencies and view trying situations as fraught withperil. They not only magnify the severity of pos-sible threats but worry about perils that rarely, ifever, happen. As a result- they experience a., highlevel of cognitively generated distress. Elevatedarousal, in turn, heightens preoccupation with per-sonal inefficacy and potential calamities.

Anticipatory thought that does not exceed re-alistic bounds has functional value in that it mo-tivates development of competencies and plans fordealing with foreseeable threats. But to those whodoubt their coping self-efficacy, the anxious antic-ipation can become a preoccupation that often far

exceeds the objective hazards. In an intensive anal-ysis of .acute anxiety reactions, Beck, Laude, andBohnert (1974) found that almost without excep-tion, frightful cognitions occur just prior to theonset of anxiety attacks. The ideation often centersaround profound coping inefficacy, which resultsin dreadful physical and social catastfophies.

Because stress-inducing thought plays a para-mount role in human arousal, self-percepts of cop-ing efficacy can reduce the level of arousal before,during, and after a trying experience. In laboratorystudies of perceived control, people who believethat they can exercise some influence over aversiveevents display less autonomic arousal and impair-ment in performance than those who believe theylack any personal control, even though both groupsare subjected to the same aversive stimulation(Averill, 1973; Miller, 1979, 1980). Mere belief incoping efficacy similarly increases ability to with-stand pain (Neufeld & Thomas, 1977).

SELF-EFFICACY AS A MEDIATING MECHANISM

That perceived self-efficacy operates as a cognitivemechanism by which controllability reduces feararousal receives support in the previously citedresearch designed to enhance coping efficacy insevere phobics (Bandura & Adams, 1977; Banduraet al., 1977; Bandura et al., 1980). In these studies,after completing the various forms of treatment,phobics designated the strength of their perceivedefficacy in performing different tasks varying inthreat value. During later behavioral tests theyreported the intensity of fear arousal that they ex-perienced in anticipation of performing each taskand, again, while they were performing theactivity.

In Figure 10 the intensity of fear arousal is plot-ted as a function of self-efficacy strength enhancedthrough four different modes of influence. Peopleexperience high anticipatory and performance dis-tress on tasks in which they perceive themselvesto be inefficacious, but as the strength of their self-judged efficacy increases, their fear arousal de-clines. At high strengths of self-efficacy, threat-ening tasks are performed with virtually no ap-prehensiveness.

Studies in which perceived self-efficacy is in-duced to differential levels (Bandura et al., inpress) shed further empirical light on the notionthat fear arousal arises from perceived copinginefficacy. Here the data of interest are the amountof distress phobics at different levels of perceivedself-efficacy experience while performing the same


common task (Figure 11). The relationship be-tween perceived inefficacy and subjective distressis replicated, regardless of whether self-perceptsof efficacy are instated enactiyely or > vicariouslyor whether the analysis involves anticipatory orperformance fear based on intergroup or intrasub-ject changes. The less efficacious subjects judgethemselves to be, the more fear they experience.

The generality of the relationship between per-ceived inefficacy and stress reactions is furthercorroborated in a study using physiological indicesof arousal (Bandura et al., in press). Elevation inblood pressure and cardiac acceleration were mea-sured in severe spider phobics during anticipation

and performance of intimidating tasks correspond-ing to strong, medium, and weak strength of per-ceived self-efficaciousness. In the next phase of thestudy, self-percepts of efficacy were raised to max-imal strength, whereupon autonomic reactions tothe same tasks were again measured. Figure 12shows the mean change from the baseline level inheart rate and blood pressure as a function of dif-ferential strength of self^percepts of efficacy.

Subjects were viscerally unperturbed by tasksthat they regarded with utmost self-efficacious-ness. On tasks about which they were moderatelyinsecure concerning their coping efficacy, how-ever, their heart rate accelerated and their blood

JCO

1

Oct<orUJu.u.o_lUJ>UJ

~J

o

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

o

• • ANTICIPATORYo--o PERFORMANCE

^—

—

—

\o \\\

ENACTIVE N\

i i i i v ¥

(0

- o

VICARIOUS

10-20 30-40 50-60 70-80 90-100 10-20 30-40 50-60 70-80 90-100

EFFICACY STRENGTH

ct 5<UJ .u. 4u.o 3

UJ

0

o—

EMOTIVE

10-20 30-40 50-60 70-80 9O-100 10-20 30-40 50;60 70-80 90-100

EFFICACY STRENGTH

Figure 10. Relationship between strength of self-percepts of efficacy and level of anticipatoryand performance fear arousal, after enhancement of self-efficacy through enactive, vicarious,emotive, or cognitive influence. (Participant modeling created such strong self-efficacy thatthere were only a few instances in which subjects receiving this form of treatment displayedself-percepts of efficacy below a strength value of 80 [Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & Howells,1980].)


10 F-•ANTICIPATORY—^PERFORMANCE

LOW MEDIUM HIGH LOW MEDIUM HIGH

INTERGROUP LEVELS INTRASUBJECT LEVELS

LOW MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM

INTERGROUP LEVELS INTRASUBJECT LEVELS

LEVEL OF PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY

Figure 11. Mean intensity of anticipatory and performance fear arousal experienced bydifferent groups of subjects at different levels of perceived self-efficacy (intergroup) and bythe same subjects at successively higher levels of perceived self-efficacy (intrasubject). (Self-percepts of efficacy were raised through eriactive mastery in the two left panels and throughmodeling in the two right panels [Bandura et al., in press].)

pressure rose during anticipation and performanceof the activities. After self-percepts of efficacywere fully strengthened, these same task demandswere managed unperturbedly.

When presented with tasks in the weak self-ef-ficacy range, most subjects promptly dismissedthem as too far beyond their coping capabilitiesto even attempt. Indeed, only a few subjects wereable to do any of them. Although too few instanceswere available for a meaningful analysis of per-formance arousal, data from the anticipatory phaseshed some light on how visceral reactions changewhen people preclude transactions with threatsthat they judge will overwhelm their coping ca-

pabilities. Cardiac reactivity subsided, but bloodpressure continued to climb. After self-percepts ofefficacy were strengthened to the maximal level,everyone performed these previously intimidatingtasks without any visceral agitation.

Heart rate is likely to be affected more quicklythan blood pressure by personal restructuring ofstressful demands, which may explain the differ-ential pattern of physiological reactivity at extremeself-inefflcaciousness. There exists some evidencethat catecholamines are released in different tem-poral patterns in response to external events (Mef-ford et al., 1981). Heart rate is especially sensitiveto momentary changes in hormonal patterns, with

8 s

WBj S(S)S(M)S(W)

1°1-1

SYSTOLICin 6

843£D 3Zuj 219

1'ozO

i

DIASTOLIC

B, S M W B2 S(S)S(M)S(W) B, S M W B2 S(S)S(M)S(W)

STRENGTH OF SELF-PERCEPTS OF EFFICACY

Figure 12. Mean change from the baseline level in heart rate and blood pressure duringanticipatory and performance periods, as a function of differential strength of self-perceptsof efficacy. (B refers to baseline, and S, M, and W signify strong, medium, and weak strengths .of perceived self-efficacy, respectively. For each physiological measure the figure on the leftin the panel shows the autonomic reactions related to self-percepts that differ in strength[performance arousal at weak self-efficacy is based on only a few subjects who exhibited partialperformances]; the figure on the right in the same panel shows the autonomic reactions to thesame set of tasks after self-percepts of efficacy were strengthened to maximal level [Banduraet al., in press].)


epinephrine, which is rapidly discharged, havinga more pronounced effect on cardiac activity thanon arterial pressure. Understanding of the phys-iological mechanisms by which self-percepts ofefficacy give rise to stress reactions can be carriedone step further by linking strength of perceivedself-efficacy to hormonal releases.

Perceived self-efficacy and emotional arousalundoubtedly involve, interactive (though asym-metrical) effects, with coping efficacy exercisingthe much greater sway. That is, perceived ineffi-caciousness in coping with potential threats leadspeople to approach such situations anxiously, andexperiencing disruptive arousal may further lowertheir sense of efficacy that they will be able toperform skillfully. However, self-percepts of effi-cacy predict avoidance behavior, whereas auto-nomic arousal bears no uniform relationship to it(Bandura, 1978a; Bolles, 1972; Herrnstein, 1969;Leitenberg, Agras, Butz, & Wincze, 1971). Peopleare thus much more likely to act on their self-per-cepts of efficacy than on visceral cues. This shouldcome as no surprise, since information derivedfrom past accomplishments and comparative ap-praisals is considerably more indicative of capa-bleness than are the indefinite stirrings of the vis-cera. For example, accomplished actors interprettheir brief nervousness before a play as a normativesituational reaction, rather than as an indicant ofpersonal .incapability, and are in no way dissuadedby their viscera from going on stage and perform-ing well what they assuredly know they can doonce they get started.

Perceived Self-Inefficacy, Futility,and Despondency

Inability to influence events and social conditionsthat significantly affect one's life can give rise tofeelings of futility and despondency as well as toanxiety. Self-efficacy theory distinguishes betweentwo judgmental sources of futility. People can giveup trying because they seriously doubt that theycan do what is required. Or they may be assuredof their capabilities but give up trying because theyexpect their efforts to produce no results due tothe unresponsiveness, negative bias, or punitivenessof the environment. These two separate sources offutility have quite different causes and remedialimplications. To change efficacy-based futility re-quires development of constituent competenciesand strong percepts of self-efficacy. In contrast, tochange outcome-based futility necessitates chang-ing the social environment so that people can gain

OUTCOME JUDGMENT

UI

oQ

U

U

u.ui(0

SOCIAL ACTIVISM

PROTEST

GRIEVANCE

MILIEU CHANGE

RESIGNATION

APATHY

ASSURED,OPPORTUNE

ACTION

SELF-DEVALUATION

DESPONDENCY

Figure 13. Interactive effects of self-percepts of effi-cacy and response outcome expectations on behavior andaffective reactions.

the benefits of the competencies they already pos-sess.

In any given instance behavior would be bestpredicted by considering both self-efficacy andoutcome beliefs.4 As can be seen in Figure 13, dif-ferent patterns of outcome and efficacy beliefs arelikely to produce different psychological effects.A high sense of personal efficacy and a responsiveenvironment that rewards performance attain-ments fosters assured, active responsiveness. Con-sider next the pattern combining high self-efficacy

4 The types of outcomes people expect depend largely ontheir judgments of how well they will be able to perform ingiven situations. For example, drivers who judge themselvesinefficacious in navigating winding mountain roads will conjureup outcomes of wreckage and bodily injury, whereas those whoare fully confident of their driving capabilities will anticipatesweeping vistas rather than tangled wreckage. Similarly thesocial reactions people anticipate for asserting themselves de-pend on their judgments of how adroitly they can do it. Insocial, intellectual, and athletic pursuits, those who judge them-selves highly efficacious will anticipate successful outcomes andself-doubters will expect mediocre performances of themselvesand, thus, less favorable outcomes. For activities in which out-comes are either inherent to the actions or are tightly linkedby social codes, expected outcomes cannot be disembodied fromthe very performance judgments on which they are conditional.Outcome expectations are dissociable from self-efficacy judg-ments when extrinsic outcomes are loosely linked to level orquality of performance. Such structural arrangements permitsocial biases to come into play, so the same performance at-tainments may produce variable, and often inequitable, out-comes. Expected outcomes are also partially separable from self-efficacy judgments when extrinsic outcomes are fixed to a min-imal level of performance, as when a designated level of workproductivity produces a fixed pay but higher performancebrings no additional monetary benefits.


with low environmental responsiveness. Effica-cious persons who cannot achieve positive out-comes by their actions will not necessarily ceasebehaving. Those of low efficacy will give upreadily, should their efforts fail to produce results.But self-efficacious individuals will intensify theirefforts and, if necessary, try to change the envi-ronment.

The pattern in which competency goes unre-warded or is punished underscores the need todifferentiate two levels of control—control overoutcomes and control over the social systems thatprescribe what the outcomes will be. In addressingthis issue Gurin (in press) and Lacey (1979) giveconsiderable attention to the exercise of influenceover social systems, which typically receives scantnotice in psychological analyses of controllability.Conditions combining high self-efficacy with en-vironmental unresponsiveness tend to generate re-sentment, protest, and collective efforts to changeexisting practices (Bandura, 1973; Short & Wolf-gang, 1972). Should change be difficult to achieve,given suitable alternatives people will desert en-vironments that are unresponsive to their effortsand pursue their activities elsewhere.

Considering the joint influence of self-efficacyand outcome beliefs provides a basis for differ-entiating conditions conducive to apathy fromthose likely to induce despondency. When peoplehave a low sense of personal efficacy and noamount of effort by themselves or comparativeothers produces results, they become apathetic andresigned to a dreary life. The pattern in whichpeople perceive themselves as ineffectual but seesimilar others enjoying the benefits of successfuleffort is apt to give rise to self-disparagement anddepression. Evident successes of others make ithard to avoid self-criticism.

In the original theory of learned helplessness(Seligman, 1975), people become inactive and de-pressed if their actions cannot affect what happensto them. Because they come to expect future re-sponding to be futile, they no longer try, even insituations in which they can achieve results throughtheir behavior. The reformulated theory (Abram-son, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) shifts the causallocus of detrimental effects from belief that one'sperformances will go unrewarded (response-out-come independence) to belief that one cannot pro-duce the performances. It singles out three di-mensions in causal judgments of failure: In-ternality—Are failures ascribed to personal or toexternal factors? Stability—Are the ascribed causesenduring or transient? Generality—Are the causes

believed to operate in many situations or only afew? Attributing one's failures to personal defi-ciencies of generalized and enduring nature, whichis postulated to be most debilitating and depress-ing, constitutes a profound sense of personal inef-ficacy. Biases toward ascribing poor performancesto basic personal deficiencies increase pronenessto depression (Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, &von Baeyer, 1979).

The adequacy of performance attainments de-pends on the personal standards against which theyare gauged. A comprehensive theory of depressionmust therefore be concerned not only with theperceived causality of failure but also with internalstandards by which attainments will be self-judgedas successes or as failures to begin with. Depressivereactions often arise from stringent standards ofself-evaluation, which make objective successespersonal failures. Individuals who are prone todepression impose on themselves high perfor-mance demands and devalue their accomplish-ments because they fall short of their exacting stan-dards (Kanfer & Hagerman, 1980; Rehm, 1977;Simon, Note 8).

A theory must specify when perceived ineffi-cacy will give rise to anxiety or despondency. Thenature of the outcomes over which personal controlis sought is one differentiating factor. People ex-perience anxiety when they perceive themselvesill equipped to manage potentially injurious events.Attenuation or control of aversive outcomes is cen-tral to anxiety. People are saddened and depressedby their perceived inefficacy in gaining highlyvalued outcomes. Irreparable loss or failure to gaindesired rewarding outcomes figures prominentlyin despondency. In the extreme cases individualsbecome so chronically preoccupied with self-de-preciation and their sense of worthlessness that thepursuit of personal satisfactions becomes futile(Beck, 1973). There are certain situations, ofcourse, in which perceived inefficacy in gaininghighly valued outcomes can be anxiety provokingas well. When the valued outcomes one seeks alsoserve to forestall future aversive events, as whenfailure to secure a job jeopardizes one's livelihood,perceived inefficacy is both distressing and de-pressing. Because of the interdependence ofevents, both apprehension and despair often ac-company perceived personal inefficacy.

Undermining Self-Efficacy byRelinquishing Personal ControlWhen personal control is easy to exercise and en-ables one to deal effectively with everyday events,


it is highly desired. Indeed, in laboratory studiesin which aversive stimuli can be controlled by sim-ple responses requiring neither skills nor expen-diture of effort and entailing no risks, controlla-bility is decidedly preferred (Miller, 1979). Butthere is an onerous side to personal control that israrely, if ever, incorporated in most of the para-digms-designed to study personal control. Self-de-velopment of efficaciousness requires mastery ofknowledge and skills that can be attained onlythrough long hours of arduous work. This oftennecessitates sacrificing many immediate rewards.Moreover, maintaining proficiency in given en-deavors, which constantly change with social andtechnological advances, demands continued heavyinvestment of time, effort, and resources.

In addition to the work of self-development, inmany situations the exercise of personal controlcarries heavy responsibilities and risks. For ex-ample, presidents of corporations are granted con-siderable controlling power, but they must bearpersonal responsibility for the negative conse-quences of their decisions and actions, some ofwhich have widespread repercussions. These bur-densome aspects dull the appetite for personal con-trol. Attractive incentives, privileges, and headysocial rewards are therefore needed to get peopleto seek control involving complicated skills, labo-rious responsibilities, and heavy risks.

PROXY CONTROL

People are not averse to relinquishing control overevents that affect their lives in order to free them-selves of the performance demands and hazardsthat the exercise of control entails. Rather thanseeking personal control, they seek their securityin proxy control—wherein they can exert someinfluence over those who wield influence andpower. Part of the price of proxy control is restric-tion of one's own efficacy and a vulnerable securitythat rests on the competencies and favors of others.

Perceived inefficacy fosters dependence on proxycontrol* which further reduces opportunities tobuild the requisite skills for efficacious action. Theinfluential role of comparative self-ability evalu-ation in proxy control is revealed in studies byMiller and her associates (Miller, 1980). Peoplewho are led to believe that they possess superiorcoping ability handle potential threats themselves,whereas those who believe themselves to be lessskilled readily yield control to others to cope withthe aversive environment. The dependent onesenjoy the protective benefits without the perfor-mance demands and attendant stresses, and the

controllers do the work and suffer the distress overrisks of failure.

UNDERMINERS OF PERSONAL EFFICACY

The preceding discussion focused on personal inef-ficacy- arising from the costs and demands of ef-ficacious behavior. Many factors operate in every-day life to undermine efficacious use of theknowledge and skills that people possess. In an in-formative program of research on illusory incom-petence, Langer (1979) has given us a better un-derstanding of the diverse conditions that impairthe exercise of capabilities: Situational factors thatoften accompany poor performance can in them-selves instill a sense of incompetence that is un-warranted. The mere presence of a highly confi-dent individual undermines effective use of routineskills. Attending to what is strange in new tasks,rather than what is familiar and clearly withinone's range of capability, may similarly hinderperformance. And when people are cast in sub-ordinate roles or are assigned inferior labels, im-plying limited competence, they perform activitiesat which they are skilled less well than when theydo not bear the negative labels or the subordinaterole designations.

The intervening mechanism through which de-moralizing conditions undermine effective use ofwell-established skills remains to be clarified. Stud-ies in which self-percepts are measured under in-duced illusory self-efficacy suggest that perceivedinefficacy, with its concomitant effects on choicebehavior, effort expenditure, persistence, and self-debilitating thought, may be the operative mech-anism. This evidence comes from experimentsdemonstrating that changes in physical stamina incompetitive situations are partly mediated throughself-percepts of efficacy (Weinberg et al., 1979;Weinberg et al., 1980). The lower the illusorilyinstated self-percepts of physical efficacy, theweaker the competitive endurance in new physicalactivities. Even the mere sight of a formidablelooking oponent instills lower self-percepts of ef-ficacy than does one who looks less impressive. Asmight be expected preexisting self-percepts of ef-ficacy have greatest impact on initial competitiveperformance, whereas socially induced self-per-cepts affect the subsequent course of competitiveendurance (Weinberg, Gould, Yukelson, & Jack-son, in press). The power of self-efficacy belief overbrawn is underscored further by evidence that self-percepts of physical efficacy illusorily boosted infemales and illusorily diminished in males oblit-


crates large preexisting sex differences in physicalstrength (Weinberg et al, 1979).

Collective Efficacy

The discussion thus far has focused mainly on thepersonal effects of perceived self-efficacy. Peopledo not live their lives as social isolates. Many ofthe challenges and difficulties they face reflectgroup problems requiring sustained collective ef-fort to produce any significant change. The strengthof groups, organizations, and even nations liespartly in people's sense of collective efficacy thatthey can solve their problems and improve theirlives through concerted effort. Perceived collectiveefficacy will influence what people choose to doas a group, how much effort they put into it, andtheir staying power when group efforts fail to pro*duce results. It should be noted that knowledge ofpersonal efficacy is not unrelated to perceivedgroup efficacy. As will be shown shortly, collectiveefficacy is rooted in self-efficacy. Inveterate self-doubters are not easily forged into a collectivelyefficacious force.

COLLECTIVE EFFICACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The task of social change has never been an easyone. Those who seek to alter social systems andtheir practices encounter opposition from powerholders and influential vested interests. Shouldchallengers resort to forceful social protest, puni-tive sanctions can be brought to bear against them.The numerous obstacles and coercive threats deterattempts to alter social conditions that adverselyaffect human lives.

It is often said that hopelessness breeds militantsocial action. However, the evidence would seemto dispute this view. Consistent with self-efficacytheory, studies of social and political activism in-dicate that detrimental conditions prompt forcefulaction, not in those who have lost hope, but in themore able members whose efforts at social andeconomic betterment have met with at least somesuccess (Bandura, 1973). Consequently, they havereason to believe that some changes can be broughtabout through forceful group action.

Among the members of dissident groups, thosewho protest social inequities, compared to non-participants, are generally better educated, havegreater self-pride, have a stronger belief in theirability to influence events in their lives, and favorcoercive measures, if necessary, to improve theirliving conditions (Caplan, 1970; Crawford & Na-

ditch, 1970). In many nations university students,rather than the severely underprivileged segmentsof the society, are the spearhead of political activ-ism (Lipset, 1966). They are the ones who ofteninitiate the protest movements that eventuallyforce social reforms and topple governments. Re-sults of comparative studies indicate that peoplewho are most disposed to social action generallycome from familial backgrounds in which the ex-ercise of social influence has been modeled andrewarded (Keniston, 1968; Rosenhan, 1970). Mod-eling influences, however, which serve as a majorvehicle of social diffusion, can substantially alterthe personal and social correlates of activism overtime. Those who initiate collective action usuallydiffer in characteristics from later adopters.

Research including efficacy probes speaks moredirectly to the issue of whether perceived efficacyserves as one mechanism through which social dis-content gives rise to social activism. Much of thisresearch relies on global indices of efficacy, oftenblending mixed contents (Balch, 1974). Even so,the relationships obtained are fairly consistent. Thehigher the perceived efficacy, the greater the pro-pensity to social activism (Forward & Williams,1970; Marsh, 1977; Muller, 1972, 1979). However,sharper empirical tests of theory will require par-ticularized multifaceted measures of efficacy, tap-ping perceived capabilities for fashioning and ex-ecuting different types of strategies designed toinfluence the course of social events. Since socialoutcomes are typically achieved in concert withothers, perceptions of group as well as personalefficacy warrant examination.

UNDERMINERS OF COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

Rapidly changing conditions, which impair thequality of social life and degrade the physical en-vironment, call for wide-reaching solutions to hu-man problems and greater commitment to sharedpurposes. Such changes can be achieved onlythrough the mutual effort of people who have theskills, the sense of collective efficacy, and the in-centives to shape the direction of their future en-vironment. As the need for efficacious group actiongrows, so does the sense of collective powerlessness.

One can point to a number of factors that serveto undermine the development of collective effi-cacy. Modern life is extensively regulated by com-plex physical technologies that most people neithercomprehend nor believe they can do much to in-fluence. Pervasive dependence on technologiesthat govern major aspects of life imposes depen-dence on specialized technicians. The social ma-


chinery of a society is no less challenging. Layersof bureaucratic structures thwart effective social

"action. Even the more efficacious individuals, whoare not easily deterred, find their efforts bluntedby mazy organizational mechanisms that diffuseand obscure responsibility. Rather than developingthe means for shaping their future, most peoplegrudgingly relinquish control to technical special-ists and to public officials.

Effective action for social change requires merg-ing diverse self-interests in support of commongoals. Disagreements among different constituen-cies that have a personal stake in the matters ofconcern create additional obstacles to successfulgroup action. Recent years have witnessed growingsocial fragmentation irito narrow-interest constit-uencies. Pluralism is taking the form of militantfactionalism. As a consequence it is easier to enlistdiverse factions to block courses of action than tomerge them into a unified force for social change.

In addition to the difficulties in enlisting sharedpurposes and collective effort in their service, theinstitutions that are the objects of change mounttheir own forceful countermeasures. Because of themany conflicting forces that come into play, at-tempts to produce socially significant changes donot bring quick successes. Long delays betweenaction and noticeable results discourage many ofthe advocates along the way, even though changesof long-term significance may eventually occur. Itis; difficult to develop and sustain a sense of col-lective efficacy when the effects of group effortare not readily noticeable.

To complicate matters further, life in today'ssocieties is increasingly affected by transnationalinterdependencies (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Whathappens in one p&rt of the world can affect thewelfare of vast populations elsewhere". There areno handy direct mechanisms by which people canexercise reciprocal influence on transnational sys-te'ms that affect their daily lives. Profound globalchanges—burgeoning populations, shrinking re-sources, deteriorating environments—are creatingnew realities requiring transnational remedies.

The subject of collective efficacy calls for broadand comprehensive research effort. Advancementin this field of study requires development of suit-able tools for gauging groups' perceptions of theirefficacy to achieve varying levels of results. Great-est progress will be made in elucidating the de-velopment, decline, and restoration of collectiveefficacy arid how it affects group functioning, ifmeasures of perceived group efficacy are tiedclosely to explicit indices of group performance.

National surveys have been conducted periodi-

cally of people's geheral sense of political efficacy,their confidence in their social institutions, andhow they view the competence of those theychoose to lead them. Though such omnibus mea-sures leave much to be desired, they do provideevidence of growing erosion of perceived efficacyof the citizenry and its social institutions to solvehuman problems (Guest, 1974; Lipset & Schneider,1982).

FACTIONAL EFFICACY AND COLLECTIVE ENDEAVOR

In analyzing impediments to human endeavors, itis all too easy to lose sight of the fact that humaninfluence, whether individual or collective, oper-ates in reciprocal, rather than in unidirectional,ways (Bandura, 1978b; Cairns, 1979; Endler &Magnusson, 1976; Pervin & Lewis, 1978). Althoughthe degree of reciprocality may vary from onedomain of activity to another, social transactionsare rarely unilateral. The amount of imbalance ofsocial power partly depends on the extent to whichpeople exercise the influence that is theirs to com-mand. The less they bring their influence to bearon others, the more control they relinquish to them.

It is the internal barriers created by perceptionsof collective inefficacy that are especially perni-cious because they are more demoralizing and be-havior ally self-debilitating than are external im-pediments. People who have a sense of collectiveefficacy will mobilize their efforts and resourcesto Cope with external obstacles to the changes theyseek. But those convinced of their inefficacy willcease trying even though changes are attainablethrough concerted effort.

The social system is not a monolith. Rather, itcomprises numerous constituencies, each vying forpower and lobbying for its own interests. In thiscontinual interplay one and the same faction istransmuted from a challenger of the system to aninfluential confederate in the system opposing rivalfactions, depending on the issues at stake. Thus,for example, the tobacco constituency fights thesystem in federal efforts to curtail smoking, butit becomes the system fighting the efforts of othersto curtail federal subsidies to tobacco growers.Whether people want government in or out oftheir lives depends on the particular interests beingserviced.

The rise of narrow-interest groups flexing theirfactional efficacy does not jibe with the diagnosesof growing public apathy and feelings of help-lessness. Clearly there exists a paradox to be ex-plained. Viewed from the efficacy perspective, inthe absence of shared imperatives, growing fac-


tional efficacy undermines the exercise of collec-tive efficacy through mutual immobilization. Ef-ficacious factional initiatives, often fragmentedand rivalrous, create an overload of programs andregulations, force divisive issues on officeholders,weaken their capabilities to deal with them satis-factorily, and obfuscate a sense of purpose (Atkin,1980; Barton, 1980; Fiorina, 1980). Thus peopleare exercising greater factional influence butachieving less collectively and becoming more dis-contented. Since changing officeholders does hoteliminate the social problems people face, theybecome disillusioned about the prospect of effect-ing significant change in their social and economicway of life through the institutional means avail-able to them.

Achievement of collective efficacy requires co-gent means of relating factional interests to sharedpurposes. The unifying purposes must be explicitarid attainable through concerted effort. Becausesuccess calls for sustained endeavor over a longtime, proximal subgoals are needed to provide in-centives and evidence of progress along the way.As a society we enjoy the benefits left by thosebefore us, who collectively resisted inhumanitiesand worked for social reforms that permit a betterlife. Our own collective efficacy will shape, in turn,how future generations will live their lives: Thetimes call for a commitment of collective effort,rather than litanies of powerlessness that instill inpeople beliefs of inefficacy to influence conditionsthat shape the course of their lives.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. Kendrick, M. )., Craig, K. D., Lawsori, D. M., & Davidson,P. O. Cognitive and behavioral therapy for musical per-formance anxiety. Unpublished manuscript, University ofBritish Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 1981. ,

2. Mclntyre, K., Mermelstein, R., & Lichtenstein, E. Predictingabstinence from smoking using measures of self-efficacyand physical dependence. Paper presented at the meetingof the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy,New York, December 1980.

3. Katz, R. C., Stout, A., Taylor, B., Home, M., & Agras, S.Effects of propranolol and participant modeling in thetreatment of spider phobia. Paper presented at the meetingof the Western Psychological Association, Los Angeles, April1981.

4. Barrios, B. A. The role of self-efficacy in the reduction ofheterosocial anxiety: A microanalysis. Paper presented atthe meeting of the Association for Advancement of BehaviorTherapy, San Francisco, December 1979.

5. Hackett, G. Mathematics self-efficacy and the considera-tion of math-related majors: A preliminary path model.Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psycholog-ical Association, Los Angeles, August 1981.

6. Sagotsky, G., & Lewis, A. Extrinsic reward, positive ver-balizations, and subsequent intrinsic interest. Paper pre-sented at the meeting of the American Psychological Asso-ciation, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 1978.

7. Schunk, D. H. Overt verbalization as a facilitator of chil-dren's achievement, self-efficacy, and interest. Unpublishedmanuscript, University of Houston, 1981.

8. Simon, K. M. Effects of self comparison, social comparison,and depression on goal setting and self-evaluative reac-tions. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 1979.

REFERENCES

Abramson, L. ¥., Seligmari, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. Learnedhelplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journalof Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 87, 49-74,

Arnold, H. J. Effects of performance feedback and extrinsicreward upon high intrinsic motivation. Organizational Be-havior and Human Performance, 1976, 17, 275-288.

Atkiri, J. M. The government in the classroom. Daedalus, 1980,109(3), 85-97.

Averill, J. R. Personal control over aversive stimuli and its re-lationship to stress. Psychological Bulletin, 1973,80,286-303.

Balch, G. I. Multiple indicators in survey research: The concept"sense of political efficacy." Political Methodology, 1974,i(2), 1-43.

Bandura, A. Aggression: A social learning analysis. EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Bandura, A. Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behav-ioral change. Psychological Review, 1977, 84, 191-215. (a)

Bandura, A. Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1977. (b)

Bandura, A. Reflections on self-efficacy. In S. Rachman (Ed.),Advances in behaviour research and therapy (Vol. 1). Oxford,England: Pergamon Press, 1978. (a)

Bandura, A. The self system in reciprocal determinism. Amer-ican Psychologist, 1978, 33, 344-358. (b)

Bandura, A. Self-referent thought: A developmental analysis ofself-efficacy. In J. H. Flavell & L. Ross (Eds.), Social cognitivedevelopment: Frontiers and possible futures. Cambridge,England: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Bandura, A. The self and mechanisms of agency. In J. Suls (Ed.),Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, N.J.:Erlbaum, in press.

Bandura, A., & Adams, N. E. Analysis,of self-efficacy theoryof behavioral change. Cognitive Therapy and Research,

. 1977, 1, 287-308:Bandura, A., Adams, N. E., & Beyer, J. Cognitive processes

mediating behavioral change. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 1977, 35, 125-139.

Bandura, A., Adams, N. E., Hardy, A. B., & Howells, G. N,Tests of the generality of self-efficacy theory. Cognitive Ther-apy and Research, 1980, 4, 39-66.

Bandura, A., Reese, L., & Adams, N. E. Microanalysis,of actionand fear arousal as a function of differential levels of per-ceived self-efficacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, in press.

Bandura, A., & Schunk, D. H. Cultivating competence, self-efficacy, and intrinsic interest through proximal self-moti-vation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1981,•41, 586-598.

Barton, A. H. Fault lines in American elite consensus. Daedalus,1980, 109(3), 1-24.

Bales, J. A. Extrinsic reward and intrinsip motivation: A reviewwith implications for the classroom. Review of EducationalResearch, 1979, 4&, 557-576:

Beck, A. T. The diagnosis and management of depression.Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973.

Beck, A. T. Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders.New York: International Universities Press, 1976.

Beck, A. T., Laude, R., & Bohnert, M. Ideational componentsof anxiety neurosis. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1974,31, 319-325.

Bern, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Ad-


vances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6). New York:Academic Press, 1972.

Betz, N.'E., & Hackett, G. The relationships of career-relatedself-efficacy expectations to perceived career options in col-Jege women and men. Journal of Counseling Psychology,1981,28,399-410.

Biran, M., & Wilson, G. T. Cognitive versus behavioral methodsin the treatment of phobic disorders: A self-efficacy analysis.Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1981, 49,886-899.

Boggiano, A. K., & Ruble, D. N. Competence and the overju's-tification effect: A developmental study. Journal of Person-ality and Social Psychology, 1979, 37, 1462-1468.

Bolles, R..C. The avoidance learning problem. In G. Bower(Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 6).New York: Academic Press, 1972.

Bourque, P., & Ladouceur, R. An investigation of various per-formance-based treatments with acrophobics. Behaviour Re-search and Therapy, 1980, 18, 161-170. .

Brown, I., Jr., & Inouye, D. K. Learned helplessness throughmodeling: The role of perceived similarity in competence.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978,36,900-908.

Cairns, R. B. (Ed.). The analysis of social interactions: Meth-ods, issues and illustrations. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1979.

Calder, B. J., & Staw, B. M. Self-perception of intrinsic andextrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1975, 31, 599-605.

Caplan, N. The new ghetto man: A review of recent empiricalstudies. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26, 59-73.

Chambliss, C. A., & Murray, E. J. Cognitive procedures forsmoking reduction: Symptom attribution versus efficacy at-tribution. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1979, 3, 91-96.(a)

Chambliss, C. A., & Murray, E. J. Efficacy attribution, locusof control, and weight loss. Cognitive Therapy and Research,1979, 3, 349-354. (b)

Collins, J. Self-efficacy and ability in achievement behavior.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1982.

Condiotte, M. M., & Lichtenstein, E. Self-efficacy and relapsein smoking cessation programs. Journal of Consulting andClinical Psychology, 1981, 49, 648-658.

Condry, J. Enemies of exploration: Self-initiated versus other-initiated learning. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1977, 35, 459-477.

Crawford, T., & Naditch, M. Relative deprivation, powerless-ness, and militancy: The psychology of social protest. Psy-chiatry, 1970, 33, 208-223.

Davidson, P., & Bucher, B. Intrinsic interest and extrinsic re-ward: The effects of a continuing token program on con-tinuing nonconstrained preference. Behavior Therapy, 1978,9, 222-234.

DeCharms, R. Personal causation: The internal affective de-terminants of behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1968.

Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Press,1975. .

DiClemente, C. C. Self-efficacy and smoking cessation main-tenance: A preliminary report. Cognitive Therapy and Re-search, 1981, 5, 175-187. ...

Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (Eds.). Interactional psychologyand personality. Washington, D.C.; Hemisphere, 1976.

Enzle, M. E., & Ross, J. M. Increasing and decreasing intrinsicinterest with contingent rewards: A test of cognitive evalu-ation theory. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,1978, 14,588-597.

Feltz, D. L., Landers, D. M., & Raeder, U. Enhancing self-efficacy in high-avoidance motor tasks: A comparison ofmodeling techniques. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1979, 1,112-122.

Fiorina, M. P. The decline of collective responsibility in Amer-ican politics. Daedalus, 1980, 109(3), 25-45.

Forward, J. R., & Williams, J. R. Internal-external control andblack militancy. Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26, 75-92.

Garber, J., & Seligman, M. E. P. (Eds.). Human helplessness:Theory and applications. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Gauthier, J., & Ladouceur, R. The influence of self-efficacyreports on performance. Behavior Therapy, 1981, 12, 436-439.

Glass, D. C., Reim, B., & Singer, J. Behavioral consequences ofadaptation to controllable and uncontrollable noise. Journalof Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 244-257.

Greene, D., Sternberg, B., & Lepper, M. R. Overjustificationin a token economy. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1976, 34, 1219-1234.

Greeno, J. G. Theory and practice regarding acquired cognitivestructures. Educational Psychologist, 1973, 10, 117-122.

Guest, A. M. Subjective powerlessness in the United States: Somelongitudinal trends. Social Science Quarterly, 1974,54,. 827-842.

Gunnar, M. R. Control, warning signals, and distress in infancy.Developmental Psychology, 1980, 16, 281-289.

Gunnar-vonGnechten, M. R. Changing a frightening toy intoa pleasant toy by allowing the infant to control its actions.Developmental Psychology, 1978, 14, 147-152.

Gurin, P. Sense of efficacy: Its dependence on judgments of theself and the world. In P. B. Baltes & O. G. Brim, Jr. (Eds.),Life-span development and behavior. New York; AcademicPress, in press.

Hackett, G., & Betz, N. E. A self-efficacy approach to the careerdevelopment of women. Journal of Vocational Behavior,1981,18,326-339.

Herrnstein, R. J. Method and theory in the study of avoidance.Psychological Review, 1969, 76, 49-69.

Kanfer, F. H., & Hagerman, S. The role of self-regulation. InL. P. Rehm (Ed.), Behavior therapy and depression: Presentstatus and future directions. New York: Academic Press,1980. .

Karniol, R., & Ross, M. The effect of performance-relevant andperformance-irrelevant rewards on children's intrinsic mo-tivation. Child Development, 1977, 48, 482-487.

Kazdin, A. E. Covert modeling and the reduction of avoidancebehavior. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1973, 81, 87-95.

Kazdin, A. E. Imagery elaboration and self-efficacy in the covertmodeling treatment of unassertive behavior. Journal of Con-sulting and Clinical Psychology, 1979, 47, 725-733.

Keniston, K. Young radicals. New York: Harcourt, Brace &World, 1968.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. Power and interdependence:World politics in transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

Kruglanski, A. W. The endrogenous-exogenous partition in at-tribution theory. Psychological Review, 1975, 82, 387 -406.

Lacey, H. M. Control, perceived control and the methodologicalrole of cognitive constructs. In L. C. Perlmuter & R. A. Monty(Eds.), Choice and perceived control. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erl-baum, 1979.

Langer, E. J. The illusion of incompetence. In L. C. Perlmuter& R. A. Monty (Eds.), Choice and perceived control. Hills-dale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1979.

Lazarus, R. S. The stress and coping paradigm. In C. Eisdorfer,D. Cohen, A. Kleinman, & P. Maxim (Eds.), Theoretical basesfor psychopathology. New York: Spectrum, 1980.

Lazarus, R. S., & Launier, R. Stress-related transactions betweenperson and environment. In L. A. Pervin & M. Lewis (Eds.),Perspectives in interactional psychology. New York: PlenumPress, 1978.

Lefcourt, H. M. Locus of control: Current trends in theoryand research. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1976.

Leitenberg, H., Agras, W. S., Butz.R., & Wincze, J. Relationshipbetween heart rate and behavioral change during the treat-ment of phobias. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 78,59-68.


Lepper, M. R. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in children:Detrimental effects of superfluous social controls. In W. A.Collins (Ed.), Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology(Vol. 14). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1980.

Lepper, M. R., & Greene, D. Overjustification research andbeyond: Toward a means-end analysis of intrinsic and ex-trinsic motivation. In M. R. Lepper & D. Greene (Eds.), Thehidden costs of reward: New perspectives on the psychologyof human motivation. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1978.

Lipset, S. M. University students and politics in underdevelopedcountries. Comparative Education Review, 1966, 10, 132-162.

Lipset, S. M., & Schneider, W. How Americans dew their in-stitutions. New York: Macmillan, 1981.

Locke, E. A., Cartledge, N., & Knerr, C. S. Studies of the re-lationship between satisfaction, goal setting, and perfor-mance. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1970, 5, 135-158.

Loveland, K. K., & Olley, J. G. The effect of external rewardon interest and quality of task performance in children ofhigh and low intrinsic motivation. Child Development, 1979,50, 1207-1210.

Marlatt, G. A., & Gordon, J. R. Determinants of relapse: Im-plications for the maintenance of behavior change. In P. O.Davidson & S. M. Davidson (Eds.), Behavioral medicine:Changing health lifestyles. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1980.

Marsh, A. Protest and political consciousness. Beverly Hills,Calif.: Sage, 1977.

McLoyd, V. C. The effects of extrinsic rewards of differentialvalue on high and low intrinsic interest. Child Development,1979, 50, 1010-1019.

Mefford, I. N., Ward, M. M., Miles, L., Taylor, B., Chesney,M. A., Keegan, D. L., & Barchas, J. D. Determination ofplasma catecholamines and free 3,4-dihydroxyphenylaceticacid in continuously collected human plasma by high per-formance liquid chromatography with electrochemical de-tection. Life Sciences, 1981, 28, 447-483.

Meichenbaum, D. H. Cognitive-behavior modification: An in-tegrative approach. New York: Plenum Press, 1977.

Miller, S. M. Controllability and human stress: Method, evidenceand theory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1979,17,287-304.

Miller, S. M. Why having control reduces stress: If I can stopthe roller coaster I don't want to get off. In J. Garber &M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.), Human helplessness: Theory andapplications. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Miller, S. M. Predictability and human stress: Towards a clar-ification of evidence and theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Ad-vances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 14). NewYork: Academic Press, 1981.

Muller, E. N. A test of a partial theory of potential for politicalviolence. The American Political Science Review, 1972, 66,928-959.

Muller, E. N. Aggressive political participation. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1979.

Neufeld, R. W. J., & Thomas, P. Effects of perceived efficacyof a prophylactic controlling mechanism on self-control underpain stimulation. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science,1977, 9, 224-232.

Newell,'A. Production systems: Models of control structures. InW. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing. NewYork: Academic Press, 1973.

Newell, K. M. Some issues on action plans. In G. E. Stelmach(Ed.), Information processing in motor control and learning.New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Perlmuter, L. C., & Monty, R. A. (Eds.). Choice and perceivedcontrol. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1979.

Pervin, L. A., & Lewis, M. (Eds.). Perspective in interactionalpsychology. New York: Plenum Press, 1978.

Rachman, S. (Ed.). Perceived self-efficacy: Analysis of Ban-dura's theory of behavioural change. Advances in BehaviourResearch and Therapy, 1978, i(Whole No. 4).

Rehm, L. P. A self-control model of depression. Behavior Ther-apy, 1977, 8, 787-804.

Rosenhan, D. L. The natural socialization of altruistic auton-omy. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism andhelping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Ross, M. The self perception of intrinsic motivation. In J. H.Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions inattribution research (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1976.

Rotter, J. B., Chance, J. E., & Phares, E. J. Applications of asocial learning theory of personality. New York: Holt, Rine-hart & Winston, 1972.

Salomon, G. Television is "easy" and print is "tough": Thedifferential investment of mental effort in learning as a func-tion of perceptions and attributions. Journal of EducationalPsychology, in press.

Sarason, I. G. Anxiety and self-preoccupation. In I. G. Sarason& D. C. Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and anxiety (Vol. 2). Wash-ington, D.C.: Hemisphere, 1975.

Schunk, D. H: Modeling and attributional effects on children'sachievement: A self-efficacy analysis. Journal of EducationalPsychology, 1981, 73, 93-105.

Seligman, M. E. P. Helplessness: On depression, development,and death. San Francisco: Freeman, 1975.

Seligman, M. E. P., Abramson, L. Y., Semmel, A., & von Baeyer,C. Depressive attributional style. Journal of Abnormal Psy-chology, 1979, 88, 242-247.

Seligman, M. E, P., & Binik, Y. M. The safety signal hypothesis.In H. Davis & H. Hurwitz (Eds.), Pavlovian-operant inter-action. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

Short, J. F., Jr., & Wolfgang, M. E. Collective violence. Chicago:Aldine-Atherton, 1972.

Stelmach, G. E. (Ed,). Motor control: Issues and trends. NewYork: Academic Press, 1976.

Stelmach, G. E. (Ed.). Information processing in motor controland learning. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Telch, M. J., Bandura, A., Vinciguerra, A., Agras, A., & Stout,A. L. Social demand and congruence between self-efficacyand performance. Behavior Therapy, in press.

Weinberg, R. S., Gould, D., & Jackson, A. Expectations andperformance: An empirical test of Bandura's self-efficacy the-ory. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1979, J, 320-331.

Weinberg, R. S., Gould, D., Yukelson, D., & Jackson, A. Theeffect of self- and manipulated-efficacy on a competitivemuscular endurance task. Journal of Sport Psychology, inpress.

Weinberg, R. S., Yukelson, S., & Jackson, A. Effect of publicand private efficacy expectations on competitive perfor-mance. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1980, 2, 340-349.

White, R. W. Motivation reconsidered: The concept of com-petence. Psychological Review, 1959, 66, 297-333.


self-efficacy mechanism in human agency · 2018-02-19 · they no longer need to judge their...

Documents