selective online exposure and political polarization during swedish election campaigns

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Selective online exposure and political polarization during Swedish election campaigns a longitudinal analysis using four waves of panel data Peter M. Dahlgren Adam Shehata Jesper Strömbäck @ peterdalle peterdahlgren.com [email protected]

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Selective online exposure and political polarization during Swedish election campaignsa longitudinal analysis using four waves of panel data

Peter M. Dahlgren

Adam Shehata

Jesper Strömbäck

@peterdalle

peterdahlgren.com

[email protected]

Selective online exposure

Background

• Internet is a high-choice media environment

• Personal motivations increasingly important in news selection

• Prefer attitude-consistent news, but don’t avoid attitude-inconsistent

• Political ideologies more salient during elections

Purpose

Examine how political ideology and selective exposure mutuallyreinforce over time, and whether they become more extreme

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Hypotheses

More selective exposure more ideologically extreme

Less selective exposure less ideologically extreme

Research questions

Selective exposure over time?

Role of political interest?

RQ1

RQ2

H1

H2

Method

• Panel survey during five months in the 2014 EU and Swedish national election: ”super election year”

• Random sample

• 2,281 (33%) completed all waves

Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4

May 22–25 September 14May 26–June 4April 11–22 August 1–13 September 15–24

Sample (n=2,281)

Sex:

Education:

Age: 19–76 years (M=46, SD=17)

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Results: political ideology

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Conclusions

No support for political ideology and selective exposure mutually reinforcing and becoming more extreme over time.

Individuals exposed to attitude-inconsistent news get slightlyless extreme (but mostly moving toward right).

High political interest: more extreme political ideology, and more exposure to attitude-inconsistent news.

RQ1

RQ2

H1

H2

Peter M. Dahlgrenselective exposure and media effects

@peterdalle

peterdahlgren.com

[email protected]