security sector reform and the paradoxical tension between local ownership and gender equality

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Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an increas-ingly significant feature of peacebuildingefforts (UN 2013 and 2008; Sedra 2010) inrecognition of the importance of effectiveand accountable security sector institutionsto sustainable peace, as well as regional sta-bility and international security (UN 2008;

OECD 2007). It is broadly agreed that local

ownership is one of the core principles ofsuccessful SSR projects (Donais 2009; OECD2007; Nathan 2007; Mobekk 2010b). SSRprogrammes that are not locally owned tendto result in security and justice sector institu-tions that are not accountable or responsiveto the needs of the people and, therefore,lack public trust and confidence. This under-mines the extent to which SSR and broaderpeacebuilding efforts can be successful.

Similarly, it is increasingly recognised thatmainstreaming gender issues and promot-ing gender equality in SSR programmes is

Gordon, E et al 2015 Security Sector Reform and the ParadoxicalTension between Local Ownership and Gender Equality. Stability:International Journal of Security & Development,4(1): 53, pp. 123,DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gj

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Security Sector Reform and the ParadoxicalTension between Local Ownership andGender Equality

Eleanor Gordon*, Anthony Cleland Welch*and Emmicki Roos

This article analyses the tension or conict that can exist between the princi-ples of local ownership and gender equality that guide Security Sector Reform(SSR) programmes when gender discrimination and patriarchal values character-ise the local environment (and locals do not value gender equality). In thesesituations, international actors may be reluctant to advocate gender equality,regarding it as imposing culturally alien values and potentially destabilising tothe SSR process. It is argued, however, that the tension between local owner-ship and gender equality is deceptive and merely serves to protect the powerof dominant groups and disempower the marginalised, often serving to disguisethe power relations at play in post-conict environments and avoid addressingthe security needs of those who are often at most risk. The paper concludesthat rather than a tension existing between the two principles, in fact, localownership without gender equality is meaningless. Moreover, failing to promotegender equality undermines the extent to which SSR programmes result in secu-rity and justice sector institutions that are representative of and responsive tothe needs of both men and women. It can also perpetuate structural inequali-ties and conict dynamics and, ultimately, limit the success of SSR and broaderpeacebuilding processes.

* Department of Criminology, University of

Leicester, [email protected]

Executive Director at 1325 Policy Group

stability
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gjmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gj


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Gordon et al: Security Sector Reform and the Paradoxical Tensionbetween Local Ownership and Gender Equality

Art. 53, page 2 of 23

essential to their success and is a key factorin developing meaningful local ownership(Bastick 2008; Mobekk 2010a; Naraghi-Anderlini 2008; Valasek 2008). However,while the principles of local ownership and

gender equality are intertwined, there can bea tension where local actors may not sharethe Western liberal norms and values under-pinning democratic governance, humanrights and gender equality (Donais 2009).In these instances, should external actorsrefrain from imposing their own culturally-specific values regarding gender equality,which would undermine the principle oflocal ownership? Or, rather, should efforts be

taken to ensure that local ownership is inclu-sive and not limited to members of male-dominated, state-level security and politicalstructures and other elites, thereby avoidingfurther disempowering women and othermarginalised groups?

This article examines examples of SSR inSouth Sudan and other conflict-affectedenvironments to analyse the tension or con-flict that can exist between local ownership

and gender equality. What happens whengender discrimination and patriarchal val-ues characterise the local environment andlocals do not value gender equality? It isargued that the tension between local own-ership and gender equality is deceptive, serv-ing merely to protect the power of dominantgroups, disempower the marginalised, todisguise the power relations at play in post-conflict environments and avoid addressingthe security needs of those who are often at

most risk. The paper concludes that ratherthan a tension existing between the twoprinciples, in fact, local ownership withoutgender equality is meaningless. In essence,the question that needs to be asked is: whatdo we mean by locals? Locals are not ahomogenous whole and, although SSR maybe achieved more quickly by simply identify-ing state-level leaders as local counterparts,the results may perpetuate power divisions

and conflict dynamics that undermine thevalue of the SSR process.

This article further argues that local own-ership needs to be inclusive if institutionsare to be genuinely responsive to the needsof the people, rather than the elite or domi-nant members of society. In particular, SSR

programmes need to ensure that womenactively engage in SSR programmes for theirspecific security and justice needs to informdecisions about future security structures.Indeed, unless the specific security needs andconcerns of the marginalised are addressedin SSR programmes, post-conflict securityand justice will be illusory.

This paper draws on literature concerninggender and peacebuilding, and local owner-

ship and SSR. It will fill a gap in the existingacademic and policy-oriented literature byaddressing the gender dimensions of localownership in SSR and investigating the ten-sion that can exist in the field between gen-der-sensitivity and local ownership. It alsodraws on primary research in South Sudan,supplemented by consultation with a net-work of scholars, practitioners and studentsin the field of building security and justice

after conflict (and affiliated with the Security,Conflict and International Development(SCID) MSc programme delivered by theDepartment of Criminology at the Universityof Leicester). The authors also draw fromtheir professional experience of buildingsecurity and justice sector institutions afterconflict and promoting the engagement ofwomen in peacebuilding.

The Principle of Local Ownership

It is widely agreed that the principle of localownership is the bedrock of successful SSR(Donais 2009; OECD 2007; Nathan 2007;Mobekk 2010b). If SSR programmes are notlocally owned, it is likely that security sec-tor institutions, processes and policy willbe less able to respond to local needs orenjoy public trust and confidence, and thusless likely to be effective and sustainable(UN 2013; Smith-Hhn 2010). Local actors

need to be actively engaged in SSR pro-cesses in order to be able to ensure that the


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outputs including security sector institu-tions and policies are responsive to localneeds, resonate with cultural values, and areaccepted by the populace. Security sectorinstitutions and policies designed by outsid-

ers and at odds with local customs, traditionsand practices, are likely to be rejected by thelocal population (Edomwonyi 2003; Smith-Hhn 2010).

While local ownership is part of the con-temporary commonsense of SSR (Donais2009: 119), it remains unclear who the localsare (Mobekk 2010b; Scheye and Peake 2005;Donais 2009) and what comprises owner-ship (Mobekk 2010b) or rather, as Martin

and Wilson (2008: 83) ask Which Locals?Ownership of What? Despite the lack ofconsensus over the term, the emphasis onthe role of local actors has, since the mid-1990s, been a common component of theliterature on SSR. As conflicts take placewithin societies, it is within these societiesthat SSR measures must be rooted. Indeed,fostering and supporting local actors with anactive interest in building peace are seen as

key principles of post-conflict developmentmanagement, despite the ongoing confusionover who such local actors might be (Ropers2000).

It is generally considered that local own-ership should entail a nationally led andinclusive process in which national andlocal authorities, parliaments and civil soci-ety, including traditional leaders, womensgroups and others, are actively engaged (UN2008: 11). However, it is widely acknowl-

edged that there is a gap between policyand practice (Donais 2009; Gordon 2014;Nathan 2007; Welch 2014), with externalactors frequently imposing their modelsand programmes on local actors (Nathan2007: 7). Too often local ownership is reducedto limited consultation or engagement afterkey decisions have been made. Where localactors are engaged in the SSR process, theytend to be only a few like-minded, state-level,

predominantly male members of the securityand political elite who are likely to accept

the decisions reached previously by externalactors (Baker 2010; Caparini 2010; Mobekk2010b; Sedra 2010). Country-wide diversity isoften ignored (Baker 2010) and representa-tives of civil society and those at the com-

munity level tend to be engaged minimallyand sporadically, often amounting to littlemore than initial consultation and infre-quent dialogue (Capairini 2010). This hasbeen seen in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Iraq andSomalia, for example (Gordon 2014; Jackson2011, 2010; Saferworld and Forum for CivicInitiatives 2007). Christian Action Researchand Education (CARE 2006: 88) notes that,during the period 2004-2006 in Kosovo,

international governmental and non-govern-mental organisations were biased towardsworking with people who are, comparativelyspeaking, easier to reach either because theyare more moderate, apolitical or willing tocooperate. This tended to create educa-tional, class and urban predispositions. Otherreasons why local ownership rarely includesthose beyond the state-level security andpolitical elite include concerns regarding

co-ordination and resource implications aswell as fears about empowering spoilers andengaging those who may lack the requisiteexpertise (Gordon 2014). All these factorslimit the extent to which women and othermarginalised groups engage with SSR.

However, narrowly interpreting local own-ership in terms of who locals are and whatownership constitutes is contrary to policyadvice (UN 2008), undermining the poten-tial success of SSR and, with it, the broader

peacebuilding process. Locals do not consti-tute a homogenous whole who all have thesame security concerns (Ebo 2007; Mobekk2010b; UN 2008). Especially where govern-ments may not be broadly representativeof those they represent (Martin and Wilson2008), a narrow interpretation of local own-ership is likely to particularly disadvantagethe marginalised, including women. Whilenon-state actors continue to be widely con-

sidered as only marginally relevant to thecore concerns of SSR (Donais 2009: 123)


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without more inclusive and meaningfullocal ownership, the reformed security sectorinstitutions are less likely to be responsiveto the security concerns and needs of non-elite groups or enjoy broad public trust and

confidence. The effectiveness as well as thelegitimacy and accountability of these secu-rity sector institutions will suffer as a result,which will impact efforts to promote securityand justice and thus, to build sustainablepeace (Gordon 2014). It is vital, therefore, toensure that there is a broad interpretation ofwho the locals are and what constitutes own-ership, that the heterogeneity of society andthe complexity of the reform process is rec-

ognised rather than denied (Gordon 2014),and that there are ways in which the voicesof different actors across society can be heardand inform the process (Benedix and Stanley2008; Nathan 2007).

Expanding the interpretation of local own-ership beyond the state-level to civil societyand the community level is likely to increasethe representation of otherwise margin-alised groups, such as women and other

groups who may not be represented amongthe state-level security and justice sectorelite. It is, however, important to rememberthat dominant power relations often perme-ate throughout society, and that civil societyor community level groups are not necessar-ily more inclusive (Gordon 2014). It is equallyimportant not to romanticise (Richmond2011) or homogenise (Mac Ginty 2015) localsand so remove agency and prevent disparatevoices from finding expression. Similarly, it

is important not to romanticise and homog-enise marginalised groups or demonise andhomogenise elite groups, including thosewithin male-dominated, state-level securityand political structures. Indeed, recognisingthe heterogeneity of society, the multiplicityof voices and multiple sites of agency, and thecomplexity of power relations demands thatlocal ownership is inclusive and meaningful.It is also important, as Mac Ginty urges, to

ask where power lies in order to ascertainthe true extent of localism in peacebuilding.Questioning where the money, direction,

concepts and authority come from (MacGinty 2015: 846) can render the concept oflocal ownership, no matter how inclusive,as potentially meaningless, unless owner-ship becomes decision-making authority

throughout the SSR process and beyond. Therisk is that the adoption of the term localownership in policy discourse risks legiti-mising interventions that are no different toprevious interventions and continue to servethe intervener more than the intervened, andrisks losing the radical import of the local(Hughes, jendal and Schierenbeck 2015:819; Mac Ginty 2015). Likewise, the discourseof gender equality can legitimise rather than

challenge the dominant status quo and dom-inant power relations and, in this instance,how security is managed and how peace-building interventions operate (see McLeod2015). It is, therefore, crucial to interpretlocal ownership and gender equality with aview to how power operates, an awareness ofthe political nature of policy discourse, andan acknowledgement of the multiplicity oflocal voices and gender identities.

Gender and SSRConflict and security are gendered. In otherwords, men and women can experience con-flict differently and can have different secu-rity concerns during and after conflict, notleast owing to gendered stereotypes (Enloe2000). It follows that security and justice sec-tor institutions need to attend to these con-cerns, which can only be done by integratinggender into SSR programmes from incep-

tion. This means that women as well as menneed to be included in planning, develop-ing and implementing SSR programmes; berepresented in SSR outcomes; and have theirparticular needs attended to.

As outlined by the Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF2010) and the Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development (OECD2007), integrating gender issues into SSR

is increasingly recognised as being instru-mental to operational effectiveness (beyondthe ability to better respond to the needs of


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women see Mobekk 2010a; DCAF 2010;Dharmapuri 2011; Egnell 2013; Bastick andValasek 2008), responsiveness, local own-ership, public trust and confidence andstrengthened oversight. Integrating gender

issues also contributes to creating an effi-cient, accountable and participatory secu-rity sector (Bastick and Valasek 2008: 1).Similarly, the UN Secretary-Generals 2008Report on SSR, which was one of the first UNdocuments to underscore the importance ofmainstreaming gender in SSR, states that:

. . . the integration of a gender perspec-tive in security sector reform is inherent

to an inclusive and socially responsiveapproach to security. Gender sensitivesecurity sector reform is key to devel-oping security sector institutions thatare non-discriminatory, representativeof the population and capable of effec-tively responding to the specific securityneeds of diverse groups (UN 2008: 11).

The first UN Security Council Resolution on

SSR (2151 adopted in 2014) also emphasisesthe importance of mainstreaming gender,underscoring:

. . . the importance of womens equaland effective participation and fullinvolvement in all stages of the secu-rity sector reform process, given theirvital role in the prevention and reso-lution of conflict and peacebuilding,and in strengthening civilian protec-

tion measures in security services,including the provision of adequatetraining for security personnel, theinclusion of more women in thesecurity sector, and effective vettingprocesses in order to exclude perpe-trators of sexual violence from thesecurity sector (UN 2014: 6).

Aside from normative and utilitarian reasons

why SSR should be gender-sensitive (Stanley2008), there are obligations to adhere tointernational instruments. The application

of a gender perspective in SSR and in peace-building at large is often mistakenly viewedas optional, to be applied when and whereit is convenient. It is often forgotten thatthere is an extensive legal framework

ensuring in principle the application of agender perspective, including womens par-ticipation, in peacebuilding and post-conflictreconstruction.

In 2000, the UN Security Council adoptedthe landmark Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325), the first of seven resolutions (1820,1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122) makingup the Women, Peace and Security (WPS)Agenda (UN Women 2015). The WPS Agenda

established that women and men experienceconflict differently and that women are par-ticularly vulnerable to sexual violence. It alsoestablished that womens active participa-tion in peacebuilding and in ending sexualviolence in conflict is fundamental to ensur-ing international peace and security (1325Policy Group 2015).

As a Security Council Resolution adoptedunder Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR

1325 and the following six resolutions arelegally binding upon all of the UNs 193member states (Shepherd 2008).

UNSCR 1325 (2000) calls for:

. . . Member States to ensure increasedrepresentation of women at all deci-sion-making levels in national, regionaland international institutions andmechanisms for the prevention, man-agement, and resolution of conflict.

UNSCR 2122 (2013) mentions SSR specifi-cally and states that the Security Council:

. . . further expresses its intention toinclude provisions to facilitate wom-ens full participation and protectionin... disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration programs, secu-rity sector and judicial reforms, and

wider post-conflict reconstructionprocesses where these are mandatedtasks within the mission.


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Moreover, it is important to note that the WPSAgenda does not exist in a legal vacuum; it ispart of an existing legal framework of bothinternational humanitarian law and humanrights, with their respective enforcementmechanisms (Rees 2010). The WPS Agendais complimentary to the Convention on theElimination of All forms of Violence againstWomen (CEDAW 2013) and is supported byCEDAWs General Recommendation 30 onwomen in conflict prevention, conflict andpost-conflict situations.

Despite the promise of gender main-streaming, gender-sensitive SSR has oftenbeen reduced to recruiting and retaining

women in the security sector (Baaz andUtas 2012; Hendricks 2012; Mobekk 2010a),based upon the assumption that this willenhance womens security and security sec-tor effectiveness. Increased recruitment andretention of women may neither impact theinstitutional culture of security sector insti-tutions nor, therefore, result in enhancedsecurity for women. In fact, a small num-ber of women recruited to or promoted

within these institutions can be exposed torisk (Barr 2013), may not be in a position orinclined to promote gender issues, or may bemore likely to out-male their colleagues inorder to succeed in spite of male networksand expectations (Hudson 2012: 452). Agender-sensitive SSR requires inclusion ofwomen during and throughout the SSR pro-cess as well as throughout the security sector,including at decision-making levels. Beyondthis, decisions reached throughout the SSR

process and within the subsequent securitysector institutions need to attend to genderissues, and consider the gender implicationsof each decision made. Structures, processesand policies need to be in place which willfoster a culture that promotes gender equal-ity within the institutions, as well as inrespect to the services provided.

Kunz (2014: 616) suggests that rather thanrestricting a gender-sensitive SSR to recruit-

ing and retaining women in the security sec-tor, it is about gendering differently suchas through reforming violent masculinities.

However, in practice this serves only toreproduce gendered (and racialised) bina-ries, without recognising and accepting amultiplicity of subjectivities: SSR deliveredby external experts tends to constituteothers as needing protection (women) orreform them into professional security sec-tor personnel displaying acceptable forms ofmasculinity (rather than the violent hyper-masculinity associated with conflict-affectedenvironments) (Kunz 2014). Indeed, someargue that the WPS Agenda also legitimises(and depoliticises) the international commu-nitys will to empower and protect women,which can replace the mobilization of genu-

ine political will and commitment, treatingsymptoms rather than structural root causesof war (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011:499). It can also exclude those women whodont fit neatly into the frames of referenceand expectations contained within the WPSAgenda (Gibbins 2011).

However, a gender-sensitive SSR is notjust about recruiting and retaining women(Mobekk 2010), redefining acceptable mascu-

linities or imposing altered gendered binaries(Kunz 2014), or limiting possible subjectivi-ties or alternative narratives and constrain-ing opportunities for change (Gibbins 2011).It is about responding to the challenges ofreforming the security sector with a view tohow power relations operate and how theyproduce and are reproduced and reinforcedby the security sector institutions. The riskis that gender-sensitive SSR and the broaderWPS Agenda legitimise the very things that

they seek to challenge. Including womenin SSR, and the subsequent security sectorinstitutions that are formed, can legitimisethese processes and institutions and, along-side, the dominant gendered power rela-tions that perpetuate conflict (Cohn 2008;Puechguirbal 2010), It is, therefore, impor-tant to look beyond inclusion and redefiningacceptable masculinities, to attend to thevarious ways in which power manifests itself

and is reinforced through security sectorinstitutions. It is also important to recognisethat gender and gender security is perceived


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differently by different people (McLeod 2011and 2015) and also women (or locals) arenot a homogenous whole. What is required,therefore, is a context-specific approach toSSR that attends to the political nature ofSSR and how power relations can be alteredor reinforced through it. Through so doing,SSR does not seek to impose normative goalsbut to enable the security concerns of allgroups, not least the most marginalised, tofind expression through SSR and, ultimately,be addressed through the subsequent secu-rity sector institutions.

Tension between Local Ownership

and Gender EqualityIronically, the principle of local ownershipis often used in defence of a reluctanceto promote the engagement of women inSSR programmes and mainstream genderthroughout SSR processes, as suggested bythe following case study and examples. Whenit is perceived or presented that gender dis-crimination and patriarchal values character-ise the local environment and locals do not

value gender equality, it has been argued bypractitioners that to promote gender equal-ity and mainstreaming would undermine theprinciple of local ownership. This, in turn,would undermine the prospects of success-ful SSR and, with it, effective peacebuilding.Hence, the apparent tension between localownership and gender equality.

The authors argue that rather than a ten-sion existing between the two principles,local ownership without gender equality is

meaningless. Adopting a gender lens canbroaden the concept of local ownership(Naraghi-Anderlini 2008); indeed, genuineand inclusive local ownership entails engage-ment by a cross-section of society (Mobekk2010a). As Naraghi-Anderlini (2008) hasdescribed, a gender-responsive SSR alsoresonates with and promotes the demo-cratic values of accountability, transparency,inclusion and equality that local ownership

aims to instil in the security sector. The ques-tion, in essence, that needs to be asked is:what do we mean by locals? Locals arent a

homogenous whole and by simply identify-ing state-level leaders as local counterparts,SSR may be smoother and quicker but theresults may perpetuate power divisions,structural inequalities and conflict dynamicsand, thus, undermine the value of SSR and,moreover, undermine the peacebuilding pro-cess (on the links between gender violenceand discrimination and armed conflict seeAnderlini 2011; Caprioli 2003; Greenbergand Zuckerman 2009).

An SSR programme that merely resonateswith the dominant values of a society risksresulting in a security sector that merelyattends to the security needs of dominant

groups and protects their interests. If secu-rity sector institutions are not representa-tive of and responsive to the needs of thewider public, they will not be effective, norwill they enjoy broad public trust and con-fidence. Consequently, the potential successof SSR and sustainable peace will be under-mined. It is particularly important that thosewho have the least access to security and jus-tice should be able to be actively engaged in

the development and implementation of anySSR programme and have their security andjustice needs addressed. It is argued that itis precisely those societies where promotinggender equality and mainstreaming may beconsidered to be unrealistic where its pro-motion is most needed; it is ironic that gen-der-sensitive SSR should be less likely to bepromoted in places where women are mar-ginalised, discriminated against and violated.

It should be questioned why the disregard

of one principle (gender equality and main-streaming) is justified on the basis of another(local ownership), particularly when they areso integrally related. It should also be askedwhy the principle of gender equality andmainstreaming is disregarded (despite policyand legal obligations) on the basis of protect-ing the principle of local ownership, whichis generally not adhered to any case, as men-tioned earlier.

It is suggested that the tension betweenlocal ownership and gender equality isdeceptive and merely serves to protect the


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power of dominant groups and disempowerthe marginalised, often serving to disguisethe power relations at play in post-conflictenvironments and avoid addressing the secu-rity needs of those who are often at most risk.

Marginalisation of Gender-RelatedPrinciples as the Reinforcement ofDominant Power RelationsCockburn (1999) has suggested that genderpower shapes all human interaction, includ-ing political power. Hudson (2005) pointsto the fact that both men and women areaffected by organised violence and that theroles of men and women in time of war and

peace is complex and multi-faceted. Caprioli(2000 and 2003) has identified politicalinequality as central to the degree of powerbetween men and women and Peterson andRunyan (1999) assert that this lack of politicalequality is accentuated in times of violence.Olsson (2009) agrees that gender power rela-tions are more evident in times of conflict andpost-conflict recovery. Women are less likelythan men to be involved in military organi-

sations in interstate conflict and overwhelm-ingly remain in non-combatant roles. Thiscan serve to give men dominance in termsof political legitimacy. Enloe (2004) points tothe case of Israel, where combat experienceis considered a badge of political robustnessand competency that is denied female politi-cians who have not served on the front line.It might, therefore, be argued that the moretraditional role of the male warrior is used asa means to promote, secure and hold power.

In intrastate conflicts, however, the balanceof male and female combatants tends to bemore equal and consequently women canhave more of a political voice. For example,Mazurana and Proctor (2013) list 59 coun-tries where women have been combatantsin insurgent and non-state armed groupsbetween 1990 and 2013. Thompson (1999cited in Okome 2005) observes that womeninvolved in the Lebanese and Syrian fight for

independence were able to further the callfor womens votes. However, the empower-ment of women, by their moving away from

their more traditional non-combatant rolesin times of conflict or radical change, is oftenrecognised by holders of political power whothen engage other means of impeding theadvance of gender equality and power shar-

ing. Geisler (2000) points to the fact that theAfrican National Congress (ANC) in 1980sSouth Africa considered womens emancipa-tion and feminism as divisive. Women wereblocked from the training and self-devel-opment accessible to ANC men and turnedto community development instead, thusremaining in their more customary roles.Thompson (1999 cited in Okome 2005) citesNigeria in positing that even when they gain

political office, women feel beholden to theirmale benefactors and do not necessarily pro-mote gender issues as they are unwilling tojeopardise their hard-earned positions.

Away from the African continent, theinvolvement of women in the politics ofpost-conflict or transitional states can alsobe superficial. In southeast Europe, dur-ing the communist era, one-fifth to one-third of the members of state parliaments

were women, but very few had real politicalpower (Brunnbauer 2000). Since the fall ofcommunism, women have been the objectrather than the agents of change. Womenslives in the successor states of the formerYugoslavia have undergone profound eco-nomic and social transformation as a resultof post-socialist, post-conflict transition, andas a consequence of globalisation. However,womens access to political influence andinvolvement in security, including champi-

oning gender and minorities protection,remain largely unresolved in the Balkans(Kvinna till Kavinna 2012).

In many states the political elite haverisen from the ranks of freedom fighters orthe military and militia. While women mayhave been granted minor roles or symbolicpositions in government, power remainsin the hands of the male dominated clubof war heroes and activists. The shaping of

values and norms in society is influenced bythe strong position that men hold and thismale dominated power base diminishes and


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constrains the socio-economic position ofwomen, whilst cementing the position of theelite (Kameri-Mbote 2004). Thus, by denyingwomen a voice in the shaping of their ownand their States security, the needs of those

who are at most risk are often ignored.As Olsson (2009) has described, unless

peacebuilding processes are gender-sensi-tive, the level of security between men andwomen is likely to be markedly different.Men who do not conform to stereotypicalexpectations can also suffer in conflict andits aftermath where there is a close linkbetween masculinity and military might.Moreover, in societies where masculinity is

exploited for the purpose of war (Cockburn2010) all people suffer. Where there is alsoa link between military prowess and politi-cal power in the immediate aftermath ofconflict, the subsequent militarisation ofsociety undermines prospects of sustainablepeace. A gender-sensitive approach to SSRcan thus help address the security concernsof those most in need as well as help contrib-ute to the development of a society which

does not ascribe the possession of politicalpower to one gender. Such an approach canalso help contribute to the development of asociety which helps to liberate both men andwomen from pre-determined roles and, inso doing, increase the prospect of liberatingsociety from the constraints of armed con-flict. Until then, patriarchal gender relationswill continue to marginalise women andconstrain men within certain expectationsassociated with masculinity, which it will

then exploit for the purposes of war. As sug-gested earlier, a gender-sensitive SSR shouldnot be simply reduced to inclusion or rede-fining gendered binaries, but should respondto the challenges of reforming the securitysector by attending to how power relationsproduce and are reproduced by the securitysector institutions. As argued by Cockburn(2010), Enloe (2004), Sarosi (2007) and oth-ers, a gender-sensitive approach to peace-

building and security policy will help builda more lasting peace and more equitablesecurity. More radically, such feminist writers

also argue that addressing gender powerrelations can help prevent conflict and buildpeaceful societies and that, indeed, it maybe the only way to do so. As Sarosi (2007: 1)has said, sustainable peace requires a more

permanent transformation of social normsaround violence, gender and power.

SSR Case Study: South SudanThree years into its independence, SouthSudan is experiencing fragility, conflict anda peace process which, to date, has beenlargely futile. The relationship betweengender and local ownership in SSR in SouthSudan is complex as security issues are highly

sensitive in the militarised South Sudanesesociety and actors who want to influencedecision-making on security are viewedwith suspicion by traditional security actors(Kammars-Larsson 2012).

Prioritising Gender

As in many other patriarchal societies, theSouth Sudanese security sector is male-domi-nated and gender discrimination is common

(Institute of Quiet Diplomacy 2013). On thesurface, local security actors do not opposegender equality, but in reality little is done toempower women in the security sector andengage with womens organisations aboutsecurity issues. Womens organisations areoften excluded from security forums anddecision-making processes, and find it easierto interact with international actors such asUnited Nations Mission in the Republic ofSouth Sudan (UNMISS) and United Nations

Police (UNPOL) in the hope that they willbe able to facilitate dialogue with the SouthSudanese Liberation Army (SPLA) and thenational police (Kammars-Larsson 2012).Nevertheless, UNMISS influence over theSPLA was limited prior to the break out ofconflict in December 2013 and is now greatlyreduced.1

Gender, even though viewed as a priority atthe policy level, has not generally been prior-

itised by the international community in SSRprogrammes in South Sudan. Although therehave been gender training programmes for


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the national police and the SPLA, the inter-national community has not been able toconvey why it is important or contribute toan in-depth understanding of how to opera-tionalise the training provided in the South

Sudanese context.2 As one former UNMISSSSR Officer put it: You work in a society thatdoes not prioritise gender whatsoever, so youstart working with structures that are alreadyin place and then you work on gender whenyou can.3 This is a perspective shared bymany working with SSR and gender in SouthSudan. Gender is applied if and when otherpriorities are not too demanding or urgent,leading to a lack of systematic mainstream-

ing and implementation.

Local Ownership and Women

There are a number of examples of tensionbetween gender and local ownership to befound in the South Sudanese context. Onesuch example is the requirements by theinternational community that the SPLA isprofessionalised and that personnel servingare literate and educated. Since women are

less educated than men, and often illiter-ate, they are frequently left out of initiativesand programmes. The United Kingdoms(UK) Security and Defence TransformationProgramme (SDTP) is an illustration of this:training opportunities were open for bothmen and women, and women were encour-aged to apply, but few women were accepteddue to a failure to meet entry requirementssuch as literacy and English language skills.Some language training was given, but the

level was too advanced for most women.4The UK, in common with most donors, areinterested in transforming the military andworking on SSR. They are not interested inproviding basic education, as they do notview it as their responsibility. The interna-tional communitys idea of local owner-ship is ownership by educated personneland it is not clear whether it understandsthat the implications of these requirements

are damaging the participation of women.5

Nevertheless, SSR and gender experts

working in South Sudan believe that a co-ordinated effort among different stakehold-ers to provide basic literacy and Englishtraining to women, followed by SSR training,could yield positive results over time. One

Security Sector and Gender Advisor basedin Juba believes that illiterate women couldalso be valuable within the security sectorand could be given practical training (forexample, driving lessons) that does not nec-essarily require literacy.6

Reconfrming Stereotypes and

Bad Practices

An aspect affecting the quality of gender

training for the SPLA and national police,conducted by international actors, is thatadvisors and trainers often lack genderknowledge and understanding, as well as anawareness of how to operationalise what isbeing taught in the South Sudan context.Many of the training teams have been com-prised of retired military male advisors fromdonor countries and completely lack femaleadvisors.7 One SSR expert based in Juba

stated: In donor countries gender trainingswere developed for people like them; nowthey are the so called experts supposed tocontribute to changing the mentality of theirSouth Sudanese counterparts.8

Another factor having a negative impacton gender training is the desire of the advi-sors to ingratiate themselves with the SouthSudanese being trained by reconfirming ste-reotypes about women in the security sector.An example of this was an advisor who told

a group of trainees that he would not wanthis wife to work in the security sector or jointhe army.9

Compromising Gender

Another example of tension between localownership and gender is the Disarmament,Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)programme, which ran between 2009 and2011 and was designed and supported by the

UNDP and co-ordinated by the National DDRCommission. The programme is recognised


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by many as largely unsuccessful (Small ArmsSurvey 2013). One of the main reasons forits lack of success was the fact that the SPLAwas unwilling to downsize in a transparentmanner. The programme did not respond tothe local context, and when the internationalcommunity met resistance to demobiliseabled bodied male soldiers, the programmewas redesigned with an increased focus onthe disabled, the elderly and women. TheSPLA was content with a DDR programmedesigned for getting rid of women, as it ena-bled them to take women off the pay-roll andnot demobilise too many able-bodied malesoldiers. There are no statistics on the num-

bers employed by the SPLA or how manyemployees are women, but it is estimatedby the SPLAs Female Affairs Directorate that230,000 were employed before the breakoutof conflict in 2013 and that roughly 2,000of them were women. However, despitewomen making up less than 2 per cent ofthe SPLA, about half of the personnel partici-pating in the DDR programme were women.Therefore, instead of designing a programme

that supported women, the organisers cre-ated a programme depriving women of a sal-ary by taking them out of the SPLA, whichis one of the few paid jobs in South Sudansweak economy. Moreover, many women didnot see the value of the DDR programme,despite the livelihood skills training, and hadalready reintegrated into their communities(Small Arms Survey 2011).

It appears as though the internationalcommunity played into the biases in the local

context and yielded to the demands by theSouth Sudanese government. Nevertheless,the UN and the National DDR Commissionhailed the DDR programme as a success,due to the high participation of women. Thetruth was that it was detrimental to womenand did little to increase their status andability to influence and participate in thesecurity sector.10 Moreover, the DDR pro-gramme did not lead to a decrease in soldiers

employed, since the SPLA have continued torecruit personnel.11

Consultation with SSR ActorsLocal ownership, gender mainstreaming

and context-specifcityThe research conducted with those engagedin SSR and broader peacebuilding processesin South Sudan was supplemented witha small number of interviews and onlinediscussions with a network of scholars,practitioners and students affiliated withthe Security, Conflict and InternationalDevelopment (SCID) MSc programme deliv-ered by the Department of Criminology atthe University of Leicester. This networkincludes members of the SCID Panel ofExperts, comprised of over 70 international

experts in the field of conflict preventionand recovery, principally in the security andjustice sector. Those directly consulted havedirect and extensive practical experience ofdeveloping and implementing SSR projectsaround the world, primarily working as con-sultants in governmental and intergovern-mental organisations.

A number of comments reflect anecdotalevidence that there is a widely held belief

that promoting gender equality and main-streaming within SSR programmes shouldnot be a priority and, indeed, could be coun-terproductive. Some suggested that genderequality should not be promoted to avoidundermining the principle of local owner-ship. As Naraghi-Anderlini (2008: 123) hassaid:

SSR practitioners can point to keylocal actors involved, who may be dis-

missive of gender issues, and makethe case that it may not be possible tohave SSR that is both gender-sensitiveand locally owned. State or militaryrepresentatives may imply that gen-der issues are not relevant to theircontext, or that the participation ofwomen in the security sector is notsocio-culturally acceptable.

By imposing what might be judged to bealien cultural values, the effectiveness of


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the security sector will be compromisedand with it the peacebuilding process. Onerespondent argued that the security sectorwill not be effective if it does not resonatewith informal social structures and processes

and if there is no indication that the securityforces are enforcing the populations ownnorms.12The need to be context-specific wasemphasised by most respondents, as was theneed to recognise that promoting genderequality is a political as well as a technicalissue, and has significant repercussions interms of power relations and wider societaldynamics: You cant, as some countries havetried to do, insist on gender equality in the

security forces without recognizing that thisboth assumes and will then provoke, mas-sive changes in the structure of society as awhole.13

Whilst this is accepted, it should notnecessarily follow that promoting gen-der equality and gender mainstreamingshould be avoided. SSR is in itself a highlypolitical exercise, which can provoke sig-nificant shifts in power relations and social

structures. Similarly, the SSR principles ofaccountability, transparency and affordabil-ity can engender power shifts. Moreover, itis unlikely that those engaged in design-ing SSR programmes would avoid promot-ing these principles on the basis that theyare not be familiar concepts and might,therefore, undermine local ownership.Furthermore, context-specificity shouldmean being informed of the context and itscomplexity, not just being driven by those

values and those groups that are dominantwithin the society. Likewise, when consider-ing local ownership and the imposition ofvalues, we need to be highly critical aboutwhich locals we mean and whose valuesshould take precedence.

Principles of gender equality may be atodds with the principles cherished by domi-nant elite groups in society, but they maynot be antithetical to others within society.

Naraghi-Anderlini (2008: 123) suggests thatif women in insurgencies or human rightsgroups were asked whether the promotion

of gender perspectives constitutes imposi-tion of culturally-alien values, they:

. . . would argue that state laws andpolicies should provide equal oppor-tunities to all. For them, the princi-ples of equality and inclusion are infact local values, for which many havepaid with their lives. Indeed, thesestakeholders could be highly criticalof international actors who supportedthe views of the government incontravention of international obli-gations (including Resolutions 1325and 1820).

We may think it not our place to impose gen-der principles that may be alien to anotherculture, but we rarely ask women in these cul-tures what their perspective is (and whetherthese principles are alien to them). As localownership in SSR tends to be restricted toengagement of state-level members of themale-dominated security and political struc-tures, external actors engaged in SSR will not

necessarily be exposed to the views of a widecross-section of society and may rely on theviews of male-dominated privileged groupswith respect to determining local values andnorms. As Salahub and Nerland, (2010: 275)argue: while there might be a broader con-stituency for gender-sensitive reform in theconflict-affected society at large, donors andpolicy makers rarely hear their voices.

There is research based upon public sur-veys to suggest that, in fact, people in certain

post-conflict environments may be morereceptive to mainstreaming gender into SSRand to increasing the number of women inthe security sector than is popularly perceivedby those who make policy decisions. Forinstance, a public survey conducted in Nepalin 2011 revealed that 77 per cent of peoplethought that there needed to be more womenin the Nepal Police (Gordon, Sharma, Forbesand Cave 2011). In Afghanistan, a UNDP

(2012) survey showed growing support forfemale police officers (53 per cent in 2011),albeit alongside concerns that, should female


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relatives join the police, they would be subjectto harassment and abuse in the workplace14.This example highlights the need for gender-sensitive SSR to be more than just promotingthe recruitment of women in the securitysector: significant organisational change andsupport mechanisms are also required. It alsohighlights the possibility that those who maynot push for gender-responsive SSR for fearof undermining the principle of local owner-ship may be responding to the politics of fearand marginalisation rather than what localswant, particularly if they are primarily con-sulting those in male-dominated security sec-tor and governmental institutions.

These privileged groups may also havea vested interest in rejecting those valueswhich would entail the empowerment ofmarginalised groups, including women, andthe consequent divestment of their ownpower. Even if the principles of gender equal-ity and inclusion were not broadly supportedin wider society, a gender-sensitive approachto SSR would not constitute imposing cultur-ally-alien values. Aside from promoting gen-

der equality and inclusion in the SSR processand outputs, a gender-responsive SSR meansconsidering the gender implications of eachpolicy decision and ensuring processes thatreform the security sector and deliver secu-rity and justice are inclusive and equitable:

Ironically, sensitivity to gender is theopposite of imposing external valueson a local culture. It is about listen-ing to and addressing the problems

and solutions that women and menhave identified within their own cul-tural context, and responding to theirneeds (Naraghi-Anderlini 2008:106).

While some respondents argued that Localcustom, politics, education, social healthconsiderations etc. need to be incorpo-rated if unrealistic expectations aboutgender respect and inclusiveness are to be

avoided15

, it becomes unclear how the secu-rity of women can be better promoted andhow they can have a say in rebuilding the

security sector unless certain aspects of thestatus quo are challenged. Indeed, it couldbe argued that the whole raison detre ofany external SSR intervention is that changemust occur, or at least the dynamics that con-tributed to the outbreak and development ofconflict are addressed. The security sector(and the wider society if conflict has beenrecent) needs reforming and reconstruct-ing. It is also worth considering that in timesof flux, such as in the immediate aftermathof conflict, an opportunity presents itself(along with a plethora of risks) to addressstructural inequalities, some of which mayhave contributed to the outbreak of conflict.

The authors suggest that reluctance to pro-mote gender mainstreaming and equalitydoes not equate to refraining from impos-ing culturally-specific values; it equates tovalidating and reinforcing dominant socialstructures and power relations. The authorsargue that SSR programmes which do notpromote gender principles, in environmentswhich marginalise and discriminate againstwomen, result in reflecting and reinforcing

these power dynamics.Nonetheless, the authors recognise thatpromoting gender equality and mainstream-ing without knowledge of the context canbe counter-productive. Some respondentshighlighted the tendency of elements of theinternational community to promote gen-der equality with little regard for the conse-quences, rather than having a nuanced andcontext-specific understanding of genderrelations. One respondent said:

There is a tendency for donors topush for female representation incommittees, councils, etc, withouttaking into account what is some-times a long-standing reality of therole women play. This has left exam-ples of women being included on thebooks, but the role they play withinthe committees are more akin to

secretaries/tea makers rather thanhaving genuine decision-making/influencing roles.16


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Likewise, some respondents drew attentionto the significant security risks that facewomen who are recruited to security sectorinstitutions in places where gender equalityand inclusion are not accepted principles.

Other respondents, conversely, suggestedthat these views are informed by genderedassumptions about the risks that men andwomen are exposed to, should be exposedto, and knowingly expose themselves to. Thiscan reinforce the protected/protector para-digm and undermine prospects of enhancingthe security of women and consolidating sus-tainable peacebuilding:

I have talked to women politiciansand security personnel in countrieslike South Sudan, Sudan, Iraq, andLibya and they have all said the samething, that they are aware of the risks,but that they are willing and proud totake the risks involved for the futureof their country. These women do notview the risks they are taking as muchdifferent from that of men and feel

that it is their right and choice to risktheir lives.17

Aside from promoting gender equality andmainstreaming without sufficient knowl-edge of the context, some respondents alsocriticised the international community fortreating women as a homogenous group:donors need to act carefully not to just tickthe inclusion of women box but ratherunpack which groups the women put for-

ward are representing, the extent to whichthey are reflective of vulnerable groups orare actually part of an elite.18 The exampleof DDR in South Sudan above also highlightsthe ways in which the blind promotion ofgender equality can be counterproductiveand can actually undermine womens secu-rity. The focus on the generic category ofgender can also disguise the multiplicity ofneeds, demands and potential contributions

of different women, as well as ignore the spe-cific security needs, demands and potentialcontributions of men who may not fit the

traditional expectations and roles (especiallyvulnerable men). Neither men nor womenare homogenous categories and a focus ongender per se without a nuanced, context-specific and critical approach can disad-

vantage both men and women (Domingo,Holmes, Menocal, Jones, Bhuvanendra andWood 2013).

Gender, security and knowledge

With regard to external actors engaged inSSR, while some respondents consideredthat those who advocate gender-related prin-ciples can have little knowledge of the localcontext, some suggested that those who

advocate gender equality are unlikely to havean understanding of the security sector orsecurity issues. There was an assumption thatthose who promoted gender equality wouldnot be members of the security sector or havehad extensive experience working in or withthem. One respondent suggested that if youare a childrens rights campaigner, a humanrights activist or a gender theorist, how muchare you actually likely to know about secu-

rity issues and the causes and nature of con-flict?19As the South Sudan case study aboveshows, there also appears to be a widespreadbelief that security experts lack knowledgeand awareness of gender issues. The per-ceived divide between security expertiseand gender expertise echoes the traditionalconcept of security as being related to thestate rather than the individual. This is con-trary to the premise of SSR that recognisessecurity of individuals as critical to the secu-

rity of the state and that the security of theindividuals depends on more than provid-ing territorial security (Ball 2010). The per-ceived divide between security and genderexpertise can be self-perpetuating as securityexperts are not expected to have expertisein gender issues, and so those contracted tosupport SSR processes potentially becomeless likely to have experience of developinggender-sensitive SSR programmes. The dif-

ficulties this presents in terms of institutinggender-sensitive SSR is compounded by alack of meaningful representation of women


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engaged in SSR (both among external andlocal actors) because of lack of women withinsecurity sector institutions, particularly atthe higher levels.

The collision of normative and

pragmatic ideas

The need to be pragmatic, and the sensethat promoting gender equality might runcounter to that, was also mentioned by somerespondents. The argument ran that there isa tendency of human rights advocates andothers to adopt normative ideas, which are bydefinition true in all places and at all times,and which do not require you to know any-

thing about the situation on the ground.20One respondent proposed that the investiga-tion into the conflict between the SSR princi-ples of gender equality and local ownershipcould be viewed as the collision of normativeand pragmatic ideas.21It was suggested thatit is not really possible to explain to localswhy we think that these gender and otherbalances have to exist in the security sector,except for tautological arguments about fair-

ness and justice. Nor do we have an agreedconcept which explains what a satisfactoryrepresentative situation would actually be.22As detailed earlier, however, there are bothnormative and pragmatic reasons why gen-der equality and mainstreaming should bepromoted, as well as obligations to adhere tointernational instruments.

Blaming the locals

Other respondents suggested that the chal-

lenge of gender equality and mainstreamingin SSR cannot be explained by ownershipper se.23 There is often the temptation toattribute responsibility for a failed effort (orabsence of effort) to the national partner.However, the problems are usually morecomplex and attributable to a number offactors.24 Such factors include local socialmores, such as early marriage and child-birth; high levels of violence against women;

and limited access to education for girls.25

These factors inhibit the extent to whichwomen are represented, and their concerns

addressed, in SSR programmes and in secu-rity sector institutions. Other factors whichnegatively impact efforts to promote genderequality and mainstreaming in SSR processesand outputs include the fact that women

are significantly underrepresented in thesecurity institutions of donor countries andorganisations involved in supporting SSR. Asone respondent said:

[I]n order to press a national part-ner to be more inclusive of womenand marginalized groups, one musthave credibility. Such credibility canonly exist when donors and part-

ners lead by example. In the UnitedStates, for example, only 14% of theactive duty forces are women. Thenumbers are worse when it comesto high-ranking officers, where onlyroughly 7% are generals or admirals.The United Nations, which is often asignificant partner in SSR particularlyin states emerging from conflict, hasjust appointed its first woman Force

Commander and even then, it is tolead a small force (1000 strong) inCyprus.26

As such, external actors engaged in SSR maynot prioritise gender-related principles, mayseek out local counterparts who share similarviews (Sedra 2010), and may find it problem-atic to successfully advocate such principles;it may be easier to blame the locals andargue that such advocacy would compro-

mise the principle of local ownership. It mayalso be the case that assumptions that localactors, even those among the security andpolitical elite, are not interested in a gen-dered approach to building security and theinstitutions of the security sector are wrong(Naraghi-Anderlini 2008).

ConclusionTo summarise, it appears that the principles

of gender equality and mainstreaming maynot always be prioritised in SSR. Such princi-ples are also often reduced to only recruiting


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women to security sector institutions (Baazand Utas 2012; Hendricks 2012; Mobekk2010a) or treated as a late add-on to a pre-existing model of SSR (Salahub and Nerland2010: 263). This is despite policy advice to

the contrary (UN 2008; OECD 2007) anddespite being supported by a comprehen-sive legal framework. The reason given fornot promoting a gender-responsive SSRis often, as indicated above, that gender-related principles are alien to the specificcontext. Promoting such principles would,therefore, undermine the principle of localownership; a principle that is considered tobe instrumental to successful SSR and the

reform or construction of a security sectorthat is accepted by the local population and,thus, more likely to be effective and sustain-able. As has been argued, however, such aposition uncritically accepts the status quoand assumes that dominant norms and val-ues in patriarchal societies are shared by allmembers of that society. In actuality, as hasbeen shown, gender equality and local own-ership are mutually supporting. If SSR is to

be genuinely locally owned and security sec-tor institutions are to enjoy widespread pub-lic trust and confidence, it is important thatsuch programmes are inclusive and respon-sive to the needs of those beyond dominantor elite groups, and that women and othermarginalised groups are able to inform deci-sions about their security.

It is argued that gender-sensitive SSR isnot promoted, despite the fact it is likelyto lead to a more inclusive and success-

ful process, because of reluctance amongdominant groups for power relations to beexposed and to be changed within male-dominated institutions, societies and thebroader international community. It is sug-gested that it is this resistance to changeand reluctance to relinquish power thatundermines the effectiveness of SSR andbroader peacebuilding processes; it is notthe promotion of gender-equality and

mainstreaming than can inhibit potentialsuccess. Moreover, the concept of the pro-tected and protectors being ascribed towomen and men in all patriarchal societies

hinders the advancement of gender equal-ity: reinforcing rather than questioning andchallenging this can undermine the securityof women and compromise the security andstability of the broader society.

There are risks associated with promotinggender equality and mainstreaming, espe-cially where ill-informed of the local context.There may be power shifts and potentialdestabilisation as a result. Similarly, prob-lems may arise with co-ordinating a widerset of actors and concerns, or there may bereal fears about security risks facing womenpioneers in the security sector. However,there are also security risks associated with

not promoting gender equality from theoutset of any SSR programme (particularlyconsidering high levels of gender-based andsexual violence in the immediate aftermathof conflict, and reluctance to report casesof abuse or even discuss such phenomena).And while it may be less risky to addressgender issues once mainstream society ismore receptive, it is likely that efforts toaddress gender issues and promote womens

security will be successful once the struc-tures, policies and power bases have beenconstructed.

While the research that has informed thispaper is limited, it has indicated a needfor further research into the relationshipbetween the SSR principles of local owner-ship and gender equality. Moreover, it hasindicated a need to determine, based uponcomprehensive data, whether or not pro-moting gender in SSR can be counterpro-

ductive, undermine SSR principles and thesustainability of outputs, and compromisethe security of women engaged in SSR aswell as the security of the broader societymore generally. Such research is neededin order to counter the views that prevailwithin the international community or,if such views are corroborated, identifyways in which womens security and theirengagement in decisions about security

can be better promoted. Either way, suchresearch can potentially have a positiveimpact upon efforts to build security andjustice after conflict for all.


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Competing InterestsThe authors declare that they have no com-peting interests.

Acknowledgements

We would like to extend our sincere grati-tude to those who gave their time and sharedtheir insights on the relationship betweenlocal ownership and gender in SecuritySector Reform, including those working inSouth Sudan as well as SCID students andPanel of Expert members. We would also liketo thank the journal editors and the anony-mous reviewers.

Notes 1 Interview with Security Sector and Gender

Advisor based in Juba 27/06/2014. 2 Interview with Security Sector and Gender

Advisor based in Juba 19/06/2014 andUNMISS SSR Officer 15/08/2014.

3 Interview with UNMISS SSR Officer15/08/2014.

4 Interview with Security Sector and GenderAdvisor based in Juba 19/06/2014 and

UNMISS SSR Officer 15/08/2014. 5 Interview with Security Sector and GenderAdvisor based in Juba 19/06/2014 andUNMISS SSR Officer 15/08/2014.

6 Interview with Security Sector and GenderAdvisor based in Juba 27/06/2014 andSSR Expert based in Juba 12/08/2014.

7 Interview with SSR Expert based in Juba12/08/2014.

8 Interview with SSR Expert based in Juba12/08/2014.

9 Interview with Security Sector and GenderAdvisor based in Juba 19/06/2014.



12 Online communication with member ofthe SCID Panel of Experts, academic andpractitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experi-

ence in the security and defence sector02/06/2014. 13 Online communication with member of

the SCID Panel of Experts, academic and

practitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experi-ence in the security and defence sector02/06/2014.

14 Online communication with SCID stu-

dent and UN staff member 03/06/2014. 15 Online communication with member

of the SCID Panel of Experts, former UKChief Police Officer with extensive expe-rience in conflict-affected environments03/06/2014.

16 Online communication with memberof the SCID Panel of Experts, SeniorSSR Advisor with extensive experi-ence in conflict-affected environments

02/06/2014. 17Online communication with member of

the SCID Panel of Experts, Expert on 1325with extensive experience in conflict-affected environments 19/06/2014.

18 Online communication with memberof the SCID Panel of Experts, Senior SSRAdvisor with extensive experience in con-flict-affected environments 02/06/2014.

19Online communication with member of

the SCID Panel of Experts, academic andpractitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experiencein the security and defence sector.

20Online communication with member ofthe SCID Panel of Experts, academic andpractitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experi-ence in the security and defence sector17/06/2014.

21 Online communication with member of

the SCID Panel of Experts, academic andpractitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experi-ence in the security and defence sector17/06/2014.

22Online communication with member ofthe SCID Panel of Experts, academic andpractitioner with conflict-related SSRexpertise and over 30 years of experi-ence in the security and defence sector

03/06/2014. 23Online communication with member ofthe SCID Panel of Experts, UN MilitaryJustice Advisor 02/06/2014.


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24Online communication with member ofthe SCID Panel of Experts, UN MilitaryJustice Advisor 02/06/2014.



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