security module – part 1 spring 2006 v.t. raja, ph.d., oregon state university

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Security Module – Security Module – Part 1 Part 1 Spring 2006 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University Oregon State University

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Page 1: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Security Module – Part 1Security Module – Part 1Spring 2006Spring 2006

V.T. Raja, Ph.D.,V.T. Raja, Ph.D.,

Oregon State UniversityOregon State University

Page 2: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Security Module – Part 1Security Module – Part 1

• Outline– Identify and explain characteristics of a

secure communication– Ciphers and Symmetric Key Cryptography

Page 3: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

ConfidentialityConfidentiality

• Alice wants the following to be confidential:– The fact that she is communicating with Bob– Timing of communication– Frequency of communication

• Only Alice and Bob should be able to understand the contents of the transmitted message; Should not be understood by eavesdropper Trudy.

Page 4: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

ConfidentialityConfidentiality

• Alice and Bob could represent two real users, or a client and a server, or 2 DNS servers, or 2 routers etc.

• Confidentiality often relies on cryptographic techniques.

Page 5: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Message IntegrityMessage Integrity

• Content of communication is not altered maliciously or by accident

• Message integrity relies on cryptographic techniques

Page 6: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Non-repudiationNon-repudiation

• Assume sender transmitted document “D”. • Non-repudiation:

– Sender unable to successfully deny in court having transmitted document D.

• Non-repudiation also relies on cryptography techniques

Page 7: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

AuthenticationAuthentication

• Both sender and receiver should be able to confirm identity of other party involved in communication

• Confirm that the other party is indeed who/what they claim to be

• Authentication relies on authentication techniques, several of which rely on cryptographic techniques

Page 8: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Availability and Access ControlAvailability and Access Control

– Can communication occur in first place?• Detect breaches and respond to attacks

– Are entities seeking to gain access to resources allowed to do so only if they have the appropriate access rights, and perform their access in a well-defined manner?

Page 9: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

CryptographyCryptography

• Symmetric Key and Public Key Cryptography• Basic Terminology

– Plain Text • Original data – not disguised

– Cipher (Encrypted) Text• Disguised data – looks unintelligible to intruder• Data disguised using encryption algorithm

– Key• A string of #s or characters used as input to encryption

algorithm to disguise plain text

Page 10: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Ciphers and Symmetric Key CryptographyCiphers and Symmetric Key Cryptography

• Symmetric Key:

– Alice and Bob use same key to encrypt and decrypt

• Ciphers

– Caesar Cipher– Mono and Poly alphabetic Ciphers

• Symmetric Key Cryptography Techniques

– Data Encryption Standard (DES); Triple DES (3DES)

– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Page 11: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

CiphersCiphers

• Caesar Cipher– Each letter in plaintext is substituted with letter that is

K letters later– Wrap around is allowed (i.e., z followed by letter a)– If K = 3, a in plaintext becomes d in cipher text

b in plaintext becomes e in cipher text

Participation Exercise:

Once it is known that Caesar cipher is being used, it is easy to break the code (only 25 possible key values).

Page 12: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Ciphers Ciphers (Continued)(Continued)

• Monoalphabetic Cipher– Improvement on Caesar Cipher– Rather than substituting according to a regular pattern

– any letter can be substituted for any other letter, as long as each letter has a unique substitute letter, and vice versa.

– Example of a monoalphabetic cipher

Plain Text: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z

Cipher Text: m n b v c x z a s d f g h j k l p o i u y t r e w q

Page 13: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Ciphers Ciphers (Continued)(Continued)

• Polyalphabetic Encryption– Use multiple monoalphabetic/Caesar ciphers

– Use a specific monoalphabetic/Caesar cipher to encode a letter in a specific position in the plain text

– This implies that same letter appearing in different positions in the plaintext might be encoded differently.

Example: 2 Caesar ciphers; K = 5, K = 19

For every 5 bits in the plain text use the 2 Caesar ciphers in the following pattern: C1, C2, C2, C1, C2

Page 14: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Symmetric Key CryptographySymmetric Key Cryptography

• Data Encryption Standard (DES)

– Published in 1977, and updated in 1993

– For commercial and non-classified U.S. Govt. use

– Encodes plaintext in 64-bit chunks using 64-bit key

– Eight of the 64 bit-key are odd parity bits• So actual key is perceived as 56-bits.

– Objective: Scramble data and key so that every bit of the cipher text depends on every bit of the data and every bit of the key

Page 15: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

How well does DES work?How well does DES work?

• In 1997 RSA Data Security Inc., ( A network security company) launched a DES challenge contest to crack a short phrase it had encrypted using a 56-bit DES.

• Winning team took 4 months to decode; volunteers throughout the

Internet systematically explored key space. – Claimed 10K cash prize after testing only a quarter of the key space

(about 18 quadrillion keys)

• In 1999, RSA launched another DES challenge.

• Message was decrypted in little over 22 hours by a network of volunteers and a special purpose computer called “Deep Crack”.– Claimed 250 K cash prize. Not bad for a day’s work?

Page 16: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Symmetric Key CryptographySymmetric Key Cryptography

• Triple DES (3 DES)

– If 56-bit DES is considered to be insecure, one can simply run the algorithm multiple times, using a different key each time

– DES run three times (with a different 56-bit key at beginning of each time DES is run).

Page 17: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Symmetric Key CryptographySymmetric Key Cryptography

• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)– NIST – in Nov 2001 announced successor to DES. – AES is also a symmetric key algorithm that processes

data in 128-bit blocks– AES can operate with 128-bit keys, 192-bit keys, and

256-bit keys– NIST estimated that a machine that could crack a 56-

bit DES in one second (i.e. Try 255 keys per second) would take approximately 149 trillion years to crack a 128-bit AES key

Page 18: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Symmetric Key DistributionSymmetric Key Distribution

• Disadvantage of Symmetric Key Cryptography: – 2 communicating parties have to agree upon

their secret key ahead of time in a secure manner.

• Since sender and receiver do not meet face to face in the networking world , they need a trusted intermediary

Page 19: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Symmetric Key CryptographySymmetric Key Cryptography

• Trusted Intermediaries for symmetric key distribution:

– Key Distribution Center (KDC)

– Kerberos

Page 20: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Key Distribution Center (KDC)Key Distribution Center (KDC)

• A server that shares a different secret symmetric key with each registered user.

• This key might be manually installed at the server when a user first registers.

• KDC knows the secret key of each user, and each user can communicate securely with KDC using this key.

Page 21: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

KDC for Alice and BobKDC for Alice and Bob

• Assume Alice and Bob use KDC for their communication.

• Assume Alice’s secret key known to Alice and KDC is KA-KDC; Assume Bob’s secret key known to Bob and KDC is KB-KDC.

• Assume Alice wishes to send an encrypted message to Bob while using KDC as the trusted intermediary.

Page 22: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Example: Alice and BOB using KDCExample: Alice and BOB using KDC

1. Using her key, Alice sends a message to KDC saying that she (A) wants to communicate with Bob (B). We denote this message as:

KA-KDC(A, B). 2. a. KDC decrypts KA-KDC(A, B).

b. KDC generates a random number R1, which is a “nonce” that will be used as symmetric key by Alice and Bob during their communication.

c. KDC sends Alice R1, and a pair of values A and R1 encrypted using Bob’s key. We denote this message sent to Alice by KDC as:

KA-KDC(R1, KB-KDC(A, R1)).

Page 23: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

Example: Alice and BOB using KDCExample: Alice and BOB using KDC

3. Alice decrypts message and extracts symmetric key R1. Alice extracts and forwards (although she cannot decrypt)

KB-KDC(A, R1) to Bob.

4. Bob decrypts and understands that he is to use R1 as symmetric key to converse with Alice.

Page 24: Security Module – Part 1 Spring 2006 V.T. Raja, Ph.D., Oregon State University

KerberosKerberos

• Authentication service developed by MIT• Very similar to KDC• Has additional functions such as:

– Time stamp for validity of nonce R1. – Has info about which users have access privileges to

which services on which network servers. • The authentication server in Kerberos parlance,

is referred to as the Ticket Granting Server• Sending KB-KDC(A, R1) to A in the previous

example is referred in Kerberos as granting a ticket to Bob’s services.