security kritik paper sdi 2012

7/25/2019 Security Kritik Paper SDI 2012

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Security 1NCA. Danger is manufactured through discourse that constitutes international

relations

Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of

Newcastle, 1998(David, has also taught at Keele University and Johns HopkinsUniversity, Writing Security, University of Minnesota Press, pg !"#

Danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that ex ists independently of those to whom it

may become a threat.To illustrate this, consider the manner in which the insurance industry assesses risk. In Franqois Ewald's

formulation, insurance is a technology of risk the principal function of which is not compensation or reparation, but rather the operation of a

schema of rationality distinguished by the calculus of probabilities. In insurance, according to this logic, danger (or, more accurately, risk) is

"neither an event nor a general kind of event occurring in reality... but a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a

group of individuals." In other words, for the technology of risk in insurance, "Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality.

But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, consid ers the

event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a category of the understanding; it cannot be given in

sensibility or intuition. z In these terms, danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential,necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive. Nothing is

intrinsically more dangerous for insurance technology than anything else, except when interpreted as such.

This understanding of the necessarily interpretive basis of risk has important implications for

international relations. It does not deny that there are "real" dangers in the world: infectious diseases, acci-

dents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life

and death. But not all risks are equal, and not all risks are interpreted as dangers. Modern society contains a

veritable cornucopia of danger; indeed, there is such an abundance of risk that it is impossible to objectively

know all that threatens us.3Those events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as

such only through an interpretation of their var ious dimensions of dangerousness. Moreover, that process of

inter pretation does not depend on the incidence of "objective" factors for its veracity.For example, HIV infection has

been considered by many to be America's major public health issue, yet pneumonia and influenza, diabetes, suicide, and chronic liver disease have

all been individually responsible for many more deaths 4 Equally, an interpretation of danger has licensed a "war on (illegal) drugs" in the United

States, despite the fact that the consumption level of (and the number of deaths that result from) licit drugs exceeds by a considerable order of

magnitude that associated with illicit drugs. And "terrorism" is often cited as a major threat to national security, even though its occurrence within

the United States is minimal (notwithstanding the bombings in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center in New York) and its contribution to

international carnage minor.5

Furthermore, the, role of interpretation in the articulation of dan ger is not restricted to the process by

which some risks come to be considered more serious than others. An important function of inter pretation is

the way that certain modes of representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers. Given the often

tenuous relation ship between an interpretation of danger and the "objective" incidence of behaviors and

factors thought to constitute it, the capacity for a particular risk to be represented in terms of characteristics

re viled in the community said to be threatened can be an important impetus to an interpretation of danger. As

later chapters will demonstrate, the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been

pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience. In this context, it is also important to note

that there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an interpretation of dan ger. The mere

existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are

possible and thus de naturalizes the claim of a particular identity to bethe true identity, is sometimes enough

to produce the understanding of a threat.b In consequence, only in these terms is it possible to understand

how some acts of international power politics raise not a whit of concern, while something as seemingly

unthreatening as the novels of a South American writer can be considered such a danger to national security

that his exclusion from the country is warranted.' For both insurance and international relations, therefore,

danger results from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an

ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.


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Security 1NC

B. The afrmatives constitution o security as an iealan benevolent conition utili!es human lie as a tool to

calculate saety "ith response to a iscursive ieal# not amaterial conition$illon, professor of security $ %ancaster, %&&8(Michael, Underwriting Security Security Dialogue32.3)

This essay enframes risk as a biopolitical security technology. t e!"lains h#w biopolitics of

security take life as their referent object of security, how the grid of intelligibility for

biopolitics is economicand h#w, in the sec#nd half #f the 2$th century, life als# came t# %e

underst##d as emergent %eing. Contingency is constitutive especially of the life of emergent

beingand s# the essay argues that a biopolitics of security which seeks to make life live cannot

secure life against contingency but must secure life through governmental technologies of

contingency. &is' is #ne #f these techn#l#gies. The essay als# e!"lains h#w it has c#me t# "erade

the %i#"#litics #f security #f the 2st century and h#w thr#ugh the way in which ris' is traded #n

the ca"ital mar'ets it has %egun t# ac*uire the "r#"erties #f m#ney. The essay cl#ses %y descri%ingh#w the biopolitics of security differ from traditional prophylactic accounts of security andhow these biopolitics of security eceed the liberal political thinking which rationalises and

legitimates them.

Calculability results in the evaluation o human lie'ichael $illon# proessor o politics an international relationsat the (niversity o )ancaster# *pril 1999, Political &heory, 'ol ),No , *+nother Justice, p -."!/

0uite the reverse &he su12ect was never a 3r4 foundation for

2ustice, 4uch less a hospita1le vehicle for the reception of the call ofanother Justice 5t was never in possession of that self!possessionwhich was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self!possession that would ena1le it ulti4ately to ad2udicate everything&he very inde6icality re7uired of sovereign su12ectivity gave riserather to a co44ensura1ility 4uch 4ore a4ena1le to thee6penda1ility re7uired of the political and 4aterial econo4ies of4ass societies than it did to the singular, invalua1le, and uncannyuni7ueness of the self &he value of the su12ect 1eca4e the standardunit of currency for the political arith4etic of 8tates and the politicalecono4ies of capitalis4 &hey trade in it still to devastating glo1al

e9ect &he technologisation of the political has 1eco4e 4anifest andglo1al :cono4ies of evaluation necessarily re7uire calcula1ility&hus no valuation without 4ensuration and no 4ensuration withoutinde6ation ;nce rendered calcula1le, however, units of account arenecessarily su14issi1le not only to valuation 1ut also, of course, todevaluation Devaluation, logically, can e6tend to the point ofcounting as nothing Hence, no 4ensuration without de4ensurationeither &here is nothing a1stract a1out this< the declension of


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econo4ies of value leads to the =ero point of holocaust Howeverli1erating and e4ancipating syste4s of value!rights!4ay clai4 to1e, for e6a4ple, they run the risk of counting out the invalua1le>ounted out, the invalua1le 4ay then lose its purchase on lifeHerewith, then, the necessity of cha4pioning the invalua1le itself

?or we 4ust never forget that, *we are dealing always with whatevere6ceeds 4easure @ut how does that necessity present itselfA+nother Justice answers< as the surplus of the duty to answer to theclai4 of Justice over rights &hat duty, as with the advent of anotherJustice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the hu4an way of1eing


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Security 1NC

C. +oting negative repuiates the afrmativesprioriti!ation o a secure "orl,saying no to the

afrmative returns the -it o Security. The eect is toopen a space so that politics may be other"ise.Neocleous, prof of criti7ue of political econo4y $ @runei University,%&&8p -B/!-B.(Mark, >riti7ue of 8ecurity#

!he only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of

security altogether " to reject it as so ideologically loadedin fa#ur #f the state that any real

political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up.!hat is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thoughtand

thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. t is als# s#mething that the c#nstantiterati#n #f the refrain +this is an insecure w#rld+ and reiterati#n #f #ne fear, an!iety and insecurity after an#ther will a ls# ma'e it hard t# d#. ut

it is s#mething that the criti*ue #f security suggests we may hae t# c#nsider if we want a "#litical way #ut #f the im"asse #f security . !his

impasse eists because security has now become so all"encompassing that it marginalises all

else, m#st n#ta%ly the c#nstructie c#nflicts, de%ates and discussi#ns that animate "#litical life. Theconstant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end " as the political end " constitutes

a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which

differences can be articulated, in which the c#nflicts and struggles that arise fr#m such differences

can %e f#ught f#r and neg#tiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is

possible " that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. #ecurity politics

simply removes this world, it rem#es it while "ur"#rtedly addressing it. n s# d#ing it suppresses

all issues of power and turns political $uestions into debates about the most efficient way to

achieve %security+, des"ite the fact that we are neer *uite t#ld - neer c#uld %e t#ld - what might c#unt as haing achieed it. Security"#litics is, in this sense, an anti-"#litics, d#minating "#litical disc#urse in much the same manner as the security state tries t# d#minate

human %eings, reinf#rcing security fetishism and the m#n#"#listic character #f security #n the "#litical imaginati#n. &e thereforeneed to get beyond security politics, not add yet more %sectors% to it in a way that simply

epands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas ofour lives. Sim#n /al%y re"#rts a "ers#nal c#mmunicati#n with Michael&illiams, c#-edit#r #f the im"#rtant te!t 0ritical Security Studies, in which the

latterasks' if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that%s left behind1 ut +m inclined t#

agree with /al%y may%ethere is no hole.2 !he mistake has been to think that there is a hole'and that this hole needs to be fil led with a new mission or revision of securityin which it is re-

ma""ed #r ciilised #r genderedg humanised #r e!"anded #r whateer. All of these ultimately

remain within the statist political imaginary, and conse$uently end up affirming the state as

the terrain of modem politics, the gr#und #f security. !he real task is not to fill the supposed

hole with yet another dimension of security, but to fight for an alternative political language

which takes us beyond the narrow hori(on of bourgeois security an%$ which therefore does not

constantly throw us into the arms of the state.That+s the "#int #f critical "#litics t# deel#" a new "#litical languagem#re ade*uate t# the 'ind #f s#ciety we want. Thus while4 much #f what hae said here has %een #f a negatie #rder, "art #f the traditi#n #f

critical the#ry is that the negatie may %e as significant as5 the "#sitie in setting th#ught #n new "aths . 6#r if security really is the su"reme c#nce"t

#f %#urge#is s#ciety and the fundamental thematic #f li%eralism, then to keep harping on) about insecurity and to keepdemanding% more security% *while meekly

hoping that this increased security doesn%t damage our liberty+ is to blind ourselves to the

possibility of

building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. !o situate

ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved

through the constant securitising of social and political .. issues, debilitating in the sense that%

security% helps consolidate the power of the eisting forms of social domination and justifies

the short"circuiting of even the most democratic forms. t would also allow us to forge another


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kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. 7e need a new way #f thin'ing and tal'ing a%#uts#cial %eing and "#litics that m#es us %ey#nd security. This w#uld "erha"s %e emanci"at#ry in the true sense #f the w#rd. 7hat this might

mean, "recisely, must %e #"en t# de%ate. -ut it certainly re$uires recognising that security is an illusion that

has forgotten it is an illusion it re$uires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity

it re$uires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the

search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties,

ambiguities and %insecurities% that come with being human it re$uires accepting that

%securiti(ing% an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out andhanding it to the state it re$uires us to be brave enough to return the gift.3


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$iscourse /ey


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)anguage0$iscourse /ey

*ttentions an priorities cannot escape iscursiveeconomies# especially in international relations

Shapiro, Hawaii political science professor, 1989p -(Michael, International/Intertextual Relations#Civen that our unerstaning o conict# "ar, or 4ore generally, thespace within which international politicsis deployed is al"aysmeiate by moes o representation an thus by all thevarious mechanisms involve in te2t constructiongra44ars,rhetorics, and narrativity"e must operate "ith a vie" o politicsthat is sensitive to te2tuality Ehile 4uch of political thinking ise6hausted 1y concern with the distri1ution of things thought to 1e 4eaningfuland valua1le, our attention is ra"n to another aspect o politicalprocesses# that aspect in "hich the bounaries or constitutingmeaning an value are constructe. 3olitical processes are#

among other things# contests over the alternativeunerstanings(often i4plicit# immanent in the representationalpractices that implicate the actions an ob4ects one recogni!esan the various spacesleisure, work, political, private, pu1licwithinwhich persons and things take on their identities +lthough it tends to operatei4plicitly, the separation o the "orl into 5ins o space isperhaps the most signi6cant 5in o practice or establishingthe system o intelligibility "ithin "hich unerstanings oglobal politics are orge

7ocusing on the perormative character o politicalieologies is 5ey

$oty# 9(+ri=ona 8tate +ssistant Political 8cience Professor, 54perial :ncounter, pp /!.#

&his study 1egins with the pre4ise that representation is an inherent animportant aspect of glo1al political life and therefore a critical anlegitimate area o in:uiry 5nternational relations are in e2tricably bounup with discursive practices that put into circula tion representations that aretaken as FtruthF&he goal of analy= ing these practices is not to revealessential truths that have 1eenF o1scured, 1ut rather to e6a4ine howcertain representations uner lie the production of knowledge andidentities and how these repre sentations 4ake various courses of actionpossi1le +s 8aid (-G)G -# notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, 1ut there is re-presence, or representation 8uch an assertion oes not eny the e6istence of the4aterial world, 1ut rather suggests that 4aterial o12ects and su12ects areconstitute as such "ithin iscourse 8o, for e6a4ple, when U8 troops 4arch intoCrenada, this is certainly Freal,F though the 4arch of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itselfsingularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce 4eaning 5t isonly when F+4ericanF is attached to the troops and FCrenadaF to the geographic space that 4eaning iscreated Ehat the physical 1ehavior itself is, though, is still far fro4 certain until discursive practices

constitute it as an Finvasion,F a Fshow of force,F a Ftraining e6ercise,F a Frescue,F and so on Ehat isFreallyF going on in such a situation is ine2tricably lin5e to the discourse


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within which it is located&o atte4pt a neat separation 1etween discursiveand non!discursive practices,understanding the for4er as purely linguistic, assu4es aseries of dichoto4iesthoughtIreality, appearanceIessence, 4indI4atter, wordIworld,su12ectiveIo12ective!that a critical genealogy calls into :uestion . +gainst this,the perspective taken here afrms the material an perormativenature o iscourse.5n suggesting that glo1al politics, and speci3cally the aspect that has to dowith relations 1etween the North and the 8outh, is linked to representational practices 5 a4 suggestingthat the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a FrealityF whose content has for

the 4ost part 1een de3ned 1y the representational practices of the F3rst worldF ?ocusing ondiscursive practices ena1les one to e6a4ine how the processes that produceFtruthF and *knowledgeF work and how they are articulated with the e6erciseof political, 4ilitary, and econo4ic power


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)in5s


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;egemony

rnelas %&1%(aul, Professor and activist, this essay was peerreviewed in The South Atlantic QuarterlyEinter *>ounterhege4oniesand :4ancipations< Notes for a De1ate#&he Characteri!ation o ;egemony8o4e argue for the validity andstrength of U8 hege4ony +4ong those who contend that thishege4ony is in decline, there are two opposing argu4ents &he 3rstpertains to the correlation of forces< if U8 hege4ony is, in fact,weakening, it should 1e not considered relative to the place that theUnited 8tates once occupied (for instance, at the end of Eorld Ear 55#,1ut rather it should 1e considered with respect to the actually e6istingopposing forces &hus# because no rival capitali!es on the

hegemons "ea5ness# "e live in a state o unipolarity= ?The"ea5ening o North *mericas hegemonic capacity corresponsnot to the strengthening o the other pole# but to a rise in"orl"ie isorer &he second argu4ent, 1y contrast, refers tothe 4ultidi4ensional character of hege4ony, such that even i the(nite States suers signi6cant recessions in the economicrealm# "e must still ta5e into account its absolute ominancein the military sphereand, especially, in the cultural arenaegarding the latter, the ?*merican "ay o lie@ is the "orlparaigm o sociality# "ith no rivalother than that of anunattractive 5sla4ic funda4entalis4 &he New &errain of >lass 8truggle

&he level o evelopment attaine by capitalist hegemony#particularly "hen ne" technologies combine "ith the absenceo a noncapitalist alternative to that hegemony# has meant aislocation o the bounaries o social conict. *s capital hastene to e2cee the limits o nature(for instance, throughgenetic engineering# and even the li4its of the planet (for e6a4ple,through space e6ploration#, the substratum o social conictmoves through the spaces o e2ploitation Athe mar5et# theactory to"ar a politics o territory as such,that is# socialconict e2pans to all spheres o social lie an tens toe2press itsel most acutely in those areas that constitute the

very basis o lie= communities# their conitions o e2istence#an their geographical spaces an symbols" &he transfor4ationof capitalist hege4ony signals profound changes in for4s of socialstruggle 5nstitutions constructed through class struggle since the5ndustrial evolution have tended to disappear, especially thoserelated to social status and the populationLs living and workingconditions Toay# rom the perspective o po"er an rom thato the sub4ects "ho resist it# conicts are presente as


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irreucible. Thus# as the temporality o resistance ta5es onmore raical orms an strategies# repression increas inglybecomes the recourse o po"er. *t the same time# there is atenency to"ar increasing political polari!ation. eceaspeaks of the 4ilitari=ation of social life, syste4atic counterinsurgency,and the di9usion of disciplinary spaces throughout the whole of societyas the typical responses of hege4onic su12ects/ ecea argues that socialstruggles are the pri4ary li4it to capitalis4, given that fro4 thetechnological point of view it already has the resources to ac7uire4assive pro3ts and to intensify its do4ination) &his perspectivesupports the vie" o hegemony as a social construction ansocial relation.


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;egemony

Belie that some lives are "orth more than others anthat violence is 4usti6es in pursuing this en creates

calculable an e2clue ob4ectsButler, professor of rhetoric at @erkeley, %&&9p /Q!/(Judith, ?ra4es of Ear#

/ne might, for instance, believe in the sanctity of life or adhere to a general philosophy that

opposes violent action of all kinds against sentient beings, and one 4ight invest powerful

feelings in such a 1elief -ut if certain lives are not perceivable as lives, and this includes sentient

1eings who are not hu4an, then the moral prohibition against violence will be only selectively

applied *and our own sentience will be only selectively mobili(ed+. !he criti$ue of violence

must begin with the $uestion of the represemability of life itself' what allows a life to become

visible in its precariousnessand its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or

understanding certain livesin this wayA &he pro1le4 concerns the 4edia, at the 4ost general

level, since a life can be accorded a value only on the condition that it is perceivable as a life,

but it is only on the condition of certain embedded evaluative structures that a life becomes

perceivable at all &o perceive a life Fis not 7uite the sa4e as encountering a life as precarious:ncountering a life as precarious is not a raw encounter, one in which life is stripped 1are of all its

usual interpretations, appearing to us outside all relations of power +n ethical attitude does not

spontaneously arrive as soon as the usual interpretive frameworks are destroyed, and no pure

moral conscience emerges once the shackles of everyday interpretation have been thrown off

;n the contrary, it is only by challenging the dominant media that certain kinds of lives may

become visible or knowable in their precariousness 5t is not only or e6clusively the visualapprehension of a life that for4s a necessary precondition for an understanding of the

precariousness of life +nother life is taken in through all the senses, if it is taken in at all !he tacit

interpretive scheme that divides worthy from unworthy lives works fundamentally through

the senses, differentiating the cries we can hear from those we cannot, the sights we can see

from those we cannot, and likewise at the level of touch and even smell. &ar sustains its

practices through acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively,

deadening affect in response to certain images and sounds, and enlivening affective responses

to others. !his is why war works to undermine a sensate democracy, restricting what we can

feel, disposing us to feel shock and outrage in the face of one epression of violence and

righteous coldness in the face of another &o encounter the precariousness of another life, the

senses have to 1e operative, which 4eans that a struggle must be waged against those forces

that seek to regulate affectin di9erential ways !he% point isnot to cele1rate a full deregulation of

a9ect, 1ut to $uery the conditions of responsiveness by offering interpretive matrices for the

understanding of war that $uestion and oppose the dominant interpretations"interpretations

that not only act upon affect, but take form and become effective as affect itself 5f we accept

the insight that our very survival depends not on the policing of a boundary"the strategy of a

certain sovereign in relation to its territory"but on recogni(ing how we are bound up with

others, then this leads us to reconsider theway in which we conceptuali=e the 1ody in the field of

politics Ee have to consider whether the 1ody is rightly de3ned as a 1ounded kind of entity Ehat4akes a 1ody discrete is not an esta1lished 4orphology, as if we could identify certain 1odily

shapes or for4s as paradig4atically hu4an 5n fact, 5 a4 not at all sure we can identify a hu4anfor4, nor do 5 think we need to &his view has i4plications for rethinking gender, disa1ility, andraciali=ation, to na4e a few of the social processes that depend upon the reproduction of 1odilynor4s +nd as the criti7ue of gender nor4ativity, a1le!is4, and racist perception have 4ade clear,there is no singular hu4an for4 Ee can think a1out de4arcating the hu4an 1ody throughidentifying its 1oundary, or in what for4 it is 1ound, 1ut that is to 4iss the crucial fact that the 1odyis, in certain ways and even inevita1ly, un1ound!in its acting, its receptivity, in its speech, desire,and 4o1ility 5t is outside itself, in the world of others, in a space and ti4e it does not control, and itnot only e6ists in the vector of these relations, 1ut as this very vector-- 5n this sense, the 1ody

does not 1elong to itself !he body, in my view, is where we encounter a range of perspectives

that mayor may not be our own. 0ow am encountered, and how am sustained, depends


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fundamentally on the social and political networks in which this body lives, how am regarded

and treated, and how that regard and treatment facilitates this life or fails to make it livable8o the nor4s of gender through which 5 co4e to understand 4yself or 4y surviva1ility are not4ade 1y 4e alone 5 a4 already in the hands of the other when 5 try to take stock of who 5 a4 5 all

already up against a world 5 never chose when 5 e6ercise 4y agency 5t follows, then, that certain

kinds of bodies will appear more precariously than others, depending on which versions of the

body, or of morphology in general, support or underwrite the idea of the human life that is

worth protecting, sheltering, living, mourning. !hese normative frameworks establish inadvance what kind of life will be a life worth living, what life will be a life worth preserving,

and what life will become worthy of being mourned. #uch views of lives pervade and implicitly

justify contemporary war. 1ives are divided into those representing certain kinds of states and

those representing threats to state"centered liberal democracy, so that war can then be

righteously waged on behalf of some lives, while the destruction of other lives can be

righteously defended


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;egemony

Causes preemptive conict an e2termination o the>ther

)iton#visiting psychiatry professor at Harvard, %&&p "!/(o1ert Jay, 8uperpower 8yndro4e#5nsepara1le fro4 this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset.1eader and followers feel them2selves constantly under attack"threatened not just with harm

but with annihilation. 3or them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this

degraded planet, of the future itself. !hey must destroy the world in order to survive

themselves &his is why they in turn feel i4pelled to la1el as a1solute evil andannihilate any group that see4s to i4pede their own sacred 4ission #uch asense of paranoid aggressivenessis 4ore readily detecta1le in the case of certi3ed=ealots like +sahara or 1in %aden @ut it is by no means absent from the minds ofAmerican strategists who, though possessing over2whelming military dominance, epress

constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or 4preemptive4 military

actions

7ighting "ars or some evalues the lives o othersButler, professor of rhetoric at @erkeley, %&&9p )!B(Judith, ?ra4es of Ear#

&o that end, 5 want to return to the 7uestion of the FweF and think 3rst a1outwhat happens to this FweF during ti4es of war Ehose lives are regarded aslives worth saving and defending, and whose are notA 8econd, 5 want to askhow we 4ight rethink the FweF in glo1al ter4s in ways that counter the politicsof i4position %astly, and in the chapters to co4e, 5 want to consider why theopposition to torture is o1ligatory, and how we 4ight derive an i4portant senseof glo1al responsi1ility fro4 a politics that opposes the use of torture in any andall of its for4s 8o, one way of posing the $uestion of who 4we4 are in these times of waris by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are

considered ungrievable. &e might think of war as dividing populations into those who aregrievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it

has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. &e can see the division of the globe

into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to

defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others"even if

it means taking those latter lives +fter the attacks of GI--, we encountered in the4edia graphic pictures of those who died, along with their na4es, their stories,the reactions of their fa4ilies Pu1lic grieving was dedicated to 4aking thesei4ages iconic for the nation, which 4eant of course that there was considera1lyless pu1lic grieving for non!U8 nationals, and none at all for illegal workers


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;egemony

Duests an claims or *merican ominance ail anconstitute apocalyptic violence as a selEul6lling

prophecy)iton, visiting psychiatry professor at Harvard, %&& p -Q!--(o1ert Jay, 8uperpower 8yndro4e#

8epte41er -- was a triu4phant 4o4ent for 5sla4ist fanatics!and a profoundlyhu4iliating one for the leaders of the American superpower, who early on decidedthat their response would 1e FwarF and a speci3cally +4erican war at that

&hey then re2ected a 4easured international response to terroris4, o9eredspeci3cally 1y the secretary general of the United Nations, a response thatwould have included the use of force in focused ways short of war, to huntdown the terrorists and 1ring the4 to 2ustice, while 4o1ili=ing the enor4ousoutpouring of sy4pathy for our country e6pressed throughout the world5nstead, this ad4inistration chose to respond unilaterally with the rhetRoric ofwar, 4aking it clear that we alone would decide what levels of 4ilitary force to

apply and who to apply it to, accepting no restraints in the process 5n that andother ways we have responded apocalyptiRcally to an apocalyptic challenge&e have embarked on a series of wars!3rst in +fghanistan, then in 5ra7, withsugRgestions of additional targeted countries in the oSngRbecause we haveviewed the amorphous terrorist enemy as evil and dangerous @ut our own a4orphouslye6tre4e response feeds a larger dyna4ic of apocalyptic violence, even as itconstructs a twenty!3rst!century version of +4erican e4pire !hat prospectiveempire is confusing to the world, to Americans, and perhaps even to those who espouse it. t

does not follow prior imperial models of keeping an etensive bureaucracy in place in subject

countries and thereby ruling territories etending over much of the earth. nstead, we press

toward a kind of control from a distance' mobile forays of military subjugation with

sub2se$uent governmental arrangements unclear. Crucial to this kind of fluid world control is

our dominating war machine, backed by no less dominant nuclear stockpiles. #uch an

arrangement can lend itself to efforts at the remote control of history. Any such project,however, becomes enmeshed in fantasy, in dreams of imposing an omnipotent will on others,

and in the urge to control his2tory itself. Driven by superpower syndrome, such visions of

domination and control can prove catastrophicwhen, as they 4ust, they co4e upagainst the irredee4a1le stu1R1ornness of realityT


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;egemony

This rhetoric constitutes a selEul6lling prophecy o ananarchic realist "orl gone mae "hich ma5es conict

inevitableCheeseman, visiting politics fellow $ Univ of New 8outh Eales, %&&Fp ).!))(Crae4e, >ritical 8ecurity 8tudies and Eorld Politics :d @y Ken @ooth#&hese contending world visions have di9erent i4plications for the4eaning of security!in particular who or what is1eing secured andagainst what!as well as the future roles of 4ilitary force and ar4edforces Traitional balanceEoEpo"er prognoses, whether stressingunipolar, 1ipolar, or 4ultipolar structures, represent a continuationo e2isting prioriGties an minsets These "oul continue toprivilege the stateas the key actor in international a9airs and the

use or threatened use of 4ilitary force in the pursuit of national orglo1al interests 'ilitary conict "oul still be posite as themost important issue aecting national an internationalsecurity, ar4ed forces would continue to 1e structured and trainedpri4ariRly for traditional war!3ghting roles, and national strategicpostures "oul continue to emphasi!e sovereignty eense,power!1alancing, coalition warfare, and the 4anage4ent ofalliances. &he conuct o "arare an the organi!ation omilitary orces "ithin this realist "orl "ill continue to evolveto accommoate technological change an emerging socialpresGsures an e2pectations# but not raically or evenly

across the globe 8tateR1ased forces will 1e re7uired to take part inUN!sanctioned peacekeeping, hu4anitarian assistance, and othernon4ilitary operations, 1ut these will 1e as ad hoc coalitions of thewilling and a1le 8uch operations, 4oreover, will not deter4ine, e6ceptat the 4argins, the 4ilitary structures or 1asic doctrines of theirco4ponent forces This uture vision o international polGiticsmay be o comort to those "ho ear or "ish to control change#but it "ill also invo5e unchec5e security ilemmas# continuingmilitari!ation an conict# armsEracing# an the prospect o"ars bet"een ma4or po"ers or across ma4or ault lines.


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;egemony

The (S is stuc5 in a 3ostEHuropean past min set let toeal "ith the hype threats "ithout thin5ing any other

country can helpBialasie"ic! &I, %ui=a oyal Holloway University of %ondon,*Perfor4ing security< &he i4aginative geographies of current U8strategy sciencedirectco4 QQ) +@#

Hntitle 3o"er an Jea5ness# /agans essay etaile "hathe argue "as the increasingly evient isparity bet"een*merican an Huropean "orlvie"s# particularly "ith regar tothe conuct o international aairs. But his analysis# as "e "illargue here# constitute above all a 4usti6cation or *mericanpo"er# an its e2ercise "herever an ho"ever necessary.

/agans analysis e as part o a "ier unerstaning o the"ays in "hich the postECol Jar "orl "or5s evelope byneoconservative intellectuals e "oul prepare the groun#inee# ma5e inispensable# (S unilateralism an itsoctrine o preEemptive action. /agans article "as highlyinuential# 4ust as 7u5uyamas A1989# 199% The Hn o;istoryK ha been 1 years beore# because o his pro6le"ithin the oreign policy establishment# an because /aganAas 7u5uyama "as spea5ing to riens an colleagues e an#in many "ays# reiterating a set o share unerstanings./agans claims have been "iely iscusse# laue an

reute by acaemics an political leaers ali5e Asee# ore2ample those reerence in Bialasie"ic! L Hlen# %& so"e "ill present them here only in brie. /agans central claim"as that Huropeans an *mericans no longer share a commonvie" o the "orl an# moreover# that in essential "ays theycan be unerstoo as occupying ierent "orls= Hurope isturning a"ay rom po"er# or to put it a little ierently# it ismoving beyon po"er into a selEcontaine "orl o la"s anrules an transnational negotiation an cooperation. *n"hile Hurope has "ithra"n into a mirage o /antianperpetual peace# the (S has no choice but to act in a

;obbesian "orl o perpetual "ar. This state o aairs# or/agan# is not the result o the strategic choices o a singleaministration# but a persistent ivie an the reection ounamentally ierent perspectives on the "orl an the roleo Hurope0 the (S "ithin it A/agan# %&&%= 1. /agan spens asigni6cant part o his paper Aan later boo5 analy!ing "hat heterms the psychology o po"er an "ea5ness.


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believe in iplomacy an multilateralism because they are"ea5= Huropeans oppose unilateralism M. because theyhave no capacity or unilateralism A/agan# %&&%= I. Jhat ismore# he claims# the construction o the Huropean paraise#the geopolitical antasy Mo a postmoern system M"here

the ageEol la"s o international relations have been repealeOM"here Huropeans have steppe out o the ;obbesian "orl oanarchy into the /antian "orl o perpetual peace A%&&%= 11"as mae possible only by *merican po"er "hich assure theCol Jar peace. *merica continues to hol this role becausepostEhistorical Hurope "ill not an cannotO the (S is orceto remain stuc5 in history# let to eal "ith the Saams anthe ayatollahs# the /im Pong


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;egemony;egemony is a prime e2ample o the logic o the securiti!ingmin set.)evy an Thompson 1& (Eillia4, Jack @oard of CovernorsT Professor

of Political 8cience at utgers University, Pro9essor of political scienceat the University of Eashington *@alancing on %and and at 8ea Do8tates +lly against the %eading Clo1al PowerA +@#

&he 4any 4eanings of the 1alance of power concept and the 4ultipleand often contradictory variations of the theory often preclude arigorous and syste4atic e4pirical test-G Most alliance 1ehavior or4ilitary 1uildups can 1e interpreted as so4e state 1alancing againstso4e kind of power or so4e kind of threat 1y so4e other state Unlessone species who 1alances against who4, in response to what levels ofconcentration of what kinds of power or what kinds of threats in what

kinds of syste4s, it is i4possi1le to construct an e4pirical test of1alancing propositionsQ Despite their 4any disagree4ents, nearly all1alance of power theorists would accept the following set ofinterrelated propositions< (-# the prevention of others fro4 achieving aposition of hege4ony in the syste4 is a pri4ary security goal ofstates (# threats of hege4ony generate great!power 1alancingcoalitions and (# as a result, sustained hege4onies rarely if ever for4in 4ultistate syste4s- &his consensus a4ong 1alance of powertheorists concerns counterhege4onic 1alancing 1y great powers, andthat is our focus here @alance of power theorists do not all agree thatgreat powers 1alance against the strongest power in the syste4,

irrespective of the 4agnitude of its advantage, and they do notagree a1out the 1alancing 1ehavior of weaker states in great powersyste4s +lthough these 1alance of power propositions a1outnational!level preferences and strategies and a1out syste4!leveloutco4es appear to 1e uncontroversial, they are underspecied1ecause they fail to identify the syste4 over which hege4ony 4ight1e esta1lished and the 1asis of power in that syste4 &he 1alance ofpower literature generally neglects these distinctions, advances anundi9erentiated conception of the great powers, and i4plies that1alance of power propositions are universally valid in any historicalsyste4 Ee re2ect these argu4ents and contend that 1alance of power

theorieslike nearly all social science theoriesare 1ound 1y certainscope conditions 5t is critical to distinguish 1etween autono4ouscontinental syste4s, where land!1ased 4ilitary power is do4inant, andtrans regional 4ariti4e syste4s, where naval strength and econo4icwealth are do4inant Ee give particular attention to the :uropeancontinental syste4 and the glo1al 4ariti4e syste4, and we argue thatpower dyna4ics are di9erent in these two syste4s &his distinctionwas i4plicitly recogni=ed in the 4ost inVuential 1alance of power


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literature in Eestern international theory developed during the lastthree centuries, which focuses al4ost e6clusively on :urope, re2ects itsgeostrategic conte6t, and refers to 1alancing 1y :uropean greatpowers against hege4onic threats to the :uropean continent 1y land!1ased 4ilitary powers" Hypotheses on 1alances and 1alancing can

1e applied outside of :urope, 1ut scholars 4ust 1e sensitive towhether the key assu4ptions underlying 1alance of power theory areapplica1le in other syste4s/ @ritish theorists, later reinforced 1y+4ericans (who had a :urocentric security outlook until the latetwentieth century#, have had a particularly signal canLt i4pact on thedevelop4ent of 1alance of power theory &hey have re2ected thetraditional dentition of @ritish interests in ter4s of a 1alance of poweron the :uropean continent, not a 1alance of power in the glo1alsyste4, which @ritain preferred to do4inate 1ased on its co44ercial,nancial, and naval power. &he i4plicit :urocentric 1ias in 1alance ofpower theory is closely related to the theoryLs focus on land!1ased

4ilitary power as the pri4ary 1asis of power in the syste4) &heconcentrations of power that are i4plicitly assu4ed to 1e the 4ostfeared, and that are hypothesi=ed to precipitate 1alancing 1ehavior,are those that 4ost directly and i44ediately threaten the territorialintegrity of other states 8tates with large ar4ies that can invade andoccupy have traditionally 1een perceived as far greater threats thanstates that have large navies and econo4ic e4pires 5t is hardly acoincidence that when 1alance of power theorists talk a1out 1alancingagainst hege4onic threats, the historical e6a4ples to which theyusually refer are :uropean coalitions against the land!1ased 4ilitarypower of the Ha1s1urgs under >harles ' in the early si6teenth century,

Philip 55 at the end of the si6teenth century, and the co41ined strengthof 8pain and +ustria in the &hirty earsL Ear against ?rance under%ouis W5' and then Napoleon and against Cer4any under Eilhel4 55and then HitlerB &here is little 4ention of 1alancing against leadingglo1al powers such as the Netherlands in the seventeenth century,@ritain in the nineteenth century, or the United 8tates in the twentiethcenturyG :ven recent critics of 1alance of power theory focus al4oste6clusively on the :uropean syste4Q &he :urocentric 1ias in 1alanceof power theory is re2ected in the general acceptance of theproposition that sustained hege4onies do not e4erge fro4 4ultistatesyste4s +s recent research has re4inded scholars, however,

sustained hege4onies have so4eti4es e4erged, as illustrated 1y the0in and Han dynasties in ancient >hina and 1y the o4an :4pire,a4ong others- &he relative fre7uency and duration of hege4onicand nonhege4onic syste4s have yet to 1e esta1lished, 1ut theargu4ent that sustained hege4onies rarely if ever for4 ininternational syste4s is untena1le :4pirical research on 1alancingduring the last 7uarter century is a welco4e addition to a 1alance ofpower literature that had long 1een 4ore anecdotal than syste4atic


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&his research 4ade so4e i4portant theoretical advances, 1ut theevidence presented in nearly all of these cases su9ers fro4 anunacknowledged pro1le4 of selection 1ias in their research designs +pro1le4 with nearly all e4pirical studies of 1alancing1y 1othproponents and critics of the 1alancing propositionis that they focus

on 4a2or wars and ask whether states 1alance against or ally with thestrongest or the 4ost threatening state &hey do not e6a4ine periodsof peace and ask whether the a1sence of war 4ight result fro4 theanticipation of 1alancing Presu4a1ly, potential aggressors are 4orelikely to initiate war when they anticipate that potential third!partyadversaries will not 1alance, so that looking only at cases of wars leadsto a syste4atic underesti4ation of the causal i4pact of 1alancing:4pirical studies of 1alancing 4ust include peaceti4e as well aswarti4e 1ehavior 5n the ne6t section, we develop our theoreticale6pectations regarding alliance 1ehavior in response to concentrationsof power at the glo1al level


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;egemonyThe (S "ill o anything to maintain its hegemony to 5eepsecurity over hype threats-rant 1& A-reg# 8peechwriter to the 8ecretary of Defense at

Depart4ent of Defense and"riter or $o$bu!!.com ?Ne"Strategy touts Sot 3o"er# F0%I01&httpbama aministration has 6nally release its long a"aitenational security strategy. The F%Epage ocument correctlyienti6es economic po"er as the ounation o (.S. nationalpo"er an calls or a greater ocus on economic gro"th#reucing e6cits an rebalancing the instruments o statecrata"ay rom the current overEreliance on the military. The ne"

strategy avocates coalition builing an acting in concert"ith an through international organi!ations such as the (.N.an N*T>. bama "rites in theintrouction. ?>ur strength an inuence abroa begins "iththe steps "e ta5e at home#@ ;e calls or greater investment ineucation# scienti6c research an green inustries.


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"hile saeguaring privacy an civil liberties,is a nationalsecurity priority.@ an the (.N. Security Council. The (nite States must reservethe right to act unilaterally i necessary to een our nationan our interests# yet "e "ill also see5 to ahere to stanarsthat govern the use o orce. $oing so strengthens those "hoact in line "ith international stanars# "hile isolating an"ea5ening those "ho o not. Je "ill also outline a clearmanate an speci6c ob4ectives an thoroughly consier the

conse:uences ,intene an unintene,o our actions. *nthe (nite States "ill ta5e care "hen sening the men an"omen o our *rme 7orces into harms "ay to ensure theyhave the leaership# training# an e:uipment they re:uire toaccomplish their mission.@


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;egemony;egemony is thought o as a ?struggle vs evil@ an causesenless military conictChernus (5ra, Professor of Peace and >onVict 8tudies Progra4 at the

University of >olorado!@oulder, Monsters to Destroy< &heNeoconservative Ear on &error and 8in QQ. +@#

Journalist on 8uskind has noted that neocons always o9er *astate4ent of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution&hey have no hope of 3nding a real solution 1ecause they have noreason to look for one &heir story allows for success only as a fantasy5n reality, they e6pect to 3nd nothing 1ut an endless 1attle against anene4y that can never 1e defeated +t least two pro4inent neoconshave said it 7uite 1luntly Kenneth +del4an< *Ee should not try toconvince people that things are getting 1etter Michael %edeen< *&he

struggle against evil is going to go on forever"Q &his vision ofendless conVict is not a conclusion drawn fro4 o1serving reality 5t is1oth the pre4ise and the goal of the neoconsL fantasy Ulti4ately, itsee4s, endless resistance is what they really want &heir call for aunipolar world ensures a per4anent state of conVict, so that the U8can go on forever proving its 4ilitary supre4acy and pro4oting the*4anly virtues of 4ilitaris4 &hey have to ad4it that the U8, with itsvastly inco4para1le power, already has unprecedented securityagainst any foreign ar4y 8o they 4ust sound the alar4 a1out ashadowy new kind of ene4y, one that can attack in novel, une6pectedways &hey 4ust 4ake distant changes appear as huge i44inent

threats to +4erica, 4ake the i4plausi1le see4 plausi1le, and thus 3ndnew 4onsters to destroy


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;egemony

Security minset o hegemony is thought o as a?struggle vs evil@ an causes enless military conict

Chernus (5ra, Professor of Peace and >onVict 8tudies Progra4 at theUniversity of >olorado!@oulder, Monsters to Destroy< &heNeoconservative Ear on &error and 8in QQ.#

Journalist on 8uskind has noted that neocons always o9er *astate4ent of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution&hey have no hope of 3nding a real solution 1ecause they have noreason to look for one &heir story allows for success only as a fantasy5n reality, they e6pect to 3nd nothing 1ut an endless 1attle against anene4y that can never 1e defeated +t least two pro4inent neoconshave said it 7uite 1luntly Kenneth +del4an< *Ee should not try to

convince people that things are getting 1etter Michael %edeen< *&hestruggle against evil is going to go on forever"Q &his vision ofendless conVict is not a conclusion drawn fro4 o1serving reality 5t is1oth the pre4ise and the goal of the neoconsL fantasy Ulti4ately, itsee4s, endless resistance is what they really want &heir call for aunipolar world ensures a per4anent state of conVict, so that the U8can go on forever proving its 4ilitary supre4acy and pro4oting the*4anly virtues of 4ilitaris4 &hey have to ad4it that the U8, with itsvastly inco4para1le power, already has unprecedented securityagainst any foreign ar4y 8o they 4ust sound the alar4 a1out ashadowy new kind of ene4y, one that can attack in novel, une6pected

ways &hey 4ust 4ake distant changes appear as huge i44inentthreats to +4erica, 4ake the i4plausi1le see4 plausi1le, and thus 3ndnew 4onsters to destroy


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;egemony

The maintenance o our eclining hegemony re:uires the(nite States to preempt enemies. This approach "oul

be moele by other countries-riths &(Martin , QQ", senior lecturer in the 8chool of Political and 5nternational 8tudies at the?lindersUniversity of 8outh +ustralia, @eyond the @ush Doctrine +4erican Hege4ony and Eorld ;rder,+U8&+%+85+N J;UN+% ;? +M:5>+N 8&UD5:8#

;1viously, 4uch 4ore could 1e said (and has 1een said# a1out theserecentX shifts in +4erican foreign policy-/ ather than repeat whathas 1eenX ela1orated at length 1y other co44entators, or to defend4ultilateralis4 and deterrenceper se, 5 will focus on the i4plications ofthe changes forX +4erican hege4ony 5ronically, whilst 5 suspect that

they will ulti4atelyX weaken +4erican hege4onic inVuence, thechanges are the4selves 4adeX possi1le 1y the fact that the United8tates is a unipolar power, a superpowerX capa1le of conducting ororgani=ing politico!4ilitary action anywhere in theX world However,hege4ony is present in a syste4 when there is a unipolarX structure ofinfuence to 4atch the unipolar structure of capabilities &heX4is4atch 1etween 4ilitary preponderance and declining hege4ony islikelyX to increase as a result of three 4ain factorsX ?irst, +4ericangrand strategy reinforces the i4age of the United 8tates asX too 7uickto use 4ilitary force and to do so outside the 1ounds ofX internationallaw and legiti4acy &his can 4ake it 4ore diScult for theX United

8tates to gain international support for its use of force, and over theXlong ter4, 4ay lead others to resist U8 foreign policy goals 4ore1roadly,X including its e9orts to 3ght terroris4 :levating pre!e4ptionto the level ofX a for4al doctrine 4ay also increase the+d4inistrationLs inclination toX reach for the 4ilitary lever 7uickly,when other tools still have a goodX chance of working ;ther states4ay wish to e4ulate the precedent set 1yX the United 8tates in+fghanistan and 5ra7, at the sa4e ti4e reducing itsX leverage toconvince such countries not to use force This concern isUtheoretical at one level# since it relates to state octrine asoppose toU actual (.S. actions. But it is very real at another

level. Toays internationalU system is characteri!e by arelative inre:uency o interstate "ar.U $eveloping octrinesthat lo"er the threshol or preEemptive action coul put thataccomplishment at ris5# an e2acerbate regional crises alreayonthe brin5 o open conict.


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;egemony

H2ceptionalism osters a racist hierarchy an 4usti6espolitical e2clusion

+italis &%Yo1ert,QQ, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Hege4ony or :4pireA *&heede3nition of U8 Power under Ceorge E @ush!!&he Clo1al and Do4estic54plications of U8 ede3nition of PowerZ

+t least two pro1le4s or 1lind spots a9ect the understanding of+4ericaLs e6perienceX or practice of e4pire ;ne is the pro1le4 ofe6ceptionalis4 [ a standard way of viewingX or narrating or thinkinga1out the +4erican e6perience +4erican e6ceptionalis4X assu4esthe deep structural autono4y of that e6perience, that +4erican historyisX unlike and unconnected with all others :6ceptionalis4 grounds,shapes and fra4esX all the varieties of accounts purporting to prove

+4erican enterprise to 1e anythingX 1ut agents of e4pire, of +4erica1eing e4pireLs antithesis, a1out the U8 ac7uiringX an e4pire late or,as 4any political scientists are 1eginning to clai4 now, +4erica isX ane4pire 1ut one that is uni7ue in the annals of world politics.U Thesecon blin spot is "ith respect to the po"er an robustnesso belies aboutU the naturalness o hierarchy to "hich*mericans but not only *mericans subscribeU R more an lesscoherent ieologies that assign collective ientities an placesin anU inegalitarian orer on the basis o characteristics thatpeople are purportely bornU "ith or inherit or pass on totheir ospring. Cender, ethnicity, nationality andX even religion

have served as grounds for e6clusion in +4erican political life, 1ut noXidentity has 4attered 4ore than race in deter4ining and 2ustifyinghierarchy Thus#U or the scholars "ho oune the iscipline ointernational relations in the (S at theU turn o the t"entiethcentury# the soEcalle races "ere unamental or constitutiveUunits o analysis. They treate the terms internationalrelations an interracialU relations as synonyms. Critics othe hierarchies built on the basis o s5in colorU or acialeatures an the allege inerior an superior abilities o suchierentlyU mar5e boies coine a ne" term in the 19&s tocharacteri!e such practices. TheyU calle it racism# a variant

on a term use 6rst in the 191&s# racialism.U Vacism is*merican e2ceptionalisms *chilles heel# the greatcontraiction atU the heart o the storyboo5 truth about acountry that )ouis ;art!# the ;arvarU (niversity politicaltheorist an author o The Liberal Tradition in America A19FF#Uimagine as eternally ierent rom everyone elseF *5inre contraiction runsU through the "or5 o those "hotoay unselconsciously reprouce ;art!s vie"s inU their


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accounts o a uni:uely liberal an benign hegemonic orerbuilt by *mericansU ater Jorl Jar


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;egemony

3olicy ocuse on increasing an maintaining hegemony is"rappe in a monolithic elusional ieology has no

aversion to crushing lives an liberties in service o itsgoal$erian &(Ja4es Der, Ja4es Der Derian is a Eatson 5nstitute research professorof international studies and professor of political science at @rownUniversity 5n July QQ", he 1eca4e the director of the 5nstituteLs Clo1al8ecurity Progra4 Der Derian also directs the 5nfor4ation &echnology,Ear, and Peace Pro2ect in the Eatson 5nstituteLs Clo1al 8ecurityProgra4, Decoding &he National 8ecurity 8trategy of theUnited 8tates of +4erica#

egardless of authorial (or good# intentions, the N88 reads 4oreX likelatevery latenineteenth!century poetry than a strategic doctrineforX the twenty!3rst century &he rhetoric of the Ehite House favorsand clearlyX intends to 4o1ili=e the 4oral clarity, nostalgicsenti4entality, and uncontestedX do4inance re4iniscent of the lastgreat e4pires against the a41iguities,X co4ple6ities, and 4essinessof the current world disorder ;o"ever#U the gul bet"een thenations state cause Ato help ma5e the "orl not 4ustU saerbut better M1 an eensive nees Ato 6ght a "ar againstterrorists oU global reach MF is so vast that one etects"hat Niet!sche reerre to asU the breath o empty space#

that voi bet"een the "orl as it is an as "eU "oul "ish itto be#which produces all kinds of 4etaphysical concoctionsX


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be use to promote a balanceU o po"er that avors reeom(-#A Perhaps the ca1alistic 8traussiansX that 4ake up the defenseintellectual 1rain trust of the @ush ad4inistrationX (a4ong the4,PaulEolfowit=, ichard Perle, and Eillia4 Kristol# have co4eX up with anuanced, indeed, anti!Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli thatX

escapes the uninitiated @ut so 36ed is the N88 on the creation of aworldX in +4ericaLs i4age that concepts such as 1alance of power andi44inentX threat, once rooted in historical, 2uridical, as well asreciprocal traditions,


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;egemony'ultipolarity is the only "ayto achieve us interestsattempting to go it alone ma5es achieving (S interestsar more ifcult estroys multipolar partnerships an

ultimately anti prolieration movement


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3o"er +acuum

3o"er vacuums rhetoric ma5es intervention an po"erpolitics inevitable

Shim5o#professor of political science at Purdue, %&&p Q/!Q.(Keith, in Metaphorical World oliticsed @y @eer and %andtsheer#et another tried and true geopolitical metaphoris the concept of the 4powervacuumF &his wauld also 1e 4o1ili=ed at various 2unctures during the >old EarPresident :isenhower (who appears to have had a particular fondness forgeopolitical 4etaphors# o1served after the -G/. 8ue= crisis that Fthe e6istingvacuu4 in the Middle :ast 4ust 1e 3lled 1y the United 8tates 1efore it is 3lled1y ussiaF-G &he metaphor of the power vacuum is a pri4e e6a4ple af what 5 calla metaphor of power< it embodies a concep2 tion of how the world works that is conducive tothe eercise of great *pawer %ike 4any inVuential geopolitical 4etaphors, this oneis drawn ] fro4 the natural, physical, and 1iological sciences #uch metaphorsimplyithat the social world of international relatians operates according tocertain '''laws, such as the laws of physics Perhaps such analogies are so common

because they provide a comforting vision of predictability for an unpre2.dictable world t is aworld in which nations and decision makers are oddly robbed of volition and agency *and ,

thus, moral responsibilityA# NaRtlire a1hors a vacuu4 'acuu4s will 1e 3lled theywill draw things in &his is inevita1le and ine6ora1le As 5isenhower insists, thevacuum must4 be filled 5f it is not 3lled 1y the United 8tates, it will 1e 3lled 1ythe oviet Union< these are the only two aptions +nd since it is a vacuu4 of.wer, who else can 3ll it e6cept those who possess power!for e6a4ple, theUnited 8tates !he notion t hat there eists these things called power vacuums that must befilled is a metaphor of power because it presents an understanding of how the world works

that almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that those with power must epandto 3ll thevacuu4s 5n 3llRing power vacuu4s we are only doing what 4ust inevita1ly 1edone!in fact, it is the vacuum itself that is to blame because it 4draws4 in power(and,thus, the powerful# &he 4etaphor, of course, hides the o1vious o1R2ection to

the analysis and conclusion< perhaps no one has to F3llF the Fvacuu4F 1ecauseit is not in fact a Fvacuu4F at all


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Thir Jorl07aile States0$eveloping Jorl


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anything that is networked, evolving or \life!likeL in so4e way [ is no"sai to be resilient in so ar as it able to absorb shoc5s anuncertainty# or recon6gure itsel in relation to such shoc5s"hile still retaining its essential unctionality(Holling -G)QQB# &he paper e6plores the genealogy of resilience in the civil

defence 4easures pioneered to survive nuclear attack, departures inecology that 1roke with e7uili1riu41ased 4odels of range4anage4ent and echoing develop4ents in neoli1eralis4 (>ooper ^Ealker Q-Q# @esides an adaptive resilience, however, the rise oenvironmental terror has also seen the appearance o a morespatial an eensive technology= the bun5er Eith origins in the4ilitary 1unker, 1ut no" oering economic# political an culturalelites spaces o private reuge an consumption# in variousorms an e2isting at ierent scales, the 1unker has 1eco4eneoli1eralis4Ls signature ur1an architectural for4 :nviron4entalterror +ssociated with the Eorld Ears of the &wentieth >entury,

especially EE55, total "ar is usually unerstoo as thebrea5o"n o earlier 4uriical istinctions bet"een people#governments an armies(van >reveld -GG-# &hese distinctions hadearlier shaped the rules of war that protected people 1y ideallycon3ning war, at least in :urope, to 1attles 1etween co4para1lear4ies &he blurring o such ierences "as premise upon theinustrialisation o "ar During the &wentieth >entury, whether assoldiers, workers or 4others, entire societies were directly 4o1ilisedfor war ules and restraint evaporated as societies fought to the deathin support of contrary world!views and 4oral syste4s The burningcities# e2termination camps# hule reugees an mushroom

clous o JJ


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(8loterdi2k QQG# and, in the for4 of the Oeppelin raids, the 1eginningof the aerial 1o41ard4ent of ur1an centres (Meilinger -GG.# &hesewere ele4ental departures in :urope fro4 the erstwhile \crossing ofswordsL 1y e7ually 4atched ar4ies 5ndeed, the 1ody of the ene4ysoldier itself was no longer the direct target of war &he o12ective was

now the environ4ent, in this case the at4osphere and ur1aninfrastructure, which sustained ene4y life &argeting an ene4yLsenviron4ental life!world is *the 1asic idea of terroris4 in its 4oree6plicit sense (51id< -"# &hus, terroris4 *can only 1e understoodwhen grasped as a for4 of e6ploration of the environ4ent fro4 theperspective of its destructi1ility (51id< B# +s a terroristic 4odusoperandi total war involves *an attack on the ene4yLs pri4ary,ecologically!dependent vital functions< respiration, central nervousregulations, and sustaina1le te4perature and radiation conditions(51id< -.# ?ro4 this 1eginning environ4ental weapons of 4assdestruction have 4ultiplied @esides poison gas, they include 1lanket

1o41ing, designer 3re!stor4s, radiation weapons, 1iologicalpathogens, asphy6iation 1o41s and, 4ore recently, attempts togeo!engineer weather patterns, alter the properties of the ionosphere andcontrol outerEspace or military purposes(51id Peoples QQBCil1ert QQ"#


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Vesource Jars0Vesource Scarcity

7ocus on the environment is a problem,causes massviolence an saniti!es complicity "ith structural violence

by scapegoating/umari 1%Masters in 5nternational elations educated at Universityof Nottingha4 and &he University of @ir4ingha4 (Par4ila, 8ecuritising&he :nviron4ent< + @arrier &o >o41ating :nviron4ent Degradation ;r+ 8olution 5n 5tselfA, wwwe!irinfoIQ-IQ-IGIsecuritising!the!environ4ent!a!1arrier!to!co41ating!environ4ent!degradation!or!a!solution!in!itselfI#*&he Dile44a should 1y now 1e apparent securitising environ4entalissues runs the risk that the strategic0realist approach "ill cooptan colonise the environmental agenarather than respondpositively to environ4ental pro1le4s (@arnett QQ-


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and social security di4ensions#, freedo4 fro4 ha=ard i4pacts (naturalor hu4an!induced ha=ards as e9ects of environ4ental degradation#and freedo4 fro4 fear (violence and conVict#(@rauch QQB< -)!B# &hisde4onstrates how conVict is 1ut one conse7uence of degradationHnvironmentalEconict literature ignores the root

socioeconomic causes an ha!ar impact imensions oenvironmental securityO a ocus on "hich "oul lea toconclusions o unerta5ing nonEmilitary eorts li5e isasterprepareness# aaptation# mitigation# early "arning systemsetc(@rauch QQB


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may aect the Souths relations "ith the North.?or e6a4ple,Detra= and @etsill have co44ented on tensions 1etween the North and8outh in the QQ) United Nations 8ecurity >ouncil de1ate on cli4atechange ;nly G` of the 8outhern states co4pared to )Q` of Northernspeakers supported the idea of the 8ecurity >ouncil 1eing a place to

develop a glo1al response to cli4ate change &he reasons for thisdi9erence was that shifting decision!4aking to the 8ecurity >ouncilwould 4ake 8outhern states una1le to pro4ote eSciently theirinterests in o1taining resources for cli4ate adaptation and 4itigationplans ?urther4ore, Hgypt an


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness lin5s,rhetoric o competitiveness oesnot respect ierence# an attens the other into

sub4ects o violenceBristo" 1&- Sch##l #f 0ity 8 &egi#nal 9lanning, 0ardiff Uniersity (:illian, ;anuary 2


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resilience that can 1e partly overco4e with the develop4ent of a 4oreconte6tualised approach to co4petitiveness &he paper is nowstructured as follows 5t 1egins 1y e6a4ining the developingunderstanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discoursearound regional develop4ent 5t then descri1es the >P: approach and

utilises its fra4ework to e6plain 1oth how a narrow conception ofco4petitiveness has co4e to do4inate regional develop4ent policyand how resilience inter!plays in su1tle and co4ple6 ways withco4petitiveness and its e4erging criti7ue &he paper then proceeds toillustrate what resilience 4eans for regional develop4ent 3rstly, withreference to the &ransition &owns concept, and then 1y developing atypology of regional strategies to show the di9erent characteristics ofpolicy approaches 1ased on co4petitiveness and resilience esilienceis rapidly e4erging as an idea whose ti4e has co4e in policydiscourses around localities and regions, where it is developingwidespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful co41ination of

transfor4ative pressures fro4 1elow, and various catalytic, crisis!induced i4peratives for change fro4 a1ove 5t features strongly inpolicy discourses around environ4ental 4anage4ent and sustaina1ledevelop4ent (see Hudson, QQBa#, 1ut has also 4ore recentlye4erged in relation to e4ergency and disaster planning with, fore6a4ple \egional esilience &ea4sL esta1lished in the :nglish regionsto support and co!ordinate civil protection activities around variouse4ergency situations such as the threat of a swine Vu pande4ic &hediscourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions arounddesira1le local and regional develop4ent activities and strategies &herecent glo1al \credit crunchL and the acco4panying increase in

livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local andregional econo4ies that have greater \resilienceL 1y virtue of 1eingless dependent upon glo1ally footloose activities, having greaterecono4ic diversity, andIor having a deter4ination to prioritise ande9ect 4ore signi3cant structural change (+sh1y et al, QQG %arkin and>ooper, QQG# 5ndeed, resilience features particular strongly in the\greyL literature spawned 1y thinktanks, consultancies andenviron4ental interest groups around the conse7uences of the glo1alrecession, catastrophic cli4ate change and the arrival of the era ofpeak oil for localities and regions with all its i4plications for thelongevity of car1on!fuelled econo4ies, cheap, long!distance transport

and glo1al trade &his popularly la1elled \triple crunchL (New:cono4ics ?oundation, QQB# has powerfully illu4inated thepotentially isastrous material conse:uences o the voraciousgro"th imperative at the heart o neoliberalism ancompetitiveness# both in the orm o resource constraintsAespecially oo security an in the inability o the currentsystem to manage global 6nancial an ecologicalsustainability.


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previously isparate# racture ebates about the merits o thecurrent system# an challenging public an political opinion toevelop a ne"# global concern "ith rugality# egalitarianisman localism(see, for e6a4pleJackson, QQG New :cono4ics?oundation, QQB#
http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-23http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-23http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41


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Competitiveness

)anguage o competitiveness reprouces ;obbesiansecurity logics by conating economic strength "ith

military con:uest>rawford -GGB (@everly, Professor of Political 8cience at @erkeley, !nSecuritye1ook httpold Ear# national security "as e6neprimarily in terms o military threatsto state, society, andindustry &o this last category we can add concerns a1out oil and otherraw 4aterials, whose relia1ility of supply could never 1e assured withcon3dence through glo1al 4arkets Those concerns have# or themost part# no" isappeare# to be replace by languageocuse on economic XcompetitivenessX Aa moern variant o

ol Social $ar"inist arguments an threats to the nationEstate by other countries &here are two perspectives e41edded indiscussions of this new Fsecurity dile44aF &he 6rst postulateseclining national "elare i competitiveness is lostO thesecon# a threat to the *merican ability to prosecute ma4or"ars against unname aversaries +dvocates of the 3rstperspective propose 4a2or govern4ent intervention into and control ofresearch and develop4ent 5nas4uch as this re4ains ideologicalanathe4a in the United 8tates, the second o9ers a 4ore accepta1lerationale for such intervention, invoking 4ilitary security argu4entsthat do not di9er very 4uch fro4 those so4eti4es put forth during the

>old Ear
http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdfhttp://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdfhttp://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdfhttp://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdf


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness leas to inefcient ecision ma5ing/rugman 9(Paultrue )I-I-#

Cuess whatA Delors didnTt confront the pro1le4s of either the wel Xfare state or the e4s He e6plained thatthe root cause of :uropeanXune4ploy4ent was a lack of co4petitiveness with the United 8tatesXandJapan and that the solution was a progra4 of invest4ent in infraXstructure and high technologyX5t was a

disappointing evasion, 1ut not a surprising one +fter all, theUrhetoric ocompetitivenessKthe vie" that, in the words of PresidentX>linton, each nationis Xli5e a big corporation competing in the globalU

mar5etplaceXKhas become pervasive among opinion leaersthroughUout the "orl People who 1elieve the4selves to 1e sophisticated a1out Xthesu12ect take it for granted that the econo4ic pro1le4 facing anyX4odern nation is essentially one of

co4peting on world 4arketsAthatXthe (nite States an Papan arecompetitors in the same sense thatUCocaECola competes "ith3epsiKan are una"are that anyone mightUseriously :uestionthat proposition.:very few 4onths a new 1est!sellXer warns the +4erican pu1lic of the direconse7uences of losing theXFraceF for the -st century- + whole industry of councils on co4petiXtiveness, Fgeo!econo4istsF and 4anaged trade theorists has sprung upXinE ashington Many of thesepeople, having diagnosed +4erica s ecoXno4ic pro1le4s in 4uch the sa4e ter4s as Delors did :uropeTs,areXnow in the highest reaches of the >linton ad4inistration for4ulating Xecono4ic and trade policy forthe United 8tates 8o Delors was usingX?;:5CN +??+58 MarchI+pril iGG" YGZX-X8ee, for 2ust a fewe6a4ples, %aura DT+ndrea &yson, EhoTs @ashing Eho4< &radeX>onVict inH igh!&echnology 5ndustries,Eashington< 5nstitute for 5nternational :cono4Xics, -GG %ester > &hurow, Head to Head< &he >o4ing

:cono4ic @attle a4ong Japan,X:urope,Xand +4erica, New ork< Morrow, -GG 5ra > Maga=iner ando1ert @ eich,XMinding +4ericas @usiness< &he Decline and ise of the +4erican :cono4y, New ork< X'intage @ooks, -GB 5ra > Maga=iner and Mark Patinkin, &he 8ilent Ear< 5nside the XClo1al @usiness@attles 8haping +4ericas ?uture, New ork< 'intage @ooks, -GGQX:dward N %uttwak, &he :ndangered+4erican Drea4< How to 8top theU nited 8tatefsr o4X@eco4ing a &hird Eorld >ountry and How to Einthe Ceo!econo4ic 8truggle for 5ndustrialX8upre4acy, New ork< 8i4on and 8chuster, -GG Kevin PPhillips, 8taying on &op< &heX@usiness >ase for a National 5ndustrial 8trategy, New ork< ando4 House,-GB" >lydeX' Prestowit=, Jr, &rading Places< How Ee +llowed Japan to &ake the %ead, New orkoldPeace< +4erica, Japan, Cer4any, and the 8truggle forX8upre4acy, New ork< &i4es @ooks, -GG andEayne 8andholt= et al, &he HighestX8takes< &he :cono4ic ?oundations of theN e6t 8ecurity 8yste4,@erkeley oundta1le on theX5nternational :cono4y (1rie#, ;6ford University Press, -GGXPaul Krug4anXalanguage that was not only convenient 1ut co4forta1le for hi4 and Xa wide audience on 1oth sides of the+tlanticXUnfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply 4isleading as a guide to Xwhat ails :urope, and si4ilar

diagnoses in the United 8tates areXe7ually 4isleading The iea that a countryYs

economic ortunes areUlargely etermine by its success on"orl mar5ets is a hypothesis#Unot a necessary truthO an as apractical# empirical matter# thatUhypothesis is atly "rong.That is# it is simply not the case that theU"orlYs leaingnations are to any important egree in economicUcompetition"ith each other# or that any o their ma4or economicUproblemscan be attribute to ailures to compete on "orl mar5ets.UThegro"ing obsession in most avance nations "ith
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=truehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=true


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internationalUcompetitiveness shoul be seen# not as a "ellEoune concern# butUas a vie" hel in the ace oover"helming contrary evience +ndXyet it is clearly a view that people very 4uchwant to holdAa desireXto 1elieve that is reVected in a re4arka1le tendency of those whoXpreach thedoctrine of co4petitiveness to support their case withXcareless, Vawed arith4etic&his article 4akes threepoints ?irst, it argues that concerns a1outX co4petitiveness are, as an e4pirical 4atter, al4ostco4pletelyX unfounded 8econd, it tries to e6plain why de3ning the econo4ic X pro1le4 as one of

international co4petition is nonetheless so attracX tive to so 4any people ?inally, it argues that theobsession "ith comU petitiveness is not only "rong butangerous# s5e"ing omestic poliU cies an threatening theinternational economic system. This lastU issue is# o course#the most conse:uential rom the stanpoint oU public policy.Thin5ing in terms o competitiveness leas# irectlyU aninirectly# to ba economic policies on a "ie range o issues#Uomestic an oreign# "hether it be in health care or trae.


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness provies e2cuses or politicians an isevolving into a angerous istort o economic policies

/rugman 9(Paultrue )I-I-#

8econd, the iea that (.S. economic ifculties hinge cruciallyonU ?;:5CN +??+58!MarchI+priliGG" YGZX Paul Krug4anX ourailures in international competition some"hat parao2icallyUma5es those ifculties seem easier to solve.&he productivity of

theX average +4erican worker is deter4ined 1y a co4ple6 array offactors,X 4ost of the4 unreacha1le 1y any likely govern4ent policy 8oif youX accept the reality that our Fco4petitiveF pro1le4 is really ado4esticX productivity pro1le4 pure and si4ple, you are unlikely to 1eoptiX 4istic a1out any dra4atic turnaround @uti you can convinceyourU sel that the problem is really one o ailures ininternational compeU titionKthat imports are pushing "or5ersout o highE"age 4obs# orU subsii!e oreign competition isriving the (nite States out o theU high valueEae sectorsKthen the ans"ers to economic malaise mayU seem to you toinvolve simple things li5e subsii!ing high technoloU gy an

being tough on Papan.U 7inally# many o the "orl s leaershave oun the competitiveU metaphor e2tremely useul as apolitical evice. The rhetoric o comU petitiveness turns out toprovie a goo "ay either to 4ustiy har choicU es or to avoithem.&he e6a4ple of Delors in >openhagen shows theX usefulness ofco4petitive 4etaphors as an evasion Delors had to sayX so4ething atthe ec su44it yet to say anything that addressed the realX roots of:uropean une4ploy4ent would have involved huge politicalX risks Byturning the iscussion to essentially irrelevant but plausibleUsouning :uestions o competitiveness# he bought himselsome timeU to come up "ith a better ans"er(which to so4e

e6tent he provided inX Dece41er s white paper on the :uropeanecono4yAa paper that still,X however, retained Fco4petitivenessF in itstitle#X @y contrast, the well!received presentation of @ill >lintons initialXecono4ic progra4 in ?e1ruary -GG showed the usefulness of co4petXitive rhetoric as a 4otivation for tough policies >linton proposed a setXof painful spending cuts and ta6 increases to reduce the ?ederalde3citX EhyA &he real reasons for cutting the de3cit aredisappointingly undraX 4atic< the de3cit siphons o9 funds that 4ight


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otherwise have 1een proX ductively invested, and there1y e6erts asteady if s4all drag on U8 ecoX no4ic growth @ut >linton was a1leinstead to o9er a stirring patrioticX appeal, calling on the nation to actnow in order to 4ake the econo4yX co4petitive in the glo1al 4arketAwith the i4plication that dire ecoX no4ic conse7uences would follow if

the United 8tates does notX Y"QZ ?;:5CN +??+58T'olu4e)NQX>o4petitiveness< + Dangerous ;1sessionX 'any people "ho 5no"that XcompetitivenessX is a largely meanU ingless concept havebeen "illing to inulge competitive rhetoric preU ciselybecause they believe they can harness it in the service ogooU policies. *n overblo"n ear o the Soviet (nion "as usein the 19F&sU to 4ustiy the builing o the interstate high"aysystem an the e2panU sion o math an science eucation.Cannot the un4usti6e ears aboutU oreign competitionsimilarly be turne to goo# use to 4ustiy seriousU eorts toreuce the buget e6cit# rebuil inrastructure# an so onKU *

e" years ago this "as a reasonable hope. *t this point#ho"evU er# the obsession "ith competitiveness has reachethe point "here itU has alreay begun angerously to istorteconomic policies.


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness leas to "asteul governmentalspening# protectionism# trae "ars# an misallocation o

resources/rugman 9(Paultrue )I-I-#

Thin5ing an spea5ing in terms o competitiveness posesthreeUreal angers. 7irst# it coul result in the "asteulspening o governmentUmoney supposely to enhance (.S.

competitiveness. Secon# it coulUlea to protectionism antrae "ars.?inally, and 4ost i4portant, itUcoul result in ba public policyon a spectrum o important issues.U$uring the 19F&s# ear othe Soviet (nion inuce the (.S. govUerment to spen moneyonuseful things like highways and scienceXeducation 5t also, however, led to considera1le spending onmoreUoubtul items li5e bomb shelters.&he 4ost o1vious if least worriXso4edanger of the growing obsession "ith competitiveness is that itUmightlea to a similar misallocation o resources. &o take an e6a4Xple, recentguidelines for govern4ent research funding have stressedXthe i4portance of supporting research that can

i4prove U8 interXnational co4petitiveness This e2erts at least some biasto"ar invenUtions that can help manuacturing 6rms# "hich

generally compete onU

international mar5ets# rather thanservice proucers# "hich generallyUo not et 4ost of our e4ploy4ent andvalue!added is now in serXvices, and lagging productivity in services rather than 4anufacturesXhas 1eenthe single 4ost i4portant factor in the stagnation of U8Xliving standardsX+ 4uch 4ore serious risk is

that the obsession "ith competitiveUness "ill lea to traeconict# perhaps even to a "orl trae "ar.X?;:5CN +??+58 MarchI+pril-GG" Y"-ZXPaul Krug4anX'ost o those "ho have preache the octrineo competitivenessUhave not been olEashioneprotectionists. They "ant their countriesUto "in the globaltrae game# not rop out. @ut what if, despite itsX1est e9orts, a country does not see4to 1e winning, or lacksXcon3dence that it canA &hen the co4petitive diagnosis inevita1ly sugXgests thatto close the 1orders is 1etter than to risk having foreignersXtake away high!wage 2o1s and high!value

sectors. *t the very least#Uthe ocus on the supposelycompetitive nature o international ecoUnomic relationsgreases the rails or those "ho "ant conrontationalUi notran5ly protectionist policies


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness istorts many omestic issues anconverts them into an international issue

/rugman 9(Paultrue )I-I-#

>onsider, for e6a4ple, the issue o health care reorm, undou1tXedly the mostimportant economic initiative o the Clinton aminUistration#al4ost surely an order of 4agnitude 4ore i4portant toXU8 living standards than anything that 4ight 1edone a1out tradeXY"Z ?;:5CN +??+58 'oIu4ey2NoXpolicy (unless the United 8tates provokesXa full!

1lown trade war# 8ince healthXcare is an issue with few direct inter Xnational linkages, one might

haveUe2pecte it to be largely insulateUrom any istortionso policyUresulting rom misguie conE Competitiveness risksdistorting theXcerns a1out co4petitivenessXEe 4ight also note the unusual process 1y which the

health careXrefor4 was developed


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Competitiveness

Competitiveness allo"s or the bene6t o some to be atthe e2pense o others

'cCarthy %5 (%inda Mc>arthy is an assistant professor inX theDepart4ent of Ceography and a4e41erX of the Ur1an 8tudies Progra4at theX University of Eisconsin[Milwaukee 8he isX also a certi3edplanner 8he conductsX research on :urope and North +4erica inX theareas of ur1an econo4ic develop4entX and pu1lic policy Her recentresearch hasX focused on regional cooperation and co4petition,X1rown3eld redevelop4ent, theX auto4o1ile industry, and glo1ali=ation*&he Cood of the Many ;utweighs the Cood of the ;ne egional>ooperation instead of 5ndividual >o4petition in the United 8tates andEestern :uropeAhttp


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Competitiveness

Hconomic Competitiveness is becoming obsessive./rugman, PaulMarch1994Foreign Affairs;Mar/Apr94, Vol. 73 Issue 2, p2 Paul Robin Krugmanis anAmerican economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

international affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed

columnist for the New York Times.

In !une 1993, !ac"ues #elors $a%e a special presen&a&ion &o &he lea%ers of &he na&ions of &he 'uropean (o$$uni&),$ee&ing in (openhagen, on &he gro*ing pro+le$ of 'uropean une$plo)$en&. 'cono$is&s *ho s&u%) &he 'uropeansi&ua&ion *ere curious &o see *ha& #elors, presi%en& of &he '( (o$$ission, *oul% sa). Mos& of &he$ share $ore or less&he sa$e %iagnosis of &he 'uropean pro+le$ &he &a-es an% regula&ions i$pose% +) 'uropes ela+ora&e *elfare s&a&eshae $a%e e$plo)ers reluc&an& &o crea&e ne* 0o+s, *hile &he rela&iel) generous leel of une$plo)$en& +enefi&s has$a%e *orers un*illing &o accep& &he in%s of lo**age 0o+s &ha& help eep une$plo)$en& co$para&iel) lo* in &heni&e% &a&es. 5he $one&ar) %ifficul&ies associa&e% *i&h presering &he 'uropean Mone&ar) )s&e$ in &he face of &hecos&s of 6er$an reunifica&ion hae reinforce% &his s&ruc&ural pro+le$. I& is a persuasie %iagnosis, +u& a poli&icall)e-plosie one, an% eer)one *an&e% &o see ho* #elors *oul% han%le i &. 8oul% he %are &ell 'uropean lea%ers &ha& &heireffor&s &o pursue econo$ic 0us&ice hae pro%uce% une$plo)$en& as an unin&en%e% +)pro%uc& 8oul% he a%$i& &ha& &hee$s coul% +e sus&aine% onl) a& &he cos& of a recession an% face &he i$plica&ions of &ha& a%$ission for 'uropean $one&ar)union 6uess *ha& #elors %i%n& confron& &he pro+le$s of ei&her &he *elfare s&a&e or &he e$s. :e e-plaine% &ha& &he roo&cause of 'uropean une$plo)$en& *as a lac of co$pe&i&ieness *i&h &he ni&e% &a&es an% !apan an% &ha& &he solu&ion*as a progra$ of ines&$en& in infras&ruc&ure an% high &echnolog). I& *as a %isappoin&ing easion, +u& no& a surprising

one. Af&er all,the rhetoric o competitiveness EE the vie" that# in the"ors o 3resient Clinton# each nation is Xli5e a bigcorporation competing in the global mar5etplaceX EE hasbecome pervasive among opinion leaers throughout the"orl.3eople "ho believe themselves to be sophisticateabout the sub4ect ta5e it or grante that the economicproblem acing any moern nation is essentially one ocompeting on "orl mar5ets &ha& &he ni&e% &a&es an% !apan are co$pe&i&ors in &he sa$esense &ha& (oca(ola co$pe&es *i&h Pepsi an% are una*are &ha& an)one $igh& seriousl) "ues&ion &ha& proposi&ion.'er) fe* $on&hs a ne* +es&seller *arns &he A$erican pu+lic of &he %ire conse"uences of losing &he race for &he 21s&

cen&ur).* "hole inustry o councils on competitiveness# XgeoEeconomistsX an manage trae theorists has sprung up inJashington. Many of these people, having diagnosed +4ericaTs econo4ic pro1le4s in 4uch thesa4e ter4s as Delors did :uropeTs,are no* in &he highes& reaches of &he (lin&on a%$inis&ra&ion ormulatingeconomic an trae policy or the (nite States. o #elors *as using a language &ha& *as no& onl)conenien& +u& co$for&a+le for hi$ an% a *i%e au%ience on +o&h si%es of &he A&lan&ic. nfor&una&el), his %iagnosis *as%eepl) $islea%ing as a gui%e &o *ha& ails 'urope, an% si$ilar %iagnoses in &he ni&e% &a&es are e"uall) $islea%ing.The iea that

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