Security and Development in theSahel-Sahara

OCTOBER 2013

Introduction

After the severe twin crises that nearly brought Mali to its knees in January2012, the country is gradually recovering from their debilitatingconsequences. In August 2013, Mali successfully elected its new president,Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, thus putting an end to an eighteen-month-longtransitional government that was put in place following the March 2012 coup.Even though the violence has abated and renewed hope seems to be in the air,the structural causes of the Malian conflict are still stubbornly present andtheir consequences are still being felt by neighboring Sahel countries thatsuffer from similar underlying ills. The situation in Mali and other concernedstates in the region generated a renewed interest in the Sahel-Sahara regionand in efforts to stabilize this region. This prompted the International PeaceInstitute, the Executive Secretariat of the Strategy for Security andDevelopment in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger (SDS Sahel Niger), and theCentre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S) to convenean international seminar on security and development in the Sahel-Sahara onFebruary 15 and 16, 2013, in Niamey, Niger. The seminar aimed to:• develop a common in-depth understanding of the constantly changing

situation in the Sahel-Sahara, whose causes and effects have become increas-ingly transnational in nature;

• evaluate the current and planned responses to address the crisis and identifyways to make them more effective;

• develop a strategy on how international actors could organize themselves tobetter support national and regional stakeholders in the search for sustain-able solutions to recurring problems affecting this fragile region; and

• build knowledge and share the experience Niger gained through thedevelopment and initial implementation of its national Strategy for Securityand Development in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger.

The meeting was officially opened by Niger Prime Minister Brigi Rafini. Itbrought together approximately eighty participants, including UN SpecialEnvoy for the Sahel Romano Prodi, African Union (AU) High Representativefor Mali and the Sahel Pierre Buyoya, and Special Representative of the UNSecretary-General for West Africa Said Djinnit. Other participants includedrepresentatives of the government of Niger; individual country envoys for theSahel from Norway, Spain, and Switzerland; high-level representatives ofregional governments from the Sahel-Sahara and West Africa; representa-tives from interested partners and donor countries; researchers and analystsfrom within and outside the region; as well as representatives from civil

On February 15 and 16, 2013, the

International Peace Institute (IPI),

the Executive Secretariat of the

Strategy for Security and Develop -

ment in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of

Niger (SDS Sahel Niger), and the

Centre for Strategies and Security

for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S)

convened an international seminar

on security and development in the

Sahel-Sahara in Niamey, Niger. The

meeting, opened by Niger Prime

Minister Brigi Rafini, brought toge -

ther approximately eighty partici-

pants, including high-level represen-

tatives from the United Nations,

African Union, and national and

regional governments as well as

representatives from interested

partners, donor countries, civil

society, and the media.

This meeting note summarizes the

key themes of the seminar and was

drafted by Mireille Affa'a-Mindzie,

research fellow of IPI’s Africa

program. The note reflects the

rapporteur’s interpretation of the

meeting and not necessarily the

views of all of the participants. IPI

owes a debt of gratitude to the

International Organisation of La

Francophonie (IOF), the govern-

ments of Luxembourg and the

Netherlands, and its many generous

donors whose contributions made

this seminar and publication

possible.

2 MEETING NOTE

society and the media. This report summarizes the key points thatemerged from the meeting, presenting first themain factors that contributed to the pervasivemulti-dimensional problems in the Sahel-SaharaRegion. Second, the report considers the responsestrategies that were developed or implemented byinstitutions at international, regional, and nationallevels. Third, the report identifies key policymeasures for addressing the crisis. Finally, thereport presents a number of coordinationchallenges and offers suggestions on how thesechallenges can be overcome.

Crisis Factors in the Sahel-Sahara

The Sahel region has been described as a conflictsystem that episodically erupts at the smallest ofsparks. Several deep and multiform factors led tothe latest crisis in the region and the temporarycollapse of the Malian state in 2012. These factorsinclude poor governance, rampant nepotism,impunity, and limited government legitimacy. Innorthern Mali, a weak state and a growing opposi-tion between civilian and military authoritiescontributed to neglecting this space for a longperiod of time, resulting in its occupation byjihadists and in the March 2012 military coup inBamako. Moreover, tribal and ethnic corporatism,the traditional racial and ethnic rift between blackMalians and Tuareg communities, and the lack of asense of public service were also cited among thefactors that led to the crisis. In Mali and other countries in the Sahel,underdevelopment is at the root of many securitychallenges. The country’s economic fragility, socio-demographic vulnerability, and poor social servicedelivery contributed to the many other grievancesthat undergird the rebellion in Northern Mali. Thiswas worsened by climate and geostrategicchallenges threatening the region. Participants atthe seminar emphasized the importance for othercountries in the region to learn from the Malianexperience, including Niger, which has developed anational Strategy for Security and Development in

the Sahel-Saharan Areas. The conflicted relation-ship between elected leaders and their constituentswas raised as another area of concern. In addition to poverty and developmentchallenges, insecurity across the Sahel-Sahara wasfueled by the implantation of radical Islamistgroups and transnational criminality, which wasfacilitated by vast territories, porous borders, aswell as the dysfunctional nature and limited capaci-ties of the states in the region. It was observed thatMali’s north had not been administered by thecentral government for a decade, and even when itwas, traffickers were able to influence governmentappointments. Arms circulation following thecollapse of Libya’s former regime and the utiliza-tion of these arms to conduct criminal activities—including the lucrative business of foreign hostagetaking—were used to destabilize states in theregion. The transformation of the Sahel into atransit way for drug trafficking and a growing areaof drug consumption especially by the youth alsoraised concerns. Participants at the seminar noted the importanceof acknowledging the responsibility of the statesconcerned in the crisis, which over a decade letterrorist groups settle and spread, destabilizing theentire Sahel region. The responsibility of theinternational community was also discussed. Forexample, part of the $700 million spent by the USgovernment in counterterrorism efforts in theSahel went to training the Malian army,1 includingunits from the north that later joined the rebellionduring the crisis. The seminar participants agreedthat such efforts could have been better coordi-nated, and the resources that were poured intothese programs could have been utilized moreefficiently. The conflict was further linked to regionaldynamics marked by Algeria’s ambiguous role inthe Sahel and its difficult relationship withMorocco. Despite its important strategic positionin the region, Algeria has been reluctant to makeuse of its leverage to address the crisis.Explanations for Algeria’s ambiguity include theconflicting strategies developed by various nationaldecision centers, power struggles and dissent at the

1 Peter Tinti, “What Has the US Already Tried in Mali?,” Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 2012, available atwww.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/1120/What-has-the-US-already-tried-in-Mali .

highest level of the state, and ongoing fights tocontrol the national oil and gas resources.Moreover, Algeria’s own history—namely theviolent independence war, the cancelation of the1991 elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front(FIS), and the ensuing transformation of theSalafist Group for Preaching and Combat, anoffshoot of the FIS, into al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM) in 2007—as well as its specialrelations with Tuareg communities in the regionseem to have prevented the North Africancountry’s involvement in the crisis. Algeria wascriticized for using the tactic of a “pyromaniacfireman,” also illustrated by the inefficiency of theJoint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region(CEMOC). Bringing together Mali, Niger, andMauritania in addition to Algeria, CEMOC wasestablished to counter the threat of terrorism in theregion.2 For some participants at the seminar, thecomplexity of the security situation in the Sahelwould remain unresolved as long as the Algerianstate does not address its internal policy contradic-tions. Aside from Algeria’s ambiguities, Libya isincreasingly feared to be at the center of theexpansion of regional instability. The centralgovernment appears unable to assert its authorityover its vast southern territories where new threatsare brewing, namely the development of a jihadistsanctuary and a potential crisis between ethnicToubous and Arabs. Libya’s proximity to Darfurand northern Chad, where the Toubou tribes livemainly, predisposes the North African country tobe at the heart of the next conflict in the region.This new crisis could pose further risks to the Sahelregion, considering Libya’s close connections to theMaghreb.

International, Regional, andNational ResponseStrategies

No single country in the Sahel is able to address thechallenges they face alone. With the support of the

international community, a combination ofnational and regional efforts can help define acredible and sustainable response to the recurringsecurity and development challenges in thischronically troubled region. This calls for anintegrated vision that goes beyond today’s differentanalyses, perspectives, and responses. THE PROPOSED UN INTEGRATEDSTRATEGY FOR THE SAHEL

The UN integrated strategy for the Sahel is aninclusive response that takes into account Africa’scurrent context. While it is not possible to talkabout the Sahel without discussing the crisis inMali, there will be no sustainable solution to theMalian conflict unless a comprehensive regionalresponse is found. The preparation of the UN integrated strategy forthe Sahel was made possible by a range of inter -national efforts.3 Concerned about terrorism,Security Council members agreed on the necessityto fight together against this emerging threat. Andin helping to urgently address the crisis in Mali, theFrench intervention provided further momentumto counter the terrorist threat in the Sahel. Goingforward, these efforts could be used as an opportu-nity to enhance cooperation in Mali and the region.In effect, the crisis facilitated joint efforts byconcerned countries who pledged the necessaryeconomic and financial resources to supportrecovery in the region. Intervention efforts aimedat complementing regional cooperation and thelimited resources available at the individualcountry level through the Integrated Strategy havecalled for the creation of a Sahel action fund. Afterthe adoption of the UN integrated strategy, it isimportant to assess the actual contribution ofdonor countries and institutions to the proposedfund. And to anticipate any bureaucratic burdens, alight coordination mechanism for this fund shouldbe set up. Addressing governance challenges in the Sahelwas seen as another priority of the UN strategy. Inthat regard and to ensure minimum success foraddressing these challenges, three actions were

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA 3

2 Bérangère Rouppert, “The European Strategy for the Sahel,” Brussels: Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), 2011, available atwww.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2012-01-eaac/The_European_strategy_for_the_Sahel-_Berangere_Rouppert.pdf .

3 Romano Prodi, the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, presented the long-awaited strategy on June 2013 in the annex of UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel Region, UN Doc. S/2013/354, June 14, 2013, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_354.pdf .

4 MEETING NOTE

identified: people’s participation in the definitionof the problems affecting their communities andthe solutions to these problems; civil societyinvolvement; and the coordination of governmentaction in the region with that of the UN. The strategy further envisioned working in fourways: • promote both security and development; • transmit a sense of urgency to governments to

meet their populations’ needs; • ensure the responsibility of the countries

concerned to fulfill their various functions; and • recall that no successful and sustainable develop-

ment will come out of isolation or lack of cooper-ation.THE EU RESPONSE

The crisis in the Sahel must be understood asaffecting both sides of the Mediterranean Seabeyond the Sahara desert. In addition to its supportto national and regional actors, Europe isconcerned by the impact of the Sahel crisis on itsown security, including such issues as drugtrafficking, illegal migration, terrorism, and energysecurity. This further highlights the need for aglobal response, and the EU has adopted its ownstrategy for the Sahel,4 which defined four lines ofaction: • development, good governance, and internal

conflict resolution; • political and diplomatic action; • security and the rule of law; and • countering violent extremism and radicalization. Although the EU response was initiallyconceived to target Mali, Niger, and Mauritania,additional projects were implemented in BurkinaFaso and Chad. After an initial budget of €150million was mobilized for the implementation ofthe strategy, an additional €600 million budget wascommitted to the realization of the strategicobjectives. The EU strategy has identified a number of

objectives that aim to target the root causes of thecrisis in the Sahel. These prerequisites for increasedstability, security, and development in the regioninclude the establishment of legitimate govern-ments that are representative and inclusive; therestoration of state authority and its monopoly offorce across the entire national territory; afunctional and impartial justice system; and therestoration of the security forces and publicadministration. Moreover, peaceful conflictmanagement and effective cross-border coopera-tion in the areas of policing and justice should bepromoted. Other objectives identified seek to facili-tate the effective participation of national and localactors in decision-making processes; ensure thedelivery of essential social and technical services;develop and support the private sector; ensure thepersonal security of development and humani-tarian actors; and mobilize sufficient national andexternal resources, as well as adequate capacity toabsorb these resources. In Niger, where the context was conducive forcomprehensive planning, a national security anddevelopment strategy was crafted in line with theEU strategy. The national strategy facilitates themobilization of resources, and several frameworkshave since been developed to maintain andstrengthen stability. One such framework isEUCAP Sahel Niger, a program established underthe EU Common Security and Defense Policy inJuly 2012, at the request of the Niger government.EUCAP Sahel Niger supports Niger's internalsecurity forces in their fight against terrorism andorganized crime. The program has an annualbudget of €8.7 million.5

REGIONAL RESPONSES AND COOPERATION CHALLENGES

In December 2011, the UN and the AU establisheda joint fact-finding mission that traveled acrosscountries in the Sahel and reported on thechallenges confronting the region in the wake ofthe Libyan crisis.6 In March 2012, a group ofexperts met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and sought tofurther assess and identify the security and

4 European Union External Action Service, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,” March 2011, available atwww.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf .

5 European Union External Action Service, “Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP SAHEL Niger Civilian Mission Factsheet,” available athttp://consilium.europa.eu/media/1960390/eucap_sahel_factsheet_en_-_april_2013_final.pdf .

6 UN Security Council, Report of the Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region, 7 to 23 December 2011, UN Doc. S/2012/42, January18, 2012, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202012%2042.pdf .

development risks facing the Sahel region. Twoelements were underlined regarding regional andinternational response initiatives. First, promoting ownership is indispensable forany sustainable intervention in the region. The AU,EU, and UN can provide Mali and the Sahel withmany of the resources they need to address thecrisis. However, unless these countries takeownership of the strategies proposed, there will beno tangible and sustainable results. Second, itremains important to develop an effective conflictearly-warning capacity in the region. Participantsat the seminar observed that several cooperationframeworks have been established across WestAfrica and the Sahel that can play a role inpreventing and managing crises. However, theireffectiveness in the Sahel has been limited by thefact that the region stretches over several Africanregional economic communities, including theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), theEconomic Community of Central African States(ECCAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa. Thesemultiple groupings make it difficult to implementregion-wide conflict prevention mechanisms,including at the level of the core countries in theSahel. Moreover, while the AU supported ECOWAS’sintervention in Mali through the frameworkprovided by its continental peace and securityarchitecture, the framework proved to be insuffi-cient. Following the deployment of France’sOperation Serval in Mali, the January 2013 AUsummit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia provided Africanleaders with an opportunity to draw initial lessonsfrom the French intervention. Considering it aserious shortcoming in addressing Africa’schallenges well after most African countries’independence, regional leaders recognized theneed for the AU peace and security architecture toevolve and for the continent to be equipped with arapid intervention force. Cooperation challenges persist despite positivedevelopments in the region. One could have antici-pated that regional cooperation would improveafter the demise of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libyaand the military coup against the corrupt govern-ment of former Malian president Amadou

Toumani Touré. One may have also expected thatthe African-led International Support Mission toMali (AFISMA) would act as a catalyst forECOWAS, in an attempt to overcome the challengeof security cooperation in the Sahel-Sahara region.However, the divide between ECOWAS countriesand their neighbors in the north and east of theSahara desert remained obvious as neither Algeria,Mauritania, nor Libya took part in AFISMA.Algeria and Mauritania maintained an ambiguousposition for a long time, presumably due to a fearthat a military intervention would send the Islamistmilitants back to their countries of origin. Inaddition, both countries seemed to keep a marginof maneuver for themselves, which could laterinfluence possible negotiations. Algeria sees itselfas a counterweight to French and greater Europeaninfluence in the region. While in Mauritania,cultural factors and political dynamics led policy-makers to frame the military intervention in Malias one of “black soldiers” against “white popula-tions.” All these dynamics led observers toconclude that the concerned African countries hadmissed a unique opportunity to strengthen regionalcooperation in the Sahel-Sahara. In addition to concerns over Algeria andMauritania, cooperation among the core countriesin the Sahel has never been effective, and asubregional framework limited to this group—which does not include Chad, Nigeria, Libya, orother regional key players—is considered toonarrow for any regional initiative to be sustainable.Further, current regional arrangements are alsoincomplete frameworks. Neither ECOWAS nor theCommunity of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD)appears to be an appropriate model for coopera-tion, since they do not include Algeria. Someparticipants at the seminar expressed the view thatcooperation initiatives needed to come fromcountries in the region themselves with the UN'sapproval. However, since the UN can only supportnational and regional capacities and not replacethem, this option may not be the most appropriateframework either. Thus, the question was raisedabout the AU and whether the continental bodycould provide the most appropriate framework fordeveloping a regional strategy to respond to thecrisis in the Sahel-Sahara in a durable manner. To strengthen regional cooperation, a suggestion

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA 5

was made to establish an original conflict manage-ment model to reduce grievances and addressissues of common interest in a comprehensivemanner. In the Sahel-Sahara, a consultationframework could replicate existing cooperationmechanisms such as the Western MediterraneanForum, commonly known as the “5+5 Dialogue,”among western Mediterranean Sea countries.Launched in October 1990, the 5+5 Dialoguebrings together five countries from Europe—namely France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain—and five countries from the Maghreb—namelyAlgeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.For example, a similar cooperative frameworkwould regroup these five countries in the Maghrebwith Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegalin the Sahel for collaboration in the areas ofeconomic development and the human andcultural aspects of security.NATIONAL AND LOCAL RESPONSES

Malian political actors initially failed to present aunited front to the international community.Nonetheless, regional and international support setoff a dynamic that later encouraged them to movetoward more solidarity. A national response to thecrisis was developed and the governmentpresented—despite several months of delay—aroadmap detailing its plans to come out of the crisisand to make preparations for presidential electionsset for late July.7 Although the election date dividedthe Malian public, for the internationalcommunity, there was agreement that the situationhad lasted too long, and it was important to quicklyorganize a return to constitutional rule after theMarch 2012 coup d’etat. Other countries in the Sahel also developednational responses to the crisis. In Niger, thenational Strategy for Security and Development inthe Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger constitutes aninnovative approach to conflict prevention thatgives a stronger dynamic to economic, social, andcultural development.8 The strategy is centered onfive main priorities:• strengthening the security of persons and

property;• facilitating people's access to economic opportu-

nities;• facilitating access to basic social services;• strengthening local governance; and• ensuring the social and economic integration of

forced returnees from Libya, Côte d'Ivoire,Nigeria, and Algeria.

In addition, the Niger parliament called upon thegovernment to take the necessary measures toensure border security, and it authorized thecountry’s troop contribution to AFISMA inconformity with the constitution. Additional initia-tives were considered at the time of the seminar,including:• creating a network of parliamentarians for the

prevention and management of conflicts, whichcould also serve as a reflection forum;

• training of members of parliament on issues ofdemocracy, social justice, good governance, andthe involvement of the population in themanagement of security issues; and

• promoting greater parliament oversight of thegovernment.

Despite these initiatives, however, national actorsin Niger remain attentive to the fact that sustain-able peace requires the implementation of long-term strategies.

The Way to SustainableSecurity and Developmentin the Sahel-Sahara

Past efforts to advance security and development inthe Sahel proved limited because these initiativesdid not put people at the center. For a participant atthe Niamey seminar, these efforts resembled“building a hospital where no patient would betreated.” Therefore, an effective response to thecrisis in the Sahel should come after a thoroughexamination and not be limited to superficialapproaches.

6 MEETING NOTE

7 Republic of Mali Office of the Prime Minister, “Roadmap for Transition,” January 2013, available at http://donor-conference-mali.eu/sites/default/files/generated/pdf/page/2_Feuille%20de%20Route%20Mali%20version%20finale%2026%20janvier%202013.pdf .

8 Republic of Niger, “Strategy For Development and Security In Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger,” October 2011, available athttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sds_version_english.pdf .

BUILDING STATE CAPACITY BYSTRENGTHENING LOCALGOVERNANCE

In Mali, the absence of a strong state should becorrected, especially in its border areas—wherenumerous, but mostly inefficient civil servantswere posted. Further, issues of capacity must beaddressed. The seminar participants emphasizedthe need to devise a new form of governance thattakes into account local realities, including thediversity of identities overlooked at the time ofindependence. Reinforcing local governance anddecentralization was presented as an importantresponse option to strengthen state capacity. Asolid foundation at the local level—which requiresadequate resources to accompany the devolution ofpowers to local governments and communities—should form the basis of a new democraticconstruction and help move toward correcting theadministration deficit in neglected areas. Familiesand communities can serve as sources of conflictprevention and management if policymakers focuson the local level and facilitate the reconnection ofdisconnected territories. Additional actors workingto address the crisis in Mali and the Sahel wereencouraged to “think globally, but act locally.” Renewed strategies to strengthen localgovernance can build on the decentralizationprocess that already exists in Sahel-Saharacountries. In Mali, this process was initiated in theearly 1990s, with the ambition to enroot democracyand promote sustainable development. An assess-ment of the decentralization process that wasoperationalized in 1999 shows both importantachievements and persistent weaknesses. InGoundam, a municipality in the Timbuktu region,a committee for the prevention and managementof conflict was established, and in the context of theacute crisis, local leaders remained useful referentsfor their constituents. Additional initiatives takenby some elected local leaders—including thepromotion of women’s participation, education,and healthcare—facilitated the emergence of newand informed young leaders who are perceived tobe closer to the populations, less corrupt, and morecredible. However, the results of these initiatives remaininsufficient. Local communities are still far fromcontrolling their development programs. With apartial transfer of competencies and resources,

these collectivities are unable to meet their popula-tions’ needs. The limited resources available areconcentrated on basic social service delivery andvery few are allocated to development initiatives.These weaknesses partly explain the crisis innorthern Mali and make it urgent to speed up theimplementation of the decentralization process.The seminar participants reiterated that localgovernance, built on development programs thatare integrated and adapted to local specificities,should be part of a comprehensive response to thecrisis in the Sahel. Local governance by itself, however, cannotensure the effectiveness of governance practices.Additional frameworks must be put in place toensure that legitimacy and plurality are guaranteedthrough free, transparent, and democraticelections. Participation in elections should beimproved; and local communities would benefitfrom the involvement of all social categories,including women and the youth. Governanceframeworks must also be established andreinforced to promote a culture of transparency.While state capacity should be reinforced, thisshould not simply aim toward more initiatives, butrather it should aim at an improved state. Thisobjective can be achieved by valorizing citizeneducation and establishing spaces of dialogueamong elected leaders and their communities, withcivil society actors, and between collectivities.Increased citizen participation in the definition andimplementation of development strategies, innational debates on security issues, as well as inefforts to advance reconciliation and socialcohesion among the communities were furtherdiscussed as critical elements in a response to thecrisis. Moreover, improved relations with technicaland financial partners must lead to local actors’involvement in the definition of programs, andtheir capacities should be strengthened in the areasof social service delivery and economic develop-ment. The need for careful implementation ofdecentralization policies was further highlighted.In a country like Niger where mineral resources arereadily available, decentralization could have abeneficial impact on balancing relations betweenthe center and the periphery. However, in the caseof Mali, the seminar participants observed that theregions already endowed with considerable

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA 7

resources would continue to suffer from theimplementation of poor decentralization policies.In this case, the most important element of aneffective decentralization policy should be the linkbetween local resources and their utilization by thestate. TACKLING POVERTY

Participants at the Niamey seminar also discussedthe need to address poverty and developmentchallenges in response to the crisis in the region.From an economic perspective, the meetingaddressed the question of an equitable share of thefruits produced by growing economies. Reponsesto poverty-related elements of the crisis in northernMali must consider the following three facts: • Terrorism is funded more by the business of

hostage taking than drug trafficking—in 2011,the average ransom payment to terrorist groupsby Western countries was estimated at $5.4million per hostage, and AQIM is reported tohave made $90 million in the past decade fromkidnapping Western nationals.9

• Rather than promoting a return to handicraftactivities and ecotourism, what is needed ismassive growth, where productivity, know-how,and profit are encouraged.

• Beyond the concept of a golden age of interreli-gious dialogue, there is a need to dissolveSalafism and Jihadism into policies aimed towardprosperity.

Thus, possible strategies to advance developmentin the region include bankrupting and dismantlingthe AQIM enterprise, which entails taking care ofthe militants ideologically and materially byproposing an ambitious economic model. Elementsof such strategies might include creating jobs forthe youth in the service sector; developing aninclusive agricultural and food security plan; andovercoming the challenge of regional integration inthe Maghreb. Strengthening the private sector wasalso seen as critical in creating a viable social andeconomic foundation and releasing pressure on thestate. Entrepreneurship could help to ensure theprovision of basic social services throughoutnational territories, foster job creation, andpromote approaches to sustainable development

that take into account local specificities. In acontext where it is important that politics lead theeconomy and not the opposite, the reality of freecirculation of people and goods in the ECOWASregion was seen as an advantage to build upon. Further discussions highlighted the absence of aconceptualization of development in the region.Current development approaches in the Sahel haveoften sought to deal directly with tribal leadersinstead of engaging with the communities directly.While important resources have been invested inthese efforts, limited results are seen on the ground.The same challenges can be found across the regionin Mali but also in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, andSenegal. Therefore, revised and coordinateddevelopment strategies must give local populationsthe opportunity to come up with their ownunderstanding of and priorities for development.For instance, it was observed that an activity suchas farming had not been included in nationaleconomic plans and the seminar participantsemphasized the importance for countries in theregion to take charge of all possible levers that cancontribute to multiplying their limited resources.Further, because some of northern Mali’s problemsare also found in northern Niger, the importance ofconsidering transversal development programs wasdiscussed. The seminar advised SDS Niger to takeinto account Mali’s experience, where persistentdevelopment challenges were identified among thecauses of the successive Tuareg rebellions. Additional questions addressed lessons learnedfrom across the region. Noting that injustices—more than underdevelopment—have led toinequalities and crises, seminar participantshighlighted the need to develop and implementpolicies that advance ethical governance. Theimportance of accountability and the fight againstimpunity was also discussed, especially forenvironmental degradation in areas of mineralresources exploitation. The need to address theregion’s recurrent humanitarian crises was alsoemphasized. The participants at the seminaracknowledged it is easier to obtain funding forhumanitarian activities than for developmentprojects. Thus, household and communityresilience must be built to ensure long-term

8 MEETING NOTE

9 “Hostage-taking—Trading Places: An Uncoordinated Approach to Kidnapping,” The Economist, March 16, 2013, available at www.economist.com/news/international/21573608-unco-ordinated-approach-kidnapping-trading-places .

construction and anticipate future crises. ADDRESSING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Weakening the various criminal activities thatthreaten stability in the Sahel is a key concern.Recalling that payment of ransoms is the principalsource of funding for terrorism in the region, theparticipants at the seminar denounced the consid-erable sums made by a number of Europeancountries to free their nationals, and they reiterateda call not to pay ransoms to terrorist groups inexchange of hostages. Efforts to counter anderadicate terrorism involve drying up Islamistgroups’ resource supply. In addition they requireaddressing issues of unemployment and corrup-tion. However, for some participants, povertyalleviation should not be the prime consideration,and the fight against terrorism should first andforemost be a security challenge before taking intoaccount its development aspects. To enhance regional security, the seminar parti -cipants further recommended the implementationof disarmament programs and the harmonizationof their national regulations by countries in theregion to limit arms circulation. Better access andcontrol of their territory by governments wasconsidered necessary to ensure territorial stabilityand support coherent development efforts, as aregreater efforts to address territorial claims acrossthe region. And with regard to the increase of drugtrafficking, seminar participants called on theaffected countries to strengthen their cooperationwith a view to developing a comprehensiveresponse to this emerging threat. With regard to the situation in Mali, neighboringcountries and the international community werecalled upon to help Malians peacefully address thecrisis and ensure that this experience helps preventsimilar situations across the region. It was recalledthat the crisis in Mali was preceded by clear signs ofconflict. However, a negligence to take into accountthese indicators led to a weak initial response.Participants at the Niamey seminar reiterated thatthe crisis in the Sahel illustrates the limitations ofoperationalizing early-warning mechanisms in theregion and the underutilization of existing conflictprevention mechanisms. Both at the regional andnational levels, more research is therefore neededto anticipate and prevent conflicts.

In that regard, the seminar underlined thedisconnect that exists between the scientific andpolitical spheres in the region and the subsequentmarginalization of African intellectuals andnational experts in trying to identify solutions tothe recent crisis. The participants agreed thatresearch and analysis should be further developedfor its appropriate utilization by policymakers.Such efforts can be strengthened by supporting andestablishing networks among research institutionsand think tanks in the Sahel-Sahara region.Additional conflict prevention strategies couldinclude emphasizing national capacity building tofacilitate the involvement of citizens in the debateon security issues and government accountabilityover defense and security matters. The crisis in Mali constituted the latest manifes-tation of the recurring cycle of insecurity in theSahel. While each situation is particular and shouldbe contextualized, it was feared that the war in Maliwas only at its early stages, with the risk that theconflict would transform into an asymmetrical warthat would be difficult to end. This is more so sincethe problems that led to the crisis in Mali aresimilar to those brewing across the Sahel, fromMauritania to Somalia. Thus, the transnationalnature of insecurity in the region and the risks ofdeadlock posed by attempts to address the crisisonly at the national level highlighted the need forcomprehensive approaches that should take intoaccount existing coordination mechanisms.STRENGTHENING SOCIAL COHESION

The participants at the Niamey seminar noted thata security-only approach and social and economicdevelopment will not necessarily address religiousand identity conflicts in Mali and the Sahel. WestAfrica has a long history of empires and kingdomswith limited problems of identity, race, or religion.Yet today, the current racial tensions among blackpopulations, Tuaregs, and Arabs can prevent anysustainable resolution of the crisis in Mali.Century-long values that have bound the variouspopulations living in the region over time—including solidarity, tolerance, and a sense ofcommitment—can therefore help to restore thesocial fabric and to rebuild strong relationshipsamong divided communities. In areas that wereroutinely neglected by the central authorities, it willbe particularly important to involve local popula-

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA 9

tions in the development and implementation ofthe social cohesion solutions. Another way to enhance social cohesion could bethe creation of nomadic municipalities (communesnomades) that take into account local specificities.Nomadic municipalities highlight the need forcountries in the Sahel to move toward diversity andare tied to particular systems of production andassociation with nature. In Niger, the 1992 consti-tution created special municipalities and takes intoaccount cultural specificities such as nomadism ofpopulations that are now represented in parlia-ment. However, in the Malian context, this sugges-tion was clearly contested. Mali has adopted a newterritorial mapping, which was severely criticizedeven before its implementation. For some seminarparticipants, rather than seeking to divide theregion further, new governance approaches shouldconsider how a focus on diversity could serve as abridge among communities seeking to live in peacedespite their differences. Participants also discussed the critical role playedby traditional leaders in northern Mali, and theneed to institute dialogue as a function ofgovernance. Dialogue platforms must beestablished to facilitate government consultationwith all the country’s political components,communities with centuries-long relationships,and with civil society. Such permanent consulta-tion process can be gradually enhanced by puttinga strong emphasis on education and by developinga general sense of citizenship and commitmentamong the populations. The importance ofdialogue was emphasized at the national level inMali where the political class remained divided, atthe regional level to facilitate the establishment andthe coordination of monitoring systems to preventfuture crises, and at the continental and globallevels to strengthen the existing consultationmechanisms.

Overcoming CoordinationChallenges

The gaps between the policies being developed inresponse to the crisis in Mali and the Sahel andtheir implementation on the ground raisequestions about their coordination. Two keyconcerns need to be addressed in this regard: (1)how can responses go beyond warnings and

debates and ensure follow-up, and (2) how can theresponses being implemented move from competi-tion to cooperation among the various actors andinstitutions involved. Noting the importance of agreeing on thepurpose of coordination, the participants at theNiamey seminar highlighted the need for acommon vision. Developing a common vision canbe hindered by the lack of joint analyses at thenational and regional levels and the absence ofcomplementary response strategies among the keystakeholders. In addition, the difficulties linked tocoordination itself were listed among possiblechallenges (due, for example, to the urgency ofaction, differing priorities among the institutionsconcerned, and the focus on their own work).Seminar participants also deplored the absence of acommon understanding of the type of develop-ment needed for the Sahel region, the existence ofcompeting external interests, and the proliferationof regional and international actors that resulted insilencing local actors. Coordination efforts must move beyond simplysharing information toward strategies thatstrengthen the capacity of the state concerned,starting from the clear definition of their ownpriorities. At the same time, leadership must beextended to countries that have the necessaryresources. Ensuring that all those involvedeffectively cooperate will require overcomingfragmented support and competition amongactors. In this case, it is critical to agree on aninstitution that can steer the definition of acommon vision and coordinate the predictablecompetition of both international actors and thevarious actors at national and local levels. In thecase of Mali, the Support and Follow-up Group onthe situation in the country (which first met inAbidjan, Côte d’Ivoire in June 2012 and is co-chaired by the AU and the UN) resulted from sucha consensus to jointly assist the country. Theseminar emphasized the need to strengthen thecoordination mechanisms that already exist insteadof creating new ones. Thus, another suggestion wasto look at coordination in the context ofsubsidiarity, from states at the national level, toECOWAS at the regional level, to the AU at thecontinental level, and to the UN at the global level. In Mali, the seminar recalled that the UNintegrated strategy for the Sahel recognizes the

10 MEETING NOTE

key role played by local and national actors. Thisrole was also acknowledged at the regional level,with two frameworks developed by ECOWAS andthe AU: (1) a strategic concept adopted in Bamakoin October 2012 and (2) a concept of operationsthat paved the way for the military intervention.Further coordination efforts resulted inECOWAS’s leading of the preliminary mediationprocess among Malian actors, and AU’s involve-ment in AFISMA’s military, police, and civiliancomponents. Moreover, despite their relativesuccess often due to variable political will,continental institutions including the NewPartnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)and the African Development Bank were presentedas frameworks that can advance and coordinatejoint development initiatives in the Sahel-Sahararegion. Some participants at the Niamey seminar wereconcerned about a tendency to believe that Malianswere unable to come up with home-grownsolutions to address the crisis in their country. Itwas argued that regional and international actors’generosity should not prevent them from seeingwhat is already happening on the ground. Andwhile there is enough space to involve every institu-tion or actor ready to help Mali, these joint effortsmust be better articulated with due considerationgiven to the initiatives of local actors. Despite the occupation of northern Mali, the localadministration continued to function. Local leaderscame together to understand and respond to thesituation. Women groups and human rights organi-zations continued to monitor the situation andprovided useful information. The private sector alsocontinued to work on addressing the country’sdevelopment challenges. Moreover, informal spacesof dialogue were established with the support of theUN Development Programme to engage a broadrange of actors including political parties andreligious groups. Coordination efforts were alsodeveloped among international actors on theground. A cluster system was established, whichbrought together national actors and internationalNGOs supporting humanitarian efforts in Mali. Aplatform for technical development partners wasalso set up, and Mali’s technical as well as financialpartners interacted and continued to work together,trying to find new ways to support the countrythrough its local collectivities.

Conclusion

The Niamey seminar concluded with a recognitionthat the recent crisis in Mali and the Sahel washighly complex. While many of its underlyingcauses are local, its ramifications are transnationalin origin and effect. The intricate dynamics ofregional cooperation and coordinationchallenges—which resulted in competing interven-tions and a gap between the policies offered toaddress the crisis and their implementation on theground—have the potential to delay the return tosustainable peace and development in the Sahel-Sahara. A number of suggestions were formulatedat the seminar, which can help overcome thesechallenges.• More inclusive and effective conflict prevention,

early-warning, and response mechanisms areneeded. The failure of regional institutions toanticipate the crisis in Mali and address it in atimely manner underscores the shortcomings ofthese institutions. Improved relations amongcountries in the region and the identification ofappropriate cooperation frameworks areimportant prerequisites to build a secure andprosperous Sahel-Sahara.

• A strong emphasis must be put on strengtheningstate capacity, which can build on the promotionof local governance and the implementation ofeffective decentralization policies. These reneweddecentralization efforts have the potential toovercome the challenges posed by weak stateinstitutions and the failure of security anddevelopment programs that enabled the crisis inthe region.

• Advancing security and development in the Sahelshould consider key elements includingcountering terrorism and transnational crime byoffering viable ideological and economic alterna-tives to exposed youth, strengthening privateenterprise to foster job creation, broadening theterritorial basis for social services, promotingapproaches to sustainable development that takeinto account local specificities, and harmonizingregional development strategies.

• Enhancing social cohesion by reconcilingconflicting communities with centuries-longrelationships and promoting dialogue as afunction of governance can complement peace

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA 11

efforts that focus on security and economicdevelopment.

• Joint efforts are undoubtedly needed to addressthe crisis. For the international community, theseefforts call for an improved coordination of itssupport, which takes into account the existingnational and regional initiatives as well asownership concerns. Future support should also

facilitate the involvement of the populationsconcerned in the analysis of the context as well asin the definition and implementation of localsecurity and development programs. The identi-fication of a flexible and manageable coordina-tion mech anism should facilitate the harmoniza-tion of the multiple response strategies.

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Agenda

International Seminar on Security and Developmentin the Sahel-Sahara

Niamey, Niger

Friday, February 15, 2013

09:00–09:30 Opening Ceremony

Welcoming RemarksMr. Dossou Abba, Secretary-General, on behalf of the Governor of the Niamey RegionMr. Najim Elhadj Mohamed, Executive Secretary of Strategy for Security andDevelopment in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger (SDS Sahel Niger), President of theOrganizing CommitteeDr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace InstituteAmbassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, President, Centre for Strategies and Security forthe Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S)

09:30–10:00 Opening AddressH.E. Mr. Brigi Rafini, Prime Minister, Head of Government, Niger

10:00–10:30 Group Photo and Coffee Break

10:30–12:30 Working Session 1: The Evolving Crisis in the Sahel-SaharaWhat are the recent political and security developments in the Sahel-Sahara region? Whatnew dynamics have these developments triggered—including among the various state andnonstate actors? What is the impact of these developments on the humanitarian, humanrights, and development situation? What are the geopolitical and transnational implica-tions of these developments? What are some possible evolution scenarios?

Chair H.E. Mr. Amadou Boubacar Cissé, Minister of State, Minister of Planning, Niger

SpeakersH.E. Mr. Marou Amadou, Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals, NigerMr. David Gressly, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Sahel, OCHAMrs. Oumou Sall Seck, Mayor of Goundam (Timbuktu Circle), MaliMr. Mehdi Taje, Geopolitics Expert, Tunisia

Discussion

12:30–14:00 Prayer and Lunch Break

14:00–15:00 AddressMr. Romano Prodi, Secretary-General Special Envoy for the Sahel, United Nations

Introduction Ambassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, President, Centre 4S

15:00–16:00 Plenary Discussion

16:00–18:00 Working Session 2: Regional and International ResponsesIn light of the context analysis of the previous sessions, what should the main componentsor elements of an integrated, inclusive, and well-coordinated strategy for the Sahel be?What are some of the implementation challenges? How could they be overcome?

ChairAmbassador Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of theUnited Nations Office for West Africa

SpeakersH.E. Mr. Hans-Peter Schadek, Head, European Union Delegation, NiameyMr. Abdelmalek Alaoui, President, Global Intelligence Partners, MoroccoWolfram Lacher, Associate Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs Dr. Fodé N’diaye, Resident Coordinator of the UN System, Niger

Discussion

20:00–22:30 Dinner

AddressH.E. Mr. Brigi Rafini, Prime Minister, Niger

PresentationMr. Najim Elhadj Mohamed, Executive Secretary, SDS Sahel Niger

IntroductionAmbassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, President, Centre 4S

Saturday, February 16, 2013

09:00–11:00 Working Session 3: Challenges to International Coordination and CooperationHow should regional and international actors organize themselves to enhance synergiesand coordination in policy formulation and implementation? Are new mechanisms neededto help address policy gaps as they arise, and what are the implementation challenges ofcurrent or envisaged strategies?

ChairAmbassador Kai Eide, Special Envoy on the Sahel, Norway

SpeakersGénéral Francisco Espinoza, Head of Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger Dr. Issa Abdourrahamane Boubacar, Project Manager, International Organisation of LaFrancophonie (OIF) Professor André Bourgeot, Collège de France

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Discussion

11:00–11:30 Coffee Break

11:30–13:00 Plenary Discussion

13:00–14:15 Lunch Break

14:15–15:00 Address H.E. Pierre Buyoya, High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, African Union

IntroductionAmbassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, President, Centre 4S

15:00–17:00 Working Session 4: General Debate

ChairH.E. Mr. Amadou Boubacar Cissé, Minister of State, Minister of Planning, Niger

(N.B.: During this session, participants were invited to register and speak on the seminartopic under the Chatham House Rule)

17:00–17:15 Presentation and Validation of the Final Communiqué

17:15–18:00 Closing Ceremony

Reading of Final StatementMr. Mohamadou Abdoulaye, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Niger

Closing RemarksAmbassador Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, President, Centre 4SDr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Advisor, IPIH.E. Mr. Brigi Rafini, Prime Minister, Niger

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