securities regulations code
TRANSCRIPT
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Securities Regulations Code
Nicolas v. CA The futility of petitioner's action became more
pronounced by the fact that he traded securities
for the account of others without the necessary
license from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Clearly, such omission was in
iolation of Section !" of the #eised Securities
$ct which proides that no bro%er shall sell any
securities unless he is registered with the SEC.
The purpose of the statute re&uiring the
registration of bro%ers selling securities and the
ling of data regarding securities which they
propose to sell, is to protect the public and
strengthen the securities mechanism. 19
$merican urisprudence emphasies the principle
that*
. . . , an unlicensed person may notrecoer compensation for serices as a
bro%er where a statute or ordinance
re&uiring a license is applicable and such
statute or ordinance is of a regulatory
nature, was enacted in the exercise of the
police power for the purpose of protecting
the public, re&uires a license as eidence
of &ualication and tness, and expressly
precludes an unlicensed person from
recoering compensation by suit, or at
least manifests an intent to prohibit and
render unlawful the transaction of
business by an unlicensed person. 20
+e see no reason not to apply the same rule in
our urisdiction. Stoc% mar%et trading, a technical
and highly specialied institution in the
hilippines, must been trusted to indiiduals with
proen integrity, competence and %nowledge,
who hae due regard to the re&uirements of the
law.
Abacus Securities Corp. v. AmpilStoc% mar%et transactions a-ect the general
public and the national economy. The rise and fall
of stoc% mar%et indices reect to a considerable
degree the state of the economy. Trends in stoc%
prices tend to herald changes in business
conditions. Conse&uently, securities transactions
are impressed with public interest, and are thus
subect to public regulation. /n particular, the laws
and regulations re&uiring payment of traded
shares within specied periods are meant to
protect the economy from excessie stoc% mar%et
speculations, and are thus mandatory.
/n the present case, respondent cannot escape
payment of stoc%s alidly traded by petitioner on
his behalf. These transactions too% place before
both parties iolated the trading law and rules
0ence, they fall outside the puriew of the par
delicto rule.
The following pertinent facts are undisputed*
(!) on $pril 1, !""2, respondent opened a cash
account with petitioner for his transactions in
securities3!4
(5) respondent6s purchases were consistently
unpaid from $pril !4 to 74, !""23!!
(7) respondent failed to pay in full, or een ust
his deciency,!5 for the transactions on $pril !4
and !!, !""23!7
(8) despite respondent6s failure to coer his initia
deciency, petitioner subse&uently purchased
and sold securities for respondent6s account on
$pril 59 and 5"3!8
(9) petitioner did not cancel or li&uidate a
substantial amount of respondent6s stoc%
transactions until :ay ;, !""2.
The proisions goerning the aboe transactions
are Sections 57 and 59 of the #S$!; and #ule 59
of the #S$ #ules, which state as follows*
=SEC. 57. :argin #e&uirements. >
x x x x x x x x x
(b) /t shall be unlawful for any member of an
exchange or any bro%er or dealer, directly o
indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrangefor the extension or maintenance of credit to or
for any customer >
=SEC. 59. Enforcement of margin re&uirementsand restrictions on borrowings. > To preenindirect iolations of the margin re&uirementsunder Section 57 hereof, the bro%er or dealeshall re&uire the customer in nonmargintransactions to pay the price of the securitypurchased for his account within such period asthe Commission may prescribe, which shall in no
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case exceed three trading days3 otherwise, thebro%er shall sell the security purchased startingon the next trading day but not beyond tentrading days following the last day for thecustomer to pay such purchase price, unless suchsale cannot be e-ected within said period for
ustiable reasons. The sale shall be withoutpreudice to the right of the bro%er or dealer torecoer any deciency from the customer.
Section 57(b) aboe
margin re&uirements primarily upon the bro%ers
and dealers.55Sections 57 and 59 and #ule 59
otherwise %nown as the =mandatory close
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=+hoeer pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid
without the %nowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recoer only insofar as the
payment has been benecial to the debtor.=
(Emphasis supplied)
Since a bro%erage relationship is essentially a
contract for the employment of an agent,principles of contract law also goern the bro%er<
principal relationship.75
The right to collect cannot be denied to petitioner
as the initial transactions were entered pursuant
to the instructions of respondent. The obligation
of respondent for stoc% transactions made and
entered into on $pril !4 and !!, !""2 remains
outstanding. These transactions were alid and
the obligations incurred by respondent
concerning his stoc% purchases on these dates
subsist. $t that time, there was no iolation of the
#S$ yet. etitioner6s fault arose only when it
failed to* !) li&uidate the transactions on the
fourth day following the stoc% purchases, or on
$pril !8 and !9, !""23 and 5) complete its
li&uidation no later than ten days thereafter,
applying the proceeds thereof as payment for
respondent6s outstanding obligation.77
Elucidating further, since the buyer was not able
to pay for the transactions that too% place on
$pril !4 and !!, that is at TG8, the bro%er wasduty
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indebtedness that respondent raised as a defense
the inalidity of the transactions due to alleged
iolations of the #S$. /t was respondent6s
priilege to gamble or speculate, as he
apparently did so by as%ing for extensions of time
and refraining from giing orders to his bro%er to
sell, in the hope that the prices would rise.
Sustaining his argument now would amount to
relieing him of the ris% and conse&uences of hisown speculation and saddling them on the
petitioner after the result was %nown to be
unfaorable.85 Such contention nds no legal or
een moral ustication and must necessarily be
oerruled. #espondent6s conduct is precisely the
behaior of an inestor deplored by the law.
/n the nal analysis, both parties acted in
iolation of the law and did not come to court
with clean hands with regard to transactions
subse&uent to the initial trades made on $pril !4
and !!, !""2. Thus, the peculiar facts of the
present case bar the application of the pari
delicto rule
fourth day following the transaction (TG8) and
completed its li&uidation not later than ten days
following the last day for the customer to pay
(e-ectiely TG!8). #espondent6s outstanding
obligation is therefore to be determined by using
the closing prices of the stoc%s purchased at
TG!8 as basis.
+e consider the foregoing formula to be ust and
fair under the circumstances. +hen petitioner
tolerated the subse&uent purchases o
respondent without performing its obligation to
li&uidate the rst failed transaction, and without
re&uiring respondent to deposit cash before
embar%ing on trading stoc%s any further
petitioner, as the bro%er, iolated the law at its
own peril. 0ence, it cannot now complain fofailing to obtain the full amount of its claim for
these latter transactions.
In the other hand, with respect to respondent6s
counterclaim for damages for haing been
allegedly induced by petitioner to generate
additional purchases despite his outstanding
obligations, we hold that he deseres no legal o
e&uitable relief consistent with our foregoing
nding that he was not an innocent inestor as
he presented himself to be.
Baviera v. Paglinawan
etitioner led with the KIJ a complaint foiolation of Section 1.! of the S#C against priaterespondentsSC held that the complaint for iolation of theSecurities #egulation Code, should hae beenled with the SEC, not the KIJ. $gain, there is noindication here that in dismissing petitioner6scomplaint, the KIJ acted capriciously oarbitrarily.Cemco oldings! "nc. Nat#l $i%e "nsuranceCo.
petitioner asserts that the mandatory tende
o-er rule applies only to direct ac&uisition o
shares in the public company.
This contention is not meritorious.
Tender o-er is a publicly announced intention by
a person acting alone or in concert with othe
persons to ac&uire e&uity securities of a public
company.!5
$ public company is dened as acorporation which is listed on an exchange, or a
corporation with assets
exceeding 94,444,444.44 and with 544 or more
stoc%holders, at least 544 of them holding no
less than !44 shares of such company.!7 Stated
di-erently, a tender o-er is an o-er by the
ac&uiring person to stoc%holders of a public
company for them to tender their shares therein
on the terms specied in the o-er.!8 Tender o-er
is in place to protect minority shareholders
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against any scheme that dilutes the share alue
of their inestments. /t gies the minority
shareholders the chance to exit the company
under reasonable terms, giing them the
opportunity to sell their shares at the same price
as those of the maority shareholders.
Lnder existing SEC #ules,!; the !9M and 74M
threshold ac&uisition of shares under theforegoing proision was increased to thirty
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$s found by the KIJ, there is ultimately a prima
facie case that can at the ery least sustain
prosecution of priate respondents under that
law. The KIJ #esolution is persuasie in citing
$merican authorities which countenance a
exible denition of securities. :oreoer, it bears
pointing out that the denition of =securities= set
forth in Section 5 of the #eised Securities $ct
includes =commercial papers eidencingindebtedness of any person, nancial or non<
nancial entity, irrespectie of maturity, issued,
endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner
coneyed to another.=7! $ chec% is a commercial
paper eidencing indebtedness of any person,
nancial or non
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Lnder the law, what is re&uired to be disclosed is
a %act o% special signi,cance which may be
(a) a material fact which would be li%ely, on being
made generally aailable, to a-ect the mar%et
price of a security to a signicant extent, or (b)
one which a reasonable person would consider
especially important in determining his course of
action with regard to the shares of stoc%.
(a) aterial !act < The concept of a =material
fact= is not a new one. $s early as !"27, the #ules
#e&uiring Kisclosure of :aterial ?acts by
Corporations +hose Securities $re isted /n $ny
Stoc% Exchange or #egisteredBicensed Lnder the
Securities $ct, issued by the SEC on 5" January
!"27, explained that =aD fact is material if it
induces or tends to induce or otherwise a-ect the
sale or purchase of its securities.= Thus, Section
74 of the #eised Securities $ct proides that if a
fact a-ects the sale or purchase of securities, as
well as its price, then the insider would be
re&uired to disclose such information to the other
party to the transaction inoling the securities.
This is the rst denition gien to a =fact of
special signicance.=
(b.!) easonable #erson < The second denition
gien to a fact of special signicance inoles the
udgment of a =reasonable person.= Contrary to
the allegations of the respondents, a =reasonable
person= is not a problematic legal concept that
needs to be claried for the purpose of giinge-ect to a statute3 rather, it is the standard on
which most of our legal doctrines stand. The
doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the
=reasonable man= as the standard.71 $ purchaser
in good faith must also ta%e into account facts
which put a =reasonable man= on his guard.7" /n
addition, it is the belief of the reasonable and
prudent man that an o-ense was committed that
sets the criteria for probable cause for a warrant
of arrest.84 This Court, in such cases,
di-erentiated the reasonable and prudent man
from =a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a udge,= and identied him as =the
aerage man on the street,= who weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of our technical rules of eidence of
which his %nowledge is nil. #ather, he relies on
the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men hae in abundance.8! /n the
same ein, the L.S. Supreme Court similarly
determined its standards by the actual
signicance in the deliberations of a =reasonable
inestor,= when it ruled in TSC /ndustries, /nc.
Forthway, /nc.,85 that the determination o
materiality =re&uires delicate assessments of the
inferences a Nreasonable shareholder' would draw
from a gien set of facts and the signicance of
those inferences to him.=
(b.5) $ature and eliability < The factorsa-ecting the second denition of a =fact o
special signicance,= which is of such importance
that it is expected to a-ect the udgment of a
reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a
test of materiality pronounced in the case /n the
:atter of /nestors :anagement Co., /nc.87*
$mong the factors to be considered in
determining whether information is
material under this test are the degree of
its specicity, the extent to which it di-ers
from information preiously publicly
disseminated, and its reliability in light of
its nature and source and the
circumstances under which it was
receied.
/t can be deduced from the foregoing that the
=nature and reliability= of a signicant fact in
determining the course of action a reasonable
person ta%es regarding securities must be clearly
iewed in connection with the particular
circumstances of a case. To enumerate alcircumstances that would render the =nature and
reliability= of a fact to be of special signicance is
close to impossible. Feertheless, the prope
adudicatie body would undoubtedly be able to
determine if facts of a certain =nature and
reliability= can inuence a reasonable person's
decision to retain, sell or buy securities, and
thereafter explain and ustify its factual ndings
in its decision.
(c) ateriality Concept < $ discussion of the
=materiality concept= would be releant to both a
material fact which would a-ect the mar%et price
of a security to a signicant extent andBor a fact
which a reasonable person would consider in
determining his or her cause of action with regard
to the shares of stoc%. Signicantly, what is
referred to in our laws as a fact of special
signicance is referred to in the L.S. as the
=materiality concept= and the latter is similarly
not proided with a precise denition. /n Basic v.
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Levinson,88 the L.S. Supreme Court cautioned
against conning materiality to a rigid formula,
stating thus*
$ bright
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change in such ownership during such
month, shall le with the Commission, and
if such security is registered on a
securities exchange, shall also le with the
exchange, a statement indicating his
ownership at the close of the calendar
month and such changes in his ownership
as hae occurred during such calendar
month. (Emphasis proided.)
Section 7;(a) refers to the =benecial
owner.= Benecial owner has been dened in the
following manner*
F Dirst , to indicate the interest of a
beneciary in trust property (also called
=e&uitable ownership=)3 and second, to
refer to the power of a corporate
shareholder to buy or sell the shares,
though the shareholder is not registered in
the corporation's boo%s as the owner.
Lsually, benecial ownership is
distinguished from na%ed ownership,
which is the enoyment of all the benets
and priileges of ownership, as against
possession of the bare title to property.82
Een assuming that the term =benecial
ownership= was ague, it would not a-ect
respondents' case, where the respondents are
directors andBor o@cers of the corporation, who
are specically re&uired to comply with thereportorial re&uirements under Section 7;(a) of
the #eised Securities $ct. The alidity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct inury as a result of its
enforcement.81
Sections 74 and 7; of the #eised Securities $ct
were enacted to promote full disclosure in the
securities mar%et and preent unscrupulous
indiiduals, who by their positions obtain non<
public information, from ta%ing adantage of an
uninformed public. Fo indiidual would inest in a
mar%et which can be manipulated by a limited
number of corporate insiders. Such reaction
would stie, if not stunt, the growth of the
securities mar%et. To aert the occurrence of such
an eent, Section 74 of the #eised Securities $ct
preented the unfair use of non
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e-ectiity of a statute which imposes reportorial
re&uirements cannot be suspended by the
issuance of specied forms, especially where
compliance therewith may be made een without
such forms. The forms merely made more
e@cient the processing of re&uirements already
identied by the statute.
?or the same reason, the Court of $ppeals madean eident mista%e when it ruled that no ciil,
criminal or administratie actions can possibly be
had against the respondents in connection with
Sections 1, 74 and 7; of the #eised Securities
$ct due to the absence of implementing rules.
These proisions are su@ciently clear and
complete by themseles. Their re&uirements are
specically set out, and the acts which are
enoined are determinable. /n particular, Section
199 of the #eised Securities $ct is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for
the registration of securities and the particular
matters which need to be reported in the
registration statement thereof. The Kecision,
dated 54 $ugust !""1, proides no alid reason
to exempt the respondent /#C from such
re&uirements. The lac% of implementing rules
cannot suspend the e-ectiity of these
proisions. Thus, this Court cannot nd any
cogent reason to preent the SEC from exercising
its authority to inestigate respondents for
iolation of Section 1 of the #eised Securities
$ct.
>ueensland &o=(o Commodities v. eorge
+e sustain the nding of the SEC 0earing I@cer
and the C$ that petitioners allowed unlicensed
indiiduals to engage in, solicit or accept orders
in futures contracts, and thus, transgressed the
#eised #ules and #egulations on Commodity
?utures Trading.!2
+e are not persuaded by petitioners6 assertion
that they had no hand in :endoa6s designation
as respondent6s attorney
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Section !2. eriodic and Ither #eports of /ssuers.
>
!2.!. Eery issuer satisfying the re&uirements in
Subsection !2.5 hereof shall le with the
Commission*
a) +ithin one hundred thirty
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internet access to what he has to o-er to them,
say, some s%in cream. The buyers of the website
do not inest money in C/ that it could use for
running some business that would generate
prots for the inestors. The price of LSP578.44
is what the buyer pays for the use of the website,
a tangible asset that C/ creates, using its
computer facilities and technical s%ills.
$ctually, C/ appears to be engaged in networ%
mar%eting, a scheme adopted by companies for
getting people to buy their products outside the
usual retail system where products are bought
from the store6s shelf. Lnder this scheme,
adopted by most health product distributors, the
buyer can become a down
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rescissible. 0ence, the conserator merely ta%es
the place of a ban%'s board of directors. +hat the
said board cannot do such as repudiating a
contract alidly entered into under the doctrine of
implied authority the conserator cannot do
either. /neluctably, his power is not unilateral and
he cannot simply repudiate alid obligations of
the Aan%. 0is authority would be only to bring
court actions to assail such contracts as he hasalready done so in the instant case. $ contrary
understanding of the law would simply not be
permitted by the Constitution. Feither by
common sense. To rule otherwise would be to
enable a failing ban% to become solent, at the
expense of third parties, by simply getting the
conserator to unilaterally reo%e all preious
dealings which had one way or another or come
to be considered unfaorable to the Aan%,
yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights
nor ested interests of the third parties who had
dealt with the Aan%.
Rural Ban= o% Bu'i v. CA
There is no re&uirement whether express or
implied, that a hearing be rst conducted before
a ban%ing institution may be placed under
receiership. In the contrary, the law is explicit
as to the conditions prere&uisite to the action of
the :onetary Aoard to forbid the institution to do
business in the hilippines and to appoint a
receier to immediately ta%e charge of the ban%'sassets and liabilities. They are* (a) an
examination made by the examining department
of the Central Aan%3 (b) report by said
department to the :onetary Aoard3 and (c) pri"a
facie showing that the ban% is in a condition of
insolency or so situated that its continuance in
business would inole probable loss to its
depositors or creditors.
Supportie of this theory is the ruling of this
Court, which established the authority of the
Central Aan% under the foregoing circumstances,
which reads*
$s will be noted, wheneer it shall appear prima
facie that a ban%ing institution is in =a condition
of insolency= or so situated =that its continuance
in business would inoled probable loss to its
depositors or creditors,= the :onetary Aoard has
authority*
?irst, to forbid the institution to do business and
appoint a receier therefor3 and
Second, to determine, within ;4 days, whether or
not*!) the institution may be reorganied and
rehabilitated to such an extent as to be permitted
to resume business with safety to depositors
creditors and the general public3 or
5) it is indeed insolent or cannot resume
business with safety to depositors, creditors and
the general public, and public interest re&uires
that it be li&uidated.
/n this latter case (i.e., the ban% can no longer
resume business with safety to depositors
creditors and the public, etc.) its li&uidation wil
be ordered and a li&uidator appointed by the
:onetary Aoard. The Central Aan% shal
thereafter le a petition in the #egional Trial Court
praying for the Court's assistance in the
li&uidation of the ban%.= ... (Salud s. Centra
Aan%, !87 SC#$ 9"4 !"1;D).
Rural Ban= o% San iguel v. onetar( Board
etitioners argue that #esolution Fo. !49 wasbereft of any basis considering that no completeexamination had been conducted before it wasissued. This case essentially boils down to onecore issue* whether Section 74 of #$ 2;97 (also%nown as the Few Central Aan% $ct) and
applicable urisprudence re&uire a current andcomplete e+amination of the ban% before it canbe closed and placed under receiership.etitioners6 contention has no merit. Banco
Filipino and other cases petitioners cited55 were
decided using Section 5" of the old law (#$ 5;9)*
Thus in Banco Filipino, we ruled that an
=examination conductedD by the head of the
appropriate superising or examining departmen
or his examiners or agents into the condition o
the ban%=57 is necessary before the :A can order
its closure.
0oweer, #$ 5;9, including Section 5" thereof
was expressly repealed by #$ 2;97 which too%
e-ect in !""7. #esolution Fo. !49 was issued on
January 5!, 5444. 0ence, petitioners6 reliance
on Banco Filipino which was decided under #$
5;9 was misplaced.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_150886_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_150886_2007.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_150886_2007.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_150886_2007.html#fnt23
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/n #$ 2;97, only a =report of the head of the
superising or examining department= is
necessary.
oruga v. Arsenas
+hich body has urisdiction oer the Ooruga
Complaint, the #TC or the ASQ
+e hold that it is the AS that has urisdiction
oer the case.
$ reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
Ooruga6s Complaint charged defendants with
iolation of Sections 7! to 78 of the Corporation
Code, prohibiting self
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Ooruga alleges that =the dispute in the trial court
inoles the manner with which the Kirectors6
(sic) hae handled the Aan%6s a-airs, specically
the fraudulent loans and dacion en pago
authoried by the Kirectors in faor of seeral
dummy corporations %nown to hae close ties
and are indirectly controlled by the
Kirectors.=5; 0er allegations, then, call for the
examination of the allegedly &uestionable loans.+hether these loans are coered by the
prohibition on self
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Aoard. The Heneral Aan%ing aw of 5444
proides*
S*C&"DN 8. Conducting Business in an
)nsa%e or )nsound anner. /n determining
whether a particular act or omission, which is not
otherwise prohibited by any law, rule or
regulation a-ecting ban%s, &uasi
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The :onetary Aoard may, wheneer warranted
by circumstances, preentiely suspend any
director or o@cer of a ban% or &uasi
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Section 72. %ealings of $irectors tr&stees or
o1cers with the corporation. < $ contract of the
corporation with one or more of its directors or
trustees or o@cers is oidable, at the option of
such corporation, unless all the following
conditions are present*
!. That the presence of such director or
trustee in the board meeting in which thecontract was approed was not necessary
to constitute a &uorum for such meeting3
5. That the ote of such director or trustee
was not necessary for the approal of the
contract3
7. That the contract is fair and reasonable
under the circumstances3 and
8. That in case of an o@cer, the contract has
been preiously authoried by the board of
directors.
+here any of the rst two conditions set forth in
the preceding paragraph is absent, in the case of
a contract with a director or trustee, such
contract may be ratied by the ote of the
stoc%holders representing at least two
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The :onetary Aoard shall terminate the
conseratorship when it is satised that the
institution can continue to operate on its own and
the conseratorship is no longer necessary. The
conseratorship shall li%ewise be terminated
should the :onetary Aoard, on the basis of the
report of the conserator or of its own ndings,
determine that the continuance in business of the
institution would inole probable loss to itsdepositors or creditors, in which case the
proisions of Section 74 shall apply.
Section 70. Procee$ings in *eceivership an$
Li2&i$ation. < +heneer, upon report of the head
of the superising or examining department, the
:onetary Aoard nds that a ban% or &uasi
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dire straits. Lnless ade&uate and determined
e-orts are ta%en by the goernment against
distressed and mismanaged ban%s, public faith in
the ban%ing system is certain to deteriorate to
the preudice of the national economy itself, not
to mention the losses su-ered by the ban%
depositors, creditors, and stoc%holders, who all
desere the protection of the goernment.!7
The respondent ban%s hae failed to show their
entitlement to the writ of preliminary inunction. /t
must be emphasied that an application for
inunctie relief is construed strictly against the
pleader.!8 The respondent ban%s cannot rely on a
simple appeal to procedural due process to proe
entitlement. The re&uirements for the issuance of
the writ hae not been proed. Fo inasion of the
rights of respondent ban%s has been shown, nor
is their right to copies of the #IEs clear and
unmista%able. There is also no necessity for the
writ to preent serious damage. /ndeed the
issuance of the writ of preliminary inunction
tramples upon the powers of the :A and preents
it from fullling its functions. There is no right
that the writ of preliminary inunction would
protect in this particular case. /n the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the inunctie
writ constitutes grae abuse of discretion.!9 /n the
absence of proof of a legal right and the inury
sustained by the plainti-, an order for theissuance of a writ of preliminary inunction will be
nullied.!;
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_184778_2009.html#fnt16