secureworks in dire straits: straight talk on dyre august 2015 eric r. jenko, senior security...

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SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Page 1: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

SecureWorks

In Dire Straits:Straight Talk on DyreAugust 2015

Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

Page 2: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Overview

• Dyre - a.k.a. “Dyreza”, “Dyzap”, “Dyranges”– Emerged early June 2014 after Operation Tovar– Evolved to be one of the most prominent banking trojans in

circulation

• Commonly referred to as a “banking trojan”– Primarily targets online banking websites to harvest

credentials to commit Automated Clearing House (ACH) and wire fraud

– May be more appropriate to consider it like a web proxy– It has the capability to “target” any website

• At its core, it monitors traffic looking for specific targets– When a target is encountered, Dyre intercepts and

manipulates the requests and responses

Page 3: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Distribution Vectors

UPATRE

CUTWAIL SPAM

• Primarily distributed by spam from the Cutwail botnet– Initially via links to Dropbox or Cubby file storage services– Later leveraging Lerspeng and, most prominently, Upatre

• Recent campaigns have used two other downloaders– Pony (a.k.a., “Fareit”) and Ruckguv (new)

• Dyre (similar to Bugat v5) leverages private spam mailers

Page 4: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Architecture and Operation

• Dyre consists of two modules– A dropper and the main DLL (both 32-bit and 64-bit versions)

• Critical data is stored in the DLL’s resource section– Initial config, RSA key, Botnet ID, C2 servers

• Modified copy is saved to and launched from C:\Windows– Registers “Google Update Service” system service for

persistence

• Newer versions are VM-aware – Checks available CPUs

Dyre’s persistence mechanism and drop location

Page 5: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Operation :: Connect and Register

• Dyre checks Google for network connectivity

• Dyre obtains its external IP address– STUN requests to hard-coded servers (Session Traversal Utilities for

NAT)

– Fallback method via icanhazip.com

• Dyre registers with the C2 and pulls configs/plugins (using SSL)

Register the Bot:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/cert/EXT_IP/

Register the OS of the Bot:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/0/Win_XP_32bit/1023/EXT_IP/

Send “alive” signal:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/1/FcJgUwyCWvgLPymGiJGwUkwCVcBMmiD/EXT_IP/

Send NAT status:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/14/NAT/Port%20restricted%20NAT/0/EXT_IP/

CAMP_ID : Campaign ID | BOT_ID : Individual Bot identifier | EXT_IP : External IP Address

Page 6: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Operation :: Config and Plugin RetrievalWeb Injects config:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/respparser/EXT_IP/

Web Fakes config:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/httprdc/EXT_IP/

Grabber plugin:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/twgARCH/EXT_IP/

VNC plugin:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/n_vncARCH/EXT_IP/

TV plugin:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/n_tvARCH/EXT_IP/

Back Connect plugin:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/cfg_bc/EXT_IP/

I2P plugin:GET /CAMP_ID/BOT_ID/5/i2pARCH/EXT_IP/

CAMP_ID : Campaign ID | BOT_ID : Individual Bot identifier | EXT_IP : External IP Address | ARCH : Architecture

Page 7: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Operation :: Web Injects

Acme Bankhttp://acmebank.com/loginuser:eric pw:password123

ExfilServer

HTTP POST:user & pw, browser

info,cookies

Config Match

Acme Bank

Server Injects

Bank PageWebInjectServer

InjectedWeb Page

• Dyre’s injects happen dynamically at the C2– Allows for greater flexibility and less maintenance– Complicates analysis and investigation

Page 8: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Operation :: Web Fakes

Acme Bankhttp://acmebank.com/loginuser: eric pw: password123

Fake Acme Bank Page

Web FakeServer

FakeWeb Page

Subsequent requests go to Web Fake Server

• Target site is mimicked and hosted by the threat actors– Allows actors to dynamically change site pages and

content– Complicates analysis and investigation

Config Match

Acme Bank

Page 9: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Command & Control Infrastructure

• Dyre uses a proxy layer to hide its backend (true) C2 infrastructure

• Dyre can fall back on two additional control mechanisms:1.Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)

– 1,000 34-char domains daily for 1 of 8 ccTLDs in Asia & Pac. Islands

2.Invisible Internet Project (I2P) plugin (limited usage)

Geographic distribution of Dyre C2 servers (proxy layer) as of December 2014

Page 10: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Dyre :: Best Practices

To reduce the risk and impact of compromises:

• Staff Education/Training: – Ensure your organization’s security awareness and training program includes the dangers of email and social

engineering and utilizes up-to-date threat intelligence

• Email Filtering:– Where feasible, employ filters and scan the contents of email attachments– It’s also advisable to consider blocking email with executable attachments, including those found in archives

(ZIP, RAR, etc.)

• Malware Sandbox Analysis:– Such inline technology should conduct automated analysis of hyperlinks and/or attachments within incoming

email to gauge potential maliciousness

• Endpoint System Controls:– Endpoint controls should limit users’ ability to open malicious email attachments and prevent malware

installation and execution.– Keep end-user antivirus, operating system, browser, and other third-party software up to date.– Ensure an appropriate level of logging is enabled on hosts and the logs are routinely reviewed for

anomalous/malicious activity

• Network-based Controls:– Block I2P traffic at corporate firewalls– Apply post-infection controls such as firewall policies, web proxies

For additional information on Dyre, please read our Threat Analysis publication:http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/dyre-banking-trojan/

Page 11: SecureWorks In Dire Straits: Straight Talk on Dyre August 2015 Eric R. Jenko, Senior Security Researcher, CTU

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Classification: //Dell SecureWorks/Confidential - Limited External Distribution:

SecureWorks

Questions?

Eric R. Jenko [email protected]