Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

First Part Originally by Ravindranath Gummadidala

Palaniappan SathappaSuny Baffalo

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Overview

Introduction MANETs Routing Protocols for MANETs

DSR AODV DSDV

Exploits allowed by existing protocols

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Overview (contd.)

Secure Routing Protocols ARAN SRP TESLA ARIADNE TIK SAR

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Overview (contd.) Watchdog and Pathrater Byzantine Resistant CONFIDANT SEAD

Conclusions References

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MANETs A group of wireless mobile computers

(nodes) Nodes cooperate by forwarding packets

for each other Need no fixed network infrastructure Can be quickly and inexpensively setup Applications: military exercises,

disaster relief, mine site operations, etc

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Routing Protocols for MANETs

Table based (proactive) DSDV

On-demand (reactive) DSR AODV

Hybrid

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DSR

Dynamic Source Routing An on-demand ad hoc network

routing protocol composed of two parts: Route discovery Route maintenance

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DSR Route Discovery

Initiator transmits ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ) packet as local broadcast specifying target and a unique identifier from the initiator

Each node receiving the RREQ discards the request if it has seen the request identifier from the originator

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DSR Route Discovery (contd.)

Otherwise it appends its node address to a list in RREQ and rebroadcasts the RREQ

When RREQ reaches target, target sends ROUTE REPLY (RREP) back to initiator of RREQ with a copy of the accumulated address list from RREQ

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DSR Route Maintenance DSR is a source routing protocol Path to be followed included in the

packet header If a node on path does not get an

ack after a limited number of local retransmissions it returns ROUTE ERROR (RERR) back to originator identifying the broken link

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DSR Route Maintenance (contd.)

Originator then removes path containing broken link from cache

May use an alternate route to destination if one exists in cache

Else it initiates a new route discovery

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Example of DSR

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Example of DSR

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Example of DSR

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AODV Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector

Routing AODV builds routes using a route request /

route reply query cycle In addition to the source node's IP address,

current sequence number, and broadcast ID, the RREQ also contains the most recent sequence number for the destination of which the source node is aware.

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AODV (contd.) A node receiving the RREQ may send a route

reply (RREP) if it is either the destination or if it has a route to the destination with corresponding sequence number greater than or equal to that contained in the RREQ

if yes it unicasts RREP back to source else it rebroadcasts RREQ If the source later receives a RREP containing

a greater sequence number or contains the same sequence number with a smaller hop count, it updates its routing information for that destination.

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AODV (contd.) Once the source stops sending data

packets, the links will time out and eventually be deleted from the intermediate node routing tables

If a link break occurs while the route is active, the node upstream of the break propagates a route error (RERR) message to the source node to inform it of the now unreachable destination(s). After receiving the RERR, if the source node still desires the route, it can reinitiate route discovery.

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SRP

A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks

K. Sanzgiri and B. Dahill

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Exploits allowed by existing protocols

Attacks using modification Redirection by

modified route sequence numbers

Redirection with modified hop counts

DoS with modified source routes

Tunneling

Eg: A malicious node M could keep traffic from reaching X by consistently advertising to B a shorter route to X than the route to X that C advertises

Altering control message fields Forwarding routing messages

with falsified values

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Exploits allowed by existing protocols (contd.)

Attacks using impersonation Forming loops by spoofing

Attacks using fabrication Falsifying route errors in AODV and

DSR Route cache poisoning in DSR

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Redirection by modified route sequence numbers

Protocols such as AODV and DSR instantiate and maintain routes by assigning monotonically increasing sequence numbers In AODV, a higher destination sequence number

greater than the authentic value can divert the traffic through M

M replies a false RREP with a larger destination seq number when receiving a RREQ

B drops the correct RREP When this can be corrected?

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Redirection with Modified Hop Counts

When routing metric is the shortest path Hop-count can be modified by M in

AODV

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DoS with modified source routes Altering the source routes in packet

headers in DSR A shortest path route in DSR is S-A-B-M-C-

D-X M deletes D from the source route when

receiving the packet The packet can’t reach X from C

accordingly. Does the Link Layer ACK help?

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Tunneling

True path: S-A-B-C-DFalse path: S-M1-(A-B-C)-M2-DFalse path: S-M1-M2-D through a private network

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Forming loops by spoofing

M can reach A, B, C, D

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Forming loops by spoofing in AODV

M spoofs A’s MAC address, moves to B such that it can’t be heard by A, send a RREP to B with a shorthop count (eg. 0); Then B chooses A to be the next hop

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Forming loops by spoofing in AODV

M spoofs B’s MAC address and does the same thingA loop is formed and none of the four nodes can reach X

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Falsifying Route Errors in AODV and DSR

M spoofs C and sends RERROR message to B to launch DoS

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Route Cache Poisoning in DSR

Information stored in routing tables can be deleted, altered, or injected with false information In addition to learning routes from headers of

packets that a node processes along a path routes may be learned from promiscuously received packets

A node overhearing any packet may add routing information contained in that packets header to its own route cache even if it is not on the path from source to destination

A malicious node can broadcast a false RERR, a spoofed packet, etc to poison other’s route cache

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Secure Routing Protocol Requirements Route signaling cannot be spoofed Fabricated routing messages cannot

be injected into the network Routing messages cannot be altered

in transit except according to the normal functionality of the routing protocol

Routing loops cannot be formed through malicious actions

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Secure Routing Protocol Requirements (contd.)

Routes cannot be redirected from shortest path through malicious actions

Unauthorized nodes should be excluded from route computation and discovery

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ARAN Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc

Networks Components

Certification Authenticated route discovery Authenticated route setup Route maintenance Key revocation

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Certification

Requires use of a trusted certificate server T

Before entering network each node needs to request a certificate from T

Node A receives certificate as: T->A :certA=[IPA ,KA+ ,t ,e] KT-

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Authenticated route discovery

Source A begins route instantiation to destination X by broadcasting a route discovery packet (RDP):

A->brdcst:[RDP, IPX, certA, NA, t] KA-

Let B be the neighbor that receives the RDP which it subsequently rebroadcasts

B->brdcst:[[RDP, IPX, certA, NA, t] KA-] KB-, certB

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Authenticated route discovery Let C be the neighbor that receives Bs

broadcast. C subsequently broadcasts

C->brdcst:[[RDP, IPX, certA, NA, t] KA-] KC-, certC

Each node along the path repeats these steps of validating previous node’s signature, removing the previous node’s certificate and signature, recording the previous node’s IP address, signing the original contents of the message, appending its own certificate and forward broadcasting the message

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Authenticated Route Setup After receiving RDP destination unicasts a reply

REP packet back along reverse path to source. Let D be the first node that receives the REP sent by X

X->D:[REP,IPa,certX,Na,t] Kx-

Let D’s next hop to source be C D->C:[[REP,IPa,certX,Na,t]Kx-]Kd-, certD C->B:[[REP,Ipa,certX,Na,t]Kx-]Kc-, certC When source receives REP it verifies

destination’s signature and nonce returned by the destination.

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Route Maintenance When no traffic occurs on an existing route for

sometime that route is deactivated in routing table Data received on an inactive route causes nodes to

generate Error (ERR) messages that travel the reverse path towards the source

Nodes also use ERR to report links in active routes that break due to node movement.

All ERR messages must be signed B->C:[ERR,IPa,IPx,certB,Nb,t]Kb- Nonce and timestamp ensure ERR message is fresh.

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Key revocation In the event that a certificate needs to be revoked the

trusted certificate server T sends a broadcast message to the ad hoc group announcing the revocation

T-> brdcst : [revoke,certR] Kt-

Nodes receiving this message re-broadcasts it to its neighbors

Neighbors of nodes with revoked certificates need to reform routing as necessary to avoid transmission through the now untrusted node.

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Simulation Results (average packet delivery fraction)

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Simulation Results (average routing load bytes)

Overhead bytes/data bytes

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Simulation Results (average data packet latency)

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Simulation Results (average path length)

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Simulation Results (average routing load packets)

The ratio of control packet and the data packet

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Simulation Results (average route acquisition latency)

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Simulation Results (average path length with malicious node)

Malicious nodes reset hop count to 0 when receiving a RREQ and RREP

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Simulation Results (fraction of data packets passing malicious nodes)

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Summary of ARAN

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SRP

Secure Routing Protocol Assumptions

Security association between S and T assumed KS,T (bidirectional)

Adversarial nodes exhibit Byzantine behavior

Bidirectional links Promiscuous mode operation

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Overview of SRP S initiates route discovery by

constructing route request packet identified by a query sequence number and a random query identifier

Source, destination and query IDs used as input for MAC calculation with KS,T

Identities of traversed nodes accumulated in route request packet.

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Overview of SRP (contd.) Intermediate nodes discard

previously seen route requests Destination T constructs route reply;

calculates MAC covering route reply contents and returns packet to S

Multiple replies may reach S S validates replies and updates its

topology view

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Scenario 1 When M1 receives {Qs,t:S} it generates

{Rs,t:S,M1,T} RREQ should reach T

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Scenario 2 M1 discards route request packets arriving from its

neighbors The S-T route will not include M1

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Scenario 3 M1 sees and relays {Qs,t:S,1,M1}; upon arrival of

{Qs,t:S,1,M1,5,4} at T reply is generated and sent on reverse path. when M1 receives {Rs,t:S,1,M1,5,4,T} it tampers and relays {Rs,t:S,1,M1,Y,T}, Y being any invented sequence of nodes

Avoid by integrity protection

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Scenario 4 M2 receives {Qs,t:S,2,3}, it relays {Qs,t:S,X,3,M2},

where X is a false IP address. T sends the reply {Rs,t:S,X,3,M2,T}. when 3 receives the reply, the reply will be dropped since X is not its neighbor

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Scenario 5 M1 replays route requests to consume network

resources. discarded by intermediate nodes due to query identifiers.

Query sequence number takes care of cases when replay occurs after a significant period of time

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Scenario 6 M1 after seeing several RREQ from S fabricates queries

with subsequent query identifiers to result in intermediate nodes discarding legitimate future route requests.

Not possible due to the random query id

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Possible attack against SRP Nodes collude during the two phases of single route

discovery E.g. M1 receives request tunnels it to M2, M2 broadcasts

request with path between M1 and M2 falsified e.g. {Qs,t:S,M1,Z,M2}. T constructs reply and routes over {T,M2,Z,M1,S}. M2 tunnels reply to M1 thus completing attack

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Detailed protocol description

SRP extension of a reactive routing protocol

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Route Request Query sequence number allows destination

to detect outdated route requests Randomly computed Query identifier used

to combat attack where malicious nodes broadcast fabricated requests to cause subsequent legitimate queries to be discarded

RREQ fields that get updated as packet propagates to destination IP header mutable fields excluded from MAC

computation.

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SRP Header

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Query Handling/Propagation Intermediate nodes parse requests to

determine if SRP header present If not, process the packet as described by

basis protocol specification Else, extract the Qid, source and destination

address, and determine if the query previously has been seen or not

if yes discard query; else rebroadcast Also measure frequencies of queries received

from neighbors to regulate query propagation process.

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Query Handling/Propagation (contd.)

Give highest priority to nodes generating requests at the lowest rates and lowest priority to nodes generating queries at higher rates

Quanta allocated proportionally to priority and within each class round-robin servicing.

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Route Reply T validates the received route request packet by

first verifying that it is originated from a node with which it has a security binding

Qseq is compared to Smax, the maximum sequence number received from S within the lifetime of the SA

Seq is maintained for each destination, and is increased monotonically

If Qseq <= Smax request discarded Else T calculates keyed hash of the request fields If output matches SRP header MAC integrity and

authenticity verified

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Route Reply (contd.)

For every valid request T places accumulated route in route reply packet and the Qid and Qsec of the route request in the corresponding SRP header fields.

MAC covers basis protocol route reply and rest of SRP header to provide message integrity and authentication

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Route Reply Validation On reception of Route Reply, S checks the

source and destination addresses, Qid and Qsec and discards the route reply if it does not correspond to the currently pending query.

Otherwise it compares reply IP source-route with the reverse of the route carried in reply payload

If the two match, S calculates MAC using replied route, SRP header fields and Ks,t.

If MACs match validation complete.

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Intermediate Node Replies Route caching not encouraged and in

general intermediate nodes not required to provide route replies.

Route caching can improve effectiveness of route discovery process

Hence if an intermediate node V has an active route to T and a SA exists between S and V then a reply can be provided to S

This extension enabled by Intermediate Node Reply Token (INRT)

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Extended SRP Header

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Route Maintenance Route error messages are source routed

along the prefix of the route reported as broken and S compares route traversed by error messages to the prefix of the corresponding route.

Thus it can verify that route error feedback provided refers to actual route and is not generated by a node that is not part of the route

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Break

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Ariadne

Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Netowrks

Y. – C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. JohnsonACM MOBICOM 2002

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TESLA Broadcast authentication protocol Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant

Authentication sender chooses a random initial key Kn and

generates a one-way hash chain on this value: K n-1=H(Kn); Kn-2=H(Kn-1)... sender predetermines a schedule at which it

discloses each key of its one-way key chain in the reverse order from generation i.e. K0,K1,K2,...

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TESLA Loose time synchronization between

sender and receiver when receiver receives a packet it verifies

security condition i.e key Ki used to authenticate packet cannot yet have been disclosed

if yes receiver buffers packet and waits for sender to disclose Ki while using disclosed key to authenticate buffered packets

if no it drops packet

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ARIADNE

An on demand secure routing protocol based on TESLA broadcast authentication protocol

Further based on DSR

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Network Assumptions

Network links are bi-directional Network may drop, corrupt,

reorder or duplicate packets in transmission

Each node must be able to estimate end-to-end transmission time to any other node in the network

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Node Assumptions

Nodes may vary greatly in terms of resources hence it is assumed that nodes have few resources and hence asymmetric cryptography may be unsuitable for such resource constrained nodes

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Key Setup Assumptions

A mechanism to setup shared secret keys between communicating nodes

A mechanism to distribute one authentic public TESLA key for each node

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Notation

A, B are principals such as communicating nodes

KAB and KBA denote secret MAC keys shared between A and B

MAC KAB(M) denotes computation of message authentication code of M with MAC key KAB

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Ariadne Route Discovery Route discovery has two stages: initiator

floods the network with ROUTE REQUEST and the target returns a ROUTE REPLY.

To secure the Route Request packet Ariadne provides the following properties: Target node can authenticate initiator Initiator can authenticate each entry of the

path in ROUTE REPLY No intermediate node can remove a previous

node in the node list in Requestor REPLY

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Ariadne Route Discovery ROUTE REQUEST packet contains eight

fields: <RREQ, initiator, target, id, time interval, hash chain, node

list, MAC list>

When a node A receives RREQ for which it is not target it checks its table for <initiator,id> values and discards packet if match found

It then checks whether time interval is valid If not discards packet

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Ariadne Route Discovery Else it modifies RREQ by appending its own

address to node list, replacing the hash chain with H[A,hash chain] and appending a MAC of the entire request to the MAC list using key Kati

When target receives RREQ it checks validity by determining all the keys from the specified time interval have not yet been disclosed and that hash chain filed is equal to

H[Nn, H[Nn-1, H[…,H[N1, MACKSD(initiator,target,id,time interval)]…]]]

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Ariadne Route Discovery If RREQ valid RREP returned as<RREP,target,initiator,time interval,node list,MAC

list,target MAC,key list> RREP returned to initiator of RREQ along source

route obtained by reversing node list of the RREQ Node forwarding RREP waits till it can disclose its

key from specified time interval; it then appends that key to key list and forwards packet

Initiator verifies each key in key list is valid and target MAC is valid and that each MAC in MAC list is valid

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An example

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Ariadne Route Maintenance Node forwarding packet to next hop

along source route returns Route ERROR to original sender of packet if it is unable to deliver packet after a limited number of retransmissions

ERROR needs to be authenticated by sender

Each node on return path to source forwards the ERROR

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Ariadne optimization Route caching possible In basic Ariadne only initiator of

discovery can use route since target MAC can only be verified by the initiator.

If however appropriate data is broadcast authenticated any node along return path can use that route to reach target

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Simulation Parameters

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Simulation Results

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Simulation Results

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Simulation Results

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Simulation Results

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Simulation Results

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Wormhole Attack

Packet Leashes: A Defense Against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Networks

Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. JohnsonIEEE INFOCOM 2003

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Introduction Problem: Wormhole Attack

An attacker records packets at one location of the network, tunnel them to another location, and retransmits them there into the network

Wormhole attack allows attackers to: Gain unauthorized access Disrupt routing Perform DOS attacks

Solution: Packet Leash Add information into the packet to restrict its

maximum allowed transmission distance

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Temporal Leashes

Definition: a temporal leash establishes an upper bound on a packet’s lifetime, which restricts the maximum travel distance

Key Requirement: all nodes must have tightly synchronized clocks Maximum clock difference (Δ) between any

two nodes must be within a few microseconds

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Temporal Leashes Implementation with a packet expiration time Sender calculates a packet expiration time to

be sent with each packet:te = ts + L/c – Δ

te: packet expiration time ts: packet sent time c: propagation speed of wireless signal L: maximum allowed travel distance; L > Lmin = Δ*c Δ: maximum clock difference between 2 nodes

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Temporal Leashes

Receiver will accept and process a received packet if and only if the time when the packet is received (tr) is less than the packet expiration time (te)

What’s missing? Need an efficient way for the receiver to

authenticate te

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TIK Protocol - Overview TIK – TELSA with Instant Key disclosure

TIK implements a temporal leash and provides efficient instant authentication for broadcast communication in wireless networks

Based on the observation that a receiver can verify the TESLA security condition, that the corresponding key hasn’t been disclosed as it receives the packet => allow sender to disclose the key in the same packet

Assume sender can precisely predict ts and receiver can record tr as soon as the packet arrives

Requires accurate time synchronization between all the nodes

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TIK Protocol – Sender Setup

Sender generates a series of keys, K0, K1,…, Kw-1, using a PRF F and a secret master key X:

Ki = Fx(i)

Sender selects a key expiration interval I and determines the expiration time (Ti) for its keys:

Ti = T0 + i*I, where T0 is the expiration time for K0

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TIK Protocol – Sender Setup

Sender constructs a Merkle hash tree to commit to keys: K0, K1,…, Kw-1

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TIK Protocol – Merkle Hash Tree

m03

m01

K0’

K0

K1’

K1

m23

K2’

K2 K3

K3’

m47

m45

K4’

K4

K5’

K5

m67

K6’

K6 K7

K7’

m07

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TIK Protocol – Merkle Hash Tree

How is it constructed? For every leaf node, Ki’ = H(Ki); i.e. K0’ = H(K0) For every parent node, mp = H(ml || mr); i.e. m01 =

H(K0’ || K1’), m03 = H(m01 || m23); The root value (m07) is signed by the sender

and sent to the receivers, where it can be authenticated with sender’s public key

To authenticate K2, for example: Sender must include K3’, m01, m47 in the packet Receiver computes m07’ and compare to the pre-

distributed m07

m07’ = H[ H[ m01 || H[ H[K2] || K3’]] || m47 ]

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TIK Protocol – Receiver Bootstrapping

Assume all nodes are synchronized with a maximum clock difference of Δ

Assume each receiver knows every sender’s hash tree root value and the associated parameter T0 and I

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TIK Protocol – Sending and Verifying Packets

HMAC M T Ki

HMAC M T Ki

Sender

Receiver

Time at Sender

•Time at Receiver

ts Ti

•tr ≤ (ts + т - Δ) •≤ (Ti - Δ)

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TIK Protocol – Sending and Verifying Packets

S -> R: (HMACKi(M), M, T, Ki) M: message payload HMACKi(M): message authentication code for M Ki: key used to generate the HMAC for M T: tree authentication values used to

authenticate Ki

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TIK Protocol – Sending and Verifying Packets

Receiver: Verifies if the sender has started sending Ki after

receiving HMAC, based on Ti Receiver knows the expiration time of Ki since T0 and I

are known. A key is released only after it expires

Verifies if Ki is authentic based on the hash root value and T

Verifies the HMAC, using authenticated Ki

Accept the packet as authentic only if all those verifications are successful

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Security & Performance Analysis

Security Analysis Temporal leash with TIK protocol can detect and prevent

wormhole attacks if all nodes are good nodes Can’t deal with a malicious sender that claims a false timestamp Can’t deal with a malicious receiver that refuses to check the

leash What if the two colluding adversaries have strong power, e.g.

directional antenna? Performance Analysis

Efficient hash tree authentication of keys Efficient instant authentication of packet because the key is

disclosed in the same packet Modest storage requirement for the Merkle hash tree

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Conclusion More Work

More research on how the sender/receiver can accurately determine ts/tr

Design and deploy accurate time synchronization device among the nodes

Conclusion Wormhole attack is a powerful and disruptive

attack against wireless networks With precise timestamps and tight clock

synchronization, TIK can prevent wormhole attacks

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References Bridget Dahill, Brian Neil Levine, Elizabeth

Royer, Clay Shields. A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks

Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, David B Johnson. Ariadne: A secure on demand routing protocol for Ad hoc networks

Segio Marti, T J Giuli, Kevin Lai, Mary Baker. Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks

Panagitiotis Papadimitrois, Zygmunt Haas. Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks

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References (contd.) Seung Yi, Prasad Naldurg, Robin Kravetas. A

security aware ad hoc routing protocol for wireless networks

Yin-Chun Hu, David Johnson , Adrian Perrig. SEAD:secure efficient distance vector routing fore mobile wireless ad hoc networks

Sonja Buchegger, Jean Yves Le Boudec. Nodes bearing grudges: towards routing security, fairness and robustness in mobile ad hoc networks

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References (contd.) Baruch Awerbuch, David Holmer, Crisitina

Nita-Rotaru, Herbert Rubens. An on demand routing protocol resilient to Byzantine failures

Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, David Johnson. Wormhole detection in wireless ad hoc networks