secure cell relay routing protocol for sensor networks xiaojiang du, fengiing lin department of...
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Secure Cell Relay Routing Protocol for Sensor Networks
Xiaojiang Du, Fengiing Lin
Department of Computer Science
North Dakota State University
24th IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference24th IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference(IPCCC), 2005(IPCCC), 2005
Chien-Ku Lai
Outline
Introduction System Assumptions and Attacks on
Routing The Secure Cell Relay Routing
Protocol Performance Evaluation Conclusions
Introduction- Sensor Networks
Application areas Military surveillance Environmental monitoring Target tracking
Routing protocols for sensor networks Direct Diffusion TTDD Mesh Energy-Aware Delay-Constrained routing
Introduction- Sensor Networks (cont.)
The main research focus has been on making sensor networks feasible and useful
Less emphasis was placed on security
Introduction- Security
Security is important and even critical for many sensor network applications Military Homeland security
Introduction- Recent Researches
Most of the existing sensor network routing protocols Do not consider security issues during th
e design of the protocols
Introduction- About this paper
Secure Cell Relay (SCR) routing protocol is resistant to several attacks on sensor
networks is also an energy efficient routing protocol
System Assumptions and Attacks on Routing
1. Network Model
2. System Assumptions
3. Attacks on Routing
System Assumptions
Each sensor is static and aware of its own location
Base stations are trusted computing base
Attacks on Routing
Manipulating routing information Selective forwarding Sybil sinkhole Wormhole Hello flooding (unidirectional) attacks
Attacks on Routing- Hello flooding (unidirectional) attacks
Can’t reach
Normal sensor
A powerful devicee.g. laptop
The Secure Cell Relay Routing Protocol
1. Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks
2. The Secure Data Dissemination Scheme
3. Defense against Sensor Network Attacks
Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks
KG
a globally shared key is stored in each sensor node and the ba
se station before sensor deployment All the sensor nodes and the base stati
on are synchronized before deployment
Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks
B A
Check the time-stamp
< pre-set value : valid> pre-set value : discard
{node-ID, time-stamp} KG
B 0Hello
Defense against Sensor Network Attacks
Against The Sybil Attack
Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks
Against The Selective Forwarding Attack
Against The Hello Flood Attack
Against The Sybil Attack
Authentication is used to ensure one node cannot pretend to be other nodes
Thus, the Sybil attack can not work
Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks – Examples
A powerful adversary (like a laptop) has a real, high quality route to the base station
However the neighbor sensors will not use the adv
ertised route they will only route the packets via the ro
uting cells
Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks – Examples (cont.)
An adversary broadcasts to its neighbors about an artificial link to the base station
This attack does not work for the same reason as above
Against The Selective Forwarding Attack – Solution
If one node serves as the relay node for more than M times (where M is a system parameter) neighbor nodes will send an alarm to the
base station and neighbor nodes
Against The Selective Forwarding Attack – Solution (cont.)
If one node serves as the relay node for more than M times the upstream node (the sender) will send
the packet to another node in the cell encrypted with the corresponding shared secr
et key
Against The Hello Flood Attack
Since sensor nodes use the three-way handshake protocol
The hello flood attack does not work
Performance Evaluation- Parameters
Simulator: QualNet Compared with SP and Mesh MAC protocol: 802.11 DCF Base stations: 4 Sensor Nodes: 300 Simulation area: 300m x 300m Transmission range: 60m
Performance Evaluation
SCR routing protocol has high delivery ratio and low energy consumption (close to single path routing)
Conclusions- Security
The nature of SCR routing (cell relay via routing cells) makes it resistant to Spoofed routing information Selective forwarding Sinkhole Wormhole attacks
Conclusions- Security (cont.)
The three-way handshake can defense against Sybil attack Hello flooding attack
Conclusions- Energy Efficiency
In SCR routing only an active node with more remaining
energy (than other nodes) in the routing cells forwards packet