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Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May 2010.

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Page 1: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Secret Sharing for General Access Structure

İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk

Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May 2010.

Page 2: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Outline

• Multipartite access structure• Relate work:– Asmuth-Bloom’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme– Galibus and Matveev (GM) algorithm for polynomial ring in

General Access Structure (based on M)

• Proposed method– Proposed 1: Modified GM algorithm for integer (based on A-

B)– Proposed 2: Splitting-based secret sharing scheme

• Conclusion

Page 3: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Multipartite access structure (1/5)

• The set of players is divided into K different disjoint classes P1, P2,…, PK classes;

• All players of the same class play the same role in the structure.

Page 4: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Multipartite access structure (2/5)

• K-partite can be represented by a set of K-tuple vectors.

• Ex: Γ={(3, 4), (4, 2)}– Each vector is an authorized combination, • (3, 4) is a authorized combination• (4, 2) is the other authorized combination

– The ith entry in a vector denoting the required number of participants from Pi in that authorized combination.

• (3, 4) means at least 3 users from P1 and 4 from P2.

– {(|P1| 3 and |P2| 4) or (|P1| 4 and |P2| 2)}

Page 5: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Multipartite access structure (3/5)

• Ex: Γ={(3, 4), (4, 2)}, |P1|=|P2|=5,

we can find corresponding

(3, 4) Γ (4, 2) Γ

)}3,3(),1,5(),5,2{(

(2,1) (1,3)

(2,2) (2,3)

(2,3) (3,3)

(2,4) (4,3)

(2,5) (5,3)

(3,1) (1,1)

(3,2) (2,1)

(3,3) (3,1)

(3,4) (4,1)

(3,5) (5,1)

Page 6: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Multipartite access structure (4/5)

• Ex: , |P1|=|P2|=5,

we can find corresponding Γ={(3, 4), (4, 2)},

)}3,3(),1,5(),5,2{(

)5,2( )3,3()1,5(

(3,1) (1,6)

(3,2) (2,6)

(3,3) (3,6)

(3,4) (4,6)

(3,5) (5,6)

(6,1) (1,2)

(6,2) (2,2)

(6,3) (3,2)

(6,4) (4,2)

(6,5) (5,2)

(4,1) (1,4)

(4,2) (2,4)

(4,3) (3,4)

(4,4) (4,4)

(4,5) (5,4)

Page 7: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Multipartite access structure (5/5)

• Any access structure defined on a set of n users is trivially n-partite – We can always take P1 = {1}, … ,Pn = {n}.

– But, we usually want to consider the minimum possible number of classes.

• Ex1: (2,3)-threshold transform to 3-partite– Γ={(1,1,0), (1,0,1),(0,1,1)}

• Ex2: Γ={{1,4}, {2,3}} transform to 4-partite– Γ={(1,0,0,1), (0,1,1,0)}

Page 8: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

questations

• 1.Multiple assignment 是否只對 Shamir 有意義 ?(因為 CRT可輕易合併 share,沒有多個 share 問題 )–考慮 information rate

• 2.CRT是否就是 single assignment?• 3.CRT如何解 GAS

Page 9: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

[補充 ]access structures

• Threshold access structures [1], • Access structures defined by graphs [2], • Star access structures [3],• Those with at most five players [4], • Bipartite access structures [5], • Hierarchical threshold access structures [6, 7],• Weighted threshold access structures [8].

Reference to :2006_New results on multipartite access structures

Page 10: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Relate work• Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme

– C. Asmuth and J. Bloom. “A modular approach to key safeguarding,“ IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(2):208–210, 1983.

– The property of (n/2, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence– K. Kaya and A. A. Selcuk. A veriable secret sharing scheme based on the

Chinese Remainder Theorem. In Proc. of INDOCRYPT 2008, volume 5365 of LNCS, pages 414–425. Springer-Verlag, 2008.

• Galibus and Matveev (GM) algorithm for polynomial ring – T. Galibus and G. Matveev. “Generalized Mignotte’s sequences over

polynomial rings,“ Electronic Notes on Theoretical Computer Science, 186:43–48, 2007.

Page 11: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Asmuth-Bloom’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme (1/4)

• Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT)

• (t, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence:– a public sequence of coprime integers

m0 < m1 < …< mn such that

QualifiedMin t

m1, m2,…, mt

ForbiddenMax t1

mn, mn1,…, mnt+2

Page 12: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Asmuth-Bloom’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme (2/4)

• Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT)

• (t, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence:– a public sequence of integers

m0 < m1 < …< mn such that

Sj be the set of all subsets of P={1,2,…,n} of cardinality j.

Compare with coprime integers

Page 13: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

• (t, n) secret sharing encoded:– Secret d Zm0

– y = d + Am0

where A is a random positive integer such that y < M

– Share yi = y mod mi for all 1 i n

Asmuth-Bloom’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme(3/4)

QualifiedMin t

m1, m2,…, mt

Page 14: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

• (t, n) secret sharing decoded:– y is the unique solution modulo M of the system

– Secret d = y mod m0

Asmuth-Bloom’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme(4/4)

Page 15: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

(n/2, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence

• Lemma: An (n/2, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence is a (k, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence for all k such that 1 k n.– Let t = n/2– Case1: Let 1 k < t.– Case2: Let t < k n. 1 t n

k

Case 1 Case 2

k

Page 16: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

(n/2, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence

• Let t = n/2 • Case1: Let 1 k < t.

get

1 t nk

Case 1

Page 17: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

(n/2, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence

• Let t = n/2 • Case2: Let t < k n.

get

1 t nk

Case 2

Page 18: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Galibus and Matveev (GM) algorithm

• For polynomials, any access structure can be realized by using Mignotte SSS– for polynomial ring – in General Access Structure – (based on Mignotte’s sequence)

• Secret d, moduli mi, and shares yi are polynomials.

Page 19: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Galibus and Matveev (GM) algorithm

• Initial: mi(x) =1, for 1i n

• Iteration:

Page 20: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May
Page 21: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Proposed method

• Proposed 1:

Modified GM algorithm for integer (based on A-B)

• Proposed 2:

Splitting-based secret sharing scheme

Page 22: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Proposed 1: Modified GM algorithm for integer

• Based on A-B, find a prime m0 (for specified bit length)

• For each , check all– – • Find prime p, and bit length of p is minimal

• 修改 :

A C符合標準有問題

Page 23: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May
Page 24: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May

Proposed 2: Splitting-based secret sharing scheme

• k-partite , each part Pi has it’s (ni/2, ni) Asmuth-Bloom sequence

• For each vector (authorized combination)

– Using A-B’s scheme sharing subsecret dv,i into share yv,i

• For each participant l,

Page 25: Secret Sharing for General Access Structure İlker Nadi Bozkurt, Kamer Kaya, and Ali Aydın Selçuk Information Security and Cryptology, Ankara, Turkey, May