Second Report of the Monitor for the Credit Suisse RMBS Settlement

February 20, 2018

Neil M. Barofsky Jenner & Block LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 www.creditsuisse.rmbsmonitor.com

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................3

II. ONGOINGDEVELOPMENTOFELIGIBILITY,CREDITCALCULATION,ANDTESTINGPROTOCOLS...........................................................................................................4

III. BORROWEROUTREACHEVENTS..............................................................................................5

A. NewYorkEvent......................................................................................................................5

B. UpcomingFloridaEvent.....................................................................................................9

IV. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................................9

ENDNOTES................................................................................................................................................................11

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................................................15

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

MONITOR’S SECOND REPORT

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2 MONITOR’S SECOND REPORT

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3 MONITOR’S SECOND REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

This report, the Monitor’s second pursuant to the SettlementAgreement,providesanupdateonCreditSuisse’seffortstocomplywithitsobligationtoprovideconsumerreliefpursuanttothatagreement,andsetsforththeMonitor’sassessmentofCreditSuisse’scompliancetodate.

OnJanuary18,2017,CreditSuisseSecurities(USA)LLC,togetherwithitscurrentandformerU.S.subsidiariesandU.S.affiliates(collectively,“CreditSuisse”),entered intoanagreementwith theU.S.DepartmentofJustice(“DOJ”)toresolveclaimsrelatedtoCreditSuisse’sallegedunlawfulconductinconnectionwiththepackagingandsaleofresidentialmortgage‐backed securities, or “RMBS,”between2005and2007 (the “SettlementAgreement”).1

To remediate harms resulting from Credit Suisse’s allegedunlawful conduct, the Settlement Agreement requires Credit Suisse toprovideconsumerrelief todistressedborrowersandothersaffectedbythefinancialcrisis.2Specifically,theSettlementAgreementprovidesthatCreditSuissemustearn$2.8billionin“credit”byprovidingvarioustypesof consumer relief in two main categories. 3 First, Credit Suisse mustprovide loan modifications to homeowners who are having difficultymakingtheirmortgagepaymentsorwhoowemorethantheirhomesareworth. 4 Second, Credit Suisse must provide funding to construct,rehabilitate,orpreserveaffordablehousingdevelopmentsforlow‐incomeresidents.5

TheSettlementAgreementprovidedforCreditSuissetoengageanindependentmonitortooverseeandperiodicallyreporttothepubliconCreditSuisse’sprogresstowardsmeetingitsconsumerreliefobligation.6NeilM.BarofskyofthelawfirmJenner&BlockLLPwasappointedtoserveastheindependentmonitor(collectively,the“Monitor”).7

On October 27, 2017, the Monitor published its initial reportpursuant to the Settlement Agreement (the “Initial Report”). 8 Amongotherthings,theInitialReportoutlinesCreditSuisse’spreliminaryplantofulfill its consumer relief obligationbymodifying homemortgage loansand providing funding for affordable housing. For example, the InitialReport describes Credit Suisse’s plan to have its mortgage servicersubsidiary, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), complete first lienprincipal forgiveness and principal forbearance loanmodifications thatCreditSuissewillsubmittotheMonitorforcredit.ItalsoexplainsCreditSuisse’spreliminaryeffortstoprovideno‐interestloanstodevelopersofaffordablerentalhousing.

In addition to publishing periodic reports, the Monitor hasestablishedawebsitewithinformationabouttheSettlementAgreement(www.creditsuisse.rmbsmonitor.com). The Monitor’s website answers

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frequently asked questions about the agreement and provides theMonitor’s contact information. The website also provides a list ofresources fordistressedborrowersandhomeowners facingforeclosure,includingcontactinformationforfreeorlow‐costtaxandlegalservices,aswell as information about Credit Suisse‐sponsored borrower outreachevents. This Report, and all previous and subsequent reports, will bepostedontheMonitor’swebsite.

II. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF ELIGIBILITY, CREDITCALCULATION,ANDTESTINGPROTOCOLS

Since the publication of the Initial Report, the Monitor hascontinued to workwith Credit Suisse and SPS to develop agreed‐uponeligibility,creditcalculation,andtestingprotocolsforfirst lienprincipalforgiveness and principal forbearance loanmodifications completed bySPS.9Theeligibilityandcreditcalculationprotocolsestablishthecriteriatodeterminewhetherparticularconsumerreliefactionsareeligible forcreditundertheSettlementAgreementand,ifso,theamountofthatcredit.The testing protocols establish the processes pursuant towhich CreditSuissewill confirm that completed consumer relief is eligible for creditundertheSettlementAgreementbeforesubmittingittotheMonitorforfurtherreview.

Afterextensivediscussions,theMonitorandCreditSuissearenowfinalizing the protocols pursuant towhich Credit Suissewill determinethat the principal forgiveness and principal forbearance loanmodificationsitsubmitstotheMonitorforreviewareeligibleforcredit.10These protocols will be subject to further review and revision as loanmodifications are submitted to the Monitor for credit and testingcommences.

ThenextstepwillbeforCreditSuissetosubmitaninitialsampleof 100 completed principal forgiveness and principal forbearance loanmodifications. 11 The Monitor will review these loan modifications todeterminewhethertheyareeligibleforcredit,andwhetherCreditSuisse’scalculationoftheproposedamountofthecreditiscorrect.Giventhatthis100‐loan sample will be the first loans that Credit Suisse will besubmitting,theMonitorwillalsoassesswhethertheagreed‐upontestingprotocolsarefunctioningasenvisioned.CreditSuisseplanstosubmitthisinitial100‐loansampletotheMonitorinMarch2018.12TheMonitorwillreportontheresultsofthe100‐loansampleoncethatreviewconcludes.

TheMonitor and Credit Suisse continue towork on developingagreed‐uponeligibility,creditcalculation,andtestingprotocolsforCreditSuisse’s financing of affordable housing.13 The Monitor will report ontheseprotocolsinafuturereport.

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III. BORROWEROUTREACHEVENTS

Under the Settlement Agreement, Credit Suissemust hold threeborroweroutreacheventseachyearuntiltheMonitorcertifiesthatCreditSuissehassatisfieditsconsumerreliefobligation.14TheInitialReport,atPart II.D.2.b.1, details the specific requirements for these outreachevents.15

AsdiscussedintheInitialReport,CreditSuissedesignatedSPSto

coordinate and hold the required outreach events.16 In 2017, SPS heldoutreach events inDenver, Colorado; LosAngeles, California; andCarlePlace,NewYork.17TheMonitorreportedontheColoradoandCaliforniaeventsinitsInitialReport.18

A. NewYorkEvent

OnNovember18,2017,theMonitorattendedSPS’sthirdborroweroutreacheventforthe2017calendaryear,inCarlePlace,NewYork.19TheeventwasheldattheHomewoodSuitesbyHilton,400WestburyAvenue,CarlePlace,NewYork,11514,from9:00amto5:00pmEST.20

Monitor’sObservations

Theeventwaswell‐organizedandransmoothly.21Asborrowersarrived,membersofSPS’sstaffgreetedtheborrowers,providedthemwithcopies of the plain language document describing the types of reliefavailableundertheSettlementAgreement,anddirectedthemtomortgageassistance counselors for one‐on‐one sessions as counselors becameavailable. 22 Free Wi‐Fi was provided to allow borrowers to accessdocumentsorotherinformationelectronically,andadesignatedwaitingareawassetupforborrowersandstockedwithbeveragesandsnacks.23

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The Monitor observed several mortgage assistance counselingsessions, and, as with prior outreach events, was impressed by SPS’scommitmenttocustomerserviceandprofessionalism.24Thecounselorsobservedwerecourteousandhelpful,spendingsignificanttimewalkingborrowersthroughthemortgageassistanceapplicationprocessstep‐by‐step,andborrowersappearedtoappreciatetheassistanceandattentionprovidedbythecounselors.25

ComparisonwithPriorEvents

SPSPersonnel.SPSstaffedtheNewYorkeventwithapproximatelythesamenumberofpersonnelastheCaliforniaevent,asSPShadexpectedsimilar borrower turnout at both events. 26 Nineteen SPS employeesattendedtheevent,includingtwelvemortgageassistancecounselors,fiveseniormanagers,andtwoinformationtechnologyemployees.27Fiveofthemortgage assistance counselors also attended one ormore of the priorevents.28FivecounselorswerebilingualinSpanishandEnglish,andSPSreportedthat thesecounselorsassistedseveralborrowers inSpanishattheevent.29

Wait Time. The Carle Place event was the most well‐attendedoutreacheventtodate,with148borrowersinattendance.30Becauseofthehigh turnout,borrowerswaited longer toseeamortgageassistancecounselorascomparedtopriorevents,withmostborrowersappearingtowait approximately thirty minutes before speaking with a counselor.31TheMonitordidnot,however,observeanyborrowerscomplainingaboutthewaittime.32

Same‐Day Decisions. SPS was able to obtain same‐day, on‐sitedecisions for five borrower accounts at the event. 33 All five of theseaccountswereofferedtrialmodifications.34

Non‐ProfitOrganizations’Attendance.Representativesfromtwo

non‐profitorganizations,NeighborhoodHousingServicesofQueensCDC,Inc.andNeighborhoodHousingServicesofNewYorkCity,Inc.,attendedthe event. 35 These representatives helped borrowers complete theirmortgage assistance applications and provided general financialcounseling.36Additionally, therepresentatives informedSPS’smortgageassistance counselors about the New York State Mortgage AssistanceProgram,aprogramthatprovideseligibleNewYorkhomeownerswhoareat risk of foreclosure with zero‐interest rate mortgage loans of up to$40,000.37SPS’smortgageassistancecounselorswere thereforeable toconsiderwhetheranyoftheborrowerswithwhomtheymetmightqualifyfortheprogram,andinformborrowersoftheprogram’sbenefits.38

The representatives from the non‐profit organizations hadpositivefeedbackontheCarlePlaceevent,andspecificallypraisedSPSfor

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itsoutreachefforts,notingthattheturnoutattheeventwasmuchhigherthanthatofoutreacheventssponsoredbyothermortgageservicers.39

EventMetrics

NumberofInviteesandAttendees. SPSsentinvitationsto4,763borrowers. 40 82 borrowers RSVP’d for the event. 41 148 borrowersattended the event to discuss a total of 149 accounts, resulting in anapproximate 3% return rate on attendance. 42 This compares to anapproximate3%returnratefromtheCaliforniaevent,a2.5%returnratefromtheColoradoevent,anda1%returnratefromprioreventsarrangedbytheHOPENOWAllianceandDepartmentofTreasury.43

AttheMonitor’srequest,SPSaskedborrowersuponarrivalhow

they heard about the event.44 Themajority of borrowers said that theletters they receivedvia regularmailhadprompted them toattend theevent.45

Outcome. AccordingtoSPS,asof January30,2018,67accountswith borrowers in attendance were still being evaluated for potentialmortgageassistance.46Theborrowerson61oftheseaccountswerestillcollecting the documentation necessary for SPS’s review of theiraccounts.47

Outcome NumberofBorrowerAccounts

PendingDecision(AllDocumentsReceived) 6

PendingDocuments 61

MortgageAssistanceOffered 52

NoMortgageAssistanceOffered 27

DidNotRequestMortgageAssistance

3

TypesofMortgageAssistanceOffered.AsofJanuary30,2018,52borrower accounts (35%) had been offered some type of mortgageassistanceoption, including21accounts(15%)thatwereofferedatrialloan modification and one account that was offered a permanent loanmodification.48 SPS will update the Monitor with additional results asdecisionsonadditionalaccountsaremade.

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MortgageAssistanceOfferedNumberof

BorrowerAccounts

TrialLoanModification 21

PermanentLoanModification 1

PaymentDeferral 4

RepaymentPlan 26

Loan‐to‐ValueRatio.Themajorityofaccountswithborrowersin

attendance had a loan‐to‐value ratio below 100% (based on the mostrecentpropertyvalueinSPS’ssystem,whichmaynothavebeenrecentlyrecalculated).49Theloan‐to‐valueratiosweredistributedasfollows.50

Loan‐to‐ValueRatio NumberofBorrowerAccounts

<80% 58

80%‐100% 20

>100% 63

SecondLien 7

Unknown:NoPropertyValuationConductedbySPSasoftheDateof

theEvent1

DelinquencyStatus. ThemajorityofaccountswithborrowersinattendancewereclassifiedasdelinquentbySPS(i.e.,theywere30ormoredayspastdueontheirmortgageloanpayments).51Delinquencystatusesweredistributedasfollows.52

DelinquencyStatus NumberofBorrowerAccounts

Current 4

30‐90Days 23

120+Days 122

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9 MONITOR’S SECOND REPORT

Distance Traveled. Borrowers traveled from as far away asBrigantine,NewJersey(approximately100miles)toattendtheevent.53Mostborrowers,however,traveledlessthan50milestoattend.54Belowisamapshowingdistancestraveledbyborrowerstoattendtheevent.55

Cost.SPScalculatedthattheeventcost$25,750.46,whichincludes

costsfortravelandlodgingofSPSpersonnel,rentingtheeventspace,food,andovertimepayforhourlyemployees.56

B. UpcomingFloridaEvent

SPSintendstoholditsfirstborroweroutreacheventfor2018inJacksonville,FloridaonMarch10,2018.57TheMonitorintendstoattendtheeventandwillreportonitinafuturereport.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

BasedontheinformationsubmittedtotheMonitorandtheworkdescribed in thisand inpriorreports,andsubject to theMonitor’s finaldeterminationandcertificationthatCreditSuisse’sconsumerreliefeffortscomplywiththerequirementsoftheSettlementAgreement,theMonitorconcludes:

Credit Suisse is in compliance with the consumer reliefrequirementsoftheSettlementAgreementfortheperiodfromJanuary18,2017,throughthedateofthisReport.

Todate, Credit Suisse has provided theMonitorwith alldocumentsandinformationtheMonitorhasrequestedforthe purpose of determining whether Credit Suisse has

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satisfieditsconsumerreliefobligation,asrequiredbytheSettlementAgreement.

CreditSuissehasheldall threeof therequiredborroweroutreacheventsfor2017,andthoseeventshavecompliedwiththeparameterssetforthintheSettlementAgreement.

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11 ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

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13 ENDNOTES

ENDNOTESFORMONITOR’SSECONDREPORT1SettlementAgreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandCreditSuisseSecurities(USA)LLC¶¶A‐24,Jan.18,2017(hereinafter“CreditSuisseSettlementAgreement”).2CreditSuisseSettlementAgreement¶2;SettlementAgreementbetweentheUnitedStatesand Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Annex2–Consumer Relief, at 2‐6, Jan. 18, 2017(hereinafter“CreditSuisseAnnex2”).3CreditSuisseAnnex2at2‐6;CreditSuisseSettlementAgreement¶2.4CreditSuisseAnnex2at2‐4(MenuItems1.A‐1.F).5CreditSuisseAnnex2at5‐6(MenuItem2).6CreditSuisseAnnex2at7;CreditSuisseSettlementAgreement¶2.7CreditSuisseSettlementAgreement¶2.8MonitorfortheCreditSuisseRMBSSettlement,InitialReportoftheMonitorfortheCreditSuisseRMBSSettlement,Oct.27,2017(hereinafter“Monitor’sInitialReport”),availableatwww.creditsuisse.rmbsmonitor.com/reports(lastvisitedFeb.10,2018).9MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.9,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Feb.7,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.5,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.31,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.24,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisseandSPS,Jan.23,2018;MonitorCallswithSPS,Jan.17,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.16,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.10,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.3,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Dec.22,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Dec.20,2017;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Dec.15,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Dec.15,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Dec.13,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Dec.6,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Dec.4,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Nov.29,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS, Nov.16,2017; Monitor Call with SPS, Nov.15,2017; Monitor Calls with SPS,Nov.8,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Nov.1,2017.10MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.9,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Feb.7,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.5,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Nov.29,2017.11MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.9,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Feb.7,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.5,2018.12MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.9,2018;MonitorCallwithSPS,Feb.7,2018;MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Feb.5,2018.13E.g.,MonitorCallwithCreditSuisse,Nov.3,2017.14CreditSuisseAnnex2at6.15Monitor’sInitialReportat59‐60.16MonitorOn‐SiteMeetingwithCreditSuisse,Jan.31,2017.17SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017;SPSCaliforniaBorrowerOutreachEvent,Aug.5,2017;SPSColoradoBorrowerOutreachEvent,June10,2017.18Monitor’sInitialReportat60‐69.19SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.20SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.21SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.22SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.23SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.24SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.25SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.26SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.27SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.28SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.

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14 ENDNOTES

29SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.30SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.31SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.32SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.33SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.34SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.35SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.36SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.37 See New York State Mortgage Assistance Program, Center for New York CityNeighborhoods,Inc.,http://nysmap.org/(lastvisitedFeb.10,2018).38SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.39SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.40SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.41SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.42SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.43SPSCaliforniaBorrowerOutreachEvent,Aug.5,2017;SPSColoradoBorrowerOutreachEvent, June10,2017;MonitorCallwithSPS,Mar.16,2017;MonitorOn‐SiteMeetingwithCreditSuisse,Jan.31,2017.44SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.45SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.46MonitorCallwithSPS, Jan.31,2018;SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.47MonitorCallwithSPS, Jan.31,2018;SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.48MonitorCallwithSPS, Jan.31,2018;SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.49SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.50SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.51SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.52SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.53SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.54SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.55SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.56SPSNewYorkBorrowerOutreachEvent,Nov.18,2017.57MonitorCallwithSPS,Jan.31,2018.

CS RMBS Monitorship Confidential – DRAFT of October 12, 2017

Attorney Work Product

GLOSSARY

16

16 GLOSSARY

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17 GLOSSARY

AlistoftermsusedthroughouttheMonitor’sreportsappearsbelow.

Adjustable‐Rate Mortgage: Mortgage loan inwhichtheinterestratechangesoverthecourseoftheloan.Adjustable‐ratemortgagesgenerallyhavealowerinitialratethanaborrowercouldobtainonafixed‐ratemortgage,butexposeborrowerstotheriskthatinterestrateswillincreaseinthefuture.

Affordable Housing: Housing is typicallyconsidered“affordable”ifitconsumesnomorethan30% of a household’s income. The federalgovernmentincentivizesdevelopmentofaffordablehousing by, among other things, awarding taxcreditsthatcanbesoldtoprivateinvestorswhousethecreditstoreducetheirfederaltaxliabilities.

Bankruptcy:Legal proceeding involving a personorbusinessthatisunabletosatisfyitsliabilities.Inabankruptcyproceeding,anindividual’sunsecureddebts, such as credit card debt,medical bills, andunsecuredmortgagedebt,maybeextinguished.

Capitalization: Method of modifying a mortgageloan in which missed payments and otheroutstanding costs are added to the borrower’soutstandingprincipalloanbalance,andthusspreadoutovertheremainingtermoftheloan.

CompensatingFactors:Aborrowerwhootherwisemaynotqualifyforaloanduetoinsufficientcreditscore or income, for example, may have“compensating factors” that outweigh theshortcoming and warrant issuance of the loan.Somecommoncompensating factorsare lownon‐housing debt, strong career growth potential,additional income sources, exceptional credithistory, or projected significant cash reserve afterpurchasingthehome.

CreditSuisse: Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,together with its current and former U.S.subsidiariesandU.S.affiliates.CreditSuisseisoneofthepartiestotheSettlementAgreement.

Debt‐to‐IncomeRatio:Ratiobetweenaborrower’stotalmonthly debts and his or her grossmonthlyincome.ForpurposesoftheSettlementAgreement,this ratio compares the borrower’s monthlymortgagepayments and relatedhousing expenses(such as property taxes, and homeowners andmortgage insurance) to his or her gross monthlyincome.

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”): PrincipalfederallawenforcementagencyoftheUnitedStates,with the authority to seek both civil and criminalpenaltiesforviolationsoffederallaw.DOJisoneofthepartiestotheSettlementAgreement.

Due Diligence: Appropriate level of attention orcare a reasonable person should take beforeentering into an agreement or a transaction withanotherparty.Infinance,oftenreferstotheprocessbywhichonecompanyconductsaninvestigationorreview of an asset before buying the asset fromanothercompany.

Earned Principal Forgiveness: Method ofmodifyingamortgageloaninwhichaportionoftheunpaidprincipalbalanceoftheloanisforgivenovertime,providedtheborrowerremainscurrentonthemodifiedloan.

EqualCreditOpportunityAct (“ECOA”):Federallaw, codifiedat15U.S.C. §1691(a), thatgenerallyprohibits creditors from discriminating againstcredit applicants with respect to any aspect of acredittransaction.Forexample,theECOAprohibitscreditors from discriminating against creditapplications on the basis of race, color, religion,national origin, sex or marital status, or age(provided the applicant has the capacity tocontract), or because all or part of the applicant’sincomederivesfromanypublicassistanceprogram.

FairHousingAct(“FHA”):Federallaw,codifiedat42U.S.C.§3605(a),thatmakesitunlawfulforanyperson or other entitywho engages in residentialreal estate‐related transactions to discriminateagainstanypersoninsuchtransactionsbecauseofrace,color,religion,sex,handicap,familialstatus,ornationalorigin.

FirstLien:Lienthathaspriorityoverallotherliensor claims on a property, other than a tax lien orcertain other liens pursuant to state law (i.e.,mechanic’slien),intheeventofborrowerdefault.

Fixed‐Rate Mortgage: Mortgage loan with aninterestratethatdoesnotchangeoverthecourseoftheloan.

Foreclosure: Legal process in which a borrowerwho has failed to make timely payments on amortgageloanlosesownershipofthehome.Itisnotautomatic,butmustbeinitiatedbythelender,anditmayormaynotrequirethelendertoseekacourt’sapproval.Itmaytransferownershipofthehometothe lender ormay allow the lender to auction thehomeandkeepallproceedsuptotheamountowedtothelender.

Held‐for‐Sale: Under U.S. Generally AcceptedAccountingPrinciples(“U.S.GAAP”),anaccountingtreatmentformortgageloanstheownerofwhichislookingtoselltoanotherentity.

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18 GLOSSARY

Held‐for‐Investment: Under U.S. GenerallyAccepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”), anaccountingtreatmentformortgageloanstheownerof which intends to hold onto for at least theforeseeablefuture.

Home Affordable Modification Program(“HAMP”): Loanmodificationprogramof theU.S.DepartmentoftheTreasuryandU.S.DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment,intendedtohelpstruggling homeowners reducemonthlymortgagepayments to affordable, sustainable levels andpreventavoidableforeclosures.Partofthebroader“MakingHomeAffordable”initiative,createdbythefederalgovernmentin2009aspartoftheTreasuryDepartment’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.Under HAMP, loan owners, servicers, andborrowers receive federal funds as incentivepayments for performing loan modificationspermittedbytheprogram.

Immediate Principal Forgiveness: Method ofmodifyingamortgageloaninwhichaportionoftheprincipal balance of the loan is written off themomenttheloanmodificationbecomespermanent.

Imminent Default: Condition in which it isreasonablyforeseeablethataborrowerwillnotbeable to make his or her next mortgage payment,typicallyduetoahardshipsuchasjobloss,reducedhours, death of a spouse, unexpected illness, etc.Loansinimminentdefaultmaybeeligibleforaloanmodification.

Internal Review Group: Internal Credit SuissegroupcomposedofseniorCreditSuissepersonnelfrom various groups, including the CEO of CreditSuisse Global Markets, the General Counsel forCredit Suisse Global Markets and Credit SuisseHoldings(USA)Inc.,andadditionalpersonnelfromtheLegal,Compliance,ProductControl,andInternalAudit groups, amongothers. The InternalReviewGroupwill review Credit Suisse’s consumer reliefactivities to confirm that they meet therequirements of the Settlement Agreement beforesubmittingthatconsumerrelieftotheMonitorforcredit.

JuniorLien:Lienthatisnotafirstorsecondlien.Ajuniorlienislowerinprioritythaneitherafirstorsecondlienintheeventofborrowerdefault.

Lien: Interest in property held by a creditor tosecurepaymentofadebt. Amortgageisatypeoflien.

Loan‐to‐Value Ratio: Ratio between the amountowedonamortgageloanandthevalueofthehomesecuring the loan. Where a borrower’s loan‐to‐value ratio is greater than 100%, the amount theborrowerowesonhisorhermortgageexceedsthevalueofthehome.Wheretheloan‐to‐valueratioislessthan100%,thevalueofthehomeexceedstheamounttheborrowerowesonhisorhermortgage.

Low‐Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”):Federal tax credit awarded to certain affordablerental housing projects. Once awarded, projectdeveloperssellthetaxcreditstoprivateinvestors,whousethetaxcreditstoreducetheir federaltaxliabilities. To receive the tax credit, an affordablerental housing project must meet certainrequirements. For example, the project must setasideatleast40percentoftheresidentialunitsforrenters earning no more than 60 percent of thearea’smedianincome(the40/60test)or20percentof the residential units for renters earning 50percent or less of the area’s median income (the20/50 test). These units are subject to rentrestrictions to ensure that the rent is affordable,which the project must maintain for at least 30years.

Monitor:NeilM.BarofskyofthelawfirmJenner&Block LLP, appointed as independent monitor tooversee and periodically report to the public onCredit Suisse’s progress toward meeting its totalconsumer relief obligation under the SettlementAgreement.

Mortgage:Whenapersonborrowsmoneytobuyahome, the bank receives an interest in the homecalledamortgage. Iftheborrowerdoesnotrepaytheloaninatimelyfashion,themortgagegivesthebanktherighttoobtainownershipofthehome.Themortgageissaidto“secure”repaymentoftheloan,andcommonlythatloaniscalleda“mortgageloan.”

Mortgage Servicer: Company that serves anadministrative function on behalf of lenders andownersofdebt.Servicerstypicallydonotoriginateor own the loans they service and are hired byowners of loans. A servicer’s main duties arecollectingpayments,distributingthosepaymentstothepartiesentitledtoreceivethem,communicatingwithborrowers,andmaintainingrecords.Servicersmay also decide when to modify the terms ofdistressedloansinordertoavoidforeclosure.

Non‐Performing Loan: Loan on which theborrower has notmade a payment in 90 days ormore.

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19 GLOSSARY

Origination:Processbywhichaloanismade.Thelender that makes the loan is known as theoriginatoroftheloan.Theoriginatormaydealwithborrowersdirectlyormaycontractbrokerstofindpotentialborrowersandevaluateloanapplications.

Primary Mortgage Market Survey (“PMMS”):Survey conducted by the Federal Home LoanMortgage Corporation ofmortgage lenders acrosstheUnitedStatestodeterminetheaverage30‐yearfixed‐ratemortgagerate,whichisthenreportedonaweeklybasis.

Principal Forbearance: Method of modifying amortgageloaninwhichtheborrower’srepaymentofaportionoftheprincipalisdeferreduntiltheendofthetermofthe loan. Theprincipal forbearanceamountissometimesreferredtoasa“non‐interestbearingballoon.”

Principal Forgiveness: Method of modifying amortgage loan in which the borrower’s unpaidprincipalbalanceispermanentlyreduced.

RatingAgency: Inorder for adebt security tobesold to a wide group of investors, a securitygenerallyreceivesaratingfroma“ratingagency.”Aratingagencyisnotpartofthefederalgovernment,butinsteadisacompanythatanalyzesthesecurityto determine the risk that investors owning thesecurity may suffer a loss. Investors frequentlyconsider credit ratings when making investmentdecisions.

Residential Mortgage‐Backed Security(“RMBS”): Type of debt security involving acollectionofmortgageloans.AninvestorwhoownsanRMBShas the right to receive a portionof themonthlypaymentsmadeunderthemortgageloans.RMBS can be freely traded among investors. Theprocess by which loans are packaged into thesesecuritiesiscalled“securitization.”

RMBSTrust:MortgageloansincludedinanRMBSare formallyownedbya trust. Thetrust issetupduringthesecuritizationprocessforthepurposeofholding the mortgage loans and administeringpayments in a particular RMBS. Eachmonth, themortgage servicer for the loans in theRMBS trustcollects monthly payments from borrowers, andthen remits those payments to the trust. The“trustee” for the trust is in charge of aggregatingthesemonthlypaymentsandthendistributingthemtoinvestorsintheRMBS.

Screenshot: Picture of whatever appears on thescreenofacomputeratthatmomentintime.

SecondLien: Lien thathaspriorityover all otherliens or claims on a property, other than the firstlien, a tax lien, or certain other liens pursuant tostate law (i.e., mechanic’s lien), in the event ofborrowerdefault.Anexampleofasecondlienisahomeequitylineofcreditonanalready‐mortgagedhome.

Securitization:Processoftakingagroupofassetsthatgeneratea regular streamofpayments, likeacollection of residential mortgage loans, andtransformingthemintoasecuritythroughfinancialengineering. An example of securitization is aresidential mortgage‐backed security (“RMBS”),which is a type of security that is backed by acollectionofhomemortgageloans.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”): AmortgageservicerownedbyCreditSuisse.

SettlementAgreement:AgreementofJanuary18,2017, between Credit Suisse and DOJ, resolvingpotential claims relating to Credit Suisse’s allegedunlawfulconductinconnectionwiththepackagingandsaleofresidentialmortgage‐backedsecurities,or“RMBS,”between2005and2007.

SPS Compliance Group: Internal SPS groupresponsible for performing audit and compliancefunctions across SPS’s business in the ordinarycourse. Among other things, this group isresponsibleforensuringthatSPSiscompliantwithallrelevantlawsandregulations,aswellasinternalpoliciesandprocedures.

SPS Quality Control Group: Internal SPS groupresponsible for confirming that the businessdecisions made by other SPS groups were madecorrectly.Forexample,intheordinarycourseofitsbusiness,theQualityControlgroupre‐evaluatesallloan modification applications to confirm theaccuracyof thedecisionpreviouslymadebySPS’sloanresolutiondepartment.

Subprime Mortgage: Borrowers with the bestcredit histories can borrowmoney from banks attheso‐calledprimerate.Subprimemortgagescarryinterest rates higher than the prime rate, and aregenerally offered to prospective borrowers whohavepoorcredithistoriesand towhomlending isthereforeriskier.

Underwater: A homeowner is said to be“underwater” when the amount owed on amortgage loan is greater than the currentmarketvalue of the home. Many homeowners foundthemselves underwater after home values fellsignificantlyduringthe2008financialcrisis.

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20 GLOSSARY

Underwriting Guidelines: Guidelines used byoriginatorsofmortgage loans todecidewhetheraborrowershouldbegivenaloantobuyahome.Theguidelines are intended to ensure, among otherthings,thataborrowerhasenoughincometocoverhisorhermonthlymortgagepayment,andthat intheevent theborrower fails torepaythe loan, thevalueofthepropertyonwhichamortgageisgivenisgreaterthantheamountborrowed.

UnpaidPrincipalBalance(“UPB”):Amountowedona loanatanygiventime,andonwhichinterestaccruesuntilitisrepaid.

Unsecured Mortgage Debt: Mortgage loan thatwaspreviouslysecuredbyalienonahome(i.e.,atthetimeoforigination),butnowtheliennolongerexists.Thistypeofdebtwouldresult,forexample,after foreclosure and saleof aborrower’shome iftheproceedsareinsufficienttorepaytheloaninfull.The unpaid portion of the loan then becomesunsecured mortgage debt. Unsecured mortgagedebtisevenlowerinprioritythanajuniorlien,asthepropertythatoriginallyservedascollateralfortheloancannolongerbeseizedinsatisfactionofthedebt.

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