second lecture phase free will lecture 6 the issue, the options

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Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

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Page 1: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Second Lecture Phase

Free Will

Lecture 6

The issue, the Options

Page 2: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Choice

I think “Hmmm, should I do some work or go to the pub?”

Either is open to me.

I try to decide what to do, to determine what I will do.

It is up to me.

Page 3: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

A

B

An open future….

Freedom… other crucial ideas go along with it.. Praise blame, anger…

Page 4: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Could Have Done Otherwise

• The CHDO principle: that free will implies that I CHDO. Sometimes called the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP)

• But …

Page 5: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Determinism

• The thesis that previous states of the world fix what happens later, including what we do. Many say that as a scientific principle there is reason to believe this.

• So whether I raise my right or my left arm was determined centuries before I was born.

• So, determinism means … that I could not have done otherwise.

• So … we are not free…

Page 6: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Note on Determinism and Quantum Mechanics:

• Determinism, as a doctrine about the physical world is not quite true, which makes a complication since much of the debate for centuries has been cast in terms of determinism. Quantum mechanics, so we are told, means that there is chance at a minute sub-atomic level. How much of a difference does this make?

• A) Many say that although at the subatomic level, where a particle might have an equal chance of spinning up or down, such probabilities are cancelled out at the macro-level, at the level of the brain, so it makes no real difference to the debate.

• B) One could modify that general doctrine about the physical world to say that the chances of events are entirely fixed by previous events and the laws of physics.

• C) It is not clear how randomess/chance in the world helps the existence of free will (a compatibilism/soft determinist point) since a random event is not an action, since it does mean that a person is responsible for it.

Page 7: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Compatibilism• However, maybe we can be both free and

determined.

• How could this be?

• A. J. Ayer… argues that actions flow from me, my character… ‘free’ contrasts with ‘constrained’… something outside me was compelling me to do something.

• Contrast you moving your arm with someone else moving it.

Page 8: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Options

• FW & not-Det• Not FW & Det• FW & Det

• Libertarianism• Hard Determinism• Soft determinism

Are FW & Det compatible?

Libertarianism and Hard determinism agree on incompatibilism.

Soft determinism is compatibilist

A new debate!

Page 9: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument

• Initial conditions

Plus• Laws of nature• … Determine what we do.• So, we could not have done otherwise. • So, we are not free!

• (An anti-compatibilist argument)

Page 10: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Compatibilist replies…(1) ‘Can’?

• What about the CHDO principle?

• One idea: direct attention to the exact meaning of ‘can’… or ‘would’.

• Perhaps all it means or implies is:

• If I had chosen differently then I would have acted differently…

Page 11: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

Choice

Yes

No

Laws of nature plus initial conditions

Page 12: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

(2) Frankfurt (Harry)

• The neuro-surgeon example.

• Like two hit-men going to do a crime.

He argues that there are intuitive cases of responsibility, such as these, where the CHDO principle fails.

Page 13: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

(3) Dennett (Dan)

• Also questions the CHDO principle.

• “Here I stand I can do no other” (Luther).

Page 14: Second Lecture Phase Free Will Lecture 6 The issue, the Options

• So there are ways of questioning Van Inwagen’s consequence argument.

• But if you want to defend it, and thus be an incompatibilist (that is, either a libertarian or a hard determinist) you must find replies to these three objections to the argument.

• Next week … Problems with compatibilism