G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.REGALADO,J.:Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with anotherprimae impressioniscase through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.1The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals2on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Courtviathe instant petition, raising the sole issue:WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.xxx xxx xxxRespondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment,3in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition forcertiorariand lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrantvis-a-visthe court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussedseriatim.IPetitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminalprocess, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to acriminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed inspecific courtsof indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.4A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.5A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.6In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants,7such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ,warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,8or all writs,warrants, summonses, andordersof courts of justice or judicial officers.9It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, ororderissued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,10or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice.112. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules fordelitos continuadosor in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act,13have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein.14Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions,15invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted bylaw,16has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court17over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise itsauthority.18From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filedonlyin the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas andonlywith respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply tosingle-salacourtsandothercrimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdictionof, as distinguished from theexercise of jurisdictionby, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which abranchof the Regional Trial Court shallexercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of thebranchconcerned for purposes of determining the venue of allwrits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basicallyregional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to aregionwhich shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the sameregionas public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did notper seconfer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of theadministrativeareawithin which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges theadministrative areasfor which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to thejurisdictionvested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only thecourtwhich has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only thebranchof the court with jurisdiction over theplace to be searchedcan issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, hasprimaryjurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall haveprimaryjurisdiction.This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.IIAs stated inlimine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed:No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge,19said warrant does not becomefunctus officiobut is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days20but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance.21Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court.22On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines,23under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certainspecifiedwrits issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rulesexpresslyauthorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated inparagraph (b).2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case ofStonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al.,24the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City,25but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant,26and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant27would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the courta quo, as quoted by respondent court:This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located.28The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in theabsence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved.29In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.IIIConcern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in theexerciseof jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate OpinionsDAVIDE, JR.,J.,The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, andordersof courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, ororderin a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other processes issuing from a court of justice.2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations omitted)What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case . . . or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing the search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was issued.The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).Note that the required motion is filedafterthe filing of the indictment or information."Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to anoriginaljurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to disposition of matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if they had been independently presented.. . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979])."Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction.Incidentis defined thus:Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the "principal". Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes issued by a court in a casepending before itand not to a case yet to be filed with it or pending in another court.The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.Nor canStonehill vs. Diokno(20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority.In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that:1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.# Separate OpinionsDAVIDE, JR.,J.:The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, andordersof courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, ororderin a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other processes issuing from a court of justice.2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . (citations omitted)What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case... or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing the search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was issued.The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).Note that the required motion is filedafterthe filing of the indictment or information."Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to anoriginaljurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to disposition of matter property before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if they had been independently presented. . . . "Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979])."Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction.Incidentis defined thus:Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the 'principal'. Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes issued by a court in a casepending before itand not to a case yet to be filed with it or pending in another court.The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.Nor canStonehill vs. Diokno(20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority.In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that:1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)Katz v. United StatesNo. 35Argued October 17, 1967Decided December 18, 1967389 U.S. 347CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUITSyllabusPetitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1084. Evidence of petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, since there was "no physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.Held:1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp.389 U. S. 350-353.(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements.Silverman v. United States,365 U. S. 505,365 U. S. 511. P.389 U. S. 353.(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine ofOlmstead v. United States,277 U. S. 438, andGoldman v. United States,316 U. S. 129, is no longer controlling. Pp.389 U. S. 351,389 U. S. 353.2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic surveillance. Pp.389 U. S. 354-359.369 F.2d 130, reversed.Page 389 U. S. 348MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. [Footnote 1] At trial, the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,Page 389 U. S. 349because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional questions thus presented. [Footnote 3]The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth. "Page 389 U. S. 350"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. [Footnote 4] Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. [Footnote 5] But the protection of a person'sgeneralright to privacy -- his right to be let alone by other people [Footnote 6] -- is, like thePage 389 U. S. 351protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States. [Footnote 7]Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. [Footnote 8] But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. [Footnote 9] For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.See Lewis v. United States,385 U. S. 206,385 U. S. 210;United States v. Lee,274 U. S. 559,274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.Page 389 U. S. 352See Rios v. United States,364 U. S. 253;Ex parte Jackson,96 U. S. 727,96 U. S. 733.The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, [Footnote 10] in a friend's apartment, [Footnote 11] or in a taxicab, [Footnote 12] a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry,Olmstead v. United States,277 U. S. 438,277 U. S. 457,277 U. S. 464,277 U. S. 466;Goldman v. United States,316 U. S. 129,316 U. S. 134-136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangiblePage 389 U. S. 353property. [Footnote 13] But "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294,387 U. S. 304. Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed inOlmsteadthat surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law."Silverman v. United States,365 U. S. 505,365 U. S. 511. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.We conclude that the underpinnings ofOlmsteadandGoldmanhave been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.Page 389 U. S. 354The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth, [Footnote 14] and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself. [Footnote 15]Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts, in fact, took place. Only last Term we sustained the validity ofPage 389 U. S. 355such an authorization, holding that, under sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a federal court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense."Osborn v. United States,385 U. S. 323,385 U. S. 329-330. Discussing that holding, the Court inBerger v. New York,388 U. S. 41, said that "the order authorizing the use of the electronic device" inOsborn"afforded similar protections to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence." Through those protections, "no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances."Id.at388 U. S. 57. [Footnote 16] Here, too, a similarPage 389 U. S. 356judicial order could have accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement" [Footnote 17] by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions inOlmsteadandGoldman,and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusivePage 389 U. S. 357means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,"Agnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20,269 U. S. 33, for the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police. . . ."Wong Sun v. United States,371 U. S. 471,371 U. S. 481-482. "Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,"United States v. Jeffers,342 U. S. 48,342 U. S. 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, areper seunreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [Footnote 18] -- subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. [Footnote 19]It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest. [Footnote 20]Page 389 U. S. 358Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." [Footnote 21] And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. [Footnote 22]The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this case. [Footnote 23] It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization"bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."Beck v. Ohio,379 U. S. 89,379 U. S. 96. And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth AmendmentPage 389 U. S. 359violations "only in the discretion of the police."Id.at379 U. S. 97.These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment," [Footnote 24] a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed.It is so ordered.MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.[Footnote 1]18 U.S.C. 1084. That statute provides in pertinent part:"(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.""(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal."[Footnote 2]369 F.2d 130, 134[Footnote 3]386 U. S. 954. The petition for certiorari also challenged the validity of a warrant authorizing the search of the petitioner's premises. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that issue.We find no merit in the petitioner's further suggestion that his indictment must be dismissed. After his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he testified before a federal grand jury concerning the charges involved here. Because he was compelled to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity, 48 Stat. 1096, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 409(l), it is clear that the fruit of his testimony cannot be used against him in any future trial. But the petitioner asks for more. He contends that. his conviction must be vacated and the charges against him dismissed lest he be "subjected to [a] penalty . . . on account of [a] . . . matter . . . concerning which he [was] compelled . . . to testify. . . ." 47 U.S.C. 409(l).Frank v. United States,347 F.2d 486. We disagree. In relevant part, 409(l) substantially repeats the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. 46, which was Congress' response to this Court's statement that an immunity statute can supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only if it affords adequate protection from future prosecution or conviction.Counselman v. Hitchcock,142 U. S. 547,142 U. S. 585-586. The statutory provision here involved was designed to provide such protection,see Brown v. United States,359 U. S. 41,359 U. S. 45-46, not to confer immunity from punishment pursuant to apriorprosecution and adjudication of guilt.Cf. Regina v. United States,364 U. S. 507,364 U. S. 513-514.[Footnote 4]"The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth. . . . And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home."Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U. S. 479,381 U. S. 509(dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK).[Footnote 5]The First Amendment, for example, imposes limitations upon governmental abridgment of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."NAACP v. Alabama,357 U. S. 449,357 U. S. 462. The Third Amendment's prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion. To some extent, the Fifth Amendment too "reflects the Constitution's concern for . . .. . . the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."'"Tehan v. Shott,382 U. S. 406,382 U. S. 416. Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution.[Footnote 6]SeeWarren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev.193 (1890).[Footnote 7]See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill,385 U. S. 374.Cf. Breard v. Alexandria,341 U. S. 622;Kovacs v. Cooper,336 U. S. 77.[Footnote 8]In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled competing lists of "protected areas" for our consideration. It appears to be common ground that a private home is such an area,Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, but that an open field is not.Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57. Defending the inclusion of a telephone booth in his list the petitioner citesUnited States v. Stone,232 F.Supp. 396, andUnited States v. Madison,32 L.W. 2243 (D.C. Ct.Gen.Sess.). Urging that the telephone booth should be excluded, the Government finds support inUnited States v. Borgese,235 F.Supp. 286.[Footnote 9]It is true that this Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of "constitutionally protected areas,"see, e.g., Silverman v. United States,365 U. S. 505,365 U. S. 510,365 U. S. 512;Lopez v. United States,373 U. S. 427,373 U. S. 438-439;Berger v. New York,388 U. S. 41,388 U. S. 57,388 U. S. 59, but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.[Footnote 10]Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,251 U. S. 385.[Footnote 11]Jones v. United States,362 U. S. 257.[Footnote 12]Rios v United States,364 U. S. 253.[Footnote 13]See Olmstead v. United States,277 U. S. 438,277 U. S. 464-466. We do not deal in this case with the law of detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment.[Footnote 14]Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence. They preserved the petitioners end of conversations concerning the placing of bets and the receipt of wagering information.[Footnote 15]On the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them.[Footnote 16]Although the protections afforded the petitioner inOsbornwere "similar. . . to those . . . of conventional warrants," they were not identical. A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized electronic surveillance inOsbornsimply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence.See Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23,374 U. S. 37-41.Although some have thought that this "exception to the notice requirement where exigent circumstances are present,"id.at374 U. S. 39, should be deemed inapplicable where police enter a home before its occupants are aware that officers are present,id.at374 U. S. 55-58 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN), the reasons for such a limitation have no bearing here. However true it may be that "[i]nnocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion,"id.at374 U. S. 57, and that "the requirement of awareness . . . serves to minimize the hazards of the officers' dangerous calling,"id.at374 U. S. 57-58, these considerations are not relevant to the problems presented by judicially authorized electronic surveillance.Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice.Rule 41(d) does require federal officers to serve upon the person searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt describing the material obtained, but it does not invariably require that this be done before the search takes place.Nordelli v. United States,24 F.2d 665, 666-667.Thus, the fact that the petitioner inOsbornwas unaware that his words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this Court from sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court inBergerfrom reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording device sanctioned inOsbornwas entirely lawful.388 U. S. 41,388 U. S. 57.[Footnote 17]Lopez v. United States,373 U. S. 427,373 U. S. 464(dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).[Footnote 18]See, e.g., Jones v. United States,357 U. S. 493,357 U. S. 497-499;Rios v. United States,364 U. S. 253,364 U. S. 261;Chapman v. United States,365 U. S. 610,365 U. S. 613-615;Stoner v. California,376 U. S. 483,376 U. S. 486-487.[Footnote 19]See, e.g., Carroll v. United States,267 U. S. 132,267 U. S. 153, 156;McDonald v. United States,335 U. S. 451,335 U. S. 454-456;Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160,338 U. S. 174-177;Cooper v. California,386 U. S. 58;Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294,387 U. S. 298-300.[Footnote 20]InAgnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20,269 U. S. 30, the Court stated:"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted."Whatever one's view of "the longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest,"United States v. Rabinowitz,339 U. S. 56,339 U. S. 61;cf. id.at339 U. S. 71-79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), the concept of an "incidental" search cannot readily be extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.[Footnote 21]Although"[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others,"Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294,387 U. S. 298-299, there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.[Footnote 22]A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements,Zap v. United States,328 U. S. 624, but, of course, "the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect."Lopez v. United States,373 U. S. 427,373 U. S. 463(dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).[Footnote 23]Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.[Footnote 24]See Osborn v. United States,385 U. S. 323,385 U. S. 330.MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.While I join the opinion of the Court, I feel compelled to reply to the separate concurring opinion of my Brother WHITE, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels "national security" matters.Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved, they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously investigatePage 389 U. S. 360and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that, where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of "adversary and prosecutor" and disinterested, neutral magistrate.There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes. Article III, 3, gives "treason" a very narrow definition, and puts restrictions on its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive offenses. The arrests in cases of "hot pursuit" and the arrests on visible or other evidence of probable cause cut across the board, and are not peculiar to any kind of crime.I would respect the present lines of distinction, and not improvise because a particular crime seems particularly heinous. When the Framers took that step, as they did with treason, the worst crime of all, they made their purpose manifest.MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home,Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, and unlike a field,Hester v. United States,265 U. S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic, as well as physical, intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment,Page 389 U. S. 361and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected," because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.Cf. Hester v. United States, supra.The critical fact in this case is that "[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume" that his conversation is not being intercepted.Anteat389 U. S. 352. The point is not that the booth is "accessible to the public" at other times,anteat389 U. S. 351, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.Cf. Rios v. United States,364 U. S. 253.InSilverman v. United States,365 U. S. 505, we held that eavesdropping accomplished by means of an electronic device that penetrated the premises occupied by petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.Page 389 U. S. 362That case established that interception of conversations reasonably intended to be private could constitute a "search and seizure." and that the examination or taking of physical property was not required. This view of the Fourth Amendment was followed inWong Sun v. United States,371 U. S. 471, at371 U. S. 485, andBerger v. New York,388 U. S. 41, at 51.Also compare Osborn v. United States,385 U. S. 323, at385 U. S. 327. InSilverman,we found it unnecessary to reexamineGoldman v. United States,316 U. S. 129, which had held that electronic surveillance accomplished without the physical penetration of petitioner's premises by a tangible object did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This case requires us to reconsiderGoldman,and I agree that it should now be overruled.*Its limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.Finally, I do not read the Court's opinion to declare that no interception of a conversation one-half of which occurs in a public telephone booth can be reasonable in the absence of a warrant. As elsewhere under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimat