science education volume 66 issue 1 1982 [doi 10.1002%2fsce.3730660113] colin gauld -- the...

8/18/2019 Science Education Volume 66 Issue 1 1982 [Doi 10.1002%2Fsce.3730660113] Colin Gauld -- The Scientific Attitude…

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ISSUES

TRENDS

~~ ~~

J a m e s

R .

Okey , Sec t ion Ed i to r

The Scientific Attitude and Science

Education:

A

Crit ical Reappraisal

COLIN GAULD

School

of

Education University

of

New South Wales Sydney Austral ia

The Natu re of th e Scientif ic Att i tud e in Scienc e Education

For m ore tha n 60 years science educ ators have included the development of the sci-

entific attitude among the general aims of science education. Some writers label this

att itu de as “scientific-mindedness” Bur nett, 1 944), “th e habit of scientific thinking”

No ll, 1 933a ) or “the spirit of science” Educational Policies Comm ission, 1966) and

it is most often characterize d by a list of component attitud es “scientific attitudes”)

such as objectivity, open-mindedness, scepticism, and a willingness to suspend judgmen t

if

there is insufficient evidence.

M an y writers have pointed out th at knowledge abou t scientific facts a nd skill in the

use of scientific methods are of little value

if

there is no inclination to use them. The

scientific attitude represents the motivation which converts this knowledge and skill into

action and refers to a willingness to use scientific procedures and m ethods. I t may best

be described as “an a ttitu de to ideas and information and to particular ways of evaluating

them”, a formulation which distinguishes it from “an att itu de to science or scientists”

on the one hand and from “an ability

to

carry ou t scientific procedures” on the other

Ga uld Hukins, 1980).

Major statements

of

the goals of science education in the

US A

have consistently

stressed th e importance of developing scientific attitude s

in

studen ts see, for example,

Whipp le, 1932; Hen ry, 1947; Henry, 1960; Educational Policies Comm ission, 1966;

N.S.T.A. ,1971) and curriculum projects around the world include this among their aims

Gauld Hukins, 1980).

In

an analysis of 1,547 aims culled from the science education

literature Frase r 1977) found that almost half of these could be categorized as aims

related to the development of the scientific attitude. However, there is a grea t deal of

evidence that little emphasis is placed on this aim in the classroom, a ppare ntly because

Scie nce Education 66 1): 109-121 1982)

982 John Wiley

Sons,

lnc.

CCC 0036-8326/82/010l09-13 01.30


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GAULD

methods for teaching and testing a ttitudes m ay not be widely available rather than be-

cau se of a general dissatisfaction with the aim itself.

Th e scientific attitu de as it appears

in

the science education literature embodies the

adoption of a particular approach to solving problems, to assessing ideas and information

or to m aking decisions. Using this approach evidence is collected and evalua ted objectively

so tha t the idiosyncratic prejudices of the one making th e judgment do not intrude. N o

source of relevant information is rejected before it is fully evaluated and all available

evidence is carefully weighed before th e decision is made . If the evidence is considered

to be insufficient then judgm ent is suspended until there is enough information to enable

a decision to be made. N o idea, conclusion, decision or solution is accepted just because

a particular person makes a claim but it is treated sceptically and critically until its

soundness can be judged acco rding to the weight of evidence which is relevant to it.

A

person who is willing to follow such a procedure and who regu larly does so) it said by

science educators to be motivated by the scientific attitude.

It is clear tha t, in the minds of m any writers, “evidence” means “empirical evidence”

Downing, 1928;

Noll,

1933a; W ard, 1933; Henry, 1947, pp. 168- 17

1;

Lampkin, 1951 ;

Educational Policies Commission, 1966, p. 19; Diederich, 1967; Collette, 1973, pp. 14-1 5,

20; Sund and Trowbridge, 1973, pp. 5-7) and the discussion usually implies that empirical

evidence is the only type of evidence which needs to be considered in making scientific

decisions. Th e ultima te test in science is how th e conclusion fits with th e facts. Thus a

person who is motivated by t he scientific a tti tu de as it is generally conceived by science

edu cato rs is someone who makes decisions solely on th e basis of the weight of empirical

evidence and this view of the scientific attitude will be labelled here as “empiricist”.

Lampkin 195 l), Feigl 1955) and Kurtz 1976) have clearly shown how such a con-

ception is closely related to a particular view of knowledge in gene ral and of science

in

particular-a philosophical perspective which has also been labelled “em piricist”.

Th e empiricist a ttitu de in science education takes one of two forms depending on th e

type of decision which is presumed to follow from a consideration of the empirical evidence

relevant to a theory. In the “verificationist” version, empirical evidence is used to uerifv

or prove the truth of a proposition or hypothesis Dow ning, 1928; W ard, 1933; Lampkin,

195

1

Van Deventer, 1960, p 104;Diederich, 1967). Diederich 1 967) includes “a desire

for experimental verification” as a com ponent of the scientific attitude, while Lampkin

1 95 1) defines the component labelled “scepticism” as “an unwillingness to accept

statem ents w hich ar e not suppo rted by evidence defined as verification of predictions”.

W ard 1933 ) sees science as “th e body of experience and theory th at can be verified by

all observers alike” an d, for Kurz

1

976) “ a belief is tru e if, and only if, it has been con-

firmed, directly or indirectly, by reference

to

observable evidence”.

How ever, the realization t ha t logically the truth of a universal proposition canno t be

finally proven by appealing t o a finite number of items of confirming d at a has led some

writers to adopt a “falsificationist” version of the empiricist attitude. Empirical evidence

allows one to sta te unambiguously, not when a theory is true, but when it is false.

A

single new scientific fact disagreeing with the theory com pletely invalidates the theo ry.

T he w illingness to give up an old established theory as

soon

as it is proved to be definitely

inconsisten t with a single fact is the attitu de of Science; no branch of knowledge without

this attitud e can be called a science Podolsky, 19 65).


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SCIENTIFIC

ATTITUDE 1 1 1

Reasons for the Development of the Scienti fic Atti tude in Students

For m any science educa tors the importance of the scientific attitud e is

so

obvious that

no arg um ent is required to support its inclusion among those things which a school science

course shou ld aim to develop in students. This idea is also reinforced by the fact th at there

has been little, if any, argument

against

its inclusion among the aims of science education.

However, w hile it may be obvious that the scientific attit ud e is importan t in the profes-

sional lives of scientists and tha t students learning ab out science should also become aware

of the motive power w hich impels scientists in their work, it is not a simple matte r to move

on to the conclusion th at school students, many of whom do not intend t o become scien-

tists, should actu ally be encouraged to ado pt this atti tud e for themselves.

Two types of argum ent are offered by those who do provide reasons for taking this final

step . In the first, it is argued that an effective way of learning abou t the natu re of scientific

activity is for the student to act out th e role of a scientist in the classroom.

Every child-not just those who manifest interest

or

high motivation-must be viewed as a young

scientist by the teacher of science

. . .

he

or

she) must experience the mode and the excitement

an d the frustration of th e scientist. Link, 1967 ).

T h e student who enters this role most fully will be the one who ado pts for himself the

atti tud e which also motivates the scientist N ay and Crocker, 1970 ).

In th e second type of justification it is argu ed th at not only does the adoption of the

scientific attit ud e for themselves help studen ts to understand the n atu re of science and

th e activities of scientists better b ut scientific attitud es represen t desirable personal at-

tributes for all people. Th e tendency to be accu rate, intellectually honest, open-minded,

objective, and to demand reliable empirical evidence before making decisions may be

most clearly seen in the problem solving activity of scientists so this argument goes) but

they also represent predispositions appro pria te for solving problems

in

everyday life as

well. Under t he influence of such attitudes as these, it is claimed th at problems will be

approached in a m anner which is more likely to lead to successful solutions see, for ex-

am ple, No11 1933b). For the Educationa l Policies Com mission 1966 ) possession of the

scientific attitude is not only the mark of a scientifically-minded person , but also the sign

of a rational one. These benefits of a scientific education are primarily for the individual

but a number of writers have claimed additional benefits for the society.

As we consider the future responsibilities of citizens, we

will

probably ag ree tha t helping children

to become more co-operative, m ore responsible, more ‘open-minded’, an d, a t the s am e time, more

‘critical-minded’ is certainly worth the effort. He nry, 1947, p. 87).

By adopting scientific attitudes and transferring these to situations in everyday life,

students can be expected to be more tolerant of othe r points of view and to be more suc-

cessful in living and w orking alongside other people. According to the Educational Policies

Commission science can provide “power, prestige, standard of living, education, and

hea lth” but the spirit of science” promises two less tangible but equally profound benefits:

increased individuality and increased brotherhood of men” 1 966, p. 1 1).

Behind both these arguments is the assumption that scientists really are motivated

by the scientific attitu de as it is presented by science educators Offne r, 1937, Han ey,

1964; Diederich, 1967). In o ther words, in solving scientific problems, scientists adopt


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112

GAULD

an empiricist a ttitude in which emp irical dat a, gathered objectively is the final judge of

truth,

if

not

in

accepting as tru e those hypotheses which a re supported by the evidence,

then certainly

in

rejecting as false those which conflict with i t ; an att i tude in which the

ideas of other scien tists are received

in

an open-minded manner and given full, impartial

but c ritical consideration.

Scient ists and the Scient i f ic Att i tude: Research Evidence

I n science education over the past sixty years a great deal of effort ha s been devoted

to identifying the na tu re of th e scientific at titu de and m ost of this work has been based

on detailed analyses of the w ritings of scientists, philosophers of science, and science

educators Curtis, 1926; Noll, 1933a; Davis, 1935; Crowell, 1937; Ebel, 1938; Lampkin,

1938; Vitrogan, 1967, 1969; N ay and Crocker, 1970; Cohen, 1971). In a num ber of cases,

the results of these analyses were submitted to panels of scientists or science teachers

to obtain e stimates of the relative value of each component of the scientific attitud e arising

from the analyses. T he primary source material for these investigations was the w ritings

o f philosophers of science who looked at science from an empiricist perspective and it

is easy to understand why the conception of the scientific attitude which emerged also

possessed an empiricist emphasis.

I t

is interesting to observe tha t,

in

spite of the obvious

value placed

on

empirical evidence by science educators who write abou t the scientific

attitude, almost no interest has been shown

in

whether scientists do, in fact, possess the

affective characteristics attributed to them on the basis of such analyses of the literature.

I t is difficult

to

find any reference in science education lite ratu re to studies of the psy-

chology of scientists, of sociological research into th e nat ur e of th e ethos of science, of

recent historical case studies of the activities of scientists,

or

of alternatives to the em-

piricist model of science which seem s to lie behind the science edu cator’s conception of

the scientific attitu de . For the past thirty years, relevant information from these areas

has been accumulating and

will

be reviewed

in

the following sections.

Th e Psychology

of

the Scientist

In

the early 195O’s, Roe carried out extensive psychological studies of em inent physical

and biological scientists, anthropologists and psychologists. She repo rted som e of her

conclusions from these investigations

in

the following way:

Ch arac teriza tion s of scientists almost always em phasize the objectivity of their work

and

describe

their cold, detached, impassive, unconcerned observation of phenomena which have no emotional

meaning for them. This could hardly be further from the tru th . .

The

creative scientist whatever

his field, is very deeply involved emotionally and personally in his wo rk . I think many scientists

are genuinely unaware of the extent,

or

even of th e fact,

of

this

personal

involvement,

and

themselves

accept the myth

of

impersonal objectivity Ro e,

1961).

Eiduson’s study of the psychological world of the scientist also led her to conclude that

scientists themselves misrepresent the diversity of personal cha racte ristics which exist

within

their occuptional group and

so

“perpe tuate some of the fixed and stereotyped-

notions that ex ist abo ut a scientist” 1962 , p.

250;

see also pp. 124, 153, 154, 255).

T he more recent work of Maho ney 1976, 1979)

in

this area was directed towards

exam ining the extent to which scientists possess the characteristics-objectivity, ra-


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SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE

113

t i ona li t y , open-mindedness , supe r io r i n t e ll i gence, i n t eg ri t y , an d communa l i ty - tha t t h e

wr i t i ngs of sc i en t i s t s and sc i e n ce e d u c a t o r s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e m . H i s d e sc r ip t i o n of t h e

“rea l”

scientist

depa r t s cons ide rab ly from t he p i c tu re p re sen ted in t he sc i ence educa t ion

l i t e ra tu re . He a r r ived a t the fol lowing conclusions:

I .

Supe rior intelligence is neither a p rerequisite

nor

a correlate of scientific contribution ;

2. T he scientist is often saliently illogical in his work, particula rly when he is defending a pre-

ferred view or attack ing a rival one;

3. In

his experimen tal research, he is often selective, expedient, and not im mun e to distorting

the data;

4. Th e scientist

is

probably the most passionate of professionals; his theoretical and personal

biases often color his alleged “openness” to the data;

5.

H e

is

often dogm atically tenacious in his opinions, even when t he co ntrar y evidence is over-

whelming;

6.

H e is not the parago n of humility

or

disinterest but is, instead, often a selfish, ambitious a nd

petulant defend er of personal recognition and territoriality;

7. T he scientist often behaves in ways which a re diametrically opposite to commu nal sharin g

of knowledge-he is frequently secretive and occasionally suppresses da ta for personal reasons;

and

8. Far fro m being a “suspender of judgm ent” th e scientist is often an impetuous tr ut h spinner

who rushes to hypotheses and theories long before the data would warran t Ma honey , 1976,

Mahoney’s por t ra i t of th e “ real” sc ient i s t

is

of som eone wh o displays both object ivi ty

and emotionali ty, open-mindedness and tenac i ty , depending on t he con tex t . He speculates

a n d t h e t r u th of his specu la t ion i s borne o u t b y t h e w o r k of o t h e r s ) t h a t i t i s t h e le ss

eminent sc i en t i s t who

comes

c losest to possess ing th e qua l i t i e s

of the

empi r i c i s t ideal

1

979).

Among a s a m p l e of fo r ty - two sc i en ti s t s who wer e ac t ive ly invo lved in r e sea rch

r e l a t e d to data o b t a in e d t h r o u g h

the

A p o l l o m o o n missions, M i t r o f f

and

M a s o n 1974)

found a similar r a n g e of pe rsona l i t y t r a i t s as t h a t r e fe r re d t o by other invest iga tors .

Th e single dimension which most served to differentiate between t he scientists was th at of “spe-

culativeness” or “willingness to ex trapolate beyond the available data” . A t one end of the spectrum

whe re th e extrem e speculative scientists who in the words of the respondents “wouldn’t h esitate

to build a whole theory of th e solar system based

on no

data at all”; on the other extreme were the

data-bound scientists who “wouldn’t be able to save their own hide if a fire was burning next to

them because they’d never have enough data to prove the fire was really there”. On every subsequent

dimension on which these two types of scientists were compared they stood

in

extreme contrast

to one ano ther. O ne of the most significant things ab out these differences is tha t th e more out-

standing a scientist was, as judged by his peers, the more he lay near th e speculative end of the scale.

Conversely, the more “mundane”, “typical”, or “run-of-the-mill” scientists fell tow ard the

“data-bo und’’ end of the scale

A t th e sam e time the m ore speculative scientists ar e also the kinds of scientists who ar e more likely

to become rigidly com mitted to their ideas once they have produced them . Con trary to popular

misconception, it is the ‘‘lesser’’ not th e “gre ater” scie ntist , who is more likely to have a n “open

mind”. T he greater th e scientist the m ore likely he is to develop a line and to push it for all it is worth

. . In a word, the gre ater th e scientist, th e more likely he is to belie the my th of the disinterested,

uncom mitted scientist. 1974; see also Hill, 1 974).

T h e r e i s one no tab le d i sc repancy be tween t he obse rva t ions o f Roe a n d E i d u so n

on

t h e

o n e h a n d a n d M i t ro f f on the other . W hi le th e form er invest iga tors found th a t t he sc ienti s ts

P. 6).


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114 GAULD

they interviewed accepted t he emp iricist stereotype, “every one of the scientists inter-

viewed on [Mitroffs] first round of interviews indicated that they thought the notion

of the objective, emotionally disintere sted scientist naive” M itroff, I974 b). It may be

tha t, when discussing th e work they ac tually do, scientists ar e more aw are of the inap-

propriateness of the empiricist stereotype than when they ar e talking abou t science

in

gene ral see Mitroff, 1 974a, pp. 107-13 1).

The Ethos

of

Science

I n a n ar ticl e on th e ethos of science, originally published

in

1942, Merton described

the ethos

of

science as “th at emotiona lly toned complex of values an d norm s which is

held to be binding on the m an of science.” Control over th e scientist’s behavior is imposed

through these norms by sanctions and rewards and “are in varying d egrees internalized

by the scientist” M erton , 1968, p. 605).

Merton identified “universalism”, “organized scepticism”, “communism”, and

“disinterestedne ss” as four norms th roug h which h e claimed institutional control was

exerted over the behavior of scientists.

To

these Barber 1952, pp. 84-94) added “ra-

tionality” an d “emotional neutrality” an d Store r described the six norms as follows:

Unioersalism:

This norm

. .

refers both to the assumption that physical laws are everywhere

th e sam e and to the principle tha t the tr ut h and value of a scientific statement is independent of

the characteristics of its autho r . .

Organized Scepticism:

This norm embodies) the principle th at each scientist should be held in-

dividually responsible for mak ing su re that previous research by o thers

on

which he bases his work

is valid

. .

Communism or Communality:

This norm directs the scientist to sh are his findings with other

scientists freely and without favor.

. . .

Disinterestedness:

This

norm.

.

.

makes it illicit for the scientist to profit personally

i n

any way

from his research

.

.

Rationality:

This is) a faith in the moral virtue of reason

. . .

It may be interpre ted also as the

assumption t ha t necessary

to

the achievement

of

the goals of science are

1 )

empirical test rather

than tradition and

2 )

a critical approa ch to all empirical phenomena ra ther than a cceptance of

certain phenomena as exempt from scru tiny .

.

Emotional N eutrality:

This norm ) enjoins the scientist to avoid so much emotional involvement

in his work that he cannot adopt a new appro ach

or

reject

an old

answer when his findings suggest

th at this is necessary,

or

th at he intentionally distorts his findings in ord er to suppo rt a particular

hypothesis

1966,

pp.

78-80).

Storer adds that “i t

is

relatively easy to show that this com bination of n orms is admi-

rably suited to e nsure th e optimal progress

of

science; ideally, only when scientists’ be-

havior is guided by these no rms is it possible to keep scientists in touch w ith the frontiers

of knowledge” 196 6, pp. 82, 83). An exam ination of Storer’s description of t he norms

of science show th at it is an expression in sociological te rm s of the empiricist conception

of t he s cientific attit ud e foun d in science education.

Late r research by M erton 1 963, 196 9) suggested th at in addition to working und er

the control

of

norm s such a s those above, the scientist seemed als o to be influenced by

a set of what have been called “counter -norms ”. T hese represen t pressure from the sci-

entific institution to act legitimately that

is,

in th e interests of scie nce) in the

opposite

direction to that specified by the original norm s see also Rothm an, 197 2).


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SCIENTIFIC

ATTITUDE

115

On e purpose of M itro ffs study of moon scientists was to investiga te the extent to which

norm s and their counter-norms exercised control over scientists in their professional work.

Ab out forty eminent scientists who were directly interested in moon rock sam ples collected

on the Apollo missions were interviewed four times over a span of 3’/2 years between

Apollo 1 1 and Apollo 16. In addition, they w ere asked to respond to a nu mber of tests

and questionnaires. Extensive data were gathered which demonstrated the operation

of both conventional norm s and counter-norms within this group of scientists and Mitroff

produced an expanded list as

a

basis

for

further study 1974a, p. 79; 1974b).

This lack of acceptance of th e simple empiricist stereotype was found in an earlier study

in which W est 1960) ca rried out a survey of the scientific values of fifty-seven academic

scientists at a midwestern university. H e found th at there was a w ide variation in the

strength of adherence t o “th e classical ideology of science” and th at ther e was little re-

lationship between this and the extent of productive research.

Mulkay 1976 ,1979) has argued that neither the norms nor the counter-norms referred

to above ar e the strong determiners of behavior tha t M erton and Mitroff consider them

to be, since it is not the private behavior b ut th e public presentation of results which de-

termines the allocation of rewards

in

science. For him the so-called norms and c ounter-

norms constitute an informal, moral vocabulary “w hich scientists can use flexibly to

categorize professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably,

in

accord ance with varying social interests”

1

976; see also Barnes and Dolby, 1970).

Th is vocabulary points specifically to problem areas in scientific practice including those

related to objectivity-subjectivity, rationality-irrationality, and impartiality-commitment,

bu t it contains no solutions to these problems. F or example, a focus on the need for ob-

jectivity may be used to counteract an opponent who is judged to have been unduly

subjective, while an appeal to th e subjective aspects of science may be used w here claims

for objectivity appe ar to be excessive.

Historical Case Studies

Information abou t th e scientific a ttitu de is often conveyed and reinforced

in

an edu-

catio nal se tting by appealing to the work of scientists in the past. In particular, suppo rt

for the empiricist conception of this attitude is derived from the way scientists

in

the past

apparen tly constructed theories and made dec isions about their validity solely on the basis

of experiments. It is claimed, for example, that the Michelson-Morley experiment si-

multaneously d ealt the death blow to the L orentz electron theory and led to the birth

of Einstein’s special theory of relativity; or that Millikan’s oil-drop experiment once and

for all settled dispu te about th e indivisibility of the electron cha rge.

In his history of the Michelson-Morley-Miller experiments before and after 1905,

Swenson 1970 ) has shown that , following the 1887 version of the experiment, a num ber

of explanations for the null result were still available which did not require the rejection

of the concept of the aether. Because of this fact, modifications of the o riginal experiment

were carried out over the next forty-five or fifty years to attemp t to dem onstrate con-

clusively the presence or absence

of

an aethe r drift. In 1925, Miller announced th at he

had obtained an aether drift velocity of about 200 meters per second but, instead of

causing Einstein’s theory to be rejected, this result was effectively ignored for the next

thirty yea rs, in spite of M iller’s acknowledged competence. In 1954, Shankland suggested

th at the result may have been due to lack of ade quate tem perature control.


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116

GAULD

Holton’s research 1969), and th e work of others, has also shown th at the Michel-

son-Morley experiment had little

or

no effect on the origin of the theory of relativity in

Einstein’s m ind. Einstein

was

apparently prompted more by “t he essential requirement

of finding sym metry an d universality in the op erations

of

nature” Holton, 1969) than

by substanially emp irical considerations. T h e myth which describes a direct link between

th e 1887 version of the Michelson-M orley expe rimen t and Einstein’s conception of the

theor y of relativity is, for H olton , an ex amp le of th e effect of experimenticism which

“is best recognized by the unquestioned priority assigned to experiments and experimental

data in the analysis of how scien tists do their own work an d how the ir work is incorporated

into the public e nterp rise of science.” 1 969).

T h e later study by H olton of Millikan’s labora tory notebooks for the years 191 1 and

19

12,

illuminates ano the r aspect of the “experimen ticist” notion of science. T h e results

published in Millikan’s 1913 paper so clea rly support M illikan’s view of th e indivisibility

of the electron ch arg e that , a t least in this case, it seems obvious that the oil-drop ex-

periment conclusively decided the point at issue between M illikan and E hre nha ft.

Mil-

likan annou nced there tha t “th e largest depa rture from th e mean value found anywhere

i n th e table [of values of

e,

determined

for

fifty-eight droplets] amounts to 0.5 percent”

quoted in Ho lton, 1978, p. 61). Howev er, Millikan’s notebooks show tha t results for

many more droplets were eliminated even a s they were being obtained. Millikan “eval-

uated his da ta a nd assigned qua litative indications on their prospective use, guided by

both a theory ab out th e natu re of the electric charg e and a sense of the quality or weight

of

the particular run” p.

70).

In ord er to account for Millikan’s behavior in the laboratory,

Holton introduces the notion of suspension o disbelief to describe the procedure of

holding in abeyance “final judgmen ts concerning the validity of app arent falsifications

of a promising hypothesis” p. 71) especially during th e early stages of theory construction

or

testing . It may also be possible to expla in inconsistencies in Mendel’s pub lished work

in a similar way Fishe r, 193 6).

Millikan’s exam ple demo nstrates one possible respon se to data which conflict w ith

expectations a t the sta ge of scientific work prior to publication. However, even after results

ar e published, a scientist whose theory is appar ently falsified by the evidence can h andle

the situation in a num ber of different ways in order to retain his theory. H e can deny the

validity of the da ta a nd suggest possible reasons why it should be ignored; he

can

accept

th e dat a but give reasons why it has no serious implications for the theory; or he can accept

both th e data an d the implications for the theory but a rgu e that when all the problems

have eventually been cleared up the theory will be vindicated Ma ho ney , 1976, 1979;

Popper, 1968, p.

50,

Kuhn , 1970). T he treatm ent of Miller’s 1925 results for the aether

dr ift velocity is one example of the third approach to da ta which apparently falsifies a

theory. In anoth er example, clear deviations in the orbit of the planet Uran us from that

expected on the basis of Newton’s t heory of grav itation did n ot lead to th e rejection of

the th eory . Instead they w ere eventually found t o be caused by an originally unexpected

factor-the existence of the planet Neptune-w hich had no part t o play in the theory

itself. For many years, similar deviations in the orbit of Mercury were not counted against

the th eory because it was felt th at th ey would eventually be explained when a furt her ,

as yet unobserved planet was fou nd. Barber’s survey 196 1) of the extent to which sci-

entists resist the in troduction of new ideas also dem onstra tes th e strength of opposition

to falsifying evidence.


9/13

SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE 117

If, as the above and m any other) examples demonstrate, experimental evidence does

not conclusively speak for or against a particular theory one is led to adopt a non-empiricist

position similar to that of Einstein who, “though unwilling to accep t the possibility of

con firmation of a theo ry by ‘verification’ of its prediction , n prac tice also held to

th e falsification principle only sceptically weakly) when the theory pu rportedly falsified

by experimental test had

in

his views certain other merits compared with its rivals”

Holton, 1978, p, 98).

Alternative Models

o

Science

T he above evidence concerning th e behavior of scientists and , in particular, their use

of experimental data in coming to conclusions about theories is at odds both with the

conception of th e scientific attitud e possessed by science educators and with an empiricist

philosophy of science to which this attitude

seems

to be related Feigl, 1955; Kurtz, 1976).

If

the “orthodox” view of the scientific attitude is to be modified in a way which

will

accom modate the evidence presented above, it will also be necessary to chang e the m odel

of science apparently adopted by science educators working in this area . Since about 1960,

an increasing range of nonem piricist philosophies of science has becom e available from

Kuhn’s model of paradigm conflict

1

962) to the anarchistic view of Feyerabend

1

970).

Th ere is also evidence that strictly empiricist philosophies have been modified in the light

of the mou nting evidence against them (see, for example, Scheffler, 1967).

These developments

in

the philosophy of science are well known and will not be further

discussed here. However, both Holton and Mitroff, whose research has been presented

above, have offered f urthe r suggestions abou t views of science which they consider to

be consistent w ith the results of their w ork.

In

1952, Holton introduced the distinction between “public” and “private” science

1952 , pp. 234-256). T he way in which argu me nts and evidence are publicly presented

“public” science) and not the way in which they were originally conceived, clarified,

an d tested “private” science) is used by others to judg e the scientific value of the work

of a scientist. Th e technical format of a scientific paper is such that references to personal

characteristics

of

the au thor are rigorously excluded. Holton suggested tha t the empiricist

stereotype of the scientist as detached and impartial is one which arises from this edited,

public image and not from a study

of

scientists themselves as they engage

in

“private”

science. His own work in the history of science has provided considerab le evidence tha t,

in the private work of a sc ientist, the range of appropriate personal characteristics is almost

unlimited. It certainly includes those which have been incorpo rated into the empiricist

scientific atti tu de together with their opposites as outlined by Mitroff 1 974a , p. 79;

1974 b). If the distinction between “public” an d “private” science is a valid one, it means

th at the a ttitudes toward scientists held by science educators and science studen ts can

be expected to have little, if any, necessary connection with the personal cha racte ristics

of scientists.

M itro ffs research raised for him th e problem that

if,

as seems to be t he case, the best

scientists are those who tenaciously hold on to their theories almost

in

spite of th e evidence

aga inst th em , how can science be considered to be objective even

in

the public domain?

In

order to solve this problem, he appealed to a dialectical

or

adversary

notion

of science

1 972; 1974 a, pp. 21 9-250 ). I n his view, a theo ry is most likely to get a fair h earing

i f

there are individuals passionately committed to its validity and who do all they can to


10/13

118 GAULD

produce evidence and a rgum ents in its favor. Those most likely to come up with evidence

and a rgum ents against the theory a re those who disagree with it

or

who ar e committed

to an alternative view. The interaction between these two groups of passionately com-

mitted individuals helps to bring t o light as much relevant evidence as possible for as-

sessment by the relevant community of scientists without it being necessary for either

group to show complete objectivity, open-mindedness, impartiality, or emotional neu-

trality. The similarity between this way of

\

iewing science and the way tru th is sought

in

a courtroom is obvious as a re the parallels w ith Kuhn’s notion of parad igm conflict

1

962 ). Of course the degree of commitment which scientists adop t towards a particular

theory varies from individual to individual and th e situation is not so clearly defined as

may be suggested by th e above discussion. But, while th e empiricist stereotyp e allows

for little variation among the personal attrib utes of scientists, the views of H olton and

Mitroff appear to make more sense of their actual behavior.

Conclusions

Arguments for including the development of the scientific attitud e i n students among

the main goals of science education rest firmly on the assumption that this attitude is

dem ons trated in the professional behavior of successful scientists. Th e conception of the

scientific attitud e which appea rs in the science educa tion lite ratur e sees the scientist as

some one who m akes decisions solely on the basis of em pirical evidence and who at all

times prevents his personal in terests from in truding into these decisions. Th e evidence

presented dem onstrates clearly tha t this view, which seems to have been derived primarily

from the writings of scientists and philosophers of science before about 1960, is completely

untenable and may, a t best, be associated with th e less successful scientist.

The lack of attention which has been given by the science educators who carry out

research into the scientific att itu de to the evidence presented here from th e psychology,

sociology, history and philosophy of science, may be just ano ther exam ple of how com-

mitme nt to one view in this case , an empiricist view of science) can lead one to ignore

contrary evidence. The proliferation, since 1960, of nonempiricist philosophies of science,

has had little obvious influence on how the scientific at titu de is conceived by science

educators. Even Klopfer’s recent extensive and detailed outline of the structure of the

affective domain

in

relation to science education

1

976) retains many features of the

empiricist stereotype with little acknowledgemen t that contrary evidence has been taken

into account. One purpose of this paper has been to present the evidence against the

empiricist conception of the scientific attitud e.

A

conclusion tha t could be drawn from the material and argu men ts presented here

is tha t development of the scientific atti tud e in students should be elim inated a s one of

the ma jor goals of science education, an d this certainly follows for the at tit ud e as it has

been formulated by science educators for the past 60 years. Teaching that scientists

possess these characteristics is bad enough but it is abhorren t tha t science educators should

actually attem pt to mold children in the sam e false image. On the other hand, very few

writers explain what they m ean by open -mindedness, objectivity, or scepticism, and little

indication is given of how ev idence is weighed or of how o ne decides when the re is suffi-

cient evidence to m ake a decision. It is possible that, if such terms were clarified and the

way in which they r elate to scientific p ractice were more carefully discussed

in

the light


11/13


of the material presented here, one could retain a reformulated and more acceptable

version of the scientific attitud e.

This second alternative requires considerably more discussion than has taken place

up to th e present. I f any concep tion of the scientific attitude is to be retained

in

science

education it is no longer sufficient to build unquestioningly on th e consensus of science

educators.

Too

much relevant information has been ignored. If furth er work takes place

which clarifies, in th e light of the above evidence, the role which the developm ent of the

scientific attitude should play

in

science education then the second purpose of this paper

will

have been achieved.

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Received 9 March 1981

Accepted

20 Ju ly

1981

science education volume 66 issue 1 1982 [doi 10.1002%2fsce.3730660113] colin gauld -- the...

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