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<ul><li><p>School of Psychology, Birkbeck College </p><p>Course PSYC044U (Psychobiology II.) WEEK 11 May 3rd 2007 </p><p> COMPARATIVE COGNITION 2 SPATIAL AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE AND REASONING </p><p> Essay (no 8 on the March 15th list) </p><p>Apes cannot be taught language, but there is evidence that they have special abilities in the areas of social learning, imitation, and self-recognition. Discuss. </p><p> 1. Copies of selected Overheads are attached. 2. There are notes in the Easter Handout for Summer Term Lectures 3. Updated versions of these notes are given below. </p><p> A third hypothesis proposes that there are, in fact, neither quantitative nor qualitative differences among the intellects of non-human vertebrates. (Macphail, 1985; p.37) </p><p>Theoretical positions which assume differences in cognitive mechanisms available to different vertebrate species are summarised below. </p><p>Abstraction. Learning may be tied to specific physical stimuli to a greater or lesser extent. This is one way of characterising the position of Mackintosh (1988 and et al. 1985). Premack (1983) took the position that only primates have abstract codes and his 1986 view could be interpreted as an extension of this. Thompson and Oden (2000) and Vonk and Macdonald (2004) have re-iterated the position that abstract knowledge of relations between relations is a speciality of great apes, but Fagot et al. (2001) found a method of demonstrating abstract conceptualization in baboons, dolphins (Mercado et al, 2000) show evidence of generalising same-different relationships, and something behaviourally rather similar appears to be obtainable in honey bees (Giufra et al., 2001). However it is still often argued that primates have a greater abstract knowledge about physical objects than other mammals, and this makes sense in the context of the tool-using which takes place both in the wild and in the laboratory (Cunningham et al., 2006; Penn &amp; Povinelli, 2007; Phillips &amp; Santos, 2007; and see pp. 15 and 16). </p><p>Piagetian stages. Piagetian theories of mental development can be applied to species differences although in most cases it is development only during the human sensory-motor period which is relevant. The theoretical content (Piaget, 1971) is less important than the use of Piagetian tests of cognitive attainment, mostly connected with the attainment of different levels of object permanence. Great apes appear to be closer to human infants in the development of this than other primate or mammalian species (Redshaw, 1978, Deblois and Nowak, 1994, Wise et al., 1974; Call, 2001b; Shumaker et al., 2001; Mendes and Huber, 2004; Beran et al., 2005; Gomez, 2005; Suda and Call, 2006; Matzuzawa, 2007). </p><p>Social skills. Although there are many other highly social vertebrates primate intelligence in particular has been related to the learning of social skills and strategies (e.g. Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1992). This hypothesis is interesting but difficult to test (Kudo and Dunbar, 2001; Reader and Laland, 2002; de Waal and Davis, 2003, Deaner et al., 2005; Wich and de Vries, 2006; Pika and Mitani, 2006). Sub-categories of social skills include theory of mind, self-recognition, and imitation. </p><p> Theory of Mind hypotheses. These variants of social skills idea suppose that only some species have a functional concept of self (Gallup, 1970) or that only particular species (usually only the great apes) are able to make inferences or assumptions about the goals and intentions of conspecifics or human experimenters (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Hare et al, 2001; Tomasello, Call and Hare, 2003). This has attracted extra interest because of the hypothesis that human autism is characterised by a lack of this capacity (e.g. Leslie, 1987). The social cognitive features of shared-reference (or shared-attention) and proto-declarative communicative acts have been proposed as important pre-conditions both for the development of a theory of mind and for the development of human language (Baron-</p></li><li><p> 2 Course PSYC044U Week 11 </p><p>Cohen, 1992; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1983; see also Flombaum &amp; Santos, 2005; Keysers &amp; Perrett,2004; Tomasello et al., 2005; Moll &amp; Tomasello, 2007; Whiten, 2005) </p><p>Self-recognition, and interpretation of the behaviour of others. Naturalistic observation of groups of chimpanzees and vervet monkeys (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1992) suggests that individual animals come to possess a rich representation of their own social relationships to others in the group, and of the intentions and perspectives of other individuals. Laboratory tests indicate that chimpanzees, but no other non-human species tested until recently except orang-utans, recognise their own images in mirrors and video displays (Gallup, 1970; Menzel et al., 1985; Povinelli, 1989, Povinelli et al., 1993). It is suggested (e.g. Povinelli et al., 1990) that this ability may be related to a capacity for understanding how objects and events appear from anothers perspective, the mind-reading (Whiten and Byrne, 1988) of another animals (or a human experimenters) intentions and the ability for deception or pretence about ones own intentions (Woodruff and Premack, 1979). However, these forms of social cognition may be interpreted as special purpose, species-specific adaptations for social organization, rather than aspects of general-purpose learning. (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003). Some authors (e.g. Heyes, 1994, 1996, 1998) argue that there is no satisfactory evidence that primates have any special abilities in the area of social learning and imitation, or self-recognition, whereas primatologists typically believe the cognitive capacities of the monkeys and apes can be regarded as the precursors of human cognition (Whiten et al., 1999; Tomasello, 2000). It remains the general consensus that chimpanzees, and possible orang-utans, are more likely to show evidence of recognizing themselves in mirrors than other primates (Povinelli et al., 1993; Povinelli et al., 1997; Tomasello and Call, 1997). This is not necessarily inconsistent with evidence that other highly social and large brained animals, in particular dolphins and other toothed whales, and elephants, may have convergent cognitive abilities, including self-recognition in mirrors (Reiss and Marino, 2001, Plotnik et al., 2006). </p><p>Imitation. Especially given the argument that language-trained apes such as Washoe and Nim Chimsky imitated their trainers, there is a suprising degree of difficulty in establishing to what extent apparent imitation in primates should count as true imitation as opposed to emulation or social facilitation (see p. 17 for more detail on this). Emulation refers to behaviour that is influenced by observing goal achievement rather than the details of the actions preceding the goal. Imitation of action details is sometimes observed in chimpanzees (Whiten, 1998) and capuchins (Custance et al., 1999; see also Cunningham et al., 2006), but in general human infants are much more attentive to action details than non-human primates (Tennie et al., 2006). Observational learning of some kinds may occur in dogs (Topal et. al., 2007) and therefore this should not be regarded as a capacity that is unique to primates. </p><p> Conclusions </p><p> Even after extensive training, there appears to remain an immense gap between the linguistic abilities of trained apes and human infants. (Week 10) </p><p> However, chimpanzees, and other great apes, are more similar to humans than other species in some non-linguistic cognitive abilities, such as those involved in object properties (and other Piagetian tests), social skills, and self-recognition (Week 11 Call, 2001a, 2001b; Gomez, 2005; Povinelli et al., 1997; Whiten et al., 1999; Tomasello Call &amp; Hare, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2005; Moll &amp; Tomasello, 2007) </p></li><li><p> 3 Course PSYC044U Week 11 </p><p>Main references Walker, S.F. (1985). Animal Thought. Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul: London pp 305- 388 Walker, S.F. (1987b). Animal Learning. Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul: London. pp. 332- 357. Roberts, W.A (1998) Principles of Animal Cognition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 12.(1 SLC; 4 </p><p>loan copies) Further Reading (Alternatives) Boysen, ST and Himes, GT (1999) Current issues and emerging theories in animal cognition. Annual </p><p>Review of Psychology, Vol.50, Pp.683-705. Heyes, C.M. (1998) Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 21, 108-</p><p>148. Pearce J.M. (1997) Animal Learning and Cognition 2nd Edition. Hove: Psychology Press. Chapters </p><p>9.10 &amp; 11, pp225-287 Tomasello, M. (2000). Primate cognition: Introduction to the issue. Cognitive Science, 24(3), 351-361. More Additional References (Not normally for further reading) Amodio, D. M., &amp; Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition. Nature Review </p><p>Neuroscience, 7(4), 268-277. Anderson, U. S., Stoinski, T. S., Bloomsmith, M. A., &amp; Maple, T. L. (2007). Relative numerousness judgment and </p><p>summation in young, middle-aged, and older adult Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii and Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 121(1), 1-11. </p><p>Baron-Cohen, S (1992) How monkeys do things with words. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 15, 148-9. Behne, T., Carpenter, M., Call, J., &amp; Tomasello, M. (2005). Unwilling versus unable: Infants' understanding of intentional </p><p>action. Developmental Psychology, 41(2), 328-337. Beran, M. J. (2001). Summation and numerousness judgments of sequentially presented sets of items by chimpanzees (Pan </p><p>troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115(2), 181-191. Beran, M. J., Beran, M. M., &amp; Menzel, C. R. (2005). Spatial memory and monitoring of hidden items through spatial </p><p>displacements by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 119(1), 14-22. Boesch, C., &amp; Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee and human cultures. Current Anthropology, 39(5), 591-614. Bonnie, K. E., Horner, V., Whiten, A., &amp; de Waal, F. B. M. (2007). Spread of arbitrary conventions among chimpanzees: a </p><p>controlled experiment. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 274(1608), 367-372. Boysen, ST, Berntson, GG, Shreyer, TA. and Hannan, MB (1995) Indicating acts during counting by a chimpanzee (Pan-</p><p>troglodytes) . Journal of Comparative Psychology, Vol.109, No.1, Pp.47-51. Brannon, E.M. and Terrace, H.S. (1998) Ordering of the numerosities 1-9 by monkeys. Science, 282, 746-749. Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., Riedel, J., Call, J., &amp; Tomasello, M. (2006). Making inferences about the location of hidden food: </p><p>Social dog, causal ape. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 120(1), 38-47. Byrne, R. &amp; Whiten, A (eds) (1988) Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, </p><p>apes and humans. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Byrne, R. (1995) The Thinking Ape : the evolutionary origins of intelligence. Oxford : Oxford University Press Call, J. (2001a). Chimpanzee social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), 388-393. Call, J. (2001b). Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and children (Homo </p><p>sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115(2), 159-171. Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., &amp; Tomasello, M. (2004). 'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of human </p><p>intentional action. Developmental Science, 7(4), 488-498. Cheney, D.L. and Seyfarth, R.M. (1992) Prcis of How monkeys see the world. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 15, 135-</p><p>182. Cunningham, C. L., Anderson, J. R., &amp; Mootnick, A. R. (2006). Object manipulation to obtain a food reward in hoolock </p><p>gibbons, Bunopithecus hoolock. Animal Behaviour, 71, 621-629. Custance, D., Whiten, A., &amp; Fredman, T. (1999). Social learning of an artificial fruit task in capuchin monkeys (Cebus </p><p>apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 113(1), 13-23. Custance, DM, Whiten, A &amp; Bard, KA (1995) Can young chimpanzees (Pan-troglodytes) imitate arbitrary actions Hayes </p><p>and Hayes (1952) revisited. Behaviour, Vol.132, 837-859 de Waal, F. B. M., &amp; Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. </p><p>Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221-228. de Waal, F.B.M. and Berger, M. (2000) Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature, 404, 583. Deaner, R. O., Khera, A. V., &amp; Platt, M. L. (2005). Monkeys pay per view: Adaptive valuation of social images by rhesus </p><p>macaques. Current Biology, 15(6), 543-548. Deblois, ST. and Novak, MA (1994) Object permanence in rhesus-monkeys (Macaca-mulatta). Journal of Comparative </p><p>Psychology, Vol.108, No.4, Pp.318-327 </p></li><li><p> 4 Course PSYC044U Week 11 </p><p>Dehaene, S., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., &amp; Cohen, L. (1998). Abstract representations of numbers in the animal and human brain. Trends in Neurosciences, 21(8), 355-361. </p><p>Dore, F.Y. (1986) Object permanence in adult cats (Felix catus) Journal of Comparative Psychology, 100, 340-47. Dumas, C. (1992) Object permanence in cats (Felis catus): An ecological approach to the study of invisible displacements. </p><p>Journal of Comparative Psychology, 106, 404-10 Eddy, TJ, Gallup, GG and Povinelli, DJ (1996) Age-differences in the ability of chimpanzees to distinguish mirror- images </p><p>of self from video images of others. Journal of Comparative Psychology, Vol.110, No.1, Pp.38-44 Elston, G. N., Benavides-Piccione, R., &amp; DeFelipe, J. (2001). The pyramidal cell in cognition: A comparative study in </p><p>human and monkey. Journal of Neuroscience, 21(17), U1-U5. Epstein, R., Lanza, R.P. and Skinner, B.F. (1981) Self-awareness in the pigeon. Science, 212, 694-5. Fagot, J., Wasserman, E. A., &amp; Young, M. E. (2001). Discriminating the relation between relations: The role of entropy in </p><p>abstract conceptualization by baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens). Journal of Experimental Psychology-Animal Behavior Processes, 27(4), 316-328. </p><p>Flombaum, J. I., &amp; Santos, L. R. (2005). Rhesus monkeys attribute perceptions to others. Current Biology, 15(5), 447-452. Gallistel, C.R. (1990) The Organization of Learning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press Gallistel, C.R. and Gelman, R. (2000) Non-verbal numerical cognition: from reals to integers. Trends in Cognitive </p><p>Sciences, 4, 59-65. Gallup, G.G., Jr. (1970) Chimpanzees: self-recognition. Science, 167, 86-7. Giurfa, M., Zhang,S., Jenett,A., Menzel,R. &amp; Srinivasan, M.V. (2001) The concepts of sameness and difference in an </p><p>insect Nature 410, 930 - 933 Gomez, J. C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(3), 118-125. Hare, B., Addessi, E., Call, J., Tomasello, M., &amp; Visalberghi, E. (2003). Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what </p><p>conspecifics do and do not see? Animal Behaviour, 65, 131-142. Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., &amp; Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science, </p><p>298(5598), 1634-1636. Hare, B., Call, J., &amp; Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour, 61, 139-151. Hare, B., Plyusnina, I., Ignacio, N., Schepina, O., Stepika, A., Wrangham, R., &amp; Trut, L. (2005). Social cognitive...</p></li></ul>

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